JUAN TOLENTINO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs.CLODOALDO VITUG, ET AL., defendants-appellees. 

The spouses Manuel Tolentino and Pascuala Ycban died, the latter dying earlier than the former, and were survived by four children and Santiago, Genoveva, Dolores, and Remigia. Santiago, Genoveva, and Dolores married, and on their death, they were survived by their respective descendants. Remigia was married to Vicente Rivera, with whom she had a son named Guillermo Rivera. Guillermo Rivera married Felipa Vitug with whom he had five children named Victor, Romualdo, Antonia, Pelagia, and Geronima, all surnamed Rivera.

After the death of Manuel Tolentino, which occurred in 1876, his property remained  pro indiviso in the care and administration of his children. In 1889, certain disputes arose between Anacleto Yuson, husband of Dolores Tolentino, and the rest of the coheirs, and for this reason and on petition of Anacleto Yuson, an inventory was made of the property left by Manuel Tolentino, which property is described in paragraph 5 of the amended complaint, and by order of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, said property was placed under the control of Licerio Flores. In 1895, said court appointed Julian Vitug to substitute Lucerio Flores in the management of the property. As such trustee, Julian Vitug took possession of the property. Upon the death of Julian Vitug on February 6, 1903, the control over the property was transferred to his children Felipa and Clodoaldo and to his grandchildren, the children of Felipa.

In this case, the plaintiffs, the descendants and heirs of Santiago, Genoveva, and Dolores Tolentino, ask that they be declared owners of the property described in the complaint and that they be paid the value of the fruits and products of the same. The defendants Clodoaldo Vitug, Felipa Vitug, and her children Victor, Romualdo, Antonia, Pelagia, and Geronima deny the fact of being mere trustees of the property and allege, as their principal defense, that each and all of them have been in possession of the property in question for more than ten years, such possession being public, continuous, under a claim of title, exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claimants, in good faith and with just title, and that therefore the plaintiff's action has prescribed.

On December 10, 1912, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga for the recovery of the property in question, but said complaint was, on June 22, 1914, dismissed without a consideration on the merits of the case. On October 15, 1914, the plaintiffs again brought the same action by virtue of a complaint which gave rise to the cause which is now before this court on appeal.

It is fully proven that in the year 1895, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga appointed Julian Vitug trustee of the property of Manuel Tolentino, described in paragraph 5 of the amended complaint; that said Vitug accepted the trust, took the corresponding oath, and received the property. All of these facts are shown in Exhibit 1 which is a certified official; copy of all proceedings had with relation to the trust over the property. This exhibit was duly authenticated at the trial and admitted by the court after sufficient evidence was introduced to show that the originals were burned during the revolution.

The acceptance of this trust by Julian Vitug and the receipt by him of the property as such trustee have the weight of an admission on his part that the property so received by him did not belong to him but to the heirs of Manuel Tolentino.

Of the 17 parcels sought to be recovered in the complaint, those marked 3, 5, 13, 14, and 15 are in the possession of the defendant Clodoaldo Vitug. The other defendants, a mother and her children, possess the remaining parcels. All of the defendants allege that they have inherited this property from Julian Vitug, with the exception of the parcels, the title to which (Exhibits 1, 2, 10), is derived from her mother-in-law Remigia Tolentino, according to the defendant Felipa Vitug. However, upon examination of these exhibits, it is seen that they do not refer to the lands claimed by the plaintiffs. The land described on Exhibit 2 does not agree in description with any of the parcels claimed. Moreover, Exhibit 2 is not a title in the name of Remigia Tolentino, but a contract of sale in favor of Julian Vitug. The lands described in Exhibit 10 are included in Exhibit 1. Exhibit 1 is, in fact, a composition title with the State, issued in 1889 in favor of Remigia Tolentino. But, the description of the lands included in this exhibit does not coincide with that of any of the parcels claimed in the complaint. Moreover, it appears that in 1895 Remigia Tolentino intervened partly in the judicial proceedings had with regard to the trust over the property in question in favor of Julian Vitug. If

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any of the property given in trust to said Vitug was included in her composition title with the State, she would, undoubtedly, have protested against said trust; but it appears that she has not done that. We therefore arrive at the conclusion that the title to all the parcels claimed in the complaint and possessed by the defendants was derived from Julian Vitug. If, on the other hand, Julian Vitug was not the owner of these lands, he could not transmit the title to said lands to the defendants nor could the latter received from the former any right to the same.

The principal defense relied upon by the defendants in this case is that of prescription. We believe however that this defense is not supported by the evidence.

Because Julian Vitug was a mere administrator and trustee of the property, his possession in such capacity was not adverse but was only in the name and in behalf of the owners of the same property, the heirs of Manuel Tolentino. The records do not show that Vitug has ever repudiated the trust or has expressed any claim of ownership over the property. His possession was not a possession for himself, but for the owner. As to him it did not amount to possession as owner. It could not, therefore, be a ground for prescription, neither can his heirs, the defendants, now take advantage of such possession for the purpose of the prescription which they allege. For this reason, the time for prescription alleged by the defendants can be computed only from the date of the death of Julian Vitug, that is, from February 8, 1903.

