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1 PUBLIC FORUM DEBATE RESEARCH SERIES VOL. 7 MARCH 2016 NO. 6 RESOLVED: THE UNITED STATES SHOULD WITHDRAW ITS MILITARY PRESENCE FROM OKINAWA. The March 2016 Public Forum topic is timely because of the ongoing political controversy in Japan concerning the relocation of the U.S. Marine base at Futenma on the island of Okinawa. This controversy goes all the way back to World War II as described by John Pike, the director of GlobalSecurity.org: The US military presence in Japan and on Okinawa began at the end of World War II. Although the US occupation in Japan ended in 1952, US administration continued on Okinawa until 1972. In 1951, when the San Francisco Peace Treaty was officially recognized, Okinawa legally became a possession of the United States. In 1972, control of Okinawa was reverted to Japan The US-Japan security relationship is defined by a number of documents, including the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, which commits both countries to meet common dangers, and a Status of Forces Agreement that governs the legal status of US forces and their dependents stationed in Japan. The US forces on Okinawa occupy about 10 percent of the land in the prefecture. (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/okinawa.htm). Older residents on Okinawa carry the memories of the tragic loss of life during the Battle of Okinawa. Jenny Lin, an analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, describes the outcome of this battle: “More people died during the Battle of Okinawa than all those killed during the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Casualties totaled more than 38,000 Americans wounded and 12,000 killed or missing, more than 107,000 Japanese and Okinawan conscripts killed, and perhaps 100,000 Okinawan civilians who perished in the battle” ( Issues & Insights, Feb. 2015, http://csis.org/files/publication/issues_insightsvol15no3.pdf). The government of Japan is led by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, elected most recently in December, 2012. But much like the U.S. federal system of government and its fifty states, the Japanese government involves 47 prefectures. One of those prefectures is Okinawa. While Prime Minister Abe strongly supports U.S. military presence on Okinawa, the governor of Okinawa, Takeshi Onaga, has been a vocal opponent of such presence. As mentioned earlier, the primary controversy deals with the U.S. Marine base at Futenma. This base is located right in the center of Ginowan city, creating problems with noisy jets taking off and landing every few minutes. The New York Times, in a May 22, 2014 article, discusses the reasons for the Futenma base becoming the focus of the basing controversy: “Okinawans have protested our presence for decades. They've decried the crime, environmental degradation, economic stagnation and loss of prime real estate, as well as the fact that we've made their homeland an inevitable military target. Symbolic of their resistance is the struggle over the relocation of the Futenma Marine base. The proposal to shift the most unpopular of our bases began in 1995, with island-wide protests of the abduction and rape of a 12-year-old schoolgirl by three American servicemen” (Nexis). In an effort to address the concerns of the Okinawan people, the U.S. and Japan negotiated a “Realignment Roadmap” agreement. This 2006 agreement called for the closing of the U.S. Marine base at Futenma, relocating some of the troops to Henoko in the sparsely-populated northern end of Okinawa and sending about 8,000 of the Marines to a U.S. base on Guam. But this base relocation plan has never been completed, mainly because of intense protests in Okinawa over the construction of the new landing strip in Henoko. The protestors in Okinawa want the Futenma base to be moved completely off of the island – either to the mainland islands of Japan, to Guam, or back to the United States itself. While much of the current debate is about the U.S. Marine base in Futenma, there are actually 37 U.S. military bases in Okinawa, including the massive U.S. Air Force base at Kadena. The total number of U.S. troops on Okinawa is 45,354, only a few thousand of which are located at Futenma (Kozue Akibayashi, The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle Against U.S. Military Posts, 2009, p. 245). Given that the Okinawa Prefecture constitutes only 1% of Japan’s land mass, why is it that 75% of the U.S. military bases are located on the island? The answer, according to defenders of the bases, is that Okinawa is strategically situation in the East China Sea – almost 1,000 miles from the main islands of Japan and equidistant between Taiwan, China, and North Korea. The key flash points between China and Japan have been over the islands just to the west of Okinawa in the East China Sea. The future of the U.S. bases on Okinawa features a classic clash between the central government of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Okinawa governor Takeshi Onaga. Abe believes the bases are vital to Japan’s security, and Onaga responds that Okinawa has been made to bear an unreasonable burden by hosting the bases.

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PUBLIC FORUM DEBATE RESEARCH SERIES

VOL. 7 MARCH 2016 NO. 6

RESOLVED: THE UNITED STATES SHOULD WITHDRAW ITS MILITARY PRESENCE FROM OKINAWA.

The March 2016 Public Forum topic is timely because of the ongoing political controversy in Japan concerning therelocation of the U.S. Marine base at Futenma on the island of Okinawa. This controversy goes all the way back to WorldWar II as described by John Pike, the director of GlobalSecurity.org:

The US military presence in Japan and on Okinawa began at the end of World War II. Althoughthe US occupation in Japan ended in 1952, US administration continued on Okinawa until 1972. In1951, when the San Francisco Peace Treaty was officially recognized, Okinawa legally became apossession of the United States. In 1972, control of Okinawa was reverted to Japan The US-Japansecurity relationship is defined by a number of documents, including the Treaty of MutualCooperation and Security, which commits both countries to meet common dangers, and a Statusof Forces Agreement that governs the legal status of US forces and their dependents stationed inJapan. The US forces on Okinawa occupy about 10 percent of the land in the prefecture.(http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/okinawa.htm).

Older residents on Okinawa carry the memories of the tragic loss of life during the Battle of Okinawa. Jenny Lin, ananalyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, describes the outcome of this battle: “More people diedduring the Battle of Okinawa than all those killed during the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Casualtiestotaled more than 38,000 Americans wounded and 12,000 killed or missing, more than 107,000 Japanese and Okinawanconscripts killed, and perhaps 100,000 Okinawan civilians who perished in the battle” (Issues & Insights, Feb. 2015,http://csis.org/files/publication/issues_insightsvol15no3.pdf).

The government of Japan is led by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, elected most recently in December, 2012. But muchlike the U.S. federal system of government and its fifty states, the Japanese government involves 47 prefectures. Oneof those prefectures is Okinawa. While Prime Minister Abe strongly supports U.S. military presence on Okinawa, thegovernor of Okinawa, Takeshi Onaga, has been a vocal opponent of such presence. As mentioned earlier, the primarycontroversy deals with the U.S. Marine base at Futenma. This base is located right in the center of Ginowan city, creatingproblems with noisy jets taking off and landing every few minutes. The New York Times, in a May 22, 2014 article,discusses the reasons for the Futenma base becoming the focus of the basing controversy: “Okinawans have protestedour presence for decades. They've decried the crime, environmental degradation, economic stagnation and loss of primereal estate, as well as the fact that we've made their homeland an inevitable military target. Symbolic of their resistanceis the struggle over the relocation of the Futenma Marine base. The proposal to shift the most unpopular of our basesbegan in 1995, with island-wide protests of the abduction and rape of a 12-year-old schoolgirl by three Americanservicemen” (Nexis).

In an effort to address the concerns of the Okinawan people, the U.S. and Japan negotiated a “RealignmentRoadmap” agreement. This 2006 agreement called for the closing of the U.S. Marine base at Futenma, relocating someof the troops to Henoko in the sparsely-populated northern end of Okinawa and sending about 8,000 of the Marines toa U.S. base on Guam. But this base relocation plan has never been completed, mainly because of intense protests inOkinawa over the construction of the new landing strip in Henoko. The protestors in Okinawa want the Futenma base tobe moved completely off of the island – either to the mainland islands of Japan, to Guam, or back to the United Statesitself.

While much of the current debate is about the U.S. Marine base in Futenma, there are actually 37 U.S. military basesin Okinawa, including the massive U.S. Air Force base at Kadena. The total number of U.S. troops on Okinawa is 45,354,only a few thousand of which are located at Futenma (Kozue Akibayashi, The Bases of Empire: The Global StruggleAgainst U.S. Military Posts, 2009, p. 245). Given that the Okinawa Prefecture constitutes only 1% of Japan’s land mass,why is it that 75% of the U.S. military bases are located on the island? The answer, according to defenders of the bases,is that Okinawa is strategically situation in the East China Sea – almost 1,000 miles from the main islands of Japan andequidistant between Taiwan, China, and North Korea. The key flash points between China and Japan have been overthe islands just to the west of Okinawa in the East China Sea.

The future of the U.S. bases on Okinawa features a classic clash between the central government of JapanesePrime Minister Shinzo Abe and Okinawa governor Takeshi Onaga. Abe believes the bases are vital to Japan’s security,and Onaga responds that Okinawa has been made to bear an unreasonable burden by hosting the bases.

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The above map is taken from a Congressional Research Service document The U.S. Military Presence in Okinawaand the Futenma Base Controversy available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42645.pdf. As this map illustrates, theisland of Okinawa lies halfway between the main islands of Japan and Taiwan. Okinawa is right next door to the islandsof Senkaku/Diaoyu, the site of the ongoing clash between China and Japan.

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ANALYSIS OF THE TOPIC

Debaters will need to carefully consider the wording of the resolution: “Resolved: The United States should withdrawits military presence from Okinawa.” This resolution suggests a few analytical questions:

Does this resolution pose a question of fact, value or policy? Students of debate should know that there are threedifferent kinds of debate resolutions: fact, value, and policy. Ancient Greek and Roman rhetoricians used stasis theoryto analyze any given persuasive situation. The four levels of stasis (in Latin) were “An Sit” (dispute over questions offact); “Quid Sit” (dispute over definition); “Qualis Sit” (dispute over the value of something); and “Translative” (disputeover whether a certain procedure should be adopted). Questions of fact ask whether a claim is true or false, likely orunlikely. One might, for example, debate whether Lee Harvey Oswald, acting alone, killed John F. Kennedy. Questionsof value ask whether something is good or bad, worthy or unworthy. One might, for example, debate whether economicglobalization is “just.” Questions of policy ask whether a certain policy or procedure should be adopted. One might, forexample, ask whether the United States federal government should establish a tax designed to substantially reduceincome inequality in America. The February 2016 resolution clearly falls into the fourth category – it raises a question ofpolicy.

Resolutions of policy are especially challenging for public forum debaters because of the following NSDA (NationalSpeech and Debate Association) rule: “In Public Forum Debate, the Association defines a plan or counterplan as aformalized, comprehensive proposal for implementation. Neither the pro or con side is permitted to offer a plan orcounterplan; rather, they should offer reasoning to support a position of advocacy. Debaters may offer generalized,practical solutions” (NSDA District Manual, 2014-2015, p. 42). This rule means that debaters are not allowed to presentand defend fully detailed plans. When debating the Okinawa resolution, this will leave many questions unanswered: (1)Would the U.S. troops withdrawn from Okinawa be moved to mainland Japan? Would they be moved to Guam? Wouldthe U.S. beef up its naval forces to balance the drawdown in ground-based troops?

What is meant by the verb “withdraw” in the resolution? Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary defines “withdraw” as “to takeback or away” (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/withdraw). The resolution, therefore, calls upon the PROteam to propose to “take away” the U.S. military presence from Okinawa. The resolution does not specify what shouldbe done with the troops once they are withdrawn.

Must the PRO team propose the withdrawal of all U.S. troops? Would it be sufficient, for example, for a PRO teamto propose the closing of the U.S. Marine base at Futenma while leaving the tens of thousands of U.S. troops at the U.S.Air Force Base at Kadena? The Futenma base, along with its proposed relocation to Henoko, has been the main objectof opposition from the people of Okinawa. The PRO team could observe, for example, that the resolution does not containthe word “all.” But the CON team can point out that the framers of the resolution chose the verb, “withdraw,” rather thansimply “reduce.” The CON team can also point out that “withdraw” is a transitive verb – it has a direct object: “its militarypresence.” The resolution could have said “withdraw one or more of its bases” in Okinawa. But instead, the PRO teammust propose withdrawal of “its military presence.”

So what is meant by U.S. “military presence?” James Thomason, an analyst at the Institute for Defense Analysis,explains this term in the following way: “For purposes of this study military presence is defined relatively inclusively. It istaken to mean the overseas assets and activities of military units not engaged in combat. This definition is consistentwith that provided in the draft National Military Strategy of the United States” (Evolving Service Roles in PresenceMissions, Aug. 1995, p. II-2). Ladan Nekoomaram, an analyst at the Mercatus Center of George Mason University, offersanother definition: “Military presence is defined by any nation where the U.S. has a military base, where the U.S. isproviding military aid, active duty military personnel, or where U.S. soldiers are engaged in combat theaters” (U.S. MilitaryPresence in Foreign Countries, Dec. 6, 2009, https://ladannekoomaram.wordpress.com/2009/12/16/569/). While the debatemay be lively, the resolution seems to indicate that the PRO team must propose the removal of all U.S. personnel fromOkinawa.

PRO STRATEGIES

Several strategies are available to PRO debaters on this topic. The first PRO case focuses on the right of selfdetermination and the fact that the people of Okinawa have made clear their opposition to continued U.S. militarypresence. Takeshi Onaga, the governor of Okinawa has said that the U.S. “deprived us of our own land with force. . . . Ihave to say that they are terrible land thieves” (Washington Post, May 22, 2015, p. A11). Tomohiro Yara, a professor atOkinawa International University, has the following to say about U.S. military presence: "I want to ask Americans if it isright to ignore the principle of democracy here on Okinawa” (Irish Times, June 24, 2015, p. 9). Sarah Bird, writing in theMay 22, 2014 New York Times, describes the disproportionate burden of military basing that has been thrust on Okinawa:“Though the prefecture of Okinawa (which includes Okinawa Island as well as a number of smaller islands) constitutesless than 1 percent of Japan's total landmass, it was forced to host nearly three-quarters of our military bases in Japan.Almost one-fifth of Okinawa Island's 463 square miles, most of it prime farmland that would later become high-dollarbeachfront property, was seized by the United States military to use for its bases, camps, training areas and storagefacilities” (Nexis).

The second PRO case focuses on the cost to the United States of maintaining its overseas military bases in placeslike Okinawa. It is incredibly ironic that the U.S. federal government borrows money from China to maintain a massive

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military presence designed to contain China. This case argues that the danger posed by the U.S. budget deficit is greaterthan any military threat posed by China.

The final PRO case argues that the U.S. should be pursuing engagement with China as opposed to containment.Lyle Goldstein, professor of China studies at the U.S. Naval War College, believes that the United States should respondto the rise of China by extending an offer of friendship. China has now surpassed the United States as the world’s largesteconomy, it holds trillions of dollars worth of the U.S. deficit, and it has demonstrated a willingness to be a responsibleinternational actor in managing threats to world stability. Professor Goldstein believes that the U.S. can either befriendChina, thus creating a “cooperation cycle,” or continue its effort to contain China, resulting in an “escalation cycle.” Oneof the ways to create such a “cooperation cycle” would be to pull back from the U.S. bases in Okinawa:

Yet another strategic rationale for scaling back the US presence on Okinawa is the decliningutility of its fixed facilities and airfields, which are now wholly vulnerable to adversary precisionmissiles and air strikes—an inviting target for preemption—and thus quite destabilizing overall. Andyet the proximity of Okinawa to Taiwan would enable the United States to claim that furtherreductions in the force size at Okinawa were related to declining tensions across the Taiwan Strait.This move, coupled with a linkage to the Taiwan issue, would not only ease tensions in Japanesepolitics but would also certainly get Beijing's attention with a powerful suggestion that the UnitedStates was willing to make hard choices in order to facilitate progress toward a genuine Japan-China rapprochement. (Meeting China Half Way, 2015, p. 245).

CON STRATEGIES

There are also several excellent strategies available to CON debaters on this topic. The first CON case argues thatthe U.S. bases on Okinawa are necessary to security U.S.-Japan Security Alliance. The Alliance has preserved peaceand stability in East Asia.

The second CON case argues that a U.S. withdrawal from Okinawa would be viewed with alarm by the governmentof Japan, pushing them over the nuclear brink. This case demonstrates that strong forces in Japan have been calling forthe acquisition of nuclear weapons. There is no question that Japan has the capability to develop nuclear weapons.Evidence in this case demonstrates that Japanese acquisition of nuclear weapons would create a dangerous cycle ofrapid nuclear proliferation, risking nuclear war.

The final CON case argues that the U.S. bases in Okinawa are essential for balancing the rise of China. The leadersof China have become more aggressive in dealing with conflicts in the East and South China Sea, causing great concernfor neighbors such as Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Australia, and the Philippines. Removal of U.S. military presencein Okinawa would undermine peace and stability in East Asia.

A FEW WORDS ABOUT THE PROPER USE OF BAYLOR BRIEFS IN PUBLIC FORUM DEBATE

The PRO and CON cases in public forum debate must be presented in only a few minutes. Since the emphasis inpublic forum debate is on persuasive delivery for the lay person, you would never want to try to speak more rapidly inorder to pack more arguments or quotations into the few minutes available in your speeches. Most successful publicforum teams won’t use more than six or seven short quotations in the whole debate. Most of the briefs offered in ourPublic Forum Debate Research Series are much longer – and present much more evidence – than could ever bepresented in a single public forum debate. You should consider each brief as a resource and cafeteria of possibilities.Rarely in public forum debate would you ever read more than one or two short pieces of evidence under each heading.In addition, debaters typically underline just the portion of a piece of evidence that they will read in their speech –hopefully the part of the evidence that makes the point most clearly. This is an acceptable practice under NSDA rules ofevidence so long as the debater has the whole piece of evidence available for viewing (upon request) by the other teamand/or the judge(s).

Why does Baylor Briefs, then, sometimes provide several long pieces of evidence? We want to give you choices,to show you the whole context of the evidence, and also to make backup evidence available to you. You should makethe arguments your own by choosing only the arguments and evidence that makes the most sense to you.

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PEOPLE AND TERMS RELEVANT TO THE MARCH PUBLIC FORUM TOPIC

Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution: Following its surrender in World War II, the government of Japanadopted a constitution that included a provision prohibiting the maintenance of any military forces foroffensive purposes. This provision included the following two paragraphs in Article 9: “(1) Aspiringsincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce waras a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.(2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as otherwar potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”

Camp Schwab: This is a U.S. marine base near the northern end of Okinawa. The U.S.-Japan 2006 Re-Alignment Roadmap called for the Marine base at Futenma to be closed and added to the base at CampSchwab. This relocation – also called the Henoko Project – calls for the creation of an airstrip by placingconcrete piers in the ocean. The plan is controversial because of claims that it will destroy coral reefs inthe area.

Futenma: This is one of dozens of U.S. military bases on Okinawa. This U.S. Marine base is located right inthe middle of Ginowan – an Okinawan city with a population of about 100,000. One of the key eventscreating opposition to the base was the rape of a 12-year-old Okinawan schoolgirl by three Americanservicemen. Residents also complain about the deafening sounds of military aircraft leaving or arriving atthe base every few minutes. In 2006, the U.S. and Japan jointly signed off on a Re-Alignment Roadmap,calling for the closing of the base at Futenma. The agreement called for moving many of the U.S. marinesto Guam and others to a base at the sparsely-populated northern end of Okinawa. The closing of the basehas been delayed by the fact that tens of thousands of Okinawan citizens have blocked the plan toconstruct the new base at Henoko. The Okinawan protestors want the U.S. base moved completely outof Okinawa.

