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PRESIDENT YUDHOYONO’S IDIOSYNCRASY IN
MANAGING INDONESIA-AUSTRALIA RELATIONS
POST EDWARD J. SNOWDEN’S REVELATION ON
AUSTRALIA’S SPYING CONDUCT
(NOVEMBER 2013 – AUGUST 2014)
By
Tifani Lusiana
ID no. 016201100050
A thesis presented to
Faculty of International Relations, Communication and Law
President University
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for
Bachelor’s Degree in International Relations
Concentration of Diplomacy Studies
2015
i
PANEL OF EXAMINER
APPROVAL SHEET
The panel of examiners declare that the thesis entitled ―President
Yudhoyono’s Idiosyncrasy in Managing Indonesia-Australia
Relations Post Edward J. Snowden’s Revelation on Australia’s
Spying Conduct (November 2013 – August 2014)‖ that was submitted
by Tifani Lusiana majoring in International Relations from the Faculty
of International Relations, Law and Communications was assessed and
approved to have passed the Oral Examinations on (January 29th 2015)
Prof. Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, Ph.D
Chair - Panel of Examiners
Witri Elvianti
Examiner
Teuku Rezasyah, Ph.D
Thesis Adviser
ii
DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY
I declare that this thesis, entitled ―President Yudhoyono’s Idiosyncrasy
in Managing Indonesia-Australia Relations Post Edward J.
Snowden’s Revelation on Australia’s Spying Conduct (November
2013 – August 2014)‖ is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, an
original piece of work that has not been submitted, either in whole or in
part, to another university to obtain a degree.
Cikarang, Indonesia, ______________________
_______________________
Tifani Lusiana
iii
ABSTRACT
Title: President Yudhoyono‘s Idiosyncrasy in Managing Indonesia-Australia
Relations Post Edward J. Snowden‘s Revelation on Australia‘s Spying Conduct
(November 2013 – August 2014)
The issue of spying or espionage has been around taking International Relations
study‘s attention ever since the Cold War. Often its occurrence—if revealed—cause
serious strain and even conflict to nations states involved. As the development of
technology advances, the issue of spying becomes no longer state-level issue only.
Individuals and almost all layers of community play part. Ever since Edward J.
Snowden chose to play a role in freedom of information, states gain more challenge
to be concerned upon. His revelation on Australia‘s spying conduct on Indonesia‘s
top leaders including President Yudhoyono through Wikileaks had caused some
major disturbances to both states‘ bilateral relationship for at least nine months. As
of current, there is no binding legal international norm or agreement governing the
conduct of espionage. Hence, states determine their own regulation based on
negotiation and agreement between them bilaterally or multilaterally. At this point,
the role of nation‘s leader takes the utmost important part. Leaders or presidents have
choices whether to put measures and burden the relationship or peacefully settle the
strain in a form of foreign policy.
This particular research centered upon the idiosyncrasy of President Yudhoyono
in influencing the strain settlement process between Indonesia and Australia by
analyzing the international espionage tolerability, the concept of presidential power,
idiosyncratic factors in foreign policy analysis, the concept of decision making in
foreign policy analysis, the argument from both states and finally the steps President
Yudhoyono took in the settlement process. The time frame taken is from November
2013 – August 2014. Qualitative method will be used by this research in order to
examine and explain the analysis in narrative order supported by some pictures and
diagrams. The research seeks to conclude that political leaders‘ idiosyncrasy is
paramount in foreign policy decision making process.
Keywords: Espionage/Spying, Edward J. Snowden, Strain Settlement, Yudhoyono‘s
Leadership, Indonesia-Australia Bilateral Relationship.
iv
ABSTRAK
Spying atau spionase telah menjadi pembahasan studi Hubungan Internasional
sejak Perang Dingin. Jika terungkap, spionase tak jarang menimbulkan ketegangan
yang serius dan bahkan konflik antar-negara. Seiring perkembangan teknologi, isu
spionase tidak lagi hanya mencakup level Negara; individu dan hampir semua
lapisan masyarakat berperan. Sejak Edward J. Snowden ikut berpartisipasi dalam
public intelligent, banyak negara-negara semakin waspada. Pembocoran berita
tentang Australia memata-matai pemimpin tertinggi Indonesia, Presiden Yudhoyono
melalui Wikileaks oleh Snowden telah menyebabkan ketegangan hubungan bilateral
kedua negara. Sampai saat ini, belum ada norma/hukum internasional mengikat yang
mengatur perilaku spionase. Oleh karena itu, negara-negara menentukan regulasi
berdasarkan negosiasi dan kesepakatan di antara mereka secara bilateral atau
multilateral. Pada titik ini, peran pemimpin bangsa sangatlah penting. Pemimpin atau
presiden memiliki pilihan apakah akan menentukan langkah-langkah sanksi dan
membebankan hubungan bilateral atau damai menyelesaikan ketegangan.
Penelitian khusus ini berpusat pada idiosyncrasy atau factor individu dari
Presiden Yudhoyono dalam mempengaruhi proses penyelesaian/resolusi ketegangan
antara Indonesia dan Australia dengan menganalisis tolerabilitas spionase
internasional, konsep kekuasaan presiden, idiosyncratic factors dalam analisis
kebijakan luar negeri, konsep pengambilan keputusan dalam analisis kebijakan luar
negeri, argumen dari kedua negara dan langkah Presiden Yudhoyono mengambil
dalam proses penyelesaian. Kerangka waktu yang diambil adalah dari November
2013 - Agustus 2014. Metode kualitatif akan digunakan penelitian ini untuk
mengolah data, menganalisis dan menjelaskan analisis dalam kerangka narasi yang
didukung oleh beberapa gambar dan diagram. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk
menyimpulkan bahwa factor individual (idiosyncrasy) yang dimiliki pemimpin
politik berperan sangat penting dalam proses pengambilan keputusan kebijakan luar
negeri.
Kata kunci: Spying / Spionase, Edward J. Snowden, Resolusi Ketegangan/Konflik,
Kepemimpinan Yudhoyono, Hubungan Bilateral Indonesia-Australia.
v
ACKNOLEDGMENT
All praise be to the Almighty Allah S.W.T. for the countless blessings showered to
me every single time in finishing the minute details written on this thesis I present in
order to complete the final task of being International Relations student.
There is a saying by Friedrich Nietzsche, ―The essence of all beautiful art, all great
art, is gratitude.” Therefore, I would like to take this very opportunity to deliver my
highest gratitude to the people who have been supporting my pre, during and post
thesis writing, for without their support and all, I would gain nothing and achieve
less than I do right now. For all the supports and motivations, I would like to
especially place my parents, my little brothers Agil and Fajar, my best friends in the
faculty and my best friend Kevin Keanu Muhammad on the top row as they were and
are always supportive and care about paths I decided to take or I was about to take;
giving me suggestions, motivations and huge visions about everything.
This shall also include my seniors in batch 2010 who were always been good friends;
my high school friends Ryan, Gabriella, Selvhy, Nissa and Rangga for good-old-
times laugh you share with me; my roommate Kania, thank you for your critical
analysis upon everything (which is inspiring), Eka for your jokes and stories, and
Bella for the laughs shared; Pak De Purnomo for your strong support; Bu‘ De Mami
for always providing me special delicacies while I‘m far far away from home; my
colleagues at my internship site, United Overseas Bank Indonesia; Mrs. Dwi Anita,
Mrs. Hanny A., Ms. Christina Angelina, Mrs. Dwi Melisa, Mrs. Farida, Mrs. Victoria
(HR Business Partners) for your support and inspiration; For Mrs. Widyarini Utami,
the Head of HR Business Partner & Organization Development of UOB Indonesia,
for her support and diamond chances she shared with me, letting me witness the
process of many great events valuable for my future paths; President University
Model United Nations Club people, who have always been my favorite; and many
more names I cannot address one by one.
Furthermore I would like to convey my sincere gratitude for Mr. Teuku Rezasyah,
my thesis advisor who was always full of inspiration to read my draft. Hopefully my
vi
path reflects his success story into becoming a Lecturer. Ms. Witri Elvianti for her
fondest and light chit-chat with me while discussing my thesis writing which made
everything less scary. And for all coolest Lecturers of all time in President
University; Mr. Makmur Widodo, Mr. Eric Hendra, Mr. Anak Agung Banyu Perwita,
Mr. Hendra Manurung, Mr. Yugo, Ms. Nabilla Sabban, Ms. Isyana, Ms. Natasya and
more for being friends, teacher, supporter, parents while in campus and great
supervisors. Please accept my deepest and sincere gratitude for always sharing
thoughts, inspiration, guidance, knowledge, random stories and even meaning of life
with me and all of us.
And for those who are both directly and indirectly supporting me whose names I
cannot state one by one; please do accept my sincere gratitude for you.
Cikarang, January 30th
, 2015
Tifani Lusiana
vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PANEL OF EXAMINER ........................................................................................... i
APPROVAL SHEET .................................................................................................. i
DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY .................................................................... ii
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................... iii
ABSTRAK ................................................................................................................. iv
ACKNOLEDGMENT ............................................................................................... v
TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................... vii
LIST OF ABREVIATIONS ...................................................................................... x
CHAPTER I ................................................................................................................ 1
I.1. Background of Study ......................................................................................... 1
I.2. Problem Identification ........................................................................................ 6
I.3. Statement of Problem ......................................................................................... 8
1.4. Research Objectives .......................................................................................... 8
I.5. Significance of Study ......................................................................................... 9
I.6. Theoretical Framework ...................................................................................... 9
I.7. Literature Review ............................................................................................. 14
I.8. Research Methodology .................................................................................... 20
I.8.1 Research Instruments.................................................................................. 21
I.9. Scope and Limitations of the Study Assumption ............................................. 22
I.10. Definitions of Terms ...................................................................................... 22
I.11. Thesis Outline ................................................................................................ 24
CHAPTER II ............................................................................................................ 28
II.1. President Yudhoyono‘s Profile ....................................................................... 28
II.1.1. Early Years ............................................................................................... 28
viii
II.1.2. Minister of Politics, Social and Security .................................................. 31
II.1.3. President of Republic of Indonesia; General Election 2004 .................... 34
II.1.4. Indonesia‘s Foreign Policy under Yudhoyono (First Term and Second
Term) .................................................................................................................. 35
II.1.6 Leadership Characteristic .......................................................................... 40
II.2 Foreign Policy Analysis ................................................................................... 46
II.2.1. Foreign Policy Analysis in International Relations ................................. 46
II.2.2. State-level Analysis .................................................................................. 48
II.2.3. Individual-level Analysis; Idiosyncratic Factors ..................................... 51
II.3. Chapter Summary ........................................................................................... 54
CHAPTER III .......................................................................................................... 56
III.1. Indonesia-Australia Bilateral Diplomatic Relationship (Strategic Partnership
2004 – 2013) ........................................................................................................... 56
III.2. Challenges to Indonesia-Australia Bilateral Relationship ............................. 58
III.3. Edward J. Snowden‘s Allegation on Australia‘s Spying Conduct ................ 59
III.3.1. Beginning of Allegation: Revelation of Wikileaks ................................. 60
III.3.2. Indonesia‘s Argument on the Spying Allegation .................................... 66
III.3.3. Australia‘s Argument on the Spying Allegation..................................... 71
III.3.4. Post-Allegation: Implications of Spying Allegation to Indonesia-
Australia‘s Bilateral Partnership ......................................................................... 78
III.4. Chapter Summary .......................................................................................... 82
CHAPTER IV ........................................................................................................... 84
IV.1. President Yudhoyono‘s Direct Diplomatic Responses to the Spying
Allegation ............................................................................................................... 85
IV.1.1. Social Media ........................................................................................... 85
IV.1.2. Indonesia‘s 3 Steps of Resolution .......................................................... 88
IV.1.3. President Yudhoyono‘s Letter to Canberra ............................................ 91
ix
IV.2. President Yudhoyono‘s Six Road Map for Code of Conduct ....................... 93
IV.3. Indonesia-Australia Code of Conduct on Framework for Security
Cooperation .......................................................................................................... 101
IV.4. The Concept of Presidential Power and Relationship between Leadership
Characteristic and Foreign Policy Making ........................................................... 105
IV.4.1. Presidential Power ................................................................................ 105
IV.4.2. Implementation of the Use of Presidential Power (Leadership and
Foreign Policy Making) .................................................................................... 106
IV.5. The Influence of President Yudhoyono‘s Idiosyncratic Factors in the Strain
Settlement of Spying Allegation (Triangle Relationship among Authority,
Objectives and Cognitive Balance) ...................................................................... 110
IV.6. Chapter Summary ........................................................................................ 116
CHAPTER V .......................................................................................................... 117
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................. 120
APPENDICES…………………………………………………………………….134
LIST OF PICTURES & FIGURES
Figure I.1. Decision Making as Steering ................................................................ 12
Picture III.1. Alleged Australia‘s Network of Spying Outposts ............................. 61
Picture III.2. ―3G Impact and Update‖ ................................................................... 64
Picture III.3. ―IA Leadership Targets + Handsets‖ ................................................ 65
Picture IV.1. Diagram of President Yudhoyono‘s Six Roadmap ........................... 93
Picture IV.2. Diagram of Yudhoyono‘s influence during Indonesia-Australia‘s
strain settlement process ....................................................................................... 111
Figure IV.I. Triangle Relationship of Yudhoyono‘s idiosyncratic factors ........... 113
x
LIST OF ABREVIATIONS
AANZFTA
AIPRD
ASD
ASIO
ASIS
BHI
BIN
BND
BfV
CIA
DPR RI
DIGO
DIO
DSD
EU
GAM
IA-CEPA
IAPC
ISAF
KPK
NKRI
NSA
ONA
PKPI
= ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement
= Australian-Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction and Development
= Australian Signals Directorate
= The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
= The Australian Secret Intelligence Service
= Badan Hukum Indonesia (Indonesian Legal Entity)
= Badan Intelijen Negara (Indonesia‘s National Intelligence Unit)
= Bundesnachrichtendienst (Federal Intelligence Service of Germany)
= Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (The Federal Office for the
Protection of the Constitution of Germany)
= Central Intelligence Agency
= Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia (The House of
Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia)
= The Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation
= The Defence Intelligence Organisation
= The Defence Signals Directorate
= European Union
= Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement)
= Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership
Negotiations
= International Association of Political Consultants
= International Security Assistance Force
= Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (Corruption Eradication
Commission)
= Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia
= National Security Agency
= The Office of National Assessments
= Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia (Political Party of
xi
PLNRI
PRC
RPJM
TNI
UN
UNHRC
UNSC
U.S.
