FOOD SHORTAGE IN HAITI 97

insuffcicnt or, in the case of camel’s milk, difficult to deliver i n the quantities required. The importation of relevant foods is difficult and costly, and subject to probleni\ during transport and storage. Vitamin C is very unstablc, easily oxidized, destroyed by heat and sunlight, and soluble in water (Marks, 1968). The development of home gardens in the camps offers the best hope for a long- term solution, and such projects are being given priority, along with health education programs aimed at encour- aging the acceptance of non-traditional foods rich in vitamins.

Acknowledgements - The authors thank Drs. Adbi- Karim, Pierre Kohler, Pierre Harze, Alain Moren, Claire Janssens, Richard Steketee. Kedner Baptiste, and Daniel Weber tor their assistance in the field investigation. Dr. Bernard Fritzel for interpretation of the radiographs, members of the Department of Pediatrics, Mogadishu Faculty o f Medicine for the ward observations, Drs. Andrew and Lee Dean for their advice, and the Centers for Disease Control. Atlanta, Georgia, for their technical assistance and help wi th the manuscript. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the World Health Organization met all requests for assistance promptly. Ms. Peg Clement provided invaluable clerical and editorial assistance.

REFERENCES

Goldsmith G.A., Human requirements for vitamin C and its use in clinical medicine, Ann. NY Acad. Sci. 92, 230-245 (1 961 ).

Henderson-Smart D.J., Scurvey: A continuing paediatric problem, Med. J. Aust. 2,376-378 (1972).

Irwin M.I. , Hutchins B.K., A conspectus of research on vitamin C requirements of man, J. Nutr. 106, 824-825 (1 976).

Knoess K.H., The Camel: A meat and milk animal. F A 0 World Animal Review, NO. 22 (1 977).

Marks J., Vitamin losses in storage and preparation of food, in: The Vitamins in Health and Disease, pp. 158-164. J & A Churchill, London (1968).

Whelan. The rising incidence of scurvy in infants, Can. Med. ASWC. J. 78, 177-181 (1958).

Problems of J;H>d shortage assessment in Haiti, 1981

Charles Kelly

3225 Oliver Street N.W. Washington D.C. 20015 U.S.A.

INTRODUCTION

In this report, the circumstances surrounding the assessment of a threatened food shortage in Haiti in 1981 are reviewed. While the food situation in Haiti may be untypical, the basic problem of a physically isolated environment dependent on short seasonal precipitation for most of its food supply is common to most Islands of the Caribbean, Pacific and Indian Ocean. Certainly the problems encountered in using the four evaluation tech- niques - market price assessment, crop production assess- ment, climate impact assessment and nutrition assessment - were probably exacerbated by the difficult physical and institutional conditions in Haiti. Nevertheless, the problems and limitations (as well as the potential combined applicability) under the extreme conditions in Haiti provide an excellent indication of what can frustrate an attempt at food situation assessment.

From the experiences of Haiti in 1981, where only one of the four assessment methods was operational, it is apparent that planning for the evaluation process before the threat of the food shortage threat becomes too severe is critical to an effective, comprehensive evaluation. This planning should be integrated into the whole process whereby a food problem is identified, its effect defined and assistance, if required and available, is provided to the potential victims. In situations where, as in Haiti, food problems are a constant threat, the evaluation process should be an established programme to provide reports capable of adequate warning on a constant basis. As with other disaster warning systems, the food availability evaluation should be periodically reviewed and tested to ensure that the problems and capabilities remain within the limitations existing in a particular country.

In many of the poorer developing countries food supply is precarious for much of the population during normal times. When adverse political, economic or natural conditions occur, major segments of the population are

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98 FOOD SHORTAGE IN HAITI

threntened by potentially disastrous food shortages. Such tood related disasters as the Bengal famine of 1943 and the droughts o f the Sahel in the 1960's and 1970's typify situations where tood shortages, particularly those induced h y natural events. lead to problems of social disruption and increnscd morbidity and mortality. To reduce the impact of t i m i shortages, many developed countries participate in program nies to provide disaster food assistance, either through hi- or multi-lateral programmes.

'l'he effectiveness of disaster food assistance depends to a great extent on the assistance itself being available to the potential victim before a significant change in the existing h itman conditions (e.g., mortality/morbidity, migration, social disruption) occur. Where adequate food stocks are available within the country, this involves the movement of the food to the threatened location and the development of ;in effective distribution programme (no small feat in many areas).

