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Political Science 490 Informal Institutions: Institutionalism for Developing Countries

Northwestern University

Department of Political Science Fall 2019

Tues. 9:00-‐11:50AM, Scott Hall #201 (Ripton Room)

Instructor: Jordan Gans-‐Morse Office Hours: Tues. 12:00-‐2:00PM and by appointment Location: Scott Hall #203 Email: jordan.gans-‐[email protected] COURSE SUMMARY This course will examine informal institutions — rules and procedures that lack formal codification yet effectively structure political behavior. The first part of the course will provide an overview of institutional analysis. Existing institutionalist approaches focus primarily on formal institutions, yet in many developing and transition countries formal rules and procedures have a marginal influence on actual political practices. We will examine recent efforts to define, conceptualize, and empirically analyze informal institutions and informal politics more broadly. The second part of the course will consider informal institutions in the context of several areas of highly active research in contemporary comparative politics and political economy, including (1) clientelism, (2) institutions and economic growth, (3) corruption, (4) state building, and (5) institutions in non-‐democratic regimes. The study of informal institutions entails inherent methodological challenges, in that many of the practices we will examine are illicit and/or covert. Throughout the course we will focus on innovative methodological approaches, ranging from interviewing techniques to statistical tools, designed to overcome these challenges. The course is designed for graduate students preparing for the comprehensive examination in comparative politics or designing a dissertation prospectus for study of the developing world, but students from other sub-‐disciplines are welcomed and encouraged to enroll. COURSE REQUIREMENTS Participation Students are expected to complete all readings prior to each session and to attend every seminar. Seminar participation will count for 30% of students’ overall grade. In addition to unstructured contributions to the conversation, each week students will be assigned a reading that they should read with particular care and know especially well. When questions or

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disputes arise during discussions, the student responsible for the reading will be expected to take the lead in resolving confusion and sorting out divergent interpretations. Finally, students will be expected to post a discussion question on Canvas each week by 5:00PM on Monday. Assignments (1) Short essays: During some weeks, students will be asked to prepare a brief essay on a particular reading. Additional information about the content of these essays will be provided later in the quarter. The essays should be no more than two single-‐spaced pages and should be distributed by email to all seminar participants no later than noon on the day before the seminar meets. The aim of these essays is to introduce the rest of the group to as broad of range of material as possible while keeping the mandatory reading at a reasonable level. Students should be prepared to discuss and answer questions regarding their essay during seminar. The short essay assignments will count for 20% of the overall grade. With respect to the seminar’s primary assignment, students will have two options: (2a) Writing assignment option: The writing assignment may consist of a critical literature review, a research proposal, a conference paper, or a data analysis. My primary aim is that the assignment facilitates students’ preparation for the field exam(s), dissertation prospectus, and/or publication of a journal article. With this in mind, I am willing to tailor the assignment to individual students’ goals. Please come discuss your project with me no later than the fifth week of the quarter, and preferably sooner. The writing assignment will count for 50% of the overall grade. (2b) Exam/journal review option: In place of the writing assignment, students may elect to write two mock journal reviews on readings of their choice from the syllabus and take a written exam. The exam will be designed to simulate field exam questions. The reviews will count for 15% and the exam for 35% of the overall grade. Reviews must be submitted prior to the meeting in which we discuss the particular reading, and the two reviews cannot be done for the same week of readings. Deadlines: The exam will be held on Tuesday, December 3rd at 9AM and the paper will be due on Wednesday, December 4th by noon. LEARNING OBJECTIVES By the end of the course, the aim is that students will:

• Possess a rigorous conceptual command of the institutionalist approach to political science.

• Be prepared to develop research focused on the role of informal institutions. • Be familiar with methodological tools for analyzing illicit or informal political behavior.

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COURSE MATERIALS The course draws on a wide range of sources, and there are no books that we will read in their entirety. Many of the readings are journal articles that are available in electronic form through the Northwestern library. For excerpts from books, I will make copies available via the course website on Canvas. That said, you may find it useful – for this class, for your exam preparation, and/or for your own research – to purchase some or all of the following books:

• Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, eds., Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006)

• Douglass North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: WW Norton & Co., 1981)

• Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (Cambridge University Press, 1990)

• Milan Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule (Cambridge University Press, 2012) • Susan Stokes, Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Valeria Brusco, Brokers, Voters,

and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2013) • Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson, eds., Patrons, Clients, and Policies (Cambridge

University Press, 2007) • Andrew Janos, Politics and Paradigms: Changing Theories of Change in Social Science

(Stanford University Press, 1986)

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COURSE OVERVIEW Week 1: Alternatives to Institutionalism: Structuralism, Functionalism, Behavioralism Tuesday, September 24 Key questions:

• What are the alternative approaches to institutionalism? • How distinct are these different approaches? Is it productive to consider these

distinctions? • What are the strengths and weaknesses of each approach?