Kadena: This is a large U.S. Air Force base located in Okinawa. The U.S. Air Force Web site provides thefollowing description of the base: “Kadena Air Base is the hub of airpower in the Pacific, and home to theAir Force's largest combat wing -- the 18th Wing -- and a variety of associate units. Together they form‘Team Kadena’ -- a world-class combat team ready to fight and win from the Keystone of the Pacific.Nearly 18,000 Americans and more than 4,000 Japanese employees and contractors make up TeamKadena. The base's estimated economic impact upon Okinawa's economy is more than $700 millionannually.”

Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands: These are a group of 8 small islands in the East China Sea; the Japanese havegiven the islands the name, Senkaku, while the Chinese call them the Diaoyu Islands. Both Japan andChina claim ownership of the uninhabited islands. The ownership claim is made significant by the fact thatmajor petroleum resources are thought to be present beneath the seafloor near the islands. These islandsare located approximately 200 miles west of Okinawa. Some analysts fear that China and Japan may bedrawn into a military conflict over the ownership of these islands.

Shinzo Abe: Abe is the Prime Minister of Japan; he had served briefly as Prime Minister in 2006 and 2007,but he was most recently elected in 2012. Abe has been a consistent supporter of maintaining the U.S.military bases in Okinawa, despite opposition from Governor Takeshi Onaga.

Takeshi Onaga: Onaga is the current governor of Okinawa; he was elected in 2014 primarily because of hisopposition to the continued presence of U.S. military forces. The May 22, 2015 issue of the WashingtonPost presents some of the arguments offered by Governor Onaga: “The island chain was occupied by theUnited States for almost three decades after the end of World War II, and the bases remained even afterit was handed back to Japan in 1972. ‘We think that they deprived us of our own land with force,’ Onagasaid. ‘Now they say Futenma air station is not functioning and needs to be replaced and that the newfacility should be built in Okinawa. Frankly speaking, I have to say that they are terrible thieves.’”

KEY WEB SITES RELEVANT TO THE MARCH PUBLIC FORUM TOPIC

Chanlett, Emma & Rinehart, Ian. (2016, Jan. 20). The U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma

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Base Controversy. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42645.pdf. This 21-page document provides a usefulhistory of the controversy over U.S. forces in Okinawa: “Although the U.S.-Japan alliance is often labeledas “the cornerstone” of security in the Asia Pacific region, local concerns about the U.S. military presenceon the Japanese island of Okinawa have challenged the management of the alliance for decades. TheJapanese archipelago serves as the most significant forward-operating platform for the U.S. military in theregion; approximately 53,000 military personnel (39,000 onshore and 14,000 afloat in nearby waters),43,000 dependents, and 5,000 Department of Defense civilian employees live in Japan. With the UnitedStates rebalancing its defense posture towards Asia, the uncertainty surrounding the medium and long-term presence of American forces on Okinawa remains a critical concern for national security decision-makers.”

Lin, Jenny. (2015, Feb.). The US-Japan Alliance in Transformation: The Management of the US Marine CorpsFutenma Airfield Relocation Facility (FRF) http://csis.org/files/publication/issues_ insightsvol15no3.pdf.This 78-page report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies provides an outstandingoverview of the issues and controversies involved with the U.S. military bases in Okinawa. “Over theyears, the accumulation of soft and hard crimes involving US service members on Okinawa arefueling negative feelings toward Futenma and the US military among local residents. The localperception of US service members on Okinawa is that they are trouble makers. During interviews in2012, the unpopularity of the US Marines and Futenma is evident in random, casual conversationswith residents, namely, taxi-drivers and restaurant servers. According to them, while they appreciatethe US force’s contributions, the costs are incidents and crimes. According to Okinawa PrefectureGovernment (OPG) statistics, between 1972 and 2011, there were roughly 1,609 documented incidents,5,747 and 2,764 reported criminal and traffic cases committed by members of US military.”

Tanaka, Hitoshi. (2015, July). The Next Step for the U.S.-Japan Alliance. http://jcie.org/researchpdfs/EAI/10-2.pdf. The author, a senior fellow at the Japan Center for International Exchange, suggests that it is timefor the U.S. and Japan to consider lessening the burden on the Okinawan people of hosting U.S. militarybases: “First, it is important to reexamine whether maintaining US forces in such a high concentration inone area of the region, as they currently are in Okinawa, is the best strategy over the long term to fulfillUS- Japan alliance goals. Local opposition in Okinawa to the concentration of US bases there has becomemore strident in recent months as the debate over the relocation of US Marine Corps Air Station Futenmahas heated up.”

Yoshikawa, Yukie. (2015, May 20). Conveying “The Voice of Okinawa” to Washington, D.C.http://mansfieldfdn.org/mfdn2011/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/The-Voice-of-Okinawa.pdf. This issue ofNikkei Business Online details the many reasons that residents of Okinawa want the marine base atFutenma to be closed and moved off the island. But the author also acknowledges that other bases,especially the U.S. Air Force base at Kadena, are centrally important to U.S. and Japanese defensestrategy: “The most important U.S. military facility is Kadena Air Base, which is said to be the biggest airbase in East Asia. At twenty square kilometers it covers nearly twice the area of Narita Airport. It housesthe Air Force’s largest military wing, and serves as a center for special operations, reconnaissance andpatrolling. Also, during the Vietnam War it served as an attack base, with B-52 strategic bombers takingoff every day headed for their targets. This air base is essential to the U.S. for regional patrolling inpeacetime, and as a central attack and logistics base in times of crisis.”

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PRO CASE #1: SELF DETERMINATIONThe thesis of this case is that the people of Okinawa should determine whether U.S. bases have a right to remain on

their island. The people of Okinawa have repeatedly, and overwhelmingly, expressed their desire to have the U.S. militarypresence removed. If the government on the mainland in Japan continues to desire U.S. military presence, then thatgovernment should accommodate U.S. bases on the mainland.

OBSERVATION:

I. SELF-DETERMINATION IS A CORE PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

A. THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION IS ENSHRINED IN NUMEROUS INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS.

United Nations and Peoples Organization, SELF DETERMINATION, July 19, 2006. Retrieved Feb. 4, 2016from http://www.unpo.org/article/4957.

The principle of self-determination is prominently embodied in Article I of the Charter of the United Nations.Earlier it was explicitly embraced by US President Woodrow Wilson, by Lenin and others, and became theguiding principle for the reconstruction of Europe following World War I. The principle was incorporated intothe 1941 Atlantic Charter and the Dumbarton Oaks proposals which evolved into the United Nations Charter.Its inclusion in the UN Charter marks the universal recognition of the principle as fundamental to themaintenance of friendly relations and peace among states. It is recognized as a right of all peoples in the firstarticle common to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant onEconomic, Social and Cultural Rights which both entered into force in 1976. Paragraph 1 of this Articleprovides: All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine theirpolitical status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

B. PEOPLE HAVE AN INHERENT RIGHT TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN CULTURAL DESTINY.

Legal Information Institute of Cornell University Law School, SELF DETERMINATION, 2016. Retrieved Feb.4, 2016 from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/self_determination_international_law.

Self-determination denotes the legal right of people to decide their own destiny in the international order.Self-determination is a core principle of international law, arising from customary international law, but alsorecognized as a general principle of law, and enshrined in a number of international treaties. For instance, self-determination is protected in the United Nations Charter and the International Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights as a right of “all peoples.”

CONTENTIONS:

I. THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF U.S. MILITARY BASES IN OKINAWA VIOLATES THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF

DETERMINATION.

A. THE PEOPLE OF OKINAWA HAVE CONSISTENTLY EXPRESSED THEIR OPPOSITION TO U.S. BASES.

Catharine Lutz, (Prof., International Studies, Brown U.), ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL, Mar. 16, 2009. RetrievedJan. 17, 2010 from http://www.japanfocus.org/-Catherine-Lutz/3086.

In Okinawa, most polls show that 70 to 80 percent of the island’s people want the bases, or at least theMarines, to leave: they want base land back and they want an end to aviation crash risks, an end to prostitution,and drug trafficking, and sexual assault and other crimes by US soldiers. One family built a large peacemuseum right up against the edge of the fence to Futenma Air Base, with a stairway to the roof which allowsbusloads of schoolchildren and other visitors to view the sprawling base after looking at art depicting the horrorsof war.

Hirayama Motoh, (Board Member, Grassroots Movement to Remove U.S. Bases from Okinawa and theWorld), ANOTHER JAPAN IS POSSIBLE: NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND GLOBAL CITIZENEDUCATION, 2008, 149.

Concretely speaking, we want the immediate closure of the Futenma base, as well as the reduction andelimination of other military bases in Okinawa. We are also against a new offshore military base in the HenokoBay in Nago City. We want the reduction and removal of U.S. marines, and the elimination of noise and otherpollution as well as crime committed by the U.S. military. We are against the use of U.S. military bases inOkinawa for war purposes, and in particular, we are against the participation of Japanese Self-Defense Forcesas part of the U.S.-controlled military operations in Iraq. Instead of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, we want tobuild a nuclear-free and U.S. military base--free Northeast Asia.

Jennifer Chan, (Professor, Education, U. British Columbia), ANOTHER JAPAN IS POSSIBLE: NEW SOCIALMOVEMENTS AND GLOBAL CITIZEN EDUCATION, 2008, 144.

Today, nearly forty military bases are spread throughout the Okinawan archipelago. There have beenantibase protests against land seizure, impunity of the U.S. military, violence against women, andenvironmental destruction throughout the postwar period, but the 1995 rape mobilized eighty-five thousandpeople.

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David McNeill, (Staff), IRISH TIMES, Nov. 20, 2014, 13.Local anger is focused on the Futenma air base, squatting like a giant doughnut hole in the centre of

crowded Ginowan city. The facility has generated decades of complaints about noise and crime. After a historyof accidents, many locals say it is a matter of time before a military aircraft ploughs into local houses or schools.

Jonathan Soble, (Staff), NEW YORK TIMES, Mar. 24, 2015, A8.Mr. Onaga won a landslide election victory in November on a promise of blocking the expansion of Camp

Schwab to accommodate the airfield. He and his supporters want the Marines moved off the island altogether.About half of the nearly 50,000 American military personnel stationed in Japan are on Okinawa, which Mr.Onaga and his supporters say imposes a burden on the island.

Sarah Bird, (Staff), NEW YORK TIMES, May 22, 2014. Retrieved Feb. 1, 2016 from Nexis.Okinawans have protested our presence for decades. They've decried the crime, environmental

degradation, economic stagnation and loss of prime real estate, as well as the fact that we've made theirhomeland an inevitable military target. Symbolic of their resistance is the struggle over the relocation of theFutenma Marine base. The proposal to shift the most unpopular of our bases began in 1995, with island-wideprotests of the abduction and rape of a 12-year-old schoolgirl by three American servicemen.

B. THE PEOPLE OF OKINAWA VIEW CONTINUED U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE AS COLONIAL RULE.

Alexander Cooley, (Prof., Political Science, Barnard College), BASE POLITICS: DEMOCRATIC CHANGEAND THE U.S. MILITARY OVERSEAS, 2008, 137-138.

In the Okinawan case, the U.S. military actually administered the island from 1952 to 1972. Most islandersregarded U.S. military rule as colonial, and even after reversion and Okinawa's democratization, Okinawanreformists have regarded the heavy U.S. basing presence as illegitimate and a nondemocratically sanctionedlegacy of earlier military administrations.

Anna Fifield, (Staff), WASHINGTON POST, May 22, 2015, A11.[Okinawan Governor] Onaga said that Okinawa, long considered a backwater in Japan, has been treated

badly for too long. The island chain was occupied by the United States for almost three decades after the endof World War II, and the bases remained even after it was handed back to Japan in 1972. "We think that theydeprived us of our own land with force," Onaga said. "Now they say Futenma air station is not functioning andneeds to be replaced and that the new facility should be built in Okinawa. Frankly speaking, I have to say thatthey are terrible thieves."

Kozue Akibayashi, (Analyst, Institute for Gender Studies, Ochanomizu U.), THE BASES OF EMPIRE: THEGLOBAL STRUGGLE AGAINST U.S. MILITARY POSTS, 2009, 251.

According to the 1956 Price Report of the Special Subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives'Armed Services Committee, the U.S. military had expropriated 45,000 acres (about 182 square kilometers) ofland for its military installations in 1945 without paying the landowners, on the grounds that this was an act ofwar. As it expanded its bases in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the United States intensified its expropriationof Okinawan land, reflecting U.S. foreign policy opposing the establishment of the People's Republic of Chinain 1949. Okinawans saw this forced expropriation of their land as confiscation "by bulldozers and bayonets."

C. THE PRESENCE OF U.S. MILITARY BASES IS DESTROYING THE ENVIRONMENT IN OKINAWA.

William Walter Hunt, III, (J.D., U. Virginia School of Law & Former Ethics Counsel, Tennessee Supreme Court),CHRISTIAN, BUDDHIST, AND CONFUCIAN PROTESTS AGAINST MILITARY BASES IN OKINAWA: ASTUDY OF SEVEN RELIGIOUS LEADERS, 2009, 173.

Not only have Americans destroyed the land, they also have polluted it with toxic waste, bombs, loud noise,etc. The threats to the Okinawan dugong (an endangered relative of the Florida manatee) and to coral reefsare at the heart of the protests against the proposed heliport in Nago. Okinawans consider the presence of thebases a violation of its sacred space.

Cheryl Ong, (Staff), THE STRAITS TIMES, Dec. 16, 2014. Retrieved Feb. 1, 2016 from Nexis.Since the US invasion in 1945, [Okinawa] has been hosting nearly 75 per cent of American military bases

in Japan. The Pentagon controls a fifth of Okinawan land, including several of its most pristine beaches -disrupting development in Japan's poorest prefecture. Locals resent the military presence.

D. THE PRESENCE OF U.S. MILITARY BASES UNDERMINES THE CULTURE OF OKINAWA.

William Walter Hunt, III, (J.D., U. Virginia School of Law & Former Ethics Counsel, Tennessee Supreme Court),CHRISTIAN, BUDDHIST, AND CONFUCIAN PROTESTS AGAINST MILITARY BASES IN OKINAWA: ASTUDY OF SEVEN RELIGIOUS LEADERS, 2009, 173.

Arasaki, Ota and Chibana regularly try to participate in rites around ancestral lands and tombs, many ofwhich are located in the confines of the American military bases. Itokazu makes regular pilgrimages to theisland's holy natural sites. Chibana filed a lawsuit to protest the American military's refusal to allow him entranceonto his ancestral land.

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William Walter Hunt, III, (J.D., U. Virginia School of Law & Former Ethics Counsel, Tennessee Supreme Court),CHRISTIAN, BUDDHIST, AND CONFUCIAN PROTESTS AGAINST MILITARY BASES IN OKINAWA: ASTUDY OF SEVEN RELIGIOUS LEADERS, 2009, 95.

A female reporter in an Okinawan newspaper wrote, "So, due to the existence of military bases, Okinawanchildren are not only exposed to direct threats to their lives, but also to the denial of their dignity. . . Womenand children in Okinawa are suffering from the excessive burden of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty." (ellipsisis in the original)

E. THE PRESENCE OF U.S. BASES IMPOSES AN UNFAIR BURDEN ON OKINAWA.

George Packard, (Pres., U.S.-Japan Foundation), FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar/Apr 2010, 92-103.There are still some 85 facilities housing 44,850 U.S. military personnel and 44,289 dependents. Close to

75 percent of the troops are based in Okinawa, an island a little less than one-third the size of Long Island.Their presence is a continuing aggravation to local residents. In 2008, Okinawa Prefecture alone reported 28airplane accidents, six cases of water pollution from oil waste, 18 uncontrolled land fires, and 70 felonies. Andthis is to say nothing of the emergence of red-light districts near the bases.

Katherine Moon, (Prof., Political Science, Wellesley College). THE UNITED STATES AND NORTHEASTASIA: DEBATES, ISSUES, AND THE NEW ORDER, 2008, 175.

This argument echoes that was raised in Okinawa. Accounting for only 0.6 percent of Japanese territory,the prefecture houses 75 percent of the U.S. bases (in acreage) and about half of the troops stationed in Japan.The sense of disproportionate burden is intensified because the prefecture's per capita income is the lowest inJapan and the unemployment rate is twice the national average.

F. THE U.S. OUGHT NOT CONTINUE TO IMPOSE ITS WILL OVER THE OBJECTIONS OF THE PEOPLE OF

OKINAWA.

George Packard, (Pres., U.S.-Japan Foundation), FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar/Apr 2010, 92-103.The U.S. government should respect Japan's desire to reduce the U.S. military presence on its territory,

as it has respected the same desire on the part of Germany, South Korea, and the Philippines. It should bewilling to renegotiate the agreement that governs the presence of U.S. troops in Japan, which to some isredolent of nineteenth-century assertions of extraterritoriality. It should be aware that, at the end of the day,Japanese voters will determine the future course of the alliance. Above all, U.S. negotiators should start withthe premise that the security treaty with Japan, important as it is, is only part of a larger partnership betweentwo of the world's greatest democracies and economies. Washington stands to gain far more by working withTokyo on the environment, health issues, human rights, the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, andcounterterrorism.

David McNeill, (Staff), IRISH TIMES, June 24, 2015, 9."The two governments are trying to build this base against the wishes of the people," said Tomohiro Yara,

a professor at Okinawa International University. "I want to ask Americans if it is right to ignore the principle ofdemocracy here on Okinawa."

II. U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE ON OKINAWA IS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE STABILITY OF THE U.S.-JAPAN

ALLIANCE.

A. IF JAPAN TRULY WANTS THE U.S. TROOP PRESENCE, IT CAN HOST THEM ON THE MAIN ISLANDS.

Sarah Bird, (Staff), NEW YORK TIMES, May 22, 2014. Retrieved Feb. 1, 2016 from Nexis.We must undo the grave injustice committed in 1951, and relocate the bulk of our bases. Especially those

the Okinawans find most offensive such as Futenma. Not to a pristine Okinawan fishing hamlet, but to wherethey should have been from the start: on the main islands of Japan. This is an obligation that we must dischargebefore the point of greatest impact of our pivot to Asia is driven even further into a blameless land.

Anna Fifield, (Staff), WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 15, 2014, A6."Okinawa has suffered a lot. Why do we have to suffer more? What we are saying is that we want all of

Japan to share the burden," [Okinawa’s Governer, Onaga] said, adding that the prefecture comprises 0.6percent of the Japanese land mass but houses 74 percent of the U.S. military bases in the country.

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Anna Fifield, (Staff), WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 15, 2014, A6.

Just north of Futenma lies Kadena, a huge air base and the launching place for fighter jets that roar throughthe Okinawan skies day and night. A large swath of a northern part of the island is given over to jungle warfaretraining for Marines. If the U.S.-Japan security alliance is so important, Onaga contended, then all of Japanshould be sharing it.

B. OFFSHORE BALANCING OFFERS THE SUPERIOR SOLUTION FOR U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE

SOUTH AND EAST CHINA SEA.

Richard Samuels, (Prof., Political Science, MIT), SECURING JAPAN: TOKYO’S GRAND STRATEGY ANDTHE FUTURE OF EAST ASIA, 2008, 191.

Technological change has made offshore balancing more attractive. U.S. Navy doctrine now calls for a"sea strike" to project power, a "sea shield" to extend defense far from U.S. shores, and "sea basing" to projectU.S. sovereignty deep into international waters.

