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PRESIDENTIALISM AND SEPARATION OF POWERS IN AFRICA’S HYBRID

REGIMES

Paper for the Panel ‘Presidentialism in Developing Countries’

IPSA/ECPR Conference: Whatever Happened to North-South?

Sao Paulo, 16-19 February 2011

DRAFT, please do not cite without permission of the author

Oda van Cranenburgh

Leiden University

cranen@fsw.leidenuniv.nl

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Introduction

In comparing political systems, the institutional choice for a presidential or

parliamentary system of government has been a long standing issue. Debates on the

merits of each system were rekindled during the so-called Third Wave of

democratization, with the article by Juan Linz on ‘The Perils of Presidentialism’

published in 1990. While scholars had initially examined primarily European systems

and the United States, during the Third Wave they turned increasingly to Latin

America and Eastern Europe. The African and Asian regions were relatively under-

researched in terms of such institutional debates, with some notable (recent)

exceptions (Elgie & Moestrup 2007, Siaroff 2003). However, the institutional issues

are very relevant to assess whether democracy will be instituted and sustained in these

regions. The third wave of democratization brought multi-party elections and

consequently a degree of vertical accountability of the government to the electorate in

these regions. However, considering the prevalence of (varieties of) presidentialism

and semi-presidentialism in Africa, my interest is to examine whether these systems

also allow some form of horizontal accountability between the institutions of

government. Horizontal accountability is an essential addition to vertical

accountability, because it operates continuously, during the terms of government

(O’Donnel 1998). I take as a starting point the logical assumption that the creation of

horizontal accountability requires a degree of separation or balance of powers,

because where power is concentrated in a single entity, there are no entities with a

degree of independence or autonomy to hold the power center accountable. This is

why a study on separation of powers is both scientifically and politically relevant.

Several factors may explain the low profile of Africa in this institutional

debate. Primarily, the debate has been conducted in the context of (more or less

established) democratic systems. It needs no elaboration to point out that such systems

have been relatively rare in Africa until the early 1990s. Consequently, the choice of

democratic institutions and their consequences was low on the research agenda. Only

during the period of transfer of power from colonial rulers had such issues been

prominent: both the United Kingdom and France were busy during the 1950s and

1960s with an effort to ‘transplant’ their own systems of government to African and

Asian soils, and the effort was very much based on implicit assumptions about the

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inherent qualities of the political system of the ‘mother country’. As has been widely

discussed in the literature on African politics, the newly planted systems did not take

root very well and a process of institutional adaptation followed soon. Notably,

African leaders opted for unitary republics with an executive president, also in those

cases where a parliamentary system had been installed. In the name of national unity

for development, the executive president was granted a wide range of powers (at the

same time political opposition was curtailed). As many features of the planted system

were retained, the result has been the prevalence of hybrid systems of government.

This may constitute a second reason for the low profile of African countries in the

institutional debate: the hybrid nature of these regimes presents some inherent

difficulties in terms of classification and analysis. When Africa began to install

democratic reforms, beginning in Benin, a new round of institutional adaptation

followed. As noted by Conac (2007), Francophone countries reinstated forms of semi-

presidential government, making innovative adjustments in the model in terms of the

definition of powers for the president and the premier. The complex and hybrid nature

of African regimes continues to present obstacles for any systematic comparison.

This paper will examine these hybrid African systems of government in an

effort to compare the extent of separation of power between the executive and the

legislature. The more specific question pursued in this paper is whether the extent and

forms of separation of powers between the executive and legislature is clearly related

to regime type and colonial background. As elaborated below, both common sense

and the very definition of the presidential regime type suggests that separation of

power is present in these regimes, while in semi-presidential and parliamentary

regimes we would expect less separation between the branches of government.

However, earlier research has already suggested that Africa’s hybrid regimes defy

such expectations (van Cranenburgh 2008 and 2009).

The analysis builds on data gathered for previous research and is limited to 30

African countries, of which 15 are former British colonies ( I will use the term

Anglophone for this set) and 15 are former French colonies (the Francophone set).

The countries do not represent the entire ‘universe’ of Anglophone and Francophone

African countries, excluding countries where the constitution was suspended because

of war or state collapse at the time of the research (Chad, Ivory Coast and Sudan). The

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set analyzed the constitutions in force in 2007 including relevant constitutional

amendments.