USSR
WNI
Indonesia‘s Justice and Unity)
= Prinsip dan Landasan Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia (Indonesia‘s
Foreign Policy Benchmark & Principles)
= Peoples Republic of China
= Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah (Medium-term
Development Plan)
= Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesia‘s National Army)
= United Nations
= United Nations Human Rights Commission
= United Nations Security Council
= United States
= Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
= Warga Negara Indonesia (Indonesia‘s Citizen)
1
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
I.1. Background of Study
Australia and Indonesia are known for its close and fluctuated ties since
Indonesia‘s independence in 1945. During Indonesia‘s struggle for independence
under Dutch colonialism, Australia had been a very optimist neighbor supporting
the independence of the state. The bilateral partnership in multiple areas of
cooperation have been significantly growing from time to time starting from the
early years of 1990s, when Australia‘s investment into Indonesia experienced a
high surge which successfully penetrated stronger relationship among the two
democracies afterwards.1 Since the beginning of Yudhoyono‘s administration in
2004, the ties between both countries then developed into strategic cooperation
which comprises cooperation on counter-terrorism, cooperation on people
smuggling, development assistance cooperation, education, regional interfaith
dialogue, people-to people links and several regional partnership such as
AANZFTA (ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement and IA-
CEPA (Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership
Negotiations). This depicts strong relations between the two democracies.2
Notwithstanding, the background of Australia-Indonesia relationship is not
solely beautiful. Despite the growing partnership in trade, education, security
and people-to-people links, the relationship between Indonesia and Australia
faced their challenge of political tension following the East Timor‘s struggle for
independence in 1999. As the result of East Asia‘s financial meltdown during
1997-1998, the investment flow from Australia to Indonesia experienced
significant downfall. Following the 2004 election when President Yudhoyono‘s
1 Mackie, J. (2007). Australia and Indonesia; Current Problems, Future Prospects. Retrieved September 29,
2014, from Lowy Institute for International Policy Web Site:
mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/87133/.../2007-09-06.pdf
2 Ibid p.2.
2
took in office, bilateral relationship between Australia and Indonesia
experienced security issue following Bali Bombing in 2002 & 2005 and JW
Marriott & Ritz Carlton Bombing in 2003. Canberra had concerned about the
terrorist attacks Indonesia faced during those years which perceived as threat
since several Australian citizens were also being the casualties of the bombing.3
Since then, the relationship between Indonesia and Australia faced several
turbulences which almost distract both countries in terms of security
cooperation. Regardless of several occurrences that did stem Indonesia‘s
suspicions over Australia‘s motive (e.g. U.S. Military base in Darwin), both
countries managed to remain peacefully coexisted. In fact, Indonesia and
Australia managed to establish an agreement entitled Lombok Treaty in 2006
which governs the respect of each other‘s sovereignty and security cooperation.
However, in November 18, 2013 former U.S. National Security Agency
contractor, Edward J. Snowden revealed documents showing Australia‘s spying
attempt towards 10 Indonesia‘s top officials in 20094 including Mr. President
Yudhoyono, his wife and several other innermost in President Yudhoyono‘s
Administration.5 This was indeed unpleasant news for Indonesia that several
hours after the revelation, President Yudhoyono responded through social media
and national electronic media that on behalf of Indonesia, he demanded official
statements from Australia and sincere apology. Unfortunately, Australia‘s Prime
Minister Tony Abbott failed to echo the demand coming from Jakarta. Abbott on
the next day then conveyed to mass media that he regretted the fuss Wikileaks
and media caused to international public and most importantly to Australia‘s
relationship with Indonesia by revealing allegation on spying conduct. He
declined the allegation Wikileaks and Edward J. Snowden exposed, refuse to
give apology and—instead—stated that ―countries gather intelligence from one
3 Risen, J. (2014, February 15). Spying by N.S.A ally Entangled U.S. Law Firm. Retrieved September 20, 2014,
from The New York Times; Asia Pacific Web Site: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/16/U.S./eavesdropping-
ensnared-american-law-firm.html?_r=0 4 (the event was under Prime Minister Kevin Rudd administration)
5 Brissenden, M. (2013, November 18). Australia Spied on Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono,
Leaked Edward Snowden Documents Reveal. Retrieved September 18, 2014, from Australian Broadcasting
Corporation News (ABC News): http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-18/australia-spied-on-indonesian-
president-leaked-documents-reveal/5098860
3
another.‖6 This was mostly perceived as a dissatisfactory explanation from
Abbott both by peoples of Indonesia and Australia as his famous statement
during his campaign was: “More Jakarta, Less Geneva”.7
After the revelation, Indonesia decided to hold back its ties—especially in
security cooperation—in order to give space for Australia to fulfill Indonesia‘s
demand on explanation and apology. Several hours post-revelation, President
Yudhoyono called Indonesian Ambassador for Australia, Mr. Najib Riphat
Koesoma back from Canberra, signaling the suspension of diplomatic
partnership. As further result of the absence of clear explanation, Yudhoyono
also halted military cooperation with Australia. His speech for national masses
media; “I asked for temporary termination of cooperation on intelligence
exchanges and information sharing. I also asked for the termination of joint
exercises between Indonesia and Australia, either for army, navy, air force or a
combination, It is no longer the Cold War era.” 8
Indonesia expected the diplomatic ties to be suspended until at least six
months after the revelation.9 Seeing there were still no nothing from Canberra,
President Yudhoyono furthermore took an initiative to write a letter to Tony
Abbott on November 21 pertaining the issue which eventually obtaining its
silver lining in November 26 when Abbott replied the letter. Abbott agreed to
have an agreement to settle the strain in a form of Code of Conduct. The
bilateral relationship was then very strained on December onwards. There were
discussions between Indonesia‘s Foreign Minister, Marty Natalegawa and
Australia‘s Foreign Minister, Julie Bishop concerning the relationship yet there
were still no sign of any better improvement has been made.
6 Ismar, A. (2013, November 20). Indonesia to Halt Military Cooperation with Australia Over Spy Row.
Retrieved September 18, 2014, from The Wall Street Journal Web Site:
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304791704579209783444920594 7 Ibid
8 Bachelard, M. (2013, November 18). Indonesia Recalls Ambassador to Australia Over Spying Claim. Retrieved
September 18, 2014, from Sydney Morning Herald Web Site: http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-
news/indonesia-recalls-ambassador-to-australia-over-spying-claim-20131118-2xr5x.html
9 Massola, J. (2014, August 14). Australia, Indonesia to Sign Deal on Code of Conduct by end of the Month: Julie
Bishop. Retrieved September 23, 2014, from Sydney Morning Herald Web Site: http://www.smh.com.au/federal-
politics/political-news/australia-indonesia-to-sign-deal-on-code-of-conduct-by-end-of-the-month-julie-bishop-
20140819-3dxhj.html
4
The diplomatic strain remained tense between the two democracies along
the end of 2013. There were severe protests in Australian Embassy in Jakarta
that caused Australia to issue travel warning for those Australians who intended
to visit Indonesia. Although Tony Abbott was not solely affirmative to the
allegation exposed by Edward J. Snowden, he agreed to have the stipulation of
Code of Conduct President Yudhoyono requested which indicated that Canberra
also did not deny the allegation. There were also ambiguous statements from
Julie Bishop regarding the case:
“I note today that Labor is trying to suggest that all of
the current tensions in the relationship are as a result of
actions of the Abbott Government. But of course I remind
you Chris that the source of the current situation is
indeed the release of the documents stolen by Edward
Snowden that relate to alleged intelligence activities
from some years ago.”10
The word ‗stolen‘ is very prone to misinterpretation in which Julie Bishop
herself did not deny the allegation and indirectly confirmed that the documents
Edward J. Snowden exposed was the real documents stolen from the
government. Several Australia‘s media interview with Tony Abbott also showed
Australia‘s unwillingness to admit the revelation not to mention, apologizing
over the case. This definitely stemmed Jakarta‘s disrespectful responses to
Canberra.
Among all Australia‘s rejection of apologizing to Indonesia, Julie Bishop
claimed that the discussion upon code of conduct was regularly held by her and
Marty Natalegawa, Indonesia‘s minister for foreign affairs, whether it was in a
form of meeting or through electronic communication. The ice was seemed to
thaw on May 27, 2014 when Indonesian Ambassador returned to Canberra to
resume the diplomatic ties. On June 5, 2014, Tony Abbott made his first visit to
Indonesia since the allegation in order to mend the ties with Indonesia post the
10
Bishop, J. (2014, February 3). Thai Elections, Relationship with Indonesia, Australia Network, Conduct of the
ABC, Peter Greste, WA shark policy. Minister For Foreign Affairs; The Hon Julie Bishop MP . (C. Keny,
Interviewer)
5
spying row. The Joint Press Statement which was held in Batam Island was also
attended by President Yudhoyono. In the joint press statement, President
Yudhoyono conveyed that he hoped the surveillance/spying activity will not
occur again in the future and that the protocol in a form of Code of Conduct can
be soon agreed by both parties. Yudhoyono mainly stressed that conflict
resolution is an important step for both countries to resume the security
cooperation and strategic partnership. Tony Abbott in his speech afterwards,
mentioned that the relationship with Indonesia was a very important relationship
for him personally, and for Australia in common. He frequently stated that
Australia and Indonesia are strong partners which potentially benefit each other
multiple layers of cooperation. Abbott then mentioned that the intelligence issue
was now under both countries‘ Prime Ministers‘ discussion and was having an
improving status.11
Both parties furthermore agreed to have the Code of Conduct
stipulated by the mid of August 2014.
During the strain, it was widely perceived by both countries‘ peoples that
the relationship between Australia and Indonesia could become more damaging
if settlement fails to take place. Several diplomatic actions President Yudhoyono
took during the allegation were known as Indonesia‘s strongest actions since his
administration in 2004. President Yudhoyono directly commanded his cabinet to
strongly push Canberra over the allegation with 3 steps of settlement: 1) Provide
chance for Australia to explain the revelation and apologize, 2) Reviewing
bilateral partnership between Indonesia and Australia and 3) Stipulation of
protocol in a form of Code of Conduct and guiding principle in multiple areas of
cooperation.12
As one of Indonesia‘s step to review the cooperation with Australia, Gita
Wirjawan, Indonesia‘s minister of trade told international media that Indonesia
was then looking for other state (other than Australia) for cattle imports. Gita
confirmed that he already asked the parliament to look for alternative sources of
11 Prime Minister. (2014, June 4). Joint Press Statement with President Yudhoyono, Batam Island, Indonesia.
Retrieved September 21, 2014, from Prime Minister of Australia, The Hon Tony Abbott MP Web Site :
http://www.pm.gov.au/media/2014-06-04/joint-press-statement-president-yudhoyono-batam-island-indonesia 12 Situs Resmi Presiden Republik Indonesia. (2013, November 20). Tiga Langkah Indonesia untuk Australia.
Retrieved September 20, 2014, from Presiden Republik Indonesia Dr. H. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Web Site:
http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/fokus/2013/11/20/9626.html
6
beef supplies because of the recent revelation. This was certainly a strong
statement recalling the cattle import of Australia-Indonesia was considered one
of both countries‘ main trade partnerships.13
Seeing the strain between Indonesia and Australia might cause greater
damage if left disregarded, President Yudhoyono decided to take actions first
rather than waiting for the other party to give statements. Through the firmness
of foreign policies towards Australia, Yudhoyono spoke his language to
Canberra. Indonesia showed that it had put very serious attention to the
allegation leaked by Wikileaks and stood strong in its state identity as a state
who upholds respect, transparency and mutual trust.14
As fellow democracies, it
is very prudent for countries to maintain its trust among neighbors in order to
work closely. Hence, Indonesia initiatively took actions to give pressure to
Canberra; this was mainly to obtain explanation and better relationship.
Keywords: Espionage/Spying, Edward J. Snowden, Strain Settlement,
Yudhoyono‘s Leadership, Indonesia-Australia Bilateral Relationship.
I.2. Problem Identification
There is no single international relations norm or legal agreement governing
the act of espionage or spying in times of peace.15
Yet, it is also perceived as a
disadvantaging act for states that are being targeted. Hence, how states respond
to spying conduct—if they become the target—are solely depend on the
characteristic/nature/identical factors of the state itself, and its relationships
status with the other country who conducts spying. Some states may address the
13
Sydney Morning Herald . (2013, November 26). Spy affair: Indonesia Hints Tony Abbott's Letter Has Done the
Trick. Retrieved September 20, 2014, from Sydney Morning Herald Web Site : http://www.smh.com.au/federal-
politics/political-news/spy-affair-indonesia-hints-tony-abbotts-letter-has-done-the-trick-20131126-2y7w4.html
14 MPR RI. (2002). Latar Belakang, Dasar Pemikiran Dan Tujuan Perubahan UUD 1945. Retrieved September
29, 2014, from Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia Web Site:
https://www.mpr.go.id/pages/produk-mpr/panduan-pemasyarakatan/bab-ii-uud-nri-tahun-1945/a-latar-belakang-
dasar-pemikiran--tuj-perubahan
15 Forcese, C. (2011). International Law and Intelligence Collection. Spies Without Borders; International Law
and Intelligence Collection, 30-31.
7
issue less negatively and perceive it as a common challenge of a bilateral
relationship; on the other hand, the rest may put a prominent attention to the
issue (Wright, 1961). It is very common and understandable if states question
the motive behind spying, especially when the case involve states who are close
partners. The impact of spying conduct can either be; both parties choose to
settle it down, raise it to higher international judiciary (if necessary) or even
totally decide to dismiss the bilateral relationship they have. When it comes to
trust issue, international relations‘ actors have their own way to deal with it.16
Indonesia‘s foreign policy towards Australia in order to solve the strain was
inevitably related to President Yudhoyono‘s role as an individual decision
maker. President Yudhoyono initiatively gave pressures to Australia by several
diplomatic ways such as statements through Social Media, statements through
masses media until sending an official letter to Tony Abbott pertaining the row.
Not to mention, President Yudhoyono decided to suspend security cooperation,
called back home Indonesian Ambassador for Canberra and reconsider particular
import product from Australia. In which, because of these actions, Abbott agreed
to have a stipulation of Code of Conduct to President Yudhoyono for the
continuation of security cooperation that had been suspended temporarily. The
actions Indonesia took during early days of the allegation were then strongly
supported by the state‘s identity and value in international community. Indonesia
under Yudhoyono has been known for its nature of transparency, respect and
mutual trust among nations.
