PUB921 Obama Adm and Central Asia

8/9/2019 PUB921 Obama Adm and Central Asia

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CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

FOR THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATIONIN CENTRAL ASIA

Stephen J. Blank

June 2009

The views expressed in this report are those of the authorand do not necessarily reect the ofcial policy or position ofthe Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, orthe U.S. Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute(SSI) publications enjoy full academic freedom, providedthey do not disclose classied information, jeopardize

operations security, or misrepresent ofcial U.S. policy.Such academic freedom empowers them to offer new andsometimes controversial perspectives in the interest offurthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared forpublic release; distribution is unlimited.

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FOREWORD

President Obama has outlined a comprehensivestrategy for the war in Afghanistan which is now thecentral front of our campaign against Islamic terrorism.The strategy strongly connects our prosecution of thatwar to our policy in Pakistan and internal developmentsthere as a necessary condition of victory. But thestrategy has also provided for a new logistics roadthrough Central Asia.

In this monograph, Dr. Stephen Blank argues that awinning strategy in Afghanistan depends as well uponthe systematic leveraging of the opportunity providedby that road and a new coordinated nonmilitary ap-proach to Central Asia. That approach would rely heav-ily on improved coordination at home and the moreeffective leveraging of our superior economic power in

Central Asia to help stabilize the region so that it pro-vides a secure rear to Afghanistan. In this fashion wewould help Central Asia meet the challenges of ex-tremism, of economic decline due to the global eco-nomic crisis, and thus help provide political stabilityin states that are likely to be challenged by the conu-ence of those trends.

This timely monograph contributes directly to thedebate on U.S. strategy in Afghanistan and CentralAsia in the hope that policymakers will nd it informa-tive and useful, and those who may be called upon toimplement the policy will be able to do so more effec-tively.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute


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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

STEPHEN J. BLANK has served as the Strategic StudiesInstitutes expert on the Soviet bloc and the post-Sovietworld since 1989. Prior to that he was Associate Professorof Soviet Studies at the Center for Aerospace Doctrine,Research, and Education, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL,and taught at the University of Texas, San Antonio,TX, and at the University of California, Riverside,CA. Dr. Blank is the editor of Imperial Decline: RussiasChanging Position in Asia, coeditor of Soviet Militaryand the Future, and author of The Sorcerer as Apprentice:Stalins Commissariat of Nationalities, 1917-1924. He hasalso written many articles and conference papers onRussian, Commonwealth of Independent States, andEastern European security issues. Dr. Blanks currentresearch deals with proliferation and the revolution

in military affairs, and energy and security in Eurasia.His two most recent books are Russo-Chinese EnergyRelations: Politics in Command, London: Global MarketsBrieng, 2006; and Natural Allies?: Regional Security in

Asia and Prospects for Indo-American Strategic Cooperation ,Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.Army War College, 2005. He holds a B.A. in Historyfrom the University of Pennsylvania, and a M.A. andPh.D. in History from the University of Chicago.


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CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIESFOR THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION

IN CENTRAL ASIA

Introduction: The Three Linked Challenges to U.S.Policy.

The Obama administration has taken ofce whileCentral Asia undergoes at least three linked, concurrent,and major crises. In Afghanistan the situation is dete-riorating. In September 2008, the British ambassadorto Kabul, Sherard Cowper-Coles, called U.S. strategydestined to fail. He decried the worsening securityand corruption situation, argued that foreign forcesare an integral part of the problem in Afghanistan,and concluded that the only realistic outcome was anacceptable dictator for Afghanistan.1 This pessimism

and the sober assessment of the situation are widelyshared. Other reports have depicted a gradually tight-ening Taliban noose around Kabul and the growingpresence of the Taliban across the country.2 The CentralIntelligence Agency (CIA) and the Bush White Houseboth issued reports or estimates in late 2008 echoingthis pessimism and these ndings.3 Admiral MichaelMullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recentlyreiterated his belief that the United States is notwinning the war there.4 Other top U.S. commandershave been even more specic. Furthermore, clearlytop members of the Obama administration like Vice-President Joseph Biden and Secretary of State HillaryClinton are demanding a tougher line with respect tocorruption and misgovernment in Afghanistan and

are quite disenchanted with the leadership of AfghanPresident Hamid Karzai.5 A major policy review underthe Bush administration had taken place in late 2008


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and the Obama team undoubtedly will have conductedits own review by the time this report is published.6

In other words, the need for a new strategy that canproduce victory in Afghanistan and stabilize Pakistanand Central Asia is visibly apparent. But it mustnecessarily be a long-term strategy entailing a long-termcommitment of North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO) and U.S. forces and resources. The U.S. Armyis already preparing for this contingency.7 CombatantCommander for U.S. Central Command GeneralDavid H. Petraeus has said publicly that if we are towin there the United States and other states must makea sustained, substantial commitment to reversingthe deteriorating situation in Afghanistan. That com-mitment must also be extended to Pakistan. GeneralPetraeus further noted that success in Afghanistanrequires effective regional cooperation among its

neighbors, including Iran, which has certain commoninterests in this war with the NATO coalition.8 In otherwords, a successful strategy in regard to Afghanistancannot stop at its borders or even at Pakistans borders.Rather, it must embrace the entire Central Asian worldof which Afghanistan is an integral part.

At the same time General Bantz J. Craddock,Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and thus theCommander in Chief of NATO forces in Afghanistan,also warned that the United States and its allies willneed to keep large numbers of forces there for at leasta decade and maintain a military presence for decadesafter that.9

General Craddock further linked the war inAfghanistan to the second major crisis roiling Central

Asia, the global economic crisis, because that willstrike at the nancial capability and political will ofallies to continue contributing to this war.10 However,


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General Craddocks assessment neglected the alreadystrong negative impact of this crisis on Central Asia.

The World Bank reported that Kazakhstan was likelyto suffer severe banking disruptions in the nearfuture and that sector is already shrinking even asglobal credit tightens, making it difcult for it or otherstates to recapitalize their nancial sector by furtherborrowing.11 Kazakhstans growth rate will fall to 2percent in 2009 while its unemployment will rise to 8percent, according to Minister of Economy and BudgetPlanning Bakhyt Sultanov. It also is recalculatingenergy income based on a price of $40/barrel for oilfor 2009 and $50 for 2010-11, so its growth will beseverely diminished for at least 2 more years, cuttinga third from expected revenues through 2011.12 Asof this writing, it has also devalued its currency, theTenge. The crisis has also led Russia and Kazakhstan

to deport thousands of migrants whose remittancescomprised as much as an estimated 15-20 percent ofthe national incomes of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.Tajikistans plight is even worse. In one province,Gorno-Badakhshan, remittances fell by half in thelast quarter of 2008. Growth rates from Kazakhstan toTajikistan have plummeted, unemployment is rising,and countries are relapsing into protectionism and inpractice are curtailing efforts at regional cooperation.13Countries like Tajikistan that are excessively in debt toforeign lenders probably have no discernible meansof paying them back. And countries like Uzbekistanand Turkmenistan are thus replying with beggarthy neighbor policies towards weaker states likeKyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.14 Indeed, Tajikistan has

previously accused Uzbekistan of seeking to destabilizeit by organizing an explosion near its supreme court.15Kyrgyzstan Minister for Development and Trade


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Akylbek Japarov stated in November 2008, Ourstate is effectively on the verge of the nancial crisis,

although he was reprimanded for saying so.16

Andthe effects in one country then spread to another. AsKazakhstan began to suffer, it pulled out larger andlarger amounts of its investments in Kyrgyzstan thatamounted to 60 percent of that banks basic assets,triggering the nancial crisis, in Kyrgyzstan.17

As a result of this crisis, which acceleratesdramatically from one day to the next in a deepeningspiral of misery and suffering, massive geopoliticalchanges across the globe are likely to occur. AndCentral Asia is hardly immune to such upheavals. AsIan Bremmer, President of Eurasia Group, recentlywarned,

Sometimes the impact of geopolitical factors is substantialand at other times, it is more modest. But in the broadestcontext, were entering a period in which political riskwill matter more for the markets than in the recent past.. . . During 2009, political risk is especially dangerousbecause of the intense focus on the global nancial crisis.Distracted markets are less likely to price in the riskslinked to the international conict over Irans nuclearprogram, dangerous instability in Pakistan, Russiasassertive, even aggressive, foreign policy, and possible

large-scale unrest in Iraq as various militia groups andothers rush to ll the vacuum left by departing U.S.troops and to control that countrys oil.18