We have reached the foregoing conclusions, notwithstanding the allegation of the defendants that they took possession of these lands before the death of Julian Vitug. Clodoaldo Vitug testified that his father delivered to him the parcels which he now possesses, in order to cultivate them. He does not say that such lands were delivered to and received by him as his own. His possession, therefore, during the lifetime of his father, was nothing but the possession which he had as a mere administrator or trustee. Felipa Vitug on her part stated that she received the remaining parcels as her share thirty years before she gave her testimony (1915). But this testimony can not be true or at most refers to other lands, inasmuch as Julian Vitug came into possession of said land only since 1895, when they were intrusted to him.lawphil.net

Since February 8, 1903, the date of Julian Vitug's death, till December 10, 1912, when the plaintiffs presented for the first time in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a complaint for the recovery of the property in question, a period of ten years has not elapsed. Hence, the plaintiffs still have the rights to bring said action (section 40, Code of Civil Procedure), and the defendants have not as yet acquired a title by prescription to said lands (section 41, id.). When said complaint was dismissed on July 22, 1914, ten years had already elapsed, but, in view of the fact that the dismissal of the complaint was had without any consideration of the merits of the case, the plaintiffs still have one year from said date of dismissal within which to bring a new action (section 49, id.). The plaintiffs having brought this new action, which is now the object of this appeal, on October 5, 1914, within the said period of one year, it can not be claimed that their action to recover the property in question has prescribed.

The plaintiffs also seek to recover from the defendants the sum of P185,000 representing the value of the products of the property in litigation. This claim can not be considered favorably except under the supposition that the defendants were the possessors in bad faith, but the evidence does not establish this assumption. Good faith is presumed in every possessor. The only circumstances which tends to refute this presumption is that testified to by Luciano Vitug to the effect that the defendant Clodoaldo Vitug was present when his father Julian Vitug received in trust the property in question. Clodoaldo denies this fact, and we doubt seriously the truth of Luciano Vitug's testimony, not only because of his antecedents as proved in the case which unfavorably affect his veracity, but also because of the enmity existing between him and the defendant Clodoaldo, and also because of the special interest he has shown in this cause against the defendants. The same witness testified that, on the death of Julian Vitug, he (witness) went with Juan Tolentino, one of the plaintiffs to request Clodoaldo Vitug to return the lands in question, but that said Clodoaldo Vitug flatly refused to do so, alleging that he had inherited them from his father. This circumstance shows that Clodoaldo Vitug not admit the fact that the property had been intrusted to the care of his father. On the other hand, the complete failure of the plaintiffs to bring an action in the defense of their rights to the property — they having made no effort whatsoever till December 10, 1910, when they presented for the first time their complaint for the recovery of this property — might have, with reason, strengthened the belief of the defendants that they have lawfully inherited the property from Julian Vitug, and that the plaintiffs were not in any way entitled thereto.

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In view of the foregoing circumstances, we hold that the defendants are possessors in good faith, and that, therefore, the fruits they have collected belong to them.

On the other hand, there is no evidence of what the fruits collected by the defendants were and of their value, and although three witnesses testified as to what these lands could produce, nevertheless their statements are conflicting and show that their estimates are not well founded.

The lower court accepted as proved the fact that the property in question was held in trust by Julian Vitug, but declared that said Vitug was the owner of the property, and further stated that, even if said Vitug were not the owner, the plaintiff's action has already prescribed, and for these reasons the said court absolved the defendants from the complaint.

In view, however, of the foregoing consideration it follows that the judgment of the lower court should be reversed, and that the property in question belongs to the heirs of Manuel Tolentino.

It, however, appears that the plaintiffs are not the only ones interested in the property, because the defendants Felipa Vitug and her children Victor, Romualdo, Antonia, Pelagia, and Geronima, have also an interest in said property, they being heirs of Manuel Tolentino. In view of the fact that some of the plaintiffs are minors, it follows that they can not partition the property among themselves without the intervention of the court. The prayer of the complaint does not include the delivery of the property to the plaintiffs, and in fact this delivery can not be made, because the property is held pro indiviso, and also because the plaintiffs are not the only ones interested therein.

With a reversal of the judgment appealed from, we hereby hold that the property described in the complaint belongs to the heirs of Manuel Tolentino, and without prejudice to the rights of the defendants Felipa Vitug and her children, Victor, Romualdo, Antonia, Pelagia, and Geronima, as heirs of Manuel Tolentino, it is hereby ordered that the property be delivered by the defendants to the one who may duly represent all of the interested parties or to the administrator of the estate of Manuel Tolentino, upon his appointment and qualification. The defendants are hereby absolved from the other prayer of the complaint, without any special finding as to costs. So ordered.