Canberra had never admitted the allegation of spying Edward J. Snowden
revealed, but they did not solely deny it as well. Meaning that, Abbott chose to
give no statements upon the revelation; no ‗yes‘ or ‗no‘. However, with
Canberra agreed with the stipulation of Code of Conduct, it directly showed that
they somewhat affirmative to the allegation. This does not necessarily mean
negative; it rather concluded that the diplomatic actions of President Yudhoyono
had contributed significantly to how Abbott and Australia responded to the
16
Demarest, G. B. (1996). Espionage in International Law. Denv. J. International & Policy.
8
demand posed by Indonesia, which is to give explanation upon the allegation
and sincere apology.
Looking at the case, it is very important to see the nation leader‘s take upon
the row by viewing from his/her leadership characteristic in order to further
analyze President Yudhoyono‘s diplomatic actions during the strain settlement.
President Yudhoyono decided to choose to give chances and relatively reparable
partnership suspension (e.g. security cooperation) rather than permanent
economical disconnection with Australia. This work will provide foreign policy
analysis on Yudhoyono‘s idiosyncratic factors to the case which highlights
President Yudhoyono‘s characteristic in taking steps to manage the conflict
which brings Indonesia‘s state identity in international relations as a state who
value mutual trust and transparency.
This thesis will further elaborate how was the influence of President
Yudhoyono in managing the diplomatic strain with Australia through his foreign
policy towards Canberra and diplomatic approach. Furthermore, the discussion
will try to show the readers that President Yudhoyono as an individual decision
maker managed to utilize Indonesia‘s multiple areas of cooperation—which may
stress the upper hand of Indonesia‘s position in international relations—against
Australia in order to peacefully settle the row.
I.3. Statement of Problem
How did President Yudhoyono‟s idiosyncrasy influence the process of
managing the diplomatic strain with Australia in the spying allegation case
(2013 – 2014).?
1.4. Research Objectives
The author came up with bringing the topic into discussion mainly to
enlighten and provide significant study focusing on how did diplomatic measure
(foreign policy) a nation leader take related to the nation characteristic could
contribute to the settlement of strain pertaining spying of bilateral conflicting
parties taking the case of Australia-Indonesia diplomatic strain during November
2013 – August 2014.
9
To critically examine Edward J. Snowden‘s allegation upon Australia
spying conduct (November 2013 – August 2014) aligned with
discussion of President Yudhoyono‘s influence in the strain settlement
progress.
I.5. Significance of Study
This research has two key points of study:
First is the leadership characteristic of President Yudhoyono in the
government. This will be explained by foreign policy analysis in
idiosyncrasies the President has during his administration.
Second is the allegation posed by Edward J. Snowden during November
2013. This section will critically explain the case in chronological order
as well as President Yudhoyono‘s influence to the strain settlement.
I.6. Theoretical Framework
To examine President Yudhoyono‘s role as an individual decision maker in
the case, this section will discuss the foreign policy analysis in individual level
(idiosyncratic factors) to explain the process/factors influencing the individual
decision makers in determining foreign policy.
As to the study of individual decision makers‘ role, John Rourke and Mark
Boyer re-established the theories of rationality. In which, individual decision
makers not only are having different values and beliefs, yet also unique
personalities in a way that it also describes their personal experiences,
intellectual capabilities and personal styles of making decision.17
“...states might
filter individuals‟ irrational decisions so as to arrive at rational choices, or
states might distort individually rational decisions and end up with irrational
state choices” (John T. Rourke & Mark A. Boyer, 2013, p. 129).
In rational model of individual decision makers, Rourke and Boyer divided
the ways into three systematic ways in which all of these ways interfere with the
17
Rouke & Boyer (2013). Levels of Analysis and Foreign Policy. In International Politics on the World Stage
(pp. 127). Huntington College Press.
10
rational assessment of cost and benefits in making decisions, namely;
misperception, affective bias and cognitive biases. The following are the details
of each way:
1. Misperceptions and Selective Perceptions
After a certain occurrence or issue take place, the individual decision
maker will filter the information by perceiving it based on his/her
personal preference. This way, decision makers can potentially suffer
from misperceptions and selective perceptions in a way that they
“compile information on the likely consequences of their choices”.18
Jervis in Perception and Misperception in International Politics argued
that the decision making processes must reduce and filter the incoming
information on which the decision is based. Only then the effective
decision making can be made. However, the filtering itself often is biased
in which decision makers often ignore any information that does not fit
their expectations. This bias may reflect in high-level decision makers as
well as low-level decision makers. The misperceptions can affect the
implementation of policy rather than defending their national interest.19
2. Affective Bias (Positive and Negative Effects)
In other words: the rationality of individual cost-benefit calculations.
This rational supported by emotional factors affecting the decision
makers while thinking about the consequences of the actions that will be
taken (affective bias).20
This explains that the decision makers attempt to
be rational in making decisions and it is influenced by their strong
feelings they held about the subject/state/nation in which the decision is
directed.21
3. Cognitive Biases (Cognitive Balance and Cognitive Dissonance)
This explains human brain‘s limitations in making choices rather than
emotional factors/feelings. Yacoov Vertzberger stated that maintaining
18
Jervis, Robert. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton, 1976. 19
Ibid 20
Ibid p. 130. 21 “Affective biases also contribute to information screening, as positive information about disliked people or
negative information about liked people is screened out.” (John T. Rourke & Mark A. Boyer, 2013, p. 130)
11
cognitive balance refers to the tendency people have to try to maintain
mental models of the world that are logically consistent.22
One of the
ways to maintain cognitive balance can be through wishful thinking
(higher expectation of the desired result).
This research will focus on the cognitive biases as the intervening factor that
influences the process of decision making. The rationale to choose this particular
factor is that it explains President Yudhoyono‘s understanding upon the strain
sources of the issue that it also stimulates how his decision was established. In
addition, based on his leadership characteristic, Yudhoyono is rational and a
very detailed decision maker who puts minute details of information received to
calculate the effectiveness and cost of every decision, hence, cognitive biases is
a proper element in explaining his idiosyncrasy in decision making.
There are two kinds of cognitive biases; cognitive balance and cognitive
dissonance. Cognitive balance refers to the tendency of political leaders to
prioritize the intended outcome or goals rather than merely exercising power.
This paradigm is primarily resulted from what is called by wishful thinking
which indicates and overestimate of the probability of a desired outcome. In
addition, in democratic nations it is very common to leaders to put people‘s
judgment to the decision making process. This is because they are primarily the
main reviewer of every decision and it is in their hands whether to fully abide to
the established ones or simply contribute to its hurdles to success.23
While
cognitive dissonance refers to the inconsistency of thoughts leaders experience
during the process of decision making which lead to unbalanced decisions.
Cognitive dissonance also includes beliefs or leaders‘ attitude.
In explaining the process of foreign policy decision making, this research
will borrow model of decision making process from Huntington College‘s
theory of decision making process that explains decision making as steering
process “in which adjustments are made as a result of feedback from the outside
world”. The following figure shows the steering process in decision making.
22 Vertzberger, Yaacov Y. I. The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in
Foreign Policy Decision Making. Stanford, 1990. 23
Rouke & Boyer (2013). Levels of Analysis and Foreign Policy. In International Politics on the World Stage
(pp. 127). Huntington College Press.
12
Figure I.1. Decision Making as steering
John T. Rourke & Mark A. Boyer. (2013). Levels of Analysis and Foreign
Policy. In International Politics on the World Stage (pp. 127-129).
Huntington College Press.
Figure 1.124
explains the process in decision making. As Janice Gross Stein
explained in Psychological Explanations of International Conflict:25
“States take
actions because people in governments, namely the decision makers, choose
those actions.” (Stein, 2002, pp. 292-308)
At the first stage, individual or group perceive a certain occurrence after
receiving the information. For the purpose of this research‘s finding, the author
combined the respective theory with Stein‘s theory of policy making progress‘
intervening biases which inserted into the second stage of the process. The
second stage occurred when the filtering process that derived from external
factors (information) and adjusted by the psychological factors of the actors.
This stage is where individual decision makers influence the process of decision
making. Depending on their leadership characteristic, political experience and
emotional factors, this process of decoding information of individual decision
24
The figure had been modified by the author in meeting the point of discussion stated in this thesis which is
idiosyncratic factors.
25 Stein, Janice Gross. Psychological Explanations of International Conflict. Palgrave, 2002. pp. 292–308.
13
makers may experience whether misperception, affective biases or cognitive
biases. Perception and misperception often occurs in leader-dominated
(autocratic) nations rather than democratic. This is because decisions are
ultimately made by the command coming from supreme leader instead of
governmental discussion. Affective biases are somewhat affected by biological
(e.g. gender) and emotional factors of a political leader. This happens when a
leader decided to refer to his intuition rather than rational calculation and
group‘s reference in which then will explain what cognitive biases. Cognitive
biases may happen in this stage when a certain political leader puts his group‘s
assessment and his rational calculation in priority list. Group in this case may
refer to ministers, subordinates in governmental office or even the country‘s
citizen as a whole.
Furthermore at the next stages, the decision is carried out and become part of
international and domestic politics. Actors receive the result coming from the
effects of the decisions and use it as the evaluation tool through monitoring the
situation. The information received from monitoring is then calculated as the
points to consider in the next decision making progress.26
This model explains
that actors take actions based on calculations of cost and benefits in every
decision. The organization consists of group of individuals that have diverged
interests who may rationally pursue their goals in involving in a decision making
progress. However, the objectives of them may vary. For instance the U.S.
secretary of state may have different objectives with the secretary of economy.
The rational model is rather complicated by uncertainty and the multiple
objectives of decision makers.27
During stage 2 where individual decision makers ultimately influence the
process, this research will further examine this stage using the triangle
relationship in order to explain the idiosyncrasy President Yudhoyono exercised,
namely the cognitive balance factor. The agreement between Indonesia and
Australia is definitely succeeded by President Yudhoyono‘s initiative to issue
and proposed a set of guiding principle to manage the strain. Yudhoyono‘s
26 Ibid p.127. 27
Ibid p.127
14
idiosyncrasy (cognitive balance) is definitely supported by two other factors in
exercising it.
I.7. Literature Review
In order to provide a better understanding and to support the study of
espionage/spying, this section will highlight the discussion of espionage from
international relations‘ view, multiple motives of spying and tolerability of
international spying or intelligence gathering. This refers to the status of spying
in international relations among actors to further examine the strain settlement
undertaken by Australia and Indonesia during the allegation exposed by Edward
J. Snowden in late 2013. Also, this section will give a study case pertain the
conduct of espionage in international relations.
Geoffrey B. Demarest in his book Espionage in International Law defined
espionage/spying as: “...consciously deceitful collection of information, ordered
by a government... accomplished by humans unauthorized by the target to do the
collection.”28
Demarest conveyed that national leaders use the gained information through
espionage/spying to make a better-informed policy decisions.29
According to this
research, states have spied and eavesdropped on each other throughout history.
Hence, it is less relevant to conclude that spying/espionage is illegal in
international relations. National leaders should be concerned about the legal
status of international espionage since it is lacking of international community‘s
consensus. The general motive of spying can be underlined as to what Demarest
conveyed about making a better-informed policy decisions. However, as the
technology advances through decades and nations now have borderless
information sharing, the motives behind conducting espionage/spying or
commissioned spies are rather varied.
In highlighting the status of espionage in international relations, the
discussion will now cashes its light upon the views coming from Quincy
Wright’s Espionage and the Doctrine of Non-Intervention in Internal Affairs 28 Demarest, G. B. (1996). Espionage in International Law. Denv. J. International & Policy. 29
Ibid
15
(1962) and Christopher D. Baker’s Tolerance of International Espionage: A
Functional Approach.
Basically, the two different authors (Wright and Baker) are having similar
voice on ―spying/espionage is underdeveloped in international relations‖,
meaning that, the opinions are rather fragmented when it comes to defining the
act of spying. As also mentioned in previous problem identification, there is an
absent of international norm/agreement governing the act of espionage (Forcese,
2011). Moreover, there is also no international legal standard regulating whether
states are forbidden to punish individuals/institutions who seek to obtain
classified information. Hence, the debate on tolerability of international
espionage is still there; leaving states that happen to experience the case
independently choose certain actions upon it.
In his article for Richard A. Flax‘s Journal, Essays on Espionage and
International Law, Quincy Wright brought the concept of non-interference into
the discussion.30
His point of departure was the essence of international basic
norm agreed by world‘s nations; respect by each sovereign state for the
territorial integrity and political independence of others.31
That regardless
whether the action of spying is conducted by employing a spy agent to a
particular state‘s territory or wireless information gathering through network,
gathering classified documents are a breach on one‘s state territory, in this case,
the domestic law/norm. Wright furthermore explained that it is the state‘s
privilege to define the act of espionage because there is an infringement of
domestic jurisdiction once it happened. In regards to the course, Wright
conveyed as follow:
“It belongs to each state to define peacetime espionage,
sedition, subversion, sabotage, incitement, and
conspiracy as it sees fit, and it is the duty of other states
to respect such exercise of domestic jurisdiction. Thus
any act by an agent of one state committed in another
30
Ibid (Wright, 1961, p. 3) 31 Wright, Q. (1961). Espionage and the Doctrine of Non-Intervention in Internal Affairs. Essays on Espionage
and International Law, 3.
16
state's territory, contrary to the laws of the latter,
constitutes intervention, provided those laws are not
contrary to the state's international obligations.”32
Wright argued that ―if spying is not legally wrong, then why
countries/governments cannot officially confess to having commissioned a
spy?‖33
He then brought the case of U-2 incident involving U.S. and the Soviet
Union in 1955. United States sent spies to Soviet Union‘s territory with the
objective to detect any preparations for surprise attack. According to Wright, this
deployment of spy was an infringement of state‘s sovereignty that it already
interferes in the internal affairs of a certain sovereign state. The motive behind
U.S. spying conduct was not a result of any attack posed by Soviet Union first,
but as preventive action. To this notion, U.S. spying motive became surreal blur.
Primarily because ―if the U.S. planned no first strike with nuclear weapons, it
was difficult to see what defense value there would be in aerial observations‖.34
Therefore, it is hardly acceptable for states to deploy spies/gather information
from other sovereign states – even if it is for defensive purpose – based on the
concept of non-intervention.
