PRIMARY AND SECONDARY PRECEPTS IN THOMISTIC NATURAL LAW TEACHING

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY PRECEPTS

IN THOMISTIC

NATURAL LAW TEACHING

by

R. A. ARMSTRONG M.A., Ph.D .

•. ~ : . .

MARTINUS NI]HOFF I THE HAGUE / 1966

Copyright 1966 by Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands Softcover reprint of til hardcover 1st edition 1966

All rights reserved, including the right to translate or to reproduce this book or parts thereof in a1!Jl form

ISBN 978-94-011-8613-1 ISBN 978-94-011-9388-7 (e8ook)

DOl 10.1007/978-94-011-9388-7

TO MY MOTHER AND FATHER

For their many sacrifices on my behalf, their generosity and their devoted encouragement.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To Professor James Montrose, Dean of the Faculty of Law at The Queen's University of Belfast, for his inspiring and dedicated super­VISIOn.

To Dr Theodore Crowley, Dr Cahal Daly and Dr James Mackey, of the Department of Scholastic Philosophy at the Queen's University of Belfast, for their tolerance and unfailing help with many problems.

To Dr Michael Crowe, of University College, Dublin for the providing of many helpful comments and references.

To Mr Michael McTear, Mr Fergus O'Duffy and Mr Terence O'Keeffe, who read all my proofs and corrected many errors.

To the Library Staff of The Queen's University of Belfast, and especially to Mr Peter Havard Williams and Mr Henry Heaney.

To Miss Margaret Brogan and Miss Judith Ferguson for their typing of the manuscript.

To Sir Robert Kerridge and my colleagues in the Kerridge Odeon Corporation, Auckland, New Zealand, for their encouragement and for showing me that ethics and commerce can and must go hand in hand.

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments

Abbreviations

In trod uction

CHAPTER I. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEMS AND SOME PREVIOUSLY SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS

VII

XV

XVII

I. An outline of the problems to be considered 1 II. An outline of some contemporary writers 3

a. Some writers who advocate that the natural law com­prises only general, invariable precepts (3)

b. Those writers who advocate that natural law consists of both general and specific, invariable precepts (7)

c. Those writers who advocate that natural law consists of general precepts which are invariable, and specific pre­cepts which may be variable (14)

III. A statement of the problems to be solved, and the procedure to be fol-lowed 21

a. A statement of the problems (21) b. The procedure to be followed (22)

CHAPTER II. AN EXAMINATION OF THE CONCEPT OF "SELF EVIDENCE" IN THOMISTIC NATURAL LAW TEACHING

I. The nature of the problem, some preliminary considerations, and an outline of the procedure to be followed 24

a. The nature of the problem to be discussed in this chap­ter (24)

b. The status of the self-evident principles in natural law (25)

c. The relevance of the concept synderesis to our discus­sion (25)

d. An outline of the procedure to be followed (26) II. S. Thomas's teaching concerning the concept of "self-evidence" in

natural law precepts 28

x CONTENTS

A. Study of the Texts 28 a. The teaching in the Commentary on the Sentences (28) b. The teaching in De Veritate (30) c. The teaching in the Summa Theologica (33) d. An interim summary ofS. Thomas's teaching (34)

B. The Clarification of two issues arising out of our dis-cussion on the nature of self-evidence 35

a. The validity of the distinction between propositions which are self-evident in themselves, and those which are self-evident with regard to all people (35)

b. A consideration of the parallel between speculative and practical knowledge, with particular emphasis on the nature and content of the general principles involved (38)

III. The role of the Thomistic concept naturalis inclinatio in our knowledge of self-evident natural law precepts 41

a. Some preliminary considerations (41) b. An analysis of the Thomistic concept, naturalis incli­

natio (42) c. The application of the concept naturalis inclinatio to our

knowledge of self-evident natural law precepts (46)

IV. A critical assessment of some of the precepts suggested by contemporary writers as being self-evident, together with a summary of the main findings of this chapter 51

a. The views of some contemporary writers (51) b. A summary of some of the important findings in this

investigation (54)

CHAPTER III. THE THOMISTIC DISTINCTION BETWEEN PRI­MARY AND SECONDARY NATURAL LAW PRECEPTS, AS FOUND IN THE COMMENTARr ON THE SENTENCES, THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES AND THE COMMENTARr ON THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE

1. Recapitulation 56

II. The problem of the character of precepts which are not self-evident 57

III. The problem in the Commentary OTt the Sentences 58 a. The nature of the Commentary on the Sentences (58) b. Primary and secondary ends (60) c. Primary natural law precepts (63) d. Secondary natural law precepts (64)

CONTENTS

e. Secondary precepts and their relationships with primary precepts (66)

f. A Discussion of the criteria for determining secondary precepts (68)

g. The philosophical validity of the distinction between primary and secondary ends (72)

XI

IV. The Problem in the Summa Contra Gentiles 75 A. Statement of the texts 75 a. Relevance of the texts to the concept of naturalis incli­

natio (75) b. The social nature of man (76) c. Moral precepts: from the aspect of man's use of lower

things (77) d. Moral precepts: seen from the aspect of the soul-body

relationship (78) e. Moral precepts: from the aspect of man considered as

a worshipping being (80) B. Comments on the Texts 81

v. The problem in the Commentary on the Ethics 83 a. The distinction between the speculative practical as­

pects of knowledge (84) b. Comment on the distinction between precepts arising

out of the previous discussion (85)

CHAPTER IV. THE THOMISTIC DISTINCTION BETWEEN PRI­MARY AND SECONDARY NATURAL LAW PRECEPTS, AS FOUND IN THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA

The History of the text 86 Method of presentation to be followed 87

I. The doctrine oj the division of precepts in Question 94, aa. 4-6 88 a. Outline of the texts (88) b. Definition of the terms, primary and secondary pre­

cepts (91) c. The meaning and use of the termpropinquus (92) d. Two important concepts in S. Thomas's thought: de­

monstratio and determinatio (93) e. An interim summary of S. Thomas's discussion on the

division of precepts (97)

XII CONTENTS

II. The doctrine of the division of precepts in Q,uestion 100, a. 1 98 a. The justification for our discussion of Question 100 (98) b. Outline of the text (99) c. The approach of some contemporary commentators (102)

III. The doctrine of the division of precepts in Qyestion 100 aa. 3 and 11 107 a. Our justification for appealing to these articles (lO7) b. Outline and discussion of the text, Question 100, a. 3 (108) c. Outline and discussion of the text, Question 100, a. 11 (112)

CHAPTER V. SOME COMMENTS ON THE VALIDITY AND USE­FULNESS OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PRIMARY AND SECONDARY PRECEPTS

I. A statement of the aims of this chapter and an outline of the procedure to be followed 115

a. The aims of the chapter (115) b. The procedure to be followed (116)

II. Our assessment of S. Thomas's teaching on the possibility of" logical extension" in natural law 117

a. The view that natural law is restricted to a finite number of self-evident, general principles (117)

b. S. Thomas's teaching concerning the possibility of na­tural law being extended to include particular con­clusions (118)

c. A brief assessment of the validity of the views of contem­porary writers who advocate the "restricted" notion of natural law (121)

III. Afinal assessment of S. Thomas's teaching on primary and secondary precepts, and their division 124

a. The primary precepts of natural law (124) b. The secondary precepts of natural law (130)

IV. The validity and value of the distinction between primary and secondary precepts 138

a. An objection to the employment of this distinction in the teaching ofS. Thomas (138)

b. The value of the distinction between primary and secondary precepts (139)

CONTENTS

CHAPTER VI. THE CONCEPT OF V ARIABILlTY AMONG THE SECONDARY PRECEPTS OF NATURAL LAW

XIII

I. A discussion on the aims of this chapter and the procedure to be followed 143 a. Some preliminary comments (143) b. An outline of the reasons that have been suggested for

the presence of variability in natural law (144) c. An outline of the procedure to be followed (148)

II. Mere historical changes in positive moral beliefs 149 a. Statement of the texts (149) b. Comments on the texts and an analysis of the variability

involved (150)

III. Historical changes correlated with the rational development of man 151 a. A statement of the problem, and an outline of the texts

(151 ) b. Some comments on the nature of the variability involv­

ed (153)

IV. Changes in natural law due to the intrinsic complexity of certain parti-cular situations 156

a. A statement of the nature of the problem and an outline of the relevant texts (156)

b. Some comments on the problem (160)

V. The variability of decisions in particular situations due to the con-tingency of principles 161

a. A statement of the problem (161) b. A statement and exposition of S. Thomas's teaching (164) c. A short summary of the views of some modern writers (168)

VI. Variability in natural law due to the "non-obligatory" character of positively formulated precepts 1 71

a. A statement of the problem (171) b. Some comments on the distinction between positively

and negatively formulated precepts (172)

VII. Variability in natural law due to changes in the intrinsic structure of sociery 173

a. The nature of the problem (173) b. An outline ofS. Thomas's teaching (174) c. The approach of some contemporary writers (177)

XlV

Conclusion

Bibliography

Index of Authors

CONTENTS

180

186

194

Ia Pars Ia IIae IIa IIae III Pars Suppl.