Where food must be imported, famine prevention requires considerable lead-time to purchase and ship food ;IS \re11 as to organize and operate a distribution programme wliicli allows for the orderly and regular distribution of the assistance. To gain this time, an early evaluation is essential to provide a warning of the extent of the shortage, identify the areas which may require more or less assistance and pick out those population groups which may be the n i o s t affected by the actual or potential food shortages.

Intormation on food shortage gained after the onset of the crisis can, or course, assist in the response effort. None the less, the ultimate objective of preventing or significantly nii t igating the impact of the food shortage is not possible \vitliout information adequately in advance of the major impact .

FOOD PRODUCTION IN HAITI

'1.0 understand the limitations and conditions which dictate how the early assessment of food shortage can be made in Haiti, a summary of the existing food production systeni is necessary. In general the timetable and process of growing tood in Haiti is less complex than that found in the food-shortage-prone areas of south Asia but more complex than the system occuring in the Sahel. The insular and tiiountainous nature of Haiti (and several other Caribbean islands) fosters climatological conditions which result in \vide variations in typical crops and methods of cultivation between relatively small areas of the country. Throughout most o t Haiti there are two dry seasons (Summer and Wintcr) and two wet seasons (Spring and Fall). Tropical storms and cold fronts not infrequently result in significant precipitation during the dry season. On the other hand, principal crops differ by season, with corn the major Spring crop (March planting, June-August harvest) and millet the major crop in the Fall (October planting, December- February harvest). A wide variety of legumes, vegetables, tubers and fruit are also cultivated during the growing seasons as well as during the dry periods. With two rainy seasons most farmers attempt two plantings per year and interseasonal farming where possible. The cultivation of a particular crop at a specific location at a certain time is

dictated by elevation, local climate conditions and farming traditions. As a result, standard planting calendars are very difficult to compile and subject to considerable local variation.

The combined effects of low per capita farm productivity. limitations on farm size, disincentives for improved agricultural practices and a high population places a serious strain on available food supplies. Under current conditions, each seasons' harvest provides the main, and often only, source of: food for a large part of the population. External imports, either as development aid or from direct purchasc, have a limited impact on the food situation as they niake u p a relati,vely small part of the total supply (wheat, as grain and tlour, is imported in large volume for the production of' bread, a major staple in major and minor urban areas. Its impact on the overall food supply has been stated as both major and minor, and the whole matter is the subject of' considerable local debate).

The short period between harvest and planting i n Haiti, together with the high demand makes it extremely difticult to project food shortages 3 to 6 months in advance as is the case in the Sahel. In effect, the assessment ofa season's food supply prospect must be made no later than the middle of the current growing season to allow a minimum of 2 months which are required in Haiti for the acquisition and movement of additional food supplies to those areas which will be affected by shortages.

Recent food shortages in Haiti

In the past decade Haiti has suffered two major experiences of acute food shortage brought about I)? drought conditions in 1975 and 1977. On both occasions the U.S. Government and other major food donors, i n cooperation with the Government of Haiti and Non- Governmental Organizations (NGOs) made special pro- visions of food and other materials (seed, tools, fertilizer). I ti 1979, the aid community, with the support of the Government of Haiti, initiated a system to monitor rainfall. food production and food prices, in response to reports from rural areas that another drought-caused food shortage was developing. Although production in 1979 does appear to have been below normal (Fig. 11, conditions apparently did not warrant assistance beyond the normal food assistance programs. Reports in the Spring of 1980 indicated that this growing season was also suffering from poor rains, particularly in the southern parts of Haiti. Donors and NGOs monitored the situation, although less intensively than in 1979, with some expectation that additional external food assistance could be required.

The cumulative effect of these three poor harvests (Spring and Fall, 1979; Spring, 1980) was exacerbated by the passage of Hurricane Allen along the southern peninsula ot' Haiti in August, 1980. The hurricane winds were particular- ly damaging to plantains and other fruits (mangoes, oranges, avacadoes. breadfruit) which serve as normal inter- seasonal and fallback food sources. Damage to coffee, severe throughout Haiti, resulted in a decrease in the earning power of many farmers and a consequent decrease in their ability to purchase normal amounts of food in the market when food prices were on the increase.

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FOOD SHORTAGE IN HAITI 99

130 120 110 100 90 80

c

L 20 a" 10

-1 0

- 1915 u--n 1919 - 1980 - 1981 P 0

-20 -30 - -40-

-

1 1 1 1 1 1 J F M A M J J A S O N O

M o n t h s

Fig. 1. Monthly variation in the price of maize (data from a set of USAID reports and raw data of Service Fational de Commercialisation Agricole, Dept. de l'Agriculture, Haiti; no modifications have been made to the data for 1979. 1980 and 1981, e.g. correction for inflation). The percentage change is based on the preceeding December equalling zero.

