I. HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITSA. In GeneralB.Pre-SpanishTimesb. 1 The Sumakwel CodeIn 1212, after fleeing from the oppressive regime of Datu Makatunaw in Borneo, 10 datus set up their own tribalcolonies in the Visayan Islands. One of them, Datu Sumakwel, established on the Island of Panay the Confederation ofMadiaas and its constitution, the Code of Maragtas or the Code of Sumakwel. The Code of Sumakwel was consideredamong the first Filipino laws enacted before the Pre-Hispanic times. It consisted of 10 articles, mainly focusing onpunishment for laziness.An American historian, Paul Morrow debunks the Sumakwel Code as nothing more than the product of GuillermoCuinos imagination. Cuino was the first person to write about the Code Sumakwel in an essay in 1858 wherein heclaimed to have translated the Code from an ancient Filipino document. However, Cuino presented no other proof otherthan his dubious essay. Nevertheless, Paul Morrow laments, much of the Filipino education system to this day stillpreaches the Sumakwel Code asgospel historical truth.b. 2 The Code of KalantiawDatu Kalantiaw was among the ancient Visayans who built akingdom with its own tribal code known as the Codeof Kalantiaw, supposedly around 1150. It contains 18 articles, which consists mainly of punishment for criminal actsranging from the traditional ones such as homicide, theft and nonpayment of debts to the bizarre and superstitious suchas disrespect for revered trees or killing black cats during the new moon. The Code of Kalantiaw also has feudalisticovertones such as obligating those with the beautiful daughters to give them up to the sons of chiefs as well as providingspecial punishment for those who commit particular crimes against the tribal headmen as stated in the Code.Punishments for the crimes stated in the Code are cruel by todays standards; for example, those who sing whiletraveling by night are beaten for two days while those who commit homicide and theft are condemned to death by beingdrowned in the river orin boiling water.In 1968, William Henry Scott, another American historian revealed the Code of Kalantiaw as an outright hoaxperpetuated by forger Jose Marco. Marco gave the Philippine Library and Museum as ancient document claiming to bethe Code of Kalantiaw in 1912. The supposed Code and Marcos claims on how he obtained the ancient document hadtoo manydiscrepanciesand anomalousreference tohistoricalfactsthat could nothave existed during thetime oftheCodes supposed existence. Only recently have a few historians such as Sonia M. Zaide regarded the Code as a fraudbut, as Paul Morrow says, the lie still lives on.C. The Spanish Erac. 1 Harty v. Mun of Victoria 13 Phil. 152Facts: Monsignor Harty, an archbishop of the Roman Catholic Church based in Manila, claims that his parishowns the plaza located in the municipality of Victoria, Tarlac, claiming to be in peaceful possession of it for more than 60years up to 1901. The defendant municipality replied that Victoria was constituted into a town in 1855 and that the parishof Tarlac was established many years afterwards; therefore the latter cannot claim title to the plaza. Evidence seemed toshow that the originalowner, Casimiro Tanedo, of theland wherein theplaza is located, donatedsaid land tothe church ingeneral and not to the town curate, since a permanent curate was not appointed in Victoria until 1867. However, from themoment the town was created, both the town curate and the townspeople have enjoyed free access of the plaza. Still,Monsignor Harty claims the parish of Tarlac owns the plaza on the grounds of 1) prescription and 2) that the act of thecurates and the gobernadorcillos of planting fruit trees and plants onthe plaza constituted private ownership.Held: Monsignor Hartys contentions are incorrect. Reasons:1. It was a Philippine custom then that upon the establishment of a new town, a large tract of land is alwaysreserved in its center for the creation of a plaza. Before Victoria became a town it was a mere barrio. It must be assumedthat the principal residents of Victoria wanted to have a public plaza should their barrio be converted into a town.Therefore, even before Victoria became a town, the land now in dispute was always intended to be a public plaza.2. There was nosufficient proof that the late Casimiro Tanedo intended todonate the portion ofthe land intendedto be a public plaza to the churchin general3. It has been fully proven that the plaza has always been used by the people of Victoria from the moment thetown was created4. Plazas destined for public use are not subject to prescription (Art. 1936, the Old Civil Code)5. Planting of fruit trees by the curates, etc. do not constitute an act of private ownership but either evidence ofpublic use or as embellishments for the benefit of the townspeople.c. 2 Rubi v. Provincial board of Mindoro 39 Phil. 660Facts: Rubi and his fellow Manguianes filed an application for habeas corpus on the ground that they were beingdeprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of Mindoro. Rubi claimed they were being held against their will at areservationin Tigbao, Mindoro while oneDabalos wasimprisonedfor having runaway from thereservation. Theprovincial officials of Mindoro however, countered that they were authorized under section 2145 of the AdministrativeCode of 1917 to implement measures for the advancement of thenon-Christian people of Mindoro by obliging them to livein one place in order to educate them.Held: The Supreme Court ruled in favorof the provincial officials of Mindoro onthe grounds that:1. They were merely exercising the police power of the state for a lawful purpose and through lawful means,which can validly limitthe exercise of Civilliberty. The Supreme Courtcited past legislation implemented inthe Philippineswhich justified the placing in a reservation of the Manguianes such as:a. Book 6, Title 3 A compilation of laws implemented during the Spanish forcing the Indios to leave poblaciones(communities) or reducciones in order toinstruct them to the Catholic faith andenable them to livein a civilized manner.b. Decree of the Governor-General of January 14, 1881- Decree ordering the Indios to be governed by thecommon law and notallowing them, unless with absolute necessity, to change their residence.c. Letter of Instructions by President McKinley Uncivilized tribes are allowed to keep their tribal governments,subject to regulation bythe Americans.d. The Philippine Bill of 1902 The Philippine Commission (which composed of the Philippine Legislature, theother being the Philippine Assembly) was given exclusive jurisdiction over the territory inhabited by the Moros and othernon-Christian tribes of thePhilippinese.The Jones Law2. Although the Maguianes were labeled as non-Christian, the intent of the law was not to refer to any particularreligionsorgeographicaldiscriminationbutispredicatedonthelackofcivilizationbythem,whichthemeasureimplemented by the provincial officials of Mindoro intended tocorrect.3. The measure implemented was a valid delegation of legislative power by the Philippine legislature as it wasdone in accordance with Administrative Code of 1917c.3 The Maura LawQueenRegentMariaCristinaofSpain,upontherecommendationofColonialMinisterAntonioMaura,promulgated the Royal Decree of May 19, 1893 which provided for an autonomous local government in the Philippines.Under the Maura Law therewas constituted a Municipal Tribunal of five, the captain and4 lieutenants. It was givenchargeof the active work of governing the municipality, such as administration of public works, etc. and the details of taxation. Inaddition, each of its members was required to have special qualifications. These positions were honorary. The term ofoffice was 4 years. The officers, together with 2 substitutes, were elected by 12 delegates of the principalia. Theprincipalia was composed of all persons who has held certain offices (such as cabeza de barangay or former captains) orwho has paid a land tax of P50. The Governor General and the provincial governor retained disciplinary jurisdiction overthe council and its individual members, theProvincial Board also had supervision ofthe municipal council (Malcolm, Govt.of the Philippines Islands, pp. 69-71, Document 362, The Maura Law of 1893)c. 4 The Treaty of ParisThe Treaty of Paris officially ended the Spanish-American War of 1898. It was ratified by Spain and the UnitedStates on December 10, 1898.It contained 17 articles, important provisions including:Art. 1 Relinquishment by Spain of its claim of sovereignty and title to Cuba. Art. 2 Cession to the U.S. of theislands ofPuertoRico and Marianas. Art. 3 Cession tothe U.S. ofthe Philippines forthe sum of$20 million. Art. 9Allowing Spanish subjects which are natives of thePhilippines to remain in the Philippines if theyso desire. The civil rightsand political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the U.S. shall be determined by Congress.Art. 11 Relinquishment of all civil and criminal jurisdictions over all territories ceded. Art. 12 Provides for rules ondeciding judicial proceedings pending at thetime of the ratification of thetreaty.D.TheAmerican Periodd.1 The Jones LawThe Jones Law of 1893 was virtually an American-made constitution providing for a complete form of semi-autonomous government in the Philippines. It defined government functions intoan executive to beappointed by the U.S.President with the consent of the Senate, who was called the American Governor-General in the Philippines. Thelegislative power was vested in anelective bicameral/legislature a Senate anda House ofRepresentatives. The judicialpower was exercised by the Supreme-Court and other lower courts, with Filipino and American justices. The Jones Lawalso extended the Bill ofRights, defined Filipino citizenship and provided for other safeguardsand restrictions.The bulk of the Jones Law comprised mainly of defining the executive, legislative and judicial powers of thegovernment.E. The Japanese Occupatione.1 Topacio Nueno Angeles, 76 Phil. 12Facts: Jose Topacio Nueno and 3other petitioners ran for andeventually obtained seats in theMunicipal Board ofManila in 1940. World War II and the subsequent Japanese occupation however took place. After the war, 6 new boardmembers were appointed by the President. Nueno, et.al. claimed that the appointment was nulland void because 1) theirterm of office had not expired due to the world war and2) even if 1) were not true, theystill had the right to hold over theirofficers until their new successors were elected andqualified.Held:Nuenoandhisgoonswereincorrect.Reasons:1) The word term isdifferent from tenure. There is no law which allows the extension of terms ofoffice by reason of war. 2) As for tenure, thesame may be shortened or extended for variousreasons, such as the death of theincumbent or as otherwise provided bylaw. The principle of the right to hold over may validly extend the tenure of office. However, Nueno, et. al. cannot invokethis right because under 16 (a) of the Commonwealth Act, the President has the discretion of appointing temporary boardmembers until duly elected board members can be qualified.F. The Post War Yearsf. 1R.A. 2264, asamended The Local Autonomy ActEntitled,AnAct AmendingtheLawsgoverningLocalGovernmentsbyIncreasingtheir AutonomyandReorganizingtheProvincial Governments,the Actprovidesfor,among otherthings:Procedureinestablishingtheprovincial,city,municipal andregularlyorganizedmunicipal district budgetsforeachfiscalyear,taxationsources;appropriation of funds for the general welfare of the public; grant of the power of eminent domain; composition of theprovincial board; qualifications of members of the provincial board, governors, vice-governors, mayors and vice-mayor;appointment power of provincial governor, city mayor and municipal mayor; and assignment of other powers to theprovincial board, municipal board or city councils. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the interpretation of the LocalAutonomy Act shall be resolved in favor of the local government and shall bepresumed to exist.f. 2 R.A. 2370 The Barrio Charter ActBarrios are units of municipalities or municipal districts in which they are located. They are quasi-municipalcorporations endowed with such powers as herein provided in said Act for the performance of particular governmentfunctions to be exercised byand through their respective barrio governments in conformity with law.Barrios may be created or its name changedby a petition of themajority of voters in the areas affected. They maysue and be sued andmay be deal with any real or personal property in themanner provided by law.No barrio may be created if its population is less than 500 people or out of chartered cities, or poblaciones ofmunicipalities