Summa Contra

In Sent

De Ver.

In Met. In Phys. In Ethic. In Prior Anal. In Post. Anal.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

TEXTS OF S. THOMAS

Prima Pars Prima Secundae Secunda Secundae Tertia Pars Supplementum

Summa Contra Gentiles

Commentary on the four books of Peter Lombard's Sentences

De Veritate

Commentary on the Metaphysics Commentary on the P1!Ysics Commentary on the Ethics Commentary on the Prior Ana[ytics Commentary on the Posterior Ana[ytics

GENERAL WORKS

Annales Inst. Supr. Phil. Annales de l'Institut superieur de Philosophie de Louvain

Arch. Ph. Dr. Soc. Jur. Archives de Philosophie du Droit et de Sociologie Juridique

I.E.R. Irish Ecclesiastical Record

XVI

I.T.Q..

N.L.For.

Nat. Law Inst. Proc.

Proc. A.C.P.A.

Rev. de Saint-Louis Rev. philos. Louvain Riv. Filos. neoscol.

ABBREVIATIONS

Irish Theological Q.uarterly

Natural Law Forum

Natural Law Institute Proceedings

Proceedings oj the American Catholic Philosophical Association

Revue de Saint-Louis Revue Philosophique de Louvain Rivista de Filosofia Neo-Scolastica

INTRODUCTION

Never before in the history of mankind has there been a period when hitherto accepted moral principles have been more severely tested. The agonized cry of a world smitten by two major wars in a handful of years leaves no doubt in the minds of many that natural law ethics, ifit is to have relevance and to survive, must provide at least the outline of an answer to the problems of every day living.

To date, many hundreds of books and articles have been written setting forth with great eloquence the basic and immutable principles of natural law ethics. But too often these discussions fail to consider, in their agonizing detail, situations where there is a choice between conflicting values, conflicting loyalties, conflicting ideas and duties, each of which has a claim to recognition. It is only in the isolation of the particular case that the frightening dilemmas of natural law can be most clearly experienced. To give just two illustrations. Does natural law command, as some would have us believe, that any form of birth control, other than the use of the calendar, is contrary to the natural order of creation, even if the end result of this doctrine is that the earth will team with millions of human beings living in animal-like conditions, mere shadows of the human dignity, which is also a postu­late of natural law? Or to give another case; does naturallawcommand us to deprive a family of a wife and mother so that a yet unborn child may not die unbaptized? These and other issues have long been a source of moral controversy, due largely to the wide variety of different interpretations of natural law.

It is the contention of the writer that these differences cannot be explained away merely by stating that one party has a wrong con­ception of the content of natural law. This simple explanation, while satisfying to certain groups, is quite contrary to common sense. Far

XVIII INTRODUCTION

more realistic is the view that the principles of natural law, while for the most part binding on individuals, are sometimes subject to ex­ception, and furthermore, undergo some form of variability from age to age. We shall show that central to any discussion of variability among the precepts of natural law, is an understanding of the dis­tinction between what are traditionally known as primary and secondary precepts.

As our main authority we will be discussing in detail the teachings of S. Thomas Aquinas, one of the greatest exponents of natural law. His teaching will be considered however, not in isolation but rather as the spring from which much of the 20th century teaching on natural law has its source.

The natural law writers of the 20th century in fact provide us with the starting point for our study. It will be observed that there is widespread disagreement as to the content and the limits of natural law. Some writers hold that natural law is confined to a few very general, self-evident principles; while others argue that it extends further to include precepts of a more particular kind, often referred to as secondary precepts.

It is with a view to clarifYing not only the primary and secondary precept controversy but also the problem of variability in natural law, that we turn to the teachings of S. Thomas and his followers. It is our submission throughout this work that the problem of variability in natural law can only be understood in the light of the distinction between primary and secondary precepts.

It is to a discussion of these problems that we now proceed.

Auckland, New Zealand. 1st June, 1965.

Ross ARMSTRONG