6
. . . . . Quality of Care . . . . . © 2007 National Rural Health Association 173 Spring 2007 S afety and quality of care are high on the agendas of government, of payers, of providers, and increasingly of patients and their families. 1,2 However, in rural settings, relatively little is known about the factors that pose the greatest threat to quality. The recent Institute of Medicine report on rural health care 3 draws attention to the fact that rural communities are heterogeneous and diverse, and it calls for health professional competencies that include applying quality improvement and working in teams. The paradigm of complex adaptive systems suggests that each medical practice can be viewed as a complex adaptive microsystem; to thrive, such a microsystem needs to identify its own unique set of problems and devise solutions that are tailored to the situation, in light of the current quality status, practice costs, and resources available. 4-6 To achieve this, the measurements that are used to identify and prioritize quality and safety problems must be trusted by the members of the practice. The literature reflects skepticism regarding externally driven measures such as practice profiles and report cards, 7-9 suggesting that, in their current forms, they may not be trusted by many physicians as fair and valid measures. One approach to identifying problems internally has been to use error reports. The intention is that practice staff members complete these documents voluntarily when they notice mistakes or adverse events and that the information is used internally to drive improvement. Error reporting systems are widely available in hospital and ambulatory settings (commonly under the title “incident reports”), but their usefulness has always been limited by the problem of underreporting. 1 An alternative approach that permits involvement of all team members to identify and prioritize safety and quality problems is Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA). This has been widely used in other high-risk industries and has been advocated by the Institute of Medicine 1 as a means of analyzing a system to identify its weaknesses (failure modes) and possible consequences of failure (effects) and to prioritize areas ABSTRACT: Context: Rural primary care is a complex environment in which multiple patient safety challenges can arise. To make progress in improving safety with limited resources, each practice needs to identify those safety problems that pose the greatest threat to patients and focus efforts on these. Purpose: To describe and field- test a novel approach to prioritizing safety problems in rural primary care based on the method of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis. Methods: A survey instrument designed to assess perceptions of medical error frequency, severity, and cause was administered anonymously to staff of 2 rural primary care practices in New York State. Responses were converted to quantitative hazard scores, which were used to make priority rankings of safety problems. Concordance analysis was conducted. Results: Response rate was 94% at each site. Analysis yielded a list of priorities for each site. Comparison between staff groups (provider vs nursing vs administration), based on the top 10 priorities perceived by staff, showed 53% concordance at one site and 30% at the other. Concordance between sites was lower, at 20%. Conclusions: Initial field-testing of a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis approach in rural primary care suggests that it is feasible and can be used to estimate, based on staff perceptions, the greatest threats to patient safety in an individual practice so that limited resources can be focused appropriately. Higher concordance between staff within a practice than between practices lends preliminary support to the validity of the approach. 1 Patient Safety Research Center, Department of Family Medicine, State University of New York, Buffalo, NY. 2 Niagara Family Medicine Associates, Niagara Falls, NY. 3 Department of Psychology, Canisius College, Buffalo, NY. For further information, contact: Ranjit Singh, MD, MBA, Patient Safety Research Center, UB Department of Family Medicine, UB Clinical Center, 462 Grider Street, Buffalo, NY 14215; e-mail [email protected]. Prioritizing Threats to Patient Safety in Rural Primary Care Ranjit Singh, MD, MBA; 1 Ashok Singh, MD; 2 Timothy J. Servoss, MA; 1,3 and Gurdev Singh, MSc Eng, PhD 1

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Page 1: Prioritizing Threats to Patient Safety in Rural Primary Care

. . . . . Quality of Care . . . . .

© 2007 National Rural Health Association 173 Spring 2007

Safety and quality of care are high on the agendas of government, of payers, of providers, and increasingly of patients and their families. 1,2 However, in rural settings, relatively little is known about the factors that

pose the greatest threat to quality. The recent Institute of Medicine report on rural health care 3 draws attention to the fact that rural communities are heterogeneous and diverse, and it calls for health professional competencies that include applying quality improvement and working in teams.