Readings:

• Andrew Janos, Politics and Paradigms: Changing Theories of Change in Social Science (Stanford University Press, 1986)

o Chapter 2, skim Chapters 1 & 3 • Robert Adcock, “Interpreting Behavioralism,” in Modern Political Science: Ango-‐

American Exchanges Since 1870, Robert Adcock, Mark Bevir, and Shannon Stimson, eds. (Princeton University Press, 2007)

• Gerardo Munck, “The Past and Present of Comparative Politics,” in Passion, Craft, and Method in Comparative Politics, Gerardo Munck and Richard Snyder, eds. (John Hopkins University Press, 2007) (optional)

• Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978)

o Chapter 1

Further Background Reading:

• Ira Katzelneson, “Structure and Configuration in Comparative Politics,” in Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, Mark Lichbach and Alan Zuckerman, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 1997)

• James Mahoney and Richard Snyder, “Rethinking Agency and Structure in the Study of Regime Change,” Studies in Comparative International Development 34, 2 (1999): 3-‐32

• Robert Dahl, “The Behavioral Approach in Political Science: Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest,” The American Political Science Review 55, 4 (1961): 763-‐772

• Andrew Janos, East Central Europe in the Modern World: The Politics of the Borderlands from Pre-‐ to Post-‐Communism (Stanford University Press, 2002) (see Chapter 1)

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Week 2: Varieties of Institutionalism Tuesday, October 1 Key questions:

• How do various scholars define the term “institutions”? What are the strengths and weaknesses of each definition?

• What are the strengths and weaknesses of institutionalist approaches? • What precipitated the trend toward institutionalism in political science? • What are the differences between the major approaches to institutionalism, and what,

if anything, do they share in common? • What is “institutionalization”? Is it a fruitful concept? • How do institutions form and evolve?

Readings:

• Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” Political Studies 44 (1996): 936-‐957

• Robert Adcock, Mark Bevir, and Shannon Stimson, “Historicizing the New Institutionalism(s),” in Modern Political Science: Anglo-‐American Exchanges Since 1870, Robert Adcock, Mark Bevir, and Shannon Stimson, eds. (Princeton University Press, 2007) (optional)


o Chapter 1 • Douglass North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: WW Norton &

Co., 1981) o Chapters 1, 3, and 4

• Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (Yale University Press, 1968) o Skim pages 1-‐8, read pages 8-‐24, skim pages 78-‐92

• Steven Levitsky, “Institutionalization and Peronism: The Concept, the Case, and the Case for Unpacking the Concept,” Party Politics 4,1 (1998): 77-‐92

• Kathleen Thelen, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999)

o Skim pages 369-‐381, read pages 381-‐401 Further Background Reading:

• James March and Johan Olsen, “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life,” The American Political Science Review 78, 3 (1984): 734-‐749

• James March and Johan Olsen, “Elaborating the New Institutionalism,” in Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions, R.A. Rhodes, Sarah Binder, and Bert Rockman, eds. (Oxford University Press, 2007)

• Sue Crawford and Elinor Ostrom, “A Grammar of Institutions,” American Political Science Review 89,3 (1995): 582-‐600

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• Kenneth Shepsle, “Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 1 (1989): 131-‐147

• John Carey, “Parchment, Equilibrium, and Institutions,” Comparative Political Studies 33 (2000): 735-‐751

• Daniel Diermeier and Keith Krehbiel, “Institutionalism as a Methodology,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 15, 2 (2003): 123-‐144

• Ira Katznelson and Barry Weingast, eds., Preferences and Situations: Points of Intersection Between Historical and Rational Choice Institutionalism (Russell Sage Foundation Publications, 2005)

• Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics,” American Political Science Review (2000): 251-‐267

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Week 3: Conceptualizing Informal Institutions Tuesday, October 8 Key questions:

• What are informal institutions? • How are informal institutions different from informal practices, culture, networks, and

other related concepts? • Is the concept of “informal institutions” useful? • How do informal and formal institutions interact? • How do informal institutions form and evolve?

