What’s the Point of Independent

Inspection Systems? Lessons from

Western Australia

Neil Morgan

Inspector of Custodial Services, WA

[ Neil.Morgan@oics.wa.gov.au ]

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Aims of Paper

• Role of Office of Inspector of Custodial Services (OICS)

• Case Studies: – Banksia Hill Juvenile Detention Centre

– Acacia Prison

– [Note an underpinning theme. Expanding capacity in existing facilities: how to manage (or not to manage) projects, impacts & risks]

• Conclusion

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Office of the Inspector of Custodial

Services (OICS): history & features • Established in 2000 following government decision to establish a

privately operated prison (Acacia)

• Goals include transparency & accountability; improved standards,

efficiencies & outcomes

• Independence: Inspector is an Officer of Parliament, appointed by

the Governor, & reports to Parliament

• Legislation: Powers & functions prescribed by Inspector of

Custodial Services Act 2003

• Powers: include right of unfettered access to sites, people and

documents and penalties for hindrance or victimisation

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Reporting & relationships

• Generally, the Inspector must report to Parliament at least once every 3 years on sites & services

• The reports are published (www.oics.wa.gov.au) and generally take 6-7 months to become public

• Due process protections include: – Parties who are criticised have right to comment

– 30 day embargo period after report sent to Parliament

• Whilst the Inspector reports to Parliament, relationships with the Minister and the Department of Corrective Services (DCS) are also critical to resolving concerns and advancing issues

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Inspections: scope of jurisdiction

Jurisdiction (report at least once every three years)

No Jurisdiction

Prisons Community corrections

Juvenile detention centres Secure mental hospitals

Work camps Federal facilities

Prisoner transport Other ‘closed places’ such as secure facilities for children at risk or the mentally impaired

2% of police lockups 98% of police lockups Note: Parliamentary Committee recently recommended extending jurisdiction to all lockups (www.parliament.wa.gov.au/cdjsc)

Court custody & court security

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Audits and Reviews (new function after

Mr Ward’s death): examples

• Medical transport following surgery (2013)

– Triggered by media reports on 3 cases

– We found some media stories to be exaggerated but identified ways to reduce risk and improve services

• Flow of prisoners to minimum security (2013) – Examined new assessment and classification system

– Found a growing gap between the prison estate and prisoner security ratings and new system adversely impacting Aboriginal prisoners

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Audits and Reviews: further examples

• Funeral attendances by prisoners & detainees (2013) – DCS introduced policy changes to get a 50% saving

– New policy impact unkindly on Aboriginal prisoners

– Financial accountability: DCS unable to explain costs & savings

• ‘Roof ascents’ by prisoners and detainees (2012) – More frequent than expected

– Different motivations and behaviours of adults vs juveniles

– Far too frequent amongst juveniles and often carrying serious risks. Boredom, bad news and perceived unfair treatment were the main triggers and needed addressing

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Other Australian jurisdictions

• 2012: NSW enacted similar legislation to WA. Inaugural Inspector (Dr John Paget) commenced 1 October 2013

• Other jurisdictions rely on: – Internal Departmental reviews (rarely published)

– Reviews by bodies such as OCSR that lack functional independence & sit to one side of the administering Department (rarely published)

– Published ad hoc reviews by general accountability agencies (eg Ombudsman / Auditor General / Human Rights Commission)

– Reviews by external parties, usually in reaction to an incident/event (sometimes published)

• OICS is proactive and preventive not reactive or complaint/problem-driven; and public face has been essential to credibility

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Banksia Hill Detention Centre (BHDC)

• Until October 2012, WA had 2 Detention Centres (both Perth) – BHDC (male sentenced), capacity around 120

– Rangeview (male remands & females), capacity around 80

• Early 2009: Government announced Rangeview would become a prison for young adults and BHDC would become the ‘one stop shop’ for juveniles

• BHDC and Rangeview had rather different cultures

• Intended project completion date: late 2011

• Actual ‘amalgamation date’ October 2012

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OICS Directed Review into the 20

January 2013 Riot • 20 January 2013: Serious incident of mass disorder

• 21 January 2013: Minister directed me to review

• 24 January 2013: Terms of reference announced:

– Context of incident

– Contributing and causal factors

– Security infrastructure and practices

– Emergency management planning and responses

– Subsequent housing of detainees at Hakea Prison

– Staffing levels at BHDC & impact of incident on staff

• Significant benefits to government in being able to respond so quickly

OICS report and related publications

• Report released 7 August 2013 – Whilst triggered by a specific incident, it is a wide ranging review

