LGUS LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES Liability Arising From Ultra Vires or Bad Faith CHAVEZ VS SANDIGANBAYAN [G.R. No. 91391, January 24, 1991] Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena correctly observed that there is no general immunity arising solely from occupying a public office. The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is a showing of bad faith. Moreover, the petitioner's argument that the immunity proviso under Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 1 also extends to him is not well-taken. A mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the charges being automatically dropped. Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic. Where the petitioner exceeds his authority as Solicitor General acts in bad faith, or, as contended by the private respondent, "maliciously conspires with the PCGG commissioners in persecuting respondent Enrile by filing against him an evidently baseless suit in derogation of the latter's constitutional rights and liberties", there can be no question that a complaint for damages may be filed against him. High position in government does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure another. The actions governed by Articles 19, 20, 21, and 32 of the Civil Code on Human Relations may be taken against public officers or private citizens alike. The issue is not the right of respondent Enrile to file an action for damages. He has the right. Facts: Civil case was filed against Enrile in the Sandiganbayan for alleged illegal activities made by Enrile during the Marcos era. Enrile filed a motion to dismiss and compulsory counter-claim. In the counter-claim Enrile moved to implead Chavez and other PCGG officials on the basis that the case filed against him was a “harassment suit”. The motion to implead Chavez and others was granted by the Sandiganbayan. Chavez and the PCGG officials raised the defense that they are immune from suit by virtue of Sec. 4 of Executive Order NO. 1. It was found in the records of the PCGG, declared by Jovito Salonga, the there are no proof linking Enrile with the illegal activities performed by Marcos. It was further averred that the case filed against Enrile was instigated by Sol. Gen. Chavez. Sol. Gen. Chavez defended himself by saying that he was acting as a counsel and cannot be made a defendant in a counter-claim. Issue: Whether or not Sol. Gen. Chavez can be made liable for damages in filing the suit against Enrile. Held: The court held that the grounds for allowing the compulsory counter-claim of Enrile was based on the malice or bad faith of Chavez in filing the suit. It was further stated by the court that immunity from suit is granted only because of the fact that the Commission has a multitude of task. Immunity for suit on members of the PCGG and other public officers is available only if such officers are acting in good faith and in

the performance of their duty. If the acts done are tainted with bad faith or in excess of authority they can be held liable personally for damages. In the case at bar the Sol. Gen. exceeded his authority and his act is tainted with bad faith by filing baseless suit against Enrile. His office does not give him the license to prosecute recklessly to the injury of another. Thus he is made liable for his actions in the opinion of the court. SAN LUIS VS CA AND BERROYA, JR. [G.R. No. L-80160 June 26, 1989] Facts:

Berroya, Jr. was a quarry superintendent in Laguna.

Gov. San Luis transferred Berroya to the Prov. Engineer's Office pursuant to LOI 14-B.

Berroya challenged the said transfer before the CSC. CSC ruled that the order was violative

of Sec 32 RA 2260, and ordered his return to his regular position.

Instead of complying, Gov. San Luis suspended Berroya for alleged gross discourtesy, inefficiency

and insubordination. CSC ruled the 1 year suspension illegal.

Gov. San Luis appealed the issue before OP. OP reversed the CSC rulings.

MR by Berrayo, OP set aside its previous decision and declared the suspension

improper, ordered payment of back salaries.

San Luis - MR, denied. In the interim, governor issued an Order dismissing Berroya for alleged neglect of duty, frequent unauthorized absences, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of duty and abandonment of office, which order of dismissal was appealed by Berroya to the CSC. CSC declared the dismissal unjustified. Directed reinstatement. Berrayo filed a mandamus to compel his reversion to his previous position. RTC upheld the validity of his dismissal but ordered reinstatement as a matter of equity. CA favored Berroya on appeal. Issue: Whether CA erred in ruling that petitioners be held solidarily liable for payment of salaries and damages Held: No. The provincial governor obstinately refused to reinstate the petitioner, in defiance of the orders of the OP and the Ministry of Local Government and in palpable disregard of the opinion of the CSC, the CA's finding of bad faith cannot be faulted and accordingly, will not be disturbed by this Tribunal Enciso v. Remo, G.R. No. L-23670, September 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 580.] This is in line with our previous ruling in Remo v. Palacio [107 Phil. 803 (1960)] that xxx xxx xxx (i)t having been clearly shown by evidence, that respondent, Deogracias Remo, in his capacity as Mayor of Goa, refused to reinstate the petitioner to his former position in the police force of Goa, despite the orders of Malacanang to do so (Exhs. G and I), and

