Provincial Origins of the Partito Comunista Italiano

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Communism in Modena: The Provincial Origins of the Partito Comunista Italiano (1943-1945)Author(s): D. J. TravisSource: The Historical Journal, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Dec., 1986), pp. 875-895Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2639360 .

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The Historical ournal,29, 4 (i 986), pp. 875-895Printed n GreatBritain

COMMUNISM IN MODENA:THE PROVINCIAL ORIGINS OF THEPARTITO COMUNISTA ITALIANO

(1943-1945)1D.J. TRAVIS

St Anne's College, Oxford

Few fields of study are as frequently subject to revision as the history ofcontemporary politics. This is especially true for communist movements, wherenew interpretations constantly rework the old. The outpouring of recent workon the Partito comunista taliano (PCI) is a case in point. The peculiarity ofItalian communism and the popularity of the PCI within Italy pose intriguingproblems which have attracted the attention of many political scientists. Inthe search for answers to these questions, most authors also end up recountingthe Party's history. Unfortunately, the inspiration for these projects is rarelyhistorical per se, but is rather 'scientific', intended in the outdated sense of adiscipline which extracts its subject from a specific environment in order thebetter to study it.

Despite the amount of recent work on the PCI, the historicalunderstandingof Italian communism thus remains remarkably underdeveloped. We haveridden through three waves of interpretations on the PCI,2 but we are still notmuch nearer to a convincing explanation of the nature of the phenomenon.A very brief introduction to the most popular approaches in political sciencereveals some of the major problems left unresolved by that discipline.

First came the works relating Italian communism predominantly to theinternational communist movement and the USSR.3 These studies, influencedby an American tradition in the political sciences, often refused to look beyondbasic ideological labels and acknowledge the importance of the nationalcharacter of some communist movements outside the Soviet Union. Theycontinued to assert the primacy of the Russian connexion even after the PCIbegan to distance itself from the USSR in the I96os. At best, these accounts

1 I would like to thank St Anne's College, Oxford, the British School at Rome and theFondazione Einaudi in Turin for their supportat various times in the preparationof this article.2 A fourth 'wave' might be identified in the writings of Italian authors on the PCI. Theiraccounts, as distinct from the English language works considered here, focus on organizationalhistory and the Party's leadership. P. Spriano, La storiadelpartito omtinistataliano,5 vols. (Turin,

I967) and G. Galli, Storiadelpartito omunistataliano Milan, I976) are two well-known examples.3 The most influential of these studies is still D. Blackmer, Unity n diversity: taliancomnmnunism

andthe communist orld(London, I968). The same approach but in a weaker alnalysis s evidentin R. H. Evans, Coexistence. ommunismnd tspracticen Bolognla,945-1965 (Notre Dame, i967).875

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876 D. J. TRAVIScaptured something that had once been true about the PCI; more often theyasserted that it was still valid. Furthermore, some writers appeared reluctantto ask their subjects what they thought of themselves.4 All these restric-tions seriously limited the relevance of the many Soviet-oriented attempts toexplain the PCI.

Next came the Gramsci studies, already far too numerous to list fully.5Authors writing from this perspective attempt to explain what was 'new' aboutItalian communism by focusing on one of the PCI 's earliest theorists. This hada side effect of limiting their best historical accounts to the moment of originof the Communist Party - the years around 192 i. The hallmark of this pointof view is the identification of the Party with the man to an embarrassing extentin the study of this, a marxist movement. Additionally, many authors seem tosift through the Party's thinking through the years, on the lookout for thekernel of Gramsci lying within. But the Italian Communist Party must be morethan an organizational footnote to the Prison notebooksand a simple enoughadmission is overdue: Gramsci's reflexions on the factory council movementof I9I9-20 and on the rise of domestic fascism have very little to say aboutthe nature of the mass, parliamentary Communist Party in post-war Italy. The'Gramsci' approach, a quite literally single-minded one, does a disservice tothe historical investigation of Italian communism and raises importantquestions about the ability of marxism to take itself seriously as the subject ofhistorical investigation.Studies of strategy currently dominate our understanding of Italiancommunism.6 These works promote theory as the explanatory key to com-munist political behaviour in Italy. They tend to portray the history of the PCIas the gradual elaboration of a chosen strategy over time. Inherent in thisapproach is the absolute priority given to the movement's hierarchy - the

4 Blackmerconcludeswith theobservation,'The weight thispoint [the importanceof the PCI 'sinternational connexion to its militants] deserveswould be difficult to ascertainwithout carefulstudy of the attitudes of those who have joined aindvoted for the Communistparty' (Blackmer,Unity,p. 389). It is not only an issue of the weight to ascribe to the Soviet connexion within thePCI, but, as we shall see, the very nature of that connexion itself.5 Among these are: J. Cammett, AntonioGramnscind the originsof Italianco?nmnunismStanford,

I967); M. Clark, AntonioGramsci ndtherevolutionhatfailed Londoii, I977); A. Davidson, AntonioGramsci: owardsn ntellectualiographyLondon, I977) ;J. Femia, Gramsci'solitical houightOxford,I97I); G. Fiori, AntonioGramsci:ifeof a revoluitionaryLondon, I970); C. Mouffe (ed.), GramnscindAMIarxistheoryLondon, I979); S. Tarrow, 'Le Parti communisteet la soci6tt italienne' in SociologieduCommunismnenItalie(FondationNationale des SciencesPolitiques, 1974), pp. I-54; G. Williams,Proletarian rder:AntonioGramsci,actorycouncilsand the origitnsf comnmunism in Italy, I91I-I92I(London, I975).

6 Works in this genre include: G. Amyot, The ItalianCommunistarty. thecrisis of thePopularFrontstrategy Loindon, I98I); A. Davidson, The theoryandpracticeof Italianconzmmunism,ol. I(London, I982); S. Hellman, 'The PCI's alliance strategy anidthe case of the middle classes',chapter Io, Blackmer and Tarrow, Communismn Italyatnd ranice (Prinicetoni, I977); P. Lange,'The PCI at the local level: a study of strategic performance', ch. 7, Blackmer and Tarrow,Communism;. Sassoon, The strategy f the ItalianiCommuinistarty: romtiheresistanceo theh-istoriccompromiseLondon, I982) . An insightfulcritiqueof thestrategicstudies'school' isT.Judt, ' " Thespreading notion of the town": some recent writinigsoni French and Italian communism', TheHistorical ournal,XXVIII,4 (i 985), I0-I I-1.



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COMMUNISM IN MODENA 877assumption that this is the level which ' really' counts. More difficult to locatein these works is an acknowledgement that political action may have manycomponents, among which poor information and simple misjudgement maybe as determinate as the published opinions of the leadership. Ignored almostentirely are discussions of what inspires the thinking of the leadership, of whycertain opinions from on high might make sense of the world to a party'ssupporters and of the mechanism whereby the ideas of the leadership mightbecome the foundations for the political action of the base.

These trends in the interpretation of Italian communism are important,though, for each captures something true about the PCI at particularmoments. The Italian Communist Party was closely tied to the Soviet Unionfrom the I920S to the I950s; however, the PCI's subsequent break from theUSSR makes the unique nature of the Italian comnmunists' connexion toMoscow clear. Gramsci remains important to the contemporary PCI, not asthe prescient theoretician which some accounts make him out to be, but ratheras a hero who gives the Party an historical continuity which Fascism denied.The PCI does indeed have political programmes (sometimes several and notalways consistent with each other), elaborated by a powerful leadership andchanging (sometimes dramatically) over time, but these may not be the samething as a single strategy. All of the usual approaches in political scienceaccounts of Italian communism, then, have significant shortcomings. I suggestthey are weakest when it comes to explaining change in the movement overtime and in a social context (which may be one and the same thing). Theresolution of this analytical dilemma lies in developing a more fully historicalaccount of the Italian Communist Party.