The following section will illustrate the difficulties in classifying African

political systems and present a classification based on dispositional criteria, following

the work of Elgie. The next section will look specifically at the extent of institutional

separation (or non-separation) of power in these regimes. Institutional separation is

here defined as independence in terms of origin or survival for both the executive and

the legislature. Thereafter, a section will examine another form of separation, i.e. of

offices. Separation of office is here defined as incompatibility of office, i.e. one

person may not hold an executive office and a parliamentary office at the same time.

A next section will explore briefly the impact of party politics on the independence of

the branches of government. The concluding section will discuss the implications of

the patterns in separation of powers for the possibilities for horizontal accountability

and will argue that Anglophone countries most strongly represent a hybrid form of

regime which not only defies easy classification, but also expectations on the extent

and forms of separation of powers.

Classifying African regimes

Most African political systems represent a hybrid regime type, in the sense

that they combine elements of presidential and parliamentary systems of government.

In some cases the resulting system conforms to the semi-presidential regime type; in

other cases the resulting systems presents an institutional anomaly which some

authors will classify as a presidential and others as president-parliamentary. Before

elaborating on this I emphasize that the hybrid nature of the regimes does not imply

that they function or behave partly as parliamentary systems; quite to the contrary,

earlier research has shown that in most cases it makes them behave as

hyperpresidential systems (van Cranenburgh 2011).

In classifying systems I here follow the approach of Robert Elgie (1998 and

2007) which relies on dispositional rather than relational features. The reasons to

exclude the necessarily subjective assessment of power relations (between a president

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and a premier primarily) have been sufficient argued by this author. The important

variables concern the presence of a head of state (president) and a separate head of

government (premier) and – for each office – the question whether he/she is popularly

elected and whether the office has a fixed term (which implies there is independence

or separation from the other branch of government). In a parliamentary system all four

questions are answered with ‘No’. The head of government depends on the legislature

for its origin and survival and if there is a head of state, he is not popularly elected

(there may be a monarch or an indirectly elected ceremonial head of state). In a

presidential system, the head of state is also head of government and he is popularly

elected for a fixed term. Consequently, the two branches of government are

independent in the sense that the elected executive cannot be voted out of office by

the legislature; the population can only vote the executive out of office after

completion of the term (leaving aside the possibility of impeachment in

constitutionally prescribed and limited circumstances).

Most African systems combine these features of parliamentary and

presidential regimes, making them notoriously difficult to classify. There is a

popularly elected executive president with a fixed term and a cabinet, sometimes but

not always headed by a premier, that needs the confidence of the assembly and can be

dismissed by the latter. Part of the executive – the president - conforms to the

presidential model; another part – the cabinet - to the parliamentary model. In roughly

half the cases the cabinet is headed by a premier (predominantly in Francophone

countries), which results in the classification of these systems as semi-presidential in

Elgie’s system; in the other half cabinet lacks a premier (in the majority of

Anglophone countries), and consequently they are classified as presidential in Elgie’s

scheme. Note that Shugart and Carey (1992) classified the latter systems as

‘president-parliamentary’, which they also called the ‘confused’ system.

As noted by Elgie (2005), some authors object to the analytically clear and

objective classification system with the argument that many very disparate systems

end up in the same category; for example, in one semi-presidential system there may

be a balance of power between the president and the premier, while in others there is a

clear dominance of one or the other. Elgie excepts this and pointed to the necessity of

distinguishing subtypes for comparison. In a similar vein, Siaroff has compared levels

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of presidential power in various regimes type to show that such variation is hardly

related to the classical regime types. My work on 30 African systems similarly

showed wide ranges of presidential power for each regime type, granted that the

general African pattern showed a high level of presidetial power (van Cranenburgh

2008). In this contribution, I will also examine difference across and within regime

types, but the focus is not on levels of presidential power, but on the extent of

separation of powers in these regimes.

Table 1

Applying the regime typology to 30 Anglophone and Francophone Sub-

Saharan African political regimes results in the classification of 14 countries as

presidential, 13 as semi-presidential and three as parliamentary. The classification is

here presented in Table 1.

