Problems in Australian Foreign Policy: January- June 1996

Colin Brown

On 2 March 1996, the Liberal-National Party Coalition won a sweeping and widely predicted victory in the general elections. Prior to the election, the Labor Party Government had held seventy-nine seats in the House of Representatives, compared with sixty-six held by the Coalition; following the election, the Coalition had ninety-three seats and the Labor Party just fifty. John Howard replaced Paul Keating as Prime ‘Minister, and Alexander Downer took over from Gareth Evans as Foreign Minister.

The Coalition had released its foreign policy manifesto, A Confrdeent Australia, in Melbourne on 10 February 1996. The document painted a picture of a rather different approach to foreign affairs than the one espoused by the then Labor government It had little of the grand design or the global view which had been the hallmark of Evans’ term as Foreign Minister; it focused much more on bilateral than on multilateral issues.

But with one exception - albeit an important one - foreign policy did not play a prominent role in the election campaign. The exception was the Coalition’s attitudes towards Asia. Keating presented himself as if he were the first Australan political leader to be aware of the importance of Asia to Australia, and the one who shifted its orientation to Asia from Europe and the United States. He painted John Howard as yesterday’s man who, if chosen as the nation’s prime minister, would shift the country’s orientation back to Europe and the United States. According to Keating, Howard had no relationships with Asian leaders which were as close as those he enjoyed. For instance, he argued Resident Soeharto would not work with Howard. Moreover, the electorate was reminded, in 1988 Howard had expressed the view that there were too many Asian migrants to Australia, that their numbers were out of balance with those from Europe.

Howard and the Coalition reacted forcefully to these charges. A Confident Australia asserted that “Closer engagement with Asia will be our highest foreign policy priority ... The Coalition rejects the b b o r ] Government‘s opinion that only it has the capacity to make Australia ... well regarded in the Asia region’*.* It then rather spoiled the image of closeness to Asia it was (presumably) seeking to create by the way that it supported these points. At one place it stated: “Turning our faces to the East does not however mean tuning our backs on the West”.2 Apart from the clicha nature of the statement, for an Australian political party at the end of the twentieth century to refer to Asia as “the East”. and in a document purporting to show how important Asia was to Australia, reveals a mind-set which was rather outdated to say the least. Later on, the document argued that Australia had an important role to play as a “pivotal link between Europe, North America and East Asia“.3 Aside from the question of whether these regions want Australia to play this role, it is legitimate to ask on what basis it was assumed that Australia could play such a role. To argue that Australia’s capacity lay in “the intersection of our history and our geography - our historic links with Europe and our geographical proximity to, and economic interaction with, East Asia’*4 begs more questions than it answers.

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But the Coalition also asserted that it recognised the importance to Australia of Europe and the United States as well as Asia and accused Keating of paying insufficient attention to these relationships. Relations with Asia and the United States were not, it argued, mutually exclusive.

On immigration from Asia, Howard acknowledged that he had once urged a reduction in the number of Asian immigrants but declared f m l y that he had changed his opinion. Now, he said, he supported a completely non-discriminatory immigration policy. The Coalition’s Immigration Policy document itself declared:

The Coalition will continue its long-standing commitment to non discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnicity, nationality, gender or religion. Selection will be based on the case-bycase assessment of the individual‘s or family’s application^.^

There was little to indicate, though, that this issue of Asian migration to Australia would turn into the major problem for the government which it subsequently became.

Apart from this pair of related issues, though, foreign policy did not emerge as a major campaign issue. It is an interesting commenmy on the way in which the attitudes of Australian political leaders have developed in the past decade or so that Keating should make this charge of neglecting Asia, and secondly that Howard should choose to defend himself and the Coalition so vigorously against i t Clearly, both saw involvement with Asia as being a crucially important foreign policy - and perhaps national interest - issue to pursue.

Initial Steps

Not long after its election, the new government announced that it had been left a debt of $8 billion by the previous government, a debt which it argued it intended to repay within two years. In order to meet that objective, it set out to reduce substantially government expenditure. Almost every government department or authority, including the Depamnent of Foreign Affairs and Trade, had its budgetary allocation cut The Depamnent lost $125 million from its running costs, and substantial cuts b the foreign aid budget were threatened. The former Secretary of the Department, Michael Costello, a man seen as being close to Evans, was removed and replaced with Philip Flood, prior to the election Director General of the Office of National Assessments, and a former Ambassador to Jakarta. In line with commitments made during the election campaign, a decision was taken to table in Parliament all international treaties proposed for accession together with a National Interest Analysis. The proposed treaty would not be ratified unless “it could be sure it was in the national interest”.6 A parliamentary Committee on Treaties and a Treaties Council with federal and state representation were also to be set up.

