PrivacyTheFourthAmendmentandGovernmentSystems

CSC301Spring2018

HowardRosenthal

CourseNotes:

� Muchofthematerialintheslidescomesfromthebooksandtheirassociatedsupportmaterials,belowaswellasmanyofthereferencesattheclasswebsite

Baase,SaraandHenry,Timothy,AGiftofFire:Social,Legal,andEthicalIssuesforComputingTechnology(5thEdition)Pearson,March9,2017,ISBN-13:978-0134615271Quinn,Michael,EthicsfortheInformationAge(7thEdition),Pearson,Feb.21,2016,ISBN-13978-0134296548

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LessonGoals

�  TheFourthAmendmentandprivacy�  TheSupremeCourtandprivacy� Wiretapping�  E-mailprivacy�  Trackingandprivacy�  ThePrivacyActof1974�  Governmentdatacollectionandabuses�  TheRealIDAct�  TheNationalSecurityAgencyandyourprivacy�  FISACourts�  ThePatriotAct

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TheFourthAmendment

Therightofthepeopletobesecureintheirpersons,houses,papers,andeffects,againstunreasonablesearchesandseizures,shallnotbeviolated,andnoWarrantsshallissue,butuponprobablecause,supportedbyoathoraffirmation,andparticularlydescribingtheplacetobesearched,andthepersonsorthingstobeseized�  ThisrightisspecifictotheUnitedStatesConstitutionandhasvery

highlevelsofsupportacrossallpoliticalparties,classes,etc.andisprotectedbytheSupremeCourt

�  Mostcountriesdonothavesuchprotections,eveninmanyWesternDemocracies

�  TheInformationandElectronicAgehasaddednewchallengestothisAmendmentandtherighttoprivacy

�  Whilethisamendmentwasreallydirectedagainstthegovernment,manyotherorganizationsnowexistthatcaninvadeourprivacyelectronically

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DifferentTypesOfPrivacy�  Initiallyonlyappliedtophysicalprivacywithinthehome

�  Aman’shomeishiscastle!!�  Noseizurewithoutproperwarrant

�  Muchofourpersonalinformationisnolongersafeinourhomes�  Itresidesinhugedatabasesoutsideourcontrol

�  Newtechnologiesallowthegovernmenttoelectronicallysearchourhomeswithoutenteringthemandsearchourpersonsfromadistancewithoutourknowledge�  Surveillance�  Wiretaps�  Phonerecords–policecanlookatyourphonerecordstoprovethat

youweretextingwhiledriving�  Datasearches�  Medicalrecords�  Lostorstolendatacanberevealed(WikiLeaks)�  BusinessessearchtheInternetbeforehiring–watchwhatyouputon

Facebook�  Everythingisexposedwhenwegetonanairplane

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TheSupremeCourtAndPrivacy(1)�  Olmsteadvs.UnitedStates1928

�  Thecourtdecidesthatwiretappingislegal,nomatterwhatthereasonormotivation,becauseitisnotexpresslyprohibitedintheConstitution

�  InterpretedtheFourthAmendmenttoapplyonlytophysicalintrusionandonlytothesearchorseizureofmaterialthings,notconversations.

�  Usedtoputmanygangstersoutofbusiness�  JusticeBrandeis'dissentlaysthegroundworkforfutureunderstandingsof

privacy.�  Katzv.UnitedStates(1967)

�  ReversalofOlmstead�  Inthiscase,areasonableexpectationofprivacytestwascreated.Federal

agentshadattachedalisteningdevicetotheoutsideofaphonebooth�  EvidenceofKatz’sendoftheconversationsobtainedbythelisteningdevice

wasadmittedinhistrialinwhichhewasaccusedoftransmittingwageringinformationbytelephone.

�  TheSupremeCourtruledthattheelectronic"listeningto"andrecordingofMr.Katz'sconversationviolatedtheprivacyuponwhichhejustifiablyreliedandthusconstitutedasearchandseizureundertheFourthAmendment.