inspite of the opinion of the Secretary of Finance (Exh. H), the respondent Mayor of Goa, willfully acted in bad faith, and therefore, he, as Mayor of Goa, should pay for damages caused to the petitioner, Angel Enciso. [At pp. 807-808.] It is well-settled that when a public officer goes beyond the scope of his duty, particularly when acting tortiously, he is not entitled to protection on account of his office, but is liable for his acts like any private individual [Palma v. Graciano, 99 Phil. 72 (1956)]. Thus, in Mendoza v. De Leon [33 Phil. 508 (1916)], it was held: Nor are officers or agents of the Government charged with the performance of governmental duties which are in their nature legislative or quasi-judicial liable for the consequences of their official acts, unless it be shown that they act wilfully and maliciously and with the express purpose of inflicting injury upon the plaintiff [at 513; Emphasis supplied]. Accordingly, applying the principle that a public officer, by virtue of his office alone, is not immune from damages in his personal capacity arising from illegal acts done in bad faith [Tabuena v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-16290, October 31, 1961, 3 SCRA 413; Correa v. Court of First Instance of Bulacan, G. R. No. L-46096, July 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 312], the Court holds that petitioner Felicisimo T. San Luis, the Provincial Governor of Laguna who has been sued both in his official and private capacities, must be held personally liable to Berroya for the consequences of his illegal and wrongful acts. In this regard, the Court sustains the appellate court's finding that petitioner San Luis must be held liable to Berroya for moral damages since justice demands that the latter be recompensed for the mental suffering and hardship he went through in order to vindicate his right, apart from the back salaries legally due him [Rama v. Court of Appeals, supra at p. 5061]. The appellate court was clearly warranted in awarding moral damages in favor of respondent Berroya because of the obstinacy of petitioner Governor who arbitrarily and without legal justification refused Berroya's reinstatement in defiance of directives of the administrative agencies with final authority on the matter. We agree with the appellate court that the sum of P 50,000.00 for moral damages is a reasonable award considering the mental anguish and serious anxiety suffered by Berroya as a result of the wrongful acts of petitioner Governor in refusing to reinstate him. Finally, as correctly adjudged by respondent court, petitioner San Luis must likewise answer to Berroya for attorney's fees plus costs and expenses of suit, which have been fixed by said court at P 20,000.00, in view of the wrongful refusal of petitioner provincial governor to afford Berroya his plainly valid and just claim for reinstatement and back salaries. MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI VS COURT OF APPEALS [190 SCRA 206] Facts: 20 May 1986: Action for eminent domain was filed by the City of Makati against the properties of Admiral Finance, Home Bldg System, and Arceli Jo. The appraised value of the property was P5.3M. Private respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of execution. This was issued and a notice of garnishment was served upon the

manager of PNB Buendia branch. However, the sheriff was told that a hold code was placed on the account. Makati: Garnishment must be lifted! The manner of payment in expropriation proceedings should be done in installments. The Municipality later discovered that PS Bank consolidated its ownership over the property as mortgagee/ purchaser. PSB and private respondent entered into a compromise agreement where they agreed to divide the compensation due from the expropriation proceedings. Trial Court: Approved the compromise and ordered the release of the balance of the appraised value of the property. Makati: On appeal, alleged that it has two accounts with the PNB: One for the expropriation of the property, another for statutory obligations and other purposes. ISSUE: WON the funds in the second account can be the subject of execution. HELD: NO. Reasons: The funds deposited in the second PNB account are public funds and the settled rule is that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute. Absent a showing that the MC of Makati passed an ordinance appropriating from its public funds an amount corresponding to the balance due, less the sum of P99T deposited in the first account, no levy under execution may be validly effected on the second account. Where a municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance and its corresponding disbursement. In this case, the RTC decision is not disputed by Makati. For 3 years now, the city enjoyed possession and use of the property notwithstanding its failure to comply with its legal obligation to pay just compensation.

MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERNESTO R. VEGA [G.R. No. 201716: JANUARY 08, 2013] FACTS: For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national and local elections, Petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. (Abundo) vied for the position of municipal mayor. In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate and accordingly served the corresponding terms as mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for his assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a little over one year and one month. Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other. When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoral contest, Torres sought the formers disqualification to run. The RTC declared Abundo as ineligible, under the three-term limit rule, to run in the 2010 elections for the position of, and necessarily to sit as, mayor. In its Resolution, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division affirmed the decision of RTC, which affirmed by COMELEC en banc. ISSUE: Whether or not Abundo has consecutively served for three terms. HELD: The petition is partly meritorious. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Involuntary Interruption of Service The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundos three successive, continuous mayorship was effectively broken during the 2004- 2007 term when he was initially deprived of title to, and was veritably disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to which he, after due proceedings, was eventually declared to have been the rightful choice of the electorate. The declaration of being the winner in an election protest grants the local elected official the right to serve the unexpired portion of the term. Verily, while he was declared winner in the protest for the mayoralty seat for the 2004-2007 term, Abundos full term has been substantially reduced by the actual service rendered by his opponent (Torres). Hence, there was actual involuntary interruption in the term of Abundo and he cannot be considered to have served the full 2004-2007 term. Prior to the finality of the election protest, Abundo did not serve in the mayors office and, in fact, had no legal right to said position. During the pendency of the election protest, Abundo ceased from exercising power or authority. Consequently, the period during which Abundo was not serving as mayor should be considered as a rest period or break in his service because prior to the judgment in the election protest, it was Abundos opponent, Torres, who was exercising such powers by virtue of the still then valid proclamation. Petition is PARTLY GRANTED.

ABELLA VS COMELEC [201 SCRA 253] Abella claims that the Frivaldo and Labo cases were misapplied by the COMELEC. According to him these cases are fundamentally different from SPC No. 88-546 in that the Frivaldo and Labo cases were petitions for a quo warranto filed under section 253 of the Omnibus Code, contesting the eligibility of the respondents after they had been proclaimed duly elected to the Office from which they were sought to be unseated while SPC No. 88-546 which was filed before proclamation under section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code sought to deny due course to Larrazabal's certificate of candidacy for material misrepresentations and was seasonably filed on election day. He, therefore, avers that since under section 6 of Republic Act 6646 it is provided therein that: Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. The votes cast in favor of Larrazabal who obtained the highest number of votes are not considered counted making her a non-candidate, he, who obtained the second highest number of votes should be installed as regular Governor of Leyte in accordance with the Court's ruling in G.R. No. 88004. The petitioner's arguments are not persuasive. While it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to deny due course to the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed before Larrazabal could be proclaimed the fact remains that the local elections of February 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal considered as a bona-fide candidate. The voters of the province voted for her in the sincere belief that she was a qualified candidate for the position of governor. Her votes were counted and she obtained the highest number of votes. The net effect is that the petitioner lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate. In the Frivaldo and Labo cases, this is precisely the reason why the candidates who obtained the second highest number of votes were not allowed to assume the positions vacated by Frivaldo the governorship of Sorsogon, and Labo, the position of mayor in Baguio City. The nature of the proceedings therefore, is not that compelling. What matters is that in the event a candidate for an elected position who is voted for and who obtains the highest number of votes is disqualified for not possessing the eligibility requirements at the time of the election as provided by law, the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes for the same position cannot assume the vacated position. CO vs. HRET Facts: The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests on the grounds that Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines and not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar. Issue: Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a citizen of the Philippines.