C. U.S. FORCES ON OKINAWA ARE NOT NECESSARY TO PREVENT A NORTH KOREAN INVASION INTO

SOUTH KOREA.

Doug Bandow, (Sr. Fellow, Cato Institute), DEALING WITH THE NEW JAPAN, Sept. 2, 2009. Retrieved Jan.11, 2010 from www.cato.org.

The Marine Expeditionary Force stationed on Okinawa is primarily intended to back up America'scommitment to South Korea. Yet the South has some 40 times the GDP of North Korea. Seoul should takeover responsibility for its own defense. Even more so the Europeans, who possess more than ten timesRussia's GDP. If they don't feel at risk, there's no reason for an American defense guarantee. If they do feel atrisk, there's no reason for them not to do more -- a lot more.

D. GIVEN LOCAL OPPOSITION, THE U.S. BASES DO MORE TO UNDERMINE THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

THAN TO STRENGTHEN IT.

JAPAN TIMES, Mar. 28, 2015. Retrieved Feb. 1, 2016 from Nexis.But the government should consider whether the chilly relations with Okinawa -- much less an all-out

confrontation -- and forcing the relocation over the opposition from the local administration and voters will infact contribute to the stability of the security alliance. It should also question whether a plan rejected by somany local people truly serves the interests of Okinawa -- which is supposed to be the very purpose of theFutenma relocation.

Christopher Hughes, (Prof., International Politics, U. of Warwick, UK), JAPAN’S REMILITARIZATION, 2009,32.

Japan's alliance travails were exacerbated by tensions connected with US bases in Okinawa, mainly overthe costs of supporting this presence, but also linked to crimes by US service personnel, military accidents andenvironmental pollution.

Louis Hayes, (Prof., Political Science, U. Montana), INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE POLITICS, 2009, 260.The United States, recognizing the sensitivity of the American presence on Okinawa, agreed to reduce

slightly the number of American personnel there, but the basic problem remained. American military personnelcommit crimes in Okinawa that generate considerable public hostility. Most Okinawans agree with Jaime Gher:"The harsh reality is that United States SOFAS and current United States military practice protects UnitedStates troops at the expense of the local people." Although Okinawans and many other Japanese have anegative view of the American presence, Americans are not altogether pleased either. The United States wantsto elevate Japan's "junior partner" role in the alliance in order to defuse concern in the United States overJapanese "freeloading on defense."

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PRO CASE #2: WE CAN’T AFFORD TO POLICE THE WORLDThe thesis of this case is that the U.S. can no longer afford to maintain foreign military bases – especially in places

where we are not wanted and our military force is not needed. Such is the case for the U.S. bases in Okinawa. The debtowed by the U.S. government – now over $18 trillion dollars – is a far greater threat to U.S. and world stability than imaginarythreats in East Asia. Japan has the third largest economy in the world and is fully capable of providing for its own defense.Furthermore, the economies of Japan and China are so heavily interdependent that war between them has becomeunthinkable.

OBSERVATION:

I. THE CURRENT SIZE OF THE FEDERAL BUDGET DEFICIT RISKS ECONOMIC DISASTER.

A. THE U.S. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS ACCUMULATED A MASSIVE AMOUNT OF DEBT.

Mike Patton, (Staff), FORBES, Apr. 24, 2015. Retrieved Jan. 8, 2016 from http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikepatton/2015/04/24/national-debt-tops-18-trillion-guess-how-much-you-owe/.

In 2004, the federal debt was $7.3 trillion. This rose to $10 trillion when the housing bubble burst four yearslater. Today it exceeds $18 trillion and is projected to approach $21 trillion by 2019. When you break this downto an amount per taxpayer, the numbers are substantial. The chart below contains this data which shows howit has more than doubled over the past 11 years, rising from $72,051 per taxpayer in 2004 to $154,161 today.As the debt continues higher, the liability of every taxpayer is also rising.

Jonathan Ramseur, (Specialist in Energy and Environmental Policy, Congressional Research Service),CARBON TAX: DEFICIT REDUCTION AND OTHERCONSIDERATIONS, Sept. 17, 2012, 1.

The federal budget deficit has exceeded $1 trillion annually in each fiscal year since 2009. In August2012, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated an FY2012 budget deficit of $1.1 trillion, or 7.3% ofgross domestic product (GDP). Under CBO’s alternative fiscal scenario, which assumes continuation of manycurrent policies, the deficit as a percentage of GDP will be above 5% and rising from 2021 onward. Budgetdeficits are projected to continue, as the current mix of federal fiscal policies is widely viewed as beingunsustainable in the long term. Over time, unsustainable deficits can have negative macroeconomicconsequences, including reduced savings for investment, higher interest rates, and higher levels of inflation.

B. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DEBT NOW EXCEEDS THE NATION’S TOTAL ECONOMIC OUTPUT.

Mike Patton, (Staff), FORBES, Apr. 24, 2015. Retrieved Jan. 8, 2016 from http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikepatton/2015/04/24/national-debt-tops-18-trillion-guess-how-much-you-owe/.

The debt-to GDP ratio compares the amount of the public debt to the size of the economy. For example,if GDP – which is the total of all goods and services produced in the U.S. – is $17.0 trillion and the debt is thesame amount, the ratio would be 100%. As the debt rises beyond GDP, the ratio will exceed 100%. Thisindicates that the debt is greater than the total of what we produce. You might equate it to an individual’s debt-to-income ratio which helps lenders assess an individual’s ability to repay a loan. America’s debt-to-GDP ratioin 1980 was only 35.4%. Ten years later it was 57.7%. As you can see from the chart below, America’s debt-to-GDP ratio has continued to rise and today stands at 102.6%.

C. UNLESS SOMETHING IS DONE TO REDUCE U.S. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DEBT, WORLDWIDE

ECONOMIC DISASTER WILL FOLLOW.

Daniel Shaviro, (Prof., Law NYU Law School), UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE LAW REVIEW, 2012, 577.The United States is currently on an unsustainable long-term fiscal path. This conceivably could lead to a

catastrophic budget crisis in which "no one is willing to lend to the U.S. government at any interest rate.Essentially, the Treasury holds a debt auction and no one shows up." The upshot in such a dire scenario wouldbe either actual or implicit default on U.S. government bonds, in the latter case via hyperinflation. Either wouldpotentially trigger sufficient global macroeconomic disruption to "make the 2008 financial crisis look like aSunday school picnic."

Stephen Drinan, (Staff), WASHINGTON TIMES, June 16, 2015. Retrieved Jan. 8, 2016 from http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jun/16/government-debt-threatens-to-send-us-economy-into-/?page=all.

Rising federal debt threatens to choke economic growth within a decade, beginning a death spiral that willsap revenue from government programs even as demands grow, forcing the government to borrow even more,Congress‘ budget watchdog said in a frightening report Tuesday.

D. MANAGING THE FEDERAL DEBT WILL BECOME AN INSURMOUNTABLE BURDEN IF ACTION IS

DELAYED.

Jason Russell, (Staff), WASHINGTON EXAMINER, June 3, 2015. Retrieved Jan. 8, 2016 from www.washingtonexaminer.com/study-true-size-of-federal-government-debt-is-210-trillion/article/2565559.

Waiting only makes the situation worse. Doing nothing until 2023 would require a permanent 63 percenttax hike to eliminate the debt, while waiting until 2043 would require a 77 percent hike.

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CONTENTIONS:

I. THE TASK OF TRYING TO POLICE THE WORLD WITH FAR-FLUNG MILITARY BASES IS LARGELY

RESPONSIBLE FOR MASSIVE FEDERAL DEFICITS.

A. MAINTAINING OVERSEAS BASES INVOLVES MASSIVE EXPENSE.

Anita Danes, (Staff), POLICY REPORT, July 3, 2009, 1.The U.S. military's global presence is vast and costly. More than one-third of U.S. troops are currently

based abroad or afloat in international waters, and hundreds of bases and access agreements exist throughoutthe world.

Anita Danes, (Staff), POLICY REPORT, July 3, 2009, 1.The final bill: The United States spends approximately $250 billion annually to maintain troops, equipment,

fleets, and bases overseas.

Doug Bandow, (Sr. Fellow, Cato Institute), BATTLING THE BIPARTISAN CONSENSUS FOR WAR, May 25,2011. Retrieved Feb. 4, 2016 from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-bandow/battling-the-bipartisan-c_b_498681.html.

Especially with the U.S. budget deficit expected to run nearly $1.6 trillion this year alone. Over the nextdecade Uncle Sam likely will rack up another $10 trillion in red ink. In effect, Washington is borrowing everypenny which it is spending to defend other nations.

David Calleo, (Prof., International Studies, Johns Hopkins U.), FOLLIES OF POWER: AMERICA’S UNIPOLARFANTASY, 2009, 79.

Not the least of our problems is that our military needs are outrunning our capacity to finance them. Quiteapart from the self-defeating geopolitical results of our excessive and misshapen military power, there are theeconomic consequences.

B. GIVEN THE MASSIVE COST, MILITARY EXPENDITURES MUST BE LOWERED WHEN THREATS RECEDE.

Kori Schake, (Research Fellow, Hoover Institution), MANAGING AMERICAN HEGEMONY, 2009, 20.We are now facing no catastrophic challenge that justifies an unbalanced budget or perpetuating this

enormous debt. Political leaders are averting their eyes from their responsibility to keep the country on a stablefooting economically because trade-offs will be politically unpopular and painful. And yet this window ofprosperity and dominance in the international order is the best time to accept near-term sacrifice and risk toensure long-term well-being. If we cannot do it now, we cannot do it, and we will have sown the seeds of ourown demise.

C. THE COST OF MAINTAINING SO MANY OVERSEAS BASES WILL LEAD TO FINANCIAL COLLAPSE.

Chalmers Johnson, (Prof., Emeritus, U. California, San Diego), LESSONS FROM IRAQ, 2008, 23-24.In order to prevent future Iraqs, Americans need to abandon at least 700 of their 737 overseas bases,

along with the imperial hubris that helps set the stage for such ill-conceived military misadventures. If they don'tdo so, the issue is likely to become moot as a result of internal fiscal collapse.

Robert Scheer, (Contributing Editor, The Nation), THE PORNOGRAPHY OF POWER: HOW DEFENSEHAWKS HIJACKED 9/11 AND WEAKENED AMERICA, 2008, 171.

The reality is that empires are not cost effective; the price of policing a hostile population while you makeoff with their treasures always exceeds the cost of the occupation, and in the end it is the economy of themother country that is bankrupted in the process.

Catherine Lutz, (Prof., International Studies, Brown U.), THE BASES OF EMPIRE: THE GLOBAL STRUGGLEAGAINST U.S. MILITARY POSTS, 2009, 9-10.

States that invest their people's wealth in overseas bases have paid direct as well as opportunity costs,the consequences of which in the long run have usually been collapse of the empire. In The Rise and Fall ofGreat Powers, Kennedy notes that previous empires which established and tenaciously held onto overseasbases inevitably saw their wealth and power decay and that history demonstrates that military "security" aloneis never enough.

II. THE U.S. MILITARY BASES IN OKINAWA ARE NOT ESSENTIAL TO U.S. OR JAPANESE DEFENSE.

A. JAPAN IS FULLY CAPABLE OF DEFENDING ITSELF.

Franz-Stefan Gady (Sr. Fellow, EastWest Institute), BBC NEWS, Oct. 15, 2015. Retrieved Feb. 5, 2015 fromhttp://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34485966.

Japan's navy, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF), is considered to be technologicallymore advanced, more experienced, and more highly trained than its likely adversary - China's the People'sLiberation Army Navy (PLAN). It also has its own highly trained special forces outfit - the Special Boarding Unit.

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Kyle Mizokami, (Staff), THE NATIONAL INTEREST, June 24, 2014. Retrieved Feb. 6, 2016 fromhttp://nationalinterest.org/feature/five-japanese-weapons-war-china-should-fear-10660.

Japan’s Soryu-class submarines are some of the most advanced non-nuclear attack submarines in theworld. Displacing 4,100 tons submerged, the subs can make 13 knots on the surface and up to 20 knotssubmerged. Four Stirling air independent propulsion systems allow the Soryu class to remain underwater farlonger than most diesel electric submarines.

Kyle Mizokami, (Staff), THE NATIONAL INTEREST, June 24, 2014. Retrieved Feb. 6, 2016 fromhttp://nationalinterest.org/feature/five-japanese-weapons-war-china-should-fear-10660.

Japan’s submarine fleet is particularly worrisome to China because of Beijing’s traditional weakness inanti-submarine warfare (ASW). China has not practiced ASW in wartime and has been institutionally deficientin both skills and assets. Japan, on the other hand, has operated submarines for many decades. Japanesesubmarine crews are reportedly well trained, on par with their American counterparts.

Kyle Mizokami, (Staff), THE NATIONAL INTEREST, June 24, 2014. Retrieved Feb. 6, 2016 fromhttp://nationalinterest.org/feature/five-japanese-weapons-war-china-should-fear-10660.

The F-15J is armed with the AAM-5 infrared homing missile, similar to the American Sidewinder missile,which it replaced. Complementing it will be the AAM-4B, a medium-ranged radar-guided missile and one of thefew missiles in the world with an active-array radar seeker. Active-array radar missiles, of which China hasnone, dramatically increase both the range and the lock-on capability of radar-guided missiles, giving the F-15J a distinct advantage over Chinese adversaries.

B. JAPAN MAINTAINS ITS OWN VERY CAPABLE DEFENSE FORCES ON OKINAWA.

Kyle Mizokami, (Staff), THE NATIONAL INTEREST, June 24, 2014. Retrieved Feb. 6, 2016 fromhttp://nationalinterest.org/feature/five-japanese-weapons-war-china-should-fear-10660.

The F-15J is the front line of Japan’s military response to foreign military forces. In 2013, the ASDFperformed 567 air intercepts of foreign aircraft approaching Japanese airspace, a new record. The singlesquadron of 20 F-15Js stationed on Okinawa covering the Senkaku and Ryukyu islands will be reinforced withanother squadron, and the possibility of stationing a small detachment on the island of Yonaguni is beingstudied.

C. JAPAN HAS ITS OWN DEFENSES AGAINST INCOMING BALLISTIC MISSILES.

Kyle Mizokami, (Staff), THE NATIONAL INTEREST, June 24, 2014. Retrieved Feb. 6, 2016 fromhttp://nationalinterest.org/feature/five-japanese-weapons-war-china-should-fear-10660.

The two destroyers of the Atago class are Japan’s most capable surface combatants, floating arsenalsdesigned to take on a variety of missions. At 10,000 tons fully loaded, the Atago destroyers weigh as much asJapan’s World War II era cruisers. The U.S.-designed Aegis radar system makes it a potent mobile air defenseplatform, capable of shooting down aircraft and ballistic missiles.

Kyle Mizokami, (Staff), THE NATIONAL INTEREST, June 24, 2014. Retrieved Feb. 6, 2016 fromhttp://nationalinterest.org/feature/five-japanese-weapons-war-china-should-fear-10660.

The Atago class, once upgraded, will represent a formidable air defense platform. In a wartime scenarioChina could be expected to launch barrages of short and medium range ballistic missiles against Japaneseand American ships, air bases, and military facilities. Japan’s Aegis fleet would form a barrier against theseattacks. A screen of Atago destroyers could also form a potent anti-aircraft defense over the Senkaku andRyukyu islands. Armed with SM-2 Block IIIB anti-aircraft missiles with a range of 90 nautical miles, a singleAtago can dominate 565 square nautical miles of airspace.

D. FOR THE U.S., OFFSHORE BALANCING IS SUPERIOR TO THE MAINTENANCE OF BASES.

Christopher Layne, (Prof., Govt,. Texas A&M), TAKING SIDES: CLASHING VIEWS IN AMERICAN FOREIGNPOLICY, 2010, 176-177.

Washington, however, faces perhaps a last chance to adopt a grand strategy that will serve its interests inensuring that Chinese power is contained in East Asia but without running the risk of an armed clash withBeijing. This strategy is "offshore balancing," a concept that is finding increasing favor with a group of influentialAmerican scholars in the field of security studies. According to this strategy, the United States should deploymilitary power abroad only in the face of direct threats to vital American interests. The strategy recognizes thatWashington need not (and in fact cannot) directly control vast parts of the globe, that it is better off settingpriorities based on clear national interests and relying on local actors to uphold regional balances of power.The idea of offshore balancing is to husband national power for maximum effectiveness while minimizingperceptions that this power represents a threat.

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III. WORRIES ABOUT JAPANESE REARMAMENT ARE MISPLACED.

A. JAPAN IS NOT AN OFFENSIVE MILITARY THREAT.

Hugh White, (Prof., Strategic Studies, Strategic and Defense Studies Center, Australia), THE AGE, July 21,2015, 19.

None of this gives any reason to fear that Japan is returning to militarism. Quite apart from fundamentalchanges in Japan's political system and outlook, as witnessed by last week's demonstrations, the equallyfundamental shift on the distribution of power in Asia makes it impossible for Japan to seek hegemony overAsia today the way it did before 1945. Indeed, it is unfair to condemn any change in Japan's strategic postureas a revival of militarism. Japan has a right to take measures for its own security, just as other countries do,and to change its posture to meet circumstances.

Gavin Blair, (Staff), CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Sept. 10, 2015. Retrieved Jan. 25, 2016 from Nexis.In fact, despite Abe's efforts to stoke a greater martial spirit in longtime pacifist Japan, there is little appetite

for military adventure among the population. A WIN/Gallup poll earlier this year found Japanese was the leastwilling in the world to fight, at 11 percent.

Shinichi Kitaoka, (Former Ambassador of Japan to the United Nations and now President, InternationalUniversity of Japan), NEW YORK TIMES, June 5, 2015. Retrieved Jan. 25, 2016 from Nexis.

Some people, wary of the belligerence of Imperial Japan in the 1930s worry that amending Article 9 couldpave the way for a resurgence of militarism. But these fears are groundless. In the 1930s, while Japan wasfacing the strict customs policies of the great powers, its military leadership saw expansionism as necessaryfor the country's security and prosperity. China was much weaker. And Japan's civilian authorities had littleinstitutional control over the generals.

B. JAPAN IS CONSTITUTIONALLY PREVENTED FROM OFFENSIVE MILITARY ACTION.

Shinichi Kitaoka, (Former Ambassador of Japan to the United Nations and now President, InternationalUniversity of Japan), NEW YORK TIMES, June 5, 2015. Retrieved Jan. 25, 2016 from Nexis.

Article 9 comprises two paragraphs. In the first, Japan renounces ''war as a sovereign right of the nationand the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.'' This text tracks the language of theCharter of the United Nations, which has been ratified by almost all the countries of the world. In the secondparagraph of Article 9, Japan renounces maintaining any ''land, sea, and air forces, as well as other warpotential.'' No other country has imposed such a restriction on itself.

C. JAPAN WILL NOT ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

Daniel Twining, (Sr. Fellow, German Marshall Fund of the United States), NIKKEI ASIAN REVIEW, Sept. 24,2015. Retrieved Jan. 25, 2016 from Nexis.

Even with passage of the new security reforms, existing strictures on Japan's deployment of offensiveweaponry remain in place; tight civilian control over the Japanese military continues; Japan moves no closerto becoming a militarized nation bristling with nuclear ballistic missiles and other weapons of power projectionlike its neighbors in China and North Korea.

