Primer on Dialogue Mindanaw

8/14/2019 Primer on Dialogue Mindanaw

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Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP)

REFRLECTIVE DIALOGUES ON THE GRP-MILF PEACE NEGOTIATION

2010



FOREWORD

The peace talks have begun. We believe that this is the portal to winning lasting peace inMindanao. To many, peace has been a life long quest. For the country, it has been anenigma seeking a closure. But the journey has not been easy. While there have beentriumphs, there had been many painful lessons hopefully learned. What is clear is that thenation yearns for peace...so that Filipinos can simply lead normal lives and pursue theirhuman dreams.

Because the stakes are high, there is no doubt that engagement is necessary. No one has amonopoly of answers to the difficult questions that seek answers on the negotiation table.And because the ultimate beneficiaries of the dividends of peace are the people, everyonemust stand up and be involved.

In the next 60 days, the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process takes the leadin embarking on a massive Communications Plan with Reflective Dialogue as itscenterpiece. With the help of our peace partners, we will provide a safe place where peoplecan be informed and can reflect upon what they hear and learn. We will engage our people

in a non-adversarial process where they can truly listen and be heard, where they canunderstand instead of debate, where they can explore and harmonize meanings, where theycan generate a myriad of perspectives and possibilities. This way, we hope to surface thevery precious ideas and thoughts of the people whose lives and dreams are the very prize.

We take this task seriously and sincerely. The talks as well as the dialogues will take placein a less than ideal atmosphere of election blare and clatter. But because there is passion anddetermination for peace, we wish to pursue this aspiration relentlessly and with the urgencyit deserves. People ask if government is in a hurry. It is not. Government shall go by thetiming of the people. But government discerns that peace is ripe, and peace cannot wait, soit must act with dispatch.

Thus, we invite all peace-ardent Filipinos, especially those who have chosen Mindanao astheir homeland, to engage, to attend the dialogues, to make their voices be heard. Only thenwill we deserve the peace that we must so rightly own.

SEC. ANNABELLE T. ABAYAPresidential Adviser on the Peace Process



PRIMER ON “DIALOGUE MINDANAW”

“Even the best efforts of government leaders constantly faceconstraints and limitations. It may be that if people own the

process, they will work hard to ensure viable outcomes andovercome the inevitable obstacles that arise once the agreement isin place. The earlier we engage in the task of building the socialinfrastructure of peace, the sooner societies will come closer toanother reality where the dignity of difference is celebrated, political tolerance observed and a just peace becomes possible.”---Ed Garcia, international peace advocate

INTRODUCTION

The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front(MILF) have resumed formal negotiations last December 9, 2009. This opens up fresh possibilities forarriving at a Peace Agreement before the end of the term of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in June2010.

This requires, however, that the process involves the enhanced participation of the people. Followingthe Supreme Court’s declaration that the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) is unconstitutional due to lack of participatory mechanisms, the Office of the Presidential Adviseron the Peace Process (OPAPP) is now undertaking Dialogue Mindanaw.

Dialogue Mindanaw is a series of consultations, covering key regions in Mindanao and the rest of thecountry, with a special focus on the Mindanao peace negotiation, and using a particularly designedprocess called Reflective Dialogue. It is a part of the biggest communication plan embarked on by theGovernment. The plan consists of (1) Public Relations and Media Advertising Campaign to reach abroader audience, (2) Public Conversations that reaches out to grassroots communities, and (3)Reflective Dialogues, touching on critical issues being discussed in the GRP-MILF peace talks. Dialogue Mindanaw is moved by the following objectives:

1. to engage the people at all levels by informing them about the issues being discussed inthe GRP-MILF peace talks, and by securing their honest feedback on these issues;

2. to create a space where people can express their sentiments on the issues;

3. to create interest and participation in the ongoing GRP-MILF Peace Talks

Through this program, Dialogue Mindanaw hopes to achieve the following:

1. Inform the proponents of the genuine sentiments of the people on the proposed itemsbeing discussed in the peace negotiations;

2. Provide a fresh and balanced information and education relevant to the negotiations;

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3. Create authentic opportunity for dialogue, where people can experience being listened toand where they can express themselves genuinely to one another;

4. Build better understanding of people’s concerns;5. Increase political interest and knowledge, and possibly6. Make a dramatic change in opinions toward a lasting peace in Mindanao.