Held: Yes. In the year 1895, the private respondent’s grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines from China and established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar. The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905 but was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915, he filed with the court an application for naturalization and was declared a Filipino citizen. In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim. For the elections of 1984 and1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and voted there during those elections. Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural born citizens. Besides, private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines. On the issue of residence, it is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. To require him to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements. TESS DUMPIT-MICHELENA VS. BOADO, [G.R. NO. 163619-20, NOV. 17, 2005] Dumpit-Michelena is running for mayor in the municipality of Agoo, La Union. Her disqualification was sought on the claim that she is a resident and was a registered voter of Naguilian and not Agoo, La Union. Dumpit-Michelena countered that she already acquired a new domicile in Agoo when she purchased a residential lot there, designating a caretaker of her house. Supreme Court held that Dumpit-Michelena failed to comply with the 1-yr. residency requirement in the place where she intends to be elected. REQUIREMENTS FOR A CHANGE OF DOMICILE: (1) an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one (3) acts which correspond with the purpose Dumpit-Michelena failed to establish that she has abandoned her former domicile. Evidence shows that her house in Agoo is beach house and a beach house is at most a place of temporary relaxation. It can hardly be considered a place of residence. Moreover, her designation of a caretaker only shows that she does not regularly reside in the place. DISQUALIFICATIONS (Sec. 68, BP 881) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions

1. committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy 2. spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that

allowed by law 3. solicited, received, or made any prohibited contributions

4. permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country, UNLESS he waives such status

Effect of disqualification: no proclamation of the second placer MERCADO VS MANZANO [307 SCRA 630] For candidates for local elective office with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship. The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under §40 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as "disqualified from running for any elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship." This provision is incorporated in the Charter of the City of Makati. To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. 9 For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship: 1. Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; 2. Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their father's' country such children are citizens of that country; 3. Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship. There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition. The phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance." Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also

citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, while the United States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a national both of the Philippines and of the United States. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship. In CAASI V. COURT OF APPEALS, this Court ruled that immigration to the United States by virtue of a "greencard," which entitles one to reside permanently in that country, constitutes abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. With more reason then does naturalization in a foreign country result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. By having been naturalized abroad, he lost his Philippine citizenship and with it his residence in the Philippines. Until his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship on November 10, 2000, petitioner did not reacquire his legal residence in this country. Second, it is not true, as petitioner contends, that he reestablished residence in this country in 1998 when he came back to prepare for the mayoralty elections of Oras by securing a Community Tax Certificate in that year and by "constantly declaring" to his townmates of his intention to seek repatriation and run for mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections. The status of being an alien and a non resident can be waived either separately, when one acquires the status of a resident alien before acquiring Philippine citizenship, or at the same time when one acquires Philippine citizenship. As an alien, an individual may obtain an immigrant visa under §13 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1948 and an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) and thus waive his status as a non-resident. On the other hand, he may acquire Philippine citizenship by naturalization under C.A. No. 473, as amended, or, if he is a former Philippine national, he may reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation or by an act of Congress, in which case he waives not only his status as an alien but also his status as a non-resident alien. BORJA, JR. VS COMELEC [G.R. No. 133495, September 3, 1998] 1993: X, the VM succeeded Y, the M who died, by operation of law. X served as Mayor until 1995. 1995-1998: X was elected and served as Mayor