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ANDREA TABUSO and RENATO BISMORTE, petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and the HEIRS OF ESTEBAN ABAD represented by Nemesio Abad and Ana Abad Paghubasan, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

This case involves declaration of ownership. Andrea Tabuso claims to be the owner of a parcel land which she inherited by her mother evidence by tax declaration. However, the property has been in the possession of the heirs of Esteban Abad, although the house standing thereon appears to have been constructed by Marcelo Tabuso, father of Andrea Tabuso.Heirs allegation that the property was sold to Esteban by Isabel elaban evidence bby tax dec. TRIAL: declared the defendant the lawful owners of the land in question that even if tabuso had built a house thereon, such action was only tolerated by the heirs, who had originally allowed one Marcelo Tabuso to construct a house on the same lot. Besides, Tabuso is not a compulsory heir of Ignacio Montes, from whom she claims to have inherited the lot, subject of this litigation. In addition, the tax declaration in his name has long been revised. CA: affirmed. Hence this petition.

Ownership of the Property: Ownership exists when a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others. Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, one of which is the right to dispose of the thing by way of sale. possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or without right. Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession of a holder. Possessors in the concept of owners may be the owners themselves or those who claim to be so. On the other hand, those who possess as mere holders acknowledge in another a superior right which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong."

In this case, the evidence shows that the occupation of the property by petitioners is not in the concept of owners, because their stay is merely tolerated. This finding is bolstered by the fact that Petitioner Andrea Tabuso is the daughter of Marcelo Tabuso, who was merely allowed by the previous owner, Esteban Abad, to construct a small house on the lot. Lastly, the claim of petitioners that private respondents are not in actual possession of the land is unsubstantiated. Besides, it is not necessary that the latter actually stay on the property in order to prove ownership of the same. As found by both the trial and the appellate courts, since the acquisition of the subject property by private respondents, they had religiously paid the taxes due thereon. Further, one of the co-owners executed a lease contract over it in favor of a tenant. These acts are clearly consistent with ownership.

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G.R. No. 112519 November 14, 1996

CATHOLIC BISHOP OF BALANGA, respresented by CRISPULO TORRICO, petitioner, vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and AMANDO DE LEON, respondents.

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

FACTS:

A conflict arose with respect to ownership of Lot 1272 located somewhere in Balanga, Bataan. Said lot was allegedly ceded thru donation by the the then parish priest of Catholic Archbishop of Manila, prior thereto or on August 23, 1936, in favor of the predecessor of private respondent. Said predecessor, before her death, was able to give said lot to private respondent, also through a deed of donation. The deed was however, refused to be registered, for unknown reasons, by the Registered of Deeds. Despite this, however, the latter, when his predecessor died in 1945 without an issu, had allegedly been in open and continuous possession of said lot, built a house thereon and declared it for tax purposes until his ownership was disturbed on November 5, 1985 or more than 49 years after said donation, by petitioner (who obtained it from Roman Catholic Bishop of Balanga, and the latter from Roman Catholic Bishop of Manila) when petitioner filed a complaint against private respondent. In its complaint, petitioner alleged that during the Japanese occupation, without its knowledge and prior consent, private respondent entered and occupied the subject property; that despite requests by petitioner, private respondent refused to vacate the property in question.

Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the action has been barred by prescription for having been filed after more than 49 years after the donation. Petitioner filed an opposition thereto alleging that the defense of prescription was not raised in a timely filed motion to dismiss, and as an affirmative defense in the answer.

The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner. On appeal, the CA stated that private respondent could not have acquired ownership over the subject property through acquisitive prescription because the same having been duly registered under the Torrens system, title thereto was indefeasible.

Nonetheless, respondent Court of Appeals ultimately ruled that under the doctrine of laches, the consequence of petitioner's inaction for 49 years since the execution of the deed of donation, despite its apparently undeniable knowledge of private respondent's adverse, peaceful and continuous possession of the subject property in the concept of an owner from 1936 to the institution of the recovery suit in 1985, is that it has lost its rights to the subject property and can no longer recover the same due to its 18 own inexcusable negligence and grave lack of vigilance in protecting its rights over a tremendously long period of time.

ISSUE: WON the ownership of the said lot by private respondent which is premised on a duly accepted donation, although unregistered prevail over the titled ownership of petitioner.

HELD: Yes.

A just, fair and complete resolution of the present case necessitates the consideration and the application of the doctrine of laches which is not the same as but is undoubtedly closely related to, the issue of prescription which was properly raised by private respondent before the respondent Court of Appeals. Laches means the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. It has also been defined

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as such neglect or omission to assert a right taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity.

The principle of laches is a creation of equity which, as such, is applied not really to penalize neglect or sleeping upon one's right, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable situation. As an equitable defense, laches does not concern itself with the character of the defendant's title, but only with whether or not by reason of the plaintiff's long in action or inexcusable neglect, he should be barred from asserting this claim at all, because to allow him to do so would be inequitable and unjust to the defendant.

The following are the essential elements of laches:

(1) Conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation complained of;

(2) Delay in asserting complainant's right after he had knowledge of the defendant's conduct and after he has an opportunity to sue;

(3) Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and 19

(4) Injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant.

Under the present circumstances, all of the aforegoing elements are attendant in this case.