�  Insummary,theFourthAmendmentprotectspeople,notplaces.�  Tointrudeinaplacewherereasonablepersonhasareasonableexpectationofprivacy

requiresacourtorder�  U.S.vs.Jones(2012)

�  CarscannotbetrackedviaGPSwithoutawarrant7

TheSupremeCourtAndPrivacy(2)�  UnitedStatesv.Miller1976

�  Ifweshareinformationwithaninstitutionsuchasabank,thenwecan’thaveatotalexpectationofprivacy

�  Governmentcanlookatbankrecords�  Ingeneral,ifwepubliclyshareinformationwemaynothaveatrueexpectationofprivacy

�  ElectronicPrivacyInformationCentervsU.S.(2013)�  TheNSAreceivedsecretSurveillanceCourtapprovaltocollectvastamountsofmetadata

fromtelecomgiantVerizonandleadingInternetcompanies,includingMicrosoft,Apple,Google,YahooandFacebook.

�  TheinformationincludesthenumbersandlocationofnearlyeveryphonecalltoandfromtheUnitedStatesinthepastfiveyears,butdidnotactuallymonitortheconversationsthemselves-todosowouldrequireaseparate,specificallytargetedsearchwarrant.

�  SupremeCourtrefusedtooverturnSurveillanceCourtdecision,burgaveEPICoptionofgoingthroughthelowercourts

�  Rileyvs.California(2014)�  Thepolicegenerallymaynot,withoutawarrant,searchdigitalinformationonacell

phoneseizedfromanindividualwhohasbeenarrested.�  Thisoverturnedpreviousrulingswhichstatedthatphoneswerelikeotherpersonal

propertywhichcouldbesearchedwhenapersonwasarrested�  FBIvsApple

�  GovernmentwantedAppletowritecodetobreakintophoneofSanBernardinoterrorists�  AcourttoldAppletocomply�  NeverreachedtheSupremeCourtasFBIhiredanotherfirmwhichsomehowbrokethe

phone,andFBIwithdrewthecase

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Overview�  TheFourthAmendmentprotectsourrighttoprivacy

�  Mostsearches,includingwiretaps,seizureofproperty,etc.requirewarrantsandprobablecause

�  Technologyhaschangedthescopeandboundariesofcommunications,inparticularinthepast20years

�  TheCommunicationsAssistanceforLawEnforcementAct(CALEA)of1994�  Actually requires that communications systems be designed or

modified to allow law enforcement agencies the ability to interceptvariousformsofcommunications�  Notethegovernmentcreatingitsownclaimrightandimposingitthroughlaw

andregulation�  Expandedonseveraloccasionstokeepupwithtechnologychanges�  Obviouslyamajorclashpointintrade-offbetweenprivacyandthelaw

�  Mustyourphonehavea“Backdoor”tocomplywiththislaw?�  KyllovUnitedStates(2001)

�  SupremeCourtruledthatpolicecouldnotusethermal-imagingdevicestosearchahomefromtheoutsidewithoutasearchwarrant

�  Courtstatedthatwhere“governmentusesadevicethatisnotingeneralpublicuse,toexploredetailsofthehomethatwouldpreviouslyhavebeenunknowablewithoutphysicalintrusion,thesurveillanceisasearch”

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WiretappingandEmailProtection(1)�  Telephoneandtelegraphcommunicationshavebeenusedbyforunlawfulorotherless

thanethicalpurposesfromtheoutset�  Organizedcrime�  Drugtrade�  Humantrafficking�  Spying�  Moneylaundering�  Eavesdropping(partylinephones)

�  Wiretappingfollowedsoonaftertheadventofthetelegraphandtelephone�  EspeciallyusedbytheFBIandotherlawenforcementagenciesagainstorganizedcrime�  Temptationsweregreatandmanytimespublicofficialsandotherswerewiretapped

(withoutawarrant)forpoliticaloreconomicdatacollection�  CongressestablishedtheCommunicationsActin1934

�  Onlythesendermayauthorizethereleaseofanysentmessage–warrantsweren’tmentioned

�  SupremeCourtsaidthisappliedtowiretappingaswell–notethatthesewerenolongerjustphysical,butanytypeofmessage

�  FBIandotheragenciesoftenignoredtheserules�  FBIDirectorJ.EdgarHoovercollectedlotsofinformationforleverage(Kennedy,M.L.