The paradigm of complex adaptive systems suggests that each medical practice can be viewed as a complex adaptive microsystem; to thrive, such a microsystem needs to identify its own unique set of problems and devise solutions that are tailored to the situation, in light of the current quality status, practice costs, and resources available. 4-6 To achieve this, the measurements that are used to identify and prioritize quality and safety problems must be trusted by the members of the practice. The literature refl ects skepticism regarding externally driven measures such as practice profi les and report cards, 7-9 suggesting that, in their current forms, they may not be trusted by many physicians as fair and valid measures.

One approach to identifying problems internally has been to use error reports. The intention is that practice staff members complete these documents voluntarily when they notice mistakes or adverse events and that the information is used internally to drive improvement. Error reporting systems are widely available in hospital and ambulatory settings (commonly under the title “ incident reports ” ), but their usefulness has always been limited by the problem of underreporting. 1

An alternative approach that permits involvement of all team members to identify and prioritize safety and quality problems is Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA). This has been widely used in other high-risk industries and has been advocated by the Institute of Medicine 1 as a means of analyzing a system to identify its weaknesses (failure modes) and possible consequences of failure (effects) and to prioritize areas

ABSTRACT : Context: Rural primary care is a complex

environment in which multiple patient safety challenges

can arise. To make progress in improving safety with

limited resources, each practice needs to identify those

safety problems that pose the greatest threat to patients

and focus efforts on these. Purpose: To describe and fi eld-

test a novel approach to prioritizing safety problems in

rural primary care based on the method of Failure Modes

and Effects Analysis. Methods: A survey instrument

designed to assess perceptions of medical error frequency,

severity, and cause was administered anonymously to

staff of 2 rural primary care practices in New York State.

Responses were converted to quantitative hazard scores,

which were used to make priority rankings of safety

problems. Concordance analysis was conducted. Results: Response rate was 94% at each site. Analysis yielded a

list of priorities for each site. Comparison between staff

groups (provider vs nursing vs administration), based on

the top 10 priorities perceived by staff, showed 53%

concordance at one site and 30% at the other.

Concordance between sites was lower, at 20%.

Conclusions: Initial fi eld-testing of a Failure Modes and

Effects Analysis approach in rural primary care suggests

that it is feasible and can be used to estimate, based on

staff perceptions, the greatest threats to patient safety in

an individual practice so that limited resources can be

focused appropriately. Higher concordance between staff

within a practice than between practices lends

preliminary support to the validity of the approach.

1 Patient Safety Research Center, Department of Family Medicine,

State University of New York, Buffalo, NY. 2 Niagara Family Medicine Associates, Niagara Falls, NY.

3 Department of Psychology, Canisius College, Buffalo, NY.

For further information, contact: Ranjit Singh, MD, MBA, Patient

Safety Research Center, UB Department of Family Medicine,

UB Clinical Center, 462 Grider Street, Buffalo, NY 14215;

e-mail [email protected].

Prioritizing Threats to Patient Safety in Rural Primary Care Ranjit Singh , MD, MBA ; 1 Ashok Singh , MD; 2 Timothy J. Servoss , MA ; 1,3 and Gurdev Singh , MSc Eng, PhD 1

Page 2: Prioritizing Threats to Patient Safety in Rural Primary Care

. . . . . Quality of Care . . . . .

The Journal of Rural Health 174 Vol. 23, No. 2

for improvement. The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations has required since 2002 that all accredited hospitals perform proactive risk assessment each year following a series of steps based on FMEA. 10,11 It is important to point out that this method is based on the perceptions of informed decision makers.

This process, usually made up of 8 steps, 11 is time consuming, costly, and requires considerable expertise and experience. In hospital settings, trained quality-improvement personnel are available, and leadership is mandated by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations to provide the necessary resources for this type of activity. In ambulatory care, however, these factors typically are not present, and the literature is sparse regarding use of FMEA in this setting. In rural ambulatory settings, the scarcity of the necessary resources and expertise is particularly problematic. 3

In an attempt to overcome some of these practical barriers while maintaining the essential thrust of FMEA for the community primary care setting, the authors have developed an adapted FMEA process. This article describes that process and its preliminary fi eld-testing in 2 primary care practices serving rural populations. The adapted FMEA process involves administration of an anonymous safety survey to practice members followed by analysis of the results in order to develop a priority list of safety threats. Ultimately, practices are to use the priority list for developing individualized safety improvements, although that step was not included in the fi eld test reported here. The purpose of the fi eld test is to examine feasibility and begin to address validity issues.

