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. . . . . Quality of Care . . . . .
© 2007 National Rural Health Association 173 Spring 2007
Safety and quality of care are high on the agendas of government, of payers, of providers, and increasingly of patients and their families. 1,2 However, in rural settings, relatively little is known about the factors that
pose the greatest threat to quality. The recent Institute of Medicine report on rural health care 3 draws attention to the fact that rural communities are heterogeneous and diverse, and it calls for health professional competencies that include applying quality improvement and working in teams.
The paradigm of complex adaptive systems suggests that each medical practice can be viewed as a complex adaptive microsystem; to thrive, such a microsystem needs to identify its own unique set of problems and devise solutions that are tailored to the situation, in light of the current quality status, practice costs, and resources available. 4-6 To achieve this, the measurements that are used to identify and prioritize quality and safety problems must be trusted by the members of the practice. The literature refl ects skepticism regarding externally driven measures such as practice profi les and report cards, 7-9 suggesting that, in their current forms, they may not be trusted by many physicians as fair and valid measures.
One approach to identifying problems internally has been to use error reports. The intention is that practice staff members complete these documents voluntarily when they notice mistakes or adverse events and that the information is used internally to drive improvement. Error reporting systems are widely available in hospital and ambulatory settings (commonly under the title “ incident reports ” ), but their usefulness has always been limited by the problem of underreporting. 1
An alternative approach that permits involvement of all team members to identify and prioritize safety and quality problems is Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA). This has been widely used in other high-risk industries and has been advocated by the Institute of Medicine 1 as a means of analyzing a system to identify its weaknesses (failure modes) and possible consequences of failure (effects) and to prioritize areas
ABSTRACT : Context: Rural primary care is a complex
environment in which multiple patient safety challenges
can arise. To make progress in improving safety with
limited resources, each practice needs to identify those
safety problems that pose the greatest threat to patients
and focus efforts on these. Purpose: To describe and fi eld-
test a novel approach to prioritizing safety problems in
rural primary care based on the method of Failure Modes
and Effects Analysis. Methods: A survey instrument
designed to assess perceptions of medical error frequency,
severity, and cause was administered anonymously to
staff of 2 rural primary care practices in New York State.
Responses were converted to quantitative hazard scores,
which were used to make priority rankings of safety
problems. Concordance analysis was conducted. Results: Response rate was 94% at each site. Analysis yielded a
list of priorities for each site. Comparison between staff
groups (provider vs nursing vs administration), based on
the top 10 priorities perceived by staff, showed 53%
concordance at one site and 30% at the other.
Concordance between sites was lower, at 20%.
Conclusions: Initial fi eld-testing of a Failure Modes and
Effects Analysis approach in rural primary care suggests
that it is feasible and can be used to estimate, based on
staff perceptions, the greatest threats to patient safety in
an individual practice so that limited resources can be
focused appropriately. Higher concordance between staff
within a practice than between practices lends
preliminary support to the validity of the approach.
1 Patient Safety Research Center, Department of Family Medicine,
State University of New York, Buffalo, NY. 2 Niagara Family Medicine Associates, Niagara Falls, NY.
3 Department of Psychology, Canisius College, Buffalo, NY.
For further information, contact: Ranjit Singh, MD, MBA, Patient
Safety Research Center, UB Department of Family Medicine,
UB Clinical Center, 462 Grider Street, Buffalo, NY 14215;
e-mail [email protected].
Prioritizing Threats to Patient Safety in Rural Primary Care Ranjit Singh , MD, MBA ; 1 Ashok Singh , MD; 2 Timothy J. Servoss , MA ; 1,3 and Gurdev Singh , MSc Eng, PhD 1
. . . . . Quality of Care . . . . .
The Journal of Rural Health 174 Vol. 23, No. 2
for improvement. The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations has required since 2002 that all accredited hospitals perform proactive risk assessment each year following a series of steps based on FMEA. 10,11 It is important to point out that this method is based on the perceptions of informed decision makers.