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PRO CASE #3: SUPPORTING THE PEACEFUL RISE OF CHINAThe thesis of this case is that long-term prospects for peace in East Asia require a cooperative relationship between

the U.S. and the People’s Republic of China. The rate of growth in the Chinese economy means that China should beregarded as a major world power and should be treated accordingly. The rise of China offers great potential for solvingmany of the world’s most pressing problems, assuming that the U.S. chooses to establish a supportive relationship. It isnow time for the U.S. to send a clear signal to China by abandoning the containment policies of the past. The dozens ofU.S. bases on Okinawa represent a now-outmoded relic of this earlier containment policy – they are an unnecessary irritantin U.S.-China relations and should be removed.

OBSERVATIONS:

I. CHINA’S RISE IS INEVITABLE.

A. CHINA HAS SURPASSED THE U.S. AS THE WORLD’S LEADING ECONOMY.

Joseph Stiglitz, (Prof., Economics, NYU), THE CHINESE CENTURY, Jan. 2015. Retrieved Feb. 6, 2016 fromhttp://www.vanityfair.com/news/2015/01/china-worlds-largest-economy.

When the history of 2014 is written, it will take note of a large fact that has received little attention: 2014was the last year in which the United States could claim to be the world’s largest economic power. China enters2015 in the top position, where it will likely remain for a very long time, if not forever. In doing so, it returns tothe position it held through most of human history.

Michael Pillsbury, (Dir., Center on Chinese Studies, Hudson Institute), THE HUNDRED YEAR MARATHON:CHINA’S SECRET STRATEGY TO REPLACE AMERICA AS THE GLOBAL SUPERPOWER, 2015, 177.

By 2050, China's economy will be much larger than America's—perhaps three times larger, according tosome projections—and the world could then be a unipolar one, with China as the global leader.

B. CHINESE INFLUENCE IN WORLD AFFAIRS IS ON THE RISE.

Thomas Christensen, (Prof., World Politics, Princeton U. & Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State forEast Asian and Pacific Affairs), THE CHINA CHALLENGE: SHAPING THE CHOICES OF A RISING POWER,2015, 3.

China's economic clout is real and growing rapidly, especially since the 2008 financial crisis. China hasbeen the main engine of growth for the world's economy since that time and, by some measures, has becomethe world's number one trading state. In addition, China has provided an economic lifeline to exporters of alltypes: developed nations selling sophisticated equipment and developing nations selling commodities.

Jinghao Zhou, (Prof., Political Science, Hobart College), CHINESE VS. WESTERN PERSPECTIVES, 2014,79.

China's foreign reserves hit $3.197 trillion at the end of June of 2011, becoming the largest in the world.China is second only to the United States as the recipient of foreign direct investment with $650 billion in foreigndirect investment, which reflects that China's economy has been integrated into the world economy. China ismoving rapidly to dominate the global market, not just for labor-intensive manufactured goods, but also formore advanced products, including mobile telephones, laptop computers, and digital cameras.

II. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY OUGHT TO SUPPORT THE PEACEFUL RISE OF CHINA.

A. POSITIVE ENGAGEMENT WITH CHINA SHOULD BE A CENTRAL GOAL OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY.

1. China is the largest foreign holder of U.S. debt.

Geoff Dyer, (Staff, Financial Times), THE CONTEST OF THE CENTURY, 2014, 232."How do you deal toughly with your banker?" Hillary Clinton asked, shortly after she became secretary of

state. Since the start of the financial crisis, a new phantom has started to loom over U.S.-China relations: themassive amounts of American government debt that are now in China's hands. China has the largest foreign-exchange reserves in the world, at around $3.3 trillion, and overtook Japan in 2008 to be the largest overseasholder of U.S. debt.

2. China holds the key to solving many of the world’s most perplexing problems.

Joseph Stiglitz, (Prof., Economics, NYU), THE CHINESE CENTURY, Jan. 2015. Retrieved Feb. 6, 2016 fromhttp://www.vanityfair.com/news/2015/01/china-worlds-largest-economy.

The United States is confronted with real foreign-policy challenges that will prove hard to resolve: militantIslam; the Palestine conflict, which is now in its seventh decade; an aggressive Russia, insisting on assertingits power, at least in its own neighborhood; continuing threats of nuclear proliferation. We will need thecooperation of China to address many, if not all, of these problems.

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Yong Zhao, (Dir., Institute for Global Education, U. Oregon), WHO'S AFRAID OF THE BIG BAD DRAGON?:WHY CHINA HAS THE BEST (AND WORST) EDUCATION SYSTEM IN THE WORLD, 2014, 27.

Despite widespread concerns about China's rise, it is unlikely that China will invade any other country, letalone engage in military conflicts with the West. As the Harvard political scientist Joseph Nye Jr. wrote recently,"Given shared global challenges like financial stability, cybercrime, nuclear proliferation, and climate change,China and the United States also have much to gain from working together."

Robert Sutter, (Prof., International Affairs, George Washington U.), FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE PRC:THE LEGACIES AND CONSTRAINTS OF CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL POLITICS SINCE 1949, 2013, 210.

Both administrations benefit from positive engagement in various areas. Such engagement supports theirmutual interests in stability in the Asia-Pacific, a peaceful Korean peninsula, and a peaceful settlement of theTaiwan issue; the U.S. and Chinese leaders recognize the need to cooperate to foster global peace andprosperity, to advance world environmental conditions, and to deal with climate change and nonproliferation.

Donald Gross, (Analyst, Center for Strategic and International Studies). THE CHINA FALLACY: HOW THEU.S. CAN BENEFIT FROM CHINA'S RISE AND AVOID ANOTHER COLD WAR, 2013, 62.

In an era of improved U.S.-China relations, the United States could benefit from China's capabilities tomeet transnational security challenges of concern to the United States as well as America's allies and friendsin East Asia. These challenges include preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials, endingterrorism, ensuring energy security, assuring the safety of maritime commerce and severely restricting thetrafficking of arms, narcotics and people.

Wendy Dobson, (Prof., Economics, U. Toronto), PARTNERS AND RIVALS: THE UNEASY FUTURE OFCHINA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES, 2013, 128.

Cooperation, which has already begun on counterpiracy, UN Peacekeeping and disaster relief could beexpanded to other areas such as multilateral military exercises, maritime security, infectious disease controlsand countering nuclear proliferation and terrorism.

B. ENGAGEMENT WITH CHINA TRADES OFF WITH CONTAINMENT POLICIES.

Joseph Stiglitz, (Prof., Economics, NYU), THE CHINESE CENTURY, Jan. 2015. Retrieved Feb. 6, 2016 fromhttp://www.vanityfair.com/news/2015/01/china-worlds-largest-economy.

We should take this moment, as China becomes the world’s largest economy, to “pivot” our foreign policyaway from containment. The economic interests of China and the U.S. are intricately intertwined. We both havean interest in seeing a stable and well-functioning global political and economic order.

Donald Gross, (Analyst, Center for Strategic and International Studies). THE CHINA FALLACY: HOW THEU.S. CAN BENEFIT FROM CHINA'S RISE AND AVOID ANOTHER COLD WAR, 2013, 229.

In thinking about the future in Asia, the United States has a fundamental choice. It can continue toaccelerate the strategic containment of China to preserve U.S. dominance, and in so doing, burden theAmerican economy with excessive defense expenditures while heightening the risk of a devastating war. Or itcan prudently conserve American power by seeking a stable peace through rapprochement with China, whilerebuilding America's economy to cope with the challenges of the twenty-first century. Diplomatically resolvingthe outstanding security and economic conflicts with China would allow the U.S. to return to the traditionalstrategic doctrine that guided America for a century and helped underwrite American prosperity—preventingany other country from exercising dominance in the Asia Pacific.

CONTENTIONS:

I. THE U.S. OUGHT TO EMBRACE THE RISE OF CHINA.

A. THE FUTURE OF THE U.S. ECONOMY DEPENDS UPON FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH CHINA.

Henry Paulson, (Former U.S. Secretary of the Treasury), DEALING WITH CHINA, 2015, xiii.I write as an American who is deeply concerned about our country's standing in the world, the health of

our economy and our environment, and the long-term prospects of our citizens. I take the view that all of thesewill benefit from active engagement with China, that clear-eyed, constructive cooperation is the best way toadvance our national interest.

Mel Gurtov, (Prof., Political Science, Portland State U.), WILL THIS BE CHINA’S CENTURY?, 2013, 8.The China Duopolists believe in taking engagement to the next level: a US-China duopoly. This "G-2" or,

in the historian Niall Ferguson's phrasing, "Chimerica," is based on the assumption that these are the two mostimportant countries in world affairs, that they can and must cooperate in the common cause of internationalpeace and stability, and that their economic interdependence has already created a single fused economy.

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Sebastian Heilmann, (Dir., Mercator Institute for China Studies), CHINA'S FOREIGN POLITICAL ANDECONOMIC RELATIONS: AN UNCONVENTIONAL GLOBAL POWER, 2014, 160-161.

China is said to have invested more than US$16 billion and to have created twenty-nine thousand jobs inthe United States by 2011. Although thus far Chinese investments in the United States only make up 1 percentof the US FDI stock, current trends are likely to continue. In addition, for years China has financed the UnitedStates deficit as its largest creditor and has helped keep interest and inflation rates at historic lows.

B. CHINA HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT IT WILL ACT RESPONSIBLY AS A MAJOR POWER.

David Shambaugh, (Prof., International Affairs, George Washington U.), CHINA GOES GLOBAL: THEPARTIAL POWER, 2013, 142.

Since the mid-1990s, China has joined and participated in nearly all the relevant international treaties andregimes concerned with nonproliferation and arms control: the Biological Weapons Convention (1984), UNArms Control Register (1991), Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT, 1992), Seabed Arms Control Treaty (1992),Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (1996), and Chemical Weapons Conventions (1997). In the mid-1990s, theChinese government also joined the Zangger Committee (the implementing organ of the NPT to control theexport of nuclear materials) and promulgated its own export control regulations, the Nuclear Suppliers Group(NSG), provided verbal and written commitments that it would adhere to the Missile Technology ControlRegime (MTCR), and unilaterally proclaimed a nuclear weapons No First Use (NFU) pledge.

C. CHINA HOLDS THE KEY TO RESTRAINING THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM.

Donald Gross, (Analyst, Center for Strategic and International Studies). THE CHINA FALLACY: HOW THEU.S. CAN BENEFIT FROM CHINA'S RISE AND AVOID ANOTHER COLD WAR, 2013, 53.

Significantly, China has worked closely with the United States to halt North Korea's nuclear program inorder to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, materials, technologies and expertise to terrorists androgue states. Since 2003, China has chaired the Six Party Talks on North Korean nuclear issues, a multilateralframework designed by the United States to constrain and end Pyongyang's nuclear efforts. Though thesetalks have not yet achieved their objective—largely due to North Korean intransigence—U.S. policymakershave long realized that China holds more diplomatic leverage over North Korea than any other country. TheU.S.-Chinese effort to denuclearize the Korean peninsula is an example of common security interests thatcould bring greater security cooperation in the future.

D. THE AMERICAN PUBLIC NOW SUPPORTS AN ABANDONMENT OF CONTAINMENT POLICIES.

Michael Green, (Prof., International Relations, Georgetown U.), DEBATING CHINA: THE U.S.-CHINARELATIONSHIP IN TEN CONVERSATIONS, 2014, 217.

Nor does the American public think that containment is the right strategy. In a recent Chicago Council onGlobal Affairs survey, the American public was asked if the United States should "actively work to limit thegrowth of China's power"—the ultimate definition of containment—and only 28% of the respondents answered"yes." Sixty-nine percent of respondents favored instead pursuing "friendly cooperation and engagement" withChina.

E. ABANDONING THE POLICY OF CONTAINMENT WILL HELP ADVANCE HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS IN

CHINA.

Donald Gross, (Analyst, Center for Strategic and International Studies). THE CHINA FALLACY: HOW THEU.S. CAN BENEFIT FROM CHINA'S RISE AND AVOID ANOTHER COLD WAR, 2013, 121.

The U.S. can greatly advance democracy and human rights in China, therefore, by resolving andovercoming the major security issues that now divide the two countries. With a less threatening externalenvironment, Chinese dissidents (such the proponents of Charter 08) could more easily seek internal politicalreforms, including the formation of competing political parties. If the U.S. were no longer widely perceived asseeking to contain China, Chinese dissidents favoring reform could draw greater legitimacy from the U.S.democratic political system.

F. ABANDONING THE POLICY OF CONTAINMENT WILL BEST SECURE THE FUTURE FOR TAIWANESE

DEMOCRACY.

Donald Gross, (Analyst, Center for Strategic and International Studies). THE CHINA FALLACY: HOW THEU.S. CAN BENEFIT FROM CHINA'S RISE AND AVOID ANOTHER COLD WAR, 2013, 173.

An end to the U.S. policy seeking to contain China, in the context of a Framework Agreement that stabilizesChina's security relations with Taiwan, would also open China to the powerful and positive influence of Taiwan'sand Hong Kong's political systems.

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G. ABANDONING THE POLICY OF CONTAINMENT WILL IMPROVE U.S. RELATIONS WITH ITS MOST

IMPORTANT ALLIES.

Wang Yusheng, (Staff), THE NATION, Jan. 2, 2016. Retrieved Jan. 21, 2016 from Nexis.But by being unnecessarily worried that China will challenge its hegemonic status, the US has been making

moves to contain China on various fronts. Apt examples are the US' tough and even provocative stance andactions on the South China Sea issue. The ever-increasing interdependence of China and the US should haveled to better bilateral ties. And with many US allies, including Britain, Canada and Australia, showing greaterinterest in cooperating with China, one wonders why the US cannot do the same when it comes to itsrelationship with China.

Joshua Kurlantzick, (Sr. Fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations), THE WASHINGTONPOST, Jan. 17, 2016, B1.

But wariness toward China has morphed into a muddled, obsessive and often mindless U.S. policy. It holdsthat any new Chinese action must be stopped; any new Chinese ally must be won over; any new Chineseambition must be contained. The administration has become so fixated on countering Beijing that it fails torealize that some of the Chinese actions it is fighting do not imperil the United States' interests. Meanwhile, the(largely futile) battle doesn't just alienate allies. It also takes U.S. diplomats, money and arms away from placesthat truly matter to the United States. In some places, America would do best to let China win.

H. ABANDONING THE POLICY OF CONTAINMENT WILL BEST SERVE THE INTERESTS OF THE JAPANESE

PEOPLE.

Susumu Yabuki, (Analyst, Yokohama City University), EAST ASIA FORUM, June 30, 2012. Retrieved Feb. 6,2016 from http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/06/30/us-china-collusion-and-the-way-forward-for-japan/.

It is often said that the US and China are rivals — even potential combatants — in areas near Okinawaand the South China Sea. Some Japanese military strategists go as far as asserting that Japan must enlist USmilitary power to pursue a containment policy toward an expanding China. And yet Japan’s stock market reactsto small changes in the outlook for China’s economic growth every day. China is Japan’s largest export marketand offers the best hope of growth for many of Japan’s leading companies. This leaves Japan in an awkwardposition, because it has to balance its deep mutual economic dependency with China with the need to deterpossible military confrontation. How can Japan take stances and pursue policies whose outcomes are soclearly at cross-purposes? The answer is that Japan cannot.

II. BY MAINTAINING U.S. BASES IN OKINAWA, THE U.S. UNNECESSARILY ALIENATES CHINA.

A. THE U.S. BASES ON OKINAWA REPRESENT THE MOST VISIBLE EXAMPLE OF THE POLICY OF

CONTAINMENT.

Joseph Gerson, (Staff, TruthOut), OKINAWANS TO BE SACRIFICED AGAIN ON THE ALTARS OF US ANDJAPANESE MILITARISM, Jan. 3, 2014. Retrieved Feb. 6, 2016 from http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/20968-okinawans-to-be-sacrificed-again-on-the-altars-of-us-and-japanese-.

Building on the Bush-Cheney plan to "diversify" the forward locations of hundreds of US military bases andinstallations to better encircle China, the US has committed to deploy 60 percent of US war planes and 60percent of the Navy to Asia and the Pacific to press China's military containment. The more than 100 US basesand military installations in Japan - with the greatest concentration in Okinawa - and the military alliance withJapan are "keystones" of the pivot.

Joseph Gerson, (Staff, TruthOut), OKINAWANS TO BE SACRIFICED AGAIN ON THE ALTARS OF US ANDJAPANESE MILITARISM, Jan. 3, 2014. Retrieved Feb. 6, 2016 from http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/20968-okinawans-to-be-sacrificed-again-on-the-altars-of-us-and-japanese-.

The Okinawan people again are being sacrificed on the altar of militarism: the Obama Administration'smilitary "pivot" to Asia and the Pacific and the US-Japan military alliance - the "keystone" of US Asia-Pacificpower.

B. THE OKINAWAN PEOPLE VIEW THE PRESENCE OF U.S. BASES AS PREVENTING A PEACEFUL

RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA.

Violet Law, (Staff), LOS ANGELES TIMES, Sept. 18, 2015, A2.By opposing the relocation plans, they want to show they want to be peaceful neighbors to China."

Okinawans' pacifist convictions have been forged both through bloodshed and decades living alongside theU.S. military presence. Among the staunchest anti-base protesters are elderly survivors of the Battle ofOkinawa that began in March 1945, the largest battle of the Pacific war. It left 100,000 civilians dead, a thirdthe island's inhabitants.

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C. THE PRESENCE OF U.S. BASES PROMOTES A CHINESE MILITARY RESPONSE.

Yoichiro Sato, (Prof., Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, HI), THE RISE OF CHINA ANDINTERNATIONAL SECURITY, 2009, 108.

In the post-Cold War era, China increasingly sees this US-Japan naval alliance as threatening to its keymaritime interests, most importantly freedom of passage for its tankers and sea control in contingenciesinvolving the Taiwan Strait. With its rapid economic growth, China has increased its military budget and spenta large sum on modernization of its naval force.

D. THE RECENT CLASHES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA WERE PROVOKED BY JAPAN RATHER THAN BY

CHINA.

Peter Hartcher, (International Editor), SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Nov. 27, 2012, 11.And this year, in the most antagonistic move against China by any Japanese officeholder in modern times,

Ishihara sought to buy, in the name of the Tokyo regional government, a group of islands claimed by China.Ishihara proposed to build on them. The so-called islands are really a useless clutch of eight large uninhabitedrocks. They're known as the Senkaku Islands in Japan and the Diaoyu in China. Their value lies in the fact thattheir owner can claim maritime sovereignty and economic rights to seabed resources, which apparentlyincludes oil. The islands were owned by a private Japanese citizen; Ishihara moved to buy them and developthem. It was an act that had no legitimate purpose. It was designed as pure provocation of Beijing.

Li Xuemei, (Staff, Xinhua News Agency), BBC MONITORING ASIA PACIFIC, Dec. 29, 2013. Retrieved Jan.25, 2016 from Nexis.

In the past year, [Japanese Prime Minister] Abe has also repeatedly used Diaoyudao [islands disputed byChina and Japan, which Japan calls the Senkakus] and other issues to provoke contentions and confuse thepublic opinions in an attempt to gain domestic support for him by means of his "tough confrontations" withChina and the neighboring countries. However, Abe's deeds have seriously undermined regional stability andseverely reversed Japan's relations with China, the ROK, and other neighboring countries.