The 1980 Fall growing season was also affected by poor rains, again especially in the South. Despite a major aid- financed program for the distribution of seeds, tools and fertilizer to small farmers, food production was below demand and market prices were near record levels (see Fig. I). Some ofthe impact of the poor harvest in 1980 and the effects of Hurricane Allen were mitigated by the distribution of food through special food assistance programs operated by NGOs and financed by donors. In genkral these programs were initiated in response to the effects of Hurricane Allen and were not seen as assistance in response to drought conditions.

Severe food shortage threat - Spring, 1981

By April, 1981, the outlook for the Spring growing season was not good. Food prices had remained high since the previous year and the seasonal rains were late or less than normal. Despite the USAID-financed special agricultural assistance programme, seed stocks were reported to be scarce and costly. The prospect of below-adequate production was indicated even with normal rains. Field reports indicated that farmers were taking extraordinary measures to acquire funds with which to buy seeds and food, including the selling of animals and of crops before maturity, migration to Port-au-Prince (and the U.S.), and increased crop theft.

The limited data available indicated that malnutrition levels had grown worse since the passage of Hurricane

Allen. The prospect of yet another poor harvest suggested the possibility that a widespread famine might develop in August or September if adequate food was not available on the market through a good harvest and/or importation.

The USAID Mission i i Haiti initiated discussions with the Governnient of Haiti and the NGOs for the continuation of the existing Hurricane Allen food relief programme if an evaluation of the food supply situation indicated that such assistance was required. The Government of Haiti responded positively and implemented a rapid nutrition assessment of children in the Southwest of Haiti, which reports had indicated to be the most severely threatened region. The survey, conducted by the Southern Regional Health Oftice, involved the screening of a randomly selected group of children aged 1 to 5 years by measurement of arm circumference. This survey indicated that there were high levels of malnutrition in the Southwest among the specially vulnerable infant population. On this basis, USAID/Haiti forwarded to Washington a request that the post-hurricane food assistance program be continued, at least until the extent and impact ofthe Spring harvest could be adequately evaluated with respect to the already tight food supply situation.

The response of USAID in Washington was that, whilst they agreed that the available information indicated that a food shortage in Haiti might be in the offing, it was necessary to demonstrate that the current and threatened deficit was significantly worse than that normally found in Haiti, before the provision of additional food assistance could be implemented under the heading of disaster relief. The results of the arm circumference assessment were accepted as an indication that malnutrition existed, but it was pointed out that these statistics did not indicate that conditions were any worse than normal. It was suggested that USAID/Haiti and the other concerned parties, should generate and forward information (preferably quantitative) on the food supply situation which would clearly demonstrate that conditions in Haiti were unusually bad and would provide an indication of the real scale of the problem.

The problems of assessment

I n discussing the USAID/ Washington response, USAID/ Haiti, with the Government and the NGOs discussed four possible methods of assessing the food supply:

1. Crop Production Assessment 2. Climate Impact Assessment 3. Market Price Assessment 4. Nutrition Assessment.

Each of these methods had been used in the past to evaluate drought conditions in Haiti, but none had been institution- alized as a regular food assessment capability. In the event, only one of these methods, nutrition assessment, was formally used in the Spring and Summer of 1981, but it is of interest to review also the difficulties attending the other types of assessment in Haiti, since similar constraints must operate in other countries as well.

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100 FOOD SHORTAGE IN HAITl

Crop production assessment. The pre-harvest of crop production is usually based on a sampling of crop ~~er to rmance at certain points during the growing season. 'l'his information is compared to equivalent da ta on past growing seasons where harvest information is also available and harvest projections for the current season are thus 111 ad e.

I I I Haiti this process is partially hampered by the considerable regional diversity of climates and soils. More importantly, quantitative production estimates are not generally made during the growing season, and reliance has to h e placed on casual, localized information from ;tgricultural agents. stated in terms of whether a seasons crop will be better or worse than previous seasons. C'oiiiparison of these general estimates with actual harvest tigures tor the previous season is hampered as production >tatistics are Iumped together by year rather than by season ai i t l ;ire not usually available for I2 to 18 months following a p;irticuIar year. In the case of the Spring 1981 season, pro(I trc.tioti data were not available until 1982, too late for II\U i n t he Fall ot'I9XI.