We know that all this demands some amount of transparency, hence this Primer. This Primer tries to be as transparent as possible on matters of the GRP-MILF peace negotiations. Itbegins with a background on the history of the negotiations. It then situates the discussion according tothe following key messages:

1. That both peace panels are sincerely committed to forging a mutually acceptable agreement forthe sake of a lasting peace in Mindanao.

2. That unknown to many, the two panels have actually agreed on a number of important pointsin the past, from protection of the internally displaced communities to international monitoringteam, among others important joint actions.

3. That key issues remain unresolved, such as that of the identity of the Bangsamoro and themanagement of natural resources, and for this the two peace panels welcome people’s feedback.

4. That the peace panels are open to fresh insights and recommendations from the people.

This Primer also describes, very briefly, how the Reflective Dialogues will be conducted, as we bringthem to the nine regions of Mindanao and Palawan, as well as to Visayas, Luzon and the NationalCapital Region.

I. BRIEF BACKGROUND AND HISTORYOF THE GRP-MILF PEACE TALKS

The current GRP-MILF Peace Talks started on January 7, 1997 when the two parties first met to set anddefine the agenda for the formal peace talks. The MILF proposed a single agenda, which is to solve theBangsamoro problem.

A. THE MINDANAO CONFLICT AND THE BANGSAMORO ASPIRATIONS

The Mindanao conflict reflects the ongoing struggle of the Philippines’ Bangsamoro people to asserttheir distinct identity, history and culture, against what they consider as discrimination by the national

government and the majority population. Before the Philippines was colonized by the Spaniards andlater by the Americans, they already had their own political institutions and economic structures. Theyconsidered themselves a free nation assimilated to the Philippines against their consent.

The Bangsamoro people assert their right to self-determination, a right that is recognized by the UnitedNations. The right to self-determination involves the right of peoples to determine their political statusand freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

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Self-determination has two essential aspects. Internal aspects involve self-governance, social andeconomic development, culture, internal security/police, judicial matters and social services. Externalaspects involve national defense, foreign affairs, currency, immigration and postal services.

B. “THE BANGSAMORO PROBLEM”

“The Bangsamoro problem,” according to the MILF, involves wide-ranging issues that include thefollowing nine (9) key items:

1. Ancestral domain;2. Displaced and landless Bangsamoro;3. Destruction of properties and war victims;4. Human rights issues;5. Social and cultural discrimination;6. Corruption of the mind and the moral fiber;7. Economic inequities and widespread poverty;8. Exploitation of natural resources; and

9. Agrarian-related issues.

The persistence of this Bangsamoro problem is among the underlying reasons that triggered the armedrebellion of the MILF, which it has been waging since the late 1970s. The MILF was founded bySalamat Hashim after he left the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) leadership in 1977. Thesearch for the resolution to this Bangsamoro problem is at the heart of the current negotiation.

C. PEACE EFFORTS AND THEIR OUTCOMES

War is a messy encounter. Despite all the frictions, however, there have been at least some hints at

common willingness to move peace forward.

Date Event Outcomes

July 18, 1997 Parties signed “Agreementfor the General Cessationof Hostilities”

This agreement was significant for it directedboth the GRP and the MILF to each create its ownCoordinating Committees on the Cessation ofHostilities (CCCH). They, in turn, jointly createdthe GRP-MILF Coordinating Committee onCessation of Hostilities. The CCCHs are tasked toconduct investigation on alleged violations of theagreement.

Nov. 14, 1997 Parties signedimplementing guidelinesfor the “Agreement for theGeneral Cessation ofHostilities”

March 2000 Peace talks collapsed whenthe Estrada administrationdeclared an “All-out War”policy

The war that ensued incurred very heavydamage in terms of lives and properties lost. Thefinancial cost to Government alone was in severalbillions of pesos.