King,etc.)�  RobertKennedy(asAttorneyGeneral)usedillegalwiretapsagainsttheMafiaonaregular

basis,evenwhileHooverwasusingillegallycollectedinformationasleverageagainsttheKennedy’s

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WiretappingandEmailProtection(2)

�  In1967(Katzv.U.S.)courtdeclaredthatallwiretappingandotherelectronicsurveillancewasillegalwithoutawarrant�  In1968Congressexplicitlyallowedwiretappingandotherelectronicsurveillancewithacourtorder,affirmingtheKatzdecisioninlaw

�  AsE-mailandotherformsofcommunicationsevolvedCongressaddednewprotections�  ElectronicCommunicationsPrivacy(1986,amended1994)extendedwiretappingprohibitionandwarrantrequirementstoe-mailandotherformsofelectroniccommunications,includingwirelesscommunications

�  Warrantrequirementsevenextendtothirdpartiesthatstoreyoure-mailorotherelectroniccommunications

�  PatriotAct(tobediscussedshortly)loosenssomeoftheserestrictions,especiallyoncollectionofmetadata

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ComplyingWithTheCommunicationsAssistanceforLawEnforcementAct�  GovernmentwantedtomakesurethatlawenforcementcouldkeepupwithtechnologicaladvancementsandpassedCALEAin1994

�  ComplyingwithCALEArequires:�  Designersmustcooperatewithandseekapprovalfromthegovernmentfornewtechnologicalinnovationsthatimprovesecurity

�  Providersmustallowthegovernmenttoobtainaccesstometadataanddata,andsometimesplacemonitoringtoolsintheirsystems

�  Suppliersmustprovideaccesstoencryptiontechniquesandkeys,andallowforreverseengineering

�  Makesanassumptionthatthegovernmentwon’tmisusetheinformation

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MobileDevices,GPSTrackingandPrivacyRules�  ThecourthasingeneralextendedFourthAmendmentprotectionsto

newtechnologies�  Shouldasearchwarrantbeforethepolicecansearchthecontentsofa

cellphone�  Rileyvs.California(2014)

�  Thepolicegenerallymaynot,withoutawarrant,searchdigitalinformationonacellphoneseizedfromanindividualwhohasbeenarrested.

�  Theinformationinacellphoneissoextensivethatthedifferentitemsbeingsearchedforeachrequiresawarrant

�  Stingraysallowyoutotriangulatethelocationofaphone�  Isitaviolationofprivacytotrackapubliclybroadcastlocationsignal?�  Duetopublicity,mostfederalandothergovernmentagenciesobtainawarrant

beforetrackingaperson’scellphone�  CanGPStrackersbesecretlyinstalledonacarinordertotracka

person’smovements�  U.S.vJones(2012)

�  Courtruledthatavehicleisoneofaperson’spersonaleffectsandthereforeawarrantisrequiredtoplacethetrackingdeviceonthecar

�  Trackingacar24hours/daygoesbeyondobservingacarpassinginpublic

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NewTechnologiesandCourtDecisions

� Kyllov.UnitedStates(2001)saidthatyoucouldnotusethermalimagingdeviceswithoutawarrant

� DoesKylloapplytoothertypesofradarandmotionsensors

� Aredronesallowedtotrackvehicles,evenifGPStrackersaren’tallowed?� Manyoftheseissueshaveyettocomebeforethecourts

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VideoSurveillance

�  Courtssofarhaveupheldvideosurveillanceinpubliclocations�  Usedtoprovidesecurity�  Usedtoidentifycriminalsafteracrime�  Sometimesusedtoenforcecurfewsandotherlaws�  Combinedwithfacialrecognitiontoidentifycriminals

�  Issuearisingasdataisminedtocorrelatenewtypesofinformation�  Personsvisitingahome(thinkoftheGodfathermovieopening

weddingsceneandtheFBI)�  Facialrecognition�  Releaseofphotostothepublictohelpinidentifyingsuspects

�  Couldbecombinedwithlocationtrackingtoproveordisprovethatyouwereatacertainlocationatacertaintime

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ThePrivacyActof1974(1)

�  FacedwithagrowingamountofcollecteddatathePrivacyActof1974wasenactedtoensurethethegovernmentdidnotabuseitsevergrowingcollectionofinformation

�  Keyprovisionsandprinciples:�  Governmentcanonlyrecordwhatis“relevantandnecessary”tothe

legalpurposeforwhichthegovernmentcollectedtheinformation�  Theremustbenopersonaldatarecord-keepingsystemwhosevery

existenceissecret.TheremustbeaFederalRegistryofallsystemsanddatabasesthatholdpersonalinformation,withexceptionsforsomesecuritydatabases

�  Theremustbeawayforanindividualtofindoutwhatinformationabouthimisinarecordandhowitisused.