Methods Anonymous FMEA Survey . The fi rst step in the

adapted FMEA process was to begin to understand the system of care in the practice. This was done by fi rst identifying the various entities in the practice (such as the patient, provider, nurse, and chart), listing the main interactions between them, and then portraying them in a diagram (Figure). 12 This diagram was then used as the basis for an anonymous survey. Errors can occur at any point in the practice, including within entities and in the interactions between entities. The survey was designed to examine 12 key areas, with 1 page of the survey dedicated to each (eg, the nurse-provider interaction). Each page consisted of a list of failure modes (errors or causes of error) that can occur in that part of the system. The lists, which include a total of 140 different failure modes, were developed after a review of the literature 1,13-19 and consultation with the

study practice leaders. The lists can be customized to incorporate special circumstances for any given practice if desired. Table 1 shows an example of items on a page from the survey. Participants were asked to consider each of the listed errors in turn and, for each, to respond with their perception of the frequency of the error and the likely severity of the consequences. Explanations of the categorical choices were given at the bottom of each survey page (these appear as footnotes in the table). The diagram of the practice entities was included on each survey page, with the appropriate entities highlighted to orient respondents to the part of the offi ce being assessed.

All members of the 2 practices were given the same survey. They were asked to complete the survey anonymously, stating (if willing) the group to which they belonged (provider, nursing, or administrative).

Hazard Analysis for Prioritization . The goal of the analysis was to rank the failure modes from the survey according to the size of their effects, as perceived by practice staff. We chose to measure effects using the concept of hazard borrowed from engineering. The hazard posed by any given error (or failure mode) is equal to the frequency (ie, probability) with which it occurs multiplied by the severity of the consequences that accrue when it does occur (hazard = frequency × severity).

In the survey, each respondent had rated the frequency and severity of each error according to the categorical scales shown in Table 1 . These categorical responses had to be converted to numerical values so that hazard values could be calculated, summarized, and compared. The fi rst step in this process was to

Practice Diagram. Simplifi ed Diagram of Primary Care Practice Entities (Boxes) and Interactions and Processes (Arrows), as Patient Moves From Assessment Phase to Formulation of Management Plan.

Chart

Provider

Nurse

OfficeStaff

Patient

Third Party

Patient

Nurse

OfficeStaff

Third Party

Assessment Plan

Page 3: Prioritizing Threats to Patient Safety in Rural Primary Care

. . . . . Quality of Care . . . . .

Singh, Servoss and Singh 175 Spring 2007

calculate frequency in terms of each practice ’ s patient volume, yielding a rate per 1,000 patient visits. For example, the “ frequent ” probability of occurrence (which was described as 1 or more times in a week) was approximated as 2 times per week. At site 1, 220 patients were seen per week. Hence, “ frequent ” was converted to 2/220 = 0.009, or 9 times per 1,000 visits. Similarly the “ remote ” probability, described as less than once a year, was approximated to 0.5 times per year and calculated as 0.5/11,000 (patients seen per year) = 0.00005, or .05 times per 1,000 visits.

For the severity scores, conversion of the categorical responses to numerical equivalents required decisions regarding the relative weights of the outcomes. For example, how much worse is a “ moderate ” outcome than a “ mild ” outcome? In utility theory, 20 the severity outcome can be seen as a loss of

utility, or disutility. In health care settings, risk aversion is most appropriate as it gives proportionately more weight to the most severe outcomes, that is, those that are most important to avoid. Based on this, the following numerical values were assigned: minimal = 0.01, mild = 0.05, moderate = 0.2, severe = 1.0. Sensitivity analysis using different values, maintaining the risk aversive assumption, showed that hazard rankings remained stable, suggesting that the precise values chosen are not critical to the process.

Hazard scores were then calculated for each failure mode for each respondent by multiplying the numerical conversions for frequency and severity. Mean hazard scores were also calculated for each respondent subgroup (providers, nursing, administrative) and for each practice site as a whole. To allow analysis of concordance between practices, hazard values were scaled to give a range of .01-100.

The hazard scores were also listed in rank order (highest to lowest) for each subgroup and practice.