January 2001 Talks resumed whenGloria Macapagal-Arroyowas installed as President

March 24, 2001 Parties signed the Malaysia assisted in the peace talks by brokering

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“Agreement on theGeneral Framework for theResumption of PeaceTalks)

between the two parties.

June 22, 2001 First formal peace talksheld in Libya. TripoliAgreement on Peacefocused on 3 major aspects:a. Securityb. Rehabilitation andDevelopmentc. Ancestral Domain

The number of armed skirmishes between thegovernment and the MILF dropped over theyears from 698 documented incidents in 2002 and559 in 2003 to less than 20 between the years 2004to 2007.

Under the Security aspect, the following subsequent outcomes followed:

1. A Malaysian-led International Monitoring Team (IMT) was created to observe theimplementation of all GRP-MILF agreements;

2. Mechanisms to reduce the incidence of violence in the conflict-affected areas were set in place,including the Joint Coordinating Committees on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) and the AdHoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG);

3. Bantay Ceasefire (Ceasefire Watch) was initiated and created by civil society groups;4. The number of armed skirmishes between the government and the MILF dropped over the

years from 698 documented incidents in 2002 and 559 in 2003 to less than 20 between the years2004 to 2007.

5. It dramatically increased to 218 in 2008, though, when the peace talks collapsed after violenceerupted following the aborted signing of the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain(MOA-AD) in August 2008.

Under the Rehabilitation and Development aspect:

1. Both the GRP and MILF panels agreed to extend capacity building support for the BangsamoroDevelopment Agency (BDA) , the MILF’s development arm, tasked to conduct rehabilitationand development programs in conflict-affected communities.

2. Various donor countries have also committed support for the Mindanao Trust Fund (MTF)which will be implemented in full once a peace agreement is signed.

3. In 2006, a joint statement of the two panels announced the establishment of the BangsamoroLeadership Institute. The institute was envisioned as a social and political change agent forBangsamoro communities.

Since the two parties have already agreed on the Security and Rehabilitation and Development andtheir implementing guidelines, the only remaining aspect that needed resolution was that on AncestralDomain.

Once this item was resolved, the agreements on the three aspects would be consolidated into acomprehensive peace compact. But negotiations hit an impasse in September 2006 over issues on

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territorial scope that included areas outside the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).Exploratory talks resumed in late 2007, but once again the talks hit a snag.

D. THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEEMENT ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (MOA-AD) The result of the long-drawn negotiation was the draft Memorandum of Agreement on AncestralDomain (MOA-AD). It was supposed to be signed on August 5, 2008 in Kuala Lumpur. On August 4,

2008, on the eve of the well-publicized signing of the Memorandum of Agreement on AncestralDomain in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, the Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining orderenjoining the Philippine government not to sign the MOA-AD.

The TRO was in response to a petition filed by the local governments of North Cotabato, Zamboangaand Iligan who invoked their rights to consultation and be informed on matters of public concern.After a series of hearings, on October 14, 2008, the Supreme Court finally declared the MOA-ADunconstitional.

This series of events was followed by violence. Irate MILF commanders, expecting the MOA-AD to besigned, assaulted civilian communities. Government military also launched an offensive, also hitting

several communities. By the end of the year, the fighting resulted to the displacement of more than halfa million civilians.

Not everything is lost, however. On December 2, 2008, the government named Foreign Affairs Under-Secretary Rafael Seguis as the new chair. Other members of the peace panel were later named: AdelbertAntonino, former mayor of General Santos City; lawyer-businessman Tomas Cabili, Jr. of Iligan City;educator Ronald Adamat, a Teduray representing the Lumads; and Agrarian Reform Secretary NasserPangandaman, a Muslim.

The MILF has also reconstituted its panel, under the leadership of Mr. Mohagher Iqbal. With him areAtty. Lanang Ali, Mr. Maulana Alonto, Atty. Michael Mastura, and Atty Musib Buat.