To put another perspective, Christopher D. Baker conveyed in his article
entitled Tolerance of International Espionage: A Functional Approach – that
international espionage does not necessarily considered as an attempt to breach
one‘s sovereignty, it rather serves as a means to enhance international
cooperation among states. This idea departed from the view that the 21st century
is a more globalised world where states share information among one another,
thus putting aside borders and even sovereignty.
This work countered the previous work of Wright – in which, Wright had
not yet put the development of technology and information which are being the
prominent factor of dynamic changes in international relations. Baker argued
that it is difficult to determine sovereignty as an absolute term in information
32
Ibid (Wright, 1961, p. 13) 33
Ibid (Wright, 1961, p. 17) 34
Ibid
17
sharing since the data gathering occurs in another state outside the territory of
the target state.35
Information is in these days spread across nations, making
borderless international community.
In his work, Baker also opposed realist approach to international relations
that ―states spy one another in order to achieve their self-interested goals
according to their relative power positions in international community‖ is failed
to explain international tolerance for espionage and inadequately captures the
cooperative benefits that accrue to all international states as a result of
espionage.36
Baker‘s premise is based on the functional theory of international
relations which explains the benefits of global espionage. The functional theory
on global espionage described:
“...states cooperate internationally to effectively fulfill
individual domestic obligations. By minimizing friction
with their neighbors, states can direct more resources
to maximizing national welfare. Also, international
cooperation enhances domestic welfare by yielding
conditions and opportunities that benefit trade, the
environment, and other functional areas that could not
be accomplished by states acting individually.”37
Baker then put the case of U.S. U-2 flights over Cuba in 1962. Central
Intelligence Agency reported that missile parts from Soviet Union ships were
being unloaded in Cuban ports. ―Subsequent U-2 imagery confirmed the
building of missile sites on the island, but only after another CIA informant
within the Soviet military provided drawings of similar sites inside Russia.‖
(Baker, 2003, p. 1096). This enabled U.S. to exert its defensive actions to a
potentially imminent threat coming from USSR.
This concept of states cooperation however does not put how states should
response to the act of espionage. Barker suggested that intelligence and
35 Baker, C. D. (2003). Tolerance of International Espionage: A Functional Approach. American University
International Law Review. 36 Ibid 37 Ibid
18
information gathering are as means of peaceful coexistence among states that it
can facilitate the global cooperation. This certainly cannot solely be bought by
all states considering the interests, identities and views about espionage are
widely fragmented among states that this idea cannot be solely proposed to
marginalize the thought of all states about espionage.
U.S. – EU Spying Allegation Case (January 2013)
Diplomacy after Edward J. Snowden has become one of the anticipated
international issues shared among states. The revelations of classified documents
containing national top secrets have caused conflicts, dispute and strain in many
of existing bilateral and multilateral relations. One of the cases is the revelation
of U.S. wiretapping conduct towards Germany‘s Chancellor, Angela Merkel.
Edward J. Snowden revealed through Wikileaks that the United States used the
PRISM38
programme in order to run large-scale surveillance operations outside
the state, including in the territory of the European Union.39
Der Spiegel weekly
confirmed that Germany was one of the most targeted countries in NSA
intercepting approximately 500 million phone calls, e-mails and text messages at
the turn of 2012 and 2013.40
In July 2013 the German press revealed that:
“...the U.S. had also used PRISM in the ISAF mission in
Afghanistan with the knowledge and consent of German
intelligence and the Bundeswehr. Furthermore,
information surfaced that the Federal Intelligence
Service (BND) and the Federal Office for the Protection
of the Constitution (BfV) use the American spying
programme XKeyscore, which gives the NSA the
complete access to all data thus collected.”41
38
U.S. global surveillance programme established under National Security Agency in 2007 39 Zawilska-Florczuk, M. (2014, January 14). The NSA: The Impact of the Wiretapping Scandal on German-
American Relations. Retrieved October 10, 2014, from Center of Eastern Studies, OSW Web Site :
http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/commentary_124_0.pdf 40
Ibid p.1. 41 Zawilska-Florczuk, M. (2014, January 14). The NSA: The Impact of the Wiretapping Scandal on German-
American Relations. Retrieved October 10, 2014, from Center of Eastern Studies, OSW Web Site :
http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/commentary_124_0.pdf
19
President Barack Obama claimed that he was unaware that this was happening.
Soon after the revelation that Chancellor Merkel‘s phone had been tapped,
Merkel ordered German Foreign Minister, Guido Westerwelle, to summon the
U.S. ambassador in order to provide explanation before then she termed the
NSA operations. Angela Merkel (with her Minister, Hans-Peter Friedrich)
―called on the United States to respect German law.‖ She commanded the
Federal Ministry of Interior and the German Security Services to visit the United
States in the event to negotiate an agreement to halt the intelligence operations
carried out against each other.42
As to this case, Angela Merkel was acting as an individual decision maker
in responding to the case of spying allegation conducted by United States.
Merkel stressed the point to halt intelligence cooperation as the bargaining
power from Germany to the allegation revealed pertain U.S. wiretapping. She
individually responded to the opposing parties (the SPD, the Green Party and the
Left Party), ―which tried to make use of the spying scandal by discretion of the
ruling Christian Democrats and Liberals‖ (Zawilska-Florczuk, 2014). Merkel
commanded her ministers to take firm steps of foreign policy towards the U.S.
due to the reluctance of United States to provide explanation and apology.
Representing the government, Merkel conveyed that ―the government in Berlin
was demanding that the present legal framework of intelligence co-operation
between the two countries be changed.‖43
To this end, this research realizes that there is an ambiguity resulted from
prolonged debate in defining the legal status of espionage/spying in international
relations, thus states behavior and actions towards the issue is solely depending
on; how crucial or fatal the case is, its national leader(s) or how strong the
bilateral/multilateral relationship among the involved parties. The study of
foreign policy analysis is of paramount to this work in the event to describe the
conceptual framework of idiosyncratic factors affecting Yudhoyono as an
individual decision maker. There are certainly flaws in everything, including
international relations theories that provide multiple analyses on international
42
Ibid p.3. 43
Ibid p.4.
20
issues. Therefore, it is necessary for this thesis to discuss about the tolerability of
spying in international relations since it will support the study about President
Yudhoyono‘s role in managing the strain during Australia‘s spying allegation.
I.8. Research Methodology
This thesis will adapt analytical-descriptive method in order to analyze the
variables that construct the title, hence the discussion able to encompass the
details of the topic. In bringing the topic into discussion, this thesis will use
empirical analysis on primary sources coming from both Australia and
Indonesia‘s international mass media releases, governmental web sites, official
data from government obtained from annual reports of both countries and
several studies from various authors coming from international relations
background to support the theoretical framework. As C. R. Kothari (2004) in
Research Methodology: Method and Techniques (2nd Revised Edition)
explained:
“Descriptive research includes surveys and fact-finding
enquiries of different kinds. The major purpose of
descriptive research is description of the state of affairs as
it exists at present. In social science and business research
we quite often use the term Ex post facto research for
descriptive research studies. The main characteristic of this
method is that the researcher has no control over the
variables; he can only report what has happened or what is
happening. Most Ex post facto research projects are used
for descriptive studies in which the researcher seeks to
measure such items as, for example, frequency of shopping,
preferences of people, or similar data. Ex post facto studies
also include attempts by researchers to discover causes
even when they cannot control the variables. The methods
of research utilized in descriptive research are survey
methods of all kinds, including comparative and co-
relational methods. In analytical research, on the other
hand, the researcher has to use facts or information already
available, and analyze these to make a critical evaluation of
the material.”44
44 Kothari, C. R. (2004). Research Methodology: Method and Techniques (2nd Revised Edition). New Delhi:
New Age International Ltd. pp. 2-3.
21
The work will also use Library Study method in order to support
statements in the background of the study and problem identification. There
were some works (mostly journals) related to spying scandals. The discussion of
the tolerability of spying has been quite a huge discussion in international
relations; hence this thesis will refer to some works related to the course to find
its relevancy towards one another. However, there was still no published
thesis/dissertation that specifically discusses the case of Australia-Indonesia‘s
diplomatic strain pertain the allegation of spying. Therefore, the work will refer
to primary sources obtained from web sites, journals and books in order to begin
the analysis upon the variables.
I.8.1 Research Instruments
Internet Search – this thesis mostly refer to internet for primary sources
coming from both countries, mainly because it provides a wide range of
information regarding the issue. Some web sites that are used for this thesis are
as follow:
Presiden Republik Indonesia; Dr. H. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Web
Site: http://www.presidenri.go.id/
Prime Minister of Australia; The Hon Tony Abbott MP Web Site:
http://www.pm.gov.au/
Australian Government; Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Web
Site: http://www.dfat.gov.au/
Minister for Foreign Affairs; The Hon Julie Bishop MP Web Site:
http://foreignminister.gov.au/
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia Web Site:
https://www.mpr.go.id/
Books – Books are essentials to support the analysis in chapter II, III, IV
regarding the topic of spying issue in international relations, constructivist
theory and international relations individual level of analysis to elaborate
President Yudhoyono‘s leadership characteristic in the government.
22
I.9. Scope and Limitations of the Study Assumption
The issue being discussed in this thesis is considered rather sensitive since it
talks about allegation on spying conduct. The content of the revelation are
debatable and there is no absolute/certain extent to how far Australia spied on
Indonesia as Edward J. Snowden‘s Wikileaks reveal. Therefore, to limit the
study of this thesis, the limitations are set as follow:
This thesis will focus on President Yudhoyono‘s leadership
characteristic related to his idiosyncratic factors during his years of
administration and provide analysis about his preference in dealing
with issues related to bilateral relationship between Australia and
Indonesia in order to give information to the readers about President
Yudhoyono‘s leadership background in the government.
The work will as well provide analysis about policies President
Yudhoyono took during Edward J. Snowden‘s allegation of
Australia‘s spying conduct in 2013 including the suspension of
diplomatic ties, security cooperation, cooperation in combating
asylum seekers boat and cooperation on people smuggling and how it
affect Australia-Indonesia relationship. Furthermore, this thesis will
also highlight direct actions President Yudhoyono took in responding
to the revelation including his leadership style in dealing with sudden
conflict and his diplomatic approach. However, it does not necessarily
mean that Australia did not participate in the settlement.
I.10. Definitions of Terms
Surveillance/Espionage/
Spying
: To watch a person or any subject in a secret or
stealthy manner; or to keep it under observation
with hostile intent. Spying is often associated with
―espionage‖ – described by OED as the practice of
playing the spy or a secret agent whose business is
to keep a person/place/subject under close
23
observation. Furthermore,
spying/espionage/intelligence gathering in
international relations is described as one employed
or any attempt conducted by a government in order
to obtain information from other countries.45
Diplomatic Strain : Diplomatic strain or diplomatic dispute refers to a
status quo of tension/complication/problem/
conflict among state(s) that cause hindrance in
diplomatic relationship among state(s)
themselves.46
Bilateral Relationship : Bilateral relationship between countries refers to
political, economic, cultural, historic ties and
cooperation. Strong bilateral relations are
characterised by close cooperation between
institutions and persons at administrative and
political level, as well as in the private sector,
academia and civil society. It includes general
knowledge, understanding and public awareness
about the other state and the ties existing between
them.47
Strain Settlement : Strain settlement or dispute settlement is method or
institution that is/are used to solve international
dispute/strain between states/international actors.48
Leadership : The capability in inducing followers to act in accord
with the values and the motivations of both leaders
and followers. It is a dynamic relationship that, at
its best, finds leaders engaged in a process of
raising the consciousness of followers, or, at a
45
(Forcese, 2011) 46
Derived from definitions stated in Vienna Convention on Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory
Settlement of Disputes (United Nations, 1961) 47 (Kruse, 2013) 48 (Peace Palace Library, 2006)
24
minimum, engages both leaders and followers in a
common enterprise.49
Individual Decision Makers : Individual decision makers are individuals who hold
the authority to decide, representing a certain
group/organization/nation/regional, have differing
values and beliefs and unique personalities—their
personal experiences, intellectual capabilities, and
personal styles of making decisions.50
Foreign Policy : Foreign Policy is the behavior of states mainly
towards other states in international system through
their authorised agents.51
I.11. Thesis Outline
This thesis will consist of five chapters and the outline can be seen as
follow.
Chapter I; this chapter includes introduction section which comprises
background of the study, problems identification, research objectives,
significance of the study and study limitations.
Chapter II; President Yudhoyono’s Leadership and His Idiosyncratic
Factors
This chapter provides discussion on President Yudhoyono‘s leadership style
during 9 years administration (2004 – 2013); including his childhood
background until he was elected as the Minister of Political, Social and Security
during K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid‘s administration. The chapter aims to provide
discussion about the President Yudhoyono‘s preference in decision making
related to his idiosyncratic factors as an individual decision maker in the
government. This discussion will be supported by the analysis of foreign policy 49 Burns, J. M. (1978). Leadership. New York: Harper & Row. 50 Leadership and Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy chapter 4, p. 3 51 Tayfur, M. F. (2011). Retrieved October 10, 2014, from Main Approaches to the Study of Foreign Policy: A
Review: http://www.metu.edu.tr/~tayfur/reading/main_approaches.pdf
25
analysis (state-level analysis) and idiosyncratic factors (individual-level
analysis) affecting it.
II.1. President Yudhoyono’s Profile
II.1.1. Early Years
II.1.2. Minister of Politics, Social and Security
II.1.3. President of Republic of Indonesia; General Election 2004
II.1.4. Indonesia‘s Foreign Policy under Yudhoyono
II.1.5. Indonesia‘s International Image under President Yudhoyono
II.1.6. Leadership Characteristic
II.2 Foreign Policy Analysis
II.2.1. Foreign Policy Analysis in International Relations
II.2.2. State-level Analysis
II.2.3. Individual-level Analysis; Idiosyncratic Factors
Chapter III; Australia Spying Allegation (2005 – 2013)
This chapter will observe Indonesia-Australia diplomatic bilateral
relationship in general multiple areas including the challenges faced by two
countries during the relationship in order to provide information about how close
was or is the relationship between the two democracies. Furthermore, the
discussion will continue to chronologically explain the case of Edward J.
Snowden‘s allegation upon Australia‘s spying conduct during November 2013 –
August 2014 including the process of strain settlement in a form of Code of
Conduct. The discussion will also highlight Indonesia‘s and Australia‘s responds
to the case until the implication of the allegation to the bilateral relationship
between the two democracies. Therefore, the chapter only focuses on the case of
allegation in order to provide information related to spying conduct allegedly
taken by Australia to Indonesia on November 2013.