Setting . The fi eld test was conducted at 2 primary care practices serving rural populations in New York State. Site 1 was a hospital-affi liated clinic with 4 physicians and midlevel providers, 5 nurses and medical offi ce assistants, and 7 administrative offi ce staff. Site 2 had 6 physicians and midlevel providers, 10 nurses and medical offi ce assistants, and 16 offi ce staff. Site 2 also was a rural residency training site.

Results At each practice, 94% of staff voluntarily

participated. Surveys were completed during personal time, with respondents reporting they spent 20-40 minutes on this activity.

Table 2 shows the top 3 hazards for each practice in each of the 12 practice areas included in the survey, based on all respondents. Similar tables can be used to compare the perceptions of the various subgroups within each practice. It is important to note that the absolute values of the hazard scores have no meaning in themselves, it is the rank order of scores that is important since this is what is used to determine priorities.

To compare the priorities identifi ed by each subgroup of respondents within each practice, the rank orders of hazards identifi ed by each subgroup were compared in a pair-wise fashion. That is, separate comparisons were made between providers and nursing, providers and administrative staff, and nursing and administrative staff. Comparison was made by examining the top 10 hazard scores for each subgroup since these are the items that are most likely to be prioritized for remedial action. For site 1, the

Table 1. Survey Example (Nurse Section of 12-Part Survey)

Type/cause of error: Nurse (for each category below, respondents list their perceived frequency/probability of the event ’ s occurrence * and the severity of its consequences † Triage: Does not correctly identify emergency cases Incorrect measurement or recording of vital signs Not making use of available resources for advice/help Nurse fatigued, stressed, ill Nurse in a hurry Errors in handling outside test results Delay in review of results Does not identify results that require urgent attention Errors in carrying out in-offi ce tests Wrong patient Wrong test Incorrect reading of test results Equipment malfunction or miscalibration Incorrect communication of results Errors in calling in prescriptions to pharmacy Wrong patient Wrong medication/treatment Wrong dose Wrong route Wrong times Other

* Four choices for frequency/probability are: frequent (one or more times in a week); occasional (one or more times in a month); uncommon (one or more times in a year); remote (less than once a year).

† Four choices for severity of consequences are: severe (severe or irreversible complications unrelated to natural course of illness [eg, disability, loss of function, hospitalization]); moder-ate (mild or moderate reversible complications unrelated to the natural course of the illness, not requiring hospitalization); mild (increased length or severity of illness, not requiring hospitalization); minimal (no increase in length or severity of illness).

Page 4: Prioritizing Threats to Patient Safety in Rural Primary Care

. . . . . Quality of Care . . . . .

The Journal of Rural Health 176 Vol. 23, No. 2

Tab

le 2

. R

an

kin

gs

of

Top

3 P

erc

eiv

ed

Ty

pe

s/C

au

ses

of

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ors

in 1

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ract

ice

Are

as

by

Stu

dy

Sit

e

Are

a

Site

1 (N

= 1

5)Si

te 2

(N =

30)

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ean

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ard

V

alu

e *

Typ

e/C

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of

Erro

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e *

Rec

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ecep

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nis

t in

a h

urr

y19

.35

Lon

g w

ait

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ffi c

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10M

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led

rec

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18.5

6 R

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t fa

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esse

d, i

ll1.

71Lo

ng

wai

t in

offi

ce

17.9

3

Nu

rse

Nu

rse

in a

hu

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10.9

5N

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a h

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.14

Nu

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3.05

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7.98

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.31

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74M

isu

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pat

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01

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re t

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com

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har

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/no

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art

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icat

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list

no

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p t

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21.4

0 R

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m w

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g c

har

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04M

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9

Pat

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(ass

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ent)

Mas

ks s

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app

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Del

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edic

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tten

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n20

.55

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ay in

see

kin

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edic

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tten

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vid

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pro

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ms

15.0

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ab

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54D

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rate

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tres

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6.10

N

ot

acco

un

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g f

or

pat

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soci

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ivin

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on

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s0.

67N

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mak

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use

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res

ou

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(co

nsu

ltat

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)5.