�  Theremustbeawayforanindividualtopreventinformationabouthimthatwasobtainedforonepurposefrombeingusedormadeavailableforotherpurposeswithouthisconsent.

�  Theremustbeawayforanindividualtocorrectoramendarecordofidentifiableinformationabouthim.

�  Anyorganizationcreating,maintaining,using,ordisseminatingrecordsofidentifiablepersonaldatamustassurethereliabilityofthedatafortheirintendeduseandmusttakeprecautiontopreventmisuseofthedata.

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ThePrivacyActof1974(2)

�  Noagencyshalldiscloseanyrecordwhichiscontainedinasystemofrecordsbyanymeansofcommunicationtoanyperson,ortoanotheragency,exceptpursuanttoawrittenrequestby,orwiththepriorwrittenconsentof,theindividualtowhomtherecordpertains

�  Therearespecificexceptionsforallowingtheuseofpersonalrecords:�  ForstatisticalpurposesbytheCensusBureauandtheBureauofLabor

Statistics�  ForroutineuseswithinaU.S.governmentagency�  Forarchivalpurposes"asarecordwhichhassufficienthistoricalor

othervaluetowarrantitscontinuedpreservationbytheUnitedStatesGovernment"

�  Forlawenforcementpurposes�  Forcongressionalinvestigations�  Otheradministrativepurposes

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ThePrivacyActof1974(3)

�  TheComputerMatchingandPrivacyProtectionActof1988,P.L.100–503,amendedthePrivacyActof1974byaddingcertainprotectionsforthesubjectsofPrivacyActrecordswhoserecordsareusedinautomatedmatchingprograms.Theseprotectionshavebeenmandatedtoensure:�  Proceduraluniformityincarryingoutmatchingprograms�  Dueprocessforsubjectsinordertoprotecttheirrights�  OversightofmatchingprogramsthroughtheestablishmentofDataIntegrityBoardsateachagencyengaginginmatchingtomonitortheagency'smatchingactivity.

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DataCollectionByTheGovernment–ProblemsInPractice

� Haveyoueverputsomethingawayandthenforgottenaboutit?�  Thegovernmenthasalltypesofcollectedinformationthatithasn’tevendiscovered

�  Computerizedsystemsandelectronicrecordingmakeitmucheasiertogetatthatdataforbothgoodandbadpurposes

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AgenciesThatCollectDataAboutYou�  SocialSecurity–andtheSSNhasbecomeadefactoIDformanypurposes�  TheIRS(whichusestheSSN)�  TheDMV–forawhiletheSSNwasdisplayedonyourlicenseorIDinmany

states�  YourlicenseisnowpartoftheRealIDprogramandistheminimumneededtogetontoa

plane(inlieuofapassport)�  TheTransportationSafetyAdministration(TSA)whichkeepstrackofallyour

airplanetravels,andisreadytogreetyouwhenyoureturnfromabroad�  TheCensusBureau–althoughthisissupposedtobeanonymous�  Yourschooloruniversity–manyuseyourSSNasyourID�  Medicalrecordsareoftencollectedandsharedwiththegovernment�  SocialWelfareagencies�  Police,theFBI,otherlawenforcementagencies

�  Evenifyouarenotacriminal,justgettingasecurityclearancerequiresturningoverlotsofpersonaldata

�  Publicrecordsarereadilyavailableandpublished�  Propertyorbusinessownership

�  OnceinformationiscollecteditmaybesubjecttoreleaseundertheFreedomofInformationAct

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GovernmentandPrivateDataSources

�  Governmentsometimespayscompaniestominedata�  ThePatriotActallowthegovernmenttominephonecompanyrecords

�  ThegovernmentisoftenmonitoringFacebookandothersitesinthecounterterrorismfight

�  Governmentcontainsrecordsoneverycollegestudent�  Theuseismeanttobebenign–tryingtotrackhowstudentsaredoingintheseuniversities�  Whograduatesandhowlongdoesittake

�  Thisdatacouldalsobeusedforlessbenignpurposes�  Cansomeonebackdoorintoyourhealthhistory?

