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Proposal Narrative: pilot ‘Boosting quality education for girls in Shabunda District, South Kivu’

Project Title Boosting Quality Education for Girls in Shabunda District, South Kivu

Organization Name Cordaid

Principal investigator(s) Manuela Jansen Prepared By Manuela Jansen

Total Budget Request 499,938 $USD Total Duration 24 months

Start Date 1 September 2014 End Date 1 September 2016

Proposal Submission Date

29 July 2013 Country(ies) Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

Part A: Background Organization Introduction Organization’s mission, history, scope of work, strategic direction, and growth plans: Headquartered in The Hague and founded 99 years ago, Cordaid is one of the largest and oldest international development organizations in the Netherlands. Our mission is to create flourishing, self-reliant communities in fragile regions around the world. As a founding member of the Caritas Internationalis family (with 162 members worldwide) we collaborate with a network of over a thousand partners, and local governments in 36 developing countries, on projects including housing, health and education in order to achieve a dignified existence for the poor and those without rights. These programs are organized into Business Units (BU’s) as outlined in the organizational chart (Annex 1). The proposed pilot, Boosting Quality Education for Girls in Shabunda District, will be executed by the BU Child & Education. Our work in this area, in particular on education system strengthening, is expanding both in terms of budget and number of countries in which we are active. Project alignment with Cordaid’s overall strategic vision and mission: The proposed pilot seeks to improve and strengthen existing education systems in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in order to enable more children to master and develop the basic skills (reading, writing, numeracy) necessary to build self-reliant, flourishing communities. Education will provide children with the opportunity and ability to learn how to think for themselves, how to work and live together and for them to discover their role in improving the world. In turn, these skills will contribute to conflict prevention and solving in fragile regions, a core element of Cordaid’s mission. Related activities leading to the core questions of the proposed pilot: Cordaid has been working for approximately 40 years in DRC. In 2008 we started in Shabunda District of South Kivu with our education system strengthening program that uses Performance Based Financing (PBF) among 106 primary schools. Due to its promising results, the program was expanded to the Walungu District (also of South Kivu, but more stable and closer to Bukavu, and hence, with more economic opportunities) among 20 primary as well as 12 secondary schools. Our ambition is to scale up to other regions in and outside DRC in the future. To do so, we were eager to design and pilot the proposed project, modeled on these other programs, in order to build a thorough knowledge base. More specifically, we seek proof that the combination of PBF, parent and community engagement, and secondary school infrastructure improvements can result in sustained enrollment of girls and improved quality of education in fragile areas. We aim to answer these core questions: Does PBF make the education system more inclusive (for girls and most marginalized children), transparent (with regard to finance and management), and accountable (to community, parents and girls)? Description of Model Method: Central in our approach is the application of Performance Based Financing (PBF) in collaboration with relevant actors in the education chain. PBF transfers resources on the basis of accomplishment against agreed upon performance metrics. In the case of education this is payment

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for achieving not just educational outcomes, but also access and stability. For example, it is not simply the number of children in a classroom but the number of girls over a period of time who continue to come to school who continue to be engaged in learning with positive learning outcomes. Therefore, rather than paying for simply the existence of an educational institution, educational institutions are being paid on the basis of their results. In our model there is an included emphasis on improved school management and increased community and parental involvement, so that quality of these results can be maintained. Therefore this model not only builds a financing mechanism for education, but an educational system development strategy that includes active community participation at schools and supervision and regulatory oversight to improve governance and sustainability of the system. Thus Cordaid and its partners can increase the performance of key actors within the system.

The process for deploying the model in Shabunda is described in detail in Part C of this proposal, however in brief it involves the following. Building transparent and accountable relations between parents and students, schools and regulators (Ministry of Education, MoE) and controllers of the schools (school inspection), is key. The execution of the project requires contractual arrangements with each school, based on the schools themselves developing their own business plans with their own metrics that are then codified into contractual agreements. Cordaid is partnering with a local agency Agence d’Achat de Performance (AAP) who provides contractual oversight, reporting and training education on the ground.

The program is founded on active community participation at schools, strategic planning for school management, regular inspection and training by inspectors, contracts with subsidies that are paid according to pre-agreed key performance indicators, and contractual verification and counter verification. Each school will both execute its pedagogical duties and build a sustainable learning network among the others schools. The government will provide regulatory oversight, and the family and associated community will provide feedback on quality education and participation. The process incorporates a heavy emphasis on chain management and governance in order to achieve efficiency and scale. Challenges: Shabunda District lacks many things but it does not lack for challenges. It is remote, exceedingly poor, and politically unstable and fragile after decades of war. The PBF model is designed to counteract these conditions by combining stable finance, quality improvement and deep parental and community engagement in education in partnership with government institutions to restore both educational quality and community trust and commitment. Moreover, the structure of the PBF strategy accommodates those challenges using ‘handicap bonuses’ to ensure that all schools have equal opportunities to increase their performance. This process is described in more detail in Part C.