While everyone seems to be searching for a 'key' to the PCI, few considerthe obvious: communism in Italy is inescapably Italian. It is social life, in thiscase life in Italy at particular times, which not only defines what is politicalas well as problematic to Italian communists, but further limits the range ofpossible solutions to these issues. In a word, social context provides the crucialbackground to political action. The theory and practice of Italian communismmay be better understood when integrated into the history of Italy.

This article attempts to offer an historical explanation of some aspects ofItalian communism and the Communist Party. I locate the beginnings of theParty as a mass movement in the months of the resistance, from the fall of 1943to the spring of I945. I argue that many of the political ideas which we callItalian communism have their origins in this crucial period for the PCI andfor Italy. The specific focus in the article is on the province of Modena inEmilia-Romagna.7 The provincial emphasis is peculiarly valid for a countrylike Italy and it is moreover an appropriate way to reveal most satisfactorilythe connexions between social context, political allegiance and ideology. Itis not intended by this selection to suggest that Modena represents a 'typical'or even remotely 'representative' Italian province - no such place exists in the

I Modena is one of eight provinces in Emilia-Romagna. Bologna is the largest province in theregion and borders Modena to the south.



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878 D. J. TRAVIScountry and approaches based on such an assumption leave themselves opento serious challenges. Modena may, in fact, be decidedly unique.8 But byhighlighting the course of the resistance in one province and by studying theappearance of the mass party in the context of an armed struggle for nationalliberation, an attempt may be made to locate political ideas in their historicalsetting and to construct the necessarily fragile bridge between society andpolitics. In this way, a study of the provincial origins of communism in Italyoffers insights that stretch far beyond the boundaries of one single area.In Modena, as elsewhere in central and northern Italy, public celebrationsgreeted the news of the fall of Mussolini on 25 July 1943. Marshal Badoglio,in a brief message carried by radio and press, informed the nation of the king'sdismissal of the Duce and the military's assumption of the powers ofgovernment.9 To the people of Modena, this change meant the end of the war.10Expectations centered on the probable date of the return of Italian soldiers fromthe fighting.

Though political parties remained illegal in Modena under military rule,the provincial governor - an army general - permitted the formation of severalcommittees to represent the interests of the provincial population to the newgovernment. The most important of these provincial committees was 'ItaliaLibera', located in the city of Modena itself. It was a small group, of ten totwelve men from five political parties: the PCI, the Partito d'azione (Pd'A), thepartitosocialista italiano (PSI) and two independent, left groups.1" Catholics andex-popolariattended as individuals. The Communist Party was by far the largestand most significant participant.

The PCI's survival as an organization during fascism gave it the dominantrole in 'Italia Libera.' The Communist Party in Modena had never enjoyeda large membership; its open political life had been limited to a period of only

8 Clearly, the situation in southern Italy, occupied by the Allies during I943, was muchdifferent. The history of the Modena PCI may therefore bear few similarities to the developmentof the Party in the South. Only the areas north of the Gothic Line (I944-5) along the crest ofthe Apennines experienced a twenty-month resistance. Rome was liberated in June, I944 andFlorence in September.9 Gazzetta dell'Emilia, 26 July I943 (26/7/43).

10 The basic works on the resistance in Modena are: L. Arbizzani and L. Casali, 'Montefiorino:distretto partigiano' in La resistenza in Emilia Romagna (Imola, I970); L. Benedetti, 'Vent'annidi lotte contro il fascismo nella clandestinith e nella resistenza, I925-I945', 2 vols, unpublishedmanuscript (I963), PCI ModenaArchive (hereafter, PCI: Mo); F. Canovaetal., Lottadiliberazionenella bassa Modenese (Modena, I975); L. Casali, Storia della resistenza a Modena (Modena, I980);M. Cesarini, Modena M, Modena P (Rome, I955); E. Gorrieri, La repubblica di Montefiorino(Modena, I975); M. Nardi, Otto mesi di guerriglia (Bologna, I976); M. Pacor and L. Casali, Lottesociali eguerriglia inpianura: la resistenzaa Carpi, Soliera, Novi, Campogalliano (Rome, 1972); 0. Poppi,In commissario (Modena, I979); M. Ricci and A. deMichels, Armando racconta (Milan, I982);Istituto Storico della Resistenza a Modena e nella Provincia (hereafter, ISRMo), Rassegne andQuaderni.11 These were very small organizations which quickly disappeared from the scene: In Gruppodi RicostruzioneLiberaleand IMMovimentodi Unita Proletariaper la Repuibblica ocialista. Other provincialcommittees formed during the 45 Days in two larger towns of the countryside - Nonantola andMirandola.



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COMMUNISM IN MODENA 879a few months between the formation of the national Party at Livorno in I92 Iand the collapse of political liberties under fascist violence in Emilia by theend of I922. During the I920S and I930s, the PCI in Modena became a small,clandestine organization.12 Contacts between the province's few hundredcommunists were infrequent and strictly personal - security interests anddifficult communications limited the number of larger meetings. Access tomaterials from outside even the province was limited and contacts with thenational leadership exiled in Paris and Moscow were rare. Graffiti, limitedrecruitment efforts within the province's small industries and occasionalpamphleteering characterized the communists' political activities duringmuch of the ventennio.3

Importantly, the Communist Federation in Modena did not merely survivefascism - it also profited from the period of clandestinity. For over fifteen years,fascist propaganda stressed one major point: opposition to the regime wascommunist-inspired. This message prepared a favourable reception for thePCI as the leading exponent of antifascism.14 Secondly, political suppressionduring the I930S made the PCI relatively unimportant on the world stage atthe time of the stalinization of the international communist movement. Becausethe PCI did not exist as a mass party, it could not be directed towards theinterests of the Soviet Union in the same way (nor nearly as efficiently) as othercommunist parties, the French, for example. Finally, clandestinity demandedcertain skills of the communists. Obedience, discipline, secrecy and the defactopreeminence of local leaders were the stock in trade of the limited communistactivity under fascism. All proved essential to the armed resistance struggleafter iq4w.15

12 Figures on membership n the PCI during both clandestinity and the resistanceareimprecise.Estimates for the I920S and I930S are: I927- 250-400 members:0. Cremaschi, 'Dati riassuntividell'attivith del PCI svolta in alcuni comuni della provincia di Modena dal I921 al I945',interview with L. Casali, I967, 4; I 929- 75-80 members, but perhaps for the city of Modena only:P. Secchia, Azione svolta dal Partito Comnunistan Italia durante l fascismo, I926-I932 (IstitutoFeltrinelli, Annali, 969), p. 223; I932 - I 00-200 members, with a further I 77 in Communist Partyyouth organizations: G. Muzzioli, L'economia la societaModenesera le dueguerre, 919-1939(Modena, I979), table 31, p. I43. In I928, after an inspection of the province, Secchia wrotethat 'In the city of Modena there is no longer anything; in the province there are some groupswhich have formed a committee, but even these have not been seen by anyone for six months'(Secchia, Azione,p. I30).

13 The historiesof the province during fascisminclude: G. Muzzioli, L'Econlomia;, Vaccari,'Il sorgere del fascismonel Modenese' in Movimnentoperaio fascismonell'Enilia-RomagnaRome,I973); an extensive seriesof interviews compiled by ProfessorL. Casali, now found in the archiveof the Associazione Nazionale dei Partigiani Italiani (hereafter cited, ANPI Mo). In addition tothe interview with Cremaschi above (n. I2), two others are of special interest: 'Appunti per unastoria del PCI a Modena: dall'occupazione delle fabbriche alla clandestinlita ANPI Mo, I970);G. Turchi, 'Appunti per una storia dell'antifascimsoa Carpi, I9I5-I943' (ANPI Mo, I970).