A confusing point is that in two of the parliamentary systems, i.e. South Africa

and Botswana, the head of state and government are one and the same office, and

while the office is essentially like that of a premier (no popular election and no fixed

term), the office is called ‘president’. In Elgie’s system, the two questions about the

Head of State are answered with No, while the questions on the Head of Government

are non applicable because there is no separate Head of Government (in Elgie’s

scheme, this represents a ‘Type 20’ out of his 24 possibilities). Another confusing

feature concerns the rule that cabinet needs the confidence of the assembly. As noted

above, this inherent feature of the parliamentary and semi-presidential system is often

present in presidential systems as well, creating what may be called an African

anomaly. In Anglophone African countries in particular which are classified as

presidential (popular election, fixed term and no separate head of government) cabinet

needs the confidence of the assembly. Another African anomaly can be found in the

systems classified as semi-presidential: the premier often has a dual accountability,

i.e. towards the assembly and towards the president. In many countries, the president

may dismiss a premier. Shugart and Carey classified the latter systems also as

president-parliamentary. When the premier can only be dismissed by the assembly,

Shugart and Carey distinguished a sub-type of semi-presidentialism: the premier-

presidential system.

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This classification shows that although the scheme is analytically and

empirically very clear in terms of the position on the president and the premier in

Africa’s regime types, it does not capture the specific feature we find in many African

regimes, i.e. that part of the executive – cabinet, often not headed by a premier – may

be accountable to the assembly. The next section will examine the extent of separation

of powers in these regimes.

Institutional separation of powers

Leaving aside the parliamentary systems, which inherently fuse the executive

and legislative powers - both the presidential and the semi-presidential African

systems are characterized by substantial fusion of powers between (part of) the

executive and the legislature, evident in the possibility of the legislature to censure

ministers or the entire cabinet and of the president to dissolve the legislature. At the

same time, all these systems are characterized by high levels of presidential power

(see van Cranenburgh 2008 and 2009). Such features led Elgie to classify many

African semi-presidential systems as ‘presidentialized’ rather than ‘dual executive’

systems. Shugart and Carey (1992) also examined levels of presidential power, which

they defined as presidential authority over cabinet, operationalized as the power to

appoint and dismiss cabinet ministers. While the focus of this paper is not on levels of

presidential power, I use the scheme of Shugart and Carey, later refined by Shugart

because it also assesses differences in the extent of separation of powers.

In this scheme the variables are: First, is the executive independent from the

assembly with respect to its survival? Second, is the assembly independent from the

executive with respect to its survival? Independence of survival is indicated by a fixed

term, in other words one branch of government cannot dismiss the other branch.

Shugart’s scoring system has been applied to the set of 30 Anglophone and

Francophone countries in Tables 2a and 2b. To visualize the combination of high

presidential power and partial or low separation of powers I reproduce here a figure

presented earlier (van Cranenburgh 2009). While all countries score on the upper side

of the figure for presidential authority over cabinet, the countries are scattered across

the entire spectrum for the extent of separation of power.

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Figure 1

Table 2

A first pattern which emerges is that a maximum score for separation of powers (8) is

present in seven cases, i.e. in three Anglophone countries and four Francophone

countries. Zambia is alone is scoring 7. All these countries with high separation of

powers are classified as presidential. These systems conform most closely to the ideal

typical presidential system based on separation of powers. The Cabinet consists of

Ministers who cannot be removed by the assembly; they are solely answerable to the

president.

Next, we can also discern a pattern of a polar opposite: regimes that score 0 or

1 for separation of powers, in other words countries in which the institutional

separation is very low or absent. This is the case in ten countries, which are all

classified as semi-presidential and they are all Francophone. This pattern conforms to

the expectation that separation of powers is less due to the accountability of the

premier to the assembly.

The remaining 12 countries all score between 2 and 6 for institutional

separation. The majority of Anglophone countries – 11 - show such a partial degree of

separation (scores between 2 and 6). Only one country in the set is Francophone, and

it is a presidential system (Guinea). Six countries with a medium score for separation

category are presidential regimes, three are semi-presidential and three are classified

as parliamentary regimes.

Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the extent of separation of powers for

three regime types and the Anglophone and Francophone African countries. Mean

scores suggest a relation between regime type and extent of separation: On average

the presidential regimes score 6.285, thus showing a tendency for presidential regimes

to have a higher degree of separation of powers. The semi-presidential regimes score

a mean of 1.384 and show least separation of all regime types. Besides the non-

separation inherent in cabinet subjection to assembly confidence, the president in

these regimes can dissolve parliament and thus jeopardize its independence. The

parliamentary regimes score a mean of 4. The higher degree of separation is the

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consequence of the lack of presidential power to dissolve the assembly without losing

office himself. However, statistical averages are misleading in the case of several

categories: the range in the presidential type is from 3-8, and in the semi-presidential

from 0-4. The three countries that are classified as parliamentary also show a

divergence of scores in the range of 2 to 6.

As for the classification by colonial background, the Francophone countries

show a lower average score for separation than the Anglophone groups; but the

Francophone group consists of ten countries with very low separation and four

countries with very high separation; there is only one country showing a score in

between. In the Anglophone set, a partial or median score for separation is more or

less the norm.

Table 3

The descriptive statistics for separation of powers illustrate the complexity and

hybrid nature of African regimes. The classification into regime types does not give

us clues as to the extent of separation of powers. The Anglophone set in particular is

most illustrative of the African hybrid system conforming neither to the ideal typical

presidential system with separation of powers, nor to the semi-presidential model with

very low or no separation of powers. At the same time, only the presidential regime

type shows the expected pattern of relatively high separation (with a high mean

score), but 6 presidential regimes do not conform to this pattern and have only a very

partial separation of powers. The semi-presidential and parliamentary regime types do

not show the extent of separation suggested by the very definition of the type: in

particular, semi-presidential regimes have lower separation than parliamentary

regimes.

Separation of Offices

Another indicator of separation between the executive and legislative branch of

government is whether offices are separated in the sense that one person cannot hold

offices in both branches. In particular, the question is whether cabinet ministers may

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also hold a seat in the representative assembly (legislative office). This issue has not

been subject of systematic comparative research in Africa, expect by Nijzink et al

(2006). Usually constitutions define explicitly whether or not there are

incompatibilities of office; in other cases it may be inferred from the clauses

regulating the appointment of ministers.

Table 4 reports on the presence or absence of fusion of offices. Here a

divergent pattern between Anglophone and Francophone countries is quite evident.

All Francophone countries separate offices, while the majority of Anglophone

countries allows the fusion of legislative and executive offices in one person. There

are variations in the constitutional requirements: in seven countries, ministers must be

MPs; in 4 countries ministers may be MPs; only three Anglophone countries separate

offices.

Tables 4 and 5

The pattern in Anglophone countries points to a particular way in which the

executive is fused with the assembly: the appointment to the cabinet creates a personal

union between the part of the executive and the legislature. The phenomenon can

reach quite high proportions: the average percentage of MPs holding a position in the

government is 30 for these countries, while in Namibia, 60% of MPs serve in some

capacity in the cabinet (van Cranenburgh 2009). This Anglophone feature is present in

all three regime types: in 5 out of the 14 presidential regimes, 3 out of the 13 semi-

presidential regimes and in all 3 parliamentary regimes (see table 5).

This feature has been noted in the context of the neo-patrimonial character of

African politics and represents in essence a cooptation of MPs into the government

(see for example van de Walle 2003). The result is, as Barkan noted, that ‘few MPs

pursued a legislative career with an eye on policy making for the good of the nation.

Rather, becoming a member of the legislature was seem as an avenue for lucrative

patronage jobs, a ministerial appointment being the most alluring among them’

(Barkan, 127-9). These features severely limit the possibility to ensure the

independence of parliament vis-à-vis the executive.

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While Francophone countries do not constitutionally allow the fusion of

legislative and executive offices, the tendency to expand the size of cabinet by

appointing many ministers and deputy ministers is also evident. Conac (2007, 89)

reports that such measures, as taken in Gabon, serve to increase support for the

government. Comparing both groups, Anglophone and Francophone countries clearly

differ, with Anglophone fusing executive and legislative offices. This feature creates

more obstacles in ensuring independence of the legislature vis à vis the executive.

