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UNIVERSITY OF DAR ES SALAAM BUSINESS SCHOOL
AN ASSESSMENT OF CORRUPTION IN THE PROCUREMENT PROFESSION IN GOVERNMENT: CASE IN TANZANIA.
BY
BERNARD, HELLEN
REG. NO. 2009-06-00929
RESEARCH PROPOSAL SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL TO CARRY OUT RESEARCH FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTERS OR BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION.
Table of Contents
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND 3
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 4
2.O RESEARCH AIM 6
2.1 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES6
3.0 RESEARCH QUESTIONS………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………6
3.1 RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS .7
4.0 LITERATURE REVIEW
4.1 CONCEPTUAL LITERATURE…………………………………………………………………………………………………8
4.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK……………………………………………………………………………………………….10
4.3 EMPIRICAL LITERATURE……………………………………………………………………………………………………..12
5.0 METHODOLOGY……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….14
REFERENCES………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….17
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1.0. INTRODUCTION
1.1Background
The Tanzania Government has long realized the importance of public
procurement to the economic development of Tanzania and hence to the fulfillment
of key objectives within the national Poverty Reduction Strategy. To this effect,
Tanzania was one of the first countries in Sub-Saharan Africa to enact a law
modeled on the UNCITRAL model law. Since 1996, when the first country
procurement assessment report (CPAR) was carried out, the Government has been
working closely with the World Bank and other development partners to enhance the
economy and efficiency of its procurement system and to make it more transparent
and accountable.
The Government has long acknowledged that there is rampant corruption in
Tanzania and has been fighting hard to reduce it. It is estimated that at the national
level about 20 percent of the government expenditure on procurement is lost through
corruption, mainly through kick-backs and bogus investments that have to be written
off. Considering that public procurement accounts for about 70 percent of the entire
government expenditure budget, this translates to a loss of TShs 300 billion (USD
300 million) per year, enough to finance the combined annual recurrent budgets of
the ministries of health and education.
Clearly such a loss is economically unsustainable. Major losses occur in
construction and supply contracts, which are the major avenues for corruption,
particularly at the local government level. The need for enhancing the transparency
of the procurement system cannot therefore be overemphasized.
The Government of Tanzania is fully aware that its public procurement is still
weak and needs to be strengthened substantially to enable it to ensure that the
procurement laws and institutions become effective tools in the efficient and
transparent management of public funds.
Strategic management in the public sector begins by looking up toward politics -
the current expectations and aspirations of citizens and their representatives and the
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older political agreements formally enshrined in the legislation that defines public
managers' mandates for action. Corruption had been inculcated in the political culture of
most underdeveloped countries; while, it still elicits the criticism and opposition of the
public, it has nonetheless been accepted as a fact in the political life.
One of the primary areas of corruption is in the procurement process. Grounded
on the idea that, the bread and butter of politicians exists in this aspect, the
procurement process has been the locus and target of most politicians aiming to get a
slice of the cake. In third world countries, this part of the cake proves to be the life of
people. The foreign aid given by international organizations like the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund and the government revenue from taxes is easily lost once
the budget is distributed to departments and the “purchase” of equipments and
materials has begun. .
Earlier on we questioned the assumption or perception that corruption, especially
petty corruption is a function of low pay. In our review of theories of motivation we noted
that there is consensus among theorists on motivation on pay being a necessary, but
not sufficient condition for an employee to perform at a minimum level in an
organization. Where an employee has a perception that the level of compensation given
by the employer cannot and will not meet basic living/existence needs, and the
employee is not in a position to exit from the organization, he/she will adopt deviant
work behavior, which will include a number of income maintenance strategies, including
corruption to address the income shortfall.
1.2statement of the problem
The procurement process has been the locus of government corruption- unless
this can be addressed; the citizens of Tanzania will continue to suffer. It is necessary
that strategies and measures be introduced in the government procurement profession
to reduce the corruption in this process and in effect, corruption in the government.
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Procurement corruption is deeply rooted in the political culture and traces its
roots on the nature of governments. As long as the nature of government and politics
remains to be relatively immature, corruption in the procurement process will remain.
Thus, the need for strategies to hamper this occurrence arises.