E. REMOVAL OF THE BASES IN OKINAWA WOULD SIGNAL A NEW COOPERATIVE ERA BETWEEN THE

U.S. AND CHINA.

Lyle Goldstein, (Prof., China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College), MEETING CHINA HALFWAY, 2015, 245.

Yet another strategic rationale for scaling back the US presence on Okinawa is the declining utility of itsfixed facilities and airfields, which are now wholly vulnerable to adversary precision missiles and air strikes—an inviting target for preemption—and thus quite destabilizing overall. And yet the proximity of Okinawa toTaiwan would enable the United States to claim that further reductions in the force size at Okinawa were relatedto declining tensions across the Taiwan Strait. This move, coupled with a linkage to the Taiwan issue, wouldnot only ease tensions in Japanese politics but would also certainly get Beijing's attention with a powerfulsuggestion that the United States was willing to make hard choices in order to facilitate progress toward agenuine Japan-China rapprochement.

Lyle Goldstein, (Prof., China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College), MEETING CHINA HALFWAY, 2015, 243.

The United States should endeavor to decrease the US military presence on Okinawa. In fact, this processis already under way, as some 10,000 US Marines are planned to depart the island over the next two years aspart of the base realignment plan agreed to by Tokyo and Washington in 2006." As noted above, the lingeringOkinawa issue is a major destabilizing element in the US-Japan Alliance, so much so that the alliance hasbecome a significant issue in Tokyo's domestic politics and even recently precipitated the downfall of PrimeMinister Hatoyama. Moreover, the late 2014 election of an "anti-base" governor in Okinawa confirms that theissue is not likely to fade away, as many in Tokyo and Washington would no doubt prefer.

Lyle Goldstein, (Prof., China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College), MEETING CHINA HALFWAY, 2015, 244.

The alignment of forces away from Okinawa is a long-overdue corrective to an unfortunate earlier policy.However, Washington has not realized the full strategic benefits of this realignment. Recognizing that (1) theMarines are not especially well suited for the high-intensity air/ sea combat scenarios of East Asia; and (2) thatapparently, Australia is now available as a staging area for the Marines, the forces on Okinawa can be cuteven further.

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III. CHINA DOES NOT REPRESENT A THREAT TO PEACE IN EAST ASIA.

A. CHINA HAS NO INTEREST IN ENGAGING IN A CONFLICT WITH THE U.S.

Yong Zhao, (Dir., Institute for Global Education, U. Oregon), WHO'S AFRAID OF THE BIG BAD DRAGON?:WHY CHINA HAS THE BEST (AND WORST) EDUCATION SYSTEM IN THE WORLD, 2014, 27.

Despite widespread concerns about China's rise, it is unlikely that China will invade any other country, letalone engage in military conflicts with the West. As the Harvard political scientist Joseph Nye Jr. wrote recently,"Given shared global challenges like financial stability, cybercrime, nuclear proliferation, and climate change,China and the United States also have much to gain from working together."

B. CHINA WILL NOT PROMOTE CONFLICT IN EAST ASIA.

Lyle Goldstein, (Prof., China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College), MEETING CHINA HALFWAY, 2015, 358.

A more thoughtful perspective understands that (1) China's rise will inevitably occasion some anxiety andinstability; (2) China's military buildup is largely driven by its historical experience of invasion and vulnerability;(3) Beijing has not resorted to the major use of force in more than three decades; and (4) most fundamentally,China may quibble over various rocks and reefs with neighbors, but it is emphatically not likely to invade eitherHonshu or Luzon, nor even Okinawa or Palawan. The role of scholars here needs to be to help separaterational and irrational fears and responses.

C. ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE WILL PREVENT MILITARY CONFLICT.

Noah Feldman, (Prof., International Law, Harvard U.). COOL WAR: THE FUTURE OF GLOBALCOMPETITION, 2013, 8.

This close, interdependent relationship makes war between the participants seem unlikely because itwould be irrational. Should a creditor nation attack a debtor, it would destroy the value of its own assets.Invading your trading partners would mean the end of trade until the war was over, and beyond.

Thomas Christensen, (Prof., World Politics, Princeton U. & Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State forEast Asian and Pacific Affairs), THE CHINA CHALLENGE: SHAPING THE CHOICES OF A RISING POWER,2015, 62.

While the rise of new powers has historically led to bloody and sustained conflicts, this time should bedifferent. A rising China has more reasons to avoid military and economic conflict with the United States andits allies than any previous rising power.

D. CHINA WILL ACT COOPERATIVELY WITH OTHER NATIONS IN EAST ASIA.

Wu Xinbo, (Prof., International Studies, Fudan U., China), DEBATING CHINA: THE U.S.-CHINARELATIONSHIP IN TEN CONVERSATIONS, 2014, 215.

China has invariably supported ASEAN's leadership role, because Beijing fully understands the complexityof regional politics and does not want to compete for the driver's seat with Japan and ASEAN. As China rises,it seeks to embed itself in a more integrated and interdependent East Asia, rather than putting East Asia in itsshadow and creating a Sino-centric order.

Lyle Goldstein, (Prof., China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College), MEETING CHINA HALFWAY, 2015, 269.

The first decade of the new century witnessed major progress in China-ASEAN relations, including boththe signing of the Code of Conduct on the South China Sea and a commitment on both sides to build theChina-ASEAN Free Trade Area by 2010. To be sure, both these landmark agreements had their associatedproblems—the former being too vague to resolve issues of contention, and the latter having an impact onmyriad "rice bowls," as trade agreements inevitably do. The new closeness between ASEAN and Chinareflected numerous factors, not least that of proximity and shared cultural heritage.

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CON CASE #1: THE JAPAN-SECURITY ALLIANCE MUST BE SUPPORTEDThe thesis of this case is that the U.S. bases in Okinawa are essential to support a U.S. treaty commitment – the Japan-

Security Alliance. This case will also show that the Japan-Security Alliance is vital to the maintenance of peace in EastAsia. This case will also answer the argument that the Okinawan people do not want continued U.S. military presence.

OBSERVATIONS:

I. A CENTRAL TENET OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY OUGHT TO BE THE FULFILLMENT OF TREATY

COMMITMENTS.

Michael Ramsey, (Prof. Law, U. San Diego School of Law), THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGNAFFAIRS, 2007, 187.

Treaties raise special concerns because they establish U.S. foreign policy and commit the nation to thatpolicy for the future, as a matter of international law; they are the nation’s legal commitment to a foreign power.

Stephen McCaffrey, (Prof., Law, McGeorge School of Law of Pacific U.), UNDERSTANDINGINTERNATIONAL LAW, 2006. Retrieved Feb. 6, 2016 from Google Books.

Given the fact that states are sovereign, it might be thought that they would be free to change their mindsand withdraw their consent – that is, to repudiate any agreement they entered into with another state. This isnot the case, however. Treaties are binding by virtue of the principle “pacta sunt servanda,” meaning thatagreements must be observed. Itself a norm of customary international law, “pacta sunt servanda” has beencalled “perhaps the most important principle of international law.

II. THE UNITED STATES HAS MADE A TREATY COMMITMENT TO THE DEFENSE OF JAPAN WITH THE JAPAN-

SECURITY ALLIANCE.

Beina Xu, (Analyst, Council on Foreign Relations), COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS BACKGROUNDER,July 1, 2014. Retrieved Feb. 6, 2016 from https://www.google.com/?gws_rd=ssl - safe=active&q="seina+xu"+foreign+affairs.

Forged in the wake of World War II, the U.S.-Japan security alliance has served as one of the region'smost important military relationships and as an anchor of the U.S. security role in Asia. Revised in 1960, theTreaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security grants the United States the right to military bases on thearchipelago in exchange for a U.S. pledge to defend Japan in the event of an attack.

Ian Rinehart, (Specialist in Asian Affairs, Congressional Research Service), U.S. JAPAN ALLIANCE, Dec. 12,2013, 1.

The U.S.-Japan alliance has long been an anchor of the U.S. security role in Asia. Forged in the U.S.occupation of Japan after its defeat in World War II, the alliance provides a platform for U.S. military readinessin the Pacific. About 53,000 U.S. troops are stationed in Japan and have the exclusive use of 89 facilities. Inexchange, the United States guarantees Japan’s security.

Timothy Temerson, (Analyst, MIT Japan Program), DOUBLE CONTAINMENT AND THE ORIGINS OF THEU.S.-JAPAN SECURITY ALLIANCE, 1991, 77.

After months of intensive negotiations, the United States and Japan signed the treaty creating the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance on September 8, 1951.

CONTENTIONS:

I. THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY ALLIANCE IS ESSENTIAL TO THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE IN EAST ASIA.

A. THE THREAT OF WAR IN EAST ASIA REQUIRES CONTINUED U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE.

Donald Kirk, (Staff), KOREA TIMES, Jan. 2, 2014. Retrieved Feb. 1, 2016 from Nexis.The shadows of war hang more menacingly over Northeast Asia at the opening of a brave new year than

they have at any time since, well, since the last time the region was edging into armed conflict. That might besince the Korean mini-crisis of nearly a year ago when North Korea was emitting a torrent of threats. Or it couldbe since the sinking of the Cheonan or any number of standoffs since the Korean War.

Michael Green, (Prof., Foreign Service, Georgetown U.), THE LONG SHADOW: NUCLEAR WEAPONS ANDSECURITY IN 21ST CENTURY ASIA, 2008, 353.

Japan today is again entering a period of strategic flux with the rise of China, the North Korean nuclearand missile breakout, the potential threat posed by international terrorism, and proliferation of weapons of massdestruction to rogue states and nonstate actors. Concerns about Russia's future, potential threats to MiddleEast energy supplies, and ongoing territorial disputes with all of Japan's neighbors further complicate thestrategic picture for Tokyo.

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B. THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY ALLIANCE PROVIDES CONTINUED STABILITY.

Jenny Lin, (Analyst, Center for Strategic and International Studies), ISSUES & INSIGHTS, Feb. 2015.Retrieved Feb. 5, 2016 from http://csis.org/files/publication/issues_insightsvol15no3.pdf.

Today, ties with Japan remain the cornerstone of peace and security in the Asia Pacific; it is furtheraffirmed through the “rebalance” to Asia, which endeavors to strengthen ties with all US allies andpartners in the region – through economic integration, diplomatic understanding, and strategic postures.

JAPAN NEWS, Aug. 16, 2014, 10.It has been historically proven, however, that the Japan-U.S. alliance functioned effectively both during the

Cold War between East and West, when there was a military threat from the Soviet Union, and under the fluidcircumstances in East Asia after the Cold War ended. The Japan-U.S. alliance is now acknowledged by manycountries as "a public asset" needed for the stability of Asia.

Yukio Hatoyama, (Former Prime Minister of Japan), STATES NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 19, 2010. Retrieved Feb.6, 2016 from Nexis.

The U.S.-Japan security arrangements continue to be indispensable not only for the defense of Japanalone, but also for the peace and prosperity of the entire Asia-Pacific region. Under a security environment inwhich there still exist uncertainty and unpredictability, the presence of the U.S. Forces based on the Treaty willcontinue to function as a public good by creating a strong sense of security to the countries in the region.

Yukio Hatoyama, (Former Prime Minister of Japan), STATES NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 19, 2010. Retrieved Feb.6, 2016 from Nexis.

The U.S.-Japan security arrangements have greatly contributed to not only to the security of Japan butalso the stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region. It is not an exaggeration to say that it was thanks tothe U.S.-Japan security arrangements that Japan has maintained peace, while respecting freedom anddemocracy, and enjoyed economic development in that environment since the end of the last World War tothis day.

Muthiah Alagappa, (Sr. Fellow, East-West Center), THE LONG SHADOW: NUCLEAR WEAPONS ANDSECURITY IN 21ST CENTURY ASIA, 2008, 65-66.

The long peace in Asia is now almost three decades old and cannot be considered an anomaly. The U.S.contribution to peace and security in Asia is certainly important, but it is not the only factor. Peace, security,and prosperity in Asia in the last three decades rested on several other pillars as well, including theconsolidation of Asian countries as modern states, their increased capacity to defend themselves, increasedability to partake in regional and global arrangements in rule making and implementation, growing acceptancein Asia of the political status quo, and deep interest in a wide range of Asian countries in preserving peace andstability. Asia has been transformed from a region of turmoil and numerous hot wars (many of which werewaged by or with the support of external powers) to a relatively peaceful and prosperous region that hasbecome a core world region.

Donald Gross, (Analyst, Center for Strategic and International Studies). THE CHINA FALLACY: HOW THEU.S. CAN BENEFIT FROM CHINA'S RISE AND AVOID ANOTHER COLD WAR, 2013, 177.

Ensuring the security of Japan is a central objective of American policy in the Asia Pacific. For more thanhalf a century, U.S. troops, air and naval forces have protected Japan against foreign aggression. During theCold War, the United States stood side by side with Japan in facing down the Soviet Union, which posed amajor threat to the Japanese islands. Following the demise of the Soviet empire, the U.S.-Japan alliancecontinues to deter both China and North Korea from taking actions that could harm Japan's national security.

C. THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT REGARDS THE ALLIANCE AS VITAL TO ITS SECURITY.

Gerald Curtis, (Former Dir., Weatherhead East Asian Institute), THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Sept.18, 2015. Retrieved Jan. 25, 2016 from Nexis.

But one consequence of the China security threat is agreement in Japan that no security policy is availablethat does not involve an intimate alliance with the United States. When [Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo] Abesays that no country can defend itself by itself, he is giving voice to the now widely held view in Japan that theonly way to maintain a balance of power in East Asia, which means to balance China's growing power andregional ambitions, is for Japanese security policy to be joined at the hip with the United States.

D. JAPAN CANNOT DEFEND ITSELF WITHOUT U.S. MILITARY SUPPORT.

Gavin Blair, (Staff), CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Sept. 10, 2015. Retrieved Jan. 25, 2016 from Nexis.Prof. Kayahara believes the JSDF would currently struggle to retake the Senkaku Islands if they were

invaded by the Chinese military, and would need to rely on US forces. "Although America is obliged to protectus under the terms of the security treaty, as a country, we can't always be riding on their back and expectingthem to help us out. That's why we have to make it possible for the Self-Defense Forces to protect itself andits allies, as well as increase the defense budget," says Kayahara, referring to the reinterpretation of the pacifistconstitution by the Abe government to allow 'collective self-defense' in the event of an ally of Japan beingattacked.

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E. THE ALLIANCE IS ESSENTIAL TO COUNTER THREATS FROM NORTH KOREA.

Justin McCurry, (Staff), THE GUARDIAN INTERNATIONAL, Feb. 12, 2014, 14.Successive US and Japanese administrations have said the troop presence on Okinawa has contributed

to peace in the Asia-Pacific for the past 70 years, and must stay put amid threats to stability from Chinesenaval aggression and the looming presence of an unpredictable, and nuclear-armed, North Korea.

II. THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN OKINAWA IS ESSENTIAL TO SUPPORT THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY

ALLIANCE.

A. MANY OF THE U.S. BASED IN OKINAWA ARE ACTUALLY PART OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND

DESIGNED TO ENFORCE THE POST-KOREAN WAR ARMISTICE.

Jenny Lin, (Analyst, Center for Strategic and International Studies), ISSUES & INSIGHTS, Feb. 2015.Retrieved Feb. 5, 2016 from http://csis.org/files/publication/issues_insightsvol15no3.pdf.

USMC Futenma is one of seven UNC (United Nation Command) bases in Japan and functions asa rear airfield. During the Korean War, UNC supported the Republic of Korea by providing core military andstrategic directions; today, it continues to support the Korean Armistice Agreement.

B. THE BASES IN OKINAWA ARE MUCH CLOSER TO POTENTIAL POINTS OF CONFLICT THAN BASES IN

MAINLAND JAPAN.

Jenny Lin, (Analyst, Center for Strategic and International Studies), ISSUES & INSIGHTS, Feb. 2015.Retrieved Feb. 5, 2016 from http://csis.org/files/publication/issues_insightsvol15no3.pdf.

The presence of US forces in Okinawa is of strategic importance, because it provides the US withforward deployment and logistics capabilities. Japan hosts roughly 53,000 US military personnel anddedicates 89 facilities for their use; of the 89 facilities, 37 are on Okinawa. These major forward facilitiesallow the alliance to execute its overall strategic objectives under time constraints.

Michael Schiffer, (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs), CONGRESSIONALDOCUMENTS AND PUBLICATIONS, Mar. 17, 2010. Retrieved Feb. 6, 2016 from Nexis.

The only readily deployable U.S. ground forces between Hawaii and India are the U.S. Marines located onOkinawa. And the Marines serve a much broader purpose in the region beyond merely deterring conflict andfighting in contingencies. III MEF forces led U.S. humanitarian assistance efforts in Indonesia, Bangladesh,and Burma - often in close coordination with their counterparts in Japan's Self-Defense Forces. Given thathours matter following a natural disaster, the presence of the U.S. Marines in Okinawa is critical for ensuring atimely response with capabilities no one else can bring to bear.

John Pike, (Dir., GlobalSecurity.org & former Dir., Military Analysis Section, Federation of American Scientists),MILITARY: OKINAWA, JAPAN, 2015. Retrieved Feb. 5, 2016 from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/okinawa.htm.

The early US explorers labeled Okinawa as the "Keystone of the Pacific" since Taipei, Shanghai, HongKong, Seoul, Manila, and Tokyo all lay within a 1,500 kilometer radius of the islands. Okinawa is equidistantfrom several parts of the Pacific, whether it's Tokyo, Seoul, Taiwan or the Philippines. If there is a trouble spotin the Pacific and the Department of Defense needs to move forces quickly, Okinawa had the facilities tosupport that response. The forward deployment on Okinawa significantly shortened transit times, therebypromoting early arrival in potential regional trouble spots such as the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan straits,a significant benefit in the initial stages of a conflict. For example, it takes 2 hours to fly to the Korean peninsulafrom Okinawa, as compared with about 5 hours from Guam, 11 hours from Hawaii, and 16 hours from thecontinental United States. Similarly, it takes about 1.5 days to make the trip from Okinawa by ship to SouthKorea, as compared with about 5 days from Guam, 12 days from Hawaii, and 17 days from the continentalUnited States.

C. THE KADENA AIRFIELD IN OKINAWA IS THE CENTERPIECE OF U.S. AIR FORCE PRESENCE IN EAST

ASIA.

Yukie Yoshikawa, (Former Fellow, Regional Security Policy Division of the Okinawa Prefectural Government,NIKKEI BUSINESS ONLINE, May 20, 2015. Retrieved Feb. 4, 2016 fromhttp://mansfieldfdn.org/mfdn2011/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/The-Voice-of-Okinawa.pdf.

The most important U.S. military facility is Kadena Air Base, which is said to be the biggest air base inEast Asia. At twenty square kilometers it covers nearly twice the area of Narita Airport. It houses the Air Force’slargest military wing, and serves as a center for special operations, reconnaissance and patrolling. Also, duringthe Vietnam War it served as an attack base, with B-52 strategic bombers taking off every day headed for theirtargets. This air base is essential to the U.S. for regional patrolling in peacetime, and as a central attack andlogistics base in times of crisis.