On or some time before August 23, 1936, Rev. Fr. Mariano Sarili, the parish priest and administrator of the church property in the Municipality of Balanga, Bataan, executed a deed of donation over a 265-square meter church lot in favor of Ana de los Reyes and her heirs in recognition of her long and satisfactory service to the church of Balanga, Bataan. For some reason or another, the said deed was refused registration by the Register of Deeds. However, she accepted the donation, indicated such acceptance in the said deed, occupied the donated property, and exercised acts of ownership thereupon.

In 1945, the donee, Ana de los Reyes, died without issue. She had, however, given the subject property to her nephew who is the private respondent in the instant case. Upon acceptance of the gift, private respondent immediately took possession of the subject property in the concept of owner, built his house thereon, and thenceforth paid land taxes therefor after declaring the subject property for that purpose.

The act of petitioner-defendant that culminated in the filing of the present action is thus clearly his occupation since 1945 of the subject property in the concept of owner in continuation of the occupation of the same nature regarding the same property by the donee Ana de los Reyes starting in 1936. Undoubtedly, the first element of laches exists.

The second element also exists in this case. The second element is threetiered: (a) knowledge of defendant's action; (b) opportunity to sue defendant after obtaining such knowledge; and (c) delay in the filing of such suit. Petitioner, in his complaint filed in the trial court, alleged that without its consent, private respondent entered and occupied the subject property during the Second World War. By its own admission, therefore, petitioner was clearly aware of private respondent's possession of the subject property in the concept of owner. Petitioner did not also rebut the testimony of its own authorized representative and sole witness, one Crispulo Torrico, that the subject property was so proximately located to the rest of 20 petitioner's church property as to foreclose assertion of ignorance of private respondent's possession of the subject property, on the part of petitioner.

From that time during the Second World War to 1985 when petitioner actually commenced suit against private respondent, there was doubtlessly all the opportunity to file the appropriate action to have the donation of the

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subject property to Ana de los Reyes and her heirs, declared null and void and to demand reconveyance of said property from its present occupants.

Notwithstanding such opportunity available to petitioner, however, forty (40) years had to first pass by for petitioner to finally institute the appropriate court proceedings. As such, the second element of knowledge, opportunity to file suit, and delay in filing such suit, is undoubtedly present in the instant controversy.

The third element of laches is likewise present. There is nothing on the record that impresses us as clear evidence of at least an inkling on the part of private respondent as to petitioner's serious intention to revoke the donated property. There was neither a demand letter nor positive testimony of any person who actually informed private respondent of petitioner's intentions. In other words, private respondent manifestly had every reason to believe that, with the passing of almost half a century since his predecessor-ininterest accepted the donated property and without unambiguous intimation of petitioner's non-recognition of such donation, he was secure in his possession of the subject property in the concept of owner.

In the light of all the above, it goes without saying that private respondent will suffer irreparable injury under the most unfair circumstances, were we to disregard petitioner's inaction for more than forty (40) years in asserting its rights.

In this case, petitioner filed its complaint in court only after forty nine (49) years had lapsed since the donation in its behalf of the subject property to private respondent's predecessor-in-interest. There is nary an explanation for the long delay in the filing by petitioner of the complaint in the case at bench, and that inaction for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time constitutes laches. As such, petitioner cannot claim nullity of the donation as an excuse to avoid the consequences of its own unjustified inaction and as a basis for the assertion of a right on which they had slept 21 for so long. 50 Courts cannot look with favor at parties who, by their silence, delay and inaction, knowingly induce another to spend time, effort, and expense in cultivating the land, paying taxes and making improvements thereon for an unreasonable period only to spring an ambush and claim title when the possessor's efforts and the rise of land values offer an opportunity to make easy profit at their own expense. 51 Considerable delay in asserting one's right before a court of justice is strongly persuasive of the lack of merit of his claim, since it is human nature for a person to enforce his right when same is threatened or invaded; thus, it can also be said that petitioner is estopped by laches from questioning private respondent's ownership of the subject property. 52 At any rate, petitioner's right to recover the possession of the subject property from private respondent has, by the latter's long period of possession and by petitioner's inaction and neglect, been converted into a stale demand. Such passivity in the face of what might have given rise to an action in court is visited with the loss of such right, and ignorance resulting from inexcusable negligence does not suffice to explain such failure to file seasonably the necessary suit.

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G.R. No. 57092 January 21, 1993

EDGARDO DE JESUS, REMEDIOS DE JESUS, JUANITO DE JESUS, JULIANA DE JESUS, JOSE DE JESUS, FLORDELIZA DE JESUS, REYNALDO DE JESUS, ERNESTO DE JESUS, PRISCILO DE JESUS, CORAZON DE JESUS, petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and PRIMITIVA FELIPE DE JESUS, respondents. 

DOCTRINE: Under the present Civil Code, the prescriptive period required for acquisition of immovable property is ten years if the possession is in good faith, and thirty years if in bad faith

FACTS: The property in dispute is a parcel of residential land situated in Dampol 2nd, Pulilan, Bulacan, bounded on the North by a Vereda: on the South, by the Provincial Road; on the East, by Catalino Tayag (Tayao); on the West, by Macario de Leon, containing an area of 2565 square meters and covered by Tax Declaration in the name of Victoriano Felipe

Private respondent executed a sworn statement declaring herself the only heir of the deceased Victoriano Felipe and adjudicating to herself the ownership of the land in question.