The Act also provides for the barrio council headed by thebarrio lieutenant. The barrio council shall meet with thequalified voters of the barrio at least once a year in a barrio assembly to discuss, among others, election of new officers,raising of funds and adopt measures for the welfare of the barrio. The Act also provides for the qualifications of the barriocouncil members and their powers and responsibilities, such as the taxation power and its sources.f. 3 R.A. 3590 Revised Barrio Charter ActThis Act is essentially the same as its predecessor, with the following pertinent amendments;1)A plebiscite may be called to decide on the recall of any member of the barrio council member or approve anybudgetary, supplement appropriations orspecial tax ordinances.2)Renaming the barriolieutenantas barriocaptain3)Right of succession in case of vacancy in the barrio captain position (there is novice-barrio captain in both Acts).4)The municipal mayor shall havepower of supervision over barrio officials\5)Procedure in barrio council, such as holding of meetings every month6)Effectively of barrio ordinances (unless otherwise, after 60 days after its passage or 15 days after its confirmation in aplebiscite)f. 4 R.A. 5185 The Decentralization Act of 1967This Act further strengthens the autonomous powers of local governments by providing for the following pertinentprovisions:1) Provincial and city governments are empowered to undertake field agricultural work and rural health workwhenever deemed to be necessary to assist in national programs or services.2)Appointmentofheads,assistantheadsoflocalofficersandtheirsubordinates3)Suspensionand removal ofelective local officials (grounds: disloyalty toRP, dishonesty, oppression andmisconduct in theoffice)4)Restrictioninpracticeoflawbymembersofprovincial,cityormunicipalboard5)Successiontoofficeof vice-governorand vice-mayor.6) Filling of special vacancies inlocal legislative bodies.7) Filling of elective officers in newly created and newly classified provinces, cities, municipalities or municipaldistricts8) List of actions ofprovincial, city and municipal officials and provincial boards declared immediately effective.9) Certain duties and powers oflocalchiefexecutives not tobe subject todirection andreview ofany nationalofficial10)Releaseandapportionmentofcertaingovernmentfunds11)Creationoffollowingpositions: provincial engineer, city public works official, provincial attorneyand city legalofficer12) Creation of Joint Local Government Reform Commission (for continuing studies on local autonomy of LocalGovernment andprepare local government code)G.TheMartial LawEpochg. 1P.D. 145This decree amended Section 2 of R.A. 2264 or Local Autonomy Act because the said section was ineffective incarrying out the Secretary of Finances power to suspend the effectively of any local tax ordinance which in his opinion is unjust, excessive or oppressive or contrary to national policy. Said decree improves this situation by giving the locallegislative body either 30 days to modify the taxordinance or appeal the suspension order of the Secretary of Finance in acourt of competent jurisdiction; otherwise, the tax ordinance orits part of parts inquestion is considered revokedg. 2B.P. 337 The Local Government Code of 1983This Code provides for thepertinent following provision:1) General powers and attributes oflocal government units.2) Powers and restrictions of Local Government Units to: Create sources of revenue; eminent domain; closure of roads;suability; enter into contracts; convey property; limited non-liability for damages.3) National supervision over local governments4) Relationship between Province-city, province-municipality; city-barangay, municipality-barangay; city-barangay; publicofficials-LGUs5) Fiscal matters; Expenditure of government funds; preparation ofbudget6) Requirement and prohibitions of local govt. officials; vacancy and succession7) Qualification and election of local govt. officials; vacancy and succession8) Recall, suspension and removalof elective officials9) Creation of local school boards10) PersonnelAdministration11) Settlement of municipal and barangayboundary disputes12) Details on barangay and barangay officials; municipal and municipal officials; city and city officials; province andprovince officialsH. The Presenth. 1 R.A. 7160 The Local Government Code of 1991. From the LGC of 1983, the following pertinent provisionswere added:1)Operativeprinciplesofdecentralization2)Authority byCongress orany political subdivisionto create, divide,merge, abolish or alter boundaries3)Emphasis on general welfare and imposition of basic services and facilities on political subdivisions4)Reclassification of lands5)Authorityof LGUs to secure and negotiate grants6)Creation of Local Prequalification, Bids and Awards Committee7)Other procedural and technical changesII. PRIMARY LAW AND GENERAL PROVISIONSA. Read Article X, Section 9 and Article XVIII, 1987 Constitutiona.1 Article X, Section 10 No province,city, municipality or barangay maybe created, divided, merged abolishedor its boundaries substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code andsubject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in aplebiscite in the political units directly affected.NOTE: Read the whole of Article X of the 1987 Constitution as well, as it refers to local, governments in general. Itcontains 21 sectors. Also Prof. Ulep must have meant Season 10 and not5 in his outline.a. 2 Article XVIII, Sec. 8 -Unless otherwise provided byCongress, the President mayconstitute the Metropolitan Authorityto be composed ofthe heads ofall local government units comprising the Metropolitan Manila Area.Article XVIII, Sec. 9 A sub-province shall continue to exist and operate until it is converted into a regular province or itscomponent municipalities are reverted to the mother province.NOTE: Theres no pointin reading all othersections of Article XVIII. See for yourself.B. Read R.A. 7924(Metropolitan Manila Development Authority)This Act states the policy of the State to treat Metro Manila as a special development and administrative regionand certain basic services affecting or involving Metro Manila as metro wide services more efficiently and effectivelyplanned, supervised and coordinated by a development authority as created herein, without prejudice to the autonomy ofthe affected LGU. Among its pertinent provisionsare:1)Scope of MMDA (metro-wide) services: Development planning; transport and traffic management; solid wastedisposal and management; Flood control; Urban renewal; zoning and land use planning; health sanitation;Urban protection and pollution control; pu8blic safety;2)Creation of Metro Manila Council (MMC) consisting of all mayors in Metro Manila3)Powers andFunctionsofMMDA, mainlytoformulate,coordinate,and regulate implementationofabovemetro-wide services4)Functions of MMC, mainly to approve projects of MMDA5)Function of MMDA chairman: Execute policies of MMC and manage operations of MMDA; appointmentpower; prepare budget of MMDA; disciplinary power on subordinates; ex officio board member (or hisrepresentative) of departments related to activities of MMDA such as DOTC, DOH, etc.6)Institutional linkages of MMDA: NEDA, NGOs ,accredited peoples organizationsb. 1 Lopez, Jr. v. COMELEC, 136 SCRA 633Facts: Mel Lopez, et. Al. questioned the validity of P, D. 824 which provides for the creation of Metro ManilaCommission which shall hold sway over 4 cities (Manila, Quezon, Caloocan, and Pasay) and 13 municipalities. P.D. Hesays it runs counter to Art. 11, Sec. 3 of the 1973 Constitution which states that: No province, city, municipality or barriomay be created, divided, abolished, merged or its boundaries substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteriaestablished in the Local Government Code and subject to the approval of the majority of votes cast in a plebiscite in theunit or units affected. No plebiscite was conducted to vote for the creation of Metro Manila. He also claims the P.D. is adenialof theequal protection clause asother cities andmunicipalitieswere notsimilarly organized intosuch. AlsothePresident cannot exercise direct supervision and control over the Metropolitan Manila Commission as it runs counter tothe autonomy of local governments.Held: Mel Lopez is incorrect. Reasons:1.Although a plebiscite was not conducted, a referendum was held Feb. 27, 1975 wherein the residents of theGreater Manila area authorized the President to reorganize the cities and municipalities under the Metro ManilaCommission. The requirements for a plebiscite were therefore deemed satisfied. Besides, at the time of thereferendum, there was no Local Government Code in existence then which provided the need for a plebiscite. Byvirtue of martial law and the absence of an interim Batasang Pambansa at that time, the President had authorityto enact said P.D.2.There is reasonable classification in organizing said 4 cities and 13 municipalities into a metropolitan area3.Article8, Sec.2 of the 1973 Constitutionexpressly recognizesthe juridical entityknown asMetropolitanManila4.There ispresumptionof constitutionality inthe Presidentspowerof directsupervisionand controlovertheMetropolitan Manila Commission. The presidential power of control can and should be constructed to mean thatsaid control is limited to thosethat may be considerednational in character.b. 2 MMDA v. Bel-Air Assn, Inc., 328 SCRA 836Facts: Pursuant to R.A. 7924 which created the MMDA, MMDA issued a notice to the Bel-Air Village Assoc.