Nevertheless, these challenges are real. Hence, and despite considerable and positive experiences with PBF in South Kivu, Cordaid seeks the additional experience represented in this pilot to build further knowledge before attempting to scale elsewhere in the DRC or in other settings. Evidence: The framework for the proposed pilot stems from our first educational system strengthening programs in Shabunda and Walungu Districts of South Kivu. Through this work, Cordaid has already demonstrated that the PBF approach successfully improves the quality of education and increases enrollment and retention of girls in schools1. Mid-term results of the connected Shabunda project show that the demand for education by girls increased (presently 50% of students at school are girls). Moreover, the quality of education has improved through reduced teacher absenteeism (from 21% to 4%), management capacity has increased, and dropout rates have decreased (from 15% to 3%). The Walungu PBF-project among 20 primary as well as 12 secondary

1 PBF success and challenges are documented extensively in an external independent evaluation

(Royal Tropical Institute: Programme Evaluation of the performance based state building project in South Kivu, 2010-2012; 2012).

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schools showed that in the first half year, management performance among school leaders improved, efforts to enroll girls increased, as did the motivation of teachers. Support for our approach is reflected by the 2010-review of the PBF program by the provincial MoE of South Kivu. A comparison was made between schools that were under a performance contract and schools that were not. In the PBF schools recruitment rates increased slightly more, quality of education was much better, and the test results of the students were much higher. Furthermore Cordaid experience with PBF in health care in DRC, Central African Republic, Rwanda, Burundi, Cameroon and Zimbabwe has also informed our design of this expansion of PBF into the secondary school level of education2. Other players in the region and our different approach: In Shabunda District, three other major players (GIZ, ACTED and UNICEF) are working in the field of education. GIZ runs two centers to make primary school drop-outs functionally literate. ACTED has rehabilitated four primary schools and five centers for primary school drop-outs. Core to the UNICEF program are cash transfers for primary schools. The implementation of this program suffered from insecurity - see reviewer’s feedback on Cordaid’s concept note - but has not been halted structurally, although some schools in the remote areas of Shabunda District have been closed down. GIZ, ACTED and UNICEF are all focusing on primary education, whereas our proposed pilot is focusing on secondary education. Cordaid’s approach stands out since it uniquely uses PBF and collaborates with relevant local stakeholders, including the community and MoE to produce sustainable quality. This embedment and collaboration with local partners enable us to act timely and accurately in case of insecurity (see also Part D on risk mitigation strategies). Strategic Opportunity Opportunity, challenges and issues: The opportunity to work on education system strengthening in South Kivu is massive, given the many hampering factors that currently prevent girls from having access to quality education. Resolving fundamental barriers can have outsized results. Supply side impediments to girls’ education in DRC and South Kivu include poor infrastructure, unsafe school environment, and low quality of teaching (World Bank 20053). Due to low public expenditures, schools currently depend heavily on parents’ contributions. Financial constraints within the family and related child labor and household duties, as well as early marriage or pregnancy, are barriers to girls’ education. Cordaid aims to address these issues by tackling financial bottlenecks and building sustainable community, school and MoE capacity thus expanding access to education among girls who are particularly marginalized. Innovation: School infrastructure and quality of education must improve if more families are to be motivated to invest in sending their daughters to school. This requires additional dollars into the educational system, dollars parents cannot provide. Through the use of an innovative approach like PBF in which payments to secondary schools are made based on outcomes (number of girls educated for one semester) rather than inputs (number of books purchased), Cordaid and its partners can increase the performance of key actors within the education system. This, in turn, leads to better managed schools, more motivated teachers, increased quality of education, and higher demand for learning that will result in increased enrollment of girls into the system. These improvements are complemented by the use of local radio for professional development (new pedagogy and didactics, classroom management) and for community awareness.

2 See http://www.cordaid.org/media/publications/Brochure-Results-Based-Financing.pdf. 3 World Bank (2005). Education in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Priorities and Options for Regeneration.

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Project rationale: Though we have proof of our approach among primary schools, it is critical to us to also gain insight in how effective our model is when applied among secondary schools in a fragile area like Shabunda and to further test the robustness of our model and our PBF tools. Hence, and despite considerable and positive experiences with PBF in South Kivu, Cordaid continues to seek the additional experience represented in this pilot to build further knowledge before attempting to scale elsewhere in the DRC or in other settings. Cordaid engages in education system strengthening, with an eye for inclusive education, in several Asian (Philippines, Bangladesh) and African countries (such as Cameroon and Central African Republic). This enables us to assess the robustness of our approach in different settings. In Mindanao (Philippines), Cordaid and partners collaborate with the government for the effective and efficient use of conditional cash transfers to reach out to marginalized children and get them in school. At the same time, we work with schools to improve the quality of education. Inclusive education is embedded in all our programs. In order to stimulate interdisciplinary synergy Cordaid is working in South Kivu on different programs (on Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR), rural economic development, women’s leadership, peace building, and education). Synergy is sought in terms of approach (the PBF approach and chain management: inclusion of local partners and stakeholders at all levels) and overall aim (flourishing communities). Deepening knowledge to move the sector within DRC and beyond forward: Our systemic approach will provide a credible evidence base for replication and scaling up and all findings and analytic tools used will be documented and evaluated with experts and all stakeholders involved and will be shared with interested parties in DRC and other countries. There are few if any precedents for financing quality secondary education in the DRC that also enable consistent school attendance by girls. Our aim is to change this poverty of knowledge as we change the poverty of education. We use a systemic approach based on agreed and closely monitored performance indicators for all areas of change and for all parties involved, to execute that approach in partnership with the MoE and school inspectors to institutionalize the approach, and to work constantly and closely with communities to build trust. PBF addresses all three key issues of the national policy of the MoE, i.e. access to and quality of education, and governance of schools. Demonstrated knowledge of this model for education financing that also increases access and retention will represent a significant contribution to secondary educational planning in the DRC and other fragile states. Part B: Project Introduction Target area: DRC is the third largest and second most populous country in Africa, and continues to grow at 2.7% rate per year, with 46% of this population being under 15 years old. However, DRC is one of the five countries in the world with the largest number of out-of-school children. A decade of violent strife, large displacements of populations and prolonged economic deprivation have led to a sharp decline in the education system in the country. Currently, there are an insufficient number of schools to reach even a majority of children in DRC. Further, many school communities have fallen apart or have been abandoned, notably in areas that have been affected by conflict, crime, and lawlessness. Schools that have remained relatively intact suffer from weak and inefficient governance and administration. School leaders do not have the necessary administrative and school management skills, and the Committées des Parents are poorly equipped to fully understand and carry out their roles as community partners to schools.