26
III.1. Indonesia-Australia Bilateral Diplomatic Relationship
(Strategic Relationship 2004 – 2013)
III.2. Challenges to Bilateral Relationship
III.3. Edward J. Snowden’s Allegation on Australia’s Spying
Conduct (November 18, 2013)
III.3.1. Beginning of Allegation: Revelation of Wikileaks (November
2013)
III.3.1.1. Snowden Leaked Australia‘s Spy Network
III.3.1.2. Allegation of Spying from Canberra towards Jakarta
III.1.1.3. Content of Allegation
III.3.2. Indonesia‘s Argument on the Spying Allegation
III.1.2.1. Sovereignty
III.1.2.2. International Political Ethics among Partners
III.3.3. Australia‘s Argument on the Spying Allegation
III.3.3.1. National Interest
III.3.3.2. Labor Party‘s Response to Australia‘s Rejection
III.3.4. Post-Allegation: Implications of Spying Allegation to
Indonesia-Australia‘s Bilateral Partnership (November 2013 – July
III.3.4.1. Political Ties
III.3.4.2. Economic Ties
Chapter IV; The Role of President Yudhoyono’s Idiosyncrasy in the Strain
Settlement: The Code of Conduct on Intelligence Activities
This chapter will focus on observing the role of President Yudhoyono in the
decision making during the strain. This will be supported by analysis on
diplomatic behavior President Yudhoyono showed during the case which
influence Canberra to offer the strain settlement to mend the ties. The chapter
27
will also answer the research question and strengthen the study in chapter two
and three.
IV.1. President Yudhoyono’s Direct Diplomatic Responses to the
Spying Allegation
IV.1.1. Social Media
IV.1.2. Indonesia‘s 3 Steps of Resolution
IV.3. President Yudhoyono’s Six Road Map for Code of Conduct
IV.3. The Relationship between Leadership Style and Foreign
Policy Making
IV.4.1. Leadership Style and Foreign Policy Making
IV.4.2. Implementation of the Exercise of Hierarchy or Control
IV.4. The Influence of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s Idiosyncratic
Factors in Leadership as a President
Chapter V; to conclude the discussion elaborated in the whole chapters, chapter five
will provide conclusion. To this end, the chapter will conclude the discussion with
the demanded result to give information about how far was the influence of President
Yudhoyono able to contribute in managing the diplomatic strain between Indonesia
and Australia pertain the spying allegation of Edward J. Snowden.
28
CHAPTER II
PRESIDENT YUDHOYONO’S LEADERSHIP AND
HIS IDIOSYNCRATIC FACTORS
(1949 – 2013)
President Yudhoyono is widely known as an inspirational figure of a leader
that does not only show his positive and exemplary attitude, yet also his
innovative and transformational strategies in the government. Yudhoyono is the
first president to be democratically elected by the peoples of Indonesia since the
reformation in 1998. His excellent leadership has been cultivated since his years
of childhood and continued during his career in military and politics which began
in 2007 through some experiences of becoming Ministry of Politics, Social and
Security during President K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid‘s administration, and
Ministry of Politics and Security during President Megawati Soekarnoputri‘s
administration. Since Yudhoyono took in power in 2004, the world started to
notice Indonesia, not only by its remarkable changes, but also known for its
charismatic supreme leader. This chapter highlights the profile of Yudhoyono that
includes his childhood until his political career in the government. The discussion
will then observe Yudhoyono‘s leadership characteristic in the government using
foreign policy analysis and idiosyncrasies in political leaders theory.
II.1. President Yudhoyono’s Profile
Yudhoyono served 2 terms (10 years) in the government which depicts the
trust of Indonesia‘s people that was very vast upon him. His powerful leadership
does not built in an instant. He is said to be inheriting his father who was also in
the military. This sub-chapter will provide Yudhoyono‘s profile and his
leadership characteristic in the government during both terms.
II.1.1. Early Years
29
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was born in Pacitan, East Java September 9,
1949. Retired as a four-star general, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was the only
child of Soekotji R. and Sitti Habibah. His father, R. Soekotji, was a devoted
Indonesian soldier who then retired as a First Lieutenant (Peltu – Letnan Satu).
While his mother, Sitti Habibah, was the daughter of one of the founders of
Pondok Pesantren Tremas (Ponpes Tremas) in Pacitan, pushing it into a devout
follower of Islam.52
In a harsh disciplinarian parenting, childhood and
adolescence, little Yudhoyono was also talented as a writer of poetry, short
stories, theatre player and music band member. Some of his works of poetry and
short stories was sent to the children's magazine at that time, for example to
Kuncung Magazine. He also liked sports such as volleyball; he enjoyed
traveling, walking, cycling or driving.53
His determination to be a soldier gained when the class V SR (1961) visited
the campus of AMN, Tidar Valley (Lembah Tidar) in Magelang. “I adore the
figures of AMN valor cadets who were running and stood in a line that time.
When the tour group stopped at Yogyakarta, I spent my money to buy a sword,
because in my mind, soldiers were carrying swords and guns,” recalls
Yudhoyono.54
Inheriting his father who had a very good discipline and attitude,
Yudhoyono struggled to realize the ideals of his childhood in the army to enter
the Indonesian Armed Forces Academy after the end of high school graduation
in 1968, however, due to late registration, President Yudhoyono does not
directly enter Armed Forces Academy. Therefore he became a student in
Mechanical Engineering Institute in 10 November, Surabaya (ITS). Just then,
Yudhoyono chose instead to enter the Secondary School Teacher Education
52 Tokoh Indonesia Magazine. (2013, May 23). Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono; Presiden Republik Indonesia
Pertama Pilihan Rakyat. Retrieved October 2, 2014, from Tokoh Indonesia Web Site:
http://www.tokohindonesia.com/biografi/article/285-ensiklopedi/2197-presiden-ri-pertama-pilihan-
rakyat?showall=1
53 Ibid
54 Ibid
30
(PGSLP) in Malang, East Java. While studying in Malang PGSLP it, he was
preparing to enter the Armed Forces Academy.55
In 1970, he entered the Armed Forces Academy in Magelang, Central Java,
after passing the final acceptance test in Bandung.56
Yudhoyono was awarded as
the best graduate in his Military Academy (Akmil – Akademi Militer) class of
1973, receiving Adhi Makasaya57
award badge. His military education continued
at the Airborne and Ranger Course at Benning Fort, Georgia, usA (1976),
Infantry Officer Advanced Course at Benning Fort, Georgia, usA (1982-1983) to
achieve honors graduate, Jungle Warfare Training in Panama (1983), Anti-tank
Weapon Course in Belgium and Germany (1984), Battalion Commander Course
in London (1985), Seskoad in London (1988-1989) and the Command and
General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, usA (1990-1991), until then,
he obtained an MA degree from Webster University in the United States.58
Whilst studying at the Military Academy, Yudhoyono met Kristiani
Herrawati, Major General Sarwo Edhi Wibowo‘s daughter. At that time, Major
General Sarwo Edhi Wibowo served as Governor of the Armed Forces
Academy. They met when Yudhoyono served as Youth Corps Division
Commander. The relationship continued to dating, engaged and wedding. They
were blessed with two sons; Harimurti Agus Yudhoyono (trace and follow and
emulate the achievements of Yudhoyono, graduated from Akademi Militer in
2000 with the award-winning Star Adhi Makayasa) and Edhie Baskoro
Yudhoyono (best graduate in SMA Taruna Nusantara in Magelang, who then
pursued economics study). 59
55
Ibid (Situs Resmi Presiden Republik Indonesia, 2013)
56 Ibid
57 Adhi Makayasa is an annual award bestowed to the best graduate coming from matra TNI (Tentara Nasional
Indonesia) and Police Academy (Kepolisian). The award receivers are those who are capable to show best
achievements in three main aspects, namely; academic, physical health and personality. Adhi Makayasa award is
directly given by President of Republic of Indonesia (or any representative on behalf of the President)
58 Situs Resmi Presiden Republik Indonesia. (2010, July 5). Biography of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.
Retrieved October 2, 2014, from Presiden Republik Indonesia Dr. H. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Web Site:
http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/statik/profil/ 59
Ibid
31
II.1.2. Minister of Politics, Social and Security
His political career began on January 27, 2000, when he decided to retire
early from the military. Yudhoyono was asked to serve as Minister of Mines and
Energy under President K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid. When he still held the
lieutenant general and eventually retired with the rank of general of honor.60
Shortly thereafter, the President was forced to leave his position as soon as K.H.
Abdurrahman Wahid served in the administration and asked him to replace
General Wiranto, who was forced to resign as Minister of Politics, Social and
Security. Yudhoyono‘s acknowledgment in the parliament increased
significantly while serving as Ministry of Politics, Social and Security.61
The greatest task as the head of the ministry is to restore public confidence
especially in security internationally. The security factor is often being the
reasons of foreign investors to cancel their investment plans in Indonesia. While
in the state, the community often feels anxious with various disorders such as
terrorist bombings that often occur following Bali bombing and JW Marriott &
Ritz Carlton bombing in Jakarta. Yudhoyono succeeded in stopping several
other traditional security issues primarily in the areas of conflict in eastern
Indonesia. However, because of the magnitude of the problems faced, the
success of his work was often not taken seriously. There were still a lot of
challenges waiting to be resolved.62
Facing a tough task turned out to be a part of living history of Yudhoyono
even before serving as a Minister. When President K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid
came to power, he was given the task of lobbying the former President Suharto‘s
family. The intention of assigning Yudhoyono to lobby the Keluarga Cendana63
was to persuade them to donate some of their wealth to the peoples and nation.
60 Many had regreted Yudhoyono‘s decision to resign from the military career. One of them was General
Himawan Sutanto, one of the former high-comissioned officer of Pangkostrad. He depicted Yudhoyono‘s career
path as a very fine line but not culminative because of his failure in continuing his career to obtain the strategic
position in military leadership career as KSAD and Panglima TNI. See Himawan Sutanto, President Yudhoyono
Penjuru Paradigma Baru ABRI, (MO) Men‘s Obsession, p. 64-65. 61
Ibid (Tokoh Indonesia Magazine, 2013)
62 Ibid
63 Keluarga Cendana refers to Soeharto‘s family
32
Especially to bring home the wealth of Suharto's family that is estimated still
stored abroad.
The New Order
On early 2001, President Abdurrahman Wahid commanded him to form a
Crisis Center. In this non-structural institution, President Wahid asked
Yudhoyono to serve as Chief Executive and put the information center or
activities (operations center) in the office of the Coordinating Ministry of
Politics, Social and Security. This new institution serves to provide
recommendations to the President in addressing various issues. The tasks
included the attitude of the Head of State in responding two memorandums
given by The House of Representatives (DPR RI).64
Although Yudhoyono repeatedly earned trust from President K.H.
Abdurrahman Wahid, it did not necessarily make Yudhoyono feel inferior in
facing the President. When the news about President Wahid insisted to establish
a decree of dissolution of Parliament (House of Representatives), Yudhoyono
with the TNI commander Admiral Widodo AS and several other military
officials asked President K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid to refrain his plan. On May
28, 2001, some Ministers agreed to not recommending the plan of President
Abdurrahman Wahid to issue the Presidential Decree pertain the dissolution of
House of Representatives. As a result he was honorably discharged from the post
Ministry of Politics, Social and Security on June 1, 2001, because he rejected the
plan.65
On August 10, 2001, when Megawati Soekarnoputri took in office, she
trusted and assigned Yudhoyono to be Minister of Politics and Security in the
Cabinet of Gotong Royong (Mutual-Aid). One of his duties was to announce the
imposition of urgent statuses in Aceh province on May 19, 2003, as well as the
process of resolving the conflict in Ambon and Poso.66
64
Ibid (Tokoh Indonesia Magazine, 2013, p. 4) 65
Ibid (Tokoh Indonesia Magazine, 2013, p. 7) 66
Ibid p.2
33
Yudhoyono’s Resignation
Yudhoyono‘s political career was then significantly improved through
several trusts he received from former administration and the ongoing (at that
time) administration under President Megawati Soekarnoputri. Several political
parties such as PKPI nominated him for the 2004‘s general election. Before
eventually Partai Demokrat (The Democrats) nominated him as the candidate of
President instead of Vice President. Since then, his peace campaigns had been
rampant in the masses media.67
At that time, Yudhoyono sensed a strong feeling that President Megawati
Soekarno Putri‘s administration did not solely involve him in several cabinet
activities. He then wrote a letter concerning his authority in the government and
requested to meet President Megawati Soekarnoputri. This was perceived by
Taufik Kiemas (the President‘s husband) as an inappropriate thing to be taken by
a Minister. The relation between Yudhoyono and the administration was then
grown tense as Yudhoyono for several times did not manage to come to
Ministrial meetings.68
On March 11, 2004, he declared his resignation from Ministry of Politics
and Security.
"In keeping with my political rights, if later in time, any
political party, say the Democrats and the other parties
combined assign me as a candidate for Presidential
election, in God‟s will, I am willing to do so."69
His resignation assessed by various political parties as an elegant decision. In the
course of his career, Yudhoyono has always been elegant both in speaking and
behaving. Many politicians perceived that his resignation will give him more
freedom to exert his political rights that will escort him to the top seat of national
leadership.
67
Ibid p.4 68 Hisyam, U. (2004). Lika-liku Karier Sang Bintang, (MO) Men‟s Obsession, Edisi Khusus Mini Biografi.
Jakarta: PT. Dharmapena. 69
Ibid p.4
34
II.1.3. President of Republic of Indonesia; General Election 2004
His resignation from President Soekarnoputri which widely perceived as the
result of unfair political practices at that time had contribute to the increasing
popularity of Yudhoyono in Indonesia‘s political regime.70
His popularity had
boosted the Democrats poll in the 2004 legislative elections the top five and
succeeded him to become one of the candidates for presidential election in 2004.
Shortly after the April 2004 legislative elections, the President had formally
requested willingness of M. Jusuf Kalla to join him as President and Vice
President Candidate.71
In the first round of the presidential election on July 5, 2004, Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono-Jusuf Kalla gained 39,838,184 votes (33.574 percent)
followed by Megawati Soekarnoputri-Hasyim 31,569,104 votes (26.60 percent).