14 The language of fascism and its style of political harangue thoroughly influenced the PCIduring the first months of the resistance. See, for example, 'Young men of Italy!' (I4/9/43) inCasali, Storia, . 272. One historian of the national resistancenoted, 'Antifascismhad its tempo,rhythmand character nevitably conditioned by its enemies' (G. Quazza, Resistenzastoriad'Italia:problemi ipotesidiricerca, ilan, I976, p. I I7).15 One of the majorfiguresin the provincialPCI during the resistance talked of the advantagesfor the Communist Party found in the 'conspiratorial instincts' developed during clandestinity.See Benedetti's interview in 'Appunti per una storia'.



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88o D. J. TRAVISThese particular traits gave the PCI a headstart within the committees. The

communists' lead over the other political parties of' Italia Libera' rested notonly on the fact that it had at the outsetof the Badoglio period an organization,but also because the PCI had a membership greater than all the other partiescombined, two operating headquarters in the province, representation in mostof the larger communes and the small industries of Modena and two printingpresses - an invaluable asset unique to the communists.16 All of these resourcesgave the PCI a political presence in Modena far greater than that of any othergroup during the 45 Days.

The Communist Party's relations with the provincial military governmentchanged quickly from cautious support to harsh criticism during the summerof I943. L'Unita celebrated the dismissal of Mussolini and endorsed the callfor 'Peace and Freedom', but the communists' newspaper also noted thatBadoglio's government represented only the first step towards the completewithdrawal of Italy from the war.17 In September I943, the provincial PCIcirculated a petition of six major demands in the factories - each one directlyopposed to the policies of Badoglio.18 The Communist Party stressed theominous implications of the German military presence in Italy,19 even to thepoint of leading 'Italia Libera' on three occasions in a request to arm thecivilian population against a feared German invasion.

As the war continued under Badoglio, popular discontent with the govern-ment, veiled for a short time by the euphoria following the demise of Mussolini,grew. Food rationing continued and seemed particularly harsh in a provinceas agriculturally rich as Modena. Major demonstrations against the rationlevels began and the withholding of grain from the government's storehousesassumed such notable proportions that the failure to consign certain agricul-tural products came to be prosecuted as an act of sabotage. Two industrialstrikes, both protests against the war, were broken up by the police.20Considerable evidence, then, shows that while expectations for major changesran high, political, civil and economic rights were not much improved by thesubstitution of the military for the fascists.Even though the Communist Party had warned of the likelihood ofBadoglio's collapse, the suddenness of the fall took Modena by surprise. Afterthe announcement of Italy's armistice with the Allies, Badoglio left Rome for

16 The historyof the PCI's clandestine pressis documented in five sources: A. Bellelli, 'Comeera organizzata la produzione della stampa clandestina della provincia di Modena', ANPI Mo,I967-8; E. Borsari, 'Contributo alla storia della stampa clandestina di Carpi', ISRMo Rassegna8 (i 967), pp. 50-5; R. Gozzi, 'Diario della tipografiaclandestina', ANPI Mo (no date); G. Musi,'La stampa clandestina del PCI pressola tipografiaCervi', ANPI Mo (no date); I. Vaccari, 'Laraccolta della tipografia Cervi', ISRMo Rassegna (I967), pp. 7-36.

17 l'Unita 28/7/43 and I2/8/43 ('Butthe music s stillthesame!')show the PCI's transitionfromcelebration over the fall of Mussolini to gravewarningsabout Italy's future under Badoglio.18 Casali, Storia,pp. I24-5-19 l'Unita 7/9/43-20 L. Arbizzani, Azioneoperai, ontadina i mnassaBari, I976), vol. iII of l'EmfiliaRonmagnanellaguerradi liberazione,p. 64-5; Casali, Storia,pp. 127-3I.



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COMMUNISM IN MODENA 88ithe safety of southern Italy. Within thirty-six hours, the province had beenoccupied by invading German troops.

The manner in which the 45-Day government ended had an importantimplication for the resistance which followed. The flight of the king, MarshalBadoglio and the government, followed shortly by the reinstatement ofMussolini as the head of the Republic of SalI, devastated the remainingtraditions of loyalty to the state which had survived twenty years of fascism,three years of world war and forty-five days of Badoglio. The near totalcapitulation of the Italian army only deepened this political vacuum.2" Indeed,the invasion of 8 September marked the end of the army as a political actorand eliminated it as a legitimate participant in the resistance to fascism.2 Thepeople of Modena, and for that matter most Italians, were 'free' of allegianceto the state and the armed forces in a way which was uncharacteristic of otheroccupied countries of the Mediterranean in which resistance to the Germansdeveloped.

At the edges of this political vacuum stood the parties of the 45-Day period,foremost among them the PCI. The communists had played the leading rolein the interim committees, making specific demands and issuing clear warnings.The German invasion proved most of their analysis correct. The CommunistParty, newly strengthened, somewhat larger and certainly vindicated by the45 Days, returned quickly to the familiar terrain of clandestinity on 9September I943.Immediately following the German invasion of Modena, 'Italia Libera'reformed into a provincial Comitato per la Liberazione Nazionale (CLN). Itspolitical composition changed in the process: the most important developmentwas the entry of the Christian Democrats, newly formed during the 45 Days.The question before all of these people was the obvious one: how best toresist ?23

The Communist Party again took the lead.24 For the communists, resistance21 Only at two locations in Modena was there army resistance of any kind to the Germaninvasion. In both cases it was quickly overcome (Casali, Storia,pp. I50-2; Cesarini, MlodenaM,p. 39). In the haste to abandon their barracks n the mountainis,Italianisoldiers left behinid toresof arms and munitions. These later became the firstweapons of the partisans.22 The army lost more than its 'legitimacy' in September I943; it also lost most of its soldiers.The Germans imprisoned several thousand Italian troops in the days immediately after theinvasion. These men were later sent to fight on foreigni ronts,includinigYuLgoslaviand the SovietUnion. Those Italian soldiers not captured, attempted to retur-no their homes. Many laterjoinedthe partisans, not as regular troops of the army but as membersof the various political divisionsin the resistance.23 Many of the publications of the provincial CLN are gathered in Atti e docutmenitiel CLN

clandestinoModena, SRMo Quaderno (1974). The communal CLNs in the larger towns formedduring the winter of 1943-4; those in the smaller villages formed later, duLringhe spring anldsummer of I944.24 One important reason for the communists' lead in the CLNs was the scarcity of repr-eselnta-tives from other political parties. Socialist participationin Modena was problematic.At least oineCLN participant claimed that 'During the clandestine struggle, whenl the idea was theconstruction of the Comitati i liberazione iazionale, e PCI members created rtificial ocialists.We



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882 D. J. TRAVISmeant an armed struggle, and marxism, as it was then understood, pointedto the industrial working class as the group most naturally inclined to revolt.25The PCI's own strength among the limited number of workers in the smallindustries of the province confirmed this theoretical inclination.26 Conse-quently, the PCI promoted an armed and urban resistance.27

The other parties of the provincial CLN strongly objected.28 They stressedthe risks that an armed movement in the cities and towns would pose to thecivilian population. There was, in addition, an important subtext to theprotests of the socialists, the a7ionisti and the Christian Democrats: thedisorganization in their ranks. They were not in a position to contribute toan armed resistance movement in the fall of I943. They needed first to createtheir own groups and gain a membership.29

But, as we have seen, the organizational question was one which the PCIhad already largely solved in the province by the fall of I943. The 45-Dayperiod had increased the communists' lead over the other political parties inModena. The PCI was, in fact, the only party capable of taking the leapproposed by Secchia late that year:It is necessaryto act immediately and as widely and as decisively as possible becauseour organizationswill form and develop in action. It is not the case that we first mustorganize ourselves and then act, that if we act first we will be cut off. If we haveorganizations with a military character that don't act, then these will in a short timedisintegrate and break apart. Instead, action will train these military organizations,it will harden them in the struggle; action will strengthen and develop them.30Debates about the nature of the resistance continued in Modena's CLN untilliberation. But events themselves resolved this first crucial issue of where andhow to resist.took our comradesand said to them, 'You are now a socialist!' They were not at all happy aboutthis... However, some of them, because of the effort required "to be a socialist", remained inthat Party' (A. DelMonte in ANPI Mo, I970).

