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IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
Proliferation Resistance Fundamentals for
Innovative Nuclear Energy Systems
James Sprinkle IAEA SGCP
IAEA 31 July 2012
Content
I. Introduction II. Structure of the INPRO Area of PR III. Scope of the INPRO Area of PR IV. Conclusion
2
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3 I. Introduction
• Not considering non-proliferation early on could become an impediment.
• There is no proliferation resistance in an NES without international nuclear material safeguards.
• Don’t assume somebody else has taken care of it. Especially for innovative systems.
• When taken into account, the costs and schedule impact of safeguards are almost negligible for known NPP.
IAEA 31 July 2012
Sustainable NES
Economics Safety (Reactor)
Safety (Fuel Cycle)
Environment Waste Management
Proliferation Resistance
Infrastructure Physical protection
I. Introduction 4
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Definition of PR Terms Proliferation Resistance (PR): “Characteristic of a nuclear system that impedes diversion or undeclared production of nuclear material, or misuse of technology, by States in order to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”.
(Meeting in Como, Italy, December 2002)
I. Introduction 5
IAEA STR-332
IAEA 31 July 2012 WS NESA, Kazakhstan 2011
Definition of PR Terms • Degree of Proliferation Resistance: “Combination of, inter alia, technical
design features, operational modalities, institutional arrangements and safeguards measures”
• Extrinsic PR Measures: “Results from States’ decisions and undertakings related to nuclear energy systems
• Intrinsic PR Features: “Results from the technical design of nuclear energy systems, including those that facilitate the implementation of extrinsic measures”.
• Fundamental of PR: “Extrinsic proliferation resistance measures, such as control and verification measures, will remain essential, whatever the level of effectiveness of intrinsic features”.
• - (Como II, IAEA STR-332, December 2002)
I. Introduction 6
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IAEA Safeguards Objective: “Timely detection of diversion of
significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection”.
(IAEA INFCIRC/153 (corrected)
I. Introduction 7
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Four IAEA Safeguards tools and measures: 1. Nuclear material (NM) accountancy:
• State system of accounting and control of NM. • Accountancy verification.
2. Containment and surveillance (C/S): • e.g., seals on containers, TV.
3. Inspection / infield verification: • Including Design Information Verification by IAEA
inspectors.
4. Evaluation of information.
I. Introduction 8
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Design Information Verification (DIV): 1. Design Information Examination (DIE).
2. Comprehensive design verification during construction, commissioning. • Use Containment/Surveillance or existing Safeguards
equipment to maintain Continuity of Knowledge.
3. After start-up periodic (re) verification of design.
I. Introduction 9
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10 I. Introduction
• “The verification role of the IAEA will
not change, nuclear material accountancy will remain a safeguards method of fundamental importance”
• What is the State-Level Approach of the IAEA?
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Safeguards effort (frequency of inspections) influenced by:
• Material category: 1. Un-irradiated direct use material (UDU):
Pu, HEU (>20% U-235), U-233
2. Irradiated direct use material (IDU), and
3. Indirect use material: U-nat (NU), U-dep (DU), LEU (<20% U-235), Th.
Timely detection goals and significant quantity: • Example: for plutonium and U-233: 1 month and 8 kg
I. Introduction 11
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12
Safeguards effort influenced by: • Attractiveness of nuclear technology:
• Enrichment, reprocessing direct use material.
• Complexity of nuclear technology: • More complex more potential diversion.
• “Safeguardability” of design: • Design features/ measures to implement safeguards
more effectively and efficiently (Safeguards by design).
I. Introduction
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INPRO Methodology for assessment of Proliferation Resistance: • Basis: Korean case studies on DUPIC.
• Focus: Potential use of NES for a nuclear weapons program in a given State.
• Scope: Complete NES in a State or region throughout the full life cycle.
• Documentation: Volume 5 of IAEA-TECDOC-1575.
I. Introduction 13
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INPRO Methodology for assessment of PR: • Methodology to be performed at 3 levels, i.e. the State, the
nuclear energy system, and the facility level.
• Asks Safeguards experts whether Safeguards goals can be met effectively and efficiently, i.e.
• Can weak intrinsic PR parameters found in the analysis be compensated by other intrinsic features or extrinsic measures (higher effort in Safeguards)?
• Are Safeguards implementation costs affordable for international safeguards authorities and the operators?
• And, ultimately, asks Safeguards experts: • Is the NES unattractive for a nuclear weapons program?
I. Introduction 14
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Content
I. Introduction II. Structure of the Area of PR III. Scope of the Area of PR IV. Conclusion
15
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16 II. Structure of the Area of PR BP
UR1
CR1.1
CR1.2
UR2
CR2.1
CR2.2
CR2.3
CR2.4
UR3
CR3.1
CR3.2
CR3.3
CR3.4
CR3.5
CR3.6
UR4
CR4.1
CR4.2
UR5
CR5.1
CR5.2
CR5.3
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18
INPRO has defined one Basic Principle for the area of PR: “PR intrinsic features and extrinsic measures shall be implemented throughout the full life cycle for INSs to help ensure that INSs will continue to be an unattractive means to acquire fissile material for a nuclear weapons program. Both intrinsic features and extrinsic measures are essential, and neither shall be considered sufficient by itself”.
II. Structure of the Area of PR
IAEA 31 July 2012
II. Structure of the Area of PR
• Five User Requirements (UR):
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1. State commitments (legal framework).
2. Low attractiveness of NM and technology.
3. High difficulty and detectability of diversion.
4. Multiple barriers. 5. Optimization of design
(costs).
• Seventeen Criteria covering all aspects of those five URs.
IAEA 31 July 2012
Content
I. Introduction II. Structure of the Area of PR III. Scope of the INPRO Area of PR IV. Conclusion
20
IAEA 31 July 2012
III. Scope of the area of PR
State commitments (legal framework):
• Standards in non proliferation regime: • National atomic law: Statutes, Atomic Energy Act • Treaties: Non-proliferation Treaty, Bangkok treaty • Agreements: Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement,
Additional Protocol, etc. • Regulatory body & Regulations: State System of
Accounting and Control (SSAC)
• National legal frame work to be established meeting international standards.
• Corresponding national institutions to be established.
21
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22 III. Scope of the area of PR
Level Embarking State
Technically Advanced State
Innovative Technology Developer
State NPT … AP in force?
Same … Same …
Energy System (Fuel Cycle)
Is the NPP proven technology?
What other technology/facilities are in the State?
PR/PP assessment of new technology?
Facility Is there a known safeguards approach?
Same … Are new safeguards measures necessary?
IAEA 31 July 2012
III. Scope of the area of PR
Multiple Barriers: • Coverage of all credible acquisition paths. • Robustness of proliferation resistance barriers and
measures. • Defence in depth.
Optimization of design: • Inclusion of PR in the design and engineering phase. • Verification approach agreed with authorities. • Optimize cost of proliferation resistance features and
measures.
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Content
I. Introduction II. Structure of the Area of PR III. Scope of the Area of PR IV. Conclusion
28
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29 IV. Conclusion
• INPRO Methodology covers all aspects of PR: • Legal and institutional framework. • Design of nuclear facilities - Safeguards by
design and Safeguardability. • Complete nuclear energy system. • Cost of implementation of PR features.
• Assessment of PR of a nuclear energy system using the INPRO Methodology needs input from PR analyses.
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IV. Conclusion
• International Safeguards:
Essential for the proliferation resistance of a nuclear energy system (NES).
• Design features helping to implement international Safeguards: If implemented at very early design stages improvement of proliferation resistance of NES.
30