As described by World Bank (see footnote 3), public expenditure on education has dropped considerably since the 1980’s in DRC and South Kivu. In 2001, the Congolese government invested $3 in every primary school student and $6 in every secondary school student. As a result, schools depend heavily on parents’ contributions. However, costs related to education put considerable pressure on the household budget. In South Kivu it is estimated that parents contribute around $30-50 per year for direct costs (incentives, material, and registration) and indirect costs (especially school uniforms). About 51% of the households in South Kivu mention household finances as the

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main educational barrier. Due to under-investment, teachers in DRC are often poorly skilled and unmotivated, resulting in a low quality of education and poor learning outcomes. Primary education teachers, if registered by the MoE (about 60% of teachers) are paid $50 per month salary from the state with another $15 ‘incentive’ paid by the parents. Moreover, 30% of teachers are over 50 years. Many do not retire, as the state is unable to pay their pensions or provide gratuity payments. Gender Analysis: Education statistics for DRC are worse for girls than for boys. According to UNICEF (2013)4, the net attendance ratio at secondary schools for 2007-2011 was 35% for boys and 28% for girls. Similar figures for primary school are respectively 78 and 72. According to UN data5 the primary-secondary Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER; f/m per 100) in 2005-2011 was 60.2/76.7. The female third-level students (% of total) in the same period was 23.6. For South Kivu specifically the available data are less recent. According the World Bank (2005, see footnote 3) the primary GER in 2001 was estimated to be 64%, of which 72% were boys and 56% were girls. Secondary GER was estimated at 23%; again numbers were lower for girls than boys. Around 50% of the students in primary education drop out before the 6th grade; the primary school completion rate is only 29%. The transition rate to secondary school is 85%, but only 13% of its students complete both primary and secondary education. Again these numbers are lower for girls than boys. The financing of education places an additional burden on parents, with gender-related consequence. In South Kivu, 41% of the children between 6 and 14 years old never went to school, the majority of these children being girls. Among boys, 74% has stopped education because of financial constraints compared to a striking 84% for girls. No less than 62% of the girls leave for financial reasons and 22% stop their education because of marriage or pregnancy. Furthermore, for girls in particular, travelling to school can be dangerous6; parents often keep their daughters at home to keep them safe. Schools that do exist often lack a water source and sanitation facilities, again, reasons girls often discontinue their education. Target group and addressing gender: Given the gender disparity, the primary targets for this project are girls, aged 11 to 18 years, enrolled at 20 schools in the Shabunda District7 of South Kivu. Regarding number targeted and impacted: of the total secondary school-going population between 10 and 14 years, 80% are expected to be reached and 60% will be impacted. This is a total number of 5,760 students targeted, enrolled in 20 schools. The current enrollment in these schools is around 4,718. Of this total number of targeted students 2,304 will be girls.

In Shabunda, a PBF approach will be used with the explicit goal of creating gender equality in education. For example, higher subsidies for girls, girl-friendly teaching methods, and SRHR lessons will be applied, and sanitary facilities will be improved in order to retain enrollment of girls in secondary schools. In addition, 500 Orphans and Vulnerable Children (OVCs), half of which are girls, will be supported. Through PBF, these girls will receive the attention they deserve and need to ensure that they continue to enroll in school (in line with inclusive education insights of UNESCO8). For conducting the social audits (part of the PBF) among the community, women’s NGOs are explicitly invited to apply. The project’s secondary target group consists of all relevant stakeholders within the education system in DRC at large. The World Bank (2005) distinguishes three categories

4 http://www.unicef.org/sowc2013/statistics.html. 5 http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Democratic Republic of the Congo. 6 The decades of political chaos, economic decline and war have created difficult living conditions for its population, particularly for women and girls who suffered excessively from gender-based violence. Lack of access to adequate health services leads to high maternal mortality and morbidity, which adds to families’ vulnerability. 7 The MoE of DRC has divided Shabunda District in three administrative zones. The 20 schools enrolled in the proposed pilot are all located in ‘Shabunda 1’. 8 UNESCO (2010). EFA Global Monitoring: Report Reaching the marginalized. Oxford University Press.

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involved in the administration of schools in DRC: the central and provincial MoE, the four main religious congregations (Catholic, Protestant, Muslim and Kimbala), and parents9.