A focus on newspaper reports, editorials and letters from readers in any of the
last ten years would make one conclude that this country has been eaten away by the
corruption scourge. Contrast the foregoing situation with what obtained between 1961,
as we became independent and the late 1970s. The decade following Tanzania’s
independence (1960-1970) did not manifest intense corruption. Where it took place it
tended to be restricted to low-level officials who demanded and received negligible
sums of money.
As the country expanded the public sector and public administration institutions
progressively decayed, entailing the rise of bureaucratic malfunctioning, opportunities
for rent-seeking behavior and asking and offering bribes started creeping in. In the
same period, the cost of living rose dramatically while public service pay remained static
or declined. Public officials became driven by a culture of survival and they
progressively adopted deviant behavior patterns discussed earlier in the paper,
including the use of corruption as an income maintenance strategy.
To address and control the trend of increased corruption, the Nyerere Government
enacted the leadership code as part of the Arusha Declaration which had been adopted
in 1967 and dedicated Tanzania to the pursuit of Ujamaa and Self Reliance as its
ideology.
While moral suasion through a socialist code of conduct was making its
contribution to the fight against corrupt tendencies, the country came to experience a
major economic crisis following the oil crisis and the after effects of the war with Idd
Amin in the late 1970s and early 1980s, with double digit inflation, major fiscal deficits
and negative economic growth. That situation saw the state lose its ability to pay public
servants a living wage. Official salaries, even at managerial and executive levels, fell
below subsistence needs, creating incentives to look for side incomes. As the state
controlled economy declined, an informal one arose to take its place. Smuggling
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became rampant. In the end, the harsh realities of scarcity and poverty overwhelmed
the dedication to socialist equality and corruption became embedded in Tanzania
society.
2.0 RESEARCH AIM
This study aims to propose measures and strategies that could resolve the issue
of government corruption in the procurement process.
2.1 research objectives
This research paper aims to:
1. Identify the different procurement corruptions in governments of Third
World countries
2. Determine the stages of the procurement process and discover where
corruption happens
3. Evaluate the nature of Third World Government and politics and the
corruption in procurement
4. Propose measures that can resolve the issue of corruption in the
procurement profession
3.0 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This study seeks to answer the following questions:
1. What are the indicators of procurement corruption and how
extensive is it among governments (Developed, developing and
Third World)
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2. What are the different corrupt practices in the process of
procurement?
3. Outlining the procurement process, what stage(s) does
corruption happen?
4. In relation to the nature of Third World Governments, what is
their relation and to what degree that these two variables
(corruption in procurements and government) affect each other?
5. What are the measures and strategies that governments have
employed to address this issue?
3.1 Research hypothesis
1. The nature of government and politics in a country is significantly
related to its corruption practices
2. The more accountable the government, the lesser the tendency of
corruption in the procurement process
3. Further, procurement corruption is directly related to the lack of
transparency in government purchases.
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4.0 LITERATURE REVIEW
4.1 Conceptual literature
CORRUPTION
Corruption is a very widespread phenomenon with most governments having a
least some. While corruption usually meets with disapproval, it may have some
redeeming features (Tullock, 1996). It may make possible smaller or no salary
payments to officials who, if carefully supervised, will still carry out their functions on a
fee-for-service basis (Tullock, 1996).
Transparency International (TI) has chosen a clear and focused definition of the
term: Corruption is operationally defined as the misuse of entrusted power for private
gain. TI further differentiates between "according to rule" corruption and "against the
rule" corruption. Facilitation payments, where a bribe is paid to receive preferential
treatment for something that the bribe receiver is required to do by law, constitute the
former. The latter, on the other hand, is a bribe paid to obtain services the bribe receiver
is prohibited from providing.
The cost of corruption
The cost of corruption is four-fold: political, economic, social, and environmental.