This process, usually made up of 8 steps, 11 is time consuming, costly, and requires considerable expertise and experience. In hospital settings, trained quality-improvement personnel are available, and leadership is mandated by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations to provide the necessary resources for this type of activity. In ambulatory care, however, these factors typically are not present, and the literature is sparse regarding use of FMEA in this setting. In rural ambulatory settings, the scarcity of the necessary resources and expertise is particularly problematic. 3
In an attempt to overcome some of these practical barriers while maintaining the essential thrust of FMEA for the community primary care setting, the authors have developed an adapted FMEA process. This article describes that process and its preliminary fi eld-testing in 2 primary care practices serving rural populations. The adapted FMEA process involves administration of an anonymous safety survey to practice members followed by analysis of the results in order to develop a priority list of safety threats. Ultimately, practices are to use the priority list for developing individualized safety improvements, although that step was not included in the fi eld test reported here. The purpose of the fi eld test is to examine feasibility and begin to address validity issues.
Methods Anonymous FMEA Survey . The fi rst step in the
adapted FMEA process was to begin to understand the system of care in the practice. This was done by fi rst identifying the various entities in the practice (such as the patient, provider, nurse, and chart), listing the main interactions between them, and then portraying them in a diagram (Figure). 12 This diagram was then used as the basis for an anonymous survey. Errors can occur at any point in the practice, including within entities and in the interactions between entities. The survey was designed to examine 12 key areas, with 1 page of the survey dedicated to each (eg, the nurse-provider interaction). Each page consisted of a list of failure modes (errors or causes of error) that can occur in that part of the system. The lists, which include a total of 140 different failure modes, were developed after a review of the literature 1,13-19 and consultation with the
study practice leaders. The lists can be customized to incorporate special circumstances for any given practice if desired. Table 1 shows an example of items on a page from the survey. Participants were asked to consider each of the listed errors in turn and, for each, to respond with their perception of the frequency of the error and the likely severity of the consequences. Explanations of the categorical choices were given at the bottom of each survey page (these appear as footnotes in the table). The diagram of the practice entities was included on each survey page, with the appropriate entities highlighted to orient respondents to the part of the offi ce being assessed.
All members of the 2 practices were given the same survey. They were asked to complete the survey anonymously, stating (if willing) the group to which they belonged (provider, nursing, or administrative).
Hazard Analysis for Prioritization . The goal of the analysis was to rank the failure modes from the survey according to the size of their effects, as perceived by practice staff. We chose to measure effects using the concept of hazard borrowed from engineering. The hazard posed by any given error (or failure mode) is equal to the frequency (ie, probability) with which it occurs multiplied by the severity of the consequences that accrue when it does occur (hazard = frequency × severity).
In the survey, each respondent had rated the frequency and severity of each error according to the categorical scales shown in Table 1 . These categorical responses had to be converted to numerical values so that hazard values could be calculated, summarized, and compared. The fi rst step in this process was to
Practice Diagram. Simplifi ed Diagram of Primary Care Practice Entities (Boxes) and Interactions and Processes (Arrows), as Patient Moves From Assessment Phase to Formulation of Management Plan.
Chart
Provider
Nurse
OfficeStaff
Patient
Third Party
Patient
Nurse
OfficeStaff
Third Party
Assessment Plan
. . . . . Quality of Care . . . . .
Singh, Servoss and Singh 175 Spring 2007
calculate frequency in terms of each practice ’ s patient volume, yielding a rate per 1,000 patient visits. For example, the “ frequent ” probability of occurrence (which was described as 1 or more times in a week) was approximated as 2 times per week. At site 1, 220 patients were seen per week. Hence, “ frequent ” was converted to 2/220 = 0.009, or 9 times per 1,000 visits. Similarly the “ remote ” probability, described as less than once a year, was approximated to 0.5 times per year and calculated as 0.5/11,000 (patients seen per year) = 0.00005, or .05 times per 1,000 visits.