Impact: Using data provided by the MoE of DRC, Cordaid’s partner AAP has drafted a table (Annex 2) that depicts a breakdown of all students (by gender), enrolled in secondary schools in administrative zone 1 of the Shabunda district during the 2012-2013 school year. At baseline, the 20 schools with the highest number of children enrolled will be selected from this list of 56 schools. The girls and teachers at the selected schools will be impacted directly by the activities conducted in the project. Due to our PBF approach positive change is expected both in terms of quality (school management, governance capacity of secondary school leaders, teaching and learning outcomes) and quantity (enrolling and retaining girls). Also teachers will increase their knowledge and skills via a training course broadcasted on the radio combined with coaching provided by the secondary school inspection. The quality of the governance capacity of secondary school leaders will increase due to performance based contracting. Reach: In addition to the previously outlined target populations, several other groups will be affected indirectly by this project. Boys will also benefit from improved curriculum, increased performance of teachers and governance at each secondary school. Others indirectly benefiting are the 36 schools (and students) located within the catchment area of the radio programs that are not selected for the pilot; immediate family members and neighbors of the targeted girls; other schools in the Shabunda District (those in zones 2 and 3); and finally, other managers, policy-makers, inspectors, and practitioners in other parts of DRC who are taught best practices and lessons learned through collaboration with national MoE stakeholders. Part C: Project Description Goals and Benefits The goal of the proposed pilot is to strengthen the existing educational system in the Shabunda District (administrative zone 1) of South Kivu in DRC, and make it inclusive (for girls and most marginalized children), transparent (with regard to finance and management), and accountable (to community, parents and youth). We seek proof that the combination of PBF, parent and community engagement, and secondary school infrastructure improvement can result in sustained enrollment of girls and improved quality of education. Innovative features: Cordaid’s approach alters the way in which quality (as indicated by a higher number of girls and marginalized children enrolled, improved curriculum and pedagogy, and better learning outcomes) in education is achieved, through management of a chain of relevant actors that begins with alternative financing (by means of PBF). This affects all stakeholders along the chain, from educators to regulators to families. Innovative results occur at each link in the chain: 1) The use of PBF, which Cordaid has pioneered in Africa over the past decade in strengthening

healthcare systems, subsidizes school facilities that achieve pre-determined targets. This approach to financing educational budgets is unique.

2) PBF subsequently becomes a motivating structure towards quality that changes the way in which teachers and schools view their roles in the education system. This improves the performance of educational staff, as well as school infrastructure.

9 Only 20% of the schools are managed directly by the state, 80% are managed by one of the religious congregations. In 1974 all private schools were nationalized but subsequently handed back in 1977. The result was a proliferation of administrative structures as both the state and each of the four congregations developed parallel structures. Our 20 targeted secondary schools mirror the different types of schools in the area.

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3) Consequently, government ministries change what inspectors monitor, from measuring inputs to measuring outcomes. This in turn stimulates school and teacher development, and girls’ enrollment. It also creates a more professional relationship between schools and inspectors.

4) This accent on quality and outcomes motivates parent and community engagement, not just on the importance of attendance, but on educational accomplishments as well. Management of the education chain involves the use of radio to raise additional awareness of educational success.

5) Students and parents are also involved in the monitoring of school performance through social audits’ in which families are interviewed about educational quality by independent auditors.

6) Results (performance in terms of quality and quantity) and satisfaction are all verified. Activities: The activities are organized in three phases: the Inception Phase (A), the Implementation Phase (B) and the Evaluation Phase (C), as described in Part D. See also the Timeline in Annex 8. Note that funding is requested from PSIPSE only for Implementation Phase activities; Inception Phase an Evaluation phase activities are fully paid for by Cordaid.

A. Inception Phase, 6 months (see Timeline activities 1a-1b, 2a-2d, and 3a-3b)

Institutional set-up: The system works on the basis of a separation of functions between different parties. The institutional building blocks are the regulator (MoE at national and provincial level, the District Department of Education, DDE, and the District Secondary School Inspection, DSSI), the provider (represented by school leaders) and AAP who is contracting schools to deliver services and performance, and the clients (girls, parents). The relations between the different actors are regulated by of arrangements laid down in contracts. The regulator’s primary function is to guarantee the quality of the services delivered by the provider. The provider must deliver a service, in this case secondary education, to a targeted number of girls. AAP negotiates and enforces the contracts. The figure below shows the constellation of key players in the education chain in the Shabunda pilot and their interdependence. The lines represent contracts, and interactions or involvement, all crucial for communication and feedback to make PBF participative (all key actors interact) and locally relevant. Education chain management is a systematic way to involve, contract and professionalize stakeholders in the education system in order to optimize communication and activities within vertical and horizontal structures. The vertical chain includes the MoE at national and provincial level, DDE, DSSI, and the (secondary) schools. The main focus in the horizontal chain is to stimulate collaboration between schools leaders, teachers, students, parent committees and communities. It is a systematic way to involve, contract and professionalize stakeholders in the education system to optimize communication and activities within vertical and horizontal and structures. Cordaid has already received an official letter from the provincial MoE with its commitment to participate in this pilot project (see letter in Annex 3). The project will work with the MoE to identify the appropriate School Inspectors, organize inspection schedules, and ensure that data capture systems have been developed.