1998-2001: X was re-elected and again served as Mayor 2001 Elections: Was X barred to run as Mayor? Answer: NO, for 2 reasons: i. In 1993, he was elected because he succeeded by operation of law ii. In 1993, he was elected not in the same office because during the 1st term, he was elected for the position of VM, and not for M Private respondent was first elected as vice- mayor, but upon the death of the incumbent mayor, he occupied the latter ’s post for the unexpired term. He was, thereafter, elected for two more terms. The Court held that when private respondent occupied the post of the mayor upon the incumbent’s death and served for the remainder of the term, he cannot be construed as having served a full term as contemplated under the subject constitutional provision. The term served must be one “for which *the official concerned+ was elected.” FRANCIS ONG VS JOSEPH ALEGRE [G.R. No. 163295, January 3, 2006] 1995-1998: X was elected and served as Mayor 1998-2001: X was re-elected and served as mayor, but an election protest was filed against X in 1998 2001-2004: X was re-elected and served as mayor, and the 1998 election protest was decided against X 2004 elections: Was X qualified to run as mayor? Answer: NO Petitioner Ong was duly elected mayor (San Vicente) in the May 1995 and again in the May 2001 elections and serving the July 1, 1995- June 30, 1998 and the July 1, 2001-June 30, 2004 terms in full. The controversy revolved around the 1998-2001 term. Ong ran for mayor of the same municipality in the May 1998 elections and actually served the 1998- 2001 term by virtue of a proclamation initially declaring him mayor-elect of San Vicente. But after the term 1998-2001, it was declared that Ong was not the real winner in the elections. The question was whether or not Ong’s assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001, may be considered as one full term service. The Supreme Court held that such assumption of office constitutes, for Francis, “service for the full term”, and should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions, supra, barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive term for the same position. His proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three term rule (even if he was later on, after the full term, declared that he was not the winner in the election).

ROBERTO L. DIZON vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MARINO P. MORALES [G.R. No. 182088, January 30, 2009] FACTS Roberto L. Dizon, a resident of Mabalacat, Pampanga filed a case with the COMELEC to disqualify Marino P. Morales, the incumbent mayor of Mabalacat because under the LGC, no local elective official is allowed to serve for more than 3 consecutive terms for the same position. Dizon alleged that Morales was municipal mayor in 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004. Thus, Morales should not have been allowed to have filed his Certificate of Candidacy on March 2007 for the same position and same municipality. Morales asserts that he is still eligible and qualified to run as mayor because he was not elected for the said position in the 1998 elections. He avers that the COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision of the RTC declaring Dee as the duly elected Mayor of Mabalacat in the 1998 elections. Morales also alleges that his term should be reckoned from 2001 or when he was proclaimed as Mayor of Mabalacat. Respondent further asserts that his election in 2004 is only for his second term. Hence, the three term rule provided under the LGC is not applicable to him. According to COMELEC, Respondent was elected mayor of Mabalacat in 1995, 1998, and 2001. When he ran in 2004, the Supreme Court ruled in May 2007 (3 years later) that respondent has violated the three-term limit and thus was not considered a candidate in the 2004 elections. The vice-mayor assumed office as mayor from May 2007-June 2007. Hence, his failure to qualify for the 2004 elections is a gap and allows him to run again for the same position in the 2007 elections. ISSUE WON Morales, in running for mayor in the 2007 elections, has violated the three-term limit rule HELD No. The petition has no merit. Dizon claims that the 2007-2010 term is Morales’ fifth term in office. However, according to the SC, it unseated Morales in its May 2007 decision by canceling his Certificate of Candidacy dated 30 December 2003. This cancellation disqualified Morales from being a candidate in the May 2004 elections. We concede that Morales occupied the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the following periods: 1 July 1995 to 30 June 1998; 1 July 1998 to 30 June 2001; 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2004; and 1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007. Both Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of the LGC state that the term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, shall be three years, and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. There should be a concurrence of two conditions for the application of the disqualification: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. However, because of his disqualification, Morales was not the duly elected mayor for the 2004-2007 term and did not hold the position

of mayor of Mabalacat for the full term. Morales cannot be deemed to have served the full term of 2004-2007 because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. Thus, the period from 17 May 2007 to 30 June 2007 served as a gap. As a result, the present 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010 term is effectively Morales’ first term for purposes of the three-term limit rule. Osmena vs COMELEC FACTS: Petitioners argue that RA 7056, in providing for desynchronized elections violates the Constitution: 1. Republic Act 7056 violates the mandate of the Constitution for the holding of synchronized national and local elections on the second Monday of May 1992;

2. Republic Act 7056, particularly the 2nd paragraph of Section 3 thereof, providing that all incumbent provincial, city and municipal officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified violates Section 2, Article XVIII (Transitory Provision) of the Constitution;