25 'There is a class instinct in the workers which is nourished by the permanent ties with thefactories,the masses and the reality of workinglife. When this is united to revolutionary ideology,it gives them a secure orientation in action' ('Due Svolte' in La nostraotta,October, I943; quotedin Casali, Storia,p. 297).26 360 of the 520 PCI members in the city of Modena at the end of I943 were operai Casali,Storia,p. 274).27 The emphasis on the recruitment of the relatively small, industrial working class for thecadres of the resistance also reflected a genlerational plit within the PCI. Older members reliedon a political formation that included the BolshevikRevolution, the Biennioosso anid the split ofthe communists from the socialists in I92I; younger members' political experiences were moredirectly tied to the situation of provincial agricultural workers under fascism. The first groupconcentrated its energies on industrial workers;the second on the mass struggle against fascism

in the mountains and the countryside. The question of who would make the resistancecame tobe resolved by events themselves: the appearance of armed groups in the mountains during thewinter of I943-4. 28 Casali, Storia,p. 226; Gorrieri,La repubblica,. 87.29 The PCI responded to the other parties in the CLN with chargesof attelndismlloa 'wait andsee' attitude. Cesarini, ModenaM, p. I76; Poppi, I commissa-io, . i8. Gorrieri (La r-epuibblica,p. 86) rejectsthe PCI 's criticism of the other CLN members.30 Secchia in La nostra otta (November I943), pp. 20-I.



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COMMUNISM IN MODENA 883The return of limited political freedoms during the 45 Days had been a busy

time for some in the province. A particularly active group in Sassuola, anagricultural centre in the north of the province and near the mountains, madeno secret of its discontent with both fascism and Badoglio during the summer.The group, with approximately thirty members, met secretly after the Germaninvasion. The police of the Republic of Salo were aware of their activities. Whenword of imminent arrests reached one clandestine meeting in mid-November,the seven people present took to the hills. They found weapons among the armsremoved spontaneously by the civilian population from Italian army barracksin the mountains after the fall of Badoglio. In this rather abrupt manner, thefirst provincial example of the vita partigiana came into being in the ruggedterrain of the Apennines.31

The Sassuola group immediately began to fight the Italian fascists. Alwaysshort of weapons, they disarmed enemy patrols on the isolated roads in thearea and attacked carabinieri rying to enforce Sal'o's new conscription orders.They burned the buildings of the fascists in a few hill towns. Funds for the groupcame from armed withdrawals against the accounts of the Fasci at local banks.In one extraordinary raid, these first partisans defeated a small fascist garrisonin the mountains, then occupied the neighbouring village, burned both thepolice archives and the Casa del Fascio, distributed stored grain to the localpopulation and danced at the village hotel until enemy reinforcements arrivedfrom the countryside below.32

The success of the Sassuola group focused the PCI's attention on themountains. Two problems soon found a single solution. The first was strategic.The example of an armed resistance active in the hills ended the tortuousdebate within the provincial CLN as to 'where' best to resist. The CommunistParty quickly abandoned its advocacy of an urban guerrilla movement; theother parties supported in principle - though still lacking in resources - anarmed movement of national liberation.

The second problem was a political one and concerned the control of thegrowing movement. The leaders of the Sassuola group were overtly 'indepen-dent' of politics. A PCI representative in the town had been working onpolitical orientation before the abrupt flight to the hills in November. Thesuddenness of the departure and the charisma of the two commanders ruinedthe communists' hopes of influencing the Sassuola partisans. The PCIresponded early in I944 by accepting the advice of one of their members (amilitant who had fought in the Spanish Civil War) and formed a Garibaldibrigade, the first provincial partisan group commanded by Communist Partymembers.33 The Modena M (Montagna) Command was largely composed ofpeasant farmers who owned their own small plots of land in the mountains.

31 A brief historyof the Sassuolagroupis 0. Tassi, 'La primapattuglia partigianadi Sassuolo',ISRMo Rassegna 6 (I965), pp. 55-7.32 Gorrieri, La repubblica,. I I9.33 This militant was Mario Ricci (Armando), a native of one of the more important towns inthe mountains, Pavullo.



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884 D. J. TRAVISIn this moment, the exclusive focus on the industrial working-class as the heartand soul of Italian communism and the resistance changed.

Equally as troublesome an issue as political influence was the question ofdiscipline. Not all of the Sassuola group's activities were as inspirational asthose listed above. Their dominance in the mountains led to excesses and theline between antifascism and common crime blurred.34 These problemsreached a point where the Communist Party's partisan police arrested theleader of the Sassuola partisans in March I944, after he had ordered theexecution of sixteen young men whose complicity with fascism was far fromclear. His troops were integrated into the fighting units of the PCI.35

The way the Communist Party organized and disciplined the early resistancereflected an important fact about the movement. The Apennine mountainswere particularly well-suited for guerrilla warfare: the land was rough andconcealment was easy. For these same reasons, the area was also a difficultplace from which to extract a living. Resources for the partisans had to bedrawn from the limited supplies available to the local population. Thisrequired full, if also quiet, support. Banditry, because it jeopardized thatsupport system, threatened the early partisan movement perhaps even morethan fascist patrols.36 But it wasn't enough that the partisans not harm thepopulation. To ensure popular support, the partigiani had also to help the localresidents.

The nature of the resistance in the mountains, then, created a mutualdependence between partisans and civilians. To some extent, this was anentirely natural development, particularly in the early stages of growth in thearmed antifascist movement when the partisans were most commonly the sonsand daughters of the villagers themselves. But the Garibaldinialso increased thenumber of actions which directly aided the local population, including thedistribution of stored and requisitioned foodstuffs, interference with the round-up of livestock by the Germans, burning of draft, police and animal recordsand attacks on draft patrols. All of these efforts served to tie the civilianpopulation more thoroughly to the partisans by helping with some of the worstproblems of life in the mountains.37 These acts also led the partisans to a directand on-going involvement in the practical exigencies of daily life in the hills.

34 Ricci, Armanido,. i83; Gorrieri, La r-epuibblica,. I22; Poppi, II C01omm7lissario,p. 2 I-4.35 Benedetti, 'Venti'anni', I, 2I6-22; Poppi, II comnlrissniSio,pp. 43-8.36 The Communist Party took great pains to distance itself fiom the bandits, warning civiliansof criminals 'acting in the name of the partisans' and noting that 'TThe ar-tigianliever requestprovisions at night, ... they are never masked [and] they leave a regular receipt', ISRMo

T. IV/26 (no date).37 Ricci, Ar-nmanido,p. I I4, I42. Similar descriptions of the popularity of these actions are foundin nearly all thediariesofthe communist Garibaldi brigades (ISRMo S. 11/6, S. 11/8 and S. III/ I4)

and in most memoirs, too. Alfeo Corassori, PCI member and later mayor of the city of Modena,noted that the acts which aided the peasalntry ' ... constittute material for a detailed study, aboveall better to ulnderstand the colnditiolns in which this battle saved thousands of peasalnt householdsfrom certain ruini and allowed our agricultural ecolnomy to grow again relatively easily onceliberatioln had come' (PCI, Alfeo Corassori (Modelna, i968), p. I5).



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COMMUNISM IN MODENA 885A communism thoroughly integrated with the actual conditions of life wascreated during the resistance.

Discontent with the Republic of Salo grew enormously during the winter of1943-4, fuelled primarily by the military draft and the first German reprisalsagainst the civilian population. Concealment became the common response tothe new conscription lists issued in November 1943. Deserters, first local menof the mountains but increasingly also youths from the countryside, came intocontact with the small groups of partisans already in the Apennines. Over thewinter months, they joined the movement. The core of the resistance inModena was made up of young men whose first political act was draft evasion.