Both candidates were advanced to the second stage of the presidential election
20 September 2004. While the votes of three other candidates are; Wiranto-
Salahuddin Wahid won 26,286,788 votes (22.154%), Amien Rais-Siswono
Yudo Husodo 17,392,931 votes (14.658%) and Hamzah Haz-Agum Gumelar
3,569,861suara (3.009%). Yudhoyono-Jusuf Kalla owned the votes in 17
provinces, including overseas. Then in the second round of the presidential
election 20 September 2004, SBY-JK won the confidence of the majority of
Indonesian people with the votes above 60 percent, ahead of the Mega-Hasyim
that won less than 40 percent of the vote.72
Yudhoyono‘s victory was inextricably linked with his humble, righteous
and charismatic profile as a leader. Although The Democrats was a very young
political party compared to other major political parties in the presidential
election, the party managed to win the votes in most of Indonesia‘s provinces
which eventually led Yudhoyono to the election. The intangible advantage The
Democrats had during the election was the profile of its candidate, Yudhoyono
that other political parties could not present. According to Weber (1998),
charisma defines the quality of a leader capable of engaging its people.
70 Hisyam, U. (2004). President Yudhoyono Sang Demokrat. Jakarta: Dharmapena, p.167 71
Ibid p.5. 72
Ibid (Tokoh Indonesia Magazine, 2013, p. 6)
35
Charismatic individuals have the ability to influence other people so that he can
develop strong cooperation/relationships with any kinds of personalities he is
dealing with.73
That charisma is what the peoples of Indonesia saw in
Yudhoyono through his humble and dauntless personality which influence the
voters to refer to him.
II.1.4. Indonesia’s Foreign Policy under Yudhoyono (First Term and
Second Term)
Ever since the fall of ‗New Order‘ Regime in the era of President Soeharto
in 1998, Indonesia was widely known for its identity of democracy (after the
reformation). However, there was still little acknowledgment for Indonesia
internationally regarding its revitalization after facing severe economic and
financial downfall as well as security threat through mass conflicts. Indonesia‘s
foreign policy has been changing substantially since the reformation in 1998 in
which during that time the regime were preoccupied with the business of
democratic transition – establishing democratic institutions, withdrawing the
military from politics and resisting various threats to reform.
Under President Yudhoyono‘s first term of administration (2004-2009),
Indonesian foreign policy was primarily focused on promoting the democratic
values in order to accelerate the „a million friends and zero enemies‟ unique
statement that he conveyed during his inaugural speech on October 2009.74
Complying with his statement, Indonesia had then managed to host several
international conferences and events involving many major states (e.g. ASEAN
Leaders‘ Summit, APEC etc.) this depicted Indonesia‘s international confidence
which slowly revitalized. Yudhoyono realized that the biggest challenge
Indonesia was facing as soon as he took in office is to restore international
confidence in order to revitalize Indonesia‘s economic and security stability
73 Weber. (2008). Contemporary Sociological Theory. In D. P. Johnson, Comtemporary Sociological Theory; An
Integrated Multi-Level Approach. Springer. 74
Jakarta Globe, 2009
36
internationally and domestically. To this end, the factors of security both ethnic
and modern security such as terrorism are listed as the top priority.
In order to achieve this, President Yudhoyono adopted Optimalisasi
Diplomasi (Optimization of Diplomacy), improving international partnership
and supporting world‘s peace in the implementation of PLNRI (Prinsip dan
Landasan Politik Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia).75
The following are the
details of President Yudhoyono‘s first term (2004-2009) foreign policy as stated
in RPJM for 2004 - 2009:76
i. Optimizing Diplomacy; the ultimate goal of this effort is to improve
Indonesia‘s capacity and performance of foreign policy and diplomacy in
contributing to the process of democratization, political stability and
national unity. This policy includes; reconceptualization of responses to
the strategic international issue, structuration of international agreements
based on Indonesia‘s value of democracy, diplomacy in border issue,
conduct of international partnership, revitalization of Indonesia‘s
international image, protection to WNI (Indonesia‘s diaspora) and
fostering human resources as a means to strengthen diplomatic
institution;
ii. Improving International Cooperation; this aimed at making optimal
use of the opportunities in diplomacy and international cooperation,
especially cooperation between ASEAN countries. Prioritizing ASEAN
cooperation in the maintenance of foreign relations and the
implementation of foreign policy is the actualization of the ASEAN as a
concentric inner circle of Indonesian foreign policy;
iii. Affirmation of Commitment to World Peace; in order to build and
develop the spirit of multilateralism in solving various problems of
75 Wuryandari, G. (2008). Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia di Tengah Pusaran Politik Domestik. Yogyakarta:
Pustaka Pelajar. 76 Peraturan Presiden No. 7 Tahun 2005 tentang Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Tahun 2004 -2009,
chapter 8. Retrieved October 12, 2014, from Kementrian PPN/ Bappenas Web Site:
http://www.bappenas.go.id/files/1113/5027/2586/bab-8-pemantapan-politik-luar-negeri-dan-peningkatan-
kerjasama-internasional.pdf
37
international security. Diplomatic measures which are based on respect
for international law is seen as a more acceptable by the subjects of
international law in international security issues. Commitment to
international peace relevant to the life purpose of the state and the nation,
as stated in Paragraph IV of the Preamble of the Constitution of 1945.
In the second term of President Yudhoyono‘s administration, the foreign
policy set was focusing on priority areas of improvement of diplomacy and
international cooperation, which includes: 1) to increase the role and leadership
of Indonesia in ASEAN; 2) Indonesia's role in maintaining world peace and
security; 3) strengthening Indonesia‘s border diplomacy; 4) service improvement
and protection of Indonesian citizens (WNI) and the Indonesian Legal Entity
(BHI) abroad; 5) Indonesia's role in the promotion of democracy, human rights,
and the environment; 6) strengthening strategic partnerships in the Asia Pacific
and Africa (Aspasaf) and Europe & America (Amerop); 7) improve the
performance of economic diplomacy implementation; and 8) improve the South-
South cooperation.77
In a discussion of Research Seminar on Foreign Relations in December 12,
2011, it was said that an increase in the implementation of economic diplomacy
in trade diplomacy directed to open, expand and seek market opportunities-new
non-traditional markets with the implementation of bilateral cooperation in the
area of Aspasaf78
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa.
The strategy which planned to be implemented to achieve the first goal was
improving the performance of adequate and resilient diplomacy to win every
mind battle and ideas and to systematically establish the position of Indonesia to
encourage fairer international order. Second, improve the coordination with the
government and local government; Third, strengthen the commitment of all
stakeholders in the state; The fourth, preserve and maintain the achievement of
foreign relations that has been achieved; Fifth, strengthen and improve the
77 Director of Politics and Communication of Bappenas Dra. Rd. Siliwanti, MPIA. (2009, December 14).
Prioritas RPJMN 2010-2014 Bidang Hubungan Luar Negeri. Retrieved October 10, 2014, from Kementrian
PPN/ Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional Web Site: http://www.bappenas.go.id/berita-dan-siaran-
pers/features/prioritas-rpjmn-2010-2014-bidang-hubungan-luar-negeri/ 78
Aspasaf is the abreviation of Asia Pasifik dan Afrika (Asia Pacific and Afrika), also known as P3K2 Aspasaf.
(kemlu.go.id)
38
quality of institutions that provide care and protection for the citizen and legal
entities abroad. Sixth, strengthen and drive the image of Indonesia; seventh,
facilitates the promotion potential of Indonesia; and eighth, to provide assistance
to countries in the South region through the mechanism of technical
cooperation.79
Marty Natalegawa on his speech of the Minister for Foreign Affairs Annual
Press Statement conveyed that:
―...throughout 2012, Indonesia‟s foreign policy has strived
to establish a regional order. This was taken both in the
form of institutional capacity building in the region and
through the strengthening of norms and principles that
underline peaceful relationship among nations, to maintain
peace and security in the Asia Pacific region.”80
In the second term of President Yudhoyono‘s administration in the office, Marty
stated that Indonesia‘s foreign policy had strived to be more active in terms of its
foreign relations. Dr. Avery Poole stated in his short periodical article; ―These
emphasize peace, prosperity and stability and Indonesia‟s role in pursuing these
goals in both immediate region and globally.”81
From this discussion, it appears that President Yudhoyono‘s
internationalism is relatively strong beside his nationalism. He believes that
improving Indonesia‘s international confidence will help Indonesia to regain its
economic and social stability post New Order. This also reflects his rational
thinking in considering the ultimate desired goal of foreign policy he determined
for Indonesia.
II.1.5. Indonesia’s International Image under President Yudhoyono
79
Ibid (Director of Politics and Communication of Bappenas Dra. Rd. Siliwanti, MPIA, 2009) 80 Minister for Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia R.M. Marty Natalegawa. (2013, January 4). 2013 Annual
Press Statement. Retrieved October 12, 2014, from Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia Web Site:
http://kemlu.go.id/Pages/SpeechTranscriptionDisplay.aspx?Name1=Pidato&Name2=Menteri&IDP=791&l=en 81 Poole, A. (2013, September 2013). A ―Democratic‖ Process? Change and Continuity in Foreign Policymaking
in Indonesia. pp. 1-11.
39
Despite the fact that Indonesia suffered and had to sacrifice much because of
ethnic/non-ethnic security issues and mass economic/financial downfall attacks
during the late 90s, Indonesia managed to show remarkable resilience by
bouncing back to hold peaceful elections in 2004. As the World Bank noted:
“No state in recent history, let alone one the size of Indonesia, has ever suffered
such a dramatic reversal of fortune.”82
Indonesia's international image which had slumped in the late New Order
era has continued to improve. The direct impact that is felt by most Indonesians
is; Indonesia is trusted by other countries to acquire a spot in various important
committees in the United Nations. At least until 2009, Indonesia sits on nine
important organs of the United Nations and other international organizations. In
the vital organs that Indonesia was elected to the average number of support is
very high, about 165 of the 192 UN members. Even Indonesia is also believed to
enter into the UN Human Rights Council and the UN Security Council.
Something in the past is impossible, given the track record we are regarded as
the state of human rights violators.83
Recognition also came from a number of independent institutions. This can
be seen through the provision of Democracy Medal that was given to President
Yudhoyono in Bali a few years ago from the International Association of
Political Consultants (IAPC). The institute praised democratic progress in
Indonesia. Then also Freedom House, which in 2005 issued a report that
Indonesia as the largest Muslim state that should be a model for other Muslim
countries. Freedom House put Indonesia into the category of free land (free),
parallel to the developed countries in the Western world. Over all the democratic
achievements, Kishore Mahbubani, Singapore's political scientist described the
success of democracy in Indonesia as a miracle in modern times. Indonesia is
able to prove Islam and democracy can work and mutually reinforcing.84
Kishore Mahbubani in his short article about Indonesia conveyed:
82
Dibb and Prince, p.629. 83
Ibid (Zaenal A. Budiyono, 2012, p. 55) 84
Mahbubani, K. (2005). Indonesia: Seizing a New Window of Opportunity.
40
“Despite significant external challenges (such as high
world oil prices), his (President Yudhoyono‟s) efforts have
improved international confidence and helped Indonesia
re-emerge on the radar screens ofinternational investors.
On the political front, President Susilo, who is Indonesia's
first democratically elected President, has recently
overseen the first ever direct local elections.”85
II.1.6 Leadership Characteristic
Dino Patti Djalal, Former Indonesian Ambassador for United States once
stated his book ―Harus Bisa! Seni Memimpin ala SBY” that the essence of
leadership characteristic of President Yudhoyono is the use of soft power or
diplomacy.86
Further, President Yudhoyono is seen as a leader who subscribes to
transformational leadership. Being a leader in an emerging era of democracy is
not an easy responsibility. It takes persistence and patience, besides of course
political stamina in order to strongly deal with the dynamics. Zaenal A.
Budiyono mentioned that President Yudhoyono has this particular leadership
capability that he could control the relative transition storm whose volatility is
more than just waves. The incapability of a leader to handle ripples that are
appearing all the time may potentially cause larger political shocks. President
Yudhoyono managed to exert his leadership in leading most of Indonesia‘s
hurdles during the first and half of the second term. Not just change, but he leads
to a clear and right direction. Not only influence, but at the same time presenting
solutions. In this context, Indonesia needs a transformational leadership in order
to lead this great state to be able to compete with dignity in the constellation of
global life.87
James MacGregor Burns (in Yukl, 1994) explained that transforming
leadership is a process to which leaders and followers raise one another to the
85 Mahbubani, K. (2005). Indonesia: Seizing a New Window of Opportunity, p.3. 86
Dino Patti Djalal. (2008). Harus Bisa (Seni Memimpin Ala SBY), p 78. Jakarta: Red & White Publishing. 87
Ibid (Zaenal A. Budiyono, 2012, p. 10)
41
degree of morality and higher self-motivation.88
However, the concept of
transforming leadership in social science has been evolving through decades.
Bernard M. Bass (1985) re-defined the transforming leadership into
transformational leadership and then added some categories to which
transformational leadership can be measured. In contrast to Burns, Bass also
argued that leadership can display both transformational and transactional
leadership characteristic instead of only one. Bass divided some elements of a
transformational leader are:89
1. The ideal figure whose life had become a role model for his followers;
2. Intellectual stimulation that stimulate creativity among followers;
3. An inspirational motivator, stating a clear vision and inspires followers.
Of the three categories above, it is not difficult to find it in President
Yudhoyono‘s leadership. Personally, life becomes a reference President
Yudhoyono many circles.90
While intellectually, he also has the ability above
average. President Yudhoyono‘s leadership was widely regarded as a different
leadership compared from that of many previous Indonesian Presidents. He has a
background in the differentiation of other military leaders. President Yudhoyono
majored in military and won the glories of a career there, as well as
academically.
The most prominent-and become a differentiating factor from many other
politicians – he consistently brings positivism in during political career,91
by
thinking positive to everyone, including to political opponents though. It is not
unusual, considering that since the 1998 reform, the political euphoria
sometimes become very banal and anarchists. Many elite defined freedom as
free from anything, including if it is infringing law. Yudhoyono who was born in
Pacitan appeared at most inopportune time. But he was able to win sympathy
88
Burns, J.M. (1978) Leadership. New York. Harper & Row. 89 Bass, B. M. (2008). The Bass Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research, and Managerial Applications" 4th
edition Free Press (Vol. 4). CA: Free Press. 90 Budiyono, Z. A. (2012). Memimpin di Era Politik Gaduh. Jakarta: DCS Publication. 91
“Positivism in politics is based on a foundationalist ontology – that is, one in which the world exists
independently of our knowledge of it – and at its heart is the promise of unambiguous and accurate knowledge of
the world which can be arrived at through sensory experience.‖ (Thomas Houghton 2011 on E-IR, taken from
Giddens 1977)
42
with his distinguished political manners. The peoples of Indonesia was then
missing a polite figure in Indonesian politics, yet firm and has brilliant
programs, until Yudhoyono came. Indonesia also needed leaders who are smart,
able to solve problems up to the crisis.92
A number of successful outcomes
carved, despite the continuing challenges ahead.