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D. THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN OKINAWA IS ESSENTIAL TO PRESIDENT OBAMA’S “PIVOT TO ASIA.”

Sarah Bird, (Staff), NEW YORK TIMES, May 22, 2014. Retrieved Feb. 1, 2016 from Nexis.Today, Okinawa is the stake from which our military would like its pivot into Asia to radiate. The prefecture

currently hosts more than half of the 50,000 American military personnel stationed in the Japanese archipelago,along with Osprey helicopters, F-15C Eagle jets and anti-submarine planes. The Pentagon maintains that theyare there to maintain stability in the Pacific, as China and Japan are rattling swords over a clump of uninhabitedrocks above a resource-rich seabed located roughly 250 miles from the Ryukyu Islands.

David McNeill, (Staff), IRISH TIMES, Nov. 20, 2014, 13.Okinawa's strategic importance has grown with President Barack Obama's so-called pivot to Asia and the

eruption of a territorial dispute in 2012 over tiny islands in the East China Sea, called Senkaku in Japan andDiaoyu in China. US marines might be ordered to help retake the islands, just 270 nautical miles fromOkinawa's main island, in the unlikely event that Chinese troops launch an invasion.

E. THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE ON OKINAWA IS ESSENTIAL TO THE STRENGTH OF THE U.S.-JAPAN

SECURITY ALLIANCE.

JAPAN TIMES, Jan. 21, 2014, 10.The task of keeping intact the important functions of Futenma Air Station, which is responsible for

transporting U.S. marines stationed in the prefecture, is of key significance to the Japan-U.S. alliance andJapan's national security.

Barack Obama, JAPAN TIMES, Apr. 23, 2014, 3.At the same time, it's important to remember that the U.S. Marine Corps presence on Okinawa is absolutely

critical to our mutual security. It plays a key role in the defense of Japan. American forces on Okinawasupported relief efforts after the Japanese earthquake and tsunami three years ago as well as the response tolast year's typhoon in the Philippines. They stand ready to respond to a wide range of contingencies, includingfuture natural disasters and humanitarian crises.

Emma Chanlett-Avery, (Specialist in Asian Affairs, Congressional Research Service), THE U.S. MILITARYPRESENCE IN OKINAWA AND THE FUTENMA BASE CONTROVERSY, Jan. 20, 2016, 4.

Okinawa’s location has become more strategically important over the past few decades. In the post-WorldWar II environment, Japan’s northern islands were seen as a bulwark to contain the Soviet Union’s Pacificfleet. Post-Cold War security threats include the potential flashpoints of the Korean Peninsula and the TaiwanStrait, but more recent assertiveness by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in the SouthChina Sea and East China Sea has drawn growing attention from Department of Defense (DOD) planners.The U.S. military presence in Japan, and particularly Okinawa, allows it to fulfill its obligations under the 1960Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security to not only defend Japan but to maintain security in the Asia-Pacificregion.

III. CLAIMS THAT U.S. BASES DISADVANTAGE THE OKINAWAN PEOPLE ARE MISGUIDED.

A. U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE SUSTAINS THE ECONOMY OF OKINAWA.

Hirayama Motoh, (Board Member, Grassroots Movement to Remove U.S. Bases from Okinawa and theWorld), ANOTHER JAPAN IS POSSIBLE: NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND GLOBAL CITIZENEDUCATION, 2008, 148.

After the reversion in 1972 and throughout the "bubble period" (marked by skyrocketing land and stockprices in the Japanese economy) from 1986 to 1990, U.S. base-related business constituted 70 percent of theOkinawan economy.

Alexander Cooley, (Prof., Political Science, Barnard College), BASE POLITICS: DEMOCRATIC CHANGEAND THE U.S. MILITARY OVERSEAS, 2008, 48.

Perhaps the most remarkable case of economic bargaining for basing access can be found on theJapanese island prefecture of Okinawa and the triangular relationship among the United States military, thegovernment of Japan, and the citizens and authorities on Okinawa. As a tacit quid pro quo for hosting 75percent of all exclusive-use U.S. military facilities in Japan, the island receives an array of rental payments,burden payments, and public works and construction funds from the government of Japan. These economicincentives provided by the mainland have been sufficient to ensure that a tacit majority of Okinawan citizenssupports the U.S. military presence, despite the island's bloody World War II history, its pervasive culture ofantimilitarism, and the vocal protests of local antibase NGOs.

B. THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT STRONGLY SUPPORTS U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN OKINAWA.

Justin McCurry, (Staff), CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Nov. 6, 2015. Retrieved Jan. 25, 2016 from Nexis."[Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo] Abe wants to push this," [Professor Mozchizki] says. "He is very

concerned about China, and thinks that building the base [at Henoko] is vital vis-a-vis deterrence. He believesthat if it doesn't get built, it will send entirely the wrong signal to China.

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C. IN THE MOST RECENT ELECTION, THE OKINAWAN PEOPLE EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR PRIME

MINISTER ABE’S IN SUPPORT OF U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE.

Reiji Yoshida, (Staff, Japan News), GINOWAN MAYORAL VICTORY GIVES ABE MUCH-NEEDEDAMMUNITION IN FUTENMA BATTLE, Jan. 26, 2016. Retrieved Feb. 6, 2016 fromhttp://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/01/25/national/politics-diplomacy/ginowan-mayoral-victory-gives-abe-much-needed-ammunition-in-futenma-battle/#.VrYyrvE2L-k.

“I have kept saying the term ‘All Okinawa’ (opposition [to the U.S. military base construction at Henoko])is out of touch with reality,” [Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary, Yoshihide] Suga told reporters at the primeminister’s office. “This time, I think local people chose the incumbent while considering various issues, includingthose involving the economy, child welfare, urban development and military bases,” he said. The result of theGinowan race will give the central government powerful ammunition for its claim that there is backing inOkinawa for the Henoko project, including by the mayor of Ginowan, the city that hosts Futenma.

AFP News, ANTI-BASE OKINAWA CANDIDATE LOSES KEY MAYORAL POLL, Jan. 24, 2016. RetrievedFeb. 5, 2016 from http://news.yahoo.com/anti-okinawa-candidate-loses-key-mayoral-poll-media-164056822.html.

A candidate backed by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe claimed victory in a mayoral election inOkinawa on Sunday, beating an opponent of a planned new US military base there.

Emma Chanlett-Avery, (Specialist in Asian Affairs, Congressional Research Service), THE U.S. MILITARYPRESENCE IN OKINAWA AND THE FUTENMA BASE CONTROVERSY, Jan. 20, 2016, 7.

The views of Okinawans are far from monolithic. Many residents of base-hosting communities appreciatethe economic benefits, whether as employees on the bases, as local business owners who serve Americancustomers, or as landowners of base property. Some locals resent the actions of outsiders who focus onenvironmental issues at the expense of economic development.

Emma Chanlett-Avery, (Specialist in Asian Affairs, Congressional Research Service), THE U.S. MILITARYPRESENCE IN OKINAWA ANDTHE FUTENMA BASE CONTROVERSY, Jan. 20, 2016, 13-14.

On the other hand, the residents who would be most directly affected have mixed, and even positive,feelings about the proposed base, possibly due to the economic benefits for the hosting community. A smallmountain range about seven miles wide separates the designated base site in Henoko village from the denselypopulated area of Nago City. It is unlikely that most people living in Nago City would experience the noise ofoverflights near the base. In May 2010 the administrative council of Henoko village, where the base would bebuilt, passed a resolution accepting the relocation of Futenma on the conditions that the runway site be movedfurther into the sea and that the government provide additional compensation. Henoko village residents arereportedly more focused on the economic benefits of the new base and irked by the intrusion ofenvironmentalists.

John Pike, (Dir., GlobalSecurity.org & former Dir., Military Analysis Section, Federation of American Scientists),MILITARY: OKINAWA, JAPAN, Nov. 16, 2009. Retrieved Jan. 9, 2010 from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/okinawa.htm.

Much of the news has focused on complaints of a small group of Okinawan landowners who protest USuse of their property for military operations. According to the US military, less than 1 percent of the 32,000owners object to military use of the land, which falls under the US -Japan security agreement. Some Okinawansobject to the noise generated by US operations, especially around the Air Force's Kadena Air Base and MarineCorps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma (which are located in the middle of urban areas), and risks to civilians fromserious military accidents, including crashes of aircraft. However, there is no consensus among Okinawans onthe bases. Since the employment of Okinawans on U.S. bases is not inconsequential, there is even a sizablethough silent constituency in favor of the status quo.

D. CLAIMS OF ENVIRONMENTAL HARM ARE EXAGGERATED.

JAPAN NEWS, Apr. 3, 2015, 4.The prefectural government claimed that the block installation "has damaged a coral reef." The Defense

Ministry replied that the work "has not damaged those corals that have grown as a coral reef and are subjectto the restriction imposed by the prefectural government." The Defense Ministry said it installed the blocks bycarefully choosing a location so as not to damage any coral reef.

E. OKINAWAN OPPOSITION IS FOCUSED ON THE PROBLEMS WITH THE U.S. MARINE BASE AT

FUTENMA, WHICH IS ONLY ONE OF DOZENS OF U.S. BASES ON THE ISLAND.

Martin Fackler, (Staff), INTERNATIONAL NEW YORK TIMES, July 4, 2015, 1.Central to [Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo] Abe's vision of a more proactive Japan is fulfilling a nearly

two-decade-old agreement between Tokyo and Washington to relocate the busy Futenma air base, one ofmore than a dozen American military facilities on Okinawa, from its current location in the middle of the crowdedcity of Ginowan in the island's south to Henoko Bay in its less-populated north.

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Sheila Smith, (Senior Fellow for Japan Studies, Council on Foreign Relations), CONGRESSIONALDOCUMENTS AND PUBLICATIONS, Mar. 17, 2010. Retrieved Feb. 6, 2016 from Nexis.

Futenma is only one base in a broad realignment effort, which if implemented will provide a solid foundationfor military cooperation in the decades ahead.

F. THE U.S. AND JAPANESE GOVERNMENTS ARE ACTIVELY WORKING ON A SOLUTION TO THE

FUTENMA BASE CONTROVERSY.

Barack Obama, JAPAN TIMES, Apr. 23, 2014, 3.I know that the people of Okinawa are concerned about the impact of bases, such as the Marine Corps Air

Station in Futenma, that are located in heavily populated areas. We take those concerns very seriously. Ourgoal has always been to have the minimal intrusion on the lives of residents living in these areas, even as wemaintain our commitments to the alliance and our treaties. In fact, working closely with the Japanesegovernment and local leaders, we've already taken a number of steps that have reduced the impact of ourpresence on Okinawa and we'll continue to do so. As part of the realignment of our forces in Japan, we'reworking to close the Futenma facility and relocate to a new facility, consolidate our presence on Okinawa intofewer locations and move many of our forces to Guam and Hawaii. All of this will reduce the impact of ourbases on local communities.

JAPAN NEWS, May 17, 2015, 2.Of the about 19,000 marines stationed in Okinawa, the Japanese and U.S. governments have agreed to

move about 4,000 to Guam and about 5,000 to the U.S. mainland and other sites. The plan to return about1,048 hectares of land south of the U.S. military's Kadena Air Base to be completed as early as fiscal 2028relies on facilities in Guam being ready to receive the units. "The marines' transfer to Guam will lead to thereturn of the large tract of land south of Kadena and be a visible symbol of Okinawa's burden being eased,"the source said, adding that Suga's visit is designed to highlight this effort.

Joseph Gerson, (Dir., American Friends Service Committee in New England), THE BASES OF EMPIRE: THEGLOBAL STRUGGLE AGAINST U.S. MILITARY POSTS, 2009, 61.

As part of the decade-old effort to pacify popular opinion in Okinawa, the Pentagon's plan calls for eithermoving Futenma Air Base, which has long tormented Ginowan City which surrounds it, to a more remote siteon the island or integrating it into the vast Kadena Air Base. It also calls for moving 8,000 marines based inOkinawa to Guam. Meanwhile, a number of command functions, a second aircraft carrier, and other forces areto be transferred from the United States' west coast and Guam to Japan, bringing them closer to China andNorth Korea.

G. THE OKINAWA BASES ARE NOT A DRAIN ON THE U.S. TREASURY – JAPAN PAYS FOR THE BASES.

Eric Talmadge, (Staff), ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 7, 2010. Retrieved Feb. 6, 2016 from Nexis.Japan covers much of the cost for supporting American troops, including utilities, maintenance and

physical upgrades plus the wages of tens of thousands of Japanese civilians working on the bases. Previousgovernments were too willing to pay because they wanted to maintain a special relationship with the UnitedStates, said Eiichi Hoshino, professor of international relations at the University of the Ryukyus.

Joseph Donovan, (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs), CONGRESSIONALDOCUMENTS AND PUBLICATIONS, Mar. 17, 2010. Retrieved Feb. 6, 2016 from Nexis.

The United States and Japan have worked together to update our alliance, through efforts ranging fromthe force posture realignment to the review of roles, missions, and capabilities. The alliance has grown inscope, with cooperation on everything from missile defense to information security. Additionally, Japanprovides approximately $3 billion annually in host nation support to the U.S. military, more than any other U.S.ally.

H. IF THE OBJECT IS TO CUT THE COST OF U.S. FOREIGN MILITARY BASES, OKINAWA WOULD NOT BE

THE PLACE TO START – THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT PAYS FOR THE BASES, UNLIKE MOST

OTHER FOREIGN BASING SITUATIONS.

Louis Hayes, (Prof., Political Science, U. Montana), INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE POLITICS, 2009, 261.In addition to the SDF, the United States maintained more than 50,000 military personnel in Japan and

Okinawa until the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan necessitated the "redeployment" of U.S. forces. The UnitedStates operates a wide variety of weapons systems on or out of Japanese territory. The forces of the twocountries engage in frequent joint exercises, and an agreement was signed in 1978 for joint military planning.Apart from expenditures on their own military establishments, the Japanese contribute to the expense ofmaintaining the American presence. Japan spends far more to offset American basing costs than any othercountry hosting U.S. troops.

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CON CASE #2: U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE CHECKS JAPANESE REARMAMENTThe thesis of this case is that the U.S. bases in Okinawa are essential to prevent the Japanese acquisition of nuclear

weapons. The entire purpose of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance is to assure Japan that it does not have to defend itselfalone against nuclear-armed North Korea and China. It is abundantly clear that Japanese Prime Minister Abe and hiscabinet view continued U.S. military presence in Okinawa as essential to the defense of Japan – especially given Chineseattacks in the East China Sea near Okinawa. If the U.S. were to break its treaty agreement to maintain a military presence,Japan would acquire nuclear weapons, creating dangerous instability in East Asia.

OBSERVATION:

I. PREVENTING JAPANESE ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OUGHT TO BE A CORE CONCERN OF U.S.

FOREIGN POLICY.

A. JAPANESE ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD CAUSE RAPID NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

IN ASIA AND AROUND THE WORLD.

John Haffner, (World Fellow, Yale U.), JAPAN’S OPEN FUTURE: AN AGENDA FOR GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP,2009, 223.

If Japan were to abandon good sense and develop a nuclear weapons program, a perilous Asian armsrace would begin, in a perfect example of mistrust feeding on itself. As the leading Harvard economist RichardCooper warns in a paper written for a Japanese audience, "Those who see China as a 'threat' and actaccordingly may well be making a self-fulfilling prophecy." South Korea, meanwhile--which has been invadedmore than 900 times in 5,000 years and has already experimented with enriched uranium-- would likely be thenext to fall in line, and a domino effect would likely ensue. Japan obtaining the bomb would have an even widerdestabilizing effects.

John Haffner, (World Fellow, Yale U.), JAPAN’S OPEN FUTURE: AN AGENDA FOR GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP,2009, 223.

As a South American friend who spent some time at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inVienna put it, Japan obtaining the bomb would represent the death knell of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Othercountries would ask: If the only country to have suffered a nuclear attack is now prepared to withdraw from orviolate the treaty and house its own bomb, why not us also?

Donald Gross, (Analyst, Center for Strategic and International Studies). THE CHINA FALLACY: HOW THEU.S. CAN BENEFIT FROM CHINA'S RISE AND AVOID ANOTHER COLD WAR, 2013, 212.

China fears that Japan could deploy nuclear weapons in a several month period, should it choose to doso. South Korea could eventually follow suit, not willing to be the odd-man out in a China-North Korea-Japannuclear triangle.

KOREA TIMES, March 14, 2014. Retrieved Jan. 25, 2016 from Nexis.Unless Tokyo gives up its ambition of becoming a potential nuclear power, efforts to denuclearize the

Korean peninsula appear increasingly meaningless, causing a nuclear domino in this already volatile regionand seriously eroding the U.S. nonproliferation strategy. Formerly, Japan’s neighbors did not need to worry somuch about Tokyo s nuclear ambitions because of some compromising forces within the country, such as itspacifist constitution, Tokyo s three-no nuclear policy and anti-nuclear popular sentiment. Since Prime MinisterShinzo Abe took power, however, all these inner checks are seemingly becoming useless, meaning onlyexternal forces can stop, or at least slow, the dangerous scheme.

B. RAPID NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION WOULD RISK NUCLEAR WAR.

H.D. Twihari, (Doctoral Thesis, Aligarh Muslim University), CONCEPT OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, Sept.23, 2015. Retrieved Feb. 6, 2016 from http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in:8080/jspui/bitstream/10603/55822/8/08_chapter 2.pdf.

The rapid proliferation of nuclear weapons constitutes a danger of unimaginable magnitude, which canresult in the complete annihilation of human civilization from the face of the earth.

Ted Greenwood, (Analyst, Council on Foreign Relations), NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: MOTIVES,CAPABILITIES, AND STRATEGIES FOR CONTROL, 1977, 29.

The world could probably adjust to a moderate rate. But rapid proliferation could cause instabilities thatmight be too great for political systems and institutions to handle, making nuclear use or nuclear war morelikely.

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Satyabrata Rai Chowdhuri, (Senior Research Fellow in International Relations at the University of London),NUCLEAR POLITICS, 2004, 245.

The international mechanisms that have been developed over the past decades to impede the spread ofnuclear weapons would be severely weakened by the cancerous political effects of a period of rapidproliferation. Circumvention, abrogation, and abuse of the withdrawal clause would leave the Non-ProliferationTreaty in shreds. Just as aspiring proliferants would tend to ignore the NPT’s proscriptions, so might thesuperpowers and other exporters of nuclear technology come to regard observance of their obligations asincreasingly costly and naïve.

CONTENTION:

I. WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORCES IN OKINAWA WOULD RESULT IN JAPANESE ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR

WEAPONS.

A. JAPAN HAS THE POTENTIAL FOR THE SUDDEN DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

KOREA TIMES, Oct. 25, 2013. Retrieved Jan. 25, 2016 from Nexis.As is well known, Japan has accumulated more than 30 tons of plutonium equivalent to thousands of

nuclear warheads and hundred times more than North Korea’s and is only a screw driver away from turningthe material into end products. Japan s technology to transport such weapons, i.e. its know-how in artificialsatellite launch, is also beyond comparison with North Korea’s. If there comes a time when Tokyo turns thishypothesis into reality under any excuse, Northeast Asia will be one of the world s most dangerous stage ofnuclear build-up, threatening to bring both President Park Geun-hye s Northeast Asian Peace Process andU.S. President Barack Obama s nuclear-free world back to where they started.