For the severity scores, conversion of the categorical responses to numerical equivalents required decisions regarding the relative weights of the outcomes. For example, how much worse is a “ moderate ” outcome than a “ mild ” outcome? In utility theory, 20 the severity outcome can be seen as a loss of
utility, or disutility. In health care settings, risk aversion is most appropriate as it gives proportionately more weight to the most severe outcomes, that is, those that are most important to avoid. Based on this, the following numerical values were assigned: minimal = 0.01, mild = 0.05, moderate = 0.2, severe = 1.0. Sensitivity analysis using different values, maintaining the risk aversive assumption, showed that hazard rankings remained stable, suggesting that the precise values chosen are not critical to the process.
Hazard scores were then calculated for each failure mode for each respondent by multiplying the numerical conversions for frequency and severity. Mean hazard scores were also calculated for each respondent subgroup (providers, nursing, administrative) and for each practice site as a whole. To allow analysis of concordance between practices, hazard values were scaled to give a range of .01-100.
The hazard scores were also listed in rank order (highest to lowest) for each subgroup and practice.
Setting . The fi eld test was conducted at 2 primary care practices serving rural populations in New York State. Site 1 was a hospital-affi liated clinic with 4 physicians and midlevel providers, 5 nurses and medical offi ce assistants, and 7 administrative offi ce staff. Site 2 had 6 physicians and midlevel providers, 10 nurses and medical offi ce assistants, and 16 offi ce staff. Site 2 also was a rural residency training site.
Results At each practice, 94% of staff voluntarily
participated. Surveys were completed during personal time, with respondents reporting they spent 20-40 minutes on this activity.
Table 2 shows the top 3 hazards for each practice in each of the 12 practice areas included in the survey, based on all respondents. Similar tables can be used to compare the perceptions of the various subgroups within each practice. It is important to note that the absolute values of the hazard scores have no meaning in themselves, it is the rank order of scores that is important since this is what is used to determine priorities.
To compare the priorities identifi ed by each subgroup of respondents within each practice, the rank orders of hazards identifi ed by each subgroup were compared in a pair-wise fashion. That is, separate comparisons were made between providers and nursing, providers and administrative staff, and nursing and administrative staff. Comparison was made by examining the top 10 hazard scores for each subgroup since these are the items that are most likely to be prioritized for remedial action. For site 1, the
Table 1. Survey Example (Nurse Section of 12-Part Survey)
Type/cause of error: Nurse (for each category below, respondents list their perceived frequency/probability of the event ’ s occurrence * and the severity of its consequences † Triage: Does not correctly identify emergency cases Incorrect measurement or recording of vital signs Not making use of available resources for advice/help Nurse fatigued, stressed, ill Nurse in a hurry Errors in handling outside test results Delay in review of results Does not identify results that require urgent attention Errors in carrying out in-offi ce tests Wrong patient Wrong test Incorrect reading of test results Equipment malfunction or miscalibration Incorrect communication of results Errors in calling in prescriptions to pharmacy Wrong patient Wrong medication/treatment Wrong dose Wrong route Wrong times Other
* Four choices for frequency/probability are: frequent (one or more times in a week); occasional (one or more times in a month); uncommon (one or more times in a year); remote (less than once a year).
† Four choices for severity of consequences are: severe (severe or irreversible complications unrelated to natural course of illness [eg, disability, loss of function, hospitalization]); moder-ate (mild or moderate reversible complications unrelated to the natural course of the illness, not requiring hospitalization); mild (increased length or severity of illness, not requiring hospitalization); minimal (no increase in length or severity of illness).
. . . . . Quality of Care . . . . .
The Journal of Rural Health 176 Vol. 23, No. 2
Tab
le 2
. R
an
kin
gs
of
Top
3 P
erc
eiv
ed
Ty
pe
s/C
au
ses
of
Err
ors
in 1
2 P
ract
ice
Are
as
by
Stu
dy
Sit
e
Are
a
Site
1 (N
= 1
5)Si
te 2
(N =
30)
Typ
e/C
ause
of
Erro
rM
ean
Haz
ard
V
alu
e *
Typ
e/C
ause
of
Erro
rM
ean
Haz
ard
V
alu
e *
Rec
epti
on
Mis
fi le
d r
eco
rd2.
