Press Freedom in China: A Comparative Analysis of Newspaper

Coverage of Labor Disputes

Vi L. Nhan, International Studies, Political ScienceAdvisor: Dr. Susan H. Whiting, Political Science

University of Washington

Introduction

• Reporters Without Borders’ 2005 Worldwide Press Freedom Index places China at 159 out of 167 countries

• 358 TV stations and 2,119 newspapers

http://www.cpj.org/Briefings/2006/imprisoned_06/imprisoned_06.html

Country Background: China

• Population: 1.3 billion people

• Economic reforms in the 70’s

• 2006 GDP real growth rate: 10.5% (official data)

• 2006 GDP - per capita: $7,600

• 400 million Chinese lifted above the $1 a day poverty level in the last 20 years

Media as the mouthpiece of the Party

1. News media must reflect the Party’s guiding ideology;

2. News media must disseminate the Party’s programs, policies, and directives;

3. News media must accept the Party’s leadership and subscribe to the Party’s organizational principles and press policies.

Three Approaches to Censorship

• Legal

• Political

• Economic

Legal Approach to Censorship

• Article 35: “freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration.”

• 1989 “Protection of National Secrets Law”• 1997 Criminal Law• Central Propaganda Department:

– The State Press and Publication Administration; – The State Administration of Radio, Film and Television; – The Ministry of Information Industry.

• Re-education as a requirement for media license renewal.

Political Approach to Censorship

• Nomenklatura – atmosphere of self-censorship• Propaganda circulars (PCs), specific instructions

on how to handle sensitive topics or specific news stories for the media. – directly from national media organizations like Xinhua,

People’s Daily, or CCTV

• “passive censorship” or “cold treatment”• Imprisonment of journalists

Economic Approach to Censorship

• Commercialization– Best means for improving the effectiveness of party

propaganda and regime legitimacy – Print media at the city, provincial, and central level

reorganized into media conglomerates or media “groups” - financially strengthen the media industry and politically consolidate leadership.

• Monetary incentives:– performance bonuses – out of pockets expenses from journalists

• Labor disputes, corruption, and health epidemics, etc. are somewhat open for critical coverage

Research Question

Given the conservative communist regime, why does the Chinese press seem to be more daring and critical in its reporting in the recent years?

Hypothesis

• Due to commercialization, the Chinese press has been more daring and critical within certain boundaries.

• Semi-commercial papers are more commercial more critical

• Official papers are less commercial less critical

Gap

• Debate: Many scholars have argued that commercialization has allowed for the loosening of the CCP's control (Lynch 1999; Gilley 2004), while others on the opposite side argue that commercialization has only changed the forms of control utilized by the CCP (Zhao 1998; Esarey 2005, 2006).

• A small degree of freedom does exist due to the turn toward marketization but within clear boundaries deemed appropriate by the government.

Official

Shandong Workers Daily

Shandong Legal Daily

Semi-commercial

Qilu Evening Newspaper

Methodology

• Media coverage of labor disputes as a window to test my censorship hypothesis

• Shandong Province in 2000

Methodology II

• Content Analysis (quantitative)– Portrayal of institutions

1. Labor Bureau ( 勞動局 ) 2. Arbitration Committee ( 仲裁委員會 )3. Court ( 法院 )

• Discourse Analysis (Qualitative)– 2 articles (one from semi-commercial with

negative portrayal and one from official with positive portrayal of institutions) for close readings

Preliminary Findings: Labor Bureau ( 勞動局 )

OfficalorSemi * Ldjportr Crosstabulation

Count

4 3 6 21 34

4 3 6 129 142

8 6 12 150 176

0

1

OfficalorSemi

Total

1 2 3 9

Ldjportr

Total

Case Processing Summary

176 100.0% 0 .0% 176 100.0%OfficalorSemi * LdjportrN Percent N Percent N Percent

Valid Missing Total

Cases

Chi-Square Tests

18.425a 3 .000

15.230 3 .002

17.985 1 .000

176

Pearson Chi-Square

Likelihood Ratio

Linear-by-LinearAssociation

N of Valid Cases

Value dfAsymp. Sig.

(2-sided)

4 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. Theminimum expected count is 1.16.

a.

Positive portrayal by semi-commercial (11.76%)

Positive portrayal by official (2.82%)

Negative portrayal by semi-commercial (8.82%)

Negative portrayal by official (2.32%)

Preliminary Findings: Arbitration Committee ( 仲裁委員會 )

Case Processing Summary

176 100.0% 0 .0% 176 100.0%OfficalorSemi * zhcportrN Percent N Percent N Percent

Valid Missing Total

Cases

OfficalorSemi * zhcportr Crosstabulation

Count

2 1 6 25 34

12 1 56 73 142

14 2 62 98 176

0

1

OfficalorSemi

Total

1 2 3 9

zhcportr

Total

Chi-Square Tests

7.543a 3 .056

7.780 3 .051

4.860 1 .027

176

Pearson Chi-Square

Likelihood Ratio

Linear-by-LinearAssociation

N of Valid Cases

Value dfAsymp. Sig.

(2-sided)

3 cells (37.5%) have expected count less than 5. Theminimum expected count is .39.

a.

Positive portrayal by semi-commercial (5.88%)

Positive portrayal by official (8.45%)

Negative portrayal by semi-commercial (2.94%)

Negative portrayal by official (0.70%)

Preliminary Findings: Court ( 法院 )

Case Processing Summary

176 100.0% 0 .0% 176 100.0%OfficalorSemi * FyportrN Percent N Percent N Percent

Valid Missing Total

Cases

OfficalorSemi * Fyportr Crosstabulation

Count

4 1 7 22 34

10 1 28 103 142

14 2 35 125 176

0

1

OfficalorSemi

Total

1 2 3 9

Fyportr

Total

Chi-Square Tests

2.224a 3 .527

1.892 3 .595

1.024 1 .311

176

Pearson Chi-Square

Likelihood Ratio

Linear-by-LinearAssociation

N of Valid Cases

Value dfAsymp. Sig.

(2-sided)

3 cells (37.5%) have expected count less than 5. Theminimum expected count is .39.

a.

Positive portrayal by semi-commercial (11.76%)

Positive portrayal by official (7.04%)

Negative portrayal by semi-commercial (2.94%)

Negative portrayal by official (0.70%)

Discourse Analysis: 齊魯晚報

Discourse Analysis: 山東工人報

Future Research • Currently, this research is inconclusive at this preliminary state. The

sample size is too small to decisively conclude on the state of media in China.

• This is an ongoing project that can incorporate many more variables with larger samples. The research will expand to include analysis of newspaper coverage of labor dispute in 1988, 1994, and 2000 in the provinces of Shandong, Shaaxi, Sichuan, and Guangdong.

• However, the future path for this project is to incorporate more variables and codes along with more rigorous hypotheses testing.

• Another direction is to look at the change over time. Given the passage of labor laws within the past several decades, one would assume that papers became more daring over time. The same argument can be made with the onset of commercialization of the media since the 70’s.

Acknowledgement

This work has been supported in part by the University of Washington Ronald E. McNair Program, Office of Minority Affairs, Prof. Susan Whiting, Chen Jie, Tam H. Tran, and Yicheng Wang.

The stratified data set is part of a larger project of Prof. Susan H. Whiting, along with Lin Ying and Chen Jie, graduate students of the Political Science Department. Prof. Whiting spent several summers in China and Hong Kong to collect newspaper articles on labor disputes. Articles are collected for the months of January, April, July, and October; depending on the availability of the sources, another month was used as a substitute.

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