German reprisals in the mountains, though infrequent, contributed to thepopular support of the partisans.38 The worst of these raids took place inMarch 1944, around the small hill town of Monchio, an area by then notoriousfor partisan activities.39 An assault on the villages - preceded by an intenseartillery barrage - left one hundred and thirty seven civilians, mostly women,children and elderly men, dead. The Germans expected that the example ofMonchio would terrorize the population into denunciation of the partisans.The opposite occurred for several reasons.

First, the bond between local partisans and the civilian population was noteasily broken. Village loyalty to local youths and their friends withstood thisdire test. Secondly, Monchio was a German action - the first major militaryundertaking in the province which revealed clearly the Republic of Sal'o'sreliance on foreign troops. From this point onwards, nationalism found a securehome in the resistance. Finally, the reprisals ended the possibility of civilianneutrality. Silence and non-involvement were no longer guarantees of safetyfor oneself or one's family after the spring of 1944. Activities which fell far shortof armed resistance henceforth met with the same capital punishment at thehands of the Germans. The elimination of options ended apolitical discontentamong the population and marked the beginnings of a much more activeantifascism and wider popular support for the partisans.

That this new antifascism might have been considered 'communist' fromthe outset is not entirely surprising. Fascist propaganda had made its owncontribution by equating communism with opposition to Salo even in theremote areas of the Apennines. Additionally, by the spring of 1944, theGaribaldi brigades of the Communist Party were the only active partisan forcesin the province.40 Finally, the communists controlled incidents of banditry andthey acted as much as possible in the interests of the local population. Theysoon provided convincing proof of the plausibility of armed resistance to theGermans and the Italian fascists.

38 The Communist Party and the provincial CLN published numerous pamphlets callingattention to the reprisals carried out by the Germans. See R. Pinelli, I Volantini della resistenzaModenese, vol. i, Tesi di laurea, ISRMo U . V/26.

39 P. Alberghi, Attila sull'Appennino: la strage di Monchio e le origini della lottapartigiana nella Valledel Secchia (ISRMo Quaderno7, I969) is the best account of the reprisal.

40 Though at this time there were partisans of other (and no) political affiliation (Pd'A, PSI,ex-Army and DC) within the various communist brigades.



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886 D. J. TRAVISJune I944, was an important month in the provincial resistance. After

several weeks of attacks against fascist barracks in the hills, the partisans beganan assault against the garrison at the village of Montefiorino. Five days later,the presidio fell. The partigiani unexpectedly found themselves in control of alarge area, nearly I,200 square kilometers, in the mountainous northeastsection of Modena. They had created the first 'free' zone in German-occupiedItalyi41 The Republic of Montefiorino - as it came to be called42 - inspiredthe resistance movement for it showed that an armed struggle was feasible.

The Republic lasted forty days. During this time thousands of new recruitscame to the resistance. Numbers swelled from an estimated I,500 at the endof May I 944,43 to over 5,000 by August:44 most were young men and womenof the countryside. The majority of the new arrivals joined the Garibaldibrigades, testifying to the prestige of the PCI and furthering the communists'domination of the resistance in Modena. Others joined the smaller groups,either independent formations or those led by the Pd'A.45 It was only duringthe days of Montefiorino that enough Christian Democrats gathered to permitthe formation of a separate Catholic partisan command.

The enormous and sudden growth in the partisan forces created seriousproblems. Foremost among these were military concerns.46 Weapons andammunition were in short supply; perhaps as much as one-third of Modena'spartigiani were always unarmed during the resistance. Thorough militarytraining was impossible with recruits arriving at the rate of several hundreda week; further complicating this situation was the fact that group commandersoften had only a little more experience in the mountains than the newestarrivals.

There was also an unresolvable problem of political orientation. People witha knowledge of the fundamentals and history of communism were much scarcerthan those with adequate military experience. A political commissar for the

41 The Republicwas established,not becausethe partisaniswerepartictllarlystrong,but becausethe enemy was rather weak. By the summer of I944, the Italian fascists lacked a reasoll and awill to carryon the fight. They generally surrenderedto the partisalns nce their communicationswere severed. The German military was hard-pressedby the Allies in mid-I944, immediatelybefore theJune liberation of Rome.

42 There is an historiographicdebate concerniing he correct label for Montefiorino: republicor district. It has little bearing on the concerns of this article. 'Republic' was chosen because itwas the term most ofteniused by the partisans durilng he forty days of Molntefiorillo.43 Arbizzani and Casali, 'Montefiorino', p. I 2. Estimates of the partisans'strengthat the timeof the attack range from 500 to I,000.44 Ibid. p. 65; Poppi, IIcomniissario,. 89.45 Figures again are imprecise.Arbizzani and Casali ('Montefiorino', p. 44) claim that of the

I,000 partisans involved in the attack on Montefiorino, 6o were enrolled in the Pd'A anldonlly40 in the Christian Democracy. Most often socialists and commulnists ought togethel in theGaribaldi brigades.

46 The first direct contactswith the Allies were estabiishedat the time of the Republic. SeveralEnglish'missions'set up permalnentheadquarters n the mountailns f Modelnadurilng hesu-mmerof I944. Three sources recount their work among the paltisalns:B. Davidson, SpecialOperationisEurope. Scenesfrom the anti-Nazi war (Londoln, I980); C. MacIntosh, Fromicloak odagger:AniSOEagentin Italy, I940-I945 (London, I982); C. MacIntosh, 'Le missiolniavalnzate Inglesi e labattaglia degli Appennini' in L. Bergonzini, La lottaarmata, ol. i of V'EiniliaRoiniaginaiella ierradi liberazione, pp. 541-76.



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COMMUNISM IN MODENA 887PCI circulated among the partisans at Montefiorino, but his effectiveness waslimited. Letters to the regional command of the PCI in Bologna and thetestimony of many participants at Montefiorino reveal the plasticity of politicsin the Republic:Slowly, as I was able to explain to these young Garibaldiniihe ideals of the struggle,the sense of duty and of discipline, the love of our country which we wished to freefromthe Germaninvadersand the fascisttraitors,the opportunityfor freedomforourpeople,etc., etc. slowly, the political consciousness and the degree of discipline andcombativeness was raised.47We will send the lists of the P[arty], which are by now almost complete, with the nextstaffetta.We call attention, however, to the fact that adherence has occurred in mass,without, however, a deep or intense enough Party life to make these adherents trulysolid and secure - there is always lacking among the troops that minimal willingnesswhich would allow us to undertake an intense and profound political education.48Lookingbackon it, one hears, 'they were all communists.'But it wasn't like that; manybecame communists,it's true, but after the end of the war. At that time those enrolledin the antifascist parties and even those who were not, saw themselves in a singlecommon denominator: fightersfor freedom ... I will be more precise.Most of the timethose young men did not even know what communism was, but they knew very wellthat they had come to me to fight against the Nazi fascists.49What was true in Montefiorino, because of the sudden growth in the numberof partigiani, was true more generally in the provincial resistance: the PCI, theleading party in the armed struggle, had neither the time nor the humanresources to impart a political education to the partisans.50 'Politics' was astraightforward matter - a fight for national liberation led by CommunistParty memnbersand organized in the Garibaldi brigades of the PCI. What littlewas known of the Soviet Union only reinforced this equation. The USSR,especially after the defence of Stalingrad (that is, at precisely the time whenthe Italian resistance got underway), was the leading country in the antifasciststruggle, for Russia had saved Europe from Hitler by inflicting the first greatdefeat on the Germans. The basic stuff of political allegiance and ideology inItalian communism in the months of the resistance was remarkably simple.The chaotic retreat from Montefiorino underscored the lack of militarypreparation among the partisans.51 A Communist Party pamphlet extolled the'victory' in the hills;52 the exact opposite was really true. The Gerrnansattacked in force from all directions except the south ;53 the effects of the retreat

47 Letter of the Political Commissar of the PCI to the Communist Par-ty Feder-ationi in Modena(August 1944) in Benedetti, 'Venti'anni', I, 245.