33R
ecep
tio
nis
t in
a h
urr
y19
.35
Lon
g w
ait
in o
ffi c
e2.
10M
isfi
led
rec
ord
18.5
6 R
ecep
tio
nis
t fa
tig
ued
, str
esse
d, i
ll1.
71Lo
ng
wai
t in
offi
ce
17.9
3
Nu
rse
Nu
rse
in a
hu
rry
10.9
5N
urs
e in
a h
urr
y18
.14
Nu
rse
fati
gu
ed, s
tres
sed
, ill
3.05
No
t u
sin
g a
vaila
ble
res
ou
rces
fo
r h
elp
7.98
N
ot
usi
ng
ava
ilab
le r
eso
urc
es f
or
hel
p1.
38N
urs
e fa
tig
ued
, str
esse
d, i
ll5.
30
Nu
rse-
pat
ien
t
inte
ract
ion
Mis
un
der
stan
din
g b
ecau
se p
atie
nt
in a
hu
rry
1.81
Mis
un
der
stan
din
g b
ecau
se n
urs
e in
a h
urr
y14
.31
Inad
equ
ate
pat
ien
t ed
uca
tio
n a
bo
ut
trea
tmen
t1.
74M
isu
nd
erst
and
ing
bec
ause
pat
ien
t in
a h
urr
y13
.52
Inad
equ
ate
pat
ien
t ed
uca
tio
n a
bo
ut
dis
ease
1.67
Inad
equ
ate
pat
ien
t ed
uca
tio
n a
bo
ut
trea
tmen
t7.
01
Nu
rse-
char
t
inte
ract
ion
Failu
re t
o u
pd
ate
char
t ad
equ
atel
y3.
90In
com
ple
te/n
ot
up
dat
ed c
har
t22
.69
Inco
mp
lete
/no
t u
pd
ated
ch
art
3.53
Med
icat
ion
list
no
t u
p t
o d
ate
21.4
0 R
ead
ing
fro
m w
ron
g c
har
t2.
04M
issi
ng
ch
art
20.9
9
Pat
ien
t
(ass
essm
ent)
Mas
ks s
ymp
tom
s b
y in
app
rop
riat
e se
lf-t
reat
men
t13
.13
Del
ay in
see
kin
g m
edic
al a
tten
tio
n20
.55
Del
ay in
see
kin
g m
edic
al a
tten
tio
n11
.37
Do
es n
ot
pro
vid
e ac
cura
te in
form
atio
n a
bo
ut
med
ical
pro
ble
ms
15.0
7 D
oes
no
t p
rovi
de
accu
rate
info
rmat
ion
ab
ou
t m
eds
take
n8.
54D
oes
no
t p
rovi
de
accu
rate
info
rmat
ion
ab
ou
t h
abit
s13
.08
Pro
vid
er
(a
sses
smen
t)P
rovi
der
in a
hu
rry
1.50
Pro
vid
er in
a h
urr
y11
.61
Pro
vid
er f
atig
ued
, str
esse
d, i
ll0.
70P
rovi
der
fat
igu
ed, s
tres
sed
, ill
6.10
N
ot
acco
un
tin
g f
or
pat
ien
t ’ s
soci
al/l
ivin
g c
on
dit
ion
s0.
67N
ot
mak
ing
use
of
exte
rnal
res
ou
rces
(co
nsu
ltat
ion
)5.
53
Pro
vid
er-p
atie
nt
in
tera
ctio
n
(a
sses
smen
t)
Inad
equ
ate
his
tory
bec
ause
pat
ien
t ca
nn
ot
exp
ress
cle
arly
2.87
Inad
equ
ate
his
tory
bec
ause
pro
vid
er m
isu
nd
erst
and
s p
atie
nt
7.71
In
adeq
uat
e h
isto
ry b
ecau
se p
atie
nt
in a
hu
rry
1.49
Inad
equ
ate
his
tory
bec
ause
pat
ien
t ca
nn
ot
exp
ress
cle
arly
7.38
In
adeq
uat
e h
isto
ry b
ecau
se m
issi
ng
info
rmat
ion
fro
m f
amily
/car
egiv
er1.