Readings:

• Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, “Introduction,” in Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America, Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, eds. (John Hopkins University Press, 2006)

• Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell, “Introduction,” in The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, Walter Powell and Paul DiMaggio, eds. (University of Chicago Press, 1991)

o Read pages 1-‐2, 11-‐22 • Alena Ledeneva, How Russia Really Works: The Informal Practices that Shaped Post-‐

Soviet Politics and Business (Cornell University Press, 2006) o Chapter 1

• Leonid Polishchuk, “Misuse of Institutions: Lessons from Transition,” in Economies in Transition: The Long Run View, Gerard Roland, ed. (Palgrave, 2011)

o Read pages 1-‐10 • Julia Azari and Jennifer Smith, “Unwritten rules: Informal institutions in established

democracies,” Perspectives on Politics 10, 1 (2012): 37-‐55 • Mareike Kleine, Informal Governance in the European Union: How Governments Make

International Organizations Work (Cornell University Press, 2013) o Introduction and Chapter 1

Readings for Short Essay #1: Regionally Specific Analyses of Informal Institutions

• Henry Hale, “Formal Constitutions in Informal Politics: Institutions and

Democratization in Post-‐Soviet Eurasia,” World Politics 63, 4 (2011): 581-‐617 • Lily Tsai, “Solidarity Groups, Informal Accountability, and Local Public Goods Provision

in Rural China,” The American Political Science Review 101, 2 (2007): 355-‐372) • Peter Siavelis, “Accommodating Informal Institutions and Chilean Democracy,” in

Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America, Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, eds. (John Hopkins University Press, 2006)

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• Peter Van der Windt, Macartan Humphreys, Lily Medina, Jeffrey F. Timmons, and Maarten Voors, “Citizen Attitudes Toward Traditional and State Authorities: Substitutes or Complements?” Comparative Political Studies 52, 12 (2019): 1810–1840

• Hans-‐Joachim Lauth, “Informal Institutions and Democracy,” Democratization 7,4 (2000): 21-‐50

• Anna Grzymala-‐Busse, “The Best Laid Plans: The Impact of Informal Rules on Formal Institutions in Transitional Regimes,” Studies in Comparative International Development 45 (2010): 1-‐23

• Alena Ledeneva, “Russian Blat and Chinese Guanxi: A Comparative Analysis of Informal Practices,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 50,1 (2008): 118-‐144

• Lowell Dittmer, “Chinese Informal Politics,” The China Journal 34 (1995): 1-‐34 • Guillermo O'Donnell, “Illusions about Consolidation,” Journal of Democracy 7, 2 (1996):

34-‐51

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Week 4: Enforcement, Compliance, and Institutional Change Tuesday, October 15 Key questions:

• How are weak institutions different than informal institutions? • What are the differences between enforcement mechanisms for formal and informal

institutions? • How are enforcement and compliance related to institutional change? • What factors underlie enforcement and compliance problems?

Readings:


o Chapters 5-‐7 • Robert Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Harvard

University Press, 1991) o Introduction and Chapter 7

• Steven Levitsky and Maria Victoria Murillo, “Variation in Institutional Strength,” Annual Review of Political Science 12 (2009): 115-‐133

• Alisha Holland, “Forbearance,” American Political Science Review 110, 2 (2016): 232-‐246.

• James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, “A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change,” in Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power, James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 2010)

• Kellee Tsai, “Adaptive Informal Institutions and Endogenous Institutional Change in China,” World Politics 59, 1 (2006): 116-‐141

Further Background Reading

• Alisha Holland, Forbearance as redistribution: The politics of informal welfare in Latin America (Cambridge University Press, 2017)

• Jordan Gans-‐Morse, “Demand for Law and the Security of Property Rights: The Case of Post-‐Soviet Russia,” American Political Science Review 111, no. 2 (2017): 338-‐359

• Robert Ellickson, “Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County,” Stanford Law Review (1986): 623-‐687

• Tom Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (Yale University Press, 1990) • Avner Greif, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval

Trade (Cambridge University Press, 2006) (Intro and Chapter 1) • Jack Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict (Cambridge University Press, 1992) • Avner Greif and David Laitin, “A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change,” American

Political Science Review 98, 4 (2004): 633-‐652

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Week 5: Clientelism Tuesday, October 22 Key questions:

• What is clientelism? • How is clientelism different than related concepts such as corruption, electoral fraud,

patrimonialism? • Is the concept of “informal institutions” fruitful for understanding clientelism? • How does clientelism affect the formal institutions of democracy? How do various

configurations of formal institutions affect the extent or type of clientelism? • How can illicit phenomena like clientelism be studied?