3. The same paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act 7056, which in effect, shortens the term or tenure of office of local officials to be elected on the 2nd Monday of November, 1992 violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution;

4. Section 8 of Republic Act 7056, providing for the campaign periods for Presidential, Vice-Presidential and Senatorial elections, violates the provision of Section 9, Article IX under the title “Commission on Elections” of the Constitution;

5. The so-called many difficult if not insurmountable problems mentioned in Republic Act 7056 to synchronized national and local elections set by the Constitution on the second Monday of May, 1992, are not sufficient, much less, valid justification for postponing the local elections to the second Monday of November 1992, and in the process violating the Constitution itself. If, at all, Congress can devise ways and means, within the parameters of the Constitution, to eliminate or at least minimize these problems and if this, still, is not feasible, resort can be made to the self-correcting mechanism built in the Constitution for its amendment or revision.

On the other hand, the SolGen, counsel for COMELEC, prays for the denial of this petition arguing that the question is political in nature and that the petitioners lack legal standing to file the petition and what they are asking for is an advisory opinion from the court, there being no justiciable controversy to resolve. On the merits, the SolGen contends that Republic Act 7056 is a valid exercise of legislative power by Congress and that the regular amending process prescribed by the Constitution does not apply to its transitory provisions.

PROCEDURAL ISSUE: WON the Court has competence to take cognizance of the instant petition?

HELD: Yes.

What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom of RA 7056. Hence, contrary to SolGen’s contention, the issue in this case is justiciable rather than political. And even if the question were political in nature, it would still come within the Court’s power considering the expanded jurisdiction conferred by Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government. Regarding the challenge to the petitioner’s standing, the

Supreme Court held that even if the petitioners have no legal standing, the Court has the power to brush aside technicalities considered the “transcendental importance” of the issue being raised herein.

MAIN ISSUE: WON RA 7056 is unconstitutional?

HELD: Yes. It is unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court held that the law contravenes Article XVIII, Sections 2 and 5 of the 1987 Constitution which provides for the synchronization of national and local elections. The said law, on the other hand, provides for the de-synchronization of election by mandating that there be two separate elections in 1992. The term of “synchronization” in the mentioned constitutional provision was used synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or occasion. This common termination date will synchronize future elections to once every three years.

R.A. No. 7056 also violated Sec. 2, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the local official first elected under the Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992. But under Sec. 3 of RA 7056, these incumbent local officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified. The Supreme Court, quoting Corpus Juris Secundum, states that “it is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold over until their successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term and when the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall begin, there is no legislative authority to continue the office beyond that period, even though the successors fail to qualify within the time”.

R.A. No. 7056 also violated the clear mandate of Sec. 8, Art. X of 1987 Constitution which fixed the term of office of all elective local officials, except barangay officials, to three (3) years. If the local election will be held on the second Monday of November 1992 under RA 7056, those to be elected will be serving for only two years and seven months, that is, from November 30, 1992 to June 30, 1995, not three years.

The law was also held violative of Sec. 9, Article IX of the Constitution by changing the campaign period. RA 7056 provides for a different campaign period, as follows:

a) For President arid Vice-Presidential elections one hundred thirty (130) days before the day of election. b) For Senatorial elections, ninety (90) days before the day of the election, and c) For the election of Members of the House of Representatives and local elective provincial, city and municipal officials forty-five (45) days before the day of the elections.

