Presupposition - SFU.cahedberg/481_2012_Presupposition.pdf · Semantic Presupposition (cont.) • Strawson 1950 – When a presupposition is false, the sentence has no truth value

Presupposition

Sources: Levinson 1983 (Pragmatics) Kadmon 2001 (Formal Pragmatics)

Beaver & Guerts 2011 (Presupposition) Birner 2013 (Chapter 5)

Presupposition Triggers (Beaver & Guerts 2011)

•  Factives (Kiparsky and Kiparsky, 1970) Berlusconi knows that he is signing the end of Berlusconism. >> Berlusconi is signing the end of Berlusconism.

•  Aspectual verbs (“stop, continue”) (Simons, 2001; Abusch, 2002; Lorenz, 1992) China has stopped stockpiling metals. >> China used to stockpile metals

•  Temporal clauses headed by “before”, “after”, “since”, etc. (Beaver and Condoravdi, 2003; Heinämäki, 1974) The dude released this video before he went on a killing spree. >> The dude went on a killing spree.

481: Presupposition 2

•  Manner adverbs (Abbott, 2000) Jamie ducked quickly behind the wall. >> Jamie ducked behind the wall.

•  Sortally restricted predicates of various categories (e.g., “bachelor”) (Thomason, 1972) Julius is bachelor. >> Julius is an adult male.

•  Cleft sentences (Delin, 1995; Prince, 1986) It was Jesus who set me free. >> Somebody set me free.

•  Quantifiers (Roberts, 1995; Gawron, 1995; Abusch and Rooth, 2000; Cooper, 1983) I have written to every headmaster in Rochdale. >> There are headmasters in Rochdale.


•  Definite descriptions (Strawson, 1950, etc.) The Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago stood up and wagged his finger. >> Trinidad and Tobago have a (unique) prime minister.

•  Names (van der Sandt, 1992) The author is Julius Seidensticker. >> Julius Seidensticker exists.

•  Intonation (e.g., focus, contrast) (Jackendoff, 1972; Geurts and van der Sandt, 2004; Roberts, 1998) HE set me free. >> Somebody set me free.



Levinson 1983 •  Properties of Presupposition

–  Constancy under negation: •  Family test (Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet 1990, 2000)

–  It was John who left. –  It wasn’t John who left. –  Was it John who left? –  If it was John who left, then we can relax. –  Someone left

–  Defeasible in certain contexts: •  It wasn’t Oakland OR San Francisco that won. The game was

called off because of the earthquake. (Hedberg 1990) –  Detachable:

•  John didn‘t leave. –  At least with pronunciation: John didn’t LEAVE. –  Contrastive focus triggers presupposition: JOHN didn’t leave.

Semantic Presupposition •  Frege (1892)

–  “Kepler died in misery” presupposes that the name Kepler designates something.

–  The negation of a sentence with a presupposition also presupposes it

•  Kepler didn’t die in misery. –  If the presupposition is false, the sentence cannot have a

truth value.


Semantic Presupposition (cont.)

•  Russell (1905) –  The existential and uniqueness conditions on definite

descriptions are entailments: •  The King of France is wise. •  ∃x [KOF(x) & ∀y[KOF(y) → y = x] & Wise(x)]

–  If there is no King of France, the sentence will be false. –  The negation can either mean that the King of France is

unwise or that there is no King of France. •  The King of France isn’t wise. •  “The King of France isn’t wise. There is no King of France.”

–  But note the contextual constraints on this statement.



•  Strawson 1950 –  When a presupposition is false, the sentence has no truth

value (like Frege). –  The truth value of the King of France statement depends on

the context in which it is uttered. •  This suggests that there is a pragmatic component to

presupposition. –  We need a trivalent logic: True, False, Neither. –  When a presupposition is false, a yes-no question has

neither a yes or no answer. •  Have you stopped smoking? •  #Yes.

#No. 481: Presupposition 8


•  If a sentence A presupposes proposition B, then: i.  In all situations where A is true, B is true. ii.  In all situations where A is false, B is true. iii.  In a situation where B is true, A may be either

true or false. iv.  In a situation where B is false, A is neither true

nor false.


Presupposition and Entailment •  A positive sentence containing a presupposition trigger also

entails the presupposition. i.  It’s my wife that’s been kidnapped. ii.  Someone’s been kidnapped. iii.  It’s not my wife that’s been kidnapped.

Entailments are not retained under negation. iv.  My wife has been kidnapped. v.  Someone’s been kidnapped. vi.  My wife has not been kidnapped.


Defeasibility of Presuppositions

•  Presuppositions can sometimes be cancelled. Entailments cannot. –  I haven’t stopped smoking! I never did smoke. –  #My wife has been kidnapped! No one has been.

•  Presuppositions can sometimes be suspended. –  John has stopped smoking, if he ever did smoke. –  It was his mother who taught him how to dress, if anyone did.

•  World knowledge can also suspend a presupposition. –  Sue cried before she finished her thesis. –  Sue died before she finished her thesis.

