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After the party’s over...
After the Party’s Over:
Ireland’s employment model and the
surprising survival of the welfare state
tasc lunchtime seminar
30 October 2014
James Wickham
Outline
The bubble labour market
Preconditions (‘Openings’)
Employment, debt, emigration and
welfare in the crisis
Conclusion
Goldrush labour markets
Definition of a bubble: Normal rules assumed to no longer apply (cf Patrick Honohan); ‘Boosterism’ (Belich, 2010)
Just as asset prices are assumed to rise indefinitely, employment growth is assumed to grow continuously
Boundless optimism: Everybody can win (or at least hope to win)
The business of the boom [bubble] is boom itself (Belich)
Casualisation of recruitment: ‘Hiring any one who shows up’
Bargain of convenience: mutual short-termism, mutual flexibility
De-institutionalisation: rules and regulations just get forgotten
De-territorialisation: employers face an apparently inexhaustible supply of labour
Quantitative expansion: little pressure for innovation
Boosterism
1920-29 1.7m settlers entered California...
‘Kill Pessimists, Bishop Advises’ Los Angeles newspaper headline, 1920s
(cited Belich, Replenishing the Earth: The settler revolution and the rise of
the Anglo-world, Oxford UP, 2009: 402)
And in Ireland...
People...‘cribbing and moaning...I don’t
know why people who engage in that
don’t commit suicide’ Bertie Ahern, July 2007.
Employment rates 1997-2008
Source: Employment in Europe 2009
50.0
55.0
60.0
65.0
70.0
75.0
80.0
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
EU27
Germany
France
Sweden
Denmark
Italy
Greece
Ireland
UK
Even at the top
of the boom
Ireland never
reached the
Lisbon
employment
target!
Crisis of a Role Model
“Today Ireland stands as a shining example of
the art of the possible in long-term economic
policy-making, and that is why I am in Dublin:
to listen and learn” (George Osborne, then
UK Shadow Chancellor, 23/02/2006)
Osborne highlighted Irish ‘world class’
education, global R&D because of low tax,
and 12.5% corporate tax rate
Gate Openers (1): FDI
Attracting FDI has been the leitmotiv of Irish economic policy since 1956
No longer low cost manufacturing (e.g. Barry, 2007) » Logistics, service, support, headquartering
» Dell moved production from Limerick to Poland in 2009, but employs 2.200 in support, sales and research
» Google EMEA headquarters in Dublin
» Almost entirely US-owned: electronics, software, pharmaceuticals, medical appliances
» Since 1980s almost entirely non-union
Incentives » Increasingly focused on tax rate rather than location, infrastructure,
education
Politics » Transformation of Irish-America: A dramatic example of elite diaspora
politics (cf. US Israeli lobbies) with access to US political and corporate elite
» Unspoken role of American Chamber of Commerce in Dublin: direct and indirect influence, increasing acceptance of ‘Boston not Berlin’
» Conflict with EU ‘partners’ pre-progammed
Gate openers (2): Financialisation of everyday life
‘Residential capitalism’ (Schwartz & Seabrooke, 2008)
2000 82% all Irish households owner-occupiers, one of highest in Europe, but c50% then debt free
THEN combined with extensive mortgage credit
House becomes an asset
‘We are the first in Europe to see property as an asset class. We use it as a substitute for pensions and now are buying overseas.’ Fay Davies, Director of international property at Jackson Stops & Staff, FT 29.10.03).