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Selection and contracting schools: At baseline, the 20 schools with the highest number of children enrolled are selected from this list of 56 schools. Girls make up approximately 30% of the overall number of students. Schools sign a contract with a contracting agency AAP and through this contract AAP buys a set of services for a pre-negotiated price. For example, a priced service might be ‘schooling for one girl during one semester for a price of 2 USD’ or ‘one session on reproductive health and family planning for 5 USD’. To ensure that all schools have equal opportunities to increase their performance the contract provides for the possibility of a handicap bonus. Schools that are functioning in difficult circumstances beyond their control can receive a bonus of up to 40% of their performance. Determination of the subsidy as well as all other procedures (verification and payments) and sound instruments (contracts, registration forms, and evaluation sheets) are all described in Cordaid’s PBF Procedures Manual for South Kivu, which will be adapted for to specific contexts and updated according to new insights and lessons learned (Annex 4).

Prepare plans and select indicators: The strength of the PBF approach is that the choice of indicators, the targets of the indicators, the subsidies for every indicator, as well as the bonus on quality can (and will) vary over the years. This flexibility is built as needs and perceived degrees of urgency may change over time and differ across school locations. The list of indicators, the balanced scorecard (i.e. an agreed list of activities to stimulate school performance), developed by AAP, DDE, DSSI and Cordaid, are based on reviews of best practices and widely accepted standards (e.g. according to INEE toolkits: see http://toolkit.ineesite.org/toolkit/Home.php). The corresponding amount of subsidies is negotiated between AAP and the school leaders (the main implementers), the school inspection, DDE and DSSI. Initially all schools will work with the same set of indicators, but in the course of time schools will develop their own path (laid down in business plans). Hence, in the future we expect to have a combined set of fixed and variable indicators per school to stimulate performance.

Develop the training materials, radio lessons and process: Teachers are expected to increase their knowledge and skills via a training course broadcasted on the radio combined with coaching provided by the secondary school inspection. The quality of the governance capacity of secondary school leaders will increase due to performance based contracting. Radio lessons for professional development will be developed and fine-tuned. Basic investment in these approaches has already been done by Cordaid. They will be adopted for this secondary school pilot.

B) Implementation phase, 24 months (roll out, implement and adjustment of PBF cycle: see Timeline activities 5b-5g and 6a-6c)

Contractual performance: Every trimester each school is visited by AAP during which the

expected performance is verified against perform indicators (the higher the score, the higher the payment). Contracts are draw for the period of one year but payments are made per trimester, after verification of the results. In addition, twice a year, the total quality of performance of schools is assessed: good schools may receive an up to 100% bonus of the subsidies paid based on ‘regular’ verification. Key activities and milestones for schools, DDE and DSSI are fixed during the year, such as approval of the management and financial plans, contracting, verification of results, evaluation for the quality bonus and payment of subsidies.

Indicator adjustment: Also, twice a year, schools revise their business and financial plans to overcome existing constraints and undertake activities to increase performance for the next period. AAP pays the regulator for every visit.

Continued training: School inspectors will follow-up and monitor teachers enrolled in a teacher training course to see the effects. Refreshment courses for teachers are delivered via radio.

Community engagement: To make sure that schools do not ‘over-register’ and to avoid ‘ghost students’ AAP contracts a local NGO to perform ‘social audits’. Families are visited, students are verified, and parents and students are interviewed about quality, satisfaction and price of delivered services. Additionally, the community and parents will be engaged in the content design and the roll-out of the radio lessons-based teacher training program.

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Summary Table listing three main outcomes, objectives and activities to take place at 20 secondary schools in Shabunda, administrative zone 1. Timing of activities is indicated in the Timeline (Annex 8).

Objective 1 To increase the capacity and governance (in terms of transparency, accountability and efficiency) of school mangers and management teams.

Activities The complete list of activities is part of the ‘PBF program cycle’ (see Annex 8). Examples of activities herein are e.g.: PBF-training of school leaders to develop, implement and revise a business plan. Analyzing and monitoring of the strategic and financial plan by the school

leader. Stimulation of school mangers to set up and maintain a functional and school

management team, with active communication with and participation of parents’ committees and representation of teachers.

PBF-training to enhance effective collaboration and communication between different stakeholders (school leaders, teachers, parents’ committees, school inspectors, and DDE and DSSI officers).

An additional but related activity is the set-up of a PBF database (see also Funding Partners).

Outcome 1 Improved quality and increased effectiveness of 20 secondary school leaders and corresponding school management teams by the end of the pilot.

Objective 2 To improve teaching quality and to generate better learning among girls.

Activities The complete list of activities is part of the ‘PBF program cycle’ (see Annex 8). Examples of activities herein are e.g.: Training of school leaders and teachers on SRHR and girl-friendly teaching so

that SRHR becomes a standard element of the school curriculum and teaching methods contribute to gender equity.

Making school staff acquainted with PBF so that they will gain strong intrinsic motivation through the use of bonuses on quality performance.

Conducting regular monitoring visits and coaching of teachers by DSSI. Stimulation of teachers to develop their skills on pedagogy, didactics, and

classroom management, and to update subject specific knowledge. An additional activity is the development and use radio lessons for teachers on pedagogy and didactics, classroom management and subject specific updates.

Outcome 2 Increased motivation and capacity of 225 teachers at 20 secondary schools to enhance the quality learning, by the end of the pilot.

Objective 3 To increase the number of girls enrolled and retained and their learning outcomes.

Activities The complete list of activities is part of the ‘PBF program cycle’ (see Annex 8). Examples of activities herein are e.g.: Stimulation of schools through performance bonuses to enroll and retain girls at

secondary schools (higher subsidies for indicators relating to girls). Stimulation of schools through special bonuses to enroll and retain 500 OVCs Stimulation of school leaders and teachers to liaise with primary schools and

communities to increase the likelihood that girls pursue secondary education. Stimulation of school staff to create a safe learning environment so that girls

feel safe and respected, and are offered equal opportunities to access school. An additional activity is the development and roll out of radio sessions calling for investing in secondary education for girls.