But the initiatives which were perhaps of greatest immediate import concerned the new government‘s auitudes towards relations with Asia

Relations with Asia

At the beginning of April - a month after the election - in a speech to the Foreign Correspondents‘ Association in Sydney, Downer emphasised the government’s past and continuing commitment to the Asian r e g i ~ n . ~ Neither side of Australian politics, he argued, “owned” Asia; both had contributed to the development of relations between Australia and its region. This did not, however, mean that there were no differences

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between the ways the previous government had pursued its Asia policy, and the ways in which the new government would do so.

Bilateralism was clearly going to be the key to the government’s approach. Downer noted that “this Government will be placing greater emphasis on strengthening key bilateral relationships throughout the region”.8 He argued this point vigorously in various other forums, but perhaps nowhere more revealingly than in a speech he made in Canberra to launch the book Comparing Cultures in May. Here he engaged in a minor critique of Samuel Huntington’s much-debated “Clash of Cultures” thesis. Downer rejected this thesis, arguing that it:

ignores the fact that it is the state, rather than culture or civilisation, which confiues to be the primary locus of power and identification. It is the state that is the primary source of political power. Despite the influence of transnational corporations and international capital flows, it is the state that remains the primary economic unit. This realist approach sets the theoretical framework in and through which Australia approaches its engagement with Asia ... This is why this Government is so committed to restoring a proper focus on bilateral relations as the basis of its foreign policy.9

There was thus an ideological basis for the focus on bilateralism. Malaysia was singled out for special attention. The former Prime Minister, Paul

Keating, and the Malaysian Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir Mohamad, had crossed swords on a number of occasions. Downer, it would seem, held Keating more to blame than Mahathir. A Confident Australia had foreshadowed “a specific ministerial initiative to rebuild links with the senior levels of Malaysia’s Govemment”.1° Keating had ma& an official visit to Malaysia in January, and called upon Mahathir, but clearly this had not produced any significant change in the latter’s outlook on Australia As the leader writer in the Canberra Times noted, Keating’s “cap-in-hand visit” was not sufficient “to engender a degree of warmth from the intransigent (if not recalcitrant) Malaysian leader”. * 1

Only hours after taking office as prime minister, Howard sent the former Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Richard Woolcott, to Kuala Lumpur as his special envoy with the task of improving Australian relations with Malaysia He apparently succeeded.I2 On 25 March Downer met Mahathir in the transit lounge at Darwin airport while Mahathir was passing through AusValia on his way to New Zealand. Downer described the meeting as ‘‘warm and easy”; his spokesmen said tbat it was a “getting-to-know-you exercise”.l3 The prime minister was rather more effusive, saying that the meeting: “indicate[d] the importance my Government attaches to Australia’s relationship with Malaysia and the attention that Mr Downer intends to give to the enhancement of that relati~nship’’.’~ On his return from New Zealand, Mahathif met John Howard in Brisbane, a meeting

which was apparently marked by a good deal of warmth on the part of the Malaysian Prime Minister but marred - for those in attendance at least - because it was gate- crashed by demonstrators protesting against Malaysia’s treatment of the indigenous people of East Malaysia’s

It was not immediately obvious what concrete results were expected to flow from this well-publicised rapprochement. From Australia’s perspective, perhaps the major perceived policy implication of the tensions with Malaysia had been Kuala Lumpur’s promotion of the East Asian Economic Caucus @AEC) from which Australia was to be excluded, and its opposition to Australia‘s membership of the Asia Europe Meetings (ASEM). Mahathir appears to have given no indication that he intended to change Malaysia’s position on either of these matters. Indeed, it seems to have been Australia which gave way, the new government reportedly substantially watering-down its predecessor‘s opposition to the

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EAEC.16 On the commercial front, Mahathir gave no more than formal assurances that Transfield Defence Systems had a "good chance" of winning the long-sought contract to supply patrol craft to the Malaysian Navy.17 Neither Downer nor Howard raised the issue of the children of Jacqueline Gillespie who had been taken to MaIaysia by their Malaysian father in 1992. Both argued that it would have been inappropriate for them to have raised the issue, instead leaving it to officials from the Department to raise with their Malaysian counterparts.18

A second country singled out for attention, though at a much lower and less urgent level, was India. Until recently, India had not attracted much attention in Australia compared with, for instance, Indonesia. But starting the previous year, Australia had begun to try to get closer to India, amongst other things because the Indian economy was undergoing major structural change, which offered profitable opportunities for foreign investors - including those from Australia. l9 Howard acknowledged that the approach to India had been begun by Keating but, in his view, his own government had considerably strengthened that approach.

Australia's relations with China went through a period of considerable tension. This was ironic, given that the new government indicated on several occasions that it believed the former government had paid too littIe attention to bilateral relations with northeast Asia, of which China was a key member. Under Keating, in the last months of 1995 a number of problems had emerged in the Australia-China relationship, most notably the Chinese programme of nuclear testing. During the fmt few months of the Howard government, though, the relationship was put under additional strain.