53

Pro

vid

er-p

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nt

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n

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Inad

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cle

arly

2.87

Inad

equ

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his

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bec

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pro

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isu

nd

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and

s p

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nt

7.71

In

adeq

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1.49

Inad

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adeq

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9 Fa

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13.6

0 M

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2.35

Imp

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11.5

6 M

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1.89

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9.63

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4.20

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0 U

ncl

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qu

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Pro

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12.0

0 U

ncl

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esse

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76

Pat

ien

t d

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mak

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1.26

Mis

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in a

hu

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8.23

N

ot

invo

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g p

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care

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Pat

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lan

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* H

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s (0

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= m

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1 to

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wee

n p

ract

ices

.

Page 5: Prioritizing Threats to Patient Safety in Rural Primary Care

. . . . . Quality of Care . . . . .

Singh, Servoss and Singh 177 Spring 2007

levels of concordance in the top 10 priorities were: providers versus nursing staff, 40%; providers versus administrative, 50%; and nursing versus administrative, 70%, giving a mean of 53%. For site 2, the concordances were lower (40%, 10%, and 40%, respectively) with a mean of 30%.

Further, hazard rankings were compared across the 2 practices for each of the subgroups using the same methodology as for the within-practice comparisons. Concordance between providers at site 1 and providers at site 2 was 40%, while between nursing staff at each site, it was 10% and between administrative staff, it was 10%, giving a mean value of 20%.

Discussion In this article, we have described an approach that

aims to help individual rural practices to answer the question: “ What are the events or situations that pose the greatest threat to the safety of our patients? ” Practices must fi nd answers to this question so that they can focus their limited resources on solving safety problems that are important rather than following the common and convenient practice of simply solving the problems that are the most visible or those that are most amenable to solution.

The fi eld test in the 2 study practices suggests that the approach is feasible. High response rates were achieved with minimal disruption of practice activities. The analysis required is straightforward and can easily be automated using a spreadsheet.

It is interesting to note that the hazard scores at site 2 were consistently higher than those at site 1. This indicates that staff at site 2 perceived greater frequency and/or severity of the errors in their practice than did those at site 1. This may be a true refl ection of higher error rates in the larger practice, which includes a residency training program, compared to the smaller community clinic, or perhaps it refl ects a heightened perception of hazard due to factors such as the organization ’ s culture.

Within each practice, there was a moderate level of agreement between subgroups of respondents regarding the top 10 sources of hazard. Convergence of opinions within a practice can be helpful since it shows that team members are “ on the same page ” and also lends some credence to the validity of the measurement. On the other hand, variations in opinion are to be expected since different subgroups and different individuals within those subgroups will each have their own perspectives. These similarities and differences of opinion should be embraced and explored by practice members to help in mutual understanding. At site 2, levels of concordance were

lower, suggesting a wider divergence of opinion than at site 1. This might again be due to the nature of it being a larger residency practice site, in which there might be less of a coherent team vision, or it may represent a failure of the proposed approach to capture the prevailing perceptions.

The level of concordance between sites was lower than that seen within the practices, lending support to the notion that each practice is unique.

The proposed approach, based on FMEA, may be viewed as complementary to the externally derived practice profi les and internally derived error reports that are currently in common use. It is based on the anonymously expressed perceptions of individual members of the practice team and can be seen as an attempt to capture the memory of the whole practice and foster teamwork. While this represents an advantage, overcoming some of the problems inherent in the aforementioned approaches, it is also an important weakness; because the hazard scores are derived from subjective judgments, they are subject to various biases that may affect the reliability and validity of the responses. Further work is clearly needed to address this issue.

The sites where the approach was fi eld-tested are larger than most rural practices and administratively atypical (one a hospital-affi liated clinic and one a residency practice site). It remains to be seen whether this kind of approach will prove practical in smaller freestanding offi ces. One concern that may arise is that of maintaining anonymity within a very small group of respondents. Further, although the analytical skills required to perform this analysis are rudimentary, this still may be a challenge in some small practices.

Replication of the methodology at multiple sites will help clarify its potential roles and refi ne the procedures. Finally, since the purpose of the process is to help practices to prioritize quality and safety problems, it is imperative that we evaluate practice members ’ ability to use the priorities generated to focus their efforts and to develop and implement interventions that improve safety.

Conclusion The modifi ed FMEA approach shows promise as a

technique for identifying the most serious threats to patient safety in rural primary care practices.

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