KOREA TIMES, June 22, 2012. Retrieved Jan. 25, 2016 from Nexis.Ultra-rightist Japanese politicians, including Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara, have long bragged about

how the island nation can turn itself into one of the largest nuclear powers in the world almost overnight if itwants so, or as a U.S. paper put it, all this is just "a screwdriver's turn away.' Japan has 30 tons of weapons-grade plutonium and 1,200-1,400 kilograms of enriched uranium, enough to make 15,000 nuclear bombs likethe one dropped on Hiroshima in 1945. Tokyo also has state-of-the-art rocket technology for their long-distancedelivery and spy satellites. In short, Japan has the world's third-largest nuclear power generation capacity andis also the third-biggest military spender. What more does it need?

Japanese News Agency Kyodo, BBC MONITORING ASIA PACIFIC, Oct. 21, 2015. Retrieved Jan. 25, 2016from Nexis.

China's disarmament ambassador blasted Japan on Tuesday [20 October] for its growing stockpile ofnuclear fissile materials, expressing concern they could be used to make nuclear weapons and that there are"political forces" in the country pressing for nuclear armament.

Japanese News Agency Kyodo, BBC MONITORING ASIA PACIFIC, Oct. 21, 2015. Retrieved Jan. 25, 2016from Nexis.

Chinese envoy [the the United Nations] Fu Cong said in a speech to the committee that Japan's fissilematerials inventory is large enough to manufacture more than 1,000 nuclear warheads. "Over the years, Japanhas accumulated a huge amount of sensitive nuclear materials, giving rise to grave risks both in terms ofnuclear security and nuclear proliferation," he said, adding that the inventory "far exceeds its legitimate needs."

B. JAPANESE CONCERNS ABOUT ITS SECURITY PLACE IT ON THE BRINK OF DECIDING TO GO

NUCLEAR.

KOREA TIMES, March 14, 2014. Retrieved Jan. 25, 2016 from Nexis.There is little surprise then that an increasing number of U.S. officials have expressed concerns about

Japan s going nuclear since last year. Most recently, Christine Wormuth, U.S. deputy undersecretary ofdefense, did not rule out the possibility Monday that some countries capable of developing nuclear weaponsindependently would push for nuclear armament if and when Washington continues to cut down on its defensespending. Japan clearly is included in this group, she said.

Chung Min-uck, (Staff), KOREA TIMES, July 6, 2012. Retrieved Jan. 25, 2016 from Nexis.A Japanese prime ministerial committee proposed Thursday to allow Japan's self-defense forces to

engage in military activities overseas if its allies are attacked, disregarding the pacifist constitution that prohibitsthe use of self-defense in settling international disputes. Last month, Japan also inserted a clause into its atomicpower-related law on 'security guarantees' laying the legal groundwork for possible nuclear armament.

Sreeram Chaulia, (Prof., International Affairs, Jindal School of International Affairs, India), THE STRAITSTIMES, Sept. 21, 2015. Retrieved Jan. 25, 2016 from Nexis.

Japan is at a historic inflection point and this moment has huge implications both for its national identityand for security in the Asia-Pacific. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has succeeded in passing controversial lawsthat expand the operational scope and strategic orientation of the Self-Defence Forces (SDF), shaking up thepost-World War II status quo of Japan having a passive and geographically constrained military.

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Japanese News Agency Kyodo, BBC MONITORING ASIA PACIFIC, Oct. 21, 2015. Retrieved Jan. 25, 2016from Nexis.

"Some political forces in Japan have continuously clamored for the development of nuclear weapons,claiming that Japan should have nuclear weapons if it wants to be a power that could sway internationalpolitics," [Chinese Envoy to the UN, Fu Cong] said. Speaking to reporters after his speech, Fu claimed thatJapan could produce nuclear weapons in an "extremely short" period of time using its stockpile of separated -or weapons-convertible - plutonium because of the country's advanced level of technology. "Japan haseverything and the only thing that is missing is the so called political decision," Fu said, noting it is a "veryspecial country" in terms of technological know-how.

KOREA TIMES, June 22, 2012. Retrieved Jan. 25, 2016 from Nexis.Tokyo might feel sufficient need to turn its long-cherished ambition into reality. Japan's once-almighty

economy has been languishing for two decades to cede its place to China, and its political influence in this partof the world is even being eclipsed by oil-rich Russia. The security guarantee from the United States hasweakened in part because of America's strategic shift and own decline. North Korea also provides a convenientexcuse through its playing with nuclear fire.

KOREA TIMES, Oct. 25, 2013. Retrieved Jan. 25, 2016 from Nexis.It was natural therefore, that the lingering concerns among the former victims of Imperial Japan, such as

Korea, came to surface this week when a number of U.S. experts raised the possibility of Japan’s nucleararmament under the pretext of threats from North Korea and China. Noting that the nuclear allergy among theJapanese has kept on easing over the past decades, the experts cited that up to one-third of candidates forthe country’s recent parliamentary elections gave a positive answer to the question of whether Tokyo shouldconsider arming itself with nuclear weapons in order to check the rise of China and prepare for possible attacksby suicidal North Korea.

Peter Hartcher, (International Editor), SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Nov. 27, 2012, 11.Despite the wording of its US-imposed constitution renouncing the right to maintain any armed forces

whatsoever, and despite a relatively small defence budget, Japan already has the world's fourth-biggest navyand top-tier access to US military technology. In recent years, Ishihara and Hashimoto have expressed supportfor Japan to arm itself with nuclear weapons, an alarming prospect for many Japanese and for some of itsneighbors. A leading South Korean daily, The Dong-A Ilbo, expressed alarm at their "right-wing extremistideology".

C. ARTICLE 9 OF JAPAN’S CONSTITUTION HAS ALREADY BEEN OFFICIALLY RE-INTERPRETED – IT NO

LONGER PREVENTS NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT.

BUSINESS TIMES, June 30, 2015. Retrieved Jan. 25, 2016 from Nexis.By choosing to reinterpret Article 9, Mr Abe has alarmed surprisingly large numbers of Japanese citizens,

causing them to engage in rare public protests, and has also outraged Japanese scholars and even someofficials. All this has gone relatively unreported outside Japan.

Chung Min-uck, (Staff), KOREA TIMES, June 21, 2012. Retrieved Jan. 25, 2016 from Nexis.Japan has inserted into its nuclear power-related law a clause on 'security guarantees' through the use of

atomic power, triggering suspicions that it is laying the legal groundwork for possible nuclear armament, someexperts said Thursday. According to the Tokyo Shimbun, the upper house of Japan's parliament amended thebasic law on atomic power, Wednesday. The newly added line in Article 2 says Japan should secure the safetyof nuclear use for the protection of people's lives, health and wealth as well as a 'security guarantee.' Japanalso rewrote the law concerning the use of aerospace by removing the phrase 'restricted to peaceful use.'

Gavin Blair, (Staff), CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Sept. 19, 2015. Retrieved Jan. 25, 2016 from Nexis.Japanese awoke Saturday to the news that their nation had undergone its most significant shift in defense

policy since the revision of the Japan-US Security Treaty in 1960. In the very early hours of the morning,security bills that reinterpret the pacifist Article 9 of Japan's Constitution - and that allow its military to engagein fighting abroad even if Japan is not attacked - had finally passed. The bills were carried by a vote of 148 to90 in Japan's Upper House after a record 226 hours of deliberations, delays, and drama across the parliament'stwo chambers. The week of marathon sessions was punctuated by lawmakers' raised fists and shovingmatches, a plethora of procedural blocking measures by the opposition, and large, noisy protests by citizensoutside.

JAPAN NEWS, Aug. 16, 2014, 10.Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's administration decided in July on a new constitutional interpretation that

acknowledged the country's limited ability to exercise the right of collective self-defense. In connection withthis, Mayor Tomihisa Taue of Nagasaki expressed "anxiety and apprehension" in the Peace Declaration ofNagasaki on the 69th anniversary of the atomic bombing of that city on Aug. 9, stating that "the rushed debateover collective self-defense has given rise to the concern that this principle [of pacifism] is wavering." Othersare also averse to the government's reinterpretation of the Constitution, making such claims as that the newgovernment view could "pave the way for Japan to again take part in a war."

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Kang Seung-woo, (Staff), KOREA TIMES, Oct. 23, 2013. Retrieved Jan. 25, 2016 from Nexis.U.S. scholars are saying that the world may witness a nuclear-armed Japan with neighboring countries

including, North Korea growing dangerous in terms of nuclear weapons. In a paper, James Schoff, a seniorassociate of the Carnegie Asia Program, and Richard Samuels, Ford International Professor of PoliticalScience at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, said under the title 'Japan's Nuclear Hedge: Beyond ‘Allergy'and Breakout' that Japan's strategy on nuclear weapons has been ambivalent.

Kang Seung-woo, (Staff), KOREA TIMES, Oct. 23, 2013. Retrieved Jan. 25, 2016 from Nexis.The report [from the Cargnegie and Asia Program] added that two surveys by the 2012 and 2013 general

election candidates showed a third of the respondents in Japan saying the country should consider developinga nuclear arsenal of its own.

KOREA TIMES, June 22, 2012. Retrieved Jan. 25, 2016 from Nexis.The world has long regarded Japan as a virtual nuclear power. On Wednesday, Tokyo took its first step

toward becoming a "real' one. The upper house of Japan's Diet passed an amendment to the country's AtomicEnergy Basic Law to allow the use of nuclear power for "national security,' according to the Tokyo Shimbun.The addition of these controversial words was made so furtively that not only the Japanese public but evenmany Lower House lawmakers didn't know about it, other reports say. Despite denials from the Japanesegovernment, there should be little doubt about Tokyo's intention - nuclear armament. The stealthy way theJapanese parliament handled the matter proves it.

Li Xuemei, (Staff, Xinhua News Agency), BBC MONITORING ASIA PACIFIC, Dec. 29, 2013. Retrieved Jan.25, 2016 from Nexis.

The more dangerous thing is that Abe has negated history as a means to rearm Japan and revise thePeace Constitution in order to acquire the war-making power. In the past year he has wielded the banner ofthe so-called "positive pacifism" to wantonly expand military armament and to qualitatively and quantitativelyincrease Japan's capability for military offensive in an all-round way. For this purpose, he also forcefully impelsthe Parliament to pass the Secrecy Law at year-end in order to provide convenience for arbitrary actions onarms expansion, war preparation, and other major issues.

D. U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN JAPAN IS THE LAST REMAINING CHECK ON JAPANESE REARMAMENT.

Dean Cheng, (Chinese Military Analyst, CNA Corporation’s Project Asia), JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY, 4th

Quarterly, 2009, 34.On the one hand, the security commitment from the United States has obviated the necessity for Japan to

create its own conventional or nuclear deterrents, thereby allowing it to maintain its "peace constitution," whichformally renounces war as an instrument of national policy. Both Japanese and Asians generally would preferto see Japan continue to operate under such strictures. At the same time, the U.S. alliance constitutes whatone American Marine general termed the "cork in the bottle" on any Japanese rearmament.

Louis Hayes, (Prof., Political Science, U. Montana), INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE POLITICS, 2009, 258.Although the SOFA creates an "inequity favoring the United States," the Japanese government has

considered the alliance vital to the country's security. It is seen in Tokyo as enhancing the credibility of theAmerican deterrence, thus making American defense assistance more reliable. As the Japanese governmentsees it, if Japan is to avoid a major military buildup, there is little choice but to rely on the armed strength of theUnited States.

Jennifer Lind, (Prof., Government, Dartmouth), FOREIGN AFFAIRS, May/June 2009, 138.South Korea's Ministry of National Defense has identified Japan as a potential security threat, and it has

called for increasing South Korea's maritime power. This wariness of Japan has also led South Koreans to seethe U.S.-Japanese security alliance as essential for keeping a lid on Japanese ambition and stabilizing EastAsia. Crises over textbooks or shrine visits have caused Japan's neighbors to recall their ambassadors fromTokyo and cancel summits even when these countries were negotiating with Japan about vital issues, such asNorth Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Woosang Kim, (Prof., Political Science, Yonsei U., Seoul). THE UNITED STATES AND NORTHEAST ASIA:DEBATES, ISSUES, AND THE NEW ORDER, 2008, 130.

In the long term, however, if a significant change of this partnership in the future occurs, the region'ssecurity environment would be drastically shaken. To begin with, the change would imply withdrawal of theU.S. presence. Then, the resurgence of Japan would be expected, and that would have to be balanced ordeterred by China. It means the end of stability in Northeast Asia. The U.S.-Japan alliance has functioned asa balancer between China, Japan, and the United States.

Muthiah Alagappa, (Sr. Fellow, East-West Center), THE LONG SHADOW: NUCLEAR WEAPONS ANDSECURITY IN 21ST CENTURY ASIA, 2008, 72.

Assurance of allies is an important function of military power. A primary role of American alliances andforward deployment in Asia is to assure allies (Japan, Australia, South Korea, and Taiwan) and prevent themfrom pursuing undesired capabilities or engaging in undesired actions.

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Hideki Wakabayashi, (Japan Chair, Center for Strategic and International Studies), THE U.S.-JAPANALLIANCE: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR ENHANCED GLOBAL SECURITY, 2008, 5.

The U.S.-Japan security arrangement, based on the above-mentioned Security Treaty, is the mostimportant pillar for Japan's defense. Japan has been able to enjoy rapid economic growth since World War IIwith a relatively small defense capability because the U.S.-Japan security arrangement has achieved a balanceof military power in the region.

Muthiah Alagappa, (Sr. Fellow, East-West Center), THE LONG SHADOW: NUCLEAR WEAPONS ANDSECURITY IN 21ST CENTURY ASIA, 2008, 503.

Tokyo sees the U.S. extended deterrence commitment as the central pillar of its nuclear policy. The otherpillars are nuclear disarmament of North Korea, development of BMD, maintenance of a latent nuclear weaponcapability, and strong support for the international nonproliferation regime. The key question for Japan is howto ensure the effectiveness and credibility of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence commitment in a newsecurity environment. Although declaratory statements by high-ranking U.S. leaders were deemed sufficient inthe past, Japan now seeks more concrete assurance.

E. JAPAN HAS AN INTENSE FEAR OF U.S. ABANDONMENT – REMOVAL OF TENS OF THOUSANDS OF

U.S. FORCES WOULD SEND THEM OVER THE BRINK.

David Pilling, (Staff), FINANCIAL TIMES, APR. 21, 2010. Retrieved May 7, 2010 fromhttp://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b25acdd4-4d77-11df-9560-00144feab49a.html?nclick_check=1.

The alliance, a bedrock of Japanese prosperity and crucial to US security policy in the Pacific, has survivedructions before. Moreover, any unravelling of the alliance would have profound implications neither side couldtolerate. Without the absolute protection of the US and its nuclear umbrella, Japan would either have to developan independent nuclear capability or forge a new kind of partnership with China.

Christopher Layne, (Prof., Govt,. Texas A&M), TAKING SIDES: CLASHING VIEWS IN AMERICAN FOREIGNPOLICY, 2010, 178.

Driven by fears of US abandonment in a future East Asian crisis, Japan has embarked on a buildup of itsmilitary capabilities and has even hinted that it is thinking about acquiring nuclear weapons. Moreover, the pastseveral years have seen a significant escalation in tensions between China and Japan, fueled both bynationalism and by disputes over control of the South China and East China seas (which may contain largeenergy deposits).

Donald Gross, (Analyst, Center for Strategic and International Studies). THE CHINA FALLACY: HOW THEU.S. CAN BENEFIT FROM CHINA'S RISE AND AVOID ANOTHER COLD WAR, 2013, 200.

If Japan were to become alarmed that improved U.S. relations with China were occurring at Japan'sexpense by effectively undermining its security, Japan could obtain "compensation," as Michael Greenobserves, by undertaking a large-scale military buildup or becoming a nuclear weapons state (drawing onexisting stocks of plutonium to manufacture nuclear bombs). The prospect of Japan seeking "great power"status by military means—although entirely contrary to current Japanese policy—would deeply unsettle theregion and lead to serious instability rather than an outcome that is mutually beneficial to both the U.S. andJapan.

John Haffner, (World Fellow, Yale U.), JAPAN’S OPEN FUTURE: AN AGENDA FOR GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP,2009, 220.

Japan feels increasingly insecure. Although Pyongyang has threatened to turn Seoul and Tokyo into a"sea of fire," and its 2006 announcement of a successful nuclear test met with understandable alarm, at thetime of writing, the North Korean threat seems to be receding. Rather, the prospect of China's rise, especiallyin conjunction with cracks and fissures in US foreign policy and influence, is giving renewed support to thenuclear argument among hawks in Japan.

F. THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT VIEWS THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN OKINAWA AS ESSENTIAL TO

ITS SECURITY.

Nanae Kuraschige, (Staff, Asahi Shimbun), OKINAWA, THE FRONT LINE OF JAPAN’S DEFENSE, Aug. 1,2012. Retrieved Feb. 6, 2016 from http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201208010055.

Okinawa serves as a vital bulwark against China as the giant neighbor presses territorial claims and flexesits military muscle in waters around Japan, according to this year's defense white paper. By emphasizing thestrategic importance of Okinawa, the Defense Ministry apparently seeks to highlight the deterrence power ofU.S. military forces stationed in the southernmost prefecture. It says the U.S. military presence is a "lifeline" forJapan in terms of the Japan-U.S. alliance. The document, released July 31 at a Cabinet meeting, cites theimportance of defending the Nansei Islands, which extend some 1,000 kilometers near major sea lanes in asouthwesterly direction almost as far as Taiwan. The Japanese government regards cooperation with U.S.forces stationed in Japan as indispensable in countering China's rapid military buildup and aggressive navalposturing in the Pacific Ocean.

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Nanae Kuraschige, (Staff, Asahi Shimbun), OKINAWA, THE FRONT LINE OF JAPAN’S DEFENSE, Aug. 1,2012. Retrieved Feb. 6, 2016 from http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201208010055.

For the first time, the [Japanese government] white paper came with graphics and explanations titled,"Geopolitical location of Okinawa and the significance and the role of the U.S. Marine Corps stationed inOkinawa." The graphics also show routes that Chinese warships have taken to venture into the Pacific Oceanby passing through the Nansei Islands, concluding that "Okinawa is located in a strategically important area.""The stationing of U.S. forces in Okinawa is contributing greatly to the safety of Japan and the peace andstability of Asia and the Pacific region," it says.

Shannon Tiezzi, (Staff), JAPAN TIMES, Nov. 18, 2015. Retrieved Feb. 6, 2016 from http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/11/18/commentary/japan-commentary/okinawas-base-conundrum/ - .VrZhkPE2L-k.

Tomohiko Taniguchi, a professor at Keio University and a special adviser to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’sCabinet, describes Okinawa along similar lines. “Given the expansionist policy Beijing is after over the maritimedomain, Okinawa and the strategic value the island chain holds have never been as high as they are now,”Taniguchi says.

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CON CASE #3: BALANCING THE RISE OF CHINAThe thesis of this case is that maintaining the U.S. military presence in Okinawa is essential to balance the rise of

China. China is becoming more powerful, both economically and militarily; it is also becoming more aggressive – threateningto unravel decades of relative peace in East Asia. The Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia” is designed to ensure thatthe rise of China does not cause conflict in a region vital to U.S. interests.