Taiwan was the key to many of these problems. In March, in an apparent attempt to influence elections taking place in Taiwan, the PRC authorities began military exercises in the Taiwan Strait, which separates the island from the mainland. In response, the United States moved two aircraft carrier battle groups into the region. For the new Australian government, this development was the fmt foreign policy crisis it had to face. The first reaction by a government minister, made shortly before his swearing in, was by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade, Tim Fischer. He indicated that the degree of tension which had developed between China and Taiwan was a matter of concern to Australia. But then he added:

1 would say that there's one particular point about APEC; [it] is one of the few major organisations which China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, all three am members of, and that's one thing that I would put forward.2o

This statement produced a swift and critical response from former Foreign Minister, and now shadow Treasurer, Gareth Evans. With his trademark subtlety, Evans observed

It's just a fundamentally stupid misconception as to what APEC is all about ... It is terribly important that in climbing [the learning curve], the foot stays as far away from the mouth as possible because each one of these statements ... makes it clear that the new Government simply does not h o w what it is talking aboutt1

Any attempt to involve APEC in resolving the tension, Evans went on, would simply result in China's pulling out of APEC, to the detriment of the organisation, and of Australia. This may well have been the case. Yet Fischer's statement was clearly not intended to be a formal statement of government policy, indeed, he bad gone on to note that Downer had formal responsibility for the issue. In his defence Fischer could point to a speech made by Paul Keating the previous September, in which he alluded to the political and security dimensions of APEC, in addition to the economic ones.=

The government's formal reaction to these developments came shortly after Fischer's remarks, and less than twenty-four hours after the government had been sworn in to

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office. The Chinese Ambassador to Australia, Hua Junduo, was called in to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade to hear of Australia’s concern at the tensions which bad emerged in the Taiwan Strait region.” Downer subsequently indicated that Australia welcomed the American decision to send the aircraft carrier battle groups to the region.24 China did not appreciate the Australian position and the Chinese Ambassador warned Australia that his country considered the Taiwan question to be an internal one: “Should Taiwan go independent or any foreign power meddle in [sic] and interfere the Chinese Government will certainly not sit idly by”.25

Other problems related to Taiwan included a planned visit to Brisbane by the mayor of Taipei, the capital of Taiwan, to attend a conference of Asia-Pacific mayors. Downer indicated that he would have no problems with issuing a visa for the proposed visit26 In June, the Chinese Embassy in Canberra made a rather clumsy attempt to have tourist operators in Australia remove Taiwanese flags from their premises on the grounds that visitors from China were offended by the sight of such flags.

Another problem area was Tibet. Downer made it clear that, when the Dalai Lama visited Australia in September, he and other senior members of the government would be prepared to meet him “subject of course to mutual availability”.Z7 This, he argued, was notwithstanding the fact that the Coalition, like its predecessors since 1972, implicitly recognised Tibet as a part of the People’s Republic of China. The Dalai Lama, though, was recognised as “a spiritual and cultural leader, a figure of very great international significance”?8 Downer concluded his statement by acknowledging that

the Chinese ambassador has made a public request that a member of the Australian government does not meet the Dalai Lama But, at the end of the day. we make the judgments about the people we meet here in Australia; ambassadors do not make those judgments for us.29

The leader writer of the Sydney Morning Herald agreed: “for Mr Downer to have acted differently would have been an outrageous surrender to the Chinese Government’s bullying”?0

In early June, China tested another nuclear device at Lop Nor. When rumours of an impending blast began to circulate a month earlier, a spokesman for Downer indicated the minster’s displeasure: “Australia’s opposition to nuclear testing is well known and very clear . . . The Govemment has made that clear to the Chinese on many 0ccasions.”3~ The acting Chinese Ambassador to Australia, Mr Zhao Xiangling, was called in to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade on Saturday within hours of the blast3’ The prime minister was strongly critical of the Chinese action, arguing that as the only remaining state still testing nuclear devices China had showed ‘’particular insensitivity” to world opinion.

It is particularly regrettable that China continues to test when the negotiations for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty [CTBT] are at a critical juncbe ... I urge China to end immediately its nuclear weapons testing program and affirm its unconditional support for a CTBT33

Finally, as will be noted below, the abolition of the Development Import Finance Facility @IFF) - and tbe way in which Downer handled the matter - caused a good deal of unhappiness in China. It seemed as if formal letters of protest and concern from Chinese officials were being ignored.

In all, then, relations with China suffered a series of setbacks which did not augur well for Howard‘s proclaimed intention to restore northeast Asia to the prominence on the Australian foreign policy agenda from which it had allegedly been deposed by the previous government.