•  Again, this suggests that there is a pragmatic component to presupposition.


Defeasibility of Presuppositions (cont.)

•  Some presuppositions are easier to defeat than others (Abusch 2002) –  Soft trigger:

•  We do not need to stop devaluing hands-on work; we’ve never devalued it to begin with.

–  Hard trigger: •  #That’s not what gave me the courage and confidence to go to New

York; nothing did!

•  Hard triggers are detachable—whether the only reason for saying it “in that way” would be to convey the presupposition (Abbott 2006) –  That’s what gave me the courage to go to New York. –  That gave me the courage to go to New York.



Presupposition Projection •  Which presuppositions of component clauses will in

fact be inherited by the complex whole? •  Kartunnen 1973

–  Holes •  It is possible that the King of France is bald. •  Sue knows that the King of France is bald.

–  Plugs •  Looney old Harry believes he’s the King of France. •  Nixon announced his regret that he did not know what his

subordinates were up to. –  Filters

•  If John does Linguistics, he will regret doing it. •  Either John will not in the end do linguistics, or he will regret

doing it.

Kartunnen 1973 (cont.)

–  Filters •  If John does Linguistics, he will regret doing it. •  Either John will not in the end do linguistics, or he will

regret doing it.

•  In a sentence of the form if p then q, the presuppositions of the parts will be inherited by the whole unless q presupposes r and p entails r.

•  In a sentence of the form p or q, the presuppositions of the parts will be inherited by the whole unless q presupposes r and ¬p entails r



•  Metalinguistic Negation (plug) vs. Descriptive Negation (hole): Horn 1985 –  The King of France isn’t bald. There is no King of France. –  She isn’t competent in Linguistics --She is masterly at the subject! –  I didn’t buy toMAHtoes, I bought toMAYtoes. –  Contradiction contour

•  Liberman & Sag 1974 –  Elephantiasis isn’t incurable!

•  Hedberg, Sosa & Fadden 2003 –  A: Where? What are you talking about? "–  B: In Japan."–  A. "

Presupposition as Common Ground

•  Stalnaker 1974 suggested that presupposition is purely pragmatic.

•  A speaker uttering a sentence with a presupposition, indicates that the presupposition is in the common ground. –  It is in the set of propositions mutually believed by speaker

and addressee. –  It is simply inappropriate to utter a sentence with a false

presupposition.


Presupposition as Common Ground (cont.)

•  There are differences in the strengths of various presuppositions, which suggests that pragmatic principles are involved. –  The King of France is wise. –  John thinks he’s the King of France. –  Jane had lunch with the King of France.

•  Note that Strawson 1962 proposes that a definite description only presupposes the existence of a referent when it is expressed as the topic of the utterance.

–  Joey is dressing up as the King of France for Halloween.



Projection in a Common Ground Framework: Gazdar

1979 •  The context consists of a set of propositions that are mutually

known by participants, or which would at least be accepted to be non-controversial. When they converse, participants augment the context by the addition of the propositions they express.

•  The order in which an utterance’s inferences are added is the following:

1.  The entailments of the uttered sentence S. 2.  The clausal conversational implicatures of S 3.  The scalar conversational implicatures of S 4.  The presuppositions of S.

•  If a given meaning component is contradicted by a previous component, it is not added to the context.

•  Some of the police, and in fact all of them, beat up the protester. -  Entailment: All of the police beat up the protester. -  Scalar implicature: The speaker knows that not all of the

police beat up the protester. •  Some of the police, if not all of them, beat up the protester.

-  Clausal implicature: It is consistent with all that the speaker knows that all of the police beat up the protester.

-  Scalar implicature: The speaker knows that not all of the police beat up the protester.

•  If there is a King of France, the King of France doesn’t any longer live in Versailles. -  Clausal implicature: It is consistent with all the speaker

knows that there is not a King of France -  Presupposition: The speaker knows that there exists a

King of France.



•  John doesn’t regret failing, because in fact he passed. –  Entailment: John passed. –  Presupposition: John failed.

•  Kissinger ceased to be Secretary of State before the third world war started.

–  Background knowledge: There has been no third world war. –  Presupposition: The third world war started.

•  The student said that he hadn’t realized that Wales was a republic.

–  Background knowledge: Wales isn’t a republic. –  Presupposition: Wales is a republic.

»  We can do without Kartunnen’s plugs.


Dynamic Theories: Stalnaker-Kartunnen-Heim

1.  JOHN drinks too and Mary doesn’t like it. 2.  Bill is not present and JOHN drinks too. 3.  Bill drinks and JOHN drinks too. 4.  If JOHN drinks too, then the bottle is empty. 5.  If the bottle is empty, then JOHN drinks too. 6.  If Bill drinks, then JOHN drinks too.

•  Someone else drinks besides John. –  1,2,4,5 presuppose this. –  3,6 do not presuppose this.