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UsesandMisusesofGovernmentDataCollection�  Somepurposesaregood,usefulandgenerallysupported

�  Understandingpopulationdemographicsandmovements�  Allocatingrepresentation(oneoftheoriginalpurposesofthecensus,alongwith

taxation)�  Taxcollection,collegeloancollection,etc.�  Maintainingsecurity–thiscanalsobeabused�  Draftregistration�  Trackingcriminalsandsexoffendersinparticular�  Goingafteraparentowingchildsupport

�  Otherpurposescanbebadorillegal�  Releaseofpersonallyembarrassinginformation�  Identitytheft�  Misidentification(peoplehavebeenputonthe“no-fly”listduetomistaken

identity)�  Denialofcredit�  Identificationofpoliticalbeliefsbydonations(overridesthesecretballot

concept)�  Industrialespionage�  Otherpoliticalmischief

�  Wewouldliketoevaluateeachuseofthedataindividually,butsometimesthisdoesn’thappen�  Thereforeweneedtoevaluatethecollectionofdatatypes,oraggregateddata,

againstalltheprosandcons–arisk/rewardidentificationandtrade-off24

TheRealIDActof2005

� Congresswantedtohaveamoreuniformandfairwayforpeopletobeidentified,especiallywhengettingontoairplanesorenteringfederalfacilities�  Setafederalstandardforeachdriver’slicenseorpersonalID�  Youneedanewdriver’slicenseby2020inCaliforniainordertoboardaplane(unlessyouhaveapassport)

�  Requiredeachpersontoprovidesupportingdocumentationsuchasabirthcertificate,withthestatesevaluatingtheinformationaccordingtothestandard,beforethestateissuedthelicenseorID

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ANationalIDCard?(1)�  Thenationalidentificationcardusesalargedatabasethatlinksallofthe50states'databasestogether.Thisnationaldatabase,containingeverycardholder'spersonalinformation,canbeaccessedfromanywhere,includingschools,airportsecuritychecks,policestations,etc.

� Prosfornationalidentificationsystem:�  Youwouldneedtheactualcardwithbiometricstoverifyidentity.

�  ThecardswouldbemoresecurethanthecurrentSocialSecurityCard

�  You’dbeabletouseonecardinsteadofthemanyyoucarrywithyounow

�  Couldhelpreducecreditcard,governmentbenefits,andothertypesoffraud

� Usedtoe-verifybeforeemployment�  Easiertotrackcriminalsandterrorists�  Easierforpolicetocheckcriminalbackgrounds

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ANationalIDCard?(2)�  Consfornationalidentificationsystem:

�  History–whenagovernmenthassomuchcontroloverinformationittendstouseit.

�  Potentialforinvasionofprivacyistremendous�  Ifyouridentityishackeditmaybeevenmoretroublesome�  Everysystemsofarcreatedhasbeenhackable�  ThenationalIDcardissupposedtobehardertoforgethanourIDcardsof

today;�  However,thischallengemayactuallyincreasetheriskofidentitytheft.

Manypeoplewillhaveaccesstothenationaldatabasewithsomuchinformationaboutyou.

�  Therehavealreadybeenincidentsofidentitytheftwiththissysteminothercountries.

�  RecentlyinRussia,policemenandcivilianswereapprehendedafterhavingforgedIDcardsthatwouldhaveallowedthemdirectaccesstoPresidentVladimirPutin'soffice.

�  Nationalidentificationcardsarefacingoppositionallacrosstheglobe.CountriessuchasAustralia,NewZealand,thePhilippines,Thailand,andtheUnitedKingdomhavebeenfightingtheinstallationofanationalidentificationsystemforthepast11years.

�  ClassDiscussion�  Whatdoyouthink–makeyourownliststhataddtotheideasshown

above�  DevelopevaluationcriteriaandgiveascoretotheNationalIDCardidea

(Positivemeansyes,negativeno)27

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ABriefSummaryOfEarlyActivities(1)

�  OperationShamrock�  ContinuationofWorldWarIIinterceptionofinternationaltelegrams

bytheNationalSecurityAgency(1952)�  Expandedtotelephonecalls�  Kennedy(continuedevenafterwiretappingwithoutawarrantmade

illegal)�  Organizedcrimefigures�  Cuba-relatedindividualsandbusinesses

�  JohnsonandNixon�  Vietnamwarprotesters

�  Nixon�  Warondrugs

�  CarnivoreSurveillanceSystem�  CreatedbyFBIinlate1990s�  MonitoredInternettraffic,includingemailexchanges�  Carnivore=WindowsPC+“packet-sniffing”software�  Capturedpacketsgoingto/fromaparticularIPaddress�  Replacedwithcommercialsoftware