Those risk factors that exist in Central Asia are alsopalpably multiplying and should be factored into anyregional assessment and risk analysis. The conjunctionof the new economic crisis, the spillover effects of the

war, and the precarious domestic situation in thesecountries could easily come together to open anotherfront in the war against terrorism. Indeed, virtually


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all the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)countries are raising their military budgets or are

receiving military aid from Russia or the United States,even as their nances are becoming increasinglystretched.19 Central Asian surveys show growinganger at ofcial corruption and an ensuing profoundalienation from local governments. The widespreadrepressions against religious organizations have alsoled to substantial resentment, particularly amongyounger residents (aged 18 to 30) who believe that lawenforcement agencies are not held properly accountablefor their actions, and can operate with impunityeven when they cause harm to innocent people.Moreover, the economic crisis only adds to high ratesof previously existing unemployment in Tajikistan andUzbekistan, particularly among the youth, always theincendiary element in society. Understandably these

circumstances, particularly under worsening economicconditions, can cause an upheaval in key Central Asianstates like Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, or Uzbekistan,especially if the perception of government controlweakens any further.20 For example, Kyrgyzstan istaking no chances and has recently focused attentionon one of the major Islamist challenges to the regime,the terrorist organization Hizb al-Tahrir (also knownas Hizb ut-Tahrir).21 In addition, the InternationalCrisis Group recently stated that Tajikistan was onthe verge of becoming a failing state.22 The overallsituation both globally and in the region (includingRussia) deteriorates in an ever accelerating spiral fromday-to-day.

Finally, the third problem, which is linked to the

other two, is Russias determination to oust the UnitedStates from any military presence in Central Asia and tomore fully subordinate the entire region to its dictates.Part of its motivation stems from the current crisis as


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it is attempting to forge a ruble union and economicbloc among it and Central Asian states to shore up

the rubles value. But it has also done so to create anexclusive closed trading and economic bloc, not unlikeGermany in the 1930s.23 More specically, it seeks toconsolidate a Eurasian Economic Community as asingle economic space, i.e., a trade, customs, and rublebloc, intensify energy cooperation with Kazakhstanto prevent it from cooperating further with China orthe West, upgrade intelligence cooperation, intensifymilitary-technical cooperation, i.e., linking plants inCentral Asia back to the Russian defense industry, asin Soviet times, and create new joint instruments forcollective action.24

More to the point, Russia both pressured and bribedKyrgyzstan into ousting the United States from its baseat Manas.25 By doing so, it made clear its insistence on

following through on President Dmitry Medvedevsinsistence that Russia have privileged interests andrelations with CIS members to the exclusion of allrivals. This demonstrates that Central Asian statessovereignty and right of free choice of military partnersis not important to Moscow when compared to its ownimperial interests. It also shows that for all Russiastalk about a willingness to cooperate with Washingtonagainst terrorism, in fact Russia regards the preservationof its neo-imperial patrimony as more urgent a task thanthe defeat of terrorism.26 In other words, Washingtoncannot take for granted the oft-voiced sentiment thatMoscow really wants cooperation with Washingtonagainst terrorism in Central Asia and Afghanistan. Thisargument merely projects American ideas concerning

what Russias interests should be onto the Russiangovernment and then plays them back to Washingtonaudiences as if they were fact. Such mindless mirror-


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imaging cannot serve as an adequate basis for policy orstrategy, especially as it nds no basis in what Russian

leaders do or say. Russia does seek cooperation onAfghanistan, but only after ensuring that its imperialrequirementswhich can only promote greater insta-bility across the regioncome rst.27

As General Charles Callwell (Victorian Englandsleading theorist of small wars) wrote, theory cannotbe accepted as conclusive when practice points theother way.28 Indeed, it appears that for all its talk ofcooperation, Moscow actually fears that the UnitedStates and NATO are losing and therefore seeks a hedgeagainst that outcome. Thus when President HamidKarzai of Afghanistan, sensing the loss of support forhim in Washington, approached Moscow about armssales to Afghanistan, Russia replied afrmatively butstipulated that there must rst be a prior political

agreement between the two governments and thatNATO and Russia must resume their dialogue brokenduring the war with Georgia.29 In other words,Moscows interests, not surprisingly, take precedenceover ghting terrorism. What an agreement with theKarzai government and the Obama administrationabout Afghanistan might mean was hinted at by SergeiRogov, director of the prestigious and well-connectedInstitute for the Study of the USA and Canada inMoscow. Speaking in Washington on January 13, 2009,he stated:

The only way to achieve some stabilization of thesituation in Afghanistan is to invite Russia to join theIFOR (International Forces there more commonly knownas ISAFauthor). Russia should accept responsibility

for Regional Economic Reconstruction Teams in [the]Northern provinces. Russian teams should be supportedby security personnel. The key problem will be to include


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Russia in the political decision-making mechanism onAfghanistan while Russia remains a non-member ofNATO. A possible solution may be giving additionalfunctions to the NATO-Russia Council, or creationof [a] special body with decision-making authority.The Soviet experience in Afghanistan makes Russiavery unenthusiastic about another engagement in thiscounty. It will demand an extra effort from the new USAdministration. 30

While Moscow may still have or profess to have

an Afghanistan syndrome and will therefore notsend troops to the area, such ideas and a division ofAfghanistan into spheres of responsibility and a newRussian military presence there as a leverage point toinsert itself into NATO raises so many objections thatit is a nonstarter as an arguing point. Certainly this isnot an acceptable foundation for cooperation with theUnited States on Afghanistan as it would only providea basis for either unending or future conict. ThusMoscow conrms Henry Kissingers observation thatthe past conduct of Afghanistans principal neighborsdoes not augur well for a policy of restraint, oppositionto terrorism, and we might add, nonintervention in itspolitics.31

But Rogovs formula, plus Moscows decision to

send military aid to Afghanistan also suggest Russiasapprehension that the Taliban might win leaving itto confront that movement with no means of dealingwith it politically or of insulating Central Asia fromit. Indeed, clearly Moscow is making every effort tofurther enmesh Central Asian regimes in various formsof economic, trade, and defense integration that wouldpreclude them from being able to act effectively indefense of their own sovereignty. Likewise, Moscowsabortive efforts to obtain Central Asian governments


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approval for its unilateral revisions of Georgiasborders in August 2008 represent another sign of its

basic contempt for their sovereignty, something theyall grasp. From the beginning of his tenure, RussianPresident Vladimir Putins rst priority, and one thatremains the central foreign policy priority for Russia, isto establish an exclusive sphere of inuence in the CISand to revitalize the existing institutions of cooperation,or even create new ones in defense, intelligencesharing, and overall economic policy, including tradeand energy.32

Thus as the dire situation in Afghanistan worsens,Central Asia, its strategic rear, is coming underever greater pressure. Consequently, the Obamaadministration, even before it took ofce, faced dif-cult strategic issues as to the size and nature of theU.S. military response, e.g., whether it should be a con-

ventional or counterinsurgency response. Obviously itconfronts a seriously deteriorating situation before theadministration has been able to formulate its strategy.33Now it must make those decisions even before ithas a thoroughly well-conceived plan. Although theadministration immediately confronts the most difcultquestions of strategy and policy in Afghanistan, it alsodecided, even before President Obamas inauguration,to make Afghanistan its highest priority and tofashion a broad, comprehensive strategy for dealingwith the war.34 It evidently must devise a strategy topresent by the time of the April 2009 NATO summitto garner further support from the members for yetgreater and more long-term exertions.35 It would bedifcult to conceive of more inauspicious conditions

for the prosecution of a war. Worse yet, as onesenior U.S. military commander said about the Bush


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administration, We have no strategic plan. We neverhad one. Thus President Obama has no time to think

or even to rely on an existing strategy but must buildone on the y.36

As a result, any of these crises or a combination ofthem could lead to a disaster in Central Asia, even asthe war and instability still occur in Afghanistan andPakistan. The impact of a negative outcome to thewar is obvious. But so, too, is the potential strategicimpact of the regional economic-political crisis. Thatcould lead to failing states, particularly in Tajikistanand Kyrgyzstan, and to an upheaval in Uzbekistan if asuccession to President Islam Karimov occurs duringthe crisis. Tajikistan, in particular, is already close tobeing a failing state, an already poor and fragile countrygripped by multiple pathologies including massivecorruption, drugs, and poor governance. The threat

of a failing state in Tajikistan not only involves theinterests of the United States, Russia, Iran, and China,but also could spread throughout the rest of CentralAsia. The advent of thousands of disenfranchised andunemployed young men in a time of economic crisiswith nothing to do could certainly further undermine itsshaky foundations, so it is not surprising that repressionthere has increased, e.g., Tajikistans recent outlaw-ing of the Saudi brand of Islam, Salast Islam, the ver-sion associated with al-Qaida or Kyrgyzstans outlaw-ing of head scarves.37