48 Ibid. II, 20 (I6/9/44). Also in Istituto Nazioniale per la Storia del Movimiienlto diLiberazione in Italia, Le Brigate Garibaldi, ii, 601--3 (Milan, I979).

49 Ricci, Armando, . i8 .5 An observation with which the Political Commissar for the PCI at Montefiorino agreed infull in the 1970s (Poppi, II commissario,p. 93).

51 Arbizzani and Casali, 'Montefiorinio', p. 49; F. Bellei, 'La formazionie "Italia Libeia'(ANPI Mo, I970).52 The PCI pamphlet which made this claim, 'The trtuth about the battle', is founid in ISRMo

T. 111/28 (4/8/44) and in Gorrieri, La repubblica,P. 426-7, n. 42.53 Estimates of the number of German troops in the battle r-ange from s,ooo to 30,000.



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888 D. J. TRAVISwere grave. Several hundred partisans died in battle.41 The resistance splitinto three groups: one headed north into neighbouring Reggio-Emilia; asecond stayed just ahead of pursuing enemy troops in the rnountains for thenext several months until the majority crossed German lines anldjoined theAllies in the autumn; the remainder returned singly or in small groups to theirhomes in the countryside.55 The mass, organized resistance in the mountainscrumbled in the wake of the defeat at Montefiorino. It reappeared only in thespring of I945, in the months immediately before liberation in April.But during the winter of I944-5 the resistance grew spectacularly in the flatagricultural countryside, the pianura.5f The movemenit took longer to developthere than in the mountains because the risks for both partisans and civilianswere far greater; concealment was more difficult for the partigiani andcommunications much easier for the Germans. Nonetheless, by the late autumnof I944, a substantial resistance movement, led again by the Communist Party,had taken hold.

A pattern of allegiance and enrollment to the PCI similar to the resistancein the mountains held true in the pianura.The PCI's strong social presence andits solid antifascist reputation, far greater than the other parties of the CLN,were important in attracting recruits.57 There were, as in the mountains,sources of great popular discontent in the pianura with the new fascism ofthe Republic of Salo. Food and livestock requisitions were, if anything, harsherand more efficient in the agricultural heartland of Modena.58 The threatof conscription was a very real one for both country peasants and citydwellers. Arbitrary reprisals were a constant fear. Forced deportation oflabourers and the expropriation of valuable machinery to Germany weregrave problems in the factories. The Communist Party mobilized around allof these grievances.

The most popular initiative among the peasantry was the communists'anti-harvest campaign of I944.59 The PCI and its partisans urged share-croppers (the mezzadri) and day labourers (the braccianti)not to harvest theircereals; the partigiani immobilized balers by slashing the rubber transmissionbelts whose replacement in the war-time economy of Italy was virtually

54 Approximately 250 partisans died during the retreat (Gorrieri, La r-epuibblica,. 428, n. 43).There may have been as many as 2,000 Gelman casualties.

55 By the end of the battle, somewhere betweenl 2,000 and 2,500 partisanis were dispersedthroughout the mountains in small groups (Nardi, Otto inesi, p. I41).

56 Pacor and Casali (Lotte sociali, pp. 87, 97) give the following figures for growth of the earlypartisan movement in the pianura: end of Dec. 1943, 150; end of Mar-ch 1944, 350; end of April1944, 450; eind of May I944, 650; end ofJune I944, 850; end ofJuly 1944, I,ooO; eild of AugustI944, I,300. Figures (from ISRMo S.III/I4, 'Diario storico Aristides') fol the growth in sevenbrigades of the Modena P (Pianura) command give the following totals: auttumn 1943, 91 ; autumnI944, 1,462; spring I945, 2,493; Liberation I945, 3,I96.

57 A point repeatedly emphasized in the diaries of the Garibaldi brigades.58 Two pamphlets focused on these issues exclusively: 'Agiricoltoiri -- il gr-ario al popolo!

Lavoratori, tutti! Difendiamo il grano!' and 'Difendiamo il inostro bestiamiie'. Both wer-e spoinsor-edby the Provincial Committee for the Defence of FarmnWorkers (ISRMo T. 111/44--6).

59 See ISRMo S. 1I/I4, 'Diario storico Aristides', p. io. PCI propaganda was slow in comllingto the peasantry. Only sporadic and uncoordinated efforts were imade in their directioni beforeJuly 1944. See L. Casali, 'Formazione della " lilnea politica" del PCI, in ISRMo Rassegna n. 9-10(I968-9), pp. I8-I9.



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COMMUNISM IN MODENA 889impossible. And the Garibaldiniencouraged peasants who were forced to harvestunder the supervision of the fascists to conceal as much grain as possible.

The Communist Party partisans also took action against the flourishingblack market in the province.60 Patrols threatened those individuals dealingin contraband or stolen goods of primary necessity.61 They requisitioned otherproducts for distribution to the population, fixed prices at acceptable levelsand on some occasions even shot the most flagrant violators and profiteers.Finally, Communist Party propaganda began to stress the identity of interestsbetween fascism and the large landed estates in the countryside.62 This drewpeasant grievances over harsh work contracts into the orbit of the nationalliberation struggle, thereby setting the stage for the communists' post-warinsistence on drastic agricultural reform.

The PCI was active within the factories as well. The Communist Partyendorsed sabotage on the assembly line and organized the removal of key piecesof machinery to safety in the countryside.63 Indications are that these effortswere well-received by metal and steel workers and that industrial output inthe province fell by significant levels.64

A series of industrial strikes promoted by the PCI found widespread supportin thepianura factories during the spring of I944.65 General discontent underlaythe agitation, but the immediate spark was the threatened deportation ofworkers to Germany. In April, the fascist civilian administrator for theprovince notified the directors of several factories of their quotas for'emigration'.6 When only one worker volunteered at the FIAT Grandi Motoriplant, the management posted the names of seven others selected for the'training programme' in Germany. The workers came out on strike and FIATremained closed for two days.67 The strike spread to other industries in Modenaand eventually included 5,000 workers.68 The PCI played the principal rolein the organization and coordination of the April strike.69

All of these acts tended to organize and mobilize popular discontent. Thisappears to have been the work almost exclusively of the PCI; the communistpartisan divisions gave high priority to these undertakings, while the nextlargest group in the resistance, the Christian Democrats, rarely mentioned such

60 ISRMo S . III/I4, 'Diario storico Aristides', p. 76.61 One PCI warning to blackmarketprofiteers s foundin ISRMo S. III/ I4, 'CronistoriadellaBrigata Matteotti', allegato n. I8 (I9/2/45). 62 ISRMo S. II/ Io, n. 256.63 L. Guerrieri, 'Come il CLN salv5 la Maserati', ANPI Mo, I969; ISRMo T.III/Carpi,n. 45; Cesarini,ModenaM, p. I6I.64 Pacor and Casali, Lotte ociali,appendix 8, 'La Magneti Marelli di Carpi', pp. 3I5-20.6 Arbizzani, Azioneoperai,pp. I8o-2. The March I943 industrial strikes in northern Italyfound little reflexion in the province of Modena.66 The Podesthset the province's contribution of manual labourersat 20,000, excluding from

considerationthosewith more than five children, the parentsof soldierskilled in the war, studentsin their last yearof studiesand directorsof' important' industries.Local prefectswere encouragedto select for deportation the unemployed and those on communal welfare roles. See F. Gorrieri,La resistenzanella bassaModenese:da initiativedi minoranze ttivea movimentoopolaredi massa,I943-I945, Tesi di laurea, ISRMo U. V/ I5.