(BAVA) that the former will open Neptune Street owned by the latter in Bel-Air Village, as well as tear down a perimeterwall owned by said village. Both actions,the MMDA said, is necessary for the decongestion oftraffic along the said areasBAVA petitioned the trail court and later on the Court of Appeals to enjoin the implementation of MMDAs proposedactions. BAVAs petition was granted. The MMDA thus now seeks recourse with the Supreme Court, claiming amongothers that its proposed actions werein the exercise ofthe police power.Held: MMDA is wrong. The reason is that R.A. 7924 did not expressly or impliedly delegate any police power tothe MMDA, most notably the power to enact ordinances necessary for the implementation of its plans, programs andprojects aimed at the delivery of metro-wide services in Metro Manila,without diminution of the autonomy of the LGUsconcerning purely local matters(See. 2, R.A. 7924) MMDAs proposed actions were not under the authority of anyordinance (Whats funny is that theMMC, the governing board ofthe MMDA, is composed ofthe different mayors of MetroManila, and these guys, asmayors per se,have the power or at least, the political will to enact ordinances)C. Read R.A. 6732 (Organic Act for ARMM [Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao])Mindanao, encompassing 13 provinces and 9 cities, through a plebiscite for that purpose. This government shalloperate within the framework of the Regional Government. The executive power is conferred on the Regional Governor.The legislative powerisconferred inthe Regional Assembly. TheSupreme Court, theCourtof Appealsand thelowercourts shall continue to exercise their poweras mandated in theConstitution; however, there shall bea Shariah AppellateCourt which shall also be learned in Islamic law and jurisprudence. The Shariah Courts decisions shall be final andexecutory subject to theoriginal and appellate jurisdiction ofthe Supreme Court. Tribal Appellate Courts for casesdealingwith tribal codes shall also beestablished.The Regional Government shall have fiscal autonomy or the power to create its own sources of revenue, subjectto the limitations ofthe Constitution and this Organic Act. The Organic Act also provides for:Protection of ancestral lands,ancestral domain and indigenous cultural communities; urban and rural planning and development; power to enact lawspertaining to the national economy and patrimony responsive to the needs of the Regional Government; public order andsecurity; education, science and technology and sports development; social justice and services; and power to amend orrevise the Organic Act, either by Congress or bythe Regional Assembly, the latter beingsubject to approval byCongress.c. 1 Abbas v. COMELEC, 179 SCRA 287Facts: Datu Firdausi Abbas, et.al. challenged the constitutionality of R.A. 6734 on thefollowing grounds:1)R. A. 6734 conflicts with the Tripoli Agreement (what conflicts the case doesnt say)2)R. A. 6734 provides for the unconditional creation of the ARMM and not through the mode of a plebiscite asprovided in the Constitution3)The Constitution provides that ARMM shall be approved bya majority of votes cast in a plebiscite byall votersresiding in the provinces and cities affected, but R.A. 6734 says by a majority or votes castby the constituentunitsin a plebiscite and only those provinces and cities where a majority of votes cast in favor of the OrganicAct shall be included inthe Autonomous Region. R.A. 6734 thus conflicts the Constitution4)R.A. 6734includes provincesand citieswhich donot havethe samecultural andhistoricalheritage and otherrelevant characteristics needed for admission to the ARMM5)R. A. 6734 violates constitutional guarantee on freedom of exercise of religion as some its provisions runcounter to the Koran6)The creation of an Oversight Committee to supervise the transfer of power to the ARMM is contrary to theconstitutional mandate that the creation of the autonomous region hinges solely on the result of the plebiscite7)R. A. 6734 says that only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included inthe ARMM. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the AutonomousRegion shall remain in the existing administrative regions:Provided however, that the President may, byadministrative determination, merge the existing regions. This provision, Abbas claims, is contrary to theConstitutional mandate that, No province city, municipality or barangay may be created, divided, merged,abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established with thelocal government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unitsdirectly affected. (Art. 10, Sec. 10, 1987 Constitution)Held: Abbas is wrong. Reasons:1)R. A. 6734 as an enactment of Congress, is superior to the TripoliAgreement, being a subsequent law to theTripoliAgreement (though inmy opinion itwouldnt matter if R. A. 6734was prior tothe Tripoli Agreement)2)The transitory provisions of R. A. 6734 does provide for a plebiscite (1 guess nobody reads the transitoryprovisions)3)The framers of the Constitution must have intended that the majority of votes must come fromeach of theconstituent unitsand not all the votes of the provinces and cities (I couldnt understand how the justicesarrived at this conclusion)4)It isnot for the Court todecide on thewisdom ofthe law concerningthe inclusion of provinces andcitieswhich Abbas claims should not be included ina plebiscite5)There is no actual controversy yet as to any violation of freedom of religion, only a potential one

6)The creation of an Oversight Committee is merely procedural and in fact will aid in the timely creation of theARMM7)The power of the President to merge administrative regions is inherent in his power of general supervisionover local governments. Besides, administrative regions are not territorial or political regions. Examples ofadministrative regions are Regions I to XII and the NCRc. 2 Chiongbian v. Orbos, 245 SCRA 253Facts: In 1990, President Aquino issued E. O. No. 439 wherein she picked certain provinces and cities, some ofwhich did not participate inthe inclusion to the ARMM, to thereorganized to new regions (e.g.Misamis Occidental, whichdid not participate in the ARMM plebiscite, was transferred from Region X to Region XI). Aquino issued said E. O.pursuant ant R. A. 6734, which says:That only the provinces andcities voting favorably in suitable plebiscites shallbeincluded inthe ARMM.The provincesandcitieswhich plebiscite novote forinclusion inthe Autonomous Region shallremain in the existing administrative regions. Provided however, that the President may, by administrative determination,merge existing regions. James Chiongbian, a Sultan Kudarat congressman, filed a certiorari prohibition to protest the E.O., claiming that President Aquino had no power to reorganizeadministrative regions because said provision in R. A. 67341) also states that provinces, cities which inthe plebiscite do not vote forinclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remainthe existing administrative regions 2) the Constitution does not expressly provide the President the power to mergeadministrative regions; in fact Art. 10, Sec. 10 of theConstitution (see II of youroutline) prohibits this and 3)even grantingthat the President is allowed to merge administrative regions, there is law setting standard on how it is to be done.Held: Chiongbian is wrong. Reasons:1)The sentence shall remain in the existing administrative regions, is further qualify by the phrase, Providedhowever that the President may, by administration determination merge the existing regions.2)Past legislation, particularly R. A. 5345 issued in 1968, authorized the President the help of aCommission onReorganization, to reorganize thedifferent example departments including administrative regions. This showsthat traditional power to reorganize administrative regions has always been lodged in thePresident3)ThestandardisfoundinR. A.5345whichstatestopromotesimplicity,economicefficiencyinthegovernment to enable it to pursue programs consistent with no goals for accelerated social and economicdevelopment and to improve service transaction of the public business.D. Read R. A. 6766 (Organic Act for Cordillera Autonomous Region of 1989)This Act provides for creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR) shall consist of thecities and provincesthat shall vote favorable in a plebiscite pursuant ant 10, Sec. 18 of the Constitution. Those cities and provinces areBenguet, Ifugao, Muslim Province, Abra, Kalinga-Apayao and BaguioThe Act consists of thefollowing pertinent articles:1)Guiding principles and policies similar to that ofArt. 2 of the 1987 Constitution2)Vesting oflegislative power in the Cordillera Assembly; executive power Cordillera governor with adeputygovernor as well; creation of indigenous special courts whosedecisions are final and executory but subject tothe original and appellate jurisdiction ofthe Supreme Court3)Creation of a Regional Commission onAppointments4)Measurestoprotectanddeveloptheancestrallandsandancestraldomainsofindigenousculturalcommunities as well as the national economy and patrimonyThe rest of its provisions are roughly similar to the Organic Act for ARMM (see11-c) CAR never came toexistence. Only Ifugao province voted in favor of CAR, so the Supreme Court in Ordillo v. COMELEC ruled thatIfugao could no constitute itself intothe CAR>d. 1 Ordillo v. COMELEC, 192 SCRA 100Facts: CAR Regional Assembly member Alexander Ordillo raised the question in his petition on whether theprovince of Ifugao, being the onlyprovince which voted favorably for thecreation of the CAR, can alonelegally and validlyconstitute such region.Held: Ordillos petition is meritorious. Reasons:1)Statutory construction ofArt. X, Sec. 15 of the 1987 Constitution shows that the word region is to be madeup of more than one constituent unit2)Section 2 or R. A. 6766 says The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions necessary forthe proper governance and development of all provinces, cities, barangays and municipalities within theCAR. Therefore, Congress could not have intended thatonly a single provincewould constitute CAR3)It would be illogical for Ifugao to have 2 sets of officials, one for Ifugao and one for the CAR, when Ifugao isthe only member of the CARd. 2 Cordillera Board Coalitions v. COMELEC, 181 SCRA 495Facts: Pending the convening of Congress after President Aquino was swept into power in 1986, she issued E. O.220 which petitioner Cordillera Board Coalitions claimed created the CAR, thus preempting the constitutional mandatethat Congress shall be the one to pass an Organic Act providing for the creation of CAR. Petitioner also questions theconstitutionality ofthe CAR asit runs contrary to Article 10,Sec. 10 ofthe 1987 Constitution (See 11-1). Finally petitionerclaims the CAR will interfere with the local autonomyof individual cities and provinces ingeneral.Held: Cordillera Board Coalition is wrong. Reasons:1. The presumption of constitutionality of laws shall be applied in the case. E. O. 220 was actually envisioned toconsolidate and coordinate the delivery of services of