Privacy and Anonymity Using Mix Networks*

Nitesh SaxenaCS392/6813

Some slides borrowed from Philippe Golle, Markus Jacobson

Course Admin

• HW6 solution provided; grading almost done• HW7, HW8 to be graded; solutions to be provided• HW9 will be posted by tomorrow

– You should email me with the formation of your team (of 2 each); one email per team

– I’ll create you an account on Vlab and send you instructions on how to access it

• The final is on Thursday, 12/20, 6-8:30pm

Contents

• Mix Network (Mixnet)

• Mixnet Applications

• Mixnet Requirements

• Robustness of Mixnets

• Checking a Mixnet’s Robustness

Definition: Mix Server

• A mix server:

• Receives inputs

• Produces “related” outputs

• The relationship between inputs and outputs is secret

Inputs Outputs?

Mix Server

Definition: Mix Network

• Mix network

A group of mix servers that operate sequentially.

Server 1 Server 2 Server 3

Inputs Outputs

? ? ?

Applications

• Hide:

“who voted for whom?”

“who paid whom?”

“who communicated with whom?”

“what is the source of a message?”

• Good for protecting privacy for

election and communication

• Used as a privacy building block

1. “Who do you like best?”

2. Put your ballot into

an WHITE envelope

and put again in a RED one and sign on it

Electronic Voting Demonstration

Jerry

Washington Lincoln Roosevelt

Administrators will

1. Verify signatures together

2. 1st Admin. shuffles and opens RED envelopes

3. Send them to 2nd Admin.

4. 2nd Admin. shuffles again and opens WHITE envelopes

5. Count ballots together

Electronic Voting Demo. (Cont’d)

Jerry

Sign voter 1 (encr(encr (vote1)))

Sign voter 2 (encr(encr (vote2)))

.

.

.Sign voter n (encr(encr (voten)))

A real system for elections

vote1

vote2

vote3

.

.

voten

MixNet

Washington Lincoln Roosevelt

MixNet

• “Choose one person you like to pay $5”

• Put your ballot into an WHITE envelope and put again in a RED

one and sign on itJerry

Name of the person ( ___________ )

Electronic Payment Demo.

Electronic Voting Demo. (Cont’d)Administrators will

1. Verify signatures together

2. Deduct $5 from each account

3. 1st Admin. shuffles and opens RED envelopes

4. Send them to 2nd Admin.

5. 2nd Admin. shuffles again and opens WHITE envelopes

6. Credit $5 to recipients

For payments

Sign payer 1 (encr(encr (payee1)))

Sign payer 2 (encr(encr (payee2)))

.

.

.

.

.Sign payer n (encr(encr (payeen)))

payee1

payee2

payee3

.

.

payeen

DEDUCT

Credit

Jerry

Name

(________ )

MixNet

For email communication

encr (email1, addressee1)

encr (email2, addressee2)

.

.

.encr (emailn, addresseen)

.

.

.

MixNet

DeliverTo: Jerry

Don’t forget to have lunch.

Other uses

• Anonymous web browsing (LPWA Anonymizer)

From LPWA homepage

Other uses (Cont’d)

• Location privacy for cellular devices

– Location-based service is GOOD ! • Landline-phone calling to 911 in the US,

112 in Europe

• All cellular carrier by December 2005

– RISK !• Location-based spam

• Harm to a reputation

Other uses (Cont’d)

• Anonymous bulletin boards

From A. Juels at WOTE’01

Mix

Other uses (Cont’d)

Sometimes abuses

• Avoid legislation (e.g., piracy)

Other Uses

• Anonymous VoIP calls

Principle Chaum ’81

Message 1

Message 2

server 1 server 2 server 3

PrivacyEfficiencyTrustRobustness

Issues :

But what about robustness?

encr(Berry)

encr(Kush)

encr(Kush)

Kush

Kush

Kush

STOP

I ignore his

outputand

produce my own

There is no robustness!

Requirements

1. Privacy

Nobody knows who said what

2. Efficiency

Mixing is efficient (= practically useful)

3. Trust How many entities do we have to trust?

4. Robustness

Will replacement cheaters be caught? What if a certain number of mix servers fail?

Zoology of Mix Networks

• Decryption Mix Nets [Cha81,…]:– Inputs: ciphertexts

– Outputs: decryption of the inputs.

• Re-encryption Mix Nets[PIK93,…]:– Inputs: ciphertexts

– Outputs: re-encryption of the inputs

Inputs Outputs?

First SolutionChaum ’81, implemented by Syverson, Goldschlag

Not robust (or: tolerates cheaters for correctness)

Requires every server to participate (and in the “right” order!)

Re-encryption Mixnet

0. Setup: mix servers generate a shared ElGamal key

1. Users encrypt their inputs: Input Input Pub-key

3. A quorum of mix servers decrypts the outputs

Output OutputPriv-key

Server 1 Server 2 Server 3

re-encrypt

& mix

re-encrypt

& mix

re-encrypt

& mix

2. Encrypted inputs are mixed:

Proof ProofProof

Recall: El Gamal encryption

Public parameters: q is a prime

p = 2kq+1 is a prime

g generator of Gp

Secret key of a user: x (where 0 < x < q)

Public key of this user: y = gx mod p

El Gamal Encryption (encrypt m using y)

For message (or “plaintext”) : m

1. Pick a number k randomly from [0…q-1]

2. Compute a = yk. m mod p b = gk mod p

3. Output (a,b)

Decryption technique (to decrypt (a,b) using x)

Compute m a / bx (= yk. m = gxk. m) (gk)x gkx

Re-encryption technique

Input: a ciphertext (a,b) wrt public key y

1. Pick a number randomly from [0…q-1]

2. Compute a’ = y . a mod p b’ = g . b mod p

3. Output (a’, b’)

Same decryption technique!

Compute m a’ / b’x (= yk. y . m = gx (k+. m) (gk . g )x g

(k+x

A simple mix

(a1, b1)

(a2, b2).

.

.(an, bn)

RE-ENCRYPT

RE-ENCRYPT

(a’1,b’1)

(a’2,b’2).

.

.(a’n,b’n)

(a’’1,b’’1)

(a’’2,b’’2).

.

.(a’’n,b’’n)

Note: different cipher text, different re-encryption exponents!

And to get privacy… permute, too!

(a1, b1)

(a2, b2).

.

.(an, bn)

(a’’1,b’’1)

(a’’2,b’’2).

.

.(a’’n,b’’n)

Problem

• Mix servers must prove correct re-encryption– Given n El Gamal ciphertexts E(mi)as input

– and n El Gamal ciphertexts E(m’i) as output

– Compute: E( mi) and E(=m’i) – Ask Mix for ZK proof that these ciphertexts decrypt to

same plaintexts

Tor

• A low-latency anonymizing networkhttp://www.torproject.org/

• Currently 1000 or so routers distributed all over in the internet

• Can run any SOCKS application on top of Tor• No mixing is employed• Peer-based: a client can choose to be a router• A request is routed to/fro a series of a circuit of three

routers• A new circuit is chosen every 10 minutes• Let’s see Tor in practice