Principled People—Yes; Principled Policies—NoAuthor(s): Robert CunninghamSource: Administrative Theory & Praxis, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Mar., 2003), pp. 109-111Published by: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25610590 .

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Dialogue: Principles and Pragmatism 109

REFERENCES

Callahan, D. (2000). Universalism and particularism: Fighting to a draw. Hastings Center Report, 30, 37-44.

Halpern, J. (2001). From detached concern to empathy: Humanizing medical practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Harmon, M. (2003). Why principles can't justify: A pragmatist commentary on the affirmative action debate (this issue).

Korsgaard, C. (1996). The sources ofnormativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Principled People?Yes; Principled Policies?No

Robert Cunningham University of Tennessee

Principles are important at the individual level. Our personal principles create and constitute a moral gyroscope for leading an honest life as a decent

person. Principles give life purpose and consistency, and define each of us as

individuals. Acting in consonance with professed beliefs builds trust among members of a community. Consistency does not mean rigidity. People change their minds, and priorities among principles rearrange themselves, but not

much, and not often. Principled people contribute to the order, growth, and

vitality of a community. When principles move from the individual level to the group level,

principles take a benign turn, or a toxic turn. When benign, group principles become symbolic platitudes, which receive universal affirmation, yet do not

impinge on individual behaviors. Examples: love, freedom, democracy. People are free to exercise or ignore any of these principles. No problem, so

long as the principles remain abstract symbols. Toxicity invades when a reasonable principle or value (i.e., capitalism,

socialism, Christianity, Islam) hardens into a rigidly defined ideology, incorporating a specific set of behaviors that its adherents hold to be universal truth that cannot be questioned publicly.1 A group or community captured by a cohesive set of principles or values turns into itself, treating the outside world as uninformed, untrustworthy, and perhaps dangerous. Policies and problem solving derived from rigidly-held group principles threaten those both inside and outside the group. Such an attitude on the part of a community can be described as "ethnocentrism."

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110 Administrative Theory & Praxis Vol. 25, No. 1

Take the example of September 11, 2001. While ethnocentrism did not "cause" 9-11, US policy following that horrific event, carried out by a few hundred men with a few million dollars, has been compatible with a

"principled morality" or ethnocentric approach to policy-making. The US

government responded to the 9-11 tragedy by verbally attacking "evil

regimes" and promising to "eliminate terrorism." Such talk by our President and members of his administration created or exacerbated fears by US citizens of what may be done to us by foreigners, and fears by foreigners of ill considered acts by the US government.2 Billions of dollars in US government expenditures and commitments have gone to domestic programs designed to calm the fears of US citizens. Actions by the US government in aggressively pursuing short term military actions in Afghanistan, adopting adversarial rhetoric and policies toward regimes it characterizes as evil, and issuing policy declarations in the absence of policy discussions or consensus among Congress or our closest allies have likely had effects detrimental to our national interest: allies do not trust our judgment and are less likely to collaborate whole-heartedly with our leadership in security policy; neutral nations are less likely to be forthcoming in cooperating in providing information on possible "terrorists"; popular demonstrations against US

policies in other countries have caused those countries to reduce cooperation with the US on other policies of interest to the US; and our credibility as

disinterested adjudicator in any regional or international conflict becomes

suspect. As a result, our pursuit of a principled approach to policy-making regarding 9 11 has likely increased rather than deceased our risk of being subjected to attacks by terrorists.3 Our response as a nation resembles our response to the domestic communist threat we faced in the 1945-55 period.

In The Torment of Secrecy, Edward Shils (1956) analyzed our domestic situation during this ten-year period following World War II. Shils saw the

greatest danger to pluralist liberalism emerging from an elite that pandered to the irrational fears of the masses. Sloganeering emphasizing the rhetoric of

security made our nation less secure by politicizing the security apparatus and

distorting the goals of those agencies by focusing on prominent personalities who had early and slight contact with communists, and had long ago shed their

communist sympathies. Policy founded upon abstract principles such as

"security," "freedom," or "independence" do not call forth specific

governmental actions, and such rhetoric when put into practice may undermine the goals inherent in those principles.

S. M. Lipset (1960, chap. 1) argued that liberal democracy is effective and

long-lasting because it addresses problems as they arise, before small, unresolved problems attach to each other and agglutinate into large problem clusters which are difficult to deal with, and from which war or revolution can

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Dialogue: Principles and Pragmatism 111

result. Decision-making based upon principles encourages certainty, rules,

conformity, bureaucracy, and control; pragmatic decision-making encourages

openness, questioning, tolerance, supportiveness, and innovation. While rules and bureaucracy are important for an efficient political system; openness, tolerance, and innovation are the engine for economic, emotional, and

intellectual vibrancy at both the individual and societal levels, and are more

likely than principled policies to engender peace and prosperity. Pragmatism accepts various principles as having potential utility in

problem-solving. Pragmatism emphasizes solving the problem effectively, then seeing which principle(s) appears compatible with the solution. Its low

ideological content serves as a flexible guide to policy-making, fitting easily with Lipset's (1960) admonition to solve problems as they arise, before they migrate and attach to other festering issues. The problems of Kashmir and Palestine date from 1948, the Irish question for longer. Our Cuban policy is a

cold-war relic from the 1950s, and our policy on illegal drugs contributes to

the destabilization of some Latin America countries and deters attempts at

inner-city revitalization. Attachment to principles on a personal level can contribute to appropriate

moral growth of citizens; attachment to principles as a foundation for policy making increases the difficulty of effective policy-making and inhibits our

ability to respond to challenges in a way that furthers our national interest.

ENDNOTES

1. Gustav Bergmann (1951) describes how the motivational power of a value

judgment is increased when it comes to be believed as a fact.

2. Americans are now frightened by brown men wearing moustaches and women

with ankle-length dresses and head scarves. Men and women with these characteristics

have been removed from airline flights, despite having undergone multiple security checks, simply because other passengers are afraid.

3. Please do not assume that I think the US government should have done nothing. We acted appropriately by increasing surveillance and gathering, tracking, and sharing

intelligence information with trustworthy allies. At the date of this writing, we have

killed probably several hundred non-Afghan al-qaida members, some of whom might have been able to cause us harm, and several thousands of Afghanis who never had any intention of leaving their homeland. Our response has likely swelled the ranks of

applicants to al-qaida-related terrorist groups.

REFERENCES

Bergmann, G. (1951, April). Ideology. Ethics, 61, 205-218.

Lipset, S. M. (1960). Political man. New York: Doubleday.

Shils, E. A. (1956). The torment of secrecy. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.

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