Finally, the consequences of a subordination ofCentral Asia to Russia are equally unpalatable. Not onlyis this a recipe for perpetuation of the backwardness,autocratic governance, and poor administration that

characterizes the region, it also is a recipe for upheavalbecause Russia cannot sustain its imperial dreams andcan only try to do so by further subordinating Central


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Asia to its neo-colonial interests, which entail thefreezing of these pathologies in place. That can only

lead in the foreseeable future to one or more upheavalsthere. And certainly Russian meddling in Afghanistanhas long since shown us how benecial it is to theregion. Furthermore, allowing Russia to dictate termsto Central Asia also means consigning that regionand Europe to unending dependency upon the tendermercies of the Russian gas (and oil) industry. Hereagain, we have seen, most notably in Ukraine but inactuality across Europe, how Moscow uses the energyweapon to impose political conditions, suborn foreignpolitical leaders and institutions, and punish states andgovernments that do not respond to its desires.38

For all these reasons, the need for a regional strategydesigned to reverse the deteriorating situation in Af-ghanistan, stabilize Pakistan, and assist Central Asia is

obvious. This monograph aims to provide at least someanswers to the Central Asian piece of the puzzle. Boththe war and the economic crisis are regional challengesthat can only be resolved on that scale. As GeneralPetraeus noted, Indeed, Afghanistan and Pakistanhave in many ways merged into a single problem set.And the way forward in Afghanistan is incompletewithout a strategy that includes and assists Pakistanand involves India, as well as the northern CentralAsian countries, China, and Russia.39 Thus a strategythat focuses solely on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Indiais only half-correct and doomed to insufciency, if notfailure. This becomes even clearer when we considerthe danger of Indo-Pakistani tensions that could spillover into Central Asia. This threat level remains high as

the crisis generated by the terrorist attack in Mumbai inNovember 2008 demonstrates. Further manifestationsof crisis in Central Asia, even if it seems to be a distantand relatively peripheral area for U.S. interests, must


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therefore engage serious U.S. attention, given the warin Afghanistan and the coinciding economic crisis. For

these same reasons, the strategy for Central Asia (likethat for Afghanistan and Pakistan or those parts of theoverarching regional strategy for Central and SouthAsia) must be much more than a military strategy. Asthe crisis there is primarily economic-political in natureand only secondarily related to the progress of theoperation in Afghanistan, it must be a strategy that isled by institutions other than the Defense Department.It must be an integrated strategy that comprehensivelyaddresses Central Asian security in all its dimensions.Therefore that strategy must be holistic, one employingall the instruments of power: diplomatic, informational,military, and economic, to the challenges at hand. Itmust address issues such as water, economic causesof instability amid conditions of poor governance and

rampant authoritarianism, trafcking in drugs, and soforth. This strategy must therefore bring together allthe different government agencies working on theseissues in Central Asia and support whatever possiblecoordinated private sector activities towards similarends exist here and there.

As Admiral Mullen has said, the military cannot leadthese overall multidimensional strategies, vital thoughits part may be. More money and personnel must bedirected to the responsible civilian agencies involved inthese strategies with the armed forces.40 In this respect,Admiral Mullen merely echoes the counsel of Secretaryof Defense Robert Gates and a host of independent andcongressional reports.41 Moreover, the interagency andpolicymaking process must be revived and restored

to provide for an integrated, coherent, and well-orchestrated strategy. As noted above, this has not beenthe case previously in Afghanistan. But it also has not


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been the case in Central Asia and other places, e.g., Iraqand North Korea.42 Indeed, it appears that something

like a consensus is emerging that the United States isincapable of forging strategy for any existing crisisand certainly failed to do so under President Bushsdirection.43 Certainly the prior neglect of Central Asiaand failure to devise a coherent strategy utilizing allour instruments of power in a coherent fashion has ledto the defeats we have suffered and the two evictionsfrom our bases.44

Challenge and Opportunity for the United States andNATO.

Nevertheless, as the Chinese remind us, crisis de-notes both challenge and opportunity. Therefore CentralAsia presents the Obama administration not only with

challenges but also with opportunities to forge exactlythe kind of regional strategy that has been missing. Thechallenges are obvious: war in Afghanistan, Russianopposition to our presence, Indo-Pakistani tensions at ahigh level, and the impact of the global economic crisis.But opportunities are there as well. Indeed, to somedegree, the signs of the current crisis are responsiblefor their presence. The U.S. Government has alreadyindicated that it will increase the number of U.S. troopsin Afghanistan, a program that accords with PresidentObamas campaign speeches.45 At the same time NATO,including the United States, is negotiating with theCentral Asian governments of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan,and Russia to build an alternative and new supplyroad to Afghanistan.46 All the Central Asian states

except Kyrgyzstan have agreed to transmit nonmilitarycargoes to Afghanistan.47As a result of General Petraeusnegotiations, this new supply road will be built along


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with an expanded air corridor through Kazakhstan tothis roads starting point. This road would traverse

Russian air space and territory to go to these countries,and supplies would then go over land to Afghanistan.Another alternative is to start on Georgias coast, gothrough it and Azerbaijan by rail, and load the supplieson ships through the Caspian Sea to Kazakhstan, fromwhere they would be transported by rail to Termez inUzbekistan and then down the road through Tajikistanto Afghanistan.48 Logistically, the advantage of eitheralternative is that they bypass the Khyber Pass thathas become the scene of numerous Taliban attacks thathave on occasion interdicted supply convoys and putthe road at risk.49

There are other reasons beyond the danger tothe Khyber Pass road for this new road project. Thisvirtual doubling of the U.S. footprint in Afghanistan

will entail a commensurate increase in food, fuel,lumber, concrete, and other construction materials.Afghanistans primitive infrastructure also makesthe cost of supporting forces much more than in Iraq.Therefore the U.S. Government and military needa faster tempo of supplies and a bigger route, not tomention an alternative route to the Khyber Pass, whereit can count on a secure logistical rear. The plan for theroad involves all the Central Asian states serving eitheras a hub like Kazakhstan or as conduits and producersof goods for the road like Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, andKyrgyzstan. Thus General Petraeus talks in Kazakhstaninvolved discussions about expanding the use of theAlmaty airport and Kazakhstans participation in theexpansion of logistical supply to Afghanistan. But he

also seems to have accepted, possibly as a quid pro quo,that the objective is not just preventing the escalationof extremism in Afghanistan, but also reducing drug


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smuggling from there, a key interest of all Central Asianstates and Russia.50 Likewise, in Turkmenistan his talks

also touched on nonmilitary aspects of security likeeducation.51 The plan for the road also calls for buyinga considerable amount of supplies locally from CentralAsian countries that, as suppliers and transit states,stand to make considerable amounts of money fromthis venture.52 While other supplies could be airlifted,heavy construction equipment and fuel would besent by rail to Central Asia and then trucked intoAfghanistan along this road. It should also be notedhere that Russia has publicly expressed an interest notonly in aiding the NATO campaign in Afghanistan butin participating in this supply route that would be analternative to relying on Pakistan.53

Even so, few if any of these reports discerned thestrategic opportunities for the United States that this

road opens up, let alone the possible drawbacks interms of potentially increased rivalry with Russia inCentral Asia. While Kyrgyzstan already was a stagingarea for U.S. forces and some Central Asian leaders areallegedly eager to increase their role in the campaign,both for the expected economic benets and becauseof a perception of a rising Taliban threat, they donot want a U.S. military presence. For these reasons,Washington has reassured them that it seeks no newbases in Central Asia despite Russian charges to thecontrary (see below) and wants to use this projectedsupply line to ship nonmilitary items (no weaponsor munitions) exclusively through local commercialcompanies.54 These negotiations, along with theoverall plan or a road, are obviously born of crisis and

challenge, namely the war in Afghanistan. But thisroad and the concurrent economic crisis facing CentralAsia also provide the impetus for an opportunity forthe Obama administration.


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Afghanistan, its neighbors (including Iran), andNATO.57 Thus a successful strategy for winning the

war in Afghanistan must seriously attend to CentralAsia as an integral part of the plan for victory.