line departments and agencies of the National Government in theareas covered by the CAR asa step preparatory to the grant ofautonomy to the Cordillera. It was not intended to preemptCongress2. CARisnot apubliccorporationoraterritorialorpolitical subdivision.It isin thesamegenre asanadministrative region for the purpose of coordinating the planning and implementation of program and services in thecovered areas. Thus no newterritorial or political subdivision was created or merged with another.3. Local autonomy is administrative autonomy. In the case of CAR and Muslim Mindanao, they are granted bothadministrative and political autonomy. Petitioner has failed to show specifically how the creation of administrative regionswill interfere with local autonomy.d. 3 E.O. 459 dated May 17, 1991This E.O. isentitled Devolving tothe Autonomous Region Government ofthe Autonomous region inMuslimMindanao Certain Powers of the DECS, the Control andSupervision Over Its Offices in the Region andfor other Offices.The E. O. aims to implement Sec. 1, Article XV of R. A. 6734 which states that, The Autonomous Region shallestablish, maintainand support acompleteand integratedsystemofquality education andadopt aneducationalframework that is meaningful, relevant and responsive to the needs, aspirations and ideals of the people in the region.To this end, the Regional Government is made responsible for the regional educational framework of the ARMM,such as formulating and implementing programs to improve education in general in the region.E. Read R. A. 7901, dated Feb. 23, 1995(Creating the CARAGA Administrative Region)This Act is entitled An Act Creating Region 13 to beknown as theCARAGAAdministrative Region, and For OtherPurposes. It consists of the provinces of Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur, Surigao del Norte, Surigao del Sur and thecities of Butuan and Surigao. The Act also transfers Sultan Kudarat toRegion 11.F.Local Government UnitDefinedDefinition: A political subdivision of the state constituted by law and possessed a substantial control over its ownaffairs.Supporting Definition: The LGU is autonomous in the sense that it is given more power authority, responsibilitiesand resources remaining to be an intra sovereign subdivision of a sovereign nation, but no intended to be animperium inimperiastate within a statef. 1 Alvarez v. Guingona, Jr. 252 SCRA 695Facts: Senator Heherson Alvarez, et. al. fileda petition for prohibition withprayer TRO and preliminary prohibitoryinjunction assailing R. A. 7720, Said R. A. provides for a conversion of the municipality of Santiago, Isabela into a City.Alvarez said the municipality of Santiago failed to meet the requirement of Sec. 450 of the LGC that, for a municipality tobecome a component city, it must have an annual income of P20M. The reason is that in the computation of the averageannualincome, theInternalRevenue Allotments (IRA) shouldhave beendeducted fromthe totalincome.Instead, theIRAs were added to the total income.Held: Alvarez is wrong. IRAs are the local government units rightful share to the national taxes. Section 450(c) ofthe LGC provides that the average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive ofspecial funds, transfers, and any recurring income. IRAs are a regular, recurring source of income; they are not specialfunding transfers since Sec. 17(g) ofthe LGC gives atechnical description for the IRA for purposes of theLGCG. Local Autonomy explained1. Autonomy either decentralization ofadministration or decentralization of power(Limbona v. Mangelin)2. Decentralization of Administration Occurs when the central government delegate administrative powers to politicalsubdivisioninordertobroadenthe basicgovernmentpowerandinthe processtomakelocalgovernmentmoreresponsive accountable and Ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities make them more effectivepartners in the pursuit of national development and progress. At the same time, it relieves the central government of thebureau managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate or national concerns (Supra)3.DecentralizationofpowerAnabdicationofpoliticalpowerinfavoroflocalgovernmentunitsdeclaredtobeautonomous. In that case the local government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimumintervention from central government authorities. According to a constitution author (Father Bernas) decentralization ofpower amounts to self-immolation since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to thecentral authorities but to its ownconstituency (Supra)4. Local Autonomy, Philippine Concept The national government does not completely relinquish all its power over localgovernments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to politicalsubdivisions. Thepurposeof thedelegation istomake governancemore directlyresponsive andeffectiveat thelocallevels. In turn, economic, political and social developments at the smaller political units are expected to propel social andeconomic growth and development.But to enable the country to develop as whole the programs and policies effectedlocally must be integrated and coordinate towards a common national goal.Thus, policy-setting for the entire country stilllies in the President and Congress. In Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp. Inc., municipal governments are still agents ofthe national government(Pimentel v. Aguirre)5. Fiscal autonomy Local government have the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to theirequitable share in the national taxes released by the national government, as well as the power to the allocate theirresources in accordance with their ownpriorities.g. 1 Malonzo, et, al v. Zamora, et, al 311 SCRA 224NOTE: Dates and peso figures are crucial to this case.Facts: In 1994, the Sangguniang Panlungsodof Caloocan City issued Ordinance No. 0168, authorizing CaloocanCity mayor Macario Asistio Jr. to initiate expropriation proceedings for lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate owned by the CLTRealty Development Corp. An amount of P39,352,047.75 was appropriated forthis purpose. CLT however countered withan interpleaded and prayer for TRO on August 6, 1997, on the ground that Maysilo estate actually straddled bothCaloocan City and the municipality of Malabon; therefore the Caloocan City and Malabon municipal governments shouldbe restrained and CLT must interplead and litigate among themselves their conflicting rights to claim suchtaxes.In the meantime, the voluntary sale of the CLT property failed to push through so the city government field a suitfor eminent domain against CLT on March 23, 1998.Some months afterwards, Rey Malonzo became mayor of Caloocan City. The expropriation of the CLT propertywas then declared discontinued, thus theappropriation of P50M for the budgetaryitem Expropriation of properties couldnow be reverted for use in supplement budget. Ordinance No. 0254 was then passed appropriating an amount of P39,343,028.00 for the immediate repair ofoffices and hiring of additional personnel.Because of this, the office of the President (OP), acting on an administrative complaint filed against Malonzo et.al., were adjudged guilty of misconduct and meted the penalty of suspension. Malonzos refuted the decision, claimingthat 1) the interpleader filed by CLT was an unavoidable discontinuance of the expropriation project; thus the amount ofP39, 352,047.00 could be reverted into savings and 2) said amount was could be denominated as Expropriation ofProperties and classified under Current Operating Expenditures. The OP countered that the amount of P39, 352,047.75was a capital outlay that must be spent for the project it is intended for, thus under Sec. 322 of the LGC it could not bereverted into savings for another use 2) the filling of the interpleader could not be considered as an unavoidablediscontinuance since months after the interpleader, the Caloocan City government even filed an expropriation casefor theCLT property 3) The Sangguniang Panlungsod, at the time of passing Ordinance No. 0254 did not adopt new or updatedrules of procedure for the current year; this wasshown by the hurried passage inone day of the saidordinance and 4) theappropriation of P50M for Expropriation of Properties actually did not exist this was merely a subterfuge by Malonzo todip his hands intothe P39, 352. 017.75intended for the CLT property expropriation project.Held: Malonzo is correct. Reasons:1) During the oral arguments and pleadings, it was clear that the amount ofP39, 352, 017.75 and whether it was a capital outlay or continuing appropriation was not the issue; rather the issue wasthe budgetary item Expropriation of Properties wherein the amount of P50M was appropriated for said use but was laterdiscontinued, and later on, an amount of P39, 313, 028.00 from the P50M was appropriated for office repair and othermiscellaneous expenses. Malonzos explanation that the P50M was not intended for the purchase of CLT property but forexpenses incidental to expropriation, such as relocation of squatters, appraisal fee, etc. was believed by the Court. (Sowhat happened to the P39, 352, 047.75, if Malonzos explanation is to be believed? Justice Kapunan and 2 othersdissented, believing the OPs argument that there was actually no P50M existing to fund the Expropriation of Propertiesitem. In fact, Malonzo used the nonexistent P50M appropriation as a cover-up to illegally spend the P32, 352, 047.75 forrepair of offices and hiring of personnel. Can you say kickback?)2) The failure to adopt new or updated rules of procedure of the Sangguniang Panlungsod as mandated by Sec.50 and 52 of the LGC is not intended to paralyze said Sanggunian from doing its job. An interpretation of Sec. 50 and 52of the LGC that will avoidinconvenience and absurdity must beadopted, thus the OPs contention ismistaken.g. 2 Sec. 1,Chapter 1, Title XII, E. O. 292Declaration of policy. The State shall ensure theautonomy of local governments. For thispurpose, it shall providefor a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization. Theallocationofpowersand resources toloose government unitsshall bepromoted andinter-local governmentgrouping,consolidation a coordination of resources shall be encouraged. The state shall guarantee the local government units theirjust share in national taxes and their equitable shares in proceeds from the use natural resources, and afford them widerlatitude for resource generation.g. 3 Pimentel v. Aguirre, G. R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000Facts: In 1997, President Ramos issued A. O. No. 372 which caught the ireof Senator Aquilino Pimentel becauseof certain 2provisions which state 1) All government departments and agencies, includingstate universities and colleges,government-ownedandcontrolled corporationandlocalgovernment unitswill identifyandimplement measures inFY1998 that will reduce total expenditures for the year by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriation for non-personalservice items, along the following suggested areas and 2) Pending of assessment and evaluation of the DevelopmentBudget Coordinating Committee of the emergency fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to 10% of the Internal RevenueAllotment (IRA) to LGUs shall be withheld. Pimentel claims that both provisions do not comply with Section 284 of LGC,which provides for the 4 requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal matters 1) an unmanaged publicsector deficit of the national government 2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House ofRepresentatives and the presidents of various local leagues 3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries ofthe DOF, DILG and DBM and 4) any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than 30% of the collection ofnational internal revenue taxes ofthe third fiscal year precedingthe current one. Specially, Pimentel claims that there wasno showing that there was actually an unmanaged public sector deficit and that there was no consultations conducted withthe different leagues of local governments.Held: Pimentel is partly correct. Reasons:1. The Supreme Court is prepared to believe the Solicitor Generals assurance that the first provision abovestated is merely an advisoryor guiding policy for localexecutives to follow, thus local autonomy is not interfered upon.2. The second provision is violative of local fiscal autonomy because its basic feature, the automatic release of thesharesof LGUsin thenational internal revenue,is missing. This ismandated inArticle 10,Sec. 6ofthe Constitution.Furthermore, Section 286 of the LGC provides that therelease shall be made directlyto the LGU concerned within 5daysafter every quarter of the year and shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the nationalgovernment for whatever purpose. The withholding of 10% ofthe IRA is definitely a holdback.H. Public Corporation definedDefinition 1: Those formed or organized for the government of a portion of the State (Act 1459, Sec.2)Definition 2: Those corporations created by the State as its own device and agency for the accomplishment of parts of itsown public works (Eliot, Mun. Corp. p. 1)I. Essential Elements of a Municipal Corporation1) A legal creation or incorporation2. A corporate name by which theartificial personality or legal entity is known and inwhich all corporation acts aredone.3) Inhabitants constituting the population who are invested with the political and corporate powers which areexecuted through duly constituted officers and agents;4) a place or territory within which the local civil government and corporate functions are exercised (Martin, Pub.Corp., 1971)J. Two fold character of a municipal corporation; its significance1) Government the municipal corporation isan agentof theStatefor thegovernment of theterritory and theinhabitants within the municipal limits. The municipal corporation exercises by delegation apart of the sovereigntyof the State.2) Private the MC acts in a similar category as a business corporation, performing functions not strictlygovernment or political. The MC stands for the community in the administration of local affairs w/c is whollybeyond the sphere of the public purposes for which its governmental powers are conferredK. What isFederalism?Definition: A system in which political power is divided between a central (national) government and smallergovernment units.Supporting Definition: The central government is often called the federal government and the smaller units, states orprovinces. In a true federalsystem, citizens owe their loyalty directly tothe central government, even though they live in states or provinces. The central government has direct authority over thepeople concerning powers granted toit in the constitution.III. CREATION AND ABOLITIONOF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONSec. 6, LGC: Authority to create Local Government Units. A local government unit may be created divided,merged, abolished or its boundaries substantially altered either bylaw enacted by Congress inthe case ofa province, city,municipality or any other political subdivision of by ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or SangguniangPanlungsod concerned in the case of a barangay located within its territorial jurisdiction, subject to such limitations andrequirements prescribed in this Code.A.Requisites for creation of Local Government Units1. Income. It must be sufficient based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential government facilitiesand services and special functions commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of the LGU concerned.2. Population. It shall be determined as the total number ofinhabitants of the within the territorial jurisdiction of theLGU concerned.3. Land Area. It must be contiguous unless it comprises 2 or more islands or is separated by an LGU independentof the other properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions and sufficient to provide for such basicservices and facilities to meet therequirements of its populace.Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be arrested by the Department of Finance, the NSO and the LandManagement Bureau of the DENR.B. Decided cases:b. 1Pelaez V. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569Facts: In 1964, President Macapagal issued several EOs creating 33 new municipalities, mainly in NorthernLuzon and Mindanao. The President based his power from Sec. 68 of the Revised Penal Code of 1917. Vice PresidentEmmanuel Pelaez filed a petition forwrit of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, restraininghim frompassinginauditany expenditureofpublicfundsinimplementationofsaidexecutiveorderand/oranydisbursement by saidmunicipalities.Pelaez contends that: 1) Sec 68 of the Revised Administration Code has been impliedly repealed by R.A 2370,the Barrio Charter Act. 2) Sec. 68 is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President and 3) Sec. 68 can allowthe president to interfere in localgovernment affairs.Held: Pelaez is correct. Reasons:1. The Barrio Charter Act states that barrios may not be created nor their boundaries altered or their nameschanged except by act of Congress of the corresponding municipal board upon petition of the majority of voters in theareas affected and therecommendation of the municipality or municipalities in which theproposed barrio is situated Thisimplies that if the President cannot create barrios, what more municipalities? (But I think this is not a very good argumentcoz its implying way too much).2. A law must be: a) Complete in itself so that there is nothing left for the delegate to do but to implement thestatute and b) Fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinable The standard set by Sec. 68 is as the publicwelfare may require This standard, in relation to thelaw in question, is sobroad that is virtually unfettered.3. Thecreation ofMunicipal Corporation isessentially legislative incharacter.If thepresident cancreatemunicipalities, situations may arise where he can submit local officials to his dictation by creating a new municipality andincluding therein the barrio wherein theofficials preside, thus said officials positions would suddenly becomes vacant. Thepower of control by the president over local government is denied by the 1935Constitutionb. 2Tan v. COMELEC 142 SCRA 727Facts: B.P. No. 885 was passed allowing for the creation of the province of Negros del Norte on the Island ofNegros. Petitioner Patricio Tan claimed thatB.P. no885 violated Article XI, Section 3of the Constitution whichstates: Noprovince, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered,except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majorityof the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. Specifically, the remaining areas in the province of NegrosOccidental were not allowed to participate in the plebiscite for the creation of Negros del Norte. Petitioner also claims theproposed province of Negros del Norte failed to meet the requirements of Sec. 197 of the LGC of 1983, specially that afuture province must have at least an area of 3,500 sq.km. Negros del Norte, Petitioner avers, is actually only 2,856.56 sqkm. Respondent claims the issue was already rendered moot and academic as the new province of Negros del Norte wasalready proclaimed. Moreover, the area of Negros del Norte is really 4,019.95 sq km, since the waters falling under thejurisdiction and control of Negros del Norte must be included in the total area of the province.Held: Tan is correct. The plebiscite is declarednull and void Reasons:1)The phrase subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affectedmust be construed to mean that the remaining areas in the province of Negros Occidental should havebeen allowed to participate in the said plebiscite. The reason is that cities belonging to Negros Occidentalwill be added to Negros del Norte, thus Negros Occidentals land area will be dismembered. Certainly, thepeople of Negros Occidental should have been allowed to vote inthe plebiscite as they are directly affectedby the diminution in land size of their province.2)A reading of the last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 LGC of 1983 says. The territory neednot be contiguous if it comprises 2 or more islands. The use of the word territory clearly reflects that thelaw refers only to the land mass and excludes the waters over which the political unit has control. In otherwords, Negros del Norte failed to meet the required land area of 3,500 sq. km for it to become a province.b. 3Paredes v. Executive Secretary 128 SCRA 6Facts: By virtue ofB.P. Blg 56,certain barangays in themunicipality of Mayoyao, Ifugao helda plebiscite to determinewhether they want to constitute themselves into the new municipality of Aguinaldo. Governor Zosimo Paredes et. al.however claimed that the rest of the barangays on Mayoyao should be allowed to participate in the plebiscite by virtue ofArt. XI, Sec of the 1973 Constitution as the other barangays are also affected by the creation of the municipality ofAguinaldo.Held: Paredes is wrong. Presumption of constitutionality should be applied in this case.B.P. Blg. 56 is a reflection oflocal autonomy on the part of the barangay wanting to constituent themselves into a new municipality. Said barangaysshould be given leeway in becoming self-reliant communities. Moreover, the people in said barangays are the ones whowill constitute the new municipality of Aguinaldo, not the other barangays ofMayoyao excluded from B.P. Blg. 56b.4Mun. of Candijay, Bohol v. Ca 251 SCRA 182Facts: The municipality of Candijay petitioned the RTC of Tagbilaran, Bohol, claiming that its boundary line actuallycovered barrio Pagahat, since the municipality of Alicia claims to have current territorial jurisdiction over said barrio. TheRTC awarded Pagahat to Candijay Alicia appealed tothe Court of Appeals. The CA ruled in favorof Alicia on thegroundsthat 1) applying the rule ofequiponderance of evidence (a principle in Civil Procedure) with Candijay as plaintiff and Aliciaas defendant in the lower court, the court mustrule in favor of the defendant. The equiponderance ofevidence rule states:Where the scale shall stand upon equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence which shall incline it to one side or theother, the court will find for the defendant. Under said principle, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence andnot on the weakness ofdefendants claim. Even if the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than thatof the defendant,there is no preponderance of evidence on his side if such evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his cause of action.In this case, both municipalities failed to satisfactorily back their claims that they owned barrio Pagahat: and 2) ifCandijays boundary line claim was true, then not only would they claim Pagahat but also other certain barrios as well,which would as a result,certainly expand Candijays territory far beyond than what the law allows her, Candijay petitionedis review on certiorari with the SC, claiming that 1) the CA misapplied the equiponderance ofevidence rule and 2) themunicipality of Alicia had no juridical personality, having been created under avoid E.O. ( E.O. No.265) since Sec. 68 ofthe RAC of 1917 from which the said E.O. derived its authority, was declared unconstitutional in Pelaez v. AuditionGeneral (See III-b 1).Held: The Municipality of Candijay is incorrect Reasons:1. The SC sees no need in reviewing the equiponderance rule as it was not arrived whimsically or capriciously by theCA2. The Municipality of Alicia was created by virtue of E.O. 265 in 1949. 