67 l'Unita (clandestine) 10-v-44. 66 Gorrieri, La repubblica,p. 217.69 Ibid. pp. 215, 2I6; A. Bellelli, 'Gli scioperi dell'aprile, 1944 a Modena', ISRMo Rassegna,

V (I964), pp. 45-8.



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890 D. J. TRAVISefforts. Again, the historical records reveal a mass Communist Party,thoroughly involved in the conditions of daily life in Modena. Other politicalparties never gained a mass membership during the resistance and they mostoften accepted the communists' leadership. The Christian Democrats'insistence on a separatecommand limited their participation to a minority ofabout Io per cent of the total partisan forces in the province.Liberation came in the spring of I945. After the disastrouswinter pause bythe Allies, the English and American troops began to move again late inMarch I945. By early April, Modena was poised for insurrection.The partisans liberated most of the towns and villages of the province bythemselves.The city of Modena was freedbypartigiani n 22 April, a few hoursahead of advancing American troops. The self-liberation symbolized thestrength and independence of Modena's communist resistance.

The provincial CLN immediately took control of local administrationandthe Allied Military Government later confirmed most of its appointments.70The first mayor of the city of.Modena was the Communist Party's represen-tative to the CLN and a PCI militant since the late I920S. The resistance inModena was over. It is hard to overvalue the importance of these twentymonths to the provincial federation of the Italian Communist Party.Modena celebratedfor severaldays afterliberation.7' Many of thepartigiani,totalling between i8,ooo and I9,000,72 participated in one major paradethrough the provincial capital on 25 April I945. The vast majority of theofficiallyrecognized partisans (perhapsas much as go per cent) were men andwomen in the Communist Party's Garibaldi brigades.73The PCI itself, at the moment of liberation, counted upon approximately6,ooo members in the province of Modena.74That figure, however, soared inthe immediate aftermath of the war, passing 50,ooo by the end of I945 andreaching 73,76475 in time for the administrativeelections of March I946 - thefirst held in Italy in twenty years. In the ConstituentAssembly vote on 2 JuneI946, the first national election after the war, the communists in Modenareceived44 percent of the popularvote.76The republicdefeated the monarchyin the institutional referendumon the sameday by a provincialmarginof threeto one.77Clearly, Modena became very 'red' during and immediately afterthe resistance.78Why?

70 Cesarini, ModenaM, pp. 417-9; PCI, Corassori,. 22.71 The official CLN pamphlet on 25 April I945 captures the atmosphere in Modena on theday of Liberation (ISRMo Rassegna, i960, p. 85).72 'Dati Statistici', ISRMo Rassegna (ig60), pp. I3-15; also ISRMo publication on the 27thanniversaryof the Liberation (0972).73 The high estimate of go9% is drawn from Istituto di Studi e Ricerche 'Carlo Cattaneo', LaPresenza ocialedelPCIe dellaDC (Bologna, i968), tables 2.2 (p. 296) and 2.4 (p. 301).74 Istituto Gramsci,Rome (hereafter,IstG): Modena, I945 and Modena, 1946folders; PartitoComunista Modena Archive (hereafter, PCIMo): I945 folder.75 IstG: Modena, I946.76 PCI = 44-I %; PSIUP = 26-o%; DC = 25-2%; ISTAT, Elezioniper l'AssembleaCostituentee Referendumstituzionale, giugno 946 (Rome, I948).

77 Republic = 75 2 %; monarchy= 2488%. ISTAT, Elezioni, 946.78 Though by the time of the administrative and constituent elections in 1946 other issues wereimportant in attracting and maintaining support for the provincial PCI. These included the



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COMMUNISM IN MODENA 89IThe explanation of the communists' domination of the resistance has been

set out in the preceding pages. The PCI was the only antifascist organizationat the outset of the 45-Day government. It enjoyed a nearly twenty-year historyof opposition to fascism, acknowledged by the regime itself. The CommunistParty correctly noted the weaknesses of the Badoglio government and warnedagainst the German invasion. For many reasons, the PCI was best able to stepinto the gaping political hole left after the flight of the monarchy and thecapitulation of the army. It was the first political party to promote the armedstruggle after September I943, and it went on to organize the most effectivefighting units in the partisan movement. The communists led these troops totheir first great victory at Montefiorino. And the PCI profited from being' communist' at the right time - after the Soviet Union stopped further Germanexpansion at Stalingrad. Simply put, the PCI was the first, the biggest andthe best in Modena, and all of these factors counted heavily to those makingthe dangerous decision to resist.

The communist resistance gained further support because it acted as muchas possible in aid of the civilian population, thereby tying the antifascist armedstruggle to the conditions of life of the population. This had the further effectof making the issues which were of greatest local importance central to thepolitical activities, and hence the political thinking, of those who calledthemselves communist. And, finally, support came to the PCI during theresistance because the communists, unlike the Christian Democrats in theprovince, practised unity in their programmes and actions. A dedication tofight fascism qualified one for entry into the Garibaldi brigades.

Who were the partisans? Precise figures on the social composition of theresistance in Modena are unavailable; some general indications, however, maybe offered. Official figures place men's participation in the resistance as highas 85 per cent of the total;79 however, these statistics omit the staffette,mostlywomen, who were numbered in the hundreds.

Most of the partisans were peasants (34 per cent) or urban workers in thesmall industries typical of the province (I7 per cent) ;80 however, given thatmost of the provincial population before 1945 worked in agriculture (approxi-communists' defence of the resistance heritage against the Christian Democrats in the nationalgovernment, the Party's protests against the arrests of its members and ex-partisaiis in the provinceand the PCI's promotion of the first agricultural reforms in the countryside.

79 From 'Dati Statistici'. Of the I9,3I8 total officially recognized paitisans and patriots, I,984(io%) were women in the province of Modena.

80 L. Casali, unpublished data; Provincial figures from Co?npendio,p. i6. The completecomparisons show the following distribution of partisans according to general occupationalcategory:

Partisans Province Partisans Province(O%) (%) (%) (O%)

Ag. workers 34-4 62-8 Clerks 5.2Industrial i6-8 2PI Transportation 34 2.7Commerce 9-8 6-7 Military I IIArtisans 8-o Various 8.7 7.2Intellectuals 5-2



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892 D. J. TRAVISmately 63 per cent) and onily a fifth found employment in industry,81 therelative presence of industrial workers was therefore higher (as much asone-half greater) than that of agricultural labourers. The strength of the PCIamong industrial workers during the resistance testified to the propaganda andrecruitment efforts made by the Communist Party in the factories during theyears of fascism.

Finally, we may consider the age of the partigiani. Figures exist for only onegroup, the first division of the Modena M command.82 In the absence of anycounter indications, I assume that this division was typical of the provincialpartisans more generally. Most partigiani, near the day of liberation in I945,were aged between I5 and 65. One-half were less than 25 years old and nearlyone-third between 2I and 25.

The most important features of these figures on social composition ofpartisans in Modena may be quickly summarized. The majority of partisanswere men; over one-half were either agricultural or industrial workers. If thedefinition of an urban working class also includes those in transportation andcommerce, then agricultural and urban workers accounted for nearly two-thirds of the partisans. Finally - and this seems to be the element of greatestsignificance - the partigiani were very young. Two-thirds were under thirty,born sometime after I9I5. This meant that they had effectively known nogovernment in Italy other than Mussolini's. Their political experience waslimited to life under fascism. While they may have had little familiarity withthe maximalist/minimalist debate in the Italian Socialist Party after the FirstWorld War, they certainly knew quite a bit about the dangers of militaryconscription under the Republic of Salo, about the hunger and deprivationcaused by war and about the consequences of the German invasion of Italy.Taking up arms in resistance to life under Italy's second fascism was their first,and very courageous, political decision. The Italian Communist Party formedas a new, mass political movement out of thousands of these 'first' decisionsand the inspiration they provided.