Given the visible urgency of the situation inAfghanistan, signs of an increased desire to generatemore effective multilateral cooperation among thekey players may actually be taking place.58 One keyissue where cooperation is necessary is the buildingof hydropower dams and provision of water to statesthat lack it, perhaps in return for energy shipmentssince those who have energy lack water and vice versa.Equally important, while there has been foot-draggingon providing sufcient water throughout CentralAsia, there could be a basis for addressing the morecommonly shared concern about improving the qualityof whatever water is available.59 Kyrgyzstan also fears

that water shortages could intensify social tensions.60

Furthermore the United States, by building this roadand making it a truly multilateral project that leads tofurther infrastructural investments that can help tiethese countries together, can also align itself with oneof the deepest currents of Kazakhstans foreign policy,its support for regional integration. Astanas supportfor such cooperation is naturally not disinterested. Asthe strongest economic player in the region, it probablystands to benet inordinately both economically andpolitically from such cooperation if not integration.61

Of course, too close an American embrace forKazakhstans ambitions would immediately triggersuspicions, not only in Moscow and Beijing, but alsoin Uzbekistans government in Tashkent since it sees

itself as Kazakhstans rival for predominance in CentralAsia. Nevertheless, there are signs that the logjam onsupplying Afghanistan by alternative routes fromCentral Asia may be melting, at least in part.


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Similarly Uzbekistan has much to gain from theU.S. program for the road. Tashkent in 2008 granted

NATO access to its railroad system and eased air-transitrestrictions and did so without consulting Moscow orits other partners in the Russian-dominated CollectiveSecurity Treaty Organization (CSTO).62 As was its wont,Uzbekistan was thereby asserting its independenceand freedom of maneuver. However, progress hasbeen slow. But apart from the economic benet ofbeing a key transit country for Western logistics intoAfghanistan, Uzbek leaders are reportedly seeking ahigh price for their cooperation, even though Tashkentis eager to see the Taliban threat contained. Accordingto some local experts, Uzbek ofcials are trying to obtaina security guarantee for President Islam Karimovsadministration, along with an expansion of militaryassistance and economic cooperation. They want all

these benets despite the fact that Tashkent has madescant progress on improving a woeful human rightsrecord. Both Washington and Brussels are on record asinsisting on human rights improvements as a conditionfor closer cooperation.63

Other motives for Tashkents policies are equallycompelling. Clearly it fears the impact of a Talibanvictory on Central Asia as well as NATO-Russiatensions and Russias continuing policy to gain statusfor the CSTO in order to insert itself between NATO andlocal states, preventing the latter from working withNATO without the CSTOs permission, and therebysecuring a veto power on NATO activity there. Whileit wishes to remain free to maneuver between East andWest, Tashkent sees and supports the necessity for a

regional approach including Russia but also hopes tobenet from direct ties with Washington and NATO inregard to Afghanistan.64 Since November 2008, NATO


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has seemed determined to pursue the alternative ofa Central Asian supply route; it is quite possible that

both it and Uzbekistan might reach an agreement thatredounds to both Uzbekistans benet and that ofKarimov personally and/or the state.65

Tajikistan in particular would greatly benet fromthe U.S. plan which could be a much-needed shot inthe arm given its economic situation. In view of itsextremely precarious domestic condition, Tajikistanfaces a double-sided threat. The loss of remittanceswill impoverish many thousands of Tajik familieswho depend upon them for their sustenance. And thepresence of thousands of able-bodied young men withnothing to do can provide a spark for a substantialincrease in unrest, criminality, and violence, if notrecruits for Islamic fundamentalism or other insurgentmovements. If the economic situation in neighboring

Uzbekistan also deteriorates, then this road, whichis also supposed to traverse Uzbekistan, will have acomparable impact upon both the Uzbek and Tajikeconomies. We can also make the same argumentfor Kyrgyzstan, another weak state riddled by crime,corruption, and bad governance.66

These crises and the partial answer of this roadsignify an opportunity to exploit this concurrence ofU.S. strategy and regional interests in a way to createa strategy that certainly includes but goes beyondmilitary measures to help consolidate developmentand security in both Afghanistan and Central Asia.As former Secretary of State Madeleine Albrightstated, A nation cannot be built or rebuilt by militarymeans alone. Theres a vast gap between the Marine

Corps and the Peace Corps, and we need to ll thatgap with agencies and people who specialize in law,development, peacemaking, and the creation of lasting


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democratic institutions.67 Likewise, it is essential toinvest in regional security before the wolf is at the

door and imposes ever greater costs that can then onlybe dealt with in tandem with the use of force whichis inherently an alienating operation. Therefore anenlightened strategy for Central Asia will emphasizecivilian aspects of development and reconstruction soas to minimize the potential future need for a heavymilitary footprint, something that has not always beenthe case in previous examples of U.S. policy. As a recentstudy pointed out,

The Army has created ad-hoc wartime SSTR capabilitieswith no real joint or interagency backbone or lastingcapability. These efforts have focused solely on post-conict operation with no thought of expanding tools ofpreemption (though the author may mean military toolswe should expand that to civilian tools as well-author).

Currently, no one agency executes operational control ofU.S. soft and hard power Stability Operations capabilities.The U.S. ability to project civilian instruments of nationalpower such as diplomacy, foreign assistance, economicreconstruction, and development, as well as rule of law,is also underfunded and underdeveloped.68

Furthermore, it should be clear that only the UnitedStates (and with it NATO and/or the European Union[EU]) combines the capabilities, resources, and skillsto lead this effort even though, relatively speaking, itdoes not cost as much as may be imagined. Indeed, asone Tajik newspaper wrote, Russias military presencethere is scaring away investors.69

For these reasons, the concurrence of U.S. militarystrategy and a new emphasis on Afghanistan with this

crisis provides an opportunity as well as a challengefor the Obama administration. Simply stated, thisroad, and the accompanying regional strategy that


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General Petraeus and others have talked about, canbe implemented if the political will is there to allocate

sufcient resources (including nonmaterial ones) in acoherent and comprehensive manner and to implementthat strategy holistically to address the problems thatcould destabilize Central Asia, Afghanistans strategicrear. In this case, the road would be a centerpiece ofa bigger regional, economic strategy to help secureCentral Asian economies and thus societies and states,while also expanding the ght against the Talibanthat is in these states mutual interest. As countlessobservers and scholars have constantly warned, toensure any kind of security throughout this region andthroughout the so-called arc of crisis, policymakingmust be holistic, utilizing all the instruments of powerand to the greatest possible extent. That quality mustbe both vertical, i.e., in terms of U.S. governmental

organization, and horizontal, in terms of the policyareas to be addressed simultaneously Equallyimportant, security management, to be successful,must also leverage the capabilities of all those allies andinternational organizations that now have a growingstake in security there.70 As Max Manwaring of the U.S.Army War Colleges Strategic Studies Institute haswritten,

The primary challenge, then, is to come to terms withthe fact that contemporary security, at whatever level, isat its base a holistic political-diplomatic, socioeconomic,psychological-moral and military police effort.The corollary is to change from a singular militaryapproach to a multidimensional, multiorganizational,multicultural and multinational paradigm. That, in turn,

requires a conceptual framework and an organizationalstructure to promulgate unied civil-military planningand implementation of the multidimensional concept.71


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Therefore this new supply road project should not beconceived of only in terms of its immediate military

benet (crucial as that nonetheless is), but rather asthe starting point or centerpiece for a rejuvenated U.S.strategy and strategic process driven by the interagencyprocess functioning as it ought to. That alone canundertake to help rescue the region from the ravagesof global crisis and do so in an integrated, i.e., holistic,manner as described above.72

Strategic coordination among all the U.S.Government agencies involved is of the utmostimportance to provide not just military security, butalso economic assistance, jobs, trade, aid, investment,(both commercial and infrastructural), and even suchcritical public goods as environmental security to rescuethe area from its dangerous shortage of fresh water.73Furthermore, to achieve support from multilateral

players like Central Asian governments and evenRussia, the strategy must address their needs andsecurity demands, e.g., their heightened concern overthe impact of drugs coming from Afghanistan to andthrough their countries.74 For years these governmentshave been complaining about the U.S. neglect ofthis problem and unwillingness to attack it head on.

Based on published accounts of General Petraeusconversations with Central Asian leaders, it appearsthat he understands their concerns and the need toaddress them, and has included expanded cooperationon measures against narcotics trafcking as part of hislarger strategy for Central Asia to win their agreementto his plans.75

Since 2005 and the ouster of U.S. forces from their

base at Karshi Khanabad in Uzbekistan, the UnitedStates has been falling behind Russia and China in


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the strategic attention and resources it has devoted toCentral Asia and thus in its inuence there.76 Indeed,

China grants more aid and assistance to Central Asiathan does the United States, indicating Central Asiasrelative priority for Beijing as compared to Washington.But given the proximity of the war in Afghanistan toCentral Asia and the stakes of possible defeat to theWest, this is obviously an unbalanced if not misguidedapproach to the region.