48In
adeq
uat
e h
isto
ry b
ecau
se p
atie
nt
in a
hu
rry
7.23
Pro
vid
er-c
har
t
inte
ract
ion
Inco
mp
lete
/no
t u
pd
ated
ch
art
2.27
Inco
mp
lete
/no
t u
pd
ated
ch
art
22.2
9 Fa
ilure
to
up
dat
e ch
art
adeq
uat
ely
2.27
Mis
sin
g c
har
t21
.23
Illeg
ible
/un
clea
r ch
art
1.83
Med
icat
ion
list
no
t u
p t
o d
ate
20.3
2
Nu
rse-
pro
vid
er
in
tera
ctio
nM
isu
nd
erst
and
ing
bec
ause
pro
vid
er in
a h
urr
y2.
42M
isu
nd
erst
and
ing
bec
ause
han
dw
riti
ng
is u
ncl
ear
13.6
0 M
isu
nd
erst
and
ing
bec
ause
nu
rse
in a
hu
rry
2.35
Imp
ort
ant
info
rmat
ion
is n
ot
com
mu
nic
ated
11.5
6 M
isu
nd
erst
and
ing
bec
ause
han
dw
riti
ng
is u
ncl
ear
1.89
Mis
un
der
stan
din
g b
ecau
se p
rovi
der
in a
hu
rry
9.63
Pro
vid
er (p
lan
)P
lan
no
t co
vere
d b
y p
atie
nt ’
s in
sura
nce
4.20
Un
clea
r co
mm
un
icat
ion
of
pla
n: u
ncl
ear
han
dw
riti
ng
16.6
0 U
ncl
ear
com
mu
nic
atio
n o
f p
lan
: fre
qu
ency
of
do
se u
ncl
ear
1.83
Pro
vid
er is
in a
hu
rry
12.0
0 U
ncl
ear
com
mu
nic
atio
n o
f p
lan
: un
clea
r h
and
wri
tin
g1.
66P
rovi
der
is f
atig
ued
, str
esse
d, i
ll10
.05
Pro
vid
er-p
atie
nt
in
tera
ctio
n (p
lan
)In
adeq
uat
e co
un
selin
g a
bo
ut
dis
ease
an
d t
reat
men
t1.
38M
isu
nd
erst
and
ing
bec
ause
pro
vid
er in
a h
urr
y8.
76
Pat
ien
t d
oes
no
t p
arti
cip
ate
in d
ecis
ion
mak
ing
1.26
Mis
un
der
stan
din
g b
ecau
se p
atie
nt
in a
hu
rry
8.23
N
ot
invo
lvin
g p
atie
nt/
care
giv
er in
dec
isio
n m
akin
g0.
84M
isu
nd
erst
and
ing
bec
ause
jarg
on
use
d b
y p
rovi
der
3.01
Pat
ien
t (P
lan
)D
oes
no
t se
ek c
lari
fi ca
tio
n w
hen
nee
ded
5.67
Do
es n
ot
pro
vid
e ac
cura
te in
form
atio
n a
bo
ut
med
s ta
ken
16.7
7 D
oes
no
t p
rovi
de
accu
rate
info
rmat
ion
ab
ou
t m
ed p
rob
lem
s4.
90D
oes
no
t se
ek c
lari
fi ca
tio
n w
hen
nee
ded
14.7
8 D
oes
no
t p
rovi
de
accu
rate
info
rmat
ion
ab
ou
t m
eds
take
n3.
87D
oes
no
t p
rovi
de
accu
rate
info
rmat
ion
ab
ou
t m
ed p
rob
lem
s12
.67
* H
azar
d v
alu
e is
per
ceiv
ed f
req
uen
cy o
f er
ror
per
1,0
00 p
atie
nt
visi
ts m
ult
iplie
d b
y p
erce
ived
sev
erit
y o
f co
nse
qu
ence
s (0
.01
= m
inim
al, 0
.05
= m
ild, 0
.20
= m
od
erat
e, a
nd
1.0
= s
ever
e).