16 years late when Pelaez v. Auditor Generalwas promulgated. And yet even after, various government acts, most notably the recognition by the 1987 Constitution ofAlicia as one of the 20 municipalities of the Third District of Bohol, indicate the States recognition and acknowledgementof the existence thereof. Alicia therefore, can claim the benefits ofSec. 442 (d) ofthe LGC of1991 which states MunicipalDistrict organized pursuant to presidential issuances and E.O. and which have their respective set of municipal officialsholdingofficialsholdingofficeatthetimeoftheeffectivityofthecodeshallhenceforthbeconsideredasregularmunicipalities. Sec. 442 (d) is therefore a curative law in favor of Alicia. The objection against it being a municipalcorporation should have been done before the LGC was enacted in 1991.b. 5Municipality of Jimenez v. Baz, Jr. 265 SCRA 182NOTE: Dates in this case are important because essentially Jimenez lost on account of the slow wheels of justiceFacts: In 1949, President Quirino issued E.O. 258, creating the municipality of Sinacaban in the Province ofMisamis Occidental. In 1988 by virtue of said E.O. Sinacaban filed a claim with the provincial Board of Misamis Occidentalagainst the municipality of Jimenez territorial possession of about 5 barrios. Jimenez in its reply with the provincial Boardthat same year and later on with the RTC in 1990, said that Sinacaban had no juridical personality to file a suit because itwas created under a void E.O. as promulgated in Pelaez Auditor General and 2) the disputed barrios belong to Jimenezsince in 1950 the municipalities entered into an agreement duly approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidentalback then which recognized Jimenezs jurisdiction over the disputed barrio in 1992, the RTC ruled in favor of Sinacabanusing as its basis the curative benefits of Sec. 2 of the LGC of 1991. Angrily, Jimenez added in its petition with theSupreme Court the RTCs decision was null and void because it failed todecide the case within one year mandated by theLGC of 1983 andthe Constitution.Held: Jimenez is incorrect Reasons:1. Sinacaban can claim the benefits of Sec.442 (d) of the LGC of 1991, since various government acts throughthe years after the Pelaez case of 1965 indicate the recognition by the years after the Pelaez case 1965 indicate therecognition by the state of the municipality of Sinacaban, most notably when the 1987 Constitution recognized Sinacabanas part of the 2ndDistrict of Misamis Occidental.2. Whatever agreement Sinacaban andJimenez entered into 1950 muststill conform with the territorial metes andbounds set forth in E.O. 258, otherwise the agreement in void (A relocation survey was ordered but the results of thesurvey was not stated in the case)3. Even granting that theRTC was deliberately slow, its decision is notrendered void. The only remedy leftwouldbe to file administrative sanctions against it.b. 6Mendenilla v. Onandia 5 SCRA 536Facts: In 1954, the mayor ofthe municipality of Legaspi appointed Emilio Mendenilla as Chief of Police. Then, in1959, Congress passed R.A. 2234 converting the municipality of Legaspi into the City of Legaspi R.A. 2234 provides thatthe position ofChiefof Police ofthe city ofLegaspi isto beappointed bythe President. Therefore, when Jose ManuelOnandia was appointed by the President City Chief of Police, Mendenilla assailed the legality of such a move, claimingthat his position as chief of police was not abolished when Legaspi was converted from a city to a municipality 2) UnderR.A. 557 his employment status as Chief of Police may not be abolished except in the manner specified in R.A. 557and3) The Civil Service Law guarantees his securityof tenure.Held: Mendenilla is incorrect Reasons:1. The position of Chief of Police of a municipality is totally different from the position of the Chief of Police of a city.Therefore, R.A. 2234 abolished the position of municipality Chief of Police and replaced it with a city Chief of police. Insupport of this contention, theSupreme Court cited Sec. 96, Article XVII of thecharter which provides that theCity Mayorthe Vice Mayor, etc. are allowed to continuein office upon the effectivity of thecharter until the expiration oftheir terms inoffice. Nowhere does it mention the Chief ofPolice in the said list ofofficials. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.2. Notwithstanding both R.A. 557 and the Civil Service Law, it is within the legal competence of Congress to enact R.A.2234. Congress has theplenary power to makelaws, meaning its power to makeany kind oflaw is, in theory, unlimited.Quiz: If the municipality of a municipal judge is converted into a city, can the judge continue to serve in the new city?Answer: Yes. A judge is not a municipal official. He does not derive his power or his appointment from a city charter; hederives them from the Constitution and otherLaws.b. 7Mathay v. CA 320 SCRA 703NOTE: Dont confuse CSU withCSCFacts: During his term, Mayor Brigido Simon appointed 16 people to positions in the Civil Service Unit (CSU) ofthe local government of Quezon City. Simons authority to appoint was based upon P.D. 51. The Secretary of Justicerendered an Opinion, stating that P.D. 51 was never published in the Gazette, therefore, conformably with the Tanada v.Tuvera ruling P.D. 51 never became law at all. The Civil Service Commission (CSC) thus ordered the revocation of allappointments in the CSU. However, the effects of such revocation were temporarily cushioned when the city councilissued an ordinance creating the Department of Public Order and Safety (DPOS). All present personnel of the CSU, thesaid ordinance stated are to be absorbed into the DPOS.However, the regular positions inthe DPOS never got filled dueto insufficient number of said positions and lackof funds.Simon and lateron his successor, Mayor Ismael Mathay, remedied the situation byoffering the CSU personnelcontractual appointment. When Mathay refused to renew their appointments, the CSU personnel complained to the CSC.The CSC replied by issuing resolutions ordering the CSU personnel reinstated. Mathay now asserts that the CSC cannotorder him to reinstate the said personnel as it is. In effect, giving the appointing power he possesses, as city Mayor to theCSC.Held: Mathay is correct. Reasons:1)First of all, the law applicable is B.P. 337 orthe old LGCand not the LGCof 1991 since thematerial eventsof thecase took place during the time of the old LGC.2)Under B.P.337,the power toappointrests inthe local chiefexecutive in the case theMayor. When the citycouncil issued the ordinance allowing for theabsorption of CSU personnel into the DPOS, it specifically made useof the wordings Present Personnel and not positions, thus the city council arrogated upon itself the appointingpower by dictating who shall occupy the DPOS positions. Even in the local government level, the separation ofpowers must be respected.3)The reasoning in no. 2 also applies to the CSC. The CSC claims that by virtue of the ordinance enacted by thecity council, the CSU personnel became regular employees and suchthey have gained theprotection of the CivilService Law. Such reasoning is wrong because in the first place the CSU never existed at all, thus they werenever part of the Civil Service to begin with. Thus when Simon and later on Mathay offered them contractualappointments, they were at the mercy of the appointing power of the said mayors, as they have the option not torenew their appointmentsb. 8Samson v. Aguirre, 315 SCRA 53Facts: R.A. 8535 was signed into law creating the City ofNovaliches out of 15 barangaysin Quezon City. QuezonCity councilor Moises Samson questioned the constitutionality of said R.A. claiming that 1) certifications as to income,land area and population of Novaliches were not presented during the deliberations that led to the passage of R.A. 85352) a certification attesting to thefact that the motherLGU, Quezon City, would not beadversely affected by the creation ofNovaliches city in terms of income, land area and population, was also not presented 3) a copy of the petition ofconcerned barangays calling or the creation of City of Novaliches was not presented to the Quezon City Council, asmandated by the Implementing Rules of the LGC, 1991 and 4) R.A. 8535 failed to specify the seat of government of theproposed City of Novaliches as mandatedby Sec. 11 (a) of theLGC, 1991.Held: Samson is wrong. Reasons:1. The presumption of constitutionally of laws shall be applied in this case,meaning that Samson has burden ofproof to show that R.A. 8535 was unconstitutional. Samson did not present anyproof that no certifications were presentedduring the deliberations. And even granting that no certifications were indeed presented, the representatives of the DOF,NSO, DENR and even Quezon City mayor Ismael Mathay were present during the deliberations. The official statementsattesting to the income, land area and population of Novaliches could serve the certifications contemplated by law2. Mathay was present during the deliberation. If Quezon City would object to the creation of the City ofNovaliches, he would be the first representative to do so. But he didnt.3. The failure to provide the QC council a petition of concerned barangays calling for the creation of the City ofNovaliches is not fatal as such petition is meant only to inform the QC council of such creation. With the mass mediapublicizing the creation of the city of Novaliches, Samson could not claim he was not informed of the proposed creation4. The failure of R.A.8535 to provide a seat of government for Novaliches is not fatal. Sec. 12 of the LGCprovides that a government center shall be established by the LGU as far as practicable. Government centers can alsoserve as seats of government.5. The fact that the City of Novaliches was not included among the 17 cities and municipalities listed in theordinance attached to the 1987 constitution does not mean that a constitutional amendment is necessary in order forNovaliches to become a city. The ordinance attached to the Constitution merely apportions the seat of the House ofRepresentatives to the different legislative districts in the country. Nowhere, does it provide that Metro Manila shall beforever composed of 17cities and municipalities.NOTE: the proposed City of Novaliches was later voted down in a plebiscite held for that purposeC. How areexisting sub-provinces converted to provinces?