By 2008 Irish households highest rate of 2nd home ownership in Europe
Lite wealth
Widespread small property ownership
Links to development of retail financial services (loans, estate agents, car financing, insurance…)
No longer just consumption property
Pension ‘reform’
Share ownership (Eircom privatisation)
Fungible assets
Facilitate recommodification of pension, health, education
Life chances not just determined by occupation
Gate openers (3): Light touch banking regulation
The conventional economic argument: Euro-membership plus weak banking regulation generated credit boom
But this ignores:
Political commitment to ‘Anglo-Saxon’ financial system
Dublin ‘International Financial Services Centre’ as key element of growth strategy post 1980s crisis – light touch regulation as policy and explicit attraction
The context for » Emergence of new rogue banks and competitive bubble lending
to developers
» New business elite: A ‘golden circle’ of bankers, property developers and politicians
Gate openers (4): Social partnership
Tripartite national agreements » Starting 1987 Programme for National Recovery
» Widening membership, policy areas;
» Also workplace partnership (Roche & Geary, 2000); local partnership (Sabel, 1987)
Consequences » Seen as delivering higher employment, higher wages, low
income tax; no major shift towards state services (Teague & Donaghey, 2009); high social welfare benefits and low activation (Grubb et al, 2009): consolidated financialisation
» No extension union rights (unions excluded from FDI sector) and increasingly public sector producer lobby; consolidated FDI framework
Crash!
99,224
231,539
186,841
79,874
34,812
120,037
8,719 0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
New motors and new mortgages 1990-2012
Number of new cars registered
Number of new mortgages
Source: Revenue (car
registrations); Department
of Environment
Who’s loosing out?
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
Q4_07 Q2_08 Q4_08 Q2_09 Q4_09 Q2_10 Q4_10
Employment and Occupation 2007-2010
Managers, self-employed
Managers, employed
Professionals
Associate Prof/Technicians
Clerical
Craft
Pers./Protective Services
Sales
Operatives
Other
Derived from Muhlau (2012)
Job losses most amongst unskilled and craft building
workers
Household debt
‘In Ireland the level of mortgage lending
per capita increased 10-fold over the
period 1995–2008, the level of credit-
card debt per capita rose by just under
700 per cent (Central Bank, 2005,
2010) and the ratio of household debt to
disposable income rose by 270 per cent
between 1995 and 2008 (Oireachtas
Library & Research Service,2010).
Mortgage arrears
More than 12% all personal
mortgages now in serious arrears
Old and new credit squeezes
I see [possibly illegal]
moneylenders knocking
on people’s doors and
the other thing is I see
people with the [hire
purchase] catalogues, a
lot of people have got
into that lately
(Stakeholder, Tallaght)
I know quite a few
couples who bought the
one bedroom apartment
thinking that they would
do that for a couple of
years and then upgrade
and they are in such
negative equity...the
income is not as high
and they can’t even think
about having families
(Stakeholder, Stepaside
Emigration ‘like the Famine’?
In the Great Famine
1845-9 over 1 million
died and 1-2 million
emigrated.
Todays’ migrants
are educated and/or
skilled
The poor and
unskilled largely stay
Famine Memorial Dublin
Coming and going
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Immigration and Emigration 1987-2012
Net migration
Emigrants: All destinations
Immigrants: All origins
Who’s leaving
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Emigration and nationality 2006-2012
Other nationalities (7)
EU15 to EU27 states
EU15 excluding Irish and UK
UK (1)
Irish
Only from 2011 were most
emigrants Irish nationals
New places?
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Emigrant destinations 2006-2012
Rest of world
USA
EU12
EU15
UK
Declining unions?
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
% em
plo
yed
Trade Union Density 2004-2012
Male
Female
Total
End of partnership
Partnership institutions allowed to decay
» Unions just another pressure group (Culpepper &
Regan 2014)
Two rounds of public sector pay cuts
Unions concentrated in public sector
BUT:
» Tax increases and wage cuts largely ‘progressive’
» No redundancy agreements
» Benefit levels and minimum wage largely
maintained
HOWEVER cuts in services, rising poverty...
Welfare state survival
Pre-crash 2011
Gini 31.7 (2007) 31.1
At risk of poverty 18.5 (2005) 16.0
At risk of poverty before
transfers
50.7
Absolute deprivation 11.8 (2007) 24.5
• Initial tax changes and public sector salary cuts progressive
• Core cash benefits maintained (monetary welfare state)