It was notjust the youth of the partisans which contributed to the formationof a remarkably new communism in Italy. The conditions of battle had aneffect, too. The necessarily nomadic and perilous existence of guerrilla warfaredid not permit a theoretically informed and programmatically specific com-munism to develop. Even during the only period of semi-permanence in theprovincial resistance - the forty days of Montefiorino - the movement lackedboth the qualified individuals and the time to develop a political explanationof communism more detailed than that of a struggle for national liberationfrom fascism.

The conditions of battle during the resistance and the partisan's agetherefore combined to produce, if not a 'pure' communism, then a purely

81 From the I936 national census, in Camera di Commercio, Modena, Comllpenldiotatistico,ableI4 (Modena, I958), p. i6.

82 ISRMo S. 11/9. The dates of birth for thirty partisans, out of the Division's total of 383, werenot recorded.



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COMMUNISM IN MODENA 893Italian one - a movement whose terms of reference lay predominantly in theresistance struggle within Italy. A first major conclusion of the study of theModena Federation of the PCI then is that Italian communism, in its originsas a mass movement in 1944 and 1945, carried very little historical orideological baggage.

Furthermore, such baggage as there was hardly measured up to traditionalsocialist standards. A communism based on nationalism and antifascismdiffered, right from the start, from anything marxist thinkers had imagined.Some of the PCI 's programmes advocated agricultural and industrial reform,but these were also to be found among the programmes of the other politicalparties, including the provincial Christian Democrats. While on occasion thePCI stressed the connexion between fascism and large landowners, there wasremarkably little economics and still less class analysis in the resistanceappeal.83 The Communist Party in Modena, for example, never talked of theexpropriation of land84 or the nationalization of industries; furthermore, it leftthe resolution of the most basic political question in the country - the choicebetween the monarchy or the republic - untouched until after the war. Theoverriding emphasis within the PCI during the resistance was on the militaryand political defeat of fascism.

Because antifascism itself was thought to entail a social revolution, there waslittle discussion about what a marxistrevolution might involve in Italy in 1945.The ambiguity between reform and revolution in the programmes of theItalian Communist Party therefore dates from the resistance. There wasneither the need nor the possibility of distinguishing between these twopositions during the armed struggle. The Communist Party and its supporterswere committed to a sweeping transformation of Italian society - a political,economic and cultural reorganization which would make the reappearance offascism impossible. Reform and revolution were not the terms in which thatbattle was fought.

But did this reorganization itself amount to a revolution? The question ishistorically unanswerable: we know only that the resistance did not make one.Did some Italian communists desire a marxist revolution, however looselydefined? Here the answer undoubtedly is 'yes', but we simply cannot say whoor how many.85

83 Arbizzani's conclusions on the situation in Bologna appear equally applicable to Modena:'The mass struggle for the small demands (higher salaries, more lard, more tyres fol the bicycles,etc.) contributed to the mobilization of thousands and thousands of people and to strengthen thepreparation for the insurrection against the Nazi-fascists; the struggle for better conditions of work,for new divisions of agricultural products, foi the daily kilogram of rice and for a higher rationof cereal became the struggle against the proprietor backed by the Germans and the definitivedefeat of the fascists.' L. Arbizzani, 'Notizie sui contadini della provincia di Bologna durante laresistenza' in II movimentoi liberazionen Italia,n. 75 (April-Julle I964).

84 L. Casali, 'Il programma agrario del PCI durante la resistenza', Critica Maiarxista,, n. 6(I970), p. I72; E. Gatti, 'Propaganda e legislazione nella Repubblica di Montefiorino', ANPI Mo,I970.

85 Because we are unable fully to answer these questions, I believe that the debates on doppiezzawithin the Communist Party are incomplete. The problem may not be simply one of the PCI



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894. D. J. TRAVISWhat we do know about revolutionary sentiments and their ties to the Soviet

Union illustrates the difficulty of evaluating the revolutionary commitment ofthe PCI. A certain image of the Soviet Union was an important part of thecommunists' outlook in 1945. The Soviet Union was the country 'withoutexploitation', and the land of a workers' democracy,86 similar, somehow, tothe 'progressive democracy' proposed by the PCI for post-war Italy. Led byStalin, the USSR had made the prime contribution to the defeat of Europeanfascism; marxism-leninism was commonly, but vaguely, seen to lie at the baseof that achievement.87 All these aspects reinforced the PCI's connexions tothe Soviet Union, and these ties in turn strengthened the emphasis onantifascism as the dominant trend in Italian communism at the war's end.

While the image of the Soviet Union was thus important to the PCI in itsantifascist appeal, the Communist Party's Federation in Modena (and Ibelieve throughout Emilia and nationally as well) did not draw support bycalling for class warfare and social revolution. Communist Party pamphlets,in fact, went out of their way to stress the unified and inter-class nature of theresistance. The enemies were defined in national and political terms - theGermans and the Italian fascists. All of this according to any marxist criteria,was decidedly vague. Yet this view of the state of things in Italy in I945 wasspecific enough, at least in Modena, to give the PCI an absolute majority ofpopular support - an outstanding achievement for any political party. Withall its strengths and weaknesses, then, resistance, not revolution (and not'merely' reform), was the raw material of Italian communism in this province.

In April 1945, only the strengths were apparent. The PCI had organizedand led a successful military struggle against powerful enemies. Liberation hadtriumphed. Whatever limitations there were in the nature of a politicalallegiance engendered by the resistance would emerge only when the condi-tions of social life and political struggle changed in the first years of the ItalianRepublic. The Communist Party carried into those years a set of politicalideas drawn from the resistance, and eventually, through many campaignsand many changes, these ideas would come to shape a new, Europeancommunism.

Finally, the resistance not only gave the PCI a particular political outlookin 1945, it also created a more general idea of the political process. The lottahierarchy minimizingits revolutionaryappearancewhile secretlyreassuringcadresof an eventualX-hour for revolution. Much more profound was the doppiezza ulilt nto the Party through thenature of the antifascistcommitment to the PCI - the 'two-sidedness' of Italian communism inwhichradical (socialrevolutionary)sentimentscoexistedwith 'moderate' (antifascist)programmesfor the duration of the resistance.After the war in the dramaticallydifferentcontext of the ItalianRepublic, these two aspects of Italian communism might have become incompatible. But whendoppiezzas seen as having social origins in the ambiguous heritage of the resistanceand the massallegiancegeneratedby the armed struggle, then this entire debate becomesa mole complex issuethan merely one of the leadership's 'duplicity'.

86 ISRMo Pedrazzi, VII (CLN), 2, 42; ISRMo Pedrazzi VIII (PCI), 6, 8.87 La nostraotta 7/I I/44) in ISRMo S. II/io, n. 254. This issue of the monthly newsletterwasdedicated to the celebrationof the RussianRevolution, idolizing Stalin aindpresentingthe SovietUnion in precisely this fashion.



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COMMUNISM IN MODENA 895armata, local initiative, the prestige of a few individual leaders, the overwhelm-ing domination of one political party and a struggle in genuine, broad unityfor onegoal common to the overwhelming majority of people - these elementsmade up the communists' image of politics in 1945, and all figured importantlyin the political and social history of post-war Italy.

In conclusion, communism on the ground created its own set of politicalideas and wrote a new definition of political allegiance during the resistance.This development related far more to conditions within the provinces than toeither the earlier history of communism or the decisions of the PCI 's own exiledleadership. Importantly, it also prepared the way for a favourable receptionfor similar ideas which would be proposed by Togliatti and others to the Partyas a whole in the years after the war. And lastly, the armed struggle provideda social base of peasants and industrial workers for communism in Italy andmade the concerns of these two main groups central to the policies of the PCIafter April 1945. The formation of a communist organization and ideology inthe provinces of northern and central Italy during the resistance is the startingpoint for an understanding of the PCI's history and its strategies in thecontemporary period.

Documents

Provincial Origins of the Partito Comunista Italiano