This does not mean that the United States has noleverage in Central Asia. For example, in 2007 U.S.Marines conducted a counterterrorism training exercisewith Tajikistans Special and Border Guards. The UnitedStates also still retains its base at Manas in Kyrgyzstanand, thanks to assiduous wooing of Uzbekistan by theUnited States, NATO, and Germany, U.S. forces haveobtained a certain amount of access to Uzbekistans

air base at Termez. There are also assistance programsand small amounts of aid for projects that can be listedas support for democratization.77 No doubt Uzbekistanand Tajikistan as well as other Central Asian govern-ments would welcome greater U.S. economic attentionboth because of the current crisis and because noneof them wants to fall into excessive dependence uponeither Russia or China. If anything, they are clearly resist-ing Moscows latest gambit of trying to force theminto a ruble zone (a policy inherited from the ThirdReich which used it to dominate Eastern and CentralEurope economically before conquering it militarily).78Indeed, that desire to safeguard their independence bymultiplying foreign contacts could be said of all theCentral Asian countries since they all, to one degree or

another, constantly practice a multi-vector diplomacythat shifts from one partner to another.


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Foreign Involvement in Central Asia in a DifferentLight.

This new U.S. strategy harmonizes quite wellwith Central Asian states ongoing conduct of suchdiplomacy, albeit in varying forms and degrees.Therefore, we need to see this multi-vector diplomacyin a context different from the one usually advancedthat extensive foreign involvment is universally orat least generally regarded as a threat to these states

sovereignty. In fact, Central Asian governments multi-vector diplomacy has been intrinsic to their state-building project since its inception in 1991-92 when theSoviet Union collapsed. And these states reliance uponexternal support and even a form of external patronageis closely tied to their domestic security perspectives.In an earlier essay, we argued that one must look atthe interplay between these states simultaneous need,typical of Third World states, to build both internaland external security in environments where the veryconcept of a state, especially a sovereign independentstate, is unprecedented or relatively new.79 Thesecountries simultaneously face the exigencies of bothstate-building, i.e., assuring internal security anddefense against external threats without sufcient

means, time, or resources to compete successfullywith other more established states. Not surprisingly,their primary concern becomes internal security andtheir continuation in power, hence the proliferationof multiple military forces, intelligence, and policeforces, which often enjoy more resources than do theirregular armies, and their governments recourse torent-seeking, authoritarian, and clientilistic policies.80

These facts possess signcant relevance for anydiscussion of security, particularly in the Third World,including Central Asia, where the security environment


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is one of reversed anarchy as described by MikhailAlexiev and Bjorn Moeller. Moeller observes that,

While in modernity the inside of a state was supposedto be orderly, thanks to the workings of the state as aHobbesian Leviathan, the outside remained anarchic.For many states in the Third World, the opposite seemscloser to realitywith fairly orderly relations to theoutside in the form of diplomatic representations, buttotal anarchy within.81

Similarly, Amitav Acharya observes that,

Unlike in the West, national security concepts in Asiaare strongly inuenced by concerns for regime survival.Hence, security policies in Asia are not so much aboutprotection against external military threats, but againstinternal challenges. Moreover, the overwhelmingproportion of conicts in Asia fall into the intra-statecategory, meaning they reect the structural weaknesses

of the state, including a fundamental disjunction betweenits territorial and ethnic boundaries. Many of theseconicts have been shown to have a spillover potential;hence the question of outside interference is an ever-present factor behind their escalation and containment.Against this backdrop, the principle of non-interferencebecomes vital to the security predicament of states. Anda concept of security that challenges the unquestionedprimacy of the state and its right to remain free from

any form of external interference arouses suspicion andcontroversy.82

Indeed, for these states, and arguably even fortransitional states like Russia, internal police forcesenjoy greater state resources than do the regulararmies, this being a key indicator of the primacyof internal security as a factor in dening the termnational security.83 Nevertheless, it still remains truethat if these states cannot defend themselves militarily


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against threats that have arisen due to a previous failureto provide security, they collapse as classical thinking

about hard security would predict.This is also the case in Central Asia where the

main issue is ensuring the continuation in power ofthe ruling regime and of the presidents power. Eventhough these states acknowledge that they face seriousexternal threats of terrorism and narcotics trafckingfrom Afghanistan, which then corrupts and corrodesthe socio-political fabric in their countries, those threatsare second to the preservation of the domestic statusquo. Indeed, to a certain extent, as Anna Matveeva hasnoted for Tajikistan, governments outsource part ormost of the responsibility for dealing with those issuesto other states and major powers.84 Similarly in 2007Kyrgyzstan invited Russia to bring its border guardsback to Kyrgyzstan and to expand the size of its Kant

Air Base because Bishkek could not afford to raise suchtroops on its own.85 These governments have also shownconsiderable willingness to associate themselves withRussia and China in regard to issues like external callsfor liberalization and democracy because they regarddemocracy promotion from Washington as an outrightthreat to the status quo, which, they maintain, boilsdown to a choice between them and Islamic fundamen-talism. For that reason, Central Asian think tanks andanalysts have urged that Washington pursue a differentstrategy, one that emphasizes not democracy promo-tion, but regional economic integration among CentralAsian states and with neighbors like Afghanistan,India, and Pakistan.86

Indeed, President Nursultan Nazarbayev of

Kazakhstan expressly linked the U.S. failure to winsuccess for its crusade for democracy to the problems inAfghanistan. In November 2006 he publicly connectedhis and presumably his colleagues frustration with


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Washingtons democracy promotion campaign ina country and region with no democratic traditions

to NATOs problems in stabilizing Afghanistan.Obviously the projected road through Central Asiato Tajikistan exemplies a strategy that could give agreater impetus to a focus on economic developmentand regional cooperation, while sidestepping this issue,thus supporting two mainsprings of Nazarbayevsforeign policies and avoiding contentious ones.87

And again for these reasons, states like Kazakhstanand Uzbekistan have pursued multi-vector diplomacy,aiming to make themselves agreeable to all theirneighbors and all the great powers so as to avoid havingto choose among them. Likewise, they play up theirweakness as something that cannot be allowed to gofurther in order to extract aid and assistance from thesepowers and to exploit the almost compulsive efforts

of the great powers to enlist them, each for their ownside against the other rivals to gain more autonomy.88In this respect, they are clearly emulating what ThirdWorld states often sought to do during the Cold War,often with great success.

Through this multi-vector diplomacy localgovernments have hitherto mitigated their potentialexternal security dilemmas by exploiting great andmajor power rivalries to secure tangible securityassistance that they could not otherwise produce ontheir own. They thereby prevent or have sought toprevent any of those external powers from dominatingthe regional security agenda, if not the region, whilesecuring the resources they need to deal with theirdomestic security challenges. This external assistance

is becoming ever more costly to Russia as the cost ofenergy and Central Asias ability to export it to diversemarkets rises and as the regions strategic importance


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grows, making investment in it ever more necessaryfor those powers which have interests or wish to see

themselves as great international actors.Indeed, a central point in these states diplomacy

is the effort to form better and more extensive globaltrade links with states beyond Russia or other post-Soviet states. According to Janes Defence Weekly in2002, Forming better trade links and means to accessinternational markets is a priority for these states andvery often a key in directing foreign policy.89 This isvery visible, of course, in their energy policies. Thesecurity and material assistance the greater powersprovide allow Central Asian regimes to worry lessabout external threats and even to forego genuineregional integration. Meanwhile, they can concentrateon exploiting those rivalries and the circumstances thatgrow out of them like energy rivalry to increase their

domestic security, and leverage enough resources likeenergy rents with which to keep domestic challengesat bay.

Thus, paradoxically, the so-called new great gameamong the great powers for inuence in Central Asiahas materially assisted domestic security and not just by foreclosing possibilities for any one power todominate it. For example, Kazakh analysts note thatone reason why they value the Shanghai CooperationOrganization (SCO) so highly is that it enhances theirsovereignty and provides them with a multilateralforum where both Russia and China, to some degree,check each others capacity for playing games withCentral Asian states.90 One way such assistance fromthe major powers contributes to regional security

is through direct material assistance, e.g., Chinas$900 million loan to local governments after the SCOsummit in 2005; NATOs help through the Partnership


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for Peace in building up Kazakhstans armed forces;U.S. presence in Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan; Russias

military presence in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and morerecently Uzbekistan; and the growing scope of theexercises of SCO member forces against terrorism,separatism, and extremism, as displayed at the 2007SCO exercises. The SCO also functions in this way onbehalf of regional governments. The construction ofthe aforementioned supply line through Uzbekistanand Tajikistan to Afghanistan will have a comparableimpact upon the region.