More than twelve years later, petitioners herein filed in the Court of First Instance, an action for recovery of ownership and possession and quieting of title to the abovementioned piece of land covered by Tax Declaration, alleging among others: "that their grandfather, Santiago de Jesus during his lifetime owned the residential lot; that Santiago de Jesus died before the outbreak of World War II, leaving three (3) sons, namely: Mariano, Exequiel, and Jose, all surnamed de Jesus; that Mariano de Jesus died on September 3, 1956 leaving eight (8) surviving children, namely: Edgardo, Remedios, Juanita, Juliano, Jose, Flordeliza, Reynaldo, and Ernesto, all surnamed de Jesus and all of them plaintiffs; that Exequiel de Jesus died on April 3, 1948, survived by two (2) children — Priscilo and Corazon, both surnamed de Jesus, also plaintiffs in this case; while Jose de Jesus died before the outbreak of World War II without any issue.CFI found for the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals set aside the judgment of the trial court in a decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has the right to the ownership and possession of the residential lot. -- YES

HELD:Yes. The petitioner has the rigth to the ownership and possesion of the residential lot.

Private respondent's pretensions to acquisitive prescription may not succeed even under Act No. 190, the Code of Civil Procedure. Under Section 41 thereof, good faith and just title are not required for purposes of acquisitive prescription; adverse possession in either character ripens into ownership after the lapse of ten years. The just title required for acquisitive prescription to set in is not "titulo verdadero y valido" — such title which by itself is sufficient to transfer ownership without the necessity of letting the prescriptive period elapse, but only "titulocolorado" — or such title where, although there was a mode of transferring ownership, still something is wrong because the grantor is not the owner, and incidentally, it may perhaps be mentioned that prescription running even after the effectivity of the New Civil Code on August 30, 1950, continued to be governed by Section 41 of the Old Civil Code.

Under the present Civil Code, the prescriptive period required for acquisition of immovable property is ten

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years if the possession is in good faith, and thirty years if in bad faith. Such open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of the disputed property for thirty years must be conclusively established.

Reckoned from the time she executed the affidavit of adjudication in 1961, eleven years after the New Civil Code had taken effect, private respondent's possession of the contested lot is far too short of the prescriptive period of thirty years considering that her possession is in bad faith. The filing of the petition for recovery of ownership and possession and quieting of title by petitioners on April 27, 1973 was well below the acquisitive prescriptive period for private respondent, which is thirty years under Article 1141 of the present Civil Code. In this case, the statutory period of prescription is deemed to have commenced when petitioners were made aware of a claim adverse to them, that is, when the affidavit of adjudication was duly registered with the Registry of Deeds which, at the earliest may be considered to be in 1974, when private respondent was able to secure a tax declaration in her name.

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G.R. No. 26844           September 27, 1927

ISABEL FLORES, plaintiff-appellant, vs.TRINIDAD LIM, defendant-appellee.

Sumulong, Lavides and Hilado and DeWitt, Perkins and Brady for appellant.Vicente Sotto for appellee.

STATEMENT

January 20, 1923, plaintiffs land was sold at sheriff's sale to the defendant for P1,603.78, it is the barrio of Pinaninding, municipality of Laguimanoc — formerly Atimonan — Province of Tayabas, and is about seventy-three hectares, on which were 164 coconut bearing trees and 1,000 non-bearing and about 300 buri trees. The usual certificate of sale was issued to the defendant under the provisions of section 463 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Prior to the one year period of redemption, plaintiff made a formal demand upon the defendant, under the provisions of section 469 of the same Code, for an accounting of the fruits and profits derived by her from the land, so that the plaintiff might have credit for the amount received on the money required for redemption from the sale

The instant case is brought by the plaintiff to redeem, and it is alleged that at the time of the sale, the defendant took the actual, physical possession of the property, and has refused and still refuses to render an account of fruits, profits, to plaintiff's damage in the sum of P1,000 and she prays judgment that the defendant be ordered to render an itemized account, the amount of which should be deducted from the price of the redemption; that plaintiff have the right to redeem; and that defendant pay her P1,000 as damages and costs.

For answer the defendant makes a general and specific denial, and as a special defense alleges that her rights of ownership over the land arise rather from a purchase made from the Government which had confiscated the land for a delinquency in the payment of the land tax than from her acquisition of it at public auction. That the plaintiff has not repurchased the land within one year, and the offer to redeem was made out of time. Defendant consented to the redemption upon the condition only that the plaintiff should pay the purchase price of the land, P6,371.19, the value of the improvements, P217.07, the amount of the land tax, and alleges that plaintiff offered to pay only the sum of P2,500 and promising to pay that little by little, which offer the defendant rejected. That the action was brought for the purpose of delaying the matter, and to gain time in which to obtain the money to redeem. That the defendant has been improving the land up to the present date, and she prays that she be absolved from the complaint, and in the event redemption is allowed, that plaintiff be required to pay her the value of the improvements made on the land in question. As a reply plaintiff made a general and specific denial of all of the new matter alleged in the answer, and as a special defense, alleged that the defendant had no legal right to make such improvements, and that they were made without her knowledge, and that she is not liable for such improvements.