On December 26, 2008, the MILF issued a five-point statement, signed by its chair, Al Haj MuradEbrahim, stating that before talks resumed, it wanted:

1. International guarantors to ensure that both sides would implement any agreement reached;

2. Resolution of the MOA’s status;

3. Return of the IMT in a way that would enable it to discharge its functions, includinginvestigations of all violations since July 2008;

4. Cessation of all operations by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) against the MILF; and

5. Continuation of Malaysia as facilitator.

On January 7, 2009, the Arroyo government announced a “new paradigm” for peace. The Presidentissued the “New Guidelines on the Conduct of Peace Talks with the MILF ” which provided Government’snew policy on the Peace Process, focusing not only on negotiating with the MILF but also on authenticdialogues with people in the communities.

A number of civil society groups responded through information campaigns and by conductingconsultations to generate greater participation of the people in the peace process. Among suchinitiatives was Konsult Mindanaw, a project commissioned by the Bishops-Ulama Conference. Foremostof its findings is the serious need for a comprehensive communication program to inform the public of

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the critical issues around the peace talks as well as to consult them about their views and sentiments.This reinforced the injunction of the Supreme Court for OPAPP to conduct sincere dialogues not onlyin Mindanao but also in the rest of the country.

II. WHERE ARE WE NOW IN THECURRENT PEACE TALKS?

A. MORE EFFORTS TOWARD PEACE

A review of the peace panels’ overall track record shows a long-standing commitment to pursue thepeace process.

Date Event GRP Response MILF Response

March 9, 2000 Parties signedAgreement onSafety and

SecurityGuarantees

Granted MILF ceasefire committee’srequest for safe conduct passes andexemption from election gun ban

Requested for safeconduct passes andexemption from the

election gun ban;

Both sides continued to respect the safety and securityguarantees for MILF members who were directly andprincipally involved in the Peace Talks.

Under the said agreement, MILF members shall not berestrained or arrested, searched, seized and harassed on theirpersons and property in connection with their participation orinvolvement in the peace talks, except in cases of commissionon common crimes such as crimes against persons, chastity,

property and other similar offenses.

Since 2001 The Presidentdirected the AFPto uphold theprimacy of thepeace process.

The President directed the ArmedForces of the Philippines to reviewits guidelines and issuancesconcerning strategic and tacticaloperations.

The review covers the existing “AFPGuidelines on the Primacy of theGRP-MILF Peace Process” issued on

12 November 2003 and the“Reminders and AdditionalGuidelines on the Primacy of theGRP-MILF Peace Process” draftedby the AFP on 31 March 2007.

In compliance with thismandate, The MILFleadership, in turn,acknowledged thegovernment’s decisionto pursue the peaceprocess and not resortto a military solution.

MILF Chairman Al HajMurad Ebrahim, inresponse, declared to“keep combatants inplace.”

November 8,2002

GRP Inter-AgencyTechnicalWorking Group

The BDA, being the development arm of the MILF, was taskedto conduct rehabilitation and development programs inconflict-affected communities. Both the GRP and MILF panels

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and theBangsamoroDevelopmentAgencyConferenceWorkshop

agreed to extend capacity-building programs through theBDA.

Currently, BDA personnel are undergoing training sessionsunder the Malaysian Technical Cooperation Program tostrengthen the institution’s capability to plan and managesustainable development projects.February 20,

2004 Joint Statementsigned onprovidingcapacity supportto theBangsamoroDevelopmentAgency (BDA)

May 4, 2006 Signed JointStatementestablishing theBangsamoro

LeadershipInstitute

The institute is envisioned as a social and political changeagent for Bangsamoro communities.

Currently, capacity training is being conducted through the

Malaysian Technical Cooperation Program (MTCP). TheDevelopment Academy of the Philippines also providesleadership and organizational development workshops

March 27, 2007 The PresidentissuedAdministrativeOrder No. 174,“Creating AnInter-agency TaskForce to Assess

and Resolve LandDisputes in NorthCotabato andAddress SimilarIssues in Conflict-Prone Areas”

Various conflicts over land ownership are sometimes thetrigger to full-blown armed conflicts, particularly NorthCotabato and similar areas. An inter-agency task force wasformed to look into the roots of these disputes, recommendpolicy decisions and coordinate with agencies on makinginterventions.