OBSERVATION:

I. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY OUGHT TO SEEK PEACE AND STABILITY IN EAST ASIA.

A. THE U.S. HAS A TREATY COMMITMENT TO DEFEND JAPAN.

G. John Ikenberry, (Prof., Politics, Princeton U.). THE UNITED STATES AND NORTHEAST ASIA: DEBATES,ISSUES, AND THE NEW ORDER, 2008, 21.

American policy toward East Asia is built around hard bilateral security ties and soft multilateral economicrelations. Embedded in these policies are a set of political bargains between the United States and othercountries within the region. The U.S.-Japan alliance is the cornerstone of the regional security order, and thecomplex array of intraregional and trans-Pacific trade and investment agreements is the cornerstone of theeconomic order. The hub-and-spoke defense system has its roots in the early Cold War and the failure of moremultilateral security arrangements that were intended to mirror the Atlantic security pact.

G. John Ikenberry, (Prof., Politics, Princeton U.). THE UNITED STATES AND NORTHEAST ASIA: DEBATES,ISSUES, AND THE NEW ORDER, 2008, 22.

The alliance system--and the U.S.-Japan security pact in particular--has also played a wider stabilizingrole in the region. The American alliance with Japan has solved Japan's security problems, allowing it to forgobuilding up its military capability, and thereby making it less threatening to its neighbors. This has served tosolve or reduce the security dilemmas that would otherwise surface within the region if Japan were to rearmand become a more autonomous and unrestrained military power. At the same time, the alliance makesAmerican power more predictable and connected to the region. Even China has seen the virtues of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

B. PEACE AND STABILITY IN EAST ASIA IS VITAL FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY.

Zou Keyuan, (Senior Research Fellow at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore), LAW OFTHE SEA IN EAST ASIA: ISSUES AND PROSPECTS, 2013, 141.

The South China Sea is part of the “choke points” in the sea lanes of communication in the world. Shippingis of utmost importance to the world economy, carrying well over 90% of world trade. The security of navigationof vessels through these sea lanes is of vital interest for East Asian countries. More than half of the world’smerchant fleet capacity sails through the straits of Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok and the South China Sea.

Robert Willard, (Commander, U.S. Forces, Pacific Command), CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS ANDPUBLICATIONS, Mar. 26, 2010. Retrieved Apr. 15, 2010 from Nexis.

The Strait of Malacca remains one of the world's most strategic waterways with over 60,000 ships transitingannually, carrying half of the world's oil and 90% of the oil imported by China, Japan and South Korea -- oursecond, fourth and seventh largest trading partners, respectively.

Sheila Smith, (Senior Fellow for Japan Studies, Council on Foreign Relations), CONGRESSIONALDOCUMENTS AND PUBLICATIONS, Mar. 17, 2010. Retrieved Apr. 15, 2010 from Nexis.

Finally, economic prosperity in the Asia Pacific demands safe maritime transport of goods and energyresources. The United States has a common interest in anti-piracy cooperation with the countries of the region,and particularly with Japan. Our maritime cooperation should be extended and enhanced to include the ASEANcountries as well as the coalition of partners now working in the Gulf of Aden off the coast of Somalia. Maritimesecurity for the economies of the Asia Pacific is vital, and the stretch of maritime waters from East Asia to SouthAsia constitute a broad area for much needed consultations and cooperation among our governments, andmultilateralizing our maritime cooperation--both civilian and military--would be an essential first step in buildingregional maritime cooperation. Our ability to work with the countries of the Asia Pacific begins with Japan, andshould be a foundation for building regional capacities that will ensure the continued stability of this vibrantmaritime region.

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CONTENTIONS:

I. THE RISE OF CHINA THREATENS PEACE AND STABILITY IN EAST ASIA.

A. CHINESE ACTIONS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA HAVE INCREASINGLY THREATENED ITS NEIGHBORS.

Donald Kirk, (Staff), KOREA TIMES, Jan. 2, 2014. Retrieved Feb. 1, 2016 from Nexis.The sense of crisis deepens, moreover, as the Chinese persist in flying reconnaissance aircraft near the

cluster of islands in the East China Sea known as the Senkakus in Japan and the Diaoyu in China. WhileChinese fishing boats dart in and out of waters around the islands, chances of an outbreak of war seem all toorealistic.

Geoff Dyer, (Staff, Financial Times), THE CONTEST OF THE CENTURY, 2014, 29-30.Beijing's most extravagant claim is in the South China Sea, where a series of islets, reefs, and rocks are

disputed by a number of countries, including Vietnam, the Philippines, and China. Beijing argues it has ahistorical right to be the dominant power in the area, a claim expressed in China's now famous "nine-dash-line"map, which assumes ownership of 80 to 90 percent of the South China Sea.

B. CHINESE ACTIONS THREATEN VITAL SEA LANES OF COMMUNICATION.

Geoff Dyer, (Staff, Financial Times), THE CONTEST OF THE CENTURY, 2014, 31.Over the last few years, China has shown a willingness to use a form of economic blackmail and bullying

during political disputes that raises real questions about how it would behave if it were ever to control the sea-lanes through the South China Sea. During a standoff with Tokyo in 2010, after the Japanese coast guardarrested a Chinese fisherman who had rammed one of its vessels in disputed waters, China limited exports toJapan of rare earths—a group of commodities which China controls and which are central to the manufactureof many products, such as cell phones.

Joshua Kurlantzick, (Sr. Fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations), THE WASHINGTONPOST, Jan. 17, 2016, B1.

The real challenges posed by China require all of America's focus at a time when the United States isshrinking its Army and is no longer the only global economic superpower. Those challenges include China'sclaims in the South China Sea, through which half the world's trade passes, and its exertions in the East ChinaSea, which would give Beijing the right to block Japanese boats and fighter planes from the region aroundnortheast Asia. And China is racing to modernize its navy to help support these power grabs. These are thedevelopments worth fighting.

Robert Willard, (Commander, U.S. Forces, Pacific Command), CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS ANDPUBLICATIONS, Mar. 26, 2010. Retrieved Apr. 15, 2010 from Nexis.

Motivated by a need for indigenous natural resources and consolidation of self-proclaimed sovereigntylimits, the PRC has re-asserted its claims to most of the South China Sea and reinforced its position in theregion, including the contested Spratly and Paracel Islands. The PLA Navy has increased its patrols throughoutthe region and has shown an increased willingness to confront regional nations on the high seas and withinthe contested island chains. Additionally, China lays claim to the Senkakus, administered by Japan, andcontests areas on its border with India. As an integral part of its strategy, the PRC has interpreted certaininternational laws in ways contrary to international norms, such as the UN Convention for Law of the Sea(UNCLOS), and has passed domestic laws that further reinforce its sovereignty claims.

Lyle Goldstein, (Prof., China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College), MEETING CHINA HALFWAY, 2015, 235-236.

Shortly following this political drama in Tokyo, a major crisis developed in China-Japan relations duringSeptember 2010. The so-called Trawler Crisis occurred when a Chinese fishing trawler captain maneuveredaggressively against Japanese Coast Guard vessels in the vicinity of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The JapanCoast Guard promptly arrested the trawler captain and his crew and impounded the ship. If this had been theend of the crisis, it would simply have resembled a string of similar incidents related to fisheries that haveoccurred over the last decades. But Beijing did not react well to what it considered to be the rough handling ofthe trawler and its crew. Not only did it demand their immediate release, but in an unusual step, China arresteda number of Japanese nationals working in China and threatened to pursue charges against them if thefishermen were not promptly released. More unprecedented still was the alleged effort by China to suddenlyhalt or at least radically slow the importing of rare earths into Japan. These materials were said to be ofincredible importance to the health of Japan's economy and, moreover, Japan (and many other countries) haddeveloped a severe dependence on China for imports in this crucial sector.

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Brahma Chellaney, (Staff), THE AUSTRALIAN, Oct. 21, 2015, 10.In the strategically vital South China Sea, the People's Republic has built artificial islands and military

outposts, and it has captured the disputed Scarborough Shoal from The Philippines. In the East China Sea, ithas unilaterally declared an air-defence identification zone covering territories that it claims but does not control.With US President Barack Obama hesitating to impose any costs on China for these aggressive moves,Japan's leaders are taking matters into their own hands. Recognising the inadequacy of Japan's existingnational security policies and laws to protect the country in this new context, the government has establisheda national security council and moved to "normalise" its security posture. By easing Japan's longstanding, self-imposed ban on arms exports, boosting defence spending, and asserting its right to exercise "collective self-defence", the government has opened the path for Japan to collaborate more actively with friendly countriesand to pursue broader overseas peacekeeping missions.

JAPAN NEWS, Jan. 10, 2016, 4.The hard-line stance of China, which is trying to drive the United States out of the Asian order and establish

its own hegemony, is becoming increasingly conspicuous. Chinese President Xi Jinping's governmentannounced that an airfield has been completed on one of its artificial islands in the South China Sea and thata "civilian plane" test-landed there. China is apparently trying to make its effective control of the South ChinaSea a fait accompli while covering up its true intention of turning the artificial islands into military strongholds.

C. THE THREAT OF CONFLICT IN EAST ASIA HAS INCREASED.

Bill Hayton, (Staff, BBC News), THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN ASIA, 2014,264.

There are no easy alternatives to continuing strife in the South China Sea. No side wishes to provoke aconflict but none is willing to reduce tension by moderating its territorial claims. With every rock now eitheroccupied or under the control of one or other country, the stress has shifted to the spaces in between and theresources that may, or may not, lie beneath. There is, unfortunately, plenty of opportunity for conflict to emergeand escalate.

Michael Pillsbury, (Dir., Center on Chinese Studies, Hudson Institute), THE HUNDRED YEAR MARATHON:CHINA’S SECRET STRATEGY TO REPLACE AMERICA AS THE GLOBAL SUPERPOWER, 2015, 187.

China's neighbors are already feeling the spillover effects of its reckless approach to development. Due towater contamination in China, much of the country's fishing industry has moved into the contested waters ofthe East China Sea, the South China Sea, and the Pacific Ocean. In 2011 alone, the South Korean CoastGuard sent back 470 Chinese fishing boats for illegally entering South Korean waters. There are regulardisputes like these between China and Vietnam, the Philippines, and Japan. They have the real potential tolead to armed conflict.

Bruce Jones, (Dir., Foreign Policy Program, Brookings Institution), STILL OURS TO LEAD: AMERICA, RISINGPOWERS, AND THE TENSIONS BETWEEN RIVALRY AND RESTRAINT, 2014, 151-152.

There are two worries. First is a Japan-China clash, which could result from the dispute over the islandsescalating, possibly through an accident. Second, and even worse because of America's treaty obligations todefend Japanese-administered territory, a Japan-China clash could pull the United States into active conflictin Asia. A Financial Times editorial warned, "The shadow of 1914 falls over the Pacific"; several opinion piecesand essays warned of mounting risks; and in a widely read foreign policy blog a long essay was titled, "Eve ofDisaster: Why 2013 Eerily Looks Like the World of 1913, on the Cusp of the Great War."

Christopher Coker, (Prof., London School of Economics), THE IMPROBABLE WAR: CHINA, THE UNITEDSTATES AND THE CONTINUING LOGIC OF GREAT POWER CONFLICT, 2015, 114.

North Korea could unravel quickly if a calculated act of aggression was to end in a colossal miscalculation.If tension escalated the Japanese and South Korean stock markets could collapse within weeks. Foreignworkers might begin leaving in droves. North Korean cyber-attacks could paralyse South Korea's publicservices. The Japanese and Chinese navies might shadow each other before coming into conflict. HenryKissinger is not alone in believing that the real danger is of an accident, incident or simply miscalculation onthe Korean Peninsula, and he is particularly critical of the fact that the United States and China do not appearto have a plan to deal with that situation should it arise.

D. ALL OF CHINA’S NEIGHBORS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA SEEK THE STABILITY PROVIDED BY U.S.

MILITARY PRESENCE.

Daniel Twining, (Sr. Fellow, German Marshall Fund of the United States), NIKKEI ASIAN REVIEW, Sept. 24,2015. Retrieved Jan. 25, 2016 from Nexis.

Nations as diverse as the Philippines, Vietnam, Singapore and India understand that China risksdominating Asia in the absence of countervailing powers. These include Japan and also the U.S., whoseregional leadership and military presence are made possible primarily by its alliance with Japan.

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II. U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN OKINAWA PROVIDES AN IMPORTANCE BALANCE TO THE RISE OF CHINA.

A. THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN OKINAWA IS STRATEGICALLY LOCATED IN THE SEA LANES.

Jenny Lin, (Analyst, Center for Strategic and International Studies), ISSUES & INSIGHTS, Feb. 2015.Retrieved Feb. 5, 2016 from http://csis.org/files/publication/issues_insightsvol15no3.pdf.

Due to Okinawa proximity and access to Eurasia, the Pacific Ocean, Japan‟s sea lanes, and the region‟s sea lines of communication, U.S. forces can respond rapidly. For instance, in contingencies arising in places surrounding Japan, response time is significantly shorter in comparison to deploying troops fromthe US mainland, Hawaii, or Guam.

Emma Chanlett-Avery, (Specialist in Asian Affairs, Congressional Research Service), THE U.S. MILITARYPRESENCE IN OKINAWA AND THE FUTENMA BASE CONTROVERSY, Jan. 20, 2016, 4.

The intensification of the territorial dispute between Japan and China over small islands in the East ChinaSea has provided another rationale for the approximately 19,000 marines stationed on Okinawa. The mainisland of Okinawa is only 270 nautical miles from the disputed islets, called Senkaku in Japan, Diaoyu inChina, and Diaoyutai in Taiwan. The potential role of U.S. Marines in defending and/or retaking uninhabitedislands from a hypothetical invasion force is unclear, but the operational capabilities of the Okinawa-basedMarines are aligned with the needs of such a mission.

B. WITHDRAWAL OF THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN OKINAWA WILL EMBOLDEN CHINA.

David McNeill, (Staff), IRISH TIMES, Nov. 20, 2014, 13.Privately, US defense experts express weariness at the tug-of-war over Futenma/Henoko but say closing

the base would send "the wrong signal" to Beijing.

Martin Jacques, (Visiting Sr. Fellow, London School of Economics), WHEN CHINA RULES THE WORLD: THEEND OF THE WESTERN WORLD AND THE BIRTH OF A NEW GLOBAL ORDER, 2009, 353.

The waning of American influence in East Asia also has implications for its position globally, on the onehand serving to embolden China and on the other acting as a marker and signal for other nations.

C. ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO ENSURE PEACE IN EAST ASIA.

Christopher Layne, (Prof., Govt,. Texas A&M), TAKING SIDES: CLASHING VIEWS IN AMERICAN FOREIGNPOLICY, 2010, 172-173.

The conventional wisdom notwithstanding, there is little support in the historical record for the idea thateconomic interdependence leads to peace. After all, Europe never was more interdependent (not onlyeconomically but also, among the ruling elites, intellectually and culturally) than before World War I. It wasfamously predicted, on the eve of World War I, that the economic ties among Europe's great powers hadushered in an era in which war among them was unthinkable. Yet, as we know, the prospect of forgoing theeconomic gains of trade did not stop Europe's great powers from fighting a prolonged and devastating war.

Christopher Layne, (Prof., Govt,. Texas A&M), TAKING SIDES: CLASHING VIEWS IN AMERICAN FOREIGNPOLICY, 2010, 173.

Beijing's actual foreign policy furnishes a concrete reason to be skeptical of the argument thatinterdependence leads to peace. China's behavior in the 1996 crisis with Taiwan (during which it conductedmissile tests in waters surrounding the island in the run-up to Taiwan's presidential election) suggested it wasnot constrained by fears that its muscular foreign policy would adversely affect its overseas trade.

D. U.S. HEGEMONY IN EAST ASIA PROMOTES PEACE AND STABILITY.

Daniel Blumenthal, (Fellow, American Enterprise Institute), MARITIME DISPUTES AND SOVEREIGNTYISSUES IN EAST ASIA, Hrg., Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, July 15, 2009, 30.

Since the end of World War II, Asia has enjoyed relative security, underwritten in large measure by ourown military power and set of security commitments. It is within that security cocoon that most Asian nationshave enjoyed peace, prosperity, and increasing democratization. Asia today, by almost any measure --economic, political, demographic, and military -- is fast becoming the center of gravity of international politics.Yet China's rise is beginning to change the sense of stability and security that has allowed for increasing peace,prosperity, and democratization. As a resident Pacific power, we want to see an Asia that continues to growand prosper peacefully. An Asia in which the United States is not seen as the clearly predominant militarypower will inevitably be a less stable Asia. An insecure region will be more concerned with security competitionthan with trade, internal reforms, and regional cooperation.

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Malcolm Foster, (Staff), ASSOCIATED PRESS ONLINE, Jan. 29, 2010. Retrieved Feb. 6, 2016 from Nexis.U.S. Ambassador John Roos defended U.S. troop levels in Japan Friday, saying their presence is essential

for maintaining peace and prosperity in the region, and stressed the importance of a key Marine base whosedelayed relocation has frayed bilateral relations. In a speech at Tokyo's Waseda University, Roos reaffirmedthe importance of the U.S.-Japan security pact, now in its 50th year, under which nearly 50,000 Americantroops are stationed in Japan. He called them "front-line forces" in case of emergencies or regional securitythreats. "Our alliance is the critical stabilizing force in this area of the world," he said, highlighting China'smilitary modernization and North Korea's missile and nuclear programs. "A North Korea that falls into internaldisarray would cause monumental security challenges to this region," he said.

G. John Ikenberry, (Prof., Politics, Princeton U.). THE UNITED STATES AND NORTHEAST ASIA: DEBATES,ISSUES, AND THE NEW ORDER, 2008, 3.

The United States has become an inseparable part of East Asian geopolitical and geoeconomic destinysince the end of World War II. Its strategic posture is the single most important determinant of regionaldynamics in East Asia.

Muthiah Alagappa, (Sr. Fellow, East-West Center), THE LONG SHADOW: NUCLEAR WEAPONS ANDSECURITY IN 21ST CENTURY ASIA, 2008, 55.

America's preponderant power and the public goods it provides are widely acknowledged in Asia. Itssecurity roles include creating a stable balance of power through its interaction with the major Asian powers(anchoring Japan and encouraging it to become a full security partner, engaging and balancing China to makeit a responsible stakeholder, and promoting and integrating India as an important power); reassuring andcontrolling allies (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan); deterring aggression and defusing conflicts across theTaiwan Strait and on the Korean peninsula; defusing and preventing escalation of the India-Pakistan conflict;securing sea lines of communication; countering proliferation of WMD; and combating terrorism. Japan,Australia, Taiwan, and many ASEAN countries have actively sought and support U.S. security commitmentsin Asia.

E. THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN EAST ASIA IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH U.S.-CHINA ENGAGEMENT.

Muthiah Alagappa, (Sr. Fellow, East-West Center), THE LONG SHADOW: NUCLEAR WEAPONS ANDSECURITY IN 21ST CENTURY ASIA, 2008, 56.

Concerned about the uncertainty that surrounds the future behavior of China and concerned aboutpreserving its primacy, Washington has responded to the rise of China with a mix of policies encapsulated interms like "responsible stakeholder" and "favorable balance of power." These policies seek to engage,socialize, restrain, hedge, and balance China with the goal of making it an economic partner in an internationalsystem underpinned by the values advanced by Washington.