The evidence was taken upon such issues, and the trial court rendered judgment giving plaintiff the right to redeem the land upon the payment to the defendant within fifteen days from notice the following amounts: (a) The price of the land at the auction sale with legal interest thereon up to this date; (b) the amount of the land tax paid by the defendant with legal interest up to this date; and (c) the sum of P15,000 the value of the improvement made by the defendant on the land, and in case redemption is not made within that period, the right is lost, and relieved the defendant from rendering an account.

On appeal the plaintiff assigns the following errors:

ERROR NO. 1

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The trial court erred in sentencing plaintiff to reimburse defendant in the sum of P15,000 for improvements alleged to have been introduced by said defendant in the land in suit, although said improvements were placed thereon by defendant with manifest bad faith.

ERROR NO. 2

The trial court erred in not ordering defendant to account to plaintiff for fruits and benefits received by said defendant from the land, and credit plaintiff against the amount due for its redemption the value of said fruits and benefits.

ERROR NO. 3

The trial court erred in denying plaintiff's motion for new trial on the ground of fraud and newly discovered evidence, that excessive indemnity was granted, and that the decision was not justified by the evidence and that the same was against the law.

JOHNS, J.:

The lower court having found that the plaintiff has a legal right to redeem, and the defendant not having appealed from that portion of the decision, the only question before this court is the amount which the plaintiff should pay to redeem. The property was sold to the defendant at sheriff's sale under the provisions of Chapter XIX of the Code of Civil Procedure, section 461 of which provides:

When the purchaser of any personal property, capable of manual delivery, pays the purchase money, the officer making the sale must deliver to the purchaser the property, and if desired, execute and deliver to him a certificate of sale. Such sale conveys to the purchaser all the right which the debtor had in such property on the day the execution or attachment was levied.

Section 463, among other things, provides:

Upon a sale of real property, the purchaser shall be substituted, to, and acquire all the right, interest, title, and claim of the judgment debtor thereto, subject to the right of redemption as hereinafter provided. The officer must give to the purchaser a certificate of sale containing:

1. A particular description of the real property sold;

2. The price paid for each distinct lot or parcel;

3. The whole price by him paid;

4. The date when the right of redemption expires.

Construing that section, this court in Pabico vs. Ong Pauco, (43 Phil., 572), said:

The sheriff's action in placing the defendant as the purchaser at the execution sale, in possession of the land was absolutely without warrant of law, was null and void ab initio, and not merely voidable, and no special action for setting the proceedings aside are therefore required. In executing a judgment the duties of the sheriff are merely ministerial; he simply carries out the orders of the court. If the writ of execution or other order of the court does not command or direct him to deliver the possession of real property to a certain person, he has no authority whatever to do so and in undertaking to eject the party in possession and deliver

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such possession to some one else, he becomes a mere trespasser. In such case, the person to whom possession is delivered is also a trespasser and the fact that he has been aided by another trespasser can constitute no defense.

The act of going on the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is necessary.

If a trespasser enters upon land in open daylight, under the very eyes of the person already clothed with lawful possession, but without the consent of the latter, and there plants himself and excludes such prior possessor from the property, the action of forcible entry and detainer can unquestionable be maintained, even though no force implied from the mere acts of planting himself on the ground and excluding the other party.

Among other things, section 465 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:

The judgment debtor, or redemptioner , may redeem the property from the purchaser, at any time within twelve months after the sale, on paying the purchaser the amount of his purchase with one per cent per month interest thereon in addition, up to the time of redemption, together with the amount of any assessments or taxes which the purchaser may have paid thereon after purchase, and interest on such last-named amount at the same rate.

That is to say, the statute specifically provides that the redemptioner may redeem within twelve months after the sale by paying the purchaser the amount of his purchase, with interest thereon at one per cent per month from the date of the purchase to the time of redemption, together with the amount of any assessments or taxes which the purchaser may have paid after the purchase, with interest thereon at the same rate. The statute having specified what the redemptioner should pay to redeem it follows that she is not required to pay anything not specified in the statute.

The lower court found that immediately after the purchase, the defendant entered upon and took possession of the premises, and that at the time of the trial, she had planted 8,000 coconut trees on the land at an expense of P15,000, and that to redeem the property it was not only necessary for the plaintiff to pay the amounts specified in section 465 of the Code above quoted, but in addition thereto and in order to redeem the property, she must pay the defendant the further sum of P15,000, the cost and the value of the 8,000 coconut trees planted on the property by the defendant. That was error. It nullifies the plain and express provisions of the statute, and there is no legal principle upon which it can be sustained.

The record shows that immediately after the sale, the defendant took the actual, physical possession of the property and drove off the employees of the plaintiff.

A purchaser of real property at an ordinary execution sale is not entitled to possession at an ordinary execution rents and profits until after the period of redemption has expired and the legal title to the land had become vested in him.

The defendant had no legal right to possession of the land in question and, hence, she was a trespasser from the time she took possession during the whole period of redemption. Being such a trespasser, and under the provisions of section 465 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the defendant cannot recover from the plaintiff any money which she expended for the planting of the coconut trees.