Readings:

• Susan Stokes, Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Valeria Brusco, Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2013)

o Chapter 1 • Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson, “Citizen-‐Politician Linkages: An Introduction,”

in Patrons, Clients, and Policies, Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 2007)

• Simona Piattoni, “Clientelism in Historical and Comparative Perspective,” in Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation: The European Experience in Historical and Comparative Perspective, Simona Piattoni, ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2001)

• Susan Stokes, “Do Informal Rules Make Democracy Work? Accounting for Accountability in Argentina,” in Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America, Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, eds. (John Hopkins University Press, 2006)

• Leonard Wantchekon, “Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin,” World Politics 55 (2003): 399-‐422

Readings for Short Essay #2: Methodological Approaches to the Study of Clientelism

• Ezequiel Gonzalez-‐Ocantos, Chad Kiewiet de Jonge, Carlos Melendez, Javier Osorio, and David Nickerson, “Vote Buying and Social Desirability Bias: Experimental Evidence from Nicaragua,” American Journal of Political Science 56, 1 (2012): 202-‐217

• Chappell Lawson and Kenneth Greene, “Making clientelism work: How norms of reciprocity increase voter compliance,” Comparative Politics 47.1 (2014): 61-‐85

• Eric Kramon, “Electoral handouts as information: Explaining unmonitored vote buying,” World Politics 68, no. 3 (2016): 454-‐498

• Javier Auyero, “The Logic of Clientelism in Argentina: An Ethnographic Account,” Latin American Research Review 35, 3 (2000): 55-‐81

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Overviews

• Allen Hicken, “Clientelism, ” Annual Review of Political Science 14 (2011): 289-‐310 • Susan Stokes, “Political Clientelism,” Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics, Susan

Stokes and Carles Boix, eds. (Oxford University Press, 2007) Classics

• James Scott, “Patron-‐Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia,” American Political Science Review 66, 1 (1972): 91-‐113

• James Scott, “Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change,” American Political Science Review 63 (1969): 1142-‐1158.

• Martin Shefter, “Party and Patronage: Germany, England, and Italy,” Politics and Society 7 (1977): 403-‐452

• Robin Theobald, “Patrimonialism,” World Politics 34, 4, (1982): 548-‐559

More Recent

• Susan Stokes, “Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina,” American Political Science Review 99, 3 (2005): 315-‐325

• Simeon Nichter, “Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot,” American Political Science review 102, 1 (2008): 19-‐31

• Steven Levitsky, “From Populism to Clientelism? The Transformation of Labor-‐Based Party Linkages in Latin America,” in Patrons, Clients, and Policies, Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 2007)

• Frederic Schaffer, ed., Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying (Lynne Rienner, 2007)

• Timothy Frye, Ora John Reuter, and David Szakonyi, “Political Machines at Work: Voter Mobilization and Electoral Subversion in the Workplace,” World Politics 66, no. 2 (2014): 195-‐228

• Rebecca Weitz-‐Shapiro, Curbing Clientelism in Argentina: Politics, Poverty, and Social Policy (Cambridge University Press, 2014)

• Mariela Szwarcberg, Mobilizing Poor Voters: Machine Politics, Clientelism, and Social Networks in Argentina (Cambridge University Press, 2015)

• Daniel Corstange, The price of a vote in the middle east: Clientelism and communal politics in Lebanon and Yemen (Cambridge University Press, 2016)

• Eric Kramon, Money for votes: The causes and consequences of electoral clientelism in Africa (Cambridge University Press, 2018)

• Simeon Nichter, Votes for survival: Relational clientelism in Latin America (Cambridge University Press, 2018)

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Week 6: Institutions for Growth Tuesday, October 29 Key Questions:

• How do informal institutions affect economic development? • How do informal institutions interact with the formal institutions needed for economic

development? • When is formalization of informal practices beneficial for economic development?

When, if ever, is it detrimental? • How is law related to formal and informal institutions? • Are lessons from institutional development in the West applicable to developing

countries?