Outcome 3 A 10% increase of enrollment and retention of girls among 20 secondary schools leading to a higher number and better qualified secondary school graduates, accomplished by the end of the pilot.

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Sustainability: We are strongly committed to this project and the region: Cordaid will remain active in South Kivu in the years to come. Funding through PSIPSE will expand our education program in Shabunda District to secondary schools. Also, we hope that with the support of PSIPSE we can generate proof of concept of our PBF approach and scale up to more secondary schools in South Kivu (or other regions in DRC). Together with partners, we also build a network that can later be introduced to additional institutional and private funders for scale up to other districts in South Kivu and other fragile regions. Chain management adds to the sustainability of our model. Central in our PBF approach is the ‘regulator’, represented by the MoE and the school inspectors. By including the MoE and inspection at both the district and provincial level with performance based contracting and support, the functions of regulation and control are durably strengthened. Once it is proved that the proposed pilot provides good value for money, to the benefit of girls’ secondary education, the MoE will be more likely to support (longer-lasting) scaling-up initiatives. We currently have good implementing capacity and support of the government in South Kivu (see letter of provincial MoE in Annex 3). Finally, sustainability is also strongly linked to local support for the project (at community and national level). Involvement of the community e.g. by parents’ committees will generate expectations for, and ownership of, improvement which in turn will reinforce teacher, management and government commitment. By strengthening capacity of all stakeholders of the education chain we expect that also when Cordaid has phased out its activities in the region, the system is strengthened and can survive on its own with financial support of the MoE in DRC. Funding partners: Cordaid itself is the co-funder (as indicated in the Project Budget in Annex 7) and we continuously search for other co-funders. In addition to this financial and organizational commitment to the pilot, in 2013-14 Cordaid will develop a database and set up thorough research on the development of quality tools and specific modules to enhance the curriculum (e.g. on SRHR). A separate proposal will be developed in cooperation with the University of Amsterdam and in partnership with the DRC University of Bukavu to work with this large dataset as it is built to better understand the application of PBF to educational improvement. This academic collaboration will represent a significant leverage of the PSIPSE grant for additional operational and impact research.

Implementing Partners: Cordaid is leading a team of implementing partners and will manage the overall project, the total budget and alignment of output and activities, overall outcomes, M&E and research. Cordaid’s partners in this pilot are non-profits (see partners’ profiles in Annex 5). In south Kivu we have an extensive and ongoing partnership with Agence d’Achat de Performance (AAP), who are responsible for the PBF contracting and monitoring activities. AAP has proven capacities to create ownership among actors to ensure that services can continue to be delivered despite hardship or insecurity. There is a multitude of contracts and agreements to be managed, most of them in relation to the roll-out of the PBF system, in conjunction with a thorough monitoring and evaluation (and research) system. Agreements on roles and deliverables of partners will be settled in contracts with or through Cordaid. In addition we work with APS International, our technical assistance partner. APS designs, manages and conducts school improvement projects. We have worked with APS since 2012 because of their expertise on development of quality instruments and appropriate teaching methods. Stakeholder Analysis and Dissemination Strategy Stakeholders’ needs: Results and performance are the base for payments in the PBF approach and are therefore structurally monitored and disseminated with relevant stakeholders (school leaders, students, parents, DDE and DSSI, MoE, etc.). The education chain is foremost a chain of contracts, a split of functions, regulation of functions, and communication (particularly feeding-back information and experiences for learning, see Part A). PBF encourages autonomy and self-determination of the schools to stimulate ownership and to maximize self-resolving power. Schools indicate their preferred way of spending of resources together with the parents’ committee and students, according to their specific needs and preferences (such as salaries, infrastructure, books or activities).

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Preferred allocation of resources is in accordance to the agreed performance improvement plan which is an integral part of their performance contract. The information and communication needs of the girl students are addressed by involving them in developmental and decision-making processes (girls are ‘at the negotiating table’) and evaluations. Given the history of and current conditions in South Kivu we consider it of utmost importance to build up a broad support base for the pilot among the community. Community participation is voluntary and will be carefully managed in order to avoid unrealistic expectations. A related issue that needs to be managed is the relationship with schools, communities and beneficiaries that are not enrolled in the pilot. Therefore, planning and scaling scenarios require intense collaboration and communication between all stakeholders. Engaging with decision-makers: The government is a critical decision-maker partner in the proposed pilot. The MoE at the provincial and district level serves as the regulator, guaranteeing the quality of services delivered by the school. The provincial and district school inspection also plays a role. Cordaid has the support of the government in South Kivu (see letter in Annex 3). By including the MoE and inspection at both the district and provincial level with performance based contracting and support, the functions of regulation and control are strengthened. As part of their work, school inspectors will follow-up and monitor teachers following a teacher training course. Additionally, they will be engaged in the content design and the roll-out of the radio lessons-based teacher training program. Regarding previous (and ongoing) engagement with other decision-makers: Cordaid has been partnering with the government in a variety of sectors; for example, we work with the Ministry of Health (MoH) on a health program in 6 provinces funded by the Global Fund. Cost efficiency: The costs per beneficiary for the implementation phase are US$ 54 per year for keeping a child in school. The initial investment for inception of the program is a once of cost guaranteed by Cordaid. When the project will be continued and scaled up, the cost efficiency will increase due to efficiency gains on monitoring and evaluation. Cost efficiency and effectiveness will be addressed in our reports and will be calculated according to standard methods10. Part D: Project Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Plan Core question: The core questions to be answered in this pilot is: Does PBF make the system more inclusive (for girls and most marginalized children), transparent (with regard to finance and management), and accountable (to community, parents and girls)? We seek proof that the combination of PBF, parent and community engagement, and secondary school infrastructure improvements can result in sustained enrollment of girls and improved quality of education. If PBF can be successfully applied in Shabunda district in a pilot setting, we are keen to scale up our approach to broader regions, after having processed the lessons learned during the pilot. The M&E plan: M&E activities are inherently part of the PBF activity cycle (see Part C) and is described into detail in the PBF Procedures manual (Annex 4). The evaluation phase (3 months, see Timeline, fully paid for by Cordaid) involves both quantitative as well as qualitative methods. There are several ‘milestones’ (such as the annual contract meetings, the verification of indicators and results four times per year, the verification of results generated by the social audits) at which lessons learned during the pilot are directly fed back into the model and implementation process. This allows