Climate impact assessmenl. As a result of the drought- iiiducctl li)od shortages in 1975 and 1977 Haiti was chosen ;is ;I test sitc for a USAID funded National Oceanic and Atiiiospheric Administration (NOAA) program aimed at the itlciititication o f potential food shortages through the use of rc-tiiotcly sensed satellite data on precipitation and crop qro\\~tl i , conihined with current and previous ground data ~vlicrc iivailable. Following tests in the Caribbean and the S;ilicl, thc system is currently producing regional cliniate- lwscd crop status estimates worldwide.

I he assessnients for the Spring, 1981 season indicated that conditions for growth in the south of Haiti were very poor a i i t l that similar conditions in the past had resulted i n \evcrc t i w l shortages. But the climate impact estimate did not indicate the scverity of the drought conditions i n qu;itititativc ternis or what amount of food would be recluircd to meet the forecast food shortage. The assessment W;I\ grectcd with sonic scepticism by USAID/Haiti and in Washington, e.g. local weather reports differed from the regional satellite-based cstiniates and reinforced the feeling t h a t the NOAA assessment was incorrect. In fact no local \\,eather inforniation, with the exception of some data from the international airport in Port au Prince, was used in the NOAA assessnient, a fact which continues to cast doubt on thc accuracy of the system. In both Haiti and Washington the question of whether the weather conditions and related crop situation reported by the NOAA programme actually represented a situation different from the recent past, and to what degree, could not be answered by the NOAA programme assessments. I n short, the climate impact assesstilent could not meet the standard set out by Washington to indicate whether additional food assistance was required.

Market price assessment. Based on the seasonal changes in crop prices it is possible to identify, through the market, conditions of deficit or excess production. This method,

- .

which draws on the farmers' and commercial agents' evaluation of the relation between food supply and dcniatid. has been used, with some success in various parts of llic world. I n Haiti, based on da ta for the period 1973 to February 1979, a comparative evaluation framework ti)r assessing the significance of price changes was developed by USAID/ Haiti. The framework was periodically updatetl until March, 1981 and used the drought years of 1975 and 1977 a,s models of typical food shortage price behaviour. A system of spot price da ta collection was also iriiplcnientcd i n 1979 to overcome the lack of consistent national market price data, which was usually disclosed 3 to 5 months a l ' t c r collection. The spot collection systeni, which was vcry informal, was discontinued after mid-1981 due to staft' changes in USAID. This discontinuance resulted i n thc inability of USAID/Haiti to evaluate what appeared t o he significant changes in food price behaviour during niid and late 1981. Thus i t was not possible to compare the price situation in Haiti during 1981 to the 1975 and 1977 drought periods about which considerable information was av;iil- able.

Nutrition ass,essment. A variety 01' methods and technique> are available for the assessment o f the nutritional status 01' ;I

population. In addition to the arni circunifercnce tilet hod referred to earlier, measurements of height, weight and blood chemical levels. age, socio-economic and cultural conditions have all been used to assess nutritional s t a t u s i n Haiti. A national study, conducted in 1978 hy the U.S. Center for Disease Control and the Government of Haiti. Department of Health, used these methods to produce ;I

comprehensive and exhaustive evaluation of nutrition i t i

Haiti. In view of criticism of the use of arm-circumfercnce

tiieasuretiient above, it was decided to use the opportiinit! of a USAID-funded rural health project to undertake it

repeat of the anthroponietric and socio-ccononiic clemetits of the 1978 survey. The survey was conducted by thc Southern Regional Health Office with funds provided hy the Ministry of Health. Beginning in June, 8 weeks was rcquircd to train the survey teams and collect materials. Actual lieltl observations began in mid-August and preliminary result\. based on 7 of 30 sites, were available in late Scptenibcr. Final results, based on data processed by the Center ti)r Disease Control and conipared with the 1978 data were available in late October.

The data indicated that there had probably heen no significant change in the long-term nutrition status of those surveyed (weight for age), but that a significant short-term (weight for height) worsening had occured. Whethcr th is was due to the climate-induced food deficit could no1 hc deduced from this survey, but the other ;iv;iilablc information supported such a conclusion.

Although, in fact, that survey did indicate that a worse than normal (1978) nutrition problem did exist in the south of Haiti during the course of July-September, t h i \ information was not available until the middle ot' thc succeeding growing season (Fall, 1981 1, By this time it was too late for use in addressing the potential problem which

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