Great leaders of the world have always been characterized by their strength
of character that shows their differentiation with other mediocre figures.
President Yudhoyono also has his own distinguish character. He showed a
strong character as a leader of Indonesia. At least, five basic attitude of
leadership we can see a long President Yudhoyono, as the leader
transformational.
> First, always ready to be in front, especially in times of crisis. As
recalled, when the tsunami hit Aceh in December 2004, Yudhoyono
was in Jayapura. From the Eastern tip of Indonesia, he made the
decision to go directly to the western tip of Indonesia, although the
current situation is very difficult. He believed that the people of Aceh
able in order to morally support the peoples of Aceh, especially the
victims, the presence of the leader is very important. President
Yudhoyono as the head of state directly led the evacuation and
coordinate emergency response and first aid to the victim. The
responsive handling of the tsunami by Indonesia‘s top leader in Aceh
received many appreciations from the international community, even
more it was considered by some politicians as a better case than the
U.S. handling the Katrina Hurricane in 2005.93
> Second, President Yudhoyono consistently emphasizes soft power in
his leadership. The previous ruling regimes (Soekarno 1945 until
Soeharto 1998) had shown a domination of hard power in the
government which prioritized coercive actions and confrontation;
while Yudhoyono came with his distinguish style in leading. He
carries the spirit of soft power, diplomacy and dialogue-based
92
Ibid (Zaenal A. Budiyono, 2012) 93
Ibid (Zaenal A. Budiyono, 2012)
43
methods of non-war, and this new approach was not taken without
any benchmark/foundation. Yudhoyono realized that in this era of
information, relations between nations are increasingly borderless.
Therefore, he felt that traditional approach to conflict resolution was
not quite relevant. Yudhoyono noticed the necessity of new
breakthroughs that may benefit all parties towards a new world order.
According to Yudhoyono, it will be more difficult to achieve peaceful
solution in conflict areas if every party depends on hard power.94
The
failure of the U.S. military approach in Afghanistan and Iraq, for
example, shows that the world community needs to be made aware of
the existence of the elements of power other than military force. In
contrast to hard power that relies on the power, the concept of
President Yudhoyono‘s soft power rely on persuasive approach using
economic assets, social, cultural, humanitarian, education, science and
technology, and so on. Like a snowball, soft power offered President
Yudhoyono invited many reactions. At the UN, the President received
a standing ovation and praise from many quarters. This idea is also
increasingly popular as the number of world leaders who began
studying it.95
> Third, dare to take risks. When the peace process between Indonesia
and GAM initiated, hundreds of critics pierced to the Palace.
Yudhoyono was considered playing around with the Homeland NKRI.
Others say Yudhoyono was too soft in dealing with GAM. The others
were seized by excessive paranoid due to the presence of Crisis
Management Initiative (CSI), as the internationalization of Aceh.
Yudhoyono calculated the consequences, and he knew that severe
"storm" will appear that time, including how to get through it. And
indeed, after several rounds of negotiations, GAM finally willing to
accept the special autonomy under NKRI. In order to ensure the
94 Hisyam, U. (2004). SBY Sang Demokrat. Jakarta: Dharmapena. 95 Hisyam, U. (2004). Lika-liku Karier Sang Bintang, (MO) Men‟s Obsession, Edisi Khusus Mini Biografi.
Jakarta: PT. Dharmapena.
44
supremacy of the sovereignty of the nation, Yudhoyono continuously
took in charge to directly monitor each stage of the negotiation. In fact
he also ruled out some of the provisions in the Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) that is not in accordance with the constitution
of RI. If Yudhoyono was to succumb to the pressure of the top elites,
perhaps a war is still going on in Aceh. However, there are still those
who cynically see the peace in Aceh. Some say that security in Aceh
is a surreal blur. Addressing this issue, Irwandi Yusuf, Governor of
Aceh has his own assessment, "The stigma that Aceh is not safe (post-
MoU) that Indonesian people understand outside Aceh is not true.
Aceh is safer than other cities in Sumatra."96
Over the great
achievements in Aceh, Yudhoyono was nominated as one of the
nominees to receive Nobel Peace Prize in 2006.
> Yudhoyono‘s policy priority sectors were aimed at pro-public. We
can see the following data;
a. Education budget rose significantly from year to year. In
2002, the national education budget was only about 3.8% of
the state budget, or Rp. 13.6 trillion. Complying to the
demands of society and the constitutional mandate (UUD
1945), then in 2009 the Indonesian government for the first
time in the history of the education budget managed to apply
20% of the state budget, which was worth about Rp. 207.41
trillion. And the trend continued to be maintained, until in
2012, the education budget increased to Rp. 286.9 trillion.
Although in the distribution process the allocation was often
deviated, this demonstrates the strong commitment of the
Yudhoyono‘s government in the improvement of education in
Indonesia.97
b. In the health sector, a sharp increase in the budget is also
evidenced by Yudhoyono. If in 2004 the state budget
96
Ibid 97
Ibid
45
allocation for new health was around Rp 5.8 trillion, then this
number increased almost four-fold in 2009, to around Rp. 20.3
Trillion. The commitment to provide free health care for the
poor was also more visible in the health budget in 2012, which
continued to increase to Rp. 29.915 Trillion.98
c. Poverty and unemployment in the era of the President also
declined, although the challenge is equally light. Poverty rate
in 2006 reached 17.8%, was reduced to 15.4% in 2008, and
back can be reduced to 13.3% in 2010. Likewise, the trend
unemployment rate, which in 2005 unemployment reached
11.2 %, was reduced to 8.5% in 2008. This figure continues to
be suppressed, as BPS, to 7.14% (August 2010) and back
down to a level of 6.56% in November 2011. Once again, the
positive trend in many sectors shows that the government of
SBY "never sleep" or continue to work for the people.99
To this end we can see that President Yudhoyono is a
> Fifth, committed in eradicating corruption. For the first time in its
history, Indonesia managed to put a paramount attention to the
eradication of corruption since Yudhoyono took in office by the
establishment of KPK (Corruption Eradication Commission). As can
be recalled, many officials ranging from members of parliament,
officials of state-owned enterprises, governors, regents and mayors
are now dealing with the law. Yudhoyono has never been selective in
enforcing the law and combating corruption. However, due to
Indonesia‘s prolonged authoritarian era, where power is more
powerful than the system, Yudhoyono‘s assertiveness was often
considered strange. In short, all the corruption in the era Yudhoyono
continues to fight, even though the business was not easy. At least the
98
Ibid 99
Ibid
46
anti-corruption foundation has been anchored strongly by Yudhoyono
as one of his prominent legacy. 100
II.2 Foreign Policy Analysis
In order to strengthen and complete the previous‘ basic theory, this chapter
aims to give a more detailed discussion upon the analysis of foreign policy in
three main levels. The main objective is to give analysis about the role of
individual decision makers – in this case, a leader – in the decision making
process. The first is the relationship between FPA and international relations
study. This sub-chapter provides analysis about the foreign policy as one of
international relations‘ study. Second is the state-level analysis of foreign policy,
which will highlight the relationship of state actors as a main agent in foreign
policy analysis. The last is individual-level of analysis of foreign policy, or
namely, the idiosyncratic factors. This explains the role of individual decision
makers in foreign policy analysis.
II.2.1. Foreign Policy Analysis in International Relations
One way to understand the concept of foreign policy is by separating it into
two components: foreign and policy. Policy is a set of decisions that guide to
action, or a set of actions aimed at achieving the goals that have been set
previously. Policy itself is rooted in the concept of choices: selection of an
action or making decisions to attain the objectives. While the notion of
sovereignty and the concept of region will help to understand the concept of
foreign. Sovereignty means an existence of supreme authority over some polity
and territory. 101
Thus, foreign policy means a set of guidelines for selecting
actions towards the outside territory of a state (Rosenau, 1969).
100
Ibid 101 Krasner, S. D. (1999). Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
47
Every study or discipline has its ground, in a way that it conceptualizes the
fundamental level on which phenomena(s) occur in that particular field of
study.102
In this course, international relations study‘s ground is the interaction
that occurs across nations by human or group decision makers. This interaction
includes that of peaceful cooperation or conflict. Substantially, interactions
involve contested creation, protection and distribution of values including assets
as security, economic, environmental stability and human rights.103
Thus, the
study of international relations is inextricably linked with the analysis of foreign
policy as it describes how international actors (individuals, states, non-states,
partnerships etc.) interact among each other in international arena. In
international relations study, foreign policy analysis (FPA) contributes in
identifying the center point of intersection between state behavior‘s determinants
which are material and ideational factors. This point of intersection is the human
decision makers.
In studying foreign policy, the basic understanding that should be
underlined is; it is basically a ―theory of action‖ or state‘s policy destined for
other countries to achieve certain purposes.104
In a general sense, foreign policy
is a formulation of values, attitudes, direction and targets for maintaining,
securing, and promoting national interests in the international arena. This
formulation is a commitment which is basically a basic strategy to achieve a goal
in the context of domestic and abroad, and also to determine a state's
involvement in international issues or the surrounding environment.105
The study of foreign policy is at the intersection between the domestic
aspects of a state (domestic) and international aspects of (external) of the life of
a state. Therefore the study of foreign policy cannot be relativized structure and
102
Hudson, V. M. (2005). Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specfic Theory and the Ground of International
Relations. Retrieved October 10, 2014, from International Relations Study Association:
https://wiki.zirve.edu.tr/sandbox/groups/economicsandadministrativesciences/wiki/c559e/attachments/396e4/Hud
son_FPA%20Actor%20Specfic%20Theory%20and%20IR.pdf?sessionID=be1325d37a7c5f7b99f39de6da779933
c272d74d 103 Rittberger, V. (2004). Approaches to the Study of Foreign Policy Derived from International Relations
Theories. Retrieved October 12, 2014, from Tübinger Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik und
Friedensforschung, p.1. 104 Rosenau, J. N. (1969). International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory. New
York: The Free Pers. 105
Ibid (Rosenau, 1969)
48
processes both of the international system (the external environment) as well as
of the domestic political system. From the above statement it is difficult for us to
distinguish between foreign policy to domestic politics. This separation is
possible only for the purpose of analysis or research in International
Relations.106
II.2.2. State-level Analysis
At this level of analysis, explanation of state behavior is determined by the
internal factors of the state. The characteristics of a certain state including its
society shape the nature of how that particular state behave and interact towards
external parties in international arena.107
According to Rourke (2008), state-level
analysis requires an understanding of how the various actors (bureaucrats,
interest groups and the legislature) in the state play a role in determining the
foreign policy. State-level analysis will result in less macro explanation as
generated at the level of system analysis, but neither is it like when using the
micro-level individual analysis.108
There are five factors influence the foreign behavior of a state. The first is
type of government; whether it is authoritarian or democratic government. In
which, in authoritarian regime, the decision is more likely to be determined to a
center/specific segment of the government (president/leader). However, due to
the size of the state, secondary leaders such as foreign ministers, bureaucrats,
interest groups and other domestic elements of the state play a role in decision
making process. In democratic regime, the decision making process tends to be
characterized with a more open government which welcomes the input coming
from legislators, media, public opinion and opposite parties.109
106
Ibid (Rosenau, 1969) 107 Bova, R. (2011). Level of Analysis in the Making of Foreign Policy. How the World Works: A Brief Survey of
International Relations, p69-95. 108 Rouke, J. T. (2003). International Politics on the World Stage, Brief 5th edition. New York : Mcgraw-Hill
College. 109
Rouke, J. T. (2003). International Politics on the World Stage, Brief 5th edition. New York : Mcgraw-Hill
College, p.78.
49
Second is the factor of situation, which divided into two categories: crisis
and non-crisis situation. In times of crisis, the decision makers tend to consider
the stage of urgency of the crisis, hence they realize that the decision shall be
immediately determined. Also, another side-effect of sudden crisis is the sense
of threat and element of surprise. Whereas in non-crisis situations, decision
makers tend to be led by a certain leader/ advisers, but still can involve more
domestic actors in shaping the policy. The last is the type of policy itself. This
refers to the issue being discussed in the decision making process in a way that it
determines whether more domestic actors such like government opposition shall
be included in the process.110
In terms of type of government, Indonesia‘s stance during the allegation
was centered on its democratic identity because Indonesia upholds democracy as
its type of government and state. The term of democratic identity was firstly
introduced by Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett in their Normative and Structural
Causes of Democratic Peace, this study analyzes the likeability of violent
conflict in democracies compared to nondemocracies using two approaches,
normative and structural. Normative approach examines that in democratic
countries are less prone to violent conflict compared to nondemocracies. While
Structural approach explains the complexity of political mobilization that
potentially affects political leaders of conflicting parties not to see the violent
conflict as an option.111
In a nutshell, democratic identity is characterized by
three factors; non-violent conflict resolution, rule of law, compromise and
transparency.112
This explains Indonesia‘s stance during the allegation revealed by Edward J.
Snowden that Indonesia strived to maintain non-violent conflict resolution by
110 Ibid (Rouke, 2003, p. 79)
111 Zeev Maos & Bruce Russett. (2006, August 23). Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace.
Retrieved November 4, 2014, from JSTOR Web Site:
http://www.uky.edu/~clthyn2/PS671/MaozRussett_1993APSR.pdf 112 Hayes, J. (2009). Identity and Securitization in the Democratic Peace: The United States and Divergence of
Response to India and Iran's Nuclear Programs. Retrieved November 5, 2014, from Academia Education Web
Site:
https://www.academia.edu/156180/Identity_and_Securitization_in_the_Democratic_Peace_The_United_States_a
nd_the_Divergence_of_Response_to_India_and_Irans_Nuclear_Programs
50
offering several diplomatic approaches and options of settlement to Australia
such as direct diplomatic negotiation inter-government related to explanation,
suspension on several layer of cooperation and protocol in a form of code of
conduct to act as a guide for both countries‘ future strategic cooperation.