Party-politics and separation of powers

Constitutions may create separate institutions and offices, but how does party

politics impact on the extent of separation between the executive and legislative

branches of government? It is beyond the scope of this contribution to present

exhaustive data on party-politics in these 30 African countries. I will report briefly on

earlier research and argue that party politics affects separation of powers.

Most research on presidential systems has emphasized the importance of the

party system for the way presidential systems function. For Latin America, much

research examined the consequences of the combination of presidentialism with

proportional representation for legislative elections, in particular the extent of

fragmentation in the party system and the need for coalitions in these systems. Other

research has looked at the timing of elections for each branch of government. The

important variable in this regard is concurrent or honeymoon elections versus mid-

term elections for the assembly. Concurrent or honey moon elections – elections very

soon after the presidential election - increase the likelihood that the president’s party

will control a majority in the assembly and are therefore also known as a

presidentialist formula (Shugart and Carey 1992). The result may be that the two

branches of government, which may be institutionally separated, are controlled by the

same party.

Table 6 shows that the all Anglophone countries have concurrent or

honeymoon elections. Existing research on the composition of parliament in the

Anglophone countries shows that the president commands vast majorities in

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parliament and cabinets are one-party cabinets in the great majority of Anglophone

countries (van de Walle 2003, Bogaards 2004, Conac 2007, van Cranenburgh 2009).

So to the extent that power is institutionally separated (which is only partly the case in

Anglophone countries) the party-political situation limits the extent to which both

branches can function as independent entities because they are controlled by the same

(presidential) party. I therefore argue that in Anglophone countries obstacles to

independence for the assembly vis-à-vis the executive are particularly great.

In Francophone countries, elections are non-concurrent in 11 out of 15

countries; they are concurrent or honeymoon-style in only four countries. In this

group of countries, legislative majorities for the president’s party are much smaller,

and consequently, coalition cabinets occur more frequently (van Cranenburgh 2009).

The party system is more fragmented and consequently it is less easy for the executive

to control a legislative majority. In sum, the basic argument is that party politics

affects the separation of powers; institutional separation is jeopardized by the control

of both branches by the same (presidential) party. The highly majoritarian party

politics in Anglophone countries, which leads to unitary and single party government,

most strongly affects the possibility for the assembly to act independently of the

government,

Table 6 Implications for Horizontal Accountability

While African countries have strong executive presidents, this feature of the

executive is combined with very partial or no separation of powers. Institutional

separation is low or absent in the majority of regimes, while offices are not separated

in roughly half the regimes examined. What are the implications of the various ways

in which powers are not separated, or fused, for horizontal accountability in Africa?

Can the legislature, or better the assembly, effectively function as a counterweight to

the executive and exercise its function of oversight of the executive? This contribution

does not examine such questions empirically by looking at the functioning of

institutions in practice, but presents an argument based on these fundamental

characteristics of the constitutional design of these African regimes.

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The prevalence of the rule of cabinet needing the confidence of the assembly -

an inherent feature of the parliamentary and semi-presidential systems - in most

African regimes might at first sight appear to present opportunities for oversight of the

executive. This feature appears to express the constitutional and philosophical idea

that parliament is ‘sovereign’. Cabinet accountability to the legislature implies that the

freedom of presidents to appoint ministers is limited by the requirement of

confidence, but after the formation of the government it also creates a virtually

guaranteed support for the government in the assembly. As pointed out by Lijphart,

Budge and others, this aspect of the Westminster parliamentary system tends to create

executive dominance, especially when the cabinet is single party. In European

parliamentary systems such as the Dutch system, a similar pattern results from the

formation of coalition accords to ensure a parliamentary majority for the government.

This is often criticized for threatening institutional dualism and creating what is called

‘monism’ in the executive-legislative relationship. The parliamentary majority is

committed to the program of the government, limiting its possibility to control

government. It is rather paradoxical to note that in practice the confidence rule limits

the possibilities of the legislature to hold the executive accountable. However, one

could argue that the damage to the power balance between the institutions of

government is smaller in the context of established and consolidated liberal

democratic systems, where both political culture and a range of other institutions play

a role in ensuring horizontal accountability. In Africa the latter conditions generally

do not apply.