The Task Force is initially composed of the following:Department of Agriculture; Department of Agrarian Reform;Department of Environment and Natural Resources; JointCoordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (GRPand MILF CCCH); International Monitoring Team; and LocalGovernment Unit of Kidapawan.

June 29, 2009 AdministrativeOrder 267 createdthe Health,Education,Livelihood,

Progress TaskForce-CentralMindanao (HELP-CM)

Chaired by the GRP peace panel head, the task force seeks toaddress the concerns arising from continued armed hostilities,the protection of civilians and non-combatants, especially fromlawless MILF renegades.

It will also help reduce the impact of the conflict on thecommunities in the conflict-affected areas, especially theinternally displaced persons (IDPs) and pursue ‘humanitarianoffensives’ to address the root causes of conflict.

July 23, 2009 Issuance of theSuspension ofOffensive Military

The Government directed the AFPto suspend all offensive operationsin conflict-affected areas and revert

Two days later, theMILF respondedpositively to the GRP’s

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Operations(SOMO)

to Active Defense mode as providedfor under the AFP Guidelines on thePrimacy of the GRP-MILF PeaceProcess.

This was a major initiative done bythe government to provide a stableenvironment for the resumption ofthe peace talks.

The PNP however is directed tocontinue undertaking its lawenforcement activities to bring thethree renegade MILF commandersand other lawless elements to thebar of justice with the AFP playing asupport role.

gesture by declaringits own Suspension ofMilitary Action(SOMA).

July 29, 2009 Re-establishmentofCommunicationLines and FormalResumption of thePeace Talks.

After a year of impasse in the peace talks, the two partiesfinally re-established their formal communication lines.

This was a crucial step that eventually paved the way for theformal resumption of the GRP-MILF Peace Talks on 9December 2009.

September 15,2009

Signing of theFrameworkAgreement on theFormation of the

InternationalContact Group forthe GRP-MILFPeace Process

The ICG will be ad hoc in nature and issue-specific in itsengagement with the GRP and MILF panels.

It shall primarily be mandated to exert the necessary leverage

and assistance towards sustaining the trust and confidence ofboth sides at the negotiating table.

October 27, 2009 Signing of theAgreement on theCivilianProtectionComponent of theInternationalMonitoring Team

(IMT)

The Agreement outlines the commitments of both peace panelsto protect civilians and civilian communities by expanding theIMT’s mandate.

The IMT is now tasked to monitor, verify and report non-compliance by either the government or the MILF to theirbasic undertaking to protect civilians. This civilian protection

component shall also remain in place should the IMT cease tooperate. The two panels shall designate humanitarianorganizations and NGOs, both international and national, withproven track record for impartiality, neutrality andindependence, to carry out the civilian protection functions.

December 9,2009

Formalresumption of theGRP-MILF Peace

TOR for the IMT was signed to renew the mandate of the IMT,which was expanded to include the component on civilianprotection (see Oct. 27, 2009)

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Talks and Signingof the Terms ofReference of theIMT

Signing of theInterimImplementingGuidelines on the JointCommuniqué ofMay 6, 2002

The Interim Implementing Guidelines was signed to renew themandate of the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG).

Both parties agreed to the isolation and interdiction of allcriminal syndicates and kidnap-for-ransom groups, includingso-called “lost commands” operating in or near MILFcommunities.

The AHJAG is tasked to pursue and apprehend these criminalelements and will operate in tandem with their respectiveCoordinating Committees on the Cessation of Hostilities.

B. UNRESOLVED ISSUES

Over the past thirteen years since negotiations began in 1997, the two peace panels have tackledcontentious issues that remain unresolved. The following are some of these key issues:

1. Bangsamoro identity: Which groups and communities are included in the ‘Bangsamoropeople’?

2. Bangsamoro homeland: What areas are covered and considered as part of the Bangsamoroancestral domain?

3. Relationship with the National Government: What exactly is the relationship between the“Regional Government” and the Philippine State?