On the political front, corruption constitutes a major obstacle to democracy and the rule
of law. In a democratic system, offices and institutions lose their legitimacy when they
are misused for private advantage. Though this is harmful in the established
democracies, it is even more so in newly emerging ones. Accountable political
leadership cannot develop in a corrupt climate. Economically, corruption leads to the
depletion of national wealth. It is often responsible for the funneling of scarce public
resources to uneconomic high-profile projects, such as dams, power plants, pipelines
and refineries, at the expense of less spectacular but more necessary infrastructure
projects such as schools, hospitals and roads, or the supply of power and water to rural
areas. Furthermore, it hinders the development of fair market structures and distorts
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competition, thereby deterring investment. The effect of corruption on the social fabric of
society is the most damaging of all. It undermines people's trust in the political system,
in its institutions and its leadership. Frustration and general apathy among a
disillusioned public result in a weak civil society. That in turn clears the way for despots
as well as democratically elected yet unscrupulous leaders to turn national assets into
personal wealth. Demanding and paying bribes become the norm. Those unwilling to
comply often emigrate, leaving the country drained of its most able and most honest
citizens. Environmental degradation is yet another consequence of corrupt systems.
The lack of, or non-enforcement of, environmental regulations and legislation has
historically allowed the North to export its polluting industry to the South. At the same
time, careless exploitation of natural resources, from timber and minerals to elephants,
by both domestic and international agents has led to ravaged natural environments.
Environmentally devastating projects are given preference in funding, because they are
easy targets for siphoning off public money into private pockets.
PROCUREMENT
Procurement is the full process involved in acquiring required goods, services or
works. Procurement involves identifying the requirement of the purchasing authority,
building a list of minimum requirements, and then scoring any interested parties who
meet the minimum requirements, usually offering the highest score based on the most
economically advantageous bid, commonly known as "best value". Part of the
Procurement process is also to manage the contract once awarded, to ensure that the
successful suppliers, or suppliers, are providing a quality service.
Collaborative contracts are becoming more commonplace; where multiple public
bodies will combine their requirements and run a single Procurement process to meet
their merged requirements. Due to the higher volume of business promised by
collaborative contracts, suppliers will usually offer larger discounts. Collaborative
contracts are usually led by one public body, acting on behalf of the others. In addition
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to this, some Procurement Centers of Expertise set up and manage contracts on behalf
of public bodies, allowing all public bodies to use these collaborative contracts. Some
examples of these Centers of Expertise are OGC, Buying Solutions and Procurement
Scotland.
The stage of the Procurement cycle when suppliers are invited to submit bids is
known as the Tendering process. Usually, in addition to submitting their monetary bid,
suppliers are required to respond to a questionnaire which the public body has put
together with the intention of identifying and eliminating suppliers who are unable to
meet their basic requirements, thereby preventing their tender from being successful
regardless of whether they have the most economically advantageous bid.
4.2 Theoretical framework
The systematic study of political corruption encompasses matters of definition,
typology, cause, and consequence, linked by a common theoretical framework. A
substantial body of literature explores these issues, but many problems exist. The
countless definitions inadequately set out the fundamental normative and behavioral
dimensions of corruption and fail to incorporate the phenomenon into a broader
theoretical framework or to deal accurately with the question of private interests.
Typologies of corruption, though equally rife, also seem to lack clear theoretical
relevance. Existing explanations of corruption can be attacked for projecting confusing
and contradictory hypotheses, for being fragmentary, and for failing to differentiate
various types of corrupt behavior; those centering on the functions of corruption also
seem incomplete. Some, for instance, underscore the positive effects of corruption in
integrating ruling elite but fail to question whether corruption influences feelings of
legitimacy toward government or inspires destabilizing protests and mobilizations.
As a form of deviant political behavior, corruption is political conduct contrary to
political norms. This definition underscores both its normative and behavioral
components. The normative aspect of corruption centers on the evaluative standards or
rules that determine political propriety: the criteria used to judge the legitimacy or
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illegitimacy (i.e., the "corruptness") of a political act; the behavioral aspect corresponds
to observable actions (Morris, 1991). The norm provides the standard by which all acts
of government are to be interpreted and judged. Accordingly, any private usurpation of
that pertaining to the public domain, which negates this principle, invites condemnation.
An important issue that warrants attention concerns the role of personal gain or
interest. Including personal gain or what is tantamount to private interest in a definition
of corruption presents two major problems. First, it is generally held that all acts are a
function of personal gain; in formal theory, this is referred to as "rationality."