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The relationship with Indonesia had been a particular hobby-horse of the previous government, with both Keating and Evans making major political and personal commitments to it. But in opposition during 1995, Downer had frequently been critical of the Keating Government’s attitudes to Indonesia Thus. for instance, he argued that Keating had been silent on human rights “derelictions” in Indonesia This silence, he said, “not only undoes the work of Australian officials and others but also gives a tacit imprimatur to practices which should be a focus for national concern at the highest level”.34 In govemment, Downer argued, the Coalition would increase aid to East Tmor, review training programmes for the Indonesian military in Australia and consider closer links between aid and human rights. Both Downer and Howard criticised the way in which the Australia-Indonesia agreement on maintaining security had been concluded. The result was that when the new government came to power, there were reservations in Jakarta about the implications for the Australia-Indonesia relationship. As the experienced correspondent in Jakarta for the Australian, Pafrick Waiters, noted

The Howard team is an unknown quantity in Jakarta, with neither the Prime Minister ... nor his foreign minister well-acquainted with Indonesia. It remains to be seen whether the enormous attention paid to Indonesia by Canbema will be continued by the Coalition.35

In government, though, on this issue as on many others, Downer showed that he was able to be as flexible as his predecessor. He quickly confirmed that the new government also saw Indonesia as being extremely important to Australia He visited Indonesia a couple of weeks after becoming foreign minister - his frrst overseas visit in this capacity - and emphasised his support for the Security Agreement between Indonesia and Australia signed in December 1995 by President Soeharto and Paul Keating. He reiterated that the Criticism he had levelled against the Treaty the previous December had been solely directed at the way in which it had been negotiated - in secrecy, with no parliamentary scrutiny. The Treaty itself, he indicated, had the full support of the new government

A greater policy tum-around was evident on Timor. In opposition, Downer had been persistently critical of Evans’ handling of the matter, alleging that he was insufficiently vigorous in pursuing the Indonesians. In government, though, Downer discovered that open denunciations of Indonesian policy were not productive. In his fmt visit to Jakarta, Downer had three meetings with his Indonesian counterpart, Ali Alatas, and another with President Suharto. Tmor was discussed in the fust Downer-Alatas meeting. Downer, however, downplayed its importance.

I don’t think that Australia would be contributing constructively to the process if we are in the game of excessive denunciation and what was once described by someone else as ‘megaphone diplomacy’ ... I don’t want this issue to be the issue that simply overwhelms the bilateral relationship with Indonesia36

There seems to have been no danger of that happening. An even more pressing Tmor-related issue was what became known as the Sherman

Report. In November 1995 Evans had commissioned Tom Sherman - former Director of the National Crime Authority - to investigate the deaths of six Australia-based journalists in east Tmor in 1975. Downer tabled Sherman’s report in June 1996.37 As Downer noted, the essence of the report was that:

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it is more likely than not that Gary Cunningham, Brian Peters, Malcolm Rennie. Greg Shackleton and Tony Stewart were killed at Balibo early in the morning of 16 October 1975, probably before 7 a.m.. by members of an attacking force under Indonesian officers consisting of Indonesian irregular troops and anti-Fretilin Thnorese; and, in circumstances of continuing fighting between the Fretilin and anti-Fretilin forces ... it is more likely than not that Roger East was summarily executed by an unidentified Indonesian soldier late in the morning of 8 December 1975 in the wharf area of DilL3*

Downer’s handling of the report was cautious and, in a diplomatic sense, proper. The report was sent to the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, with a request for Jakarta to pursue the lines of inquiry established by Sherman. As a leader writer for the Sydney Morning Herald noted, though, “it would be unrealistic to expect any real further enlightenment”.39 This proved to be the case. Alaras asserted that the report contained no new information, so there was no reason for Indonesia to take any new action. According to Downer, this meant that the affair was closed. Downer was strongly criticised in certain circles in Australia for this decision, but he stood by it, and refused to budge. Indeed, there was little else he could have done. He argued that the Australian Government had done all it could to facilitate Sherman’s inquiries, even to the point of allowing him unprecedented access to Defence Signals Directorate and Australian Secret Intelligence Service files covering the deaths. He was correct in pointing out that only investigations in Indonesia - which themselves could only be carried out by or with the concurrence of the Indonesian authorities - could hope to sheet home more specifically the responsibility for the deaths. Clearly Jakarta was not going to permit such investigations.

The appointment of a new Australian Ambassador to Indonesia was more difficult to resolve. The fmt official nominated was Miles Kupa, a senior Australian diplomat who had served in the Australian Embassy in Jakarta in the 1980s. Shortly after the nomination began to be discussed in the press, however, several groups in Indonesian expressed their reservations. The problem was that in 1988, in an internal - and thus officially secret - Foreign Affairs Department briefing, Kupa had discussed several politically sensitive matters, in particular concerning President Soeharb4 In the middle of June Aisyah Aminy, Chair of the First Committee of the Indonesian House of Representatives, expressed her opinion that Kupa should not be accepted as Australian Ambassador to Indonesia unless he was prepared to make a written apology for criticism he had previously launched against President Soeharto and his family.41

This development is, of course, reminiscent of the Mantiri Affair the previous year, when the proposed new Indonesian Ambassador to Australia. General Herman Mantiri, was pressured by certain groups in Australia to apologise for his remarks concerning the Dili Massacre of 1991. Eventually, Canberra withdrew Kupa’s nomination.