Val
ues
hav
e b
een
sca
led
to
a r
ang
e o
f .0
1 to
100
fo
r co
nco
rdan
ce a
nal
ysis
bet
wee
n p
ract
ices
.
. . . . . Quality of Care . . . . .
Singh, Servoss and Singh 177 Spring 2007
levels of concordance in the top 10 priorities were: providers versus nursing staff, 40%; providers versus administrative, 50%; and nursing versus administrative, 70%, giving a mean of 53%. For site 2, the concordances were lower (40%, 10%, and 40%, respectively) with a mean of 30%.
Further, hazard rankings were compared across the 2 practices for each of the subgroups using the same methodology as for the within-practice comparisons. Concordance between providers at site 1 and providers at site 2 was 40%, while between nursing staff at each site, it was 10% and between administrative staff, it was 10%, giving a mean value of 20%.
Discussion In this article, we have described an approach that
aims to help individual rural practices to answer the question: “ What are the events or situations that pose the greatest threat to the safety of our patients? ” Practices must fi nd answers to this question so that they can focus their limited resources on solving safety problems that are important rather than following the common and convenient practice of simply solving the problems that are the most visible or those that are most amenable to solution.
The fi eld test in the 2 study practices suggests that the approach is feasible. High response rates were achieved with minimal disruption of practice activities. The analysis required is straightforward and can easily be automated using a spreadsheet.
It is interesting to note that the hazard scores at site 2 were consistently higher than those at site 1. This indicates that staff at site 2 perceived greater frequency and/or severity of the errors in their practice than did those at site 1. This may be a true refl ection of higher error rates in the larger practice, which includes a residency training program, compared to the smaller community clinic, or perhaps it refl ects a heightened perception of hazard due to factors such as the organization ’ s culture.
Within each practice, there was a moderate level of agreement between subgroups of respondents regarding the top 10 sources of hazard. Convergence of opinions within a practice can be helpful since it shows that team members are “ on the same page ” and also lends some credence to the validity of the measurement. On the other hand, variations in opinion are to be expected since different subgroups and different individuals within those subgroups will each have their own perspectives. These similarities and differences of opinion should be embraced and explored by practice members to help in mutual understanding. At site 2, levels of concordance were
lower, suggesting a wider divergence of opinion than at site 1. This might again be due to the nature of it being a larger residency practice site, in which there might be less of a coherent team vision, or it may represent a failure of the proposed approach to capture the prevailing perceptions.
The level of concordance between sites was lower than that seen within the practices, lending support to the notion that each practice is unique.
The proposed approach, based on FMEA, may be viewed as complementary to the externally derived practice profi les and internally derived error reports that are currently in common use. It is based on the anonymously expressed perceptions of individual members of the practice team and can be seen as an attempt to capture the memory of the whole practice and foster teamwork. While this represents an advantage, overcoming some of the problems inherent in the aforementioned approaches, it is also an important weakness; because the hazard scores are derived from subjective judgments, they are subject to various biases that may affect the reliability and validity of the responses. Further work is clearly needed to address this issue.
The sites where the approach was fi eld-tested are larger than most rural practices and administratively atypical (one a hospital-affi liated clinic and one a residency practice site). It remains to be seen whether this kind of approach will prove practical in smaller freestanding offi ces. One concern that may arise is that of maintaining anonymity within a very small group of respondents. Further, although the analytical skills required to perform this analysis are rudimentary, this still may be a challenge in some small practices.
Replication of the methodology at multiple sites will help clarify its potential roles and refi ne the procedures. Finally, since the purpose of the process is to help practices to prioritize quality and safety problems, it is imperative that we evaluate practice members ’ ability to use the priorities generated to focus their efforts and to develop and implement interventions that improve safety.
Conclusion The modifi ed FMEA approach shows promise as a
technique for identifying the most serious threats to patient safety in rural primary care practices.
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Building a Safer Health System . Washington, DC : National Academy Press ; 2000 .
. . . . . Quality of Care . . . . .
The Journal of Rural Health 178 Vol. 23, No. 2
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