Consequently, all acts by government officials, whether corrupt or otherwise, are
thought to be motivated by a rational promotion of private interest. In other words, a non
corrupt act is promoted by personal interest just as is a corrupt act. Since personal
interest is an assumption of human behavior and a constant, it need not be included in a
definition
Strategic management in the public sector begins by looking up toward politics -
the current expectations and aspirations of citizens and their representatives and the
older political agreements formally enshrined in the legislation that defines public
managers' mandates for action. Politics, and the laws that politics produce, deserve this
pride of place for three key reasons. First, it is this realm that managers must search to
discover what purposes are deemed publicly valuable and can, therefore, be practically
and normatively sustained as the focus of their managerial efforts. It is in and through
politics that they can discover and help shapes their mandates for action. Second,
political institutions grant public managers the resources they need to accomplish their
operational purposes--including money and authority over their own organizations and
over those beyond their organizations who can contribute to the managers' purposes.
Third, it is to politics and law that public managers are both theoretically and practically
accountable; their performance is graded and their reputations made within this realm.
Procurement contracting often entails large monetary sums and involves widely
known or powerful people inside and outside government. Thus, this kind of corruption
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can be especially damaging to a country in terms of distorted incentives, undermined
public trust, and inequitable distribution of national budgets. This is particularly prevalent
in Third World countries where the political socialization of people seems to accept
corruption as a part of the political culture.
Among the principal types of procurement corruption includes: collusion in
bidding (leading to higher costs/prices for the city, payments for which may or may not
be shared with corrupt officials); kickbacks by firms to "fix" procurement competition;
and bribes to officials who regulate the winning contractor's behavior (which may permit
lowball bids with subsequent cost overruns and unnecessary changes in contract
specifications) (Klitgaard, MacLean, and Parris, 2000).
4.3 Empirical literature
Corruption is about economics, gaining power, maintaining power and
unfortunately to some, survival (Green, 2000). Generally, it's been my experience that
corruption usually involves bribery, kickbacks, gratuities and gifts to government
employees from individuals doing business or attempting to do business with the
government. A large percentage of corruption taking place within governments and
businesses worldwide rests within the procurement of goods and services.
The movement toward decentralization, accountability, and democratic forms of
government at the local level is gathering momentum (Klitgaard, MacLean, and Parris,
2000). In this context, the enormous costs of corruption are being explicitly recognized,
as is the urgent need to correct governmental malfeasance (Klitgaard, MacLean, and
Parris, 2000). Corruption is an entrenched symptom of misgovernance often reflected in
patronage, red tape, ineffective revenue-generating agencies, large scale bribery in
procurement, and failure to deliver services to city dwellers
When the government needs a good or service, the city government has the two
broad alternatives of making it or buying it: that is, the city can provide the good or
service itself, or procure it from the private sector (Klitgaard, MacLean, and Parris,
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2000). Corruption is one of the dimensions of this choice. Because contracting is "where
the money is", most government officials are tempted by the lure of procurement
services often at the expense of the public.
Recent developments and current trends are highlighting the role of accountants
in governance. Foremost among these are: the increasing concern with rising levels of
corruption, the renewal of interest in accountability and transparency as inoculations
against corruption; the new government focus on results, benchmarking and value-for-
money (the "new public management") and the corresponding thrust in the private
sector through business process reengineering, knowledge management and intranets
-- where accounting systems play a major role; decentralization and participation by
citizens and NGOs in public management are multiplying the needs for credible
accounting information; the privatization of utilities in several countries is increasing the
need for regulation, in which accountants have a major role in reducing information
asymmetry; the globalization of corporate finance has enhanced the need for global
standards of accounting and auditing; the Asian crisis has highlighted the weaknesses
in transparency, in financial sector regulation and in corporate governance generally in
a number of countries (Bennett, 2000).
There are several measures that could be done in order to reduce the incidence
of corruption. First, reducing the scope and role of personality politics. An increase in
public policy debates and other activities of government, opening the closed doors, and
permitting greater public scrutiny of official processes would clearly have such an
impact. Generally, the more public government affairs become, the less corrupt they
can be (Bennett, 2000).
Enhancing the autonomy of the state's subsystems would also reduce the
likelihood of corruption. This could be pursued, for instance, by creating an effective civil
service system or merit system or opening up grass-roots political involvement. Such
reforms would cripple the centralization of recruitment and thereby temper the loyalty
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patterns that currently prevail. Strengthening the autonomy and role of Congress or
democratizing corporate organizations would be steps in this direction (Bennett, 2000).