•  Stalnaker 1974, Kartunnen 1974, Heim 1983: Presupposition projection facts simply fall out of a theory of context change.


•  Example: –  B is a presupposition (ps) of S iff S can be felicitously uttered only

in contexts that entail B. –  A context c admits a sentence S =df c satisfies (= entails) ps(S).

–  A context c admits a sentence S iff each of the constituent sentences of S is admitted by its local context.

–  Suppose p ∧ q is uttered in context c. First, you add p to c. This creates a new context, c+p. Afterwards, you add q to c+p. Hence, c is the local context of p, and c+p is the local context of q.

–  (i) Concerning: ps(p) The theory requires just this: c must satisfy ps(p).

And so the prediction is: p ∧ q inherits ps(p). (ii) Concerning: ps(q) The theory requires just this: c+p must satisfy ps(q).

And so the prediction is: p ∧ q presupposes p → ps(q).


–  JOHN drinks too and Mary doesn’t like it. •  For the sentence to be admitted, c must entail that someone

besides John drinks: c must entail ps(p)

–  Bill drinks and JOHN drinks too. •  Here p entails ps(q), so the sentence is admitted.

–  Bill is not present and JOHN drinks too. •  For the sentence to be admitted, c alone can entail ps(q):

–  CONTEXT(A): I need a non-drinker to support me in avoiding alcohol. It is known that Bill is a teetotaler. You’ve just mentioned the (known) fact that Mary drinks.

•  For the sentence to be admitted, c+p can entail ps(q): –  CONTEXT(B): I need a non-drinker to support me in avoiding

alcohol. The only possible reason for anybody to not be present (in this room) is to drink vodka in the other room.


Presupposition Accommodation •  Lewis 1979:

–  “If at time t something is said that requires presupposition P to be acceptable, and if P is not presupposed just before t, then—ceteris paribus and within certain limits—presupposition P comes into existence.”

•  Kadmon 2001: –  Suppose you don’t know anything about the animals I keep or

don’t keep at home. Suppose we are at my house, and we hear some scratching noises outside. Then I say one of the following: a)  My dog is at the door. b)  My giraffe is at the door. c)  I keep a giraffe here. The giraffe is at the door. d)  I keep a dog here. The dog is at the door.

–  Suppose you are on trial for selling crack. Which of the following questions seems more fair to you? a)  Did you sell crack? b)  When did you stop selling crack?


Accommodation? Heim 1981 •  The Familiarity Theory of Definiteness (file card metaphor)

–  A woman was bitten by a dog. She hit him with a paddle. It broke in half. The dog barked. 1: woman: 2 bit 1, 1 hit 2 with 3. 2: dog: 2 bit 1, 1 hit 2 with 3, 2 barked. 3: paddle: 1 hit 2 with 3, 3 broke.

–  A woman was bitten by a dog. She hit him with a paddle. It broke in half. A dog barked. 1: woman: 2 bit 1, 1 hit 2 with 3. 2: dog: 2 bit 1, 1 hit 2 with 3. 3: paddle: 1 hit 2 with 3, 3 broke. 4: dog: 4 barked.

•  Rule: If ‘the N’, select an existing file card and enter information. If ‘a N’, select a new file card and enter information. Accommodate when necessary.


Accommodation? Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski 1993

–  a N: at least type identifiable. •  a N +> not familiar (Q1), but does not entail it:

–  Dr. Smith told me that exercise helps. Since I heard it from a doctor, I’m inclined to believe it.

–  the N: at least uniquely identifiable. •  The N +> familiar (Q2), but does not entail it:

–  I couldn’t sleep last night. The dog next door kept me awake.

–  that N: at least familiar. •  Entails (or perhaps rather conventionally implicates) familiar.

–  I couldn’t sleep last night. That dog next door kept me awake. •  Questions for thought:

–  Should all examples of non-familiar definites be analyzed as cases of accommodation, like Heim suggests?

–  Should we predict the impossibility of familiar indefinites, like Heim suggests?


Accommodation? Prince 1978 •  Informative Presupposition clefts:

•  [Beginning of newspaper article] It was just about 50 years ago that Henry Ford gave us the weekend. On September 25, 1926, in a somewhat shocking move for that time, he decided to establish a 40-hour work week, giving his employees two days off instead of one…. (Prince example, Philadelphia Inquirer).

–  “Mark a piece of information as fact, known to some people although not yet known to the intended hearer.”

•  The federal government is dealing with AIDS as if the virus was a problem that didn’t travel along interstate highways and was none of its business. It’s this lethal national inertia in the face of the most devastating epidemic of the late 20th century that finally prompted one congressman to strike out on his own…. (Hedberg 1990 example, from an Ellen Goodman op-ed piece, 15 May 1987)

–  Question for thought: Should all informative presupposition it-clefts be treated as instances of accommodation?

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Presupposition - SFU.cahedberg/481_2012_Presupposition.pdf · Semantic Presupposition (cont.) • Strawson 1950 – When a presupposition is false, the sentence has no truth value