Such assistance not only brings rewards in itself, italso stimulates anxieties about one or another powerwinning, forcing the other state to make greaterregional investments in Central Asia to retrieve theirinuence. Thus Chinese investments in pipelinesfrom Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in 2006 not only

led Russia to invest in building its own new pipelinesfrom these countries to Russia, it then also agreed topay Ashgabat $135/thousand cubic meters (tcm) ofgas, a 30 percent increase. In turn, that led Ashgabatto hold out with China for a price of $195/tcm, a pricethat became its benchmark for all future sales abroad.91Likewise, Uzbekistan was able to secure that price of$130/tcm from Gazprom, which was 30 percent higherthan the previous price it paid. By 2008, it and otherproducers were able to force Russia to agree to a priceof $300/tcm before the ensuing nancial crash of thatyear.92 Similarly, the rivalry with the EU and the UnitedStates for inuence over the direction of gas pipelineshas also led Russia to discuss new energy deals withKyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which both eagerly want

and which give them more resources to meet pressinginternal challenges, even if Russia raises its prole intheir countries.93


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Alternatively, the benets the Central Asiangovernments gain from their multi-vector diplomacy

where other actors are allowed in to provide securityagainst domestic threats may be purely political as inthe case of the SCOs political dimension. The SCOfunctions, inter alia, as an organization of mutualprotection and for the granting of the internationallegitimacy its members so desperately lack and crave.At the same time, it is very much a way for Central Asiangovernments to induce Russia and China to providethis tangible and intangible economic-political supportfor them. All the members support the continuation ofthe domestic status quo in their countries and haveunited to reject calls for externally interested partieslike Washington on behalf of democratic norms. ThusRussia and China provide both security and ideologicalcover for local regimes, allowing them to continue on

their preset course with some sense that key playerswill back them up.94 Naturally the members value thishelp and will not soon or casually forego receiving it,especially at a time of war nearby.

Indeed Moscows elite appears to view any gainby China or the United States in Central Asia withunceasing paranoia. Thus its media repeatedlyspeculates about Chinas economic conquest ofCentral Asia and regards the handover of two obsoleteHuey helicopters by Washington to Astana as thebeginning of the end of Russian inuence there.95 Asa 2007 report of the Russian-Chinese Business Councilobserved,

Being a member of the SCO, China views other members

of the organization as promising markets. It is China thatwishes to be the engine behind the trade and economiccooperation within the framework of the SCO. . . . Chinasintentions to form [a] so-called economic space within


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the SCO are well known. Owing to that fact, expertshave been speaking about greater Chinese economicexpansion in various parts of the world, includingCentral Asia. . . . Beijing has activated ties with allCentral Asian countries and strives to comprehensivelystrengthen economic relations and the dependency ofthese countries on its market.96

Similarly its Foreign Ministry regards Western

activities in Central Asia, whether they are the OSCE,EU, NATO, or the United States, as aiming to annex

the area to Western strategic ambitions to put undercontrol Iran, Afghanistan, etc. Therefore, Russia muststrengthen its activities to subordinate Central Asia toits purposes.97 Indeed, it is quite likely that any effortby a Central Asian state to open itself up to the road or,even worse from Russias standpoint, a U.S. base wouldtrigger the most negative reactions from Moscow.98

Indeed, Chief of the General Staff General NikolaiMakarov charged, completely falsely, in December2008 that the United States is setting up new bases inKazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.99 It is precisely that knee- jerk animosity to U.S. interests that led Moscow toinduce Bishkek to evict the United States from Manas.That reaction is a key reason why a U.S. Governmentthat can no longer act unilaterally in Central Asia has

rightly included Russia in the negotiations over the newroad to allay its suspicions and remove its potentialblock to the plan for a road.

Russias attitude towards the U.S. military presencein Central Asia is one of undisguised wariness. Itsposture is the same as has been the case for severalyears, namely that those bases are only tolerable

insofar and for as long as they are used to defeat theTaliban; otherwise there is no need for them and theyshould go. Indeed, Russia has long since made clear


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its opposition to any foreign bases (including Chinesebases) in Central Asia.100 More recently, on October 8,

2008, Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Denisov statedthat Russia does not object to U.S. military presence inCentral Asia as long as it stays within the proclaimedanti-terrorist goals and is not used to push somebodysextra-regional interests.101 This means that Washing-ton, before dealing with local regimes, must rst gothrough Moscow, an unacceptable diminution ofthose states sovereignty and capitulation to Moscowscraving for a closed sphere of inuence. It may also bethe case that Russia has even grander ambitions in thearea as Rogovs remarks above suggest.102

Moscow clearly also seeks a larger role in Afghanis-tan. It has good security reasons that justify this inten-tion. For example, more Russians die annually fromheroin, largely imported from Afghanistan, than died

in its war with Afghanistan. Unless that ow is stopped,as Moscow and Central Asian governments have beenurging for years, this gure will probably increase.103

Similarly Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently saidthat Russia is trying to support not only Afghanistanbut also Pakistan and NATO, and advocated increasedRussia-NATO cooperation, specically with the CSTO(that NATO refuses to recognize lest it become amedium that blocks NATO from direct engagementwith Central Asian states).104 Indeed, Rogovs proposalmay be a trial balloon from the ministry to see how farMoscow can advance in Afghanistan with NATO.

But the foregoing suggests that Russia has notobjected to a new road linking Uzbekistan, Tajikistan,and Afghanistan if it can participate (even if another

stream of supplies comes from the Caucasus). Certain-ly, it professes a shared interest with Washingtonin forestalling any upheaval in Central Asia. The


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difference is that, especially in its current straitenedcircumstances, it has less economic leverage than before

to help stabilize the situation. Although some Russianexperts are urging the government to stimulate aprogram for the industrialization of Central Asia for itsown security, the resources are not there for such a long-term extensive program. Second, Moscows policies todate have aimed to exploit Central Asia, keep it tied toRussias apron strings, and restrict its foreign trade anddiversication of its economies away from excessivereliance on energy and other raw materials. For all itspromises of energy deals, in fact, implementation hasbeen slow to occur.105 Instead, Andrei Grozin, Headof the Department on Central Asia and Kazakhstanat Russias Institute for CIS Countries, has franklyoutlined Russias overtly exploitative approach toenergy issues with Central Asian states. He told the

Rosbalt news agency in 2005 that for Uzbekistan tocooperate economically with Russia, it will need togive up the system of state capitalism, in particular, byshaking servicing of expensive ore mining and energyindustries off state shoulders. Grozin maintained thatif Gazprom obtained control over Uzbekistans gastransporting system, and if Lukoil was granted freeaccess to exploration and extraction of oil, and Russiasexpansion into the nutrition and light industry sectorsof the Uzbek market takes place, then one can say thatthe Russian state has received what it expected fromthe [Russo-Uzbek treaty of November 2005] alliancetreaty.106Elsewhere Grozin admitted that Russias neo-imperial policies are in many respects against economiclogic although they make excellent geopolitical sense

from an imperial perspective. Thus he wrote,


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The changes on the world market might force theRussian Federation to start importing uranium insteadof exporting it. This may happen in the relatively nearfuture. For this reason, the uranium of Kazakhstan and itsproducts are of special interest for Russia, while bilateralcooperation in the atomic, space research, and other hightech applied spheres might pull all the other branchesalong with them. Russia does not prot nancially fromits relations with Kazakhstan, which have nothing to dowith altruism: nancial input is accepted as paymentfor Russias geopolitical interests and national security.This is a long-term strategy that allows the Republicof Kazakhstan to adjust its nearly entire scientic andtechnical potential to Russia: Kazakhstan and Uzbekistanare two key Central Asian states. This strategy alsoapplies to the military-technical sphereMoscow sellsits resources for allied prices not only to strengthenmilitary and foreign policy contacts with Kazakhstan, butalso tie it, for many years to come, to Russias military-industrial complex and standards.107

Towards an American Strategy.

Russias defects as regional hegemon open the wayto an integrated, multilateral, and multidimensionalU.S. and Western strategy for Central Asia to achieveobjectives that are, in some degree, shared by Russianamely a victory over the Taliban and al-Qaeda; the

ensuing termination of terrorism projected beyondAfghanistan to the United States, Russia, CentralAsia, or elsewhere; and the forestalling of domesticupheavals in Central Asia and Afghanistan. ObviouslyCentral Asian governments also share these objectives.Beyond those goals, U.S. policy statements going backa decade postulate the consolidation of Central Asian

states security from terrorism and all other threatsto their de facto and de jure independence as a keyU.S. goal.108 These statements and both the policiesof the Clinton and Bush administrations explicitly


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pursued these objectives and were thus understoodby both domestic and foreign observers, including

Central Asian ones, as aiming to support these statesagainst Russian and all other efforts to circumscribetheir political, economic, and military independence.And these still remain valid, important U.S. objectiveswhose importance is only enhanced by the ghting inAfghanistan.