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ABriefSummaryOfEarlyActivities(2)

�  TALONDatabase�  CreatedbyUSDepartmentofDefensein2003�  Supposedtocontainreportsofsuspiciousactivitiesorterroristthreatsnearmilitarybases

�  Reportssubmittedbymilitarypersonnelorcivilians�  Reportsassessedas“credible”or“notcredible”bymilitaryexperts

�  Reportsaboutanti-warprotestsaddedtodatabase�  Manyofthesereportslaterdeletedfromdatabase�  In2007newUnderSecretaryofDefenseforIntelligencerecommendedthatTALONbeterminated

�  PRISMProgram�  NSAhadobtainedaccesstoserversofmostmajorserviceprovidersinordertoaccessmessagesandmonitorcommunicationsoutsidetheU.S.

�  ThisprogramwasexposedbyEdwardSnowden

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TheNationalSecurityAdministration,IntelligenceGatheringandFISACourts(1)� TheNSAhasalegalroleinthecollectionofdata

�  CreatedinsecretbyTrumanin1952� HasbeenlimitedinthepasttocollectinginformationoutsidetheU.S.

�  In1978theForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceActwaspassedtomonitortheNSA�  SetupsecretFISAcourtswiththeabilitytoissueswarrants,allowinginterceptionofcommunicationstoandfromtheU.S.inresponsetogovernmentrequeststomonitorspiesandterrorists,inparticulariftheyareU.S.citizensorotheroperatingwithintheU.S.

�  LawprohibitedtheNSAfromcollectingmassesoftelegrams(thiswas1978)andfromcompilinglistsofAmericanstowatchwithoutacourtorder

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TheNationalSecurityAdministration,IntelligenceGatheringandFISACourts(2)�  NSAstartedmonitoringmetadata(dataaboutdata)

�  Someofthisseemedtobeoutsidethescopeofwarrants,sincepersonalcontentofthedatawasnotcollectedunlessapatternwasfound

�  NSAsetupcollectionfacilitiesatmanycommunicationscompaniestocollectdata�  FISAwasamendedin2007toallowthegovernmenttowiretap

communicationsto/fromforeigncountrieswithoutoversightbyFISACourt

�  FISAActof2008protectscompaniesfromlawsuitswhentheycooperatewiththegovernment

�  InterrorismcasessomeoftherulesoftheFourthAmendment,suchasrevealingalldatacollectedtotheaccused,doesnotapply

�  Therewillalwaysbetrade-offsbetweensecurityandprivacy�  Ultimatelyweneedtoaskwhoownstheinformation

�  OnceweknowwhoownsinformationwecandiscusstheFourthAmendmentRights

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ThePatriotAct(1)�  Tenbasicprovisions(I-IV)

�  TitleI:Enhancingdomesticsecurityagainstterrorism�  Section102expressestheSenseofCongresscondemning

discriminationagainstArabandMuslimAmericans.�  TitleII:Enhancedsurveillanceprocedures

�  Includesenhancedwiretappingundercourtsupervision�  Allowslawenforcementtoseizevoicemailmessages.�  Allowslawenforcementtosubpoenaadditionalsubscriberrecords

fromserviceproviderssuchas“recordsofsessionsanddurations”and“meansandsourceofpayment.”

�  Allowsinformationtobegatheredpriortocollectionofawarrantintimecriticalsituations

�  TitleIII:Anti-money-launderingtopreventterrorism�  TitleIV:Bordersecurity

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ThePatriotAct(2)�  Tenbasicprovisions(V–X)

�  TitleV:Removingobstaclestoinvestigatingterrorism�  AuthorizestheAttorneyGeneraltomakefundsavailableforthepaymentofrewards

forassistanceincombatingterrorism.�  Includespaymentstoanindividualwhofurnishesinformationleadingtothe

preventionofterrorismortheidentityofsomeone“whoholdsakeyleadershippositioninaterroristorganization”intheStateDepartment’srewardsprogram.