* Sec. 10 LGC:Plebiscite Requirement.Nocreation,division, merger,abolition orsubstantialalterationofboundaries of LGUs shall take effect unless approved bya majority of the voted cast ina plebiscite called for the purposein the political unit or units directly affected. Said plebiscite shall beconducted by the COMELEC within 120 daysfrom thedate of effectivity of the law orordinance effecting such action, unless the lawor ordinance fixes another date.* Sec. 462 LGC: Existing Sub-provinces Existing sub-provinces are herebyconverted into regular provinces uponapproval of the voters cast in a plebiscite to be held in the said sub provinces and the original provinces directly affected.The plebiscite shall be conducted by the COMELEC simultaneously with the national elections following the effectivity ofthis code.The new legislative district created as a result of such conversion shall continue to be represented in Congress bythe duly elected representatives of the original districts out of which said new province or districts were created unit theirown representative shall have been elected in the next regular congressional elections and qualifiedThe incumbent elected officials of the said sub-provinces converted into regular provinces shall continue to holdoffice until June 30, 1992. Any vacancy occurring in the offices occupied by said incumbent elected officials, or resultingfrom expiration of resulting from expiration of their terms of office in case of negative votes in the plebiscite results, shallbe filled by appointment by the President. The appointees shall hold office until their successors shall have been electedin the regular local elections following the plebiscite mentioned herein and qualified. After effectivity of such conversion,the President shall fill up the position of governor ofthe newly created province through appointment if none hasyet beenappointed to the same as hereinbefore provided, and shall also appoint a vice governor and other members of theSanggunian Panlalawigan, all of whom shall likewise hold office unit their successors shall have been elected in the nextlocal election and qualified.All qualified appointive officials and employees in the career service of the said sub-provinces at the time of theirconversion into regular provinces shall continue inaccordance with civil service law, rules and regulation.C 1.Grino v. COMELEC, 213 SCRA 672Facts: Pursuant to Sec. 462, LGC, a plebiscite to determine whether the sub-province of Guimaras (its motherprovince was Iloilo) wants to become a regular province was held simultaneously with the May 11, 1992 elections. Theparticipants in the said plebiscite were the residents of Iloilo (except Iloilo city) and the 3 municipalities of Guimaras.Surprisingly, the ballots issued in the said 3 municipalities did not provided any space for the election of governor, vice-governor and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province of Iloilo. LDP Iloilo governor-candidateSimplicio Grino claims that the COMELEC erred in not allowing the said 3 municipalities to vote for the provincial officialsof Iloilo, since at the time of the plebiscite Guimaras was still a sub-province of Iloilo. Grino says if Guimaras voted forregular provincehood then there would have been no need for them at all to vote for the provincial officials of Iloilo. Butwhat if Guimaras votes to remain as a sub-province? Should special election be held for the 3 municipalities so that theycan vote for theprovincial official of Iloilo?Held: Obviously, Grinos petition was rendered moot and academic when Guimaras voted to become regularprovince. Besides its too late to undo what COMELEC has done. If Guimaras did vote to remain as a sub province,Grinos petition would have been meritorious.D. Conversion of a component city into a highly urbanized city and reclassification (implementing Rules andregulations, LGC).*Art 12 Conversion of acomponent city into a highly urbanized citya)Requisites for conversion. A component city shall not be converted into a highly urbanized city unless thefollowing requirements are present:1. Income latest annual income of not less than P50M based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by the citytreasure. The annual income shall included the income accruing to the general fund exclusive of special funds, transfersand non-recurring income and2. Population, which shall not beless than 200,000 inhabitants ascertified by NSO.b)Procedure for conversion:1. Resolution. The interested component city shall submit to the office of the President a resolution of itsSanggunian adopted by a majority of all its members in a meeting duly called for the purpose, and approved andendorsed by the citymayor. Said resolution shall be accompanied by certifications as toincome and population2. Declaration of conversion. Within 30 days from receipt of such resolution, the President shall, after verifyingthat the income and population requirements have been met, declare the component city as highly urbanized3. Plebiscite. Within 120 days from the declaration of the President or as specified in the declaration, theCOMELEC shall conduct a plebiscite in the city proposed to the converted such plebiscite shall be preceded by acomprehensive information campaign to be conducted by the COMELEC with the assistance of national and localgovernment officials, media, NGOs and other interestedparties.c)Effect of conversionThe conversion of a component city into a highly-urbanized city shall make it independent ofthe province where itis geographically locatedReclassification (See casesbelow and III-e)d. 1Ceniza v. COMELEC 95 SCRA 763Facts: on Dec. 221979, the interim Batasang Pambansa enactedB.P. Blg. 51 providing for local elections onJan30, 1980. Its section 3,the subject of controversy, reads as follows:xxx Until cities are reclassified into highly urbanized and componentcomes in accordance with standardestablished in the LGC asprovince for in Art XI, Sec 4(1) of theConstitution.Any city now existing withan annual regularincome derived from infrastructure and general funds of not less than P40M at the time of the approval of the act shall beclassified as a highly urbanized city. All other cities shall be considered components of the provinces where they aregeographically located. xxx The registered voters may be entitled to voter in the election of the official of the province ofwhich that city is a component. If its charter so provides. However, voters in a highly urbanized city, as hereinabovedefined shall no participate nor vote in the election of the official of the province in which the highly urbanized city isgeographical located.Robert Ceniza et.al. filed a case as tax payers and registered voters in the cities of Cebu ad Mandaue assailingSec. 3 Specially, they questioned the use of annual income of a given city as basis for classification of whether or not aparticular city is a highly urbanized city whose voters may no participate in the election of provincial officials of theprovince in which the city is geographically located. Ceniza and his fellow goons claim Sec.3 regulates the exercise offreedom of suffrage and violates the equal protection of the law. Moreover, they attacked R.A. 5519 the law creating theCity of Mandaue, which went to effect without the benefit of ratification by the residents of Mandaue in the plebiscite orreferendum. They particularly cited the charters provision denying Mandaue theright to participate in provincial elections.Held: Ceniza et. at. ismistaken. Reasons:1. The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy of LGUs Corollary to independencehowever, is the concomitant loss of right to participate in provincial affairs, more particularly the selection of electiveprovincial officials since these provincial officials have ceased to exercise any government jurisdiction and authority oversaid city.2. Regular annual income of a given city is substantial distinction for classification. The revenue of a city wouldshow whether or not itis capable of existence anddevelopment as a relatively independent economic, social andpoliticalunit. Thus, the equal protection of thelaws in not violated.3. Freedom of suffrage is not imperiled since the Constitution does not give the city voter the right to participate inprovincial elections for territorial reasons4. The city of Mandaue came into existence. In 1969, the constitutional requirement that the creation, alteration,etc. of a city, province, etc. is subject to a plebiscite only came into being when the 1973 Constitution was enacted andtherefore cannot beapplied retroactively.d. 2Tobias v. Abalos 239 SCRA 106Facts: Robert Tobias, et. al. invoking their right as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong City, assailed theconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7675, known as An act Converting the City of Mandaluyong into a Highly urbanized cityknown as the City of Mandaluyong. They cited, among others, Art. VIll, Sec. 49 of R.A. 7675, which provides that As ahighly urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district with the first representative to beelected in the next national elections after the passage of this Act. The remainder of the former legislative district of SanJuan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative district of San Juan with its first representative to be elected at thesame region Said provision Tobias claims is notgermane to the titleof R.A. 7675 thusbeing contrary to theone title-onesubjectrulesinceitcreatesalegislativedistrictwhereasthetitleexpresslyprovidesonlyfortheconversionofMandaluyong into highly urbanized city. Also, Tobias, et. al. contend that the people of san Juan should have been madeto participate in the plebiscite as the same involves a change in their legislative district.Held: Tobias, et.al. are grosslyerroneous Reasons:1. The creation of a new legislative district is a natural logical consequence of its conversion into a highlyurbanized city.2. The contention that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A.7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district is benefit of merit. The reason is that the principle subjectinvolved I the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate districtrepresentation wasonly ancillary thereto. Thus theinhabitantsof SanJuan wereproperly excluded fromthe saidplebiscite as they have nothing to do with the changed in status of neighboring Mandaluyong. (This argument