Readings:

• Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson, “Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-‐Run Growth,” in Handbook of Economic Growth, Philippe Aghion and Stephen Durlauf, eds. (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2005)

o Skim pages 388-‐421 • Stephen Haber, Armando Razo, and Noel Maurer, The Politics of Property Rights:

Political instability, Credible commitments and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876-‐1929 (Cambridge University Press, 2003)

o Chapters 1 and 2 • Kathryn Firmin-‐Sellers, “The Politics of Property Rights,” American Political Science

Review 89, 4 (1995): 867-‐881 • Robert Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Harvard

University Press, 1991) o Introduction and Chapters 3 and 8

• John McMillan and Christopher Woodruff, “Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order,” Michigan Law Review 98 (1999): 2421-‐2458

• Timothy Frye, Property Rights and Property Wrongs: How Power, Institutions, and Norms Shape Economic Conflict in Russia (Cambridge University Press, 2017)

o Chapter 5 Readings for Short Essay #3: Methodological Approaches to the Study of Informal Institutions and Growth

• Vadim Volkov, Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism (Cornell University Press, 2002)

o Preface, Chapter 1, and pages 27-‐53 • Daniel Mattingly, “Elite capture: How decentralization and informal institutions

weaken property rights in China,” World Politics 68, no. 3 (2016): 383-‐412 • Volha Charnysh, “Diversity, Institutions, and Economic Outcomes: Post-‐WWII

Displacement in Poland,” American Political Science Review 113, no. 2 (2019): 423-‐441

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Background for Assigned Readings • Ronald Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost,” The Journal of Law & Economics 3 (1960)

Institutions and Growth

• Douglass North and Barry Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-‐Century England,” Journal of Economic History 49, 4 (1989): 803-‐832

• Douglass North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: Norton, 1981) • Stephen Haggard, Andrew MacIntyre, and Lydia Tiede, “The Rule of Law and Economic

Development,” Annual Review of Political Science 11 (2008): 205–234 • Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson, “The Colonial Origins of

Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,” American Economic Review 91 (2001): 1369-‐1401

• Simon Johnson, John McMillan, and Christopher Woodruff, “Property Rights and Finance,” The American Economic Review 92, 5 (2002): 1335-‐1356

• Timothy Besley, “Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana,” Journal of Political Economy (1995): 902-‐937

• Timothy Frye, “Credible Commitment and Property Rights: Evidence from Russia,” American Political Science Review 98 (2004): 453-‐466

• James Mahoney, Colonialism and Postcolonial Development: Spanish America in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2010) Informal Institutions and Growth

• Steven Pincus and James Robinson, “What Really Happened During the Glorious

Revolution?” in Institutions, Property Rights, and Economic Growth: The Legacy of Douglass North, Sebastian Galiani and Itai Sened, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 2014)

• Joel Mokyr, “The Institutional Origins of the Industrial Revolution,” in Institutions and Economic Performance, Elhanan Helpman, ed. (Harvard University Press, 2008)

• Philip Keefer and Mary Shirley, “Formal versus Informal Institutions in Economic Development,” in Institutions, Contracts, and Organizations, Claude Ménard, ed. (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2000)

Non-‐State Property Rights Protection and Contract Enforcement

• Timothy Frye, Property rights and property wrongs: How power, institutions, and Norms

Shape Economic Conflict in Russia (Cambridge University Press, 2017) • Jordan Gans-‐Morse, “Demand for Law and the Security of Property Rights: The Case of

Post-‐Soviet Russia,” American Political Science Review 111, no. 2 (2017): 338-‐359 • Jordan Gans-‐Morse, Property Rights in Post-‐Soviet Russia: Violence, Corruption, and the

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Demand for Law (Cambridge University Press, 2017) • Stanislav Markus, “Secure Property as a Bottom-‐Up Process: Firms, Stakeholders, and

Predators in Weak States,” World Politics 61, 2 (2012) • Yue Hou, The Private Sector in Public Office: Selective Property Rights in China

(Cambridge University Press, 2019) • Yuhua Wang, Tying the Autocrat's Hands: The Rise of the Rule of Law in China

(Cambridge University Press, 2015) • David Clarke, “Economic Development and the Rights Hypothesis: The China Problem,”

American Journal of Comparative Law 51 (2003): 89-‐112 • Thomas Ginsburg, “Does Law Matter for Economic Development? Evidence from East

Asia,” Law and Society Review 34, 3 (2000): 829-‐856

Historical Examples of Non-‐State Property Rights Protection and Contract Enforcement

• Avner Greif, “Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition,” American Economic Review 83, 3 (1993)

• Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom and Barry Weingast, “Coordination, Commitment and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild,” Journal of Political Economy (1994)

• Hernando De Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else (New York Basic Books, 2000) (see Chapter 5)

Mafia Protection of Property Rights and Enforcement of Contracts

• Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection (Harvard

University Press, 1998) • Vadim Volkov, Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian

Capitalism (Cornell University Press, 2002) • Timothy Frye, “Private Protection in Russia and Poland,” American Journal of Political

Science 46, 3 (2002): 572-‐584

Relational Contracting

• Stewart Macaulay, “Non-‐Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study,” American Sociological Review 28 (1963): 1-‐19

• Simon Johnson, John McMillan, and Christopher Woodruff, “Courts and Relational Contracts,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 18, 1 (2002): 221-‐

• John McMillan and Christopher Woodruff, “Dispute Prevention without Courts in Vietnam,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15, 3 (1999): 637-‐658

• Oliver Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York: The Free Press, 1985)

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Week 7: Corruption Tuesday, November 5 Key questions:

• What is corruption? • What are the various types of corruption and how, if at all, are they related? • Is an objective understanding of corruption a feasible goal, or is corruption a culturally

subjective concept? • How is corruption related to other types of informal institutions and informal practices

previously examined in this course? • What positive effects, if any, can corruption have? • How can illicit behavior, such as corruption, be studied?

Readings:

• Jakob Svensson, “Eight questions about corruption,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 19, 3 (2005): 19-‐42

• Daniel Treisman, “What Have We Learned About the Causes of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-‐National Empirical Research?” Annual Review of Political Science 10 (2007): 211-‐244

• James Scott, Comparative Political Corruption (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-‐Hall, 1972)

o Chapters 1 and 2 • Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (Yale University Press, 1968)

o Read pages 59-‐72 • Alina Mungiu-‐Pippidi, “Corruption: Diagnosis and treatment,” Journal of democracy 17,

no. 3 (2006): 86-‐99 • Daniel Kaufmann, Sanjay Pradhan, and Randi Ryterman, “New Frontiers in Diagnosing

and Combatting Corruption,” World Bank PREMnotes No. 7 (October 1998) Readings for Short Essay #4: (Quasi)/Experimental Approaches to the Study of Corruption

• Taylor Boas, F. Daniel Hidalgo, and Marcus André Melo, “Norms versus action: Why voters fail to sanction malfeasance in Brazil,” American Journal of Political Science 63, no. 2 (2019): 385-‐400

• Ana Corbacho, Daniel Gingerich, Virginia Oliveros, and Mauricio Ruiz-‐Vega, “Corruption as a Self-‐Fulfilling Prophecy: Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Costa Rica,” American Journal of Political Science 60, no. 4 (2016): 1077-‐1092

• Amanda Lea Robinson and Brigitte Seim, “Who is targeted in corruption? Disentangling the effects of wealth and power on exposure to bribery,” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 13, no. 3 (2018): 313-‐331

• David Szakonyi, “Businesspeople in elected office: Identifying private benefits from firm-‐level returns,” American Political Science Review 112, no. 2 (2018): 322-‐338

• Marianne Bertrand, Simeon Djankov, Remma Hanna, and Sendhil Mullainathan,

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“Obtaining a Driver's License in India: An Experimental Approach to Studying Corruption,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 122, 4 (2007): 1639-‐1676

• Claudio Ferraz and Frederico Finan, “Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effect of Brazil’s Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 123, 2 (2008): 703-‐745

• Rema Hanna and Shing-‐Yi Wang, “Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service: Evidence from India,” American Economic Journal: Econ. Policy 93, 3 (2017): 262-‐ 90

• Abigail Barr and Danila Serra, “Corruption and Culture: An Experimental Analysis,” Journal of Public Economics 94, 11 (2010): 862-‐869

Readings for Short Essay #5: Innovative Approaches for Measuring Corruption

• Raymond Fisman and Edward Miguel, “Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets,” Journal of Political Economy 115,6 (2007)

• Benjamin Olken and Patrick Barron, “The Simple Economics of Extortion: Evidence from Trucking in Aceh,” Journal of Political Economy 117, 3 (2009): 417-‐452

• Yuriy Gorodnichenko and Klara Sabirianova Peter, “Public Sector Pay and Corruption: Measuring Bribery from Micro Data,” Journal of Public Economics 91,5 (2007): 963-‐991

• John McMillan and Pablo Zoido, “How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 18, 4 (2004): 69-‐92

• Yuhua Wang, “Institutions and bribery in an authoritarian state,” Studies in comparative International development 49, no. 2 (2014): 217-‐241


• Ray Fisman and Miriam Golden, Corruption: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford University Press, 2017)

• Benjamin Olken and Rohini Pande, “Corruption in Developing Countries,” Annual Review of Economics 4,1 (2012): 479-‐509