For African countries, the negative implications for horizontal accountability

are exacerbated by the party-political constellation. As noted above, in most African

countries the party of the president controls a large majority in the assembly leading

to unitary governments and one party cabinets. The political party landscape is highly

majoritarian. Thus, the lack of institutional separation is combined with a party-

political constellation making the legislature an extension of the executive. This

pattern is most strong in Anglophone countries which have majoritarian electoral

systems for the assembly (First past the Post). However, the pattern is also found in

the countries with proportional representation, such as South Africa and Namibia.

Besides the legacy of the role governing parties played as liberation movements, this

can be linked to the presence of concurrent elections for the president and the

legislature; only recently have some (high profile) cases shown an absence of a clear

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legislative majority for the president’s party (Kenya and Zimbabwe). In Francophone

countries, the party-political constellation is less majoritarian, which reflects the

prevalence of non-concurrent elections.

Besides the separation of institutions, this paper examined the separation of

offices. Anglophone countries stand out for the fusion of executive and legislative

offices, creating the strongest form of fusion between the branches, i.e. in one person.

This feature further strengthens executive dominance over the legislature. With many

MPs serving is some capacity on the government, they will not use their legislative

office to hold the government accountable.

Given the combination of executive dominance resulting from fusion of

powers between the legislature and the cabinet with a directly elected president with

substantial executive powers, my argument is that African presidential systems, and

most evidently Anglophone African systems, thus combine the power concentrating

features of the parliamentary and the presidential systems: parliamentary systems by

definition fuse power between the legislature and the executive and thus create a

degree of constitutional ‘monism’, and presidential systems are inherently

majoritarian in the sense that the single-person executive by definition gains power

through a majority vote of a winner take all type. Both systems, in their ideal typical,

but also in their empirical forms, also possess power sharing or power division

potential; parliamentary systems allow power sharing in a collective executive, and

presidential systems may divide and separate power between the branches of

government. In Africa’s hybrid systems, however, neither the power sharing nor the

power- dividing potential of the ‘pure’ types is reflected.

In the category of semi-presidential systems, in which (part of) the executive

and the legislature are inherently not institutionally separated, the African cases show

particularly high levels of presidential power. In Francophone countries, the great

majority being semi-presidential, levels of presidential power are highest and they

also show least separation of institutions. However, this group shows separation of

offices and the party-political context is less majoritarian than in the Anglophone

group. Granted the inherent institutional fusion in the semi-presidential systems, the

separation of offices and the party political context create some more possibilities for

parliament to hold the powerful executive accountable.

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In sum, the general picture shows that the balance of power between the

executive and the legislature is strongly in favor of the executive and the systemic

features lead to fusion rather than separation of power – although this is variably

manifested in low institutional separation, lack of separation of office or the

consequences of presidentialist electoral formulas. The introduction of multi-party

elections was not accompanied by a comprehensive reassessment of such systemic

features. The pattern of fusion and concentration of powers is strongest in the

Anglophone countries, which combine partial institutional separation, fusion of

offices and concurrent elections. The basic design of the executive-legislative

relationship inherently limits the independence of parliament vis-à-vis the executive

and limits the possibilities to play a significant role in legislation, policy development

and oversight of the executive.

The analysis showed that the hybridism of African regimes is particularly

evident looking at the extent to which powers are separated. The classification in

regime types does not give sufficient clues about the extent to which powers are

separated. This paper argued that an important prerequisite for the creation of

horizontal accountability – some degree of separation of powers - is absent or weak in

many African countries and most strongly in Anglophone countries and suggests that

these issues must be addressed in the effort to achieve democratic reforms.