Strengthening social organizations would also impinge on corruption. This could
be done by reducing the tutelary role of the state and lessening the dependency of
social organizations on the state or by enhancing popular input into the organizations
themselves. Not only must businesses or union’s articulate demands on the
government, but such organizations must be structurally responsive to the demands of
their constituents. Tying the fate of leaders of social organizations to criteria internal to
the group rather than those determined by the state would greatly inhibit current
patterns of corruption (Bennett, 2000).
5.0 METHODOLOGY
This chapter will discuss the method of research to be used, the respondents of the
study, the sampling technique, the instrument to be used, the validation of the
instrument, the administration of the of the instrument and the statistical treatment of the
data that will be gathered.
Research Methodology and Techniques for data collection
This study will use the descriptive approach. This descriptive type of research
will utilize interview, observation and questionnaires in the study. To illustrate the
descriptive type of research, the researcher will be guided by Calmorin when he stated:
“Descriptive method of research is to gather information about the present existing
condition. The purpose of employing this method is to describe the nature of a situation
as exists at the time of the study and to explore the cause/s of particular phenomena.
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Proposed subject Population/Sample
The general population for this study will be composed of government officials and
personnel in the procurement process, randomly selected private companies who have
been involved in the bidding process and randomly selected citizens.
I will use a combination of cluster and random sampling. First, I will cluster the
respondents from the government, the private sector and the public sector. To make
the sampling easier for every specific cluster, I will seek the aid of any anti-corruption
non-government organization to facilitate the names and addresses of the respondents
or have them together in one place (i.e., in an organizational meeting) so that the
surveys can be given in one session. I will pick one hundred (100) respondents per
cluster for a total of three hundred (300) respondents.
Validation of the Instrument
For validation purposes, I will initially submit a survey questionnaire and after approval,
the survey will be given to five respondents from the government, private corporations
and the public sector. After the survey questionnaire will be answered, I will ask the
respondents for any suggestions or any necessary corrections to ensure further
improvement and validity of the instrument. I will again examine the content of the
survey questionnaire to find out the reliability of the instrument. I will exclude irrelevant
questions and will change words that would be deemed difficult by the respondents, too
much simpler terms.
Administration of the Instrument
The revised instrument will then be administered to the respondents of the study which
will be chosen through a combination of cluster and random sampling. I will exclude the
ten respondents who will be initially used for the validation of the instrument. I will also
tally, score and tabulate all the relevant data in the survey questionnaire.
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Statistical Treatment of Data
When the entire survey questionnaire will have been collected, the researcher will use
statistics to analyze all the data.
The statistical formulae to be used in the second and third part of the survey
questionnaire will be the following:
1. Percentage – to determine the magnitude of the responses to the
questionnaire.
2. Weighted Mean
3. I will use chi-square to relate the participation rate of the government employees,
companies and the public sector. I will be assisted by the SPSS in coming up with
the statistical analysis for this study.
Resource, Confidentiality and other consideration
The survey respondents and interviewees’ identities will be held confidential.
Only I will have the knowledge on their identities and utmost secrecy will be provided.
Further, personalities who do not want to be quoted in interviews will not be disclosed.
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REFERENCES.
1. Klitgaard, Robert, MacLean, Ronald and Parris, Lindsey, Corrupt Cities: A Practical
Guide to Cure and Prevention, Ics Press, 2000
2. Bennett, Anthony, “The Role of Accounting in Good Governance”, In Carter, Williiam,
Davies, Mark, El, Yassin and Ford, Kevin, Government Ethics and Law Enforcement:
Toward Global Guidelines, Praeger Publishers, 2000
3. Green, Vincent, “An Approach to Investigating Corruption in Government”, In Carter,
Williiam, Davies, Mark, El, Yassin and Ford, Kevin, Government Ethics and Law
Enforcement: Toward Global Guidelines, Praeger Publishers, 2000
4. Morris, Stephen, “A State-Society Approach to the Study of Corruption “, Corruption &
Politics in Contemporary Mexico, University of Alabama Press, 1991
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