10 Dhaliwal, I., Duflo, E., Glennerster, R. and C. Tulloch (2012). Comparative Cost-Effectiveness Analysis to Inform Policy in Developing Countries: A General Framework with Applications for Education. Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL), MIT. And: Levin, H.M. and C. Belfield (2013). Education and Innovation Theme Cost-Effectiveness in School Education. Columbia University and City University of New York.

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for improvement of our project’s design and implementation during the roll out. Learning tracking will be facilitated by the database on PBF monitoring data. Examples of PBF M&E activities are: Regular monitoring, meetings and follow up of schools, community organizations and other

actors in the education chain (MoE, DDE, and DDSI) by AAP and Cordaid. Regular monitoring of schools for the verification of results per trimester of the performance of

all contracted actors, assuring a proper role of school inspectors towards schools in verifications. Evaluation of quality of total performance per semester to enhance mid-term feed-back to

relevant actors in order to adjust and enhance the roll out of activities. Counter verifications in form of social audits among students and parents on the performance of

schools by community organizations (NGOs). Regular monitoring of program implementation by Cordaid via email, Skype and field visits. Measuring success: Our theory of change is that PBF, a systemic approach based on agreed and closely monitored performance indicators for all relevant areas of change and for all parties involved (based on careful analysis of context and with involvement of relevant stakeholders), increases inclusiveness (for girls and most marginalized children) and it makes the education system more transparent (with regard to finance and management), and accountable (to community, parents and girls). PBF works with bonuses that are paid only when targets (both quantitative and qualitative) are reached. Indicators to measure the expected positive change include among others: Improved communication and collaboration during the PBF cycle, as laid down in contract-

meetings, monitoring visits, and committees between schools and the parents’ committees, are considered to add to the extent of transparency of relevant actors of the education chain (from national to grass root level).

Improved performance and quality of school leaders, management and staff and officials of DDE and DSSI (as indicated by teaching performance and learning outcomes).

The number of girls and marginalized children enrolled at baseline and at follow up during the PBF cycle moments (see Part C) are expected to show an increase leading to a higher number and better qualified secondary school graduates. This is considered to reflect an improvement of the education system in terms of inclusiveness.

Indirectly there are expected spin-offs whose measurement is beyond the scope of the pilot but which will be addressed in the final evaluation of the pilot (see Timeline and Resources later in Part D). For example, the measurement of results rather than input is expected to lead to a wider change in knowledge and openness to change among ‘other’ schools and officials at the MoE at national, provincial and district level. Timeline and resources for M&E: The approximate timeline for M&E activities that are inherently part of the PBF cycle can be found in Annex 8. The resources for M&E, both in terms of human capital as well as costs are included in the Project Budget (Annex 6 and related Annex 7). An annual evaluation will be conducted by Cordaid to assess the progress of the pilot. This includes an evaluation of (mid-term) results, approaches used and preparation of next cycle by revisiting the inception phase, ending with contracting of community organizations, schools and government structures for the new academic year. The mid-term evaluation allows for recalibration of key interventions. In addition, the pilot will be externally evaluated at its conclusion, i.e. after the second academic year. While doing the evaluation, lessons learned11 from previous (external) evaluations of related projects will be taken into account (see Part A and footnote 1).

11 Cordaid and APS have experience in education (and health) projects in the wider region (e.g. Burundi, CAR, Malawi and Eritrea). Evaluations showed that factors that lie at the heart of change are the shift from traditional teaching to ‘engaged learning’ (different pedagogy, better rooted in the community, more empowering), the shift from isolated projects to ‘chain programs’ (linking,

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Evaluation table

Anticipated Outcomes

Indicative Output Indicators

Indicative Outcome Indicators

Corresponding Data Source

Monitoring Methods

Increased performance of the education system in Shabunda District, administrative zone 1, as expressed by: inclusiveness, transparency, and accountability

a. Performance contracts (AAP, DDE, DSSI and 20 schools)