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References Barkan, J. 2008. ‘Legislatures on the Rise?’ Journal of Democracy, Vol. 19, no. 2, p. 124-137. Bogaards, M. 2003. ‘Counting parties and identifying dominant party systems in Africa,’ European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 43, No 2, p. 173-97. Budge, I. ‘Great Britain and Ireland’ in Political Institutions in Europe, J. Colomer, ed. (London and New Cork: Routledge), p. 18-62. Conac, F. 2007. ‘Semi-presidentialism in a francophone context’ in Semi-presidentialism outside Europe: a comparative study, R. Elgie and S. Moestrup, eds (Oxon, UK: Routledge), p. 78-92. Cranenburgh, O. van. 2008. ‘Big Men Rule: presidential power, regime type and democracy in 30 African countries’. Democratization, Vol. 15, no 5, p. 952-974. Cranenburgh, O. van. 2009 ‘Restraining Executive power: horizontal accountability in Africa’s hybrid regimes’. South African Journal of international Affairs 16, 1, p. 49-69. Cranenburgh, O. van 2011 forthcoming. ‘Democracy Promotion in Africa: the institutional context,’ Democratization. Duverger, M. 1980. ‘A new political system model: semi-presidential government’, in: European Journal of Political Research Vol. 8, no. 2, p. 165–187. Elgie, R. 1998. ‘The classification of democratic regime types: conceptual ambiguity and contestable assumptions,’ European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 33, p. 219-238. Elgie, R. 2005 ‘Variations on a Theme’ in Journal of Democracy, Vol. 16, no. 3, p. 98-113. Elgie, R. 2007, ‘What is Semi-presidentialism and where is it found?’, in R. Elgie and S. Moestrup, Semi-Presidentialism outside Europe: a comparative study (Oxon, UK: Routledge), p. 1-14. Frame, I. and Murison, K. eds. 2005, Africa South of the Sahara, 34th Edition (London: Europe Publications). Linz, J. 1990 ‘The Perils of Presidentialism,’ Journal of Democracy, Vol. 1, No. 1 p. 51-71. Lijphart, A. 1991 ‘Constitutional Choices for New Democracies,’ Journal of Democracy, Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 72-85.

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Lijphart, A. 1999. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (New Haven and London: Yale). Nijzink, L, Mozaffar, S and Azevedo, E. 2006. ‘Can Parliaments Enhance the Quality of Democracy on the African Continent? An Analysis of Institutional Capacity and Public Perceptions’, CSSR Working Paper no. 160, p. 1-27. O’Donnell, G. 1998. ‘Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies,’ Journal of Democracy, 9(3), p. 112-126. Shugart. M. and Carey, J. 1992, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Shugart, M. 1996. ‘Executive-Legislative Relations In Post-Communist Europe’, Transition. Vol. 2 (2) No. 24, p. 6-11. Shugart, M. 2005, ‘Semi-Presidential Systems: Dual Executive and Mixed Authority Patterns’ in French Politics, 2005, No. 3, p. 323-351. Siaroff, A. 2003. ‘Comparative presidencies: the inadequacy of the presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary distinction,’ European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 42, p. 287-312. Walle, N. van de 2003. ‘Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa’s Emerging party Systems,’ Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol 41, no. 2, p. 297-321.

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TABLES AND FIGURES Table 1. Classification of 30 African regimes as of 2007

* Based on constitutions in force in 2007. Botswana and South Africa are here classified as parliamentary; the difference with Mauritius is that there is no separate head of state; the head of government (no popular election and no fixed term) also serves as head of state. Table 2a. Scoring System Shugart 1996

‘presidential’ Head of state is directly elected and with fixed term; no separate head of government

‘parliamentary’: Neither the head of state nor the head of government is directly elected or with a fixed term

semi-presidential Head of state directly elected with fixed term; head of government not

Ghana Kenya (until 2007) The Gambia Zimbabwe Seychelles Sierra Leone Malawi Nigeria Zambia Benin Comoros Congo Brazzaville Djibouti Guinea

Botswana * Mauritius South Africa *

Namibia Tanzania Uganda Burkina Faso Cameroon Central African Rep. Gabon Madagascar Mali Mauritania Niger Senegal Togo

Powers over cabinet Cabinet formation 4 President appoints ministers without need for assembly confirmation 3 President appoints ministers with consent of the Assembly ` 2 President appoints ministers, who need confidence of assembly

1 President nominates Prime Minister, who needs confidence of the Assembly; PM appoints other ministers, possibly with the consent of president