�  Authorizesfederalofficerswhoconductelectronicsurveillanceorphysicalsearchestoacquireforeignintelligenceinformation,toconsultwithotherFederallawenforcementofficerstocoordinateeffortstoprotectagainstterroristattacksorclandestineintelligenceactivitiesbyaforeignpoweroritsagent.

�  Allowslawenforcementeasieraccesstotelephonetollandtransactionalrecords,financialrecords,andconsumerreports.

�  TitleVI:Victimsandfamiliesofvictimsofterrorism�  TitleVII:Increasedinformationsharingforcriticalinfrastructureprotection

�  GreatercooperationbetweenFBI,NSA,CIA,Immigration,StateLawEnforcement,etc.

�  TitleVIII:Terrorismcriminallaw�  TitleIX:Improvedintelligence

�  Againtheemphasiswasoncoordinationamongstagencies�  TitleX:Miscellaneous

�  Modifiedin2015torestrictbulkcollectionofphonerecords�  Thiscouldhurtdataminingefficiencyandabilitytotrackterroristactivities–

proponentsbelieveitisanecessarycontrolonexcessivegovernmentpower

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ThePatriotActandDataMining(1)�  ThewholedebateonthePatriotActcenteredaroundwhetherornot

thegovernmentcouldcontinuouslycollectandstoremetadatafromtheISPsandcell/land-linephoneproviders�  Apolitical/privacyargumentconflictedwithatechnicalargument

�  Rememberthedataminingsection�  TheQueryDrivenApproach

�  Whenaqueryisissuedtoaclientside,ametadatadictionarytranslatesthequeryintooneormorequeries,appropriatefortheindividualheterogeneoussiteinvolved.

�  Nowthesequeriesaremappedandsenttothelocalqueryprocessor.�  Theresultsfromheterogeneoussitesareintegratedintoaglobalanswerset.�  Advantages

�  Governmentdoesn’tgettokeepalargedatabaseofinformationonpermanentfile

�  Don’tneedtomaintainalargeITinfrastructure�  Disadvantages

�  TheQueryDrivenApproachneedscomplexintegrationandfilteringprocesses.

�  Itisveryinefficientandveryexpensiveforfrequentqueries.�  Thisapproachisexpensiveforqueriesthatrequireaggregations(constant

regrouping)ofdata

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ThePatriotActandDataMining(2)�  Rememberthedataminingsection

�  TheUpdate-DrivenApproach�  Intheupdate-drivenapproach,theinformationfrommultiple

heterogeneoussourcesisintegratedinadvanceandstoredinawarehouse.�  Thisincludesdatascrubbing–theprocessofvalidatingdataforcorrectnessinadvance

�  Thisinformationisavailablefordirectqueryingandanalysis.�  Advantages

�  Thisapproachprovideshighperformance.�  Thedatacanbecopied,processed,integrated,annotated,summarizedandrestructuredinthesemanticdatastoreinadvance.�  Inotherwords,westoredataintheway(s)wewanttolookatit

�  Queryprocessingdoesnotrequireaninterfacewiththeprocessingatthelocaloriginaldatasources.�  Muchlessintrusiveandresourceintensivetopullthedataonce,

ratherthanwheneveryouwanttoquery�  Disadvantages

�  Mustmaintainalargeinfrastructuretoimport,storeandmaintaindata�  Privacyconcernssincethegovernmentnowhasaccesstosomuchdata

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ThePatriotActEvaluated

�  ThePatriotActisconstantlybeingevaluatedintermsofitsconsequencesversusitsvalue�  DoesitinterferewithNaturalRightsasLockeseesthem�  ItisaprimeexampleoftheevolvingSocialContract,asHobbes

mightsay?�  ProtectionsareputintotheveryfirstarticletoprotectminorityandinparticularMuslimrightsaspartoftheevaluatedcalculation.

�  Certainrightstoprivacyarecededtothestateforaperceivedgreatergood.

�  Warcanoftenleadtocurtailmentofrights–thereforeitisatimetobeespeciallycarefulaboutcedingrights

�  ThePatriotActwasmodifiedin2015toreflecttheconcern(ofaminority)aboutgovernmentintrusivenessviadatamining�  Agreatervaluewasassignedtoconstrainingthegovernment,

whichmodifiedtheimmediatepost9/11valuations

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