4. Ancestral waters: Who should have control and authority over the waters within and beyondthe 15 kilometer area from the coastline?

5. Natural resources: How should the revenue generated from the natural resources covered bythe Regional Government be shared?

6. Strategic minerals: Who should have control over strategic minerals that are found within theBangsamoro homeland?

7. Governance: What powers must be shared by the National Government with the Regional

Government?

8. Constitutional change: If the proposed agreement drafted in the GRP-MILF peace talks is notcovered by the existing constitutional framework, what should be done?

C. OTHER PRESSING CONCERNS

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Various consultation groups report other sources of conflict, so there may be other issues on peace.Many of these issues are more long term, or regional in scope, and probably not within the immediateagenda of the GRP-MILF peace talks. Some issues, however, cannot be easily dismissed as long shot orirrelevant. Two of these related assertions, for example, come from groups that feel they are directlyaffected by the current peace talks, namely, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) who hadpreviously signed a peace agreement with the Government, and the Lumads who call for respect fortheir own separate struggle for self-determination.

Through Dialogue Mindanaw, the peace negotiation breaks from the traditional secretive approach indealing with the public. It invests in sharing information on the critical issues in the formal peaceagenda. In so doing, it welcomes public participation in the whole peace process.

III. HOW WILL THE REFLECTIVE DIALOGUESBE CONDUCTED AND USED?

The Reflective Dialogues will gather some 300 participants from each of the ten regions in Mindanao

and Palawan and three other regions in the rest of the country. These participants represent variousgroups of each region: local government units (LGUs), academics, non-government organizations(NGOs), the religious, the business sector, fisher folks and farmers, diverse general public includingwomen and the youth, Christians, Lumads, and Muslims.

The dialogues will consist of an input from resource persons who will be discussing issues on the peacetable, followed by small group discussions. The objective of their presentations is to inform – not todebate, convince or persuade.

The purpose of the small group discussions is to provide a space where people can reflect on the issuesfor themselves based on the information they hear and understand.

After the sharing, there will be a poll of opinions. The results of this survey will be used to guide us

in the preparation of a Communication Program.

The narratives and the data that will be drawn from the nation-wide dialogues will be analyzed andthe results will be offered to the two peace panels, the Malaysian facilitators, and the InternationalContact Group. Through forums and press conferences, the same results will also reach the widerpublic.

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The Reflective Dialogues will be conducted in the following regional centers, with their respectiveregional partners and coordinators:

Lanao Region Pakigdait, Inc. (Iligan City)Central Mindanao Notre Dame University (Cotabato City)

South Cotabato, Saranggani, SultanKudarat, Gen. Santos

Notre Dame of Marbel University (Koronadal City)

Davao & Compostela Valley University of Mindanao (Davao City)Caraga Region Caraga Conference for Peace and Development (Butuan City)

Northern Mindanao Xavier University (Cagayan de Oro City)Zamboanga Peninsula & Basilan Ateneo de Zamboanga University (Zamboanga City)

Sulu Notre Dame of Jolo College (Jolo)Tawi-Tawi Mindanao State University Tawi-Tawi (Bongao)

Palawan Nagkakaisang mga Tribu ng Palawan (Puerto Princesa City)Northern Luzon Cordillera Network of NGO’s (Baguio City)

Central Luzon, National Capital

Region, Southern Luzon

Mindanao Solidarity Network (Metro Manila)

Visayas Pax Christi, University of St. La Salle (Bacolod City)

For inquiries please contact:

Dialogue Mindanaw Project Management TeamOffice of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process

3rd Floor Central Bank Bldg., Quirino Ave., 8000 Davao CityTelefax: (082) 227 4217 (PLDT); (082) 300 8172 (Bayantel)

Website: www.opapp.gov.ph

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Primer on Dialogue Mindanaw