Cabinet dismissal

4 President dismisses ministers at will 3 President dismisses ministers with consent of the Assembly 1 President dismisses ministers, but only under certain restrictions 0 Ministers (or the whole cabinet) may be removed only by assembly on vote of censure Separation of survival in office (scored for both assembly and executive) 4 No provisions compromising separation of survival (such as fixed terms) 3 Survival can be attacked, but attacker must stand for re-election 2 Survival can be attacked only in situation of mutual jeopardy 1 Survival can be attacked at specified times 0 Survival can be attacked at any time (unrestricted censure or dissolution)

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Table 2b. Presidential Power and Separation (based on Shugart 2006)

Presidential Powers over Cabinet

Separation of Survival for…

Country

Cabinet Formation

Cabinet Dismissal

Total Assembly (dissolution)

Cabinet (fixed term)

Total

Botswana 2 4 6 3 3 6 The Gambia 2 4 6 4 0 4 Ghana 2 4 6 4 0 4 Kenya 2 4 6 3 3 6 Malawi 4 4 8 4 4 8 Mauritius 2 1 3 2 0 2 Namibia 2 4 6 3 0 3 Nigeria 3 4 7 4 4 8 Seychelles 3 4 7 0 3 3 Sierra Leone 4 4 8 4 4 8 South Africa 2 4 6 4 0 4 Tanzania 2 4 6 3 0 3 Uganda 2 4 6 4 0 4 Zambia 2 4 6 3 4 7 Zimbabwe 2 4 6 0 3 3

Presidential Powers over Cabinet

Separation of Survival for…

Country

Cabinet Formation

Cabinet Dismissal

Total Assembly (dissolution)

Cabinet (fixed term)

Total

Benin 4 4 8 4 4 8 Burkina Fase 2 4 6 0 0 0 Cameroon 2 4 6 0 0 0 C.African Rep 2 4 6 1 0 1 Comores 4 4 8 4 4 8 Congo Braz 4 4 8 4 4 8 Djibouti 4 4 8 4 4 8 Gabon 2 4 6 1 0 1 Guinea 4 4 8 1 4 5 Madagascar 2 4 6 1 0 1 Mali 2 4 6 1 0 1 Mauritania 2 4 6 1 0 1 Niger 2 4 6 1 0 1 Senegal 2 4 6 1 0 1 Togo 2 4 6 1 0 1

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Table 3. Extent of separation in three regime types and in Anglophone and Francophone African countries Regimes mean modus median Presidential (14) 6.285 8 7 Semi-presidential (13) 1.384 1 1 Parliamentary (3) 4.000 - 4 Anglophone (15) 4.866 3 of 4 4 Francophone (15) 3.000 1 1 Table 4. Fusion of Office

Ministers must be MPs Ministers may be MP’s Minister may not be MPs

Botswana Kenya* Mauritius Namibia* Tanzania* Zambia* Zimbabwe*

Ghana (50% + 1) Malawi South Africa** Uganda

The Gambia Nigeria Sierra Leone Benin Burkina Faso Comoros Congo Brazzaville Cameroon Central African Rep. Djibouti Gabon Guinea Madagascar Mali Mauritania Niger Senegal Togo

* In Kenya, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, the Presidents appoint ministers only from members of the Assembly. But, the President has the possibility to appoint twelve (Kenya) six (Namibia), ten (Tanzania), eight (Zambia) or twelve (Zimbabwe) members in the NA. Indirectly this means that the president may appoint these persons as ministers from outside the assembly. ** In South Africa, the President may select two ministers from outside the Assembly Source: The constitutions of all countries listed Table 5. Fusion of Office and Regime Type Regime type Fusion of Office Non-fusion Presidential (14) 5 9 Semi-presidential (13) 3 10 Parliamentary (3) 3 -

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Table 6 Concurrent or Honeymoon Elections * Concurrent or Honeymoon Elections Non-concurrent elections

Ghana Kenya Malawi Nigeria Namibia Sierra Leone Tanzania The Gambia Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe Central African Republic Mali Niger Senegal

Seychelles Benin Burkina Faso Cameroon Comoros Congo Brazzaville Djibouti Gabon Guinea Madagascar Mauretania Togo

* Based on constitutions in force in 2007, including relevant constitutional amendments.

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FrancophoneAnglophone

Former colony of

President-Parliamentary Presidential

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(with elected head of state)