– Recommendations for government, DCS head office and the site

• Report supported by six published Review Papers: – Physical Infrastructure

– Security

– Emergency Management

– Management, Staffing and Amalgamation

– Post-Incident Management

– Legal and Administrative Context

• On same day, Auditor General released a report on the management of the Banksia Hill expansion project from 2009-2012 (www.audit.wa.gov.au)

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Methodology • Additional external expertise (re operational practices; leadership;

management; design and infrastructure; HR and governance)

• Submissions, surveys, interviews & meetings

• Data and document analysis

• Electronic & digital information (CCTV, helicopter footage, radio traffic)

• Literature reviews, including previous reports such as the 2010 report of the Victorian Ombudsman into the Melbourne Youth Justice Precinct

• Provision of briefings and of draft report & review papers to DCS

• Inter-state visit (ACT, South Australia, Victoria, NSW, Queensland)

• Discussions with key stakeholders (government and non-government)

• Advice to Minister (only after the March 2013 election)

What happened?

• Late afternoon: three detainees went on a unit roof – an all too frequent event

• They moved around the site and then smashed a friend out of a high security cell using loose-laid pavers

• Once it became clear that cell windows were vulnerable to external attack, more detainees exited their cells (60 in all)

• Many others seriously damaged their cells internally or broke out of cells into common areas of the unit

• In total more than half the 210 detainees were actively involved to some degree

• Total duration: 4 hours

• Massive physical damage meant site largely unusable

Banksia Hill

What didn’t happen?

• The incident can fairly be called a ‘riot: the damage was unacceptable and affronting and many people were traumatised (staff and detainees).

• But what didn’t happen was very significant: – No targeting of violence to staff

– No attempt to escape

– No fires

– No evidence of detainee on detainee violence

– No evidence of gang violence

Damage caused

Key Findings

• BHDC was a tinderbox in January 2013 and had been very volatile over the preceding 12-18 months

• The precise events of 20 January were not predictable

• But a major security incident was entirely predictable, given: • The risks at BHDC itself; and

• The lessons to be learned from earlier prison riots

• DCS had not done enough to reduce/address the risk

• DCS had placed too much weight on handing over Rangeview (now Wandoo) to Serco and too little on the risks at BHDC

• The emergency response on the night was intelligent and pragmatic but prevention, planning & preparedness were poor.

What were the key risks?

• Escalation in serious incidents in 2011-12, including assaults on staff; roof ascents and ‘standoffs’; and a dangerous escape (August 2012)

• Poor leadership & management (of people and amalgamation)

• Lax security culture (dynamic, physical and process)

• Increasing staff/management disconnect and staff angst

• Staff shortages and absenteeism leading to lockdowns

• Overall: – The construction site issues and building delays compounded the

problems but did not create them;

– This was not just ‘one of those things that happens’ or a case of ‘bad kids getting worse’

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Examples of security weaknesses (i)

Examples of security weaknesses (ii)

‘But it’s easy to be wise after the event: as

Inspector, what had you been doing?’

• Frequent liaison with DCS and successive Ministers

• Issues such as lockdowns and detainee treatment raised in 2011 Inspection Report on BHDC and 2012 report on roof ascents

• April 2012, following an Inspector/Minister meeting: – DCS committed to nine risk mitigation strategies to Minister Redman

– It did not follow through on these commitments

• August 2012: – I recommended to Minister Cowper that amalgamation be deferred for an

absolute minimum of one month, with an immediate injection of major resources to reduce the risks

– The former DCS Commissioner advised that amalgamation would only proceed if he was satisfied it was safe

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Juveniles at Hakea Prison

• Most male detainees were taken to units at nearby Hakea Prison, and these were subsequently declared to be a Detention Centre (‘Hakea Juvenile Facility’).

• Separation from adults was barely adequate.

• Detainees endured long lockdowns, excessive strip-searches, excessive use of restraints and limited access to education and rehabilitation programs

• Inadequate records were kept of the regime (a situation strongly criticised by the Children’s Court)

• All detainees finally returned to BHDC in late October 2013

Hakea Juvenile Facility

Detainee risk management

So what’s happening to BHDC?