DIFF Scheme

In its Aid manifesto for the elections, the Coalition foreshadowed abolition of the Development Import Finance Facility @IFF), the function of which was to give subsidies to Ausvalian companies who undertook development projects in Asia. According to the Coalition, the DIFF scheme was to be abolished because it was too expensive and not very useful to the recipient countries. By abandoning the scheme, the Australian Government was able to save $124 million.42

Abolition of the DIFF drew strong criticism from various quarters in Australia The business people who had previously benefited from the programme naturally protested because they were no longer able to get subsidies for their projects.43 According to them,

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almost all aid donor countries had schemes similar to the DIFF: if the DIFF were to be abolished, this would mean that these companies would lose out on projects in Asia. In Parliament, the ALP was particularly critical. But what developed as the main line of attack on Downer was not the cancellation of the scheme itself - though this decision continued to be criticised -but rather the way in which Downer had handled the issue in Parliament. Opposition members had argued that cancellation of the scheme would ruin Ausualia’s relations with the countries which were in receipt of its aid. Downer rejected this criticism. On 18 June 1996, he told Parliamenr “Not one minister - be he a foreign minister or an economic development minister - has expressed any concern to me about the abolition of the DIFF program. Not one!”44 Downer repeated tbjs assertion a few days later. Unfortunately, what Downer said was later to prove to be incorrect. At the very least, Indonesian Ministers Ginanjar and Habibie had sent letters of protest to Canberra. Similar reactions were forthcoming from the Philippines and China. Clearly what Downer had told Patliament was not true. On 27 June 1996 he explained:

I sincerely regret that those remarks inadvertently misled the parliament. At no stage did I deliberately seek to misinform the House; I apologke for that inadvertence ...

I regret that this [matter] has not been handled more expeditiously. In this whole affair I have never intended at any time to do anything but fulfil my duty as a minister and to be open and honest with the HouseP5

Downer’s explanation for his actions might well have been correct. Nevertheless as the Australian correspondent for the leading Indonesian daily Kompas, Ratih Hardjono, noted, “to forget, or to treat lightly, the opinions and the concerns of two Indonesian ministers, the Deputy Rime Minister of China (and) President Marcos shows that Foreign Minister Downer does not regard these Asian countries as being of importance”.46

The opposition was not prepared to leave the matter there. On 24 June and again on 26 June, it moved censure motions against Downer for his actions. The motions were naturally lost on party lines, but they allowed the opposition - and Downer’s other critics - to highlight the difficulties he was apparently having in mastering his portfolio.

In the end, because of the pressm and criticisms he was receiving, both domestically and from overseas, Downer restored a part of the DIFF. The four countries most affected by its abolition were offered funds to support a number of high priority projects, which would otherwise have been supported through the DIFF scheme. Downer emphasised, however, this did not mean that the DIFF scheme was being revived. Naturally, some of his critics were not satisfied by this response.47

Security Issues

The Howard Government generally paid more attention to defence and security matters th‘m had its predecessor. The Coalition Defence manifesto stated clearly: “The Coalition will not cut defence spendirig from the existing Forward Estimates. We will at least maintain defence spending at current levels and in line with the Forward Estimates in the 1995-96 Budget”.“ This was one election promise the new government had every intention of keeping, Other, similar statements were contained within Coalition election policy documents; in this case, though, the commitment was honoured.

In May the new Minister for Defence, Ian McLachlan, had said that “Defence is the only federal government agency not to take an overall spending reduction. That shows the depth of Coalition Government support for Defence.”49 The government strongly supported the ASEAN Regional Forum which, according to Downer was “providing the

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principal avenue for security dialogue in the region”.5o The continued presence of United States forces in Australia and Southeast Asia was seen as being still necessary. According to Downer: “United States involvement in the region remains the single most important factor in regiod strategic pbning and, of come, is crucial to the region’s stability”.5*

At a time when, globally, threats to peace seemed to be on the decline, and certainly when the Cold War was fading in memory, the question of why defence was singled out for this special treatment naturally arises. According to Howard, while the ALP had been in government Australia’s defences had been allowed to run down. Equipment was out of date, rraining time was limited, and conditions in the armed forces generally attracted little government attention. Yet at the same time, according to Howard, the international situation Australia was facing, especially in East and Southeast Asia, was increasingly tense. Tensions on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait between Taiwan and China were on the increase. In Southeast Asia, China was claiming part of the South China Sea, and a kind of arms race was going on in Southeast Asia.