MENZON VS. PETILLA

1991 (Gutierrez)

Facts:

• Because no Governor had been proclaimed in the province of Leyte, Secretary of Local Government Luis Santos designated Vice-Governor Leopoldo Petilla as ActingGovernor of Leyte. Petitioner Aurelio Menzon, a senior member of the SangguniangPanlalawigan, was

designated by Secretary Luis Santos to act as the Vice-Governor forthe province of Leyte. •Provincial Administrator Tente Quintero inquired from the Undersecretary of theDepartment of Local Government, Jacinto Rubillar, on the legality of the appointment of petitioner to act as Vice-Governor. Undersecretary Rubillar stated that the appointmentof petitioner as the temporary Vice- Governor is not necessary since the Vice-Governorwho is temporarily performing the functions of the Governor, could concurrently assumethe functions of both offices. • The Sangguniang Panlalawigan in a special session issued Resolution No. 505 whereit held invalid the appointment of the petitioner as acting Vice-Governor of Leyte. • Undersecretary Rubillar explained his opinion: “the peculiar situation in the Provinceof Leyte, where the electoral controversy in the Office of the Governor has not yet beensettled, calls for the designation of the Sangguniang Member to act as vice-governortemporarily.” • The Acting Governor and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan refused to correct ResolutionNo. 505 and to pay the petitioner the emoluments attached to the Office of Vice-Governor. • The petitioner filed before the SC a petition for certiorari and mandamus and soughtthe nullification of Resolution No. 505 and payment of his salary for his services as theacting Vice-Governor of Leyte. • Adelina Larrazabal was proclaimed the Governor of the province of Leyte. • The provincial treasurer of Leyte allowed the payment to the petitioner of his salaryas acting Vice-Governor. • Supreme Court dismissed the petition filed by the petitioner. • Respondent Petilla requested Governor Larrazabal to direct the petitioner to pay backto the province of Leyte all emoluments and compensation which he received whileacting as the Vice-Governor. • The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and prayed that the Supreme Courtuphold his right to receive the salary and emoluments attached to the office of the Vice-Governor while he was acting as such. Issue:

1) Whether or not there was a vacancy? YES2) Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government has the authority to make temporaryappointments? YES

Held: 1. Petilla's automatic assumption to the acting Governorship resulted in a vacancy in theoffice of Vice-Governor. • Law on Public Officers: There is no vacancy when the office is occupied by a legallyqualified incumbent. There is a vacancy when there is no person lawfully authorized toassume and exercise the duties of the office . •sThe office of the Vice-Governor was left vacant when the elected Vice-Governo Petilla wasappointed Acting Governor. The office to which he was elected was left barren of alegally qualified person to exercise the duties of the office of the Vice-Governor.

• There is no satisfactory showing that Petilla continued to simultaneously exercise theduties of the Vice-Governor. The nature of the duties of a Provincial Governor calls for afull-time occupant to discharge them. More so when the vacancy is for an extendedperiod. •

The fact that the Secretary of Local Government was prompted to appoint the petitionershows the need to fill up the position during the period it was vacant. The DepartmentSecretary had the discretion to ascertain whether or not the Provincial Governor shoulddevote all his time to that particular office.2. SC declared valid the temporary appointment extended to the petitioner to act as theVice-Governor. • Under the circumstances of this case and the silence of the Local Government Code, inorder to obviate the dilemma resulting from an interregnum created by the vacancy, thePresident, acting through her alter ego, the Secretary of Local Government, may remedythe situation. The exigencies of public service demanded nothing less than theimmediate appointment of an acting Vice-Governor. • Commonwealth Act No. 588 and Revised Administrative Code of 1987: The President isempowered to make temporary appointments in certain public offices, in case of anyvacancy that may occur. In the absence of any contrary provision in the LocalGovernment Code and in the best interest of public service, the procedure in the twolaws may be similarly applied in the present case. • Section 49, LGC: In case a permanent vacancy arises when a Vice-Governor assumes theOffice of the Governor, . . . refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removedfrom office, voluntary resigns or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge thefunctions of his office the sangguniang panlalawigan . . . member who obtained thehighest number of votes in the election immediately preceding, . . . shall assume theoffice for the unexpired term of the Vice-Governor. • The mode of succession for permanent vacancies may be observed in a temporaryvacancy in the same office. There was a need to fill the vacancy. The petitioner is themember of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan with the highest number of votes. TheDepartment Secretary acted correctly in extending the temporary appointment. The COURT GRANTS the motion. The additional compensation which the petitioner hasreceived shall be considered as payment for actual services rendered as acting Vice-Governor and may be retained by him