• Jordan Gans-‐Morse, Mariana Borges, Alexey Makarin, Theresa Mannah-‐Blankson, Andre Nickow, and Dong Zhang, “Reducing Bureaucratic Corruption: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on What Works,” World Development 105 (2018): 171-‐188

• Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, “Corruption,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, 3 (1993): 599-‐617

• Robert Klitgaard, Controlling corruption (University of California Press, 1988) • Susan Rose-‐Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform

(Cambridge University Press, 1999) • Arnold Heidenheimer and Michael Johnston, eds., Political Corruption: Concepts and

Contexts (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002) • Michael Johnston, Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power and Democracy (Cambridge

University Press, 2005)

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Week 8: State Building Tuesday, November 12 Key Questions

• Is the concept of strong and weak states useful? How does the study of informal institutions influence our understanding of state strength?

• In what ways do informal institutions support state building? In what ways do they undermine state building?

• How, if at all, does consideration of informal institutions aid in disaggregating the functions of the state? In disaggregating state actors?

• States are often defined in terms of a series of monopolies – on violence, on taxation, on the dispensation of justice. Are there certain spheres in which informal institutions play a greater or lesser role?

• Does the notion of formal vs. formal institutions hold meaning in the absence of a functioning state?

Readings:

• Johan Engvall, The state as investment market: Kyrgyzstan in comparative perspective

(University of Pittsburgh Press, 2016) o Introduction and Chapter 1

• Henry Hale, Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2015)

o Chapters 1-‐2 • Keith Darden, “The Integrity of Corrupt States: Graft as an Informal Political

Institution,” Politics and Society 36, 1 (2007): 35-‐60 • Steffen Hertog, Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats: Oil and the State in Saudi Arabia

(Cornell University Press, 2011) o Introduction and Chapter 1

• Lauren MacLean, Informal Institutions and Citizenship in Rural Africa: Risk and Reciprocity in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire (Cambridge University Press, 2010)

o Chapter 1 Further background reading:

• Scott Radnitz, “Informal Politics and the State,” Comparative Politics 43, 3 (2011): 351-‐371

• Gerald Easter, “Personal Networks and Post-‐Revolutionary State-‐Building: Soviet Russia Reexamined,” World Politics 48, 4 (1996): 551-‐578.

• William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1998)

• Anna Grzymala-‐Busse, Rebuilding Leviathan: Party competition and state exploitation in post-‐communist democracies (Cambridge University Press, 2007)

• Robert Wade, “The Market for Public Office: Why the Indian State is not Better at

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Development,” World Development 13, 4 (1985): 467-‐497 • Kathleen Collins, Clan politics and regime transition in Central Asia (Cambridge

University Press, 2006) • Vadim Volkov, Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian

Capitalism (Cornell University Press, 2002) (chapter 6) • David Skarbek, The Social Order of the Underworld: How Prison Gangs Govern the

American Penal System (Oxford University Press, 2014) • Lynette Ong, “ ‘Thugs-‐for-‐Hire’: Subcontracting of State Coercion and State Capacity in

China,” Perspectives on Politics 16, no. 3 (2018): 680-‐695

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Week 9: Authoritarian Institutions Tuesday, November 19 Key Questions

• How do institutions in authoritarian regimes differ from institutions in democratic regimes?

• Do informal institutions play a greater role in authoritarian regimes than in democratic regimes?

• Why do authoritarian regimes frequently create nominally democratic institutions (e.g., electoral systems, legislatures, courts)?

Readings

• David Art, “What Do We Know about Authoritarianism After Ten Years?” Comparative Politics (2012): 351-‐373

• Milan Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule (Cambridge University Press, 2012) o Chapters 1 and 2

• Thomas Pepinsky, “The Institutional Turn in Comparative Authoritarianism,” British Journal of Political Science, 44, no. 3 (2014): 631-‐653

• Jennifer Ghandi and Ellen Lust Okar, “Elections under Authoritarianism,” Annual Review of Political Science 12 (2009): 403-‐422

• Tamir Moustafa, “Law and courts in authoritarian regimes,” Annual Review of Law and Social Science 10 (2014): 281-‐299

Further Background Readings

• Jennifer Ghandi, Political Institutions Under Dictatorship (Cambridge University Press, 2008)

• Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz, How dictatorships work: Power, personalization, and collapse (Cambridge University Press, 2018)

• Carles Boix and Milan Svolik, “The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions, Commitment, and Power-‐Sharing in Dictatorships,” The Journal of Politics 75,2 (2013): 300-‐316

• Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,” Journal of Democracy 13,2 (2002): 51-‐65

• Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War (Cambridge University Press, 2010)

• Lucan Way, “Authoritarian State Building and the Sources of Regime Competitiveness in the Fourth Wave: The Cases of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine,” World Politics 57,2 (2005): 231-‐261

• Dan Slater, Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia (Cambridge University Press, 2010)

• Dan Slater, “Altering Authoritarianism: Institutional Complexity and Autocratic Agency in Indonesia,” in Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power, James

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Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 2010) • Jennifer Ghandi and Adam Przeworski, “Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of

Autocrats,” Comparative Political Studies 40,11 (2007): 1279-‐1301 • Jason Brownlee, “Hereditary Succession in Modern Autocracies,” World Politics 59,4

(2007): 595-‐628 • Jason Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an age of democratization (Cambridge University

Press, 2007) Authoritarian Electoral and Legislative Politics

• Ellen Lust, “Competitive Clientelism in the Middle East,” Journal of Democracy 20,3 (2009): 122-‐135

• Ellen Lust-‐Okar, “Reinforcing Informal Institutions through Authoritarian Elections: Insights from Jordan,” Middle East Law and Governance 1,1 (2009): 3-‐37

• Ora John Reuter and Graeme Robertson, “Subnational Appointments in Authoritairan Regimes: Evidence from Russian Gubernatorial Appointments,” The Journal of Politics 74,4 (2012):1023-‐1037

• Lisa Blaydes, Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak’s Egypt (Cambridge University Press, 2011)

• Beatriz Magaloni, Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico (Cambridge University Press, 2006)

• Ora John Reuter, The origins of dominant parties: Building authoritarian institutions in post-‐Soviet Russia (Cambridge University Press, 2017)

• Edmund Malesky and Paul Schuler, “Nodding or needling: Analyzing delegate responsiveness in an authoritarian parliament,” American Political Science Review 104, no. 3 (2010): 482-‐502

• Rory Truex, “The Returns to Office in a ‘Rubber Stamp’ Parliament,” American Political Science Review 108, no. 2 (2014): 235-‐251

• Rory Truex, Making Autocracy Work: Representation and Responsiveness in Modern China (Cambridge University Press, 2016)

Authoritarian Courts

• Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa, Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes (Cambridge University Press, 2008)

• Peter Solomon, “Authoritarian Legality and Informal Practices: Judges, Lawyers and the State in Russia and China,” Communist and Post-‐Communist Studies 43 (2010): 351–362

• Peter Solomon, “Courts and Judges in Authoritarian Regimes,” World Politics 60,1 (2007): 122-‐145

Authoritarian Constitutions

• Michael Albertus and Victor Menaldo, “Dictators as Founding Fathers? The Role of Constitutions Under Autocracy,” Economics & Politics 24,3 (2012): 279-‐306

• Tom Ginsburg and Alberto Simpser, Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes (Cambridge

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University Press, 2014) • Henry Hale, “Formal Constitutions in Informal Politics: Institutions and

Democratization in Post-‐Soviet Eurasia,” World Politics 63,4 (2011): 581-‐617 Authoritarian Institutions and Economic Development

• Scott Gehlbach and Philip Keefer, “Private Investment and the Institutionalization of Collective Action in Autocracies: Ruling Parties and Legislatures,” Journal of Politics 74,2 (2012): 621-‐635

• Scott Gehlbach and Philip Keefer, “Investment Without Democracy: Ruling-‐Party Institutionalization and Credible Commitment in Autocracies,” Journal of Comparative Economics 39,2 (2011): 123-‐139

• Jennifer Ghandi, “Dictatorial Institutions and their Impact on Economic Growth,” European Journal of Sociology 49,1 (2008): 3-‐30

• Joseph Wright, “Do authoritarian institutions constrain? How legislatures affect economic growth and investment,” American Journal of Political Science 52, no 2 (2008): 322-‐343

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Week 10: Part I: Student Presentations of Research Papers Part II: Revisiting the Concept of Informal Institutions

Tuesday, November 26 Key Questions

• What are informal institutions? • How are informal institutions different from informal practices, culture, networks,

weak institutions, and other related concepts? • Is the concept of “informal institutions” useful?

Documents

PS 490 Informal Institutions Syllabus - Fall 2019jlg562/... · ! 2! disputesariseduringdiscussions,thestudent!responsibleforthereadingwill!beexpectedto taketheleadinresolvingconfusionandsortingoutdivergentinterpretatio