United States

Renewing and extending relations with the United States was given a high level of priority in the Coalition’s defence policy statement prior to the elections.52 The statement specifically committed an incoming Coalition Govenunent to “evaluate the potential for the US to preposition equipment in Australia” and to “increase Australian-US exercising and training ~pportunities”?~ On the very day on which he was sworn in as Defence Minister, Ian McLacMan was apparently approached by United States officials who raised the prospect of prepositioning military equipment in A~sualia.5~

On 29 May 19%. Downer asserted that “Enhancing links with the United States at all levels is something this Government sees as vitally important”.55 The United States and Asia were equally important for Australia. According to Howard, under Keating’s leadership the relationship with the United States had been allowed to deteriorate. In the first week of June, the American-Australian Leadership Dialogue took place in Washington.56 The Australian delegation to the meeting was led by Downer, and included the Opposition Leader, Kim Beazley, the Opposition spokesman on foreign affairs, Laurie Brereton, and other political, diplomatic, business, academic and media leaders. On the American side those in attendance included members of Clinton’s Cabinet, three former US ambassadors to Australia and the assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs in the US Department of State, Winston L0rd.5~ Among the foreign policy issues discussed at the Dialogue meeting were tensions between China and Taiwan, the Australian-Indonesian security treaty and business opportunities for both the United States and Australia in the Asia-Pacific region.58 In July, a summit conference between Australia and the United States was due to be held in Sydney. The American delegation - apparently the most senior ever to visit Australia, reflecting the importance of the United States to Australia and US government support for Australia - was to include Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Defence Secretary William Peny and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili.

Immigration and Racism

On the matter of immigration, the government adopted a policy which seems very clearly to have been at variance with that put forward during the election campaign. In its

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immigration manifesto, it said very clearly: ‘“The Coalition does not consider there should be any significant variation in the immigration intake at this time”.59 The number of people permitted to enter Australia each year was to be reduced from 90,OOO to 86,000,~ and the filtering of prospective immigrants was also to be altered. From now on, the selection process was to be more concerned with the skills and the capital the applicants would be able to bring to Australia. The number of migrants sponsored by family members already in Australia was to be reduced. According to Immigration Minister Philip Ruddock, the reduction in the annual migrant intake was caused by the condition of the Australian economy, and the level of unemployment in particular. Naturally, this policy attracted considerable Criticism from various quarters. Yet, confounding the fears expressed by some, there was no move to abandon the racially neutral immigration policy of the previous government.

But perhaps the issue which had the greatest capacity to affect significantly the conduct of Australian foreign policy was not directly the result of a deliberate foreign policy decision by govemment or for that matter by the opposition; it was the extent to which anti-Aboriginal and anti-Asian rhetoric had been stirred up, and made quasi-respectable, during the election campaign and symbolised by the election to Parliament of the Independent Member for Oxley, Pauline Hanson. Hanson argued that Aboriginal Australians were the most privileged minority in the community and that their position of privilege should be reduced, and that Australia was in danger of being overwhelmed by the inflow of Asian immigrants, which had to be stopped. The most generous thing which can be said of the bulk of Hanson’s public statements is that they are ill-informed and misguided. Being well-informed and sensible, though, have never been criteria for participation in Australian public life.

The prime minister defended Hanson’s right to make these remarks, and declined directly to condemn them: his govemment, he asserted, had returned the right of free speech to Australians who had previously laboured under the blanket of ‘’political correctness”. Irrespective of whether Howard’s position was justified in the domestic political arena, it clearly had negative repercussions overseas. In the Asian region, he was seen as condoning the anti-Asianism that Hanson represented. The argument, put by some in Australia, that many Asian countries had a far wme record on race relations than Ausualia’s, was of little significance. At the level of principle, the fact that another country treats its minorities badly is no justification for Australia to do likewise. More to the political point, deservedly or otherwise, Australia and Australians have acquired a reputation in the region for preaching to Asia about human rights, including the right for minorities to be treated with dignity and respect For it now to appear that a significant number of Australians is singling out Aboriginal and Asian minorities for criticism, with at least the acquiescence of the prime minister, laid Australia and its government open to charges of hypocrisy. Several Asian leaders were not reluctant to rake full advantage of the opportunities thus offered to criticise Australia

When there was a Criticism of Hanson voiced by government members, it was usually in the context of a concern about the impact of her remarks on Ausrralia‘s trade with the region. This was also a counter-productive line to follow, implying as it does that Asia was important to Australia only - or at least primarily - in economic terms. In fact, there is little evidence that business deals with Asia will be significantly affected by the shtements of Hanson and her colleagues. By and large, business people in Asia, like business people around the world, are motivated by the search for profit, not respect. But the major service industries which do depend on client goodwill - education and tourism are the biggest - are likely to feel the backlash. More broadly, though, seeing the impact of the “debate” in purely economic terms indicates just how far many in Ausvalia have to