Abiding to rule of law and compromise, Indonesia also managed to achieve an
agreement to how the tension can be at ease by initiatively engaging Australia
into active negotiation upon win-win resolution. Lastly, Indonesia valued
transparency as a means to mutual trust among partners in achieving mutual
objectives, hence Indonesia sought to provide chance to Australia to state a clear
explanation upon the allegation revealed.
In analyzing the situation, Indonesia realized that the allegation was serious
but nothing too much that it could cause violent conflict or damage. The worst
that could happen – as also predicted by majority of public – was it might cause
a serious threat to Indonesia-Australia‘s strategic partnership that had already
been built over decades. It is more relevant to say the situation that took place
during the allegation was more to strain rather than conflict simply because the
level of serious damage caused by the allegation was mainly to Indonesia‘s trust
and national identity rather than serious security breach that produce casualties.
The possibility of coercive conflict or even war was far from any view‘s
perception. Having this serious but resolvable situation, it then affected the type
of policy determined by the government; whether or not it should involve any
specific unit of the government or even an ad-hoc cabinet to solve the strain. The
strain was majorly handled by President Yudhoyono himself who was also
acting as a prominent decision maker, partly because the strain did not require
any urgent and utterly serious handling in a short term. President Yudhoyono
instructed policies towards the allegation by gathering Ministries and
government officials that related to the issue such like the Head of BIN (Badan
Intelijen Negara), Minister of Foreign Affairs, Coordinating Minister of Politics,
Legal and Secuity, Minister of State Secretary and Indonesia Bersatu II‘s
secretary.
51
II.2.3. Individual-level Analysis; Idiosyncratic Factors
Individual level of analysis in foreign policy analysis is strongly correlated
with idiosyncrasy study or personal factors of political leaders. In order to
support the research about President Yudhoyono‘s role as an individual decision
maker, this sub-chapter will highlight a more detailed analysis of individual
decision makers, in this course, idiosyncratic factors. The discussion will try to
examine the analysis of elements that influence individual decision makers in the
process of determining decision. After grasping the basic theory, this sub-
chapter will narrow the discussion into idiosyncratic factors analysis of political
leaders that is also being part of individual decision makers‘ analysis.
Idiosyncratic factors will refer to what is widely known as psychoanalysis in
international politics in which it underlines the personal characteristics of a
leader itself.
Russel Bova (2011) developed the analysis of human variations that affect
the conduct of international relations and foreign policy derived from the debate
of international relations scholars in individual decision makers. Political leaders
are human beings, and human beings have agency in regards to their preferences
of actions when encountered by a certain crisis/problem. These variations are:113
1) Belief System
This explains the substantive values and ideas about the world a certain
political leader holds. The belief system determines a leader‘s position on
a specific foreign policy challenges. After that this belief is manifested
through what is called as ideology which encompasses social, political
and economic understandings and assumptions. For example, a leader
who refers to Marxist ideology will have a different view of the
international system compared to leader who subscribes to Muslim
theocrat ideology. Furthermore, the belief system also can be reflected to
leaders‘ operational code which explains their ―beliefs about the nature
of politics and political conflict, their views regarding the extent to which
113 Bova, R. (2011). Level of Analysis in the Making of Foreign Policy. How the World Works: A Brief Survey of
International Relations, 69-95.
52
historical developments can be shaped and their notions of correct
strategy and tactics.‖114
2) Personality Attributes
Several international relations scholars have argued upon the factors of
personality attributes in shaping policy decisions. The elements of
personal attributes described here are: temperament, pragmatic or
dogmatic, authoritarian or democratic, impulsive or deliberative, cautious
or risk-taking. These elements can potentially contribute to the process of
leaders‘ individual decision making as their substantive beliefs.115
President Yudhoyono, through his 2 periods in the government managed to
give significant change to Indonesia‘s international confidence. Yudhoyono‘s
point of departure was to foster Indonesia‘s international confidence through
introducing Indonesia‘s democratic values to the world. The previous discussion
about Indonesia‘s international image and President Yudhoyono‘s leadership
characteristic had shown that Yudhoyono is a transformational leader who as
well subscribes to positivism in his political career. His belief of democratic
values combined with his exemplary personality made a perfect combination
during his terms. This demonstrated the theory that leaders are bound to be
cautious in terms of making decisions.
Idiosyncratic factor is an internal source which comes from individual
decision makers that projects the values of experience, talent and personality of
the political elite that influence perception, calculation, and their behavior
towards foreign policy. Here is also included a political elite's perception of the
state of nature of the international arena and national goals to be attained. Rouke
(2003) demonstrated that there are five factors in personal traits of leaders are:
personality, physical and mental health, ego and ambition, political history and
114 George, A. L. (1969). The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and
Decision-Making. International Stusy Quarterly. 115
Ibid
53
personal experiences and perceptions and operational reality. The following is
the details of each factor:116
1) Personality
According to Dyson (2006), a leader‘s basic orientations towards self and
others, behavioral patterns and attitudes significantly influence him/her in
making policy/decision.117
Barber (1985) divided some political
personality of leaders as: a) active leaders which are innovative in
decision making; b) passive leaders which demonstrate more to the
reactions side; c) positive leaders which have strong egos in affirming to
the contentious political environment, and; d) negative leaders which are
very responsive to criticism.118
Those four traits sometimes combined
and form a new characteristic which distinguish a certain leader to
another.
2) Physical and Mental Health
This factor is undeniably important since leaders are required to be in
their best shape in order to develop rational strategies/plan and decisions.
Failure in maintaining physical health stability will not just cost countless
expenditure, but more importantly, time; especially during times of crisis
when decisions from a leader is considered of paramount. Not just
physical health, the stability of mental health is also inevitably correlated
to how leaders make decisions. Subscription to drugs and alcohol can
potentially cause one‘s mental to be unstable in a way that thinking
straight and logical is nearly impossible.119
3) Ego and Ambition
Ego and ambition influence political leaders in a way that its fluctuation
can affect the leaders to react to a certain condition according to the
116
Rouke, J. T. (2003). International Politics on the World Stage, Brief 5th edition. New York : Mcgraw-Hill
College, p.74-77. 117
Dyson, Stephen Benedict & Preston, Thomas. 2006. Individual Characteristics of Political Leaders and the
Use of Analogy in Foreign Policy Decision Making, International Society of Political Psychology 118 Barber , J. D. (1972; 1985) The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 119
Rouke, J. T. (2003). International Politics on the World Stage, Brief 5th edition. New York : Mcgraw-Hill
College, p.74-77.
54
ongoing mood or ego which is not a very wise take since ego can
sometimes turn into more negative in connotative ways.120
4) Political History and Personal Experiences
History tends to repeat its own. Henceforth, for some leaders, experience
is important in determining the solution of a current ongoing crisis since
from experience itself they can obtain more information and knowledge
relevant to the case and to which the viable options can be taken.121
5) Perceptions and Operational Reality
In this idiosyncratic element, Caprioli (2005) defined that perceptions
contribute to policy making through the formulation of operational
reality. This explains that decision makers decide based on their
perceptions, regardless of the accuracy.122
Other than operational reality,
Schafer (2006) established the term operational code which describes
how world politics influence the leaders to whether or not engaged in a
certain decision of rewards, threats, force and other viable diplomatic
methods in the event of achieving the nation‘s objectives.123
These individual elements or factors also contribute to the cognitive, perspective
and affective factors (see: section 1.6. Theoretical Framework)
II.3. Chapter Summary
President Yudhoyono, with his distinguish leadership characteristic,
managed to tackle major challenges Indonesia was facing back in years after the
reformation of 1998. Henceforth, Yudhoyono‘s leadership is characterized by
four main characters; rational, democratic, positivism and optimization of soft
power. Financial downfall which demotivated the growth of Indonesia‘s
economy has now starting to get revitalized as Indonesia‘s international
confidence being re-built. Yudhoyono was widely known as a positive leader
120
Ibid 121
Ibid p.75. 122
Caprioli, M. and Trumbore, P.F. 2005. Rhetoric versus reality: rogue states in interstate conflict. Journal of
Conflict Resolution, 49(5), 770-91 . Carment, D. 2003. 123
Ibid
55
who values democracy above all else in his term in the government. The cases of
corruption, economic stability and security threat had been minimized by his
innovative policies.
Yudhoyono has distinguished personality able to influence the peoples of
Indonesia in general election as well as the low-level decision makers (his
followers) to be fully dedicated to the development of Indonesia. His leadership
characteristic is undoubtedly influenced by internal self-factors as an individual
decision maker in many governmental challenges. Yudhoyono is a
transformational leader who defines policies based on the view of objectivity as
well as transactional leader, who can coordinate his followers to run the
government based on the agreed interpretation of norms and values. He also
responded to ‗endless‘ criticism by positive attitude and thought. This had
become international community‘s central attention that he individually, and on
behalf of Indonesia, received several noble awards based on the attained
achievements.
As one of international relations study‘s course, foreign policy contributes
to the determination of international actors‘ role in decision making process.
Because international relations system consist of international actors (states,
individuals, groups and non-states), the study of actors and its correlation of
foreign policy is also important to this research since it contributes to describing
the role of individual decision makers in foreign policy.
The shift of Indonesia‘s political regime from guided-democracy to a sole
democracy was characterized by the increasing role of President in the
government in making decisions with the objectives to ease the bureaucracy and
evenly distribute the mandate. Hence, the role of President Yudhoyono in
governing the regime through determining fair and strategic foreign policy was
very important. He presented the strategy of strengthening Indonesia‘s
diplomacy and international cooperation as the benchmark of Indonesia‘s
foreign policy in the event to support the revitalization of Indonesia‘s
international confidence. Yudhoyono managed to accelerate his idiosyncrasy in
cognitive ability to maximize his transformational leadership.
56
CHAPTER III
AUSTRALIA SPYING ALLEGATION
(November 2013)
Edward J. Snowden‘s revelation upon Australia‘s spying conduct towards
Indonesia had undoubtedly jeopardized at least Jakarta‘s trust to Canberra. Reviews
upon bilateral political and economic partnership were continuously taken by
Indonesia due to the sensitiveness of the issue. Before getting into the discussion of
spying allegation, it is important to know the background of Indonesia-Australia‘s
bilateral diplomatic relationship in order to get a better understanding in examining
the issue. In bringing the case into discussion, this chapter will furthermore critically
examine the chronological order of the spying allegation case involving Australia
towards Indonesia during late November 2013 until its settlement in August 2014.
The discussion also includes arguments from both countries pertain the case as well
as the implications towards the bilateral political, economic & security relationship.
III.1. Indonesia-Australia Leaders Bilateral Relationship (Strategic Partnership
2004 – 2013)
Since the election of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as president of Indonesia,
bilateral relations between Indonesia and Australia had significantly improved into a
more mutually benefiting cooperation. This was reflected by the presence of Prime
Minister Howard at the inauguration of President Yudhoyono in October 2004 in
Jakarta and the provision of humanitarian assistance amounting to a $ 1 billion for
reconstruction and rehabilitation of areas devastated by the tsunami of December
2004 is coordinated through the Australian-Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction
57
and Development (AIPRD).124
During his term in office until 2013, Yudhoyono had
visited Australia for a total of four times, which is more than any predecessor.125
The strengthening ties between Indonesia and Australia was marked also by the
visit of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to Australia on 3-6 April 2005 which
resulted in a Joint Declaration on a Comprehensive Partnership which was an
umbrella arrangement of security cooperation in the political, economic, social and
cultural. The declaration also prioritized issues of transnational crimes, which
Indonesia and Australia developed closer cooperation between police agencies,
immigration and customs and security and intelligence agencies.126
Indonesian and Australian leaders have been significantly working together for
decades. For Indonesia, Australia is considered as a very prominent partner not only
recalling Australia's role in contributing to the history of Indonesia‘s independence
but also political, social, economic, education and culture connectivity. Indonesia is
now the largest recipient of Australian aid program in fiscal year 2009/2010 with an
estimated reaches 452.5 million dollars.127
The number of trade in goods and services
between the two countries reached 10.3 billion dollars, with an investment of two-
way penetrate 4.5 billion dollars. Meanwhile, there are about 400 Australian
companies operating in Indonesia, which includes mining and energy sectors,
construction, financial, and food and beverage industries. In 2008, there were more
than 16,000 Indonesian students studying in various universities in Australia.
Indonesia‘s interest was to maintain the regional stability, supported by political
stability and security.128
124 Sulistiyanto, P. (2010). Indonesia-Australia Relations in the Era of Democracy: The View from Indonesian
Side. Australian Journal of Political Science, 117-132. 125 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2014, January). Indonesia Country Brief. Retrieved October 22,
2014, from Australian Government Official Web Site: http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/indonesia/indonesia_brief.html 126
Ibid
127 Cotan, Imron (2004). Peluang dan Tantangan Hubungan Bilateral Indonesia-Australia. Retrieved October 22,
2014, from KBRI Web Site: http://www.kbri-canberra.org.au/speeches/2004/041206civitas.html
128 Australia Indonesia Partnership. (2008, Juni). Strategi Kerjasama Pembangunan Australia Indonesia 2008-
2013. Retrieved October 22, 2014, from Australian Aid:
http://aid.dfat.gov.au/Publications/Documents/aip_strat_2008-13_bahasa.pdf
58
As for Australia, Indonesia is an important neighbor which geographically
located in the north of Australia and has a vital and strategic position, not only in
terms of foreign policy, defense and security, social and economic, but also cultural
and educational. Kevin Rudd in an article in the newspaper Kompas (11/06/2008)129
mentioned that Indonesia was the nearest Asian neighbor as well as the most
important partner. In the Australian Defence White Paper 2009, stated that Indonesia
has undergone major changes since 2000 and defense ties have expanded into a form
of communion since 2008, which refer to the stipulation of Lombok Treaty.
Australian Strategic Policy Institute in a report entitled Seeing Indonesia as a Normal
Country: Implications for Australia proposed a new perspective to Australian society
which was friendlier towards Indonesia.130
III.2. Challenges to Indonesia-Australia Bilateral Relationship
Indonesia-Australia relations downgraded with the granting of temporary
protection visas by the Australian government to citizen 42 Papuan asylum seekers.
This resulted in the possibility of Indonesia‘s consideration to re-review the
Comprehensive Partnership that has been agreed. 2005 was a very challenging year
for Indonesia-Australia bilateral relationship recalling the event of arrest of 277
Indonesian fishermen in the control