is ratherstrange for me).d.3Miranda v. Aguirre 314 SCRA 603Facts: On May 5,1994 R.A. 7720 was passed converting themunicipality of Santiago, Isabel into an independentcomponent city. On Feb 14, 1998 R.A. 8528 was passed amending R.A. 7720 on2 points: 1 Sec. 2 of R.A. 7720 is herebyamended by deleting the words, an independent so that the municipality of Santiago will be converted into a componentcity only and 2)the voters ofSantiago could now vote againfor the provincial officials ofthe province ofIsabela. JoseMiranda, themayor ofSantiago andother petitioners assailedthe constitutionality ofR.A. 8528. Hesays thatsaid lawlacks the provision requiring that the plebiscite be held for its ratification. Alexander Aguirre, the Executive Secretary andother respondents on the other hand countered that (1) Miranda et. al. had no standing to file their petition 2) the issue isa political question and 3) R.A. 8528 did not created divide, etc or after any boundaries of Santiago it merely reclassifiedSantiago from an independent component cityinto a component city.Held: Aguirre and his cohorts are gravely mistaken. Reasons:1. Miranda had standing, he field the petition in his capacity as mayor ofSantiago.2. The issue is justiciable, Petitioners assail the constitutionality of R.A. 8528, since it runs contrary to article X,Sec 10 of the1987 Constitution. The court has the powerto decide theconstitutionality of any law.3. The reclassification will downgrade Santiagos status from an independent component city into a componentcity. Far reaching changeswill then take place. Itspolitical independence will diminish. The city mayor will be placed underthe administrative supervision of the provincial governor. Ordinance and resolution passed by the city council of Santiagowill have to be reviewed by the Provincial Board of Isabel. Taxes collected by the city would then be shared with theprovince. All these changes merit the need of a plebiscite so that the people at Santiago can air their side on the issue.Moreover, if a plebiscite can be held for the upgrading of an LGU, should not a plebiscite be held for its downgrading aswell?NOTE:Mendozas strong dissent was anchored onArt. X Sec. 10 of the 1987 Constitution. Said section refers toalteration of boundaries of Santiago were substantially altered nor any of its income, population or land area beenradically changes Santiago was neither recreated into another LGU nor abolished, much less its boundaries alter. (Thisgood justice is implying the reclassification was administrative in nature.E. Classification of provinces, cities and municipalities (Read E.O. 349)This act is entitled providing for a new income classification of provinces, cities and other municipalities Pertinentprovisions include:Sec. 1. Classification of provinces and cities. Provinces and cities except Manila and Quezon City, which shall beconsidered as special class cities, are hereby divided into 6 main classes according to the annual average income theyactually realized during the last 4 calendar years immediately preceding as follows: a) First class P30M or more b)Second class P20M-P30M; c) Third class P15M-P20M; d) Fourth class P10M-15M, e) Fifth class P5M-10-M; f) Sixth classless than P5MSec. 2. Classification of Municipalities x x x according to the annual average income they actually realized during thelast 4 calendar years immediately preceding as follows; a) First class, P15M ormore b) second class, P10M-15M c) Thirdclass, P5M-10M d) fourth class P3M-P5M e) Fifth class,P1M-3M f) Sixth Class, less than P1M.Sec. 3. Period of General Reclassification of Province, Cities and Municipalities. Upon the effectivity of this E.O. andfor each period of 4 consecutive calendar years thereafter, the Secretary of Finance shall reclassify the all provinces,cities, except Manila and Quezon City, Which shall remain as special class cities, and municipalities, on the basis of theforegoing schedules of the average annual income of each province, city or municipality derived during the last 4consecutive calendar years immediately such reclassification according to theprovisions hereof.Sec. 4. Definition of Terms. As used this E.O.a. Annual Income revenues and receipts realized by provinces, cities and municipalities from regular sources of thelocal general and infrastructure funds including the internal revenue and specific tax allotments provided for in PDs 144and 436, both asamended but exclusive of non-recurring receipt, such as othernational ads, grants, financial assistance,loan proceeds, sales of fixed assets and similar othersb. Average annual income- sum of the annual income- sum of the Annual Income as herein defined actuallyobtained by a province, citiesand municipalities.Sec. 5 Use of income classification of provinces, cities, and municipalities. xxx as basis for: a) Fixing of maximum taxceiling imposable by the local government b) Determination of statutory and administrative aids, Financial grants andother forms of assistance to local government c) Establishment of salary scales and rates of allowances per diems, andother emoluments that local government officials and personnel may be entitled to d) Implementation of personnel policieson promotions, transfers, details or secondment, and related matters at the local government levels e) formulation andexecution of local government budget policies and f) Determination of the financial capability of local government units toundertake development programs and priority projectsNOTE: There are 7 more sections, mainly on salaries and taxes- you know, ways to put more money into thepocket of our bureaucratsF. Settlement of boundary disputes( Sec. 118, LGC, Sec 15-19, IRR)* Section 118. Judicial Responsibility for settlement of Boundary Dispute. Boundary dispute between and amongLGUs shall, as much as possible. Be settled amicably. To this end:a. Boundary disputes involving 2 or more barangays in the same city or municipality shall be referred forsettlement to the Sangguniang Panlungsod Sangguniang Bayanconcerned.b. Boundary disputes involving 2 or more municipalities within the same province shall be referred for settlementto the Sangguniang Panlalawigan concerned.c. Boundary dispute involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces shall be jointly referred forsettlement to the Sangguniang of the province concerned.d. Boundary dispute involving a component city or municipality on the onehand and ahighly urbanized city on theother or2ormore highly urbanizedcities, shall bejointly referred forsettlementto therespectiveSangguniangofthepartiese. In the event the Sangguniang fails to present an amicable settlement within 60 days from the date the disputewas referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to that effect. Thereafter the dispute shall be formally tried by theSangguniang concerned which shall decide the issue within 60 days from the date of the certification referred to above.*Sec. 15 definition and policy. There is a boundary dispute when a portion or a whole of the territorial area of anLGU is claimed by 2 or more LGUs. Boundary disputes between or among LGUs shall, as much as possible, be settledamicably* Sec.16 Jurisdictional Responsibility. Boundary disputes shall bereferred for settlement to the following:a. Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang for those involving 2 or more barangays in the same city ormunicipality as the case may be.b. Sangguniang Panlalawigan for those involving 2or more municipalities with in thesame province.c. Jointly, to the Sanggunian of provinces concerned, for those involving component cities or municipalities ofdifferent provinces.d. Jointly, to the respective Sangguniang for thoseinvolving a component city or municipality and highly urbanizedcity of 2 or more highly urbanized cities.* Sec. 17 Procedures for settling Boundary Disputes they are 1) filing of petition 2) contents of petition 3)documents attached to petition (e.g. provincial, city or barangay map as the case may be technical description of theboundaries of the LGUs concerned 4) Joint hearing 5) failure to settle amicably (a certification shall be submitted to theeffect 6) Decision 7) Appeal (To the proper RTC)*Sec 18. Maintenance of Status Quo. Pending final resolution of the dispute, the status of the affected area priorto the dispute shall be maintained and continued for all purposes.* Sec 19. Official Custodian. The DILG shall be the official custodian of all documents on boundary disputes ofLGUs.f 1.City of Pasig v. COMELEC et.al. 314 SCRA 179Facts: 2 petitions were raised by the City of Pasig and the municipality of Cainta respectively. Both Questionedthe priority of the suspension of the scheduled plebiscites for the proposed creation of Barangay Karangalan andbarangay Napico (pursuant to2ordinances passed byboth cities) Caintahad contended that theproposed barangaysinvolve areas included in the boundary dispute between herand Pasig; hence the suspension ofthe scheduled plebiscitesis justified. Pasig however contends otherwise. Despite this, theCOMELEC ruled against Cainta and the plebiscite forthecreation of barangay Napico pushed through. The core issues now are 1) whether or not the said barangay dispute is aprejudicial question which must be resolved before any plebiscite can be held and 2) Whether the plebiscite alreadyconducted ratifying the creation of Barangay Napico has rendered the issue as to it moot andacademic.Held: Cainta is correct. Reasons1. Pasig cannot deny that there is a pending boundary dispute between her and Cainta Surely, whether the areain controversy shall be decided aswithin the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Cainta or theCity of the Pasig hasmaterial bearing to the proposed barangay Karangalan and Napico. The importance of drawing with precise strokes theterritorial boundaries of an LGU cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must beclear for they define the limits of theterritorial jurisdiction of an LGU. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorialjurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of LGUs willsow costly conflicts in the exerciseof government powers which will ultimately the peoples welfare.2. As was done before inTan v. COMELEC, the plebiscite alreadyconducted for the creation ofBarangay Napicocan be annulled and set aside.Held: SC held that the plebiscite should be held in abeyance.f. 2 DILGOpinion No. 161-1994(still to search)G. Naming of LGU naming of LGUs and public places, streets and structures* Sec 13, LGC, Art 20-23, IRRa. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan may in consultation with the Philippine Historical Commission (PHC), changethe name of thefollowing within territorial jurisdiction:1.Component cities and municipalities upon the recommendation of the Sangguniang concerned.2.Provincial roads, boulevards, avenue, thoroughfaresand bridges3.Public vocational or technical school and other post-secondary and tertiary schools4.Provincial hospitals,health centers andother health facilities5.Any other place or building owned by theprovincial government.b. The Sangguniang of highly urbanized citie