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go before they really come to grips with Australia's position in the world. For all its rhetoric on this point, the previous government clearly failed to persuade a significant minority of Australians that engagement with Asia means more than just making money out of the region: it means establishing and developing social, cultural, sporting and other personal links with the people of the region as well; it means being comfortable in dealings with Asia across the spectrum of human affairs. This cause has clearly been set back by Hanson's public statements, by the support they have attracted, and by the failure of the government clearly and unequivocally to repudiate them. This failure may turn out to have been the most important foreign policy development of the first months of the Howard government.

Conclusions

How might the foreign policies of Howard and Keating be compared? It is clear that on some matters at least, the similarities between the two governments were more obvious than the differences. Thus, for example, both major parties have made public assertions of the importance of Asia to Australia. Both parties recognised that it was essential for the future health of the Australian economy that Australia become more integrated with the Asian regional economy. On the question of migration to Australia, both parties were and are opposed to discrimination on the basis of race, nationality, religion, etc., and both regarded Indonesia as being of prime importance to Australia. With respect to the complex issue of human rights in the Asian region, despite apparently considerable criticisms of the Keating Government expressed particularly by Downer in 1995, when in government Coalition members followed almost exactly the same cautious line as had their predecessors.

But there were differences between the parties too. At the pragmatic level, to say the least, Downer's first few months as foreign minister were inauspicious. He came to office with an established reputation for making political mistakes, a reputation which he m'ulaged to enhance in the early months of the new government He must consider himself extremely lucky not to have been relieved of his post for his role in the DIFF fiasco. He is clearly not - not yet, anyway - anywhere near as in control of his portfolio as Evans was. To some extent, this could be attributed to his inexperience in the post, his earlier diplomatic service with the Department of Foreign Affairs notwithstanding. It may be recalled, too, that when Evans became foreign minister he too brought a record of political blunders, yet he managed to work his way into the job with considerable success. Howard must be hoping that Downer will display the same capacity. Nonetheless by the middle of the year, Downer's grip on his job must have been regarded as tenuous.

At the policy level, perhaps the most obvious difference between the parties was with respect to relations with the United States. The Howard Government clearly regarded the United States as being more important to Australia than did the Keating Government; without the support of the United States, Australia's position on the international stage would be substantially weakened. Closely linked with this position was the placing of greater emphasis on defence and security matters than its predecessor. Howard argued that his government was more realistic than the Keating Government, more aware of the need to maintain links with the one remaining global super-power and of the need to keep the United States militarily present in the Asian region. Howard's critics argue that his government is too faint-hearted and backward-looking, failing to recognise that the major threats to regional security - and thus Australian security - are likely to be the result

342 Problems in Australian Foreign Policy January-June 1996

not of inter-state clashes, but intra-state social and economic disparities. Nonetheless, if the March elections are any guide, Howard's supporters outnumber his critics.

The other great difference between the two administrations is perhaps less concrete, but one which illustrates the different conceptual approaches each had to the position of Australia in the region and the world. One of the most over-used words in the election campaign had been "vision". Keating and Evans, their supporters had argued, had a long- term vision of Australia and its place in the world, a vision which was focused on Asia. They tried hard to convince the nations of Asia that Australia really was independent and sovereign in international affairs, and wanted to be their long-term ally and partner. But their vision extended beyond Asia. Keating and Evans also wanted Australia to play an important role on the international political stage such as in the UN Security Council for instance, or through the formation of the Canberra Commission for Nuclear Disarmament, or the campaign against nuclear testing by China and France.

Howard and Downer, on the other hand, eschewed what they saw as such grandiose ideas. They were drawn more to day-to-day problems rather than long-tenn ones. Their focus was more on domestic issues, especially the state of the Australian economy. They continued the Keating Government's opposition to the testing of nuclear weapons, but made it clear that when the Canberra Commission for Nuclear Disarmament had completed its report, it would be disbanded. As Downer said, he and Howard were more concerned with bilateral matters than with multilateral ones.61 In their own terms, Howard and Downer were probably just as committed to Australia's defining a role for itself in the Asian region, but their attachment to the region was more utilitarian and materialist than that of their predecessors. There was certainly no sense of the Grand Crusade which permeated Keating's view of the region, and of Australia's relations with i t

343

NOTES

1 2 3 4 5

6

7

8 9

10 11 12

13 14 15 16 17

18 19

20 21 22 23 24 25 26

27

28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 31

Colin Brown

1975”. House of Representatives, Hanrard, 27 June 1996.