Outcome 1: Improved quality and increased effectiveness of 20 secondary school leaders and school management teams by the end of the pilot Outcome 2: Increased motivation and capacity of 225 teachers at 20 secondary schools to enhance the quality learning Outcome 3: A 10% increase of enrollment and retention of girls among 20 secondary school

a. Existence of contracts

a. Assessment business plans and verification schools by AAP

b. Trimester payments for results (number enrolled)

b. Administrative school records

b. Verification by AAP

c. Semester payments for quality

c. Report on evaluation of quality

c. Evaluation by AAP, DSSI and Cordaid

d. Number of contracts and annual re-negotiations contracts

d. Minutes defense of revised business plans and existence of contracts

d. Assessment plans, passed performance and new plans by AAP

e. Visits to schools by DDE and DSSI on regular basis

e. Logbook of schools, registers and visit reports of DDE and DSSI

e. Verification logbooks, registers and school reports by DDE, DSSI and AAP

f. Provision quarterly and annual reports to provincial MoE by DDE and DSSI

f. Reports available at DDE and DSSI

f. Verification by AAP

g. 225 teachers taken part in radio sessions on professional development and increased quality of their teaching

g. Evaluation report teachers’ performance; report coaching of teachers via radio lessons; school reports radio lessons, all by DSSI

g. (Counter) Verification, (social audits) and quality assessments by AAP, Cordaid, and provincial inspection

coordinating), and the shift from donor driven to demand driven change (linking donor initiatives into one coordinated program to deliver change valued by stakeholders).

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Part E: Other Implementation Details HR and Management Plan Staffs’ roles, functions, qualifications and requirements: Manuela Jansen (MSc, senior program manager) of Cordaid will be the project leader and Dave Zwaan will manage the financial aspects of the pilot (see also Annex 5). Regional staff is crucial in our work. In South Kivu, Pacifique Mushagalusa (MPH, director of AAP) will oversee the project and be responsible for the management of PBF. He is experienced to lead a professional organization that analyses and buys performance and services in remote areas of South Kivu. Expertise on school and curriculum innovation, and training of teachers will be provided by Cordaid partner APS International led by Paul Vermeulen (MA) who will train teachers about evidence-based models for instruction. Communication: The communication strategy will be tuned to support all activities, maximize output results, and enhance transparency across the education chain, and to the benefit of the funders. New ways of communication will be introduced where expected to be effective in given context, examples being the aforementioned radio communication. The earlier mentioned (research and PBF) database will be made available through the Internet. Cordaid’s open-data policy (effective from September onwards) facilitates communication with funders and other relevant or interested parties. Risks and Assumptions

Risk description, assumed likelihood of risk occurring, and project impact

Ways to reduce this risk from happening and/ or reduce the negative impact if it does

Civil war and unrest caused by militia in North Kivu expands to South Kivu and the pilot area in particular. Likelihood: medium (as the militia is partly composed of parents of school-going children, in our local partners’ view, the likelihood of school’s being militia targets is not high); Project impact: high

If the pilot area becomes inaccessible (for project staff and for a period longer than 3 months), we would propose to PSIPSE to set up and roll out the project in adjacent regions in DR Congo, meanwhile (if possible and pending progress) keeping the pilot running at a low (minimum) pace (as to avoid total collapse of the PBF system). Consequences are considerable in terms of project-time and flow (delays and lower pace) and budget, as we would need preparation time in the new area.

Loss of project staff because of health issues and lack of commitment. Likelihood: low; Project impact: medium

Staff is dedicated to the pilot. They are employed with organizations with a history of working in developing countries, experienced in dealing with safety issues (committed to Cordaid’s safety policy), and able to provide for replacement staff.

Fraud, administrative failure and incompetent management. Likelihood: low; Project impact: high

This risk is reduced by working with experienced local and Dutch partners. The pilot entails a thorough and transparent management structure. Financial administration is audited by Cordaid and external auditors (standard Cordaid procedures).

Lack of knowledge and understanding of PBF. Likelihood: low; Project impact: high

This risk can be mitigated by increasing time and effort spent on training of key staff. Cordaid will bear any related costs.

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Lack of support from parents and community and loss of political and administrative stakeholder commitment. Likelihood: low; Project impact: high

This risk is considered low as considerable time and effort is spend on community involvement, but negative impact can be high. Communication and partnering is key and will be monitored closely, so that any mitigation and/or counseling processes can get started in a timely and effective fashion.

Challenging physical conditions are part of DRC but they may be worse than expected Likelihood: medium; Project impact: medium

In part, we anticipate challenging issues (remote schools, lack of transport and energy supply) by designing distant communication into the project (radio, internet). Cordaid has worked for 40 years in this region.

Discrimination between schools (enrolled versus not enrolled; divided by ethnicity, religion). Likelihood: medium; Project impact: high

Our experience in South Kivu, has prepared us for the complexity of this area. We emphasize and if necessary increase the extent of communication (explanation, information) with community and stakeholders.

By becoming (re-)enrolled, girls’ self-esteem is expected to increase and they become empowered. This might influence power-balance within the family and the community. Likelihood: medium; Project impact: high

We anticipate that changed power-balances will occur. To mitigate any negative effects, proper information and communication will be emphasized. By enrolling also boys in schools, and by actively involving parents and the community, we expect that changes in girls’ status are socially and culturally accepted.

Financial Resources A detailed budget, drafted according to the Budget Template and linked to the project activities and timeline (see Part C), is included in Annex 6. The calculations of PBF subsidies are included in Annex 7. Timeline A timeline with the high level milestones presented in a chart, is included in Annex 8.