It is claimed that after the sale the plaintiff had said that she would not redeem, and that the defendant expended the money relying upon that statement. The evidence of that nature was verbal and is more or less hearsay, and to say the least, it is not clear or convincing. We are dealing with real property, the title to which is passed by written conveyance, judicial sale, will or descent, and it would be very dangerous to hold that the right of redemption can be waived by parol testimony. Be that as it may, the evidence should be both clear and convincing and free from any doubt.

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Suffice it to say that upon that point, there is a failure of proof. It is possible that a case could arise where the purchaser at a sheriff's sale pending the period for redemption might be forced to make certain improvements for the preservation of the property, and in equity and good conscience, he would then be entitled to receive the reasonable cost of such improvements as a condition precedent to the right of redemption. But that is not this case, and is a matter wholly outside of the record. The alleged improperty, and were apparently made for the sole purpose or preventing redemption. Defendant's contention would nullify the express provisions of the statute, and would put it beyond the power of the judgment debtor to redeem any real property sold on execution. It is the policy of the law to aid rather than to defeat the right of redemption.

Under the provisions of section 469 of the Code Civil Procedure, the plaintiff made a demand upon the defendant for an accounting, and it was the legal duty of the defendant to comply with that demand. That section also provides that for the failure to comply with the demand, the redemptioner "may bring an action to compel an accounting and disclosure of such rents and profits, and until fifteen days from and after the final determination of such action, the right of redemption is extended to such redemptioner or debtor."

In legal effect, the lower court held that such a demand was made, and that by reason thereof, the period of redemption was extended. But found that "the defendant is not under obligation to render a detailed account of the products of the coconut and buri trees planted on the land." Technically speaking, the defendant should have been required to render an accounting, but under all the circumstances, and in view of the fact that no large amount is involved, we are not disposed to disturb that finding.

The judgment of the lower court, requiring the plaintiff to pay the defendant P15,000 as one of the conditions for the redemption of the property, is reversed, but the judgment as to the payment of "(a) the price of said land at the auction sale with the legal interest thereon up to this day;" and "(b) the amount of the land tax paid by the defendant with legal interest up to this date" is in all things and respects affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur

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G.R. No. 77976 November 24, 1988

MAXIMO GABRITO, ROGER LIBUT, CARMELITA UY, LIZA DE VERA, thru her Attorney-in-Fact, JESUS DE LOS SANTOS, petitioners, vs.THE HON. NINTH DIVISION, COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. NICIAS O. MENDOZA, Presiding Judge Branch 74, Regional Trial Court, Olongapo City, ET AL., respondents.

DOCTRINE: Pending final adjudication of ownership by the Bureau of Lands, the Court has jurisdiction to determine in the meantime the right of possession over the land.

FACTS:The spouses Roberto Tan and Benita Ching-Tan filed a complaint in the Municipal Trial Court against defendants Maximo Gabrito, et al., alleging that they are the possessors and legal owners of the property situated at No. 107 Gordon Ave., New Kalalake, Olongapo City as evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 4-2046. The defendants are leasing portions of this parcel of land, each paying the corresponding monthly rentals due thereon. The Tans found it fit for them to make said lot a residential house for them instead. They furnished requests to Gabrito and others stating their reasons and three months later they (Gabrito, et al.) were still being stubborn in keeping with the operations of their commercial spaces. On November 22, 1985, the Municipal Trial Court ruled and the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for all the defendants to vacate the parcel of land described in par. 3 of the complaint, removing therefrom the buildings and any other improvements respectively owned by them; and to pay plaintiffs the following as reasonable compensation for the use of the premises:Maximo Gabrito-aT P250.00 per month from April 1984 until he vacates the premises;Roger Libut-at P150.00 per month from May 1984 until he vacates the premises;Liza de Vera-at P150.00 per month from April 1984, until she vacates the premises; Carmelita Uy-at Pl 70.00 per month from April 1984, until she vacates the premises. for all defendants to pay, in equal shares, damages by way of attorney's fees in the amount of ONE THOUSAND PESOS ( P1,000.00 ) as well as costs SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 35).

Gabrito, et al., found the findings contrary and elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court as well as the Court of Appeals, leading up to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:1. W/N an action for unlawful detainer is the proper action to oust petitioners from their occupation of the

land in dispute?2. Who has a better right to possess the land which definitely falls under the jurisdiction of the Municipal

Trial Court and which of the summary procedures may properly be applied?

HELD:In unlawful detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or termination of

his right thereto under any contract, express or implied. In such a case, prior physical possession is not required. Possession can also be acquired, not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one's will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right. Possession of land can be acquired upon the execution of the deed of sale thereof by its vendor. Actual or physical occupation is not always necessary. Although, there is still a dispute between the Bureau of Lands and the courts, unlawful detainer is still applicable and is indeed the correct action. Promulgated on March 28,

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1988, the Court clearly stated that "pending final adjudication of ownership by the Bureau of Lands, the Court has jurisdiction to determine in the meantime the right of possession over the land." Corollary thereto, the power to order the sheriff to remove improvements and turn over the possession of the land to the party adjudged entitled thereto, belongs only to the courts of justice and not to the Bureau of Lands. In fact, the Bureau of Lands in its decision of June 7, 1987, admitted the jurisdiction of the courts to decide the case on the question of physical possession, although not on the question of ownership (Rollo, p. 179).