Central Asian governments interest in maintainingthe maximum amount of exibility and independencein their foreign relations coincides neatly with both U.S.capabilities and interests. It obviously is in Washing-tons interest that its logistical rear in Afghanistan be sta-bilized especially at a time of prolonged economic hard-ship in the region and mounting conict in Afghanis-tan. The intended supply road can and hopefully willprovide a major boost to local economies by giving

contracts to local companies and hopefully provide em-ployment to some of the unemployed in these coun-tries. But the Obama administration should not stopthere. America, especially with European support,can leverage its superior economic power to regain astronger position in the region and help prevent theseembattled states from falling further prey to Russiaand/or China, which cannot compete at that levelwith the United States or with the United States andEurope together. In any case, Asias answers to CentralAsian issues consist of maintaining the status quoagainst all changes, leaving these as backward statesdependent on their cash crops and with little or nopossibility of cooperating among themselves. In otherwords, the Russian approach over time enhances their

vulnerability to challenges stemming from the Taliban,the global economic crisis, or a conuence of the twophenomena.


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Meanwhile the Bush administration has noted thatthe business community is playing a bigger role in

Central Asian states besides Kazakhstan, the regionaleconomic leader. And that role is going beyondenergy investments. Although Washington cannotoffer state-backed loans or elaborate project credits,as does Beijing, it supports WTO membership for allCentral Asian states and has established a U.S.-CentralAsia Trade and Investment Framework Agreement.109Accordingly, there is an opportunity here for the Obamaadministration to enlarge upon this foundation with aconsiderably larger and multidimensional program oftrade, aid, and investment throughout Central Asia toaccomplish the standing U.S. objectives of enhancingthese states economic independence, economicsecurity, and opportunities for their independentparticipation in the global economy without a Russian

or Chinese lter.Scholars have long realized that the building of

infrastructural projects can overcome Central Asiascenturies-long isolation from major international traderoutes and provide not only lasting economic growthbut also access to new possibilities for political actionand integration, into regional blocs as well as thewider global economy. As Robert Caneld has argued,changes in transport facilities and communicationdevices that began in Soviet times and have continuedto the present are exercising a decisive inuenceupon emerging geostrategic and economic realities inCentral Asia. Specically, the 19th century vision of anintegrated network of rail lines connecting the formerSoviet and Tsarist empires, Iran, India, and Europe is

becoming a reality. Equally important, market accessvaries inversely with transport cost. To the degree thatCentral Asian energy costs more to transport to worldmarkets, the less access it will have. But, conversely,


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to the extent that roads and other forms of travel,transport, and communication are built into Central

Asia that lower the cost of transporting people, goods,and services, it can be more integrated with the broaderglobal economy. Surely such ideas lie behind variousRussian and Chinese projects for such developments,as well as behind the rivalry over pipelines to sendCentral Asian energy to Europe and Asia.110 Thus theU.S. road project falls squarely into that category ofexemplary projects that may serve purposes other thaneconomic stability and global or regional integration,but which ultimately can facilitate those objectives andoutcomes.

Beyond that, the necessity of supplying troopswith large amounts of potable water suggests a secondbenet from this road. Perhaps it can galvanize greatercooperation among Central Asian states, if not to

increase the amount of water they consume, then atleast to upgrade the quality for the benet of all of itsusers. There is no doubt that water shortages are a realthreat to the stability of some of these societies and acause for unrest in them.111

Therefore, such infrastructural and environmentalprojects could provide a spur for a much needed butstill obstructed regional economic integration or at leastenhanced cooperation. There is no doubt that at leastsome, if not all, of these states are receptive to the ideaof greater cooperation against the Taliban.112 Sharedparticipation in a major logistical project that bringsmutual benet while supporting the war effort couldlead to spillovers that foster still more cooperation inother areas like water. While it is true that the U.S.

budget is strained and has many claimants upon itsresources, this is a region where relatively small sums,given the totality of U.S. budgetary outlays, could


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make a substantial geopolitical difference. Moreover,it might be possible to arrange matters so that the

budget is not broken here while redirecting existingprograms towards a more holistic and integrated, i.e.,multidimensional understanding of regional securityneeds and thus towards greater effectiveness. Certainlyneither Russia nor China could compete with a seriousinvestment of U.S. resources and time in this region.

But we should not think that we can do this on thecheap. The lessons of Manas are clear: If the United Statesseeks a policy position in Central Asia commensuratewith the requirements of victory in Afghanistan, thenit will have to pay by investing the resources necessaryto do the job. Otherwise its regional credibility willsteadily diminish. We cannot pretend that a geopoliticalstruggle is not occurring in this increasingly criticalregion of the world. Since power projection activities

are an input into the world order, Russian, European,Chinese, and American force deployments into CentralAsia and the Caucasus and economic-political actionsto gain access, inuence, and power there representpotentially competitive and profound attempts atengendering a long-term restructuring of the regionalstrategic order.113

Specifc Recommendations.

Specically, the U.S. Government under PresidentObama should consider and act upon the followingrecommendations and policies to facilitate the afore-mentioned strategic goals of victory in Afghanistan andthe enhanced independence of Central Asian states.

First, it must continue the Bush administrationsemphasis upon regional integration of CentralAsia with South and East Asia in regard to energy,


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electricity, and other commodities.114 As S. FrederickStarr, Director of the Central Asia Caucasus Institute at

the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies atJohns Hopkins University, has written,

Clearly defeating the Taliban and destroying Al Qaedashould be a priority. But these goals are best pursuedin the context of a broader and more positive regionalpurpose. This would be true even if the rise of the SCOand Eurasec [Eurasian Economic Community] did notcall for a strategic response from the United States.115

Washington should also expand its horizons to fostergreater U.S.-European and U.S.-Japanese cooperationin Central Asia so that these states are able to trademore openly with Europe and the United States as well.In other words, the West should leverage its superioreconomic power to achieve constructive and jointly con-

ceived strategic objectives. While energy and access topipelines are the priorities, other goods and servicesmust also be included wherever possible. Greaterinvolvement by the EU and Japan that parallels NATOinvolvement would therefore contribute to this latterenhancement of existing U.S. policies. Second, the administration must build upon thatfoundation and conceive of the road it now seeks tobuild for logistical purposes to supply U.S. forces asalso being a powerful engine for regional economicdevelopment and integration. This aspect of thepolicy called for here as part of the overall strategy forwinning the war in Afghanistan and stabilizing CentralAsia must be a multilateral project with as many localand other key partners (NATO, Russia, and China) as

possible. This is because The more consent Americaattracts abroad, the greater the practical assistance uponwhich the country will be able to draw and the more


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likely that U.S. policy will succeed. If this sometimeselusive condition is met, American strategy should

prove sustainable.116

This multilateral support is essential to persuadelocal participants that U.S. aims are not inimical totheir own but rather in sync with them. As Sir MichaelHoward wrote in 2003,

American power is indispensable for the preservationof global order, and as such it must be recognized,

accommodated, and where possible supported. But if itis to be effective, it needs to be seen and legitimized assuch by the international community. If it is perceivedrather as an instrument serving a unilateral conceptionof national security that amounts to a claim to worlddominationpursuing, in fact, a purely American Waragainst Terrorthat is unlikely to happen.117

Third, it must not detach this road from other

parts of U.S. policy. Instead the administration shouldsee it as the centerpiece of a coordinated policy andpolicy actions to integrate existing programs for trade,investment, and infrastructural projects, particularlywith regard to water quality and increasing watersupplies for all of Central Asia. This will lay a betterfoundation for the lasting economic and thus political

security of Central Asian states, and indirectly throughsuch support will help their continuing economic-political independence and integration with Asia andthe global economy. Fourth, it must, at the same time, reform theinteragency process which is universally regarded asbroken. We need to pursue security in this region andin individual countries as specied above, namely in

a holistic, multidimensional, and integrated way thatenhances all the elements of security, not just militarysecurity. While we do not espouse any particular course


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of reform of the interagency process, several pointsshould be made here. First, the strategy and policy

outlined is not purely or mainly military. Second,it therefore optimally should not be led by the U.S.military but include it under civilian leadership as animportant, but not dominating, element in that strategyfor Central Asia. While in Afghanistan actual hostilitiesrequiring a military strategy are required, it is alsoaccepted that an important component of our policyand strategy there must be to improve governance andeconomic conditions for the population.118 The overallstrategy must shun the previous procedures and lackof integrated planning for both hard and soft powerelements that have led to stovepipe efforts that do notachieve full and efcient results and effects in areas ofoperations.119 Unfortunately this attribute is pervasiveand not only in regard to Afghanistan and Central Asia.