• In addition to repairing the damage,

significant ‘upgrades’ have taken place at

the site, including:

– Target hardening windows, doors etc

–Management fences; and

– Air-conditioning (at long last)

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Subsequent Target Hardening

35 recommendations: main themes

• Embed philosophy & sense of purpose

• Improve conditions and minimise lockdowns

• Get dynamic, physical and procedural security sharper and balanced

• Improve emergency management

• Review management structures at both head office and site

• Address staffing issues, including absenteeism, staffing levels and

performance

• Reduce use of restraints and strip searching

• Transition youth justice to a new Department

• Examine the option of contestability if performance does not improve

• Improve prevention and diversion and provide better regional options 27

Response to recommendations

• In effect, government has accepted all recommendations except the transitioning of youth justice out of corrective services. But a major restructure of DCS is in train, including: – A stronger youth justice focus

– Major corporate shake-up to reflect the new model for youth justice and drive performance across the whole Department

• And our ongoing monitoring continues: – Site visits and incident reviews

– Advice to Minister and new Commissioner

– Next report (tabling 16 December) is about the girls and young women at BHDC

– I will be conducting a full inspection of BHDC again in 2014

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Acacia Prison: key facts

• WA’s first private prison (commenced 2001)

• Operated by AIMS from 2001-2006 and Serco since then

• Serco’s contract was renewed 2011: next review/renewal due 2016

• Acacia’s the state’s largest prison (currently 1000, with some double-bunking of single cells)

• Medium security rating

• Disparate prisoner cohorts, including remote Aboriginal men and a large protection prisoner population

• In the midst of a massive expansion project to bring its population up to 1400 (do you remember when 400 was a big prison?!)

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Inspections and oversight of Acacia

• 5 OICS inspections: 2003, 2005, 2007, 2010 & 2013 (report due mid-2014)

• Next inspection legislatively required in late 2017 but it may be appropriate to bring this forward to 2015 to align with contract renewal in 2016

• Like all prisons, Acacia has some ups and downs over 12 years, but it is [almost] universally acknowledged to have ‘worked’ well over the years

• The key has been a strong triangulated accountability model. – Contractor to DCS contract management

– Contractor and DCS to OICS

– Serco Acacia to Serco corporate

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Benefits of inspections at Acacia

• Victorian Auditor General: Managing of Prison Accommodation using Public Private Partnerships (September 2011). – Cost $530,000 as a ‘one-off’ – Concluded that the Department of Justice was “not able to

demonstrate that it is receiving value-for-money in terms of the standard of prison accommodation services it is paying for.”

– “Nor is it able to demonstrate that it has taken adequate steps to assure that the prison accommodation assets [are being maintained] … in an appropriate condition.”]

• In WA: – More is known (and independently validated) – Performance, value for money and conditions are examined every

three years (or more frequently)

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Acacia expansion project: some

challenges • Location: inside perimeter of WA’s largest high security prison

• Size and extent – New units for 387 (some an expansion to existing units);

– Infrastructure and services upgrades

– Separation of building site from operating prison (a very long boundary combining buildings and temporary management fences)

• Number of parties involved, some with potentially different priorities / perspectives, including: – Treasury Department;

– Different sections of DCS;

– Serco (local and corporate);

– Doric (the builder);

– Sodexo (who have the maintenance contract for the existing prison).

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Conclusions: Why have Independent

Inspection Systems? • Improve transparency and accountability in closed places

• Give a voice to people who live or work in such places

• Identify strengths and good practices

• Identify risks (for administrators and Ministers)

• Redress public/media misconceptions (prisons are not either holiday camps or torture chambers)

• Independent advice to government and Parliament

• Contribute to strategic direction, setting of correctional priorities, and improved performance

• Proactive, ongoing not reactive and ad hoc

• Not expensive (OICS costs less than 0.35% of DCS budget)

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But there are limits

(Winston Churchill 1919) We must not forget that when every material improvement has been effected in

prisons, when the temperature has been rightly adjusted, when the proper food to

maintain health and strength has been given, when the doctors, chaplains and

prison visitors have come and gone, the convict stands deprived of everything

that a free man calls life. We must not forget that all these improvements, which

are sometimes salves to our consciences, do not change that position.

The mood and temper of the public in regard to the treatment of crime and

criminals is one of the most unfailing tests of the civilisation of any country. A calm

and dispassionate recognition of the rights of the accused against the state, and

even of convicted criminals against the state….mark and measure the stored-up

strength of a nation, and are the sign and proof of the living virtue in it.

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