Under the circumstances, a careful study of the records failed to show any cogent reason to disturb the findings of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities and of the Regional Trial Court, both of Olongapo City, and finally of the Court of Appeals.WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the temporary restraining order is lifted. Costs against petitioners.SO ORDERED.

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Dizon v. Suntay47 SCRA 160

DOCTRINE: The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person in possession of the same. If the possessor of a movable lost of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has/acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefore. The only exception the law allows is when there is acquisition in good faith of the possessor at a public sale, in which case the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price.

FACTS:Plaintiff is the owner of a three-carat diamond ring valued at P5,500 and entered into a transaction with Clarita R. Sison. The plaintiff’s ring was delivered to Clarita R. Sison for sale on commission.

Upon receiving the ring, Clarita R. Sison executed and delivered to the plaintiff the receipt. After the lapse of a considerable time without Clarita R. Sison having returned to the plaintiff the latter’s ring, the plaintiff made demands on Clarita R. Sison for the return of her ring but the latter could not comply with the demands. Three days after the ring above-mentioned was received by Clarita R. Sison, the ring was pledged by Melia Sison, niece of the husand ofClarita R. Sison, evidently in connivance with the latter, with the defendant’s pawnshop for P2,600. This was done without the knowledge of the plaintiff.

The plaintiff insistently demanded from Clarita R. Sison the return of her ring, the latter finally delivered to the former the pawnshop ticket, which is the receipt of the pledge with the defendant’s pawnshop of the plaintiff’s ring. When the plaintiff found out that Clarita R. Sison pledged, she took steps to file a case of Estafa against the latter with the fiscal’s office. Subsequently thereafter, the plaintiff, wrote a letter to the defendant asking for the delivery to the plaintiff of her ring pledged with defendant’s pawnshop.

Since the defendant refused to return the ring, the plaintiff filed the present action with the CFI for the recovery of said ring. The plaintiff asked for the provisional remedy writ of replevin by the delivery of the ring to her, upon her filing the requisite bond, pending the final determination of the action.

The lower court issued the writ of replevin prayed for by plaintiff and the latter was able to take possession of the ring during the pendency of the action upon her filing the requisite bond. The lower court rendered judgment declaring that Suntay had the right to the possession of the ring in question.

Petitioner Dizon, as defendant, sought to have the judgment reversed by the CA, which ruled in favor of Suntay.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Suntay had the right to the possession of the ring. -- YES

HELD:Yes. The Supreme Court held that Suntay had the right to the possession of the ring.

The controlling provision is Article 559 of the Civil Code.

It reads thus: The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person in possession of the same. If the possessor of a movable lost of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived,

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has/acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefore. The only exception the law allows is when there is acquisition in good faith of the possessor at a public sale, in which casethe owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price

Adlawan v. AdlawanG.R. No. 161916

DOCTRINE: A co-owner by virtue of Art. 487 is allowed to bring an action without necessity of including all the co-owners as plaintiffs for it is presumed to be for the benefit of all BUT if the action of the plaintiff alone, the action should be dismissed. (batasnatin)

FACTS:The instant ejectment suit stemmed from the parties’ dispute over Lot 7226 and the house built thereon, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 8842, registered in the name of the late Dominador Adlawan and located in Cebu. Petitioner averred that he is an acknowledged illegitimate son and the sole heir of Dominador. In ruling for the petitioner, the RTC held that the questioned January 31, 1962 deed of sale validly transferred title to Dominador and that petitioner is his acknowledged illegitimate son who inherited ownership of the questioned lot. The petitioner further claims that he allowed the respondents to occupy the property out of respect and generosity to respondents who are the siblings of his father who stayed on the questioned property since birth, provided they would vacate the same should his need for the property arise. When the petitioner verbally requested respondents to vacate the house and lot, but they refused and filed instead an action for quieting of title with the RTC.

The respondents argued that even if petitioner is indeed Dominador’s acknowledged illegitimate son, his right to succeed is doubtful because Dominador was survived by his wife, Graciana. This means that the petitioner is not the sole owner of Lot 7226. This is so because Dominador was survived not only by petitioner but also by his legal wife, Graciana, who died 10 years after the demise of Dominador on May 28, 1987. By intestate succession, Graciana and petitioner became co-owners of Lot 7226.

ISSUE:Whether or not petitioner can validly maintain the instant case for ejectment against his co-owners of lot 7226. -- NO

HELD:No. The ejectment suit will not prosper as the petitioner filed it for his benefit alone and not for the benefits of the rest of co owners.

ART. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.

This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession. Article 487 includes forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de reivindicacion). A co-owner may bring such an action without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have been filed to benefit his co-owners. It should be stressed, however, that where the suit is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession of the litigated property, the action should be dismissed.

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