Thus, in 2005 Congressman J. Randy Forbes testied tothe congressionally mandated U.S.-China Commissionthat,

At every brieng we attend, no matter how high rankingthe participants, we are told that there is no coordinatedapproach to analyzing the multi-faceted complex natureof the China problem and the communication between

agencies is inadequate at best. This must be remedied assoon as possible.120

Instead, as one recent paper on the subject ofreforming this process notes, if the U.S. system is toaddress the ever increasing level of complexity inproviding security at home and abroad, indeed if it isto operate as a system at all rather than a collection of

separate componentsthen security reform must stressunity, integration, and inclusion across all levels.121This new process must take a long-term view of theproblems with which it will grapple, especially in the


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light of our own nancial crisis.122 Within that call forreform, there are several common themes in recent

works and statements on this subject that emphasize,as well, the need for multilateral support for suchprograms.123

Furthermore, in all our efforts, whether they areregional or within a particular country, experienceshows the absolute inescapable necessity that theoperation to provide such multidimensional securitymust be organized along lines of unity of commandand unity of effort to succeed. Whether the formatis one of a country team led by the ambassador thatpulls all the strings of U.S. programs together or a JointInter-Agency Task Force (JIATF) is almost a secondaryquestion. The paramount need is for well-conceivedplans that can be implemented under the principle ofthis unity of command leading to a unity of effort.124

Fifth, a key component of an expanded, integrated,and holistic approach to security in both Afghanistanand Central Asia must entail a vigorous effort tocombat narcotics trafcking. This is not just becauseit is a scourge to both Afghanistan and the CIS, butalso because it is clear that the Afghan governmentis either incapable or unwilling to act and is moreconcerned with blaming others for its deciencies.125Furthermore, such action will convince Central Asianstates and Russia that we take their security concernsseriously and will facilitate their cooperation with ourpolicy and strategy. Sixth, the administration and NATO should jointlyoffer Central Asian states an expanded menu of ala carte programs for enhancing security, border

defense, train and equip programs, interoperability,antinarcotics, and, if possible, combat support roles for


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Central Asian countries in Afghanistan. Parallel tothis, the United States should enter into 5-year military-

to-military agreements with each country similar towhat it has recently renewed with Kazakhstan.126Doing so would further engage the U.S. military withthose forces in Central Asia and provide them with analternative model to the Russian armys ways of doingbusiness. This would also be a visible sign of continuinghigh U.S. interest in Central Asian countries defenseand security and of its desire to cooperate with themtoward realizing their goals.

Conclusions.

Arguably, only on the basis of such an integratedmultidimensional and multilateral program can astrategy to secure Central Asia against the ravages of

economic crisis and war be built, while we also seekto prosecute the war in Afghanistan in a similarlyholistic way. It has long since been a critical point inU.S. policy for Central Asia that we seek to advancethese states independence, security, and integration,both at a regional level and with the global economy.U.S. experts and scholars have also argued for such aperspective.127 Thus this project could and probablyshould serve as the centerpiece of a renewed Americaneconomic strategy to help Central Asia ght off theTaliban and cope simultaneously with the globaleconomic crisis. An integrated program of economicand military action in Central Asia is surely called forgiven the scope of our growing involvement and thestakes involved in a region whose strategic importance

is, by all accounts, steadily growing. Especially as weare now increasing our troop commitment toAfghanistan and building this new supply road,


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challenge and opportunity are coming together tosuggest a more enduring basis for a lasting U.S.

contribution to Central Asias long-term security. Ineffect, the present crisis has brought matters to the pointwhere the United States has obtained a second chancein Central Asia, even as it is becoming more importantin world affairs. It is rare that states get a second chancein world politics. But when the opportunity knocks,somebody should be at home to answer the door.

ENDNOTES

1. Elaine Sciolino, Afghan Dictator Proposed in LeakedCable, New York Times, October 4, 2008, www.nytimes.com.

2. Report: Taliban Noose Around Kabul, www.cnn.com,December 8, 2008.

3. Karen DeYoung, Afghan Conict Will Be Reviewed,Washington Post, January 13, 2009, p. AO1.

4. Interview with Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, 60 Minutes, www.cbstv.com, January 11, 2009.

5. Daniel Dombey and Jon Boone, Clinton Signals New LineOn Kabul, Financial Times, January 15, 2009, www.ft.com.

6. Mark Mazetti and Eric Schmitt, U.S. Study Is Said to Warnof Crisis in Afghanistan, New York Times, October 9, 2008, www.nytimes.com; DeYoung.

7. Walter Pincus, U.S. Construction In Afghanistan Signof Long Commitment, Washington Post, January 13, 2009, p. 8;DeYoung.

8. Elizabeth Bumiller, Major Push Is Needed To Save

Afghanistan, General Says, New York Times, January 9, 2009, p.7, www.nytimes.com; The Generals Next War, Foreign Policy,January 1, 2009, pp. 48-49; William H. McMichael: CENTCOM:


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Afghan Success Needs Regional Cooperation, www.defensenews.com, January 6, 2009.

9. Ken Fireman, NATO General Sees U.S. In Afghanistan Fora Decade, Bloomberg News, January 9, 2009, www.bloomberg.com.

10. Lara Jakes, Top NATO Commander Says Global FinancialMeltdown Threatens US Support in Afghanistan, AssociatedPress, www.chicagotribune.com, January 9, 2009.

11. Roman Muzalevsky, Fears Of Financial System CollapseIn Kazakhstan, Central Asia Caucasus Analyst, January 14, 2009.

12. Kazakhstans Economy Set To Shrink, Eurasia Insight,January 20, 2009.

13. Kyrgyzstan: National Bank Forecasts Rough Year ForKyrgyz, Eurasia Insight, January 9, 2009; Uzbekistan: TashkentWants To Curtail Dependency On Foreign Imports, EurasiaInsight, December 18, 2008; Konstantin Parshin, Tajikistan:Dushanbe Braces For Shock, As Remittances Set To Fall Off Cliff,Eurasia Insight, December 16, 2008; Deirdre Tynan, Central Asia:Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan Confront A FinancialDisaster, Eurasia Insight, November 12, 2008; "Kazakhstan:Ofcials Take Action To Protect Domestic Production, EurasiaInsight, January 12, 2009; Kazakhstan: GDP Growth SlowsDramatically, Eurasia Insight, January 7, 2009.

14. Tajikistan: Drowning In Foreign Debt, Eurasia Insight, January 12, 2009; Uzbekistan: Tashkent Tells Dushanbe ToCough Up More Transit Fees, Eurasia Insight, January 6, 2009;Uzbekistan: Turning the Screws on Kyrgyzstan, Eurasia Insight,December 15, 2008; Kazakhstan: Astana Pushes For RegionalMeeting To Address Economic Crisis, Eurasia Insight, December16, 2008; Dushanbe, Najot, in Tajik, December 25, 2008, Open SourceCommittee, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Central Eurasia,(henceforth FBIS SOV), December 25, 2008; Turkmenistan:Ashgabat Turns Off Switch To Tajikistan, Eurasia Insight, January5, 2009.

15. Tajikistan Accuses Uzbek Special Services In OrganizingBlast Near Supreme Court, www.istockanalyst.com, July 21, 2008.


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16. Robert M. Cutler, Kyrgyzstan Steels For Slowdown,Asia Times Online, January 15, 2009, www.times.com.

17. Ibid.

18. Andrew Marshall, Global Crisis PoliticsA Davos DebateWith Nouriel Rubini and Ian Bremmer, Reuters, January 28,2009, blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2009/01/28/global-crisis-politics-a-davos-debate-with-nouriel-roubini-and-ian-bremmer/.

19. Andrey Korbut, Commonwealth Countries prepared ForDefense: CIS States Military Budget $46.5 Billion US, Moscow,Voyenno-Promyshlennyi Kuryer, in Russian, January 9, 2009, FBISSOV, January 9, 2009.

20. Mark Kramer, Prospects For Islamic Radicalism andViolent Extremism in the North Caucasus and Central Asia,PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo, No. 28, August 2008, ceres.georgetown.edu/esp/ponarsmemos/page/55924.html .

21. Open Source Committee Report, KyrgyzstanGovern-ment Focuses Attention On Hizb al-Tahrir, OSC Report, inEnglish, January 13, 2009, FBIS SOV, January 13, 2009.

22. International Crisis Group, Tajikistan: On the Road ToFailure, February 12, 2009, www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/central_asia/162_tajikistan___on_the_road_to_failure.pdf.

23. S

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