Para 1.1. Para 1.1. Para 1.3. Para 1.3. Immigration Policy, Melbourne, 9 February 1996. See section dealing with Program Composition. Downer, cited in Canberra Times [hereafter CT], 3 May 1996. Quite why the government would have proposed any treaty for ratification unless accession to it was certain to be in the national interest is unclear. Downer, “Australia and Asia: Taking the Long View”. Address to the Foreign Correspondents’ Association, Sydney, 11 April 1996. hid . Downer, “Australia in Asia”. Speech made at the launch of the Australia in Asia Series, Parliament House, Canberra, 23 May 1996. Para 6.2 “Howard Acquires friend - At a Price”, CT, 19 March 1996. For a rather breathless, blow-by-blow account of the planning of Woolcott’s mission, see Greg Sheridan, WeekendAustralian, 16-17 March 1996. Ian McPhedran, CT, 26 March 1996. Howard, Press Release, “Malaysia’s Prime Minister to visit Australia”. 14 March 1996 Cf CT, 30 March 1996. Cf. Ian McPhedran, CZ‘, 27 March 1996. Though Transfields had apparently been advised by a letter from the Malaysian finance ministry sent on 7 March that they had been shortlisted for the supply of the patrol boats. Cf. Don Greenless, WeekendAusfrdim, 16-17 March 1996. Ian McPhedran, CT, 26 March 1996,30 March 1996. A Confident Australia had noted: “the Indian economy has begun to expand at a rapid rate, which is likely to be sustained in the foreseeable future. This will increase demand and create a greater market for Australian goods and services as the Indian middle class expands rapidly. Liberalisation of import structures and capital ownership requirements provide opportunities for Australian exporters and investors.” Para 8.1. Ross Peake. CT, 12 March 1996. Ibid. Ibid. Don Greenlees and Richard McGregor, Australian, 13 March 1996. Ian McPhedran, CT, 13 March 1996. Ibid. ‘Questions Without Notice. Visas: Mayor of Taipei City”, House of Representatives, Hansard. 28 May 1996. See Downer, “Questions Without Notice; Dalai Lama”. House of Representatives, Hanrard. 21 May 1996. See ibid. See ibid. “Downer and Tibet”, Editorial, Sydney Morning Herald [hereafter SMHJ, 23 May 1996. Quoted by Ian McPhedran, CT, 10 May 1996. David Lague, SMH, 10 June 1996. Ibid. Austrulim, 5 April 1996. Austrulh, 11 March 1996. Quoted by Ian McPhedran, CT., 16 April 1996 Cf. Downer, “Ministerial Statements: Deaths of Australian Based Journalists in East Timor in

344 Problem in Australian Foreign Policy January-June 1996

38

39 40 41 42 43

44 45 46 47 48 49

50 51

52 53 54 55

56 57 58 59 60 61

Cf. Downer, “Ministerial Statements: Deaths of Australian Based Journalists in East Tmor in 1975”. citing p. 136 of the report. SMH, editorial, 29 June 1996 See David Lague, SMH, 13 June 1996 for details. Louise Williams, SMH, 17 June 1996. SMH, 20 July 1996. See Sercombe, “Adjoumment Debate: Export Finance”. House of Representatives, Hansard. 23 May 1996; Amanda Phelan, SMH, 24 July 1996. House of Representatives, Hansard, 18 June 1996. Downer, “DIFF Scheme”. House of Representatives, Hansard, 26 June 1996. Ratih Hardjono. “Ada Apa Dengan Menlu Australia?”, Kompas, 1 July 1996. Cf. David Lague and Tony Wright, SMH, 24 July 1996. Melbourne, n.d.. para 9.1. McLachlan, “Australian Defence Policy After the Year 2000”. Address to the conference on The New Security Agenda in the Asia-Pacific Region, Parliament House, Canberra, 3 May 1996. Downer, “Australia and Asia”. Downer, “Security through Cooperation”. Address to the IISS/SDSC Conference, ‘The New Security Agenda in the Asia Pacific Region”, Canberra, 2 May 1996. Melbourne, February 1996. See especially paragraphs 3.19-3.22. Para 3.22. Ian McPhedran, CT, 2s May 1996. Downer, “Australia and the United States: A Vital Friendship”. Speech to the Australian Centre for American Studies, Sydney, 29 May 1996. Tony Wright, SMH, 27 May 1996. Ibid. Ibid. See the section “Program Level” in Immigration Policy, Melbourne, 9 February 1996 SMH, 4 July 1996. Though Richard Leaver has recently argued that in fact the last months of the Keating administration had seen a movement back in the direction of bilateralism. He asserts: “To the extent that there has been a return to bilateralism within Australian foreign policy, I .... conclude that the movement is largely a bipartisan one”. See Richard Leaver, ‘The Return to Bilateralism - and Bipartisanship’, paper presented to the Internationalising Communities Conference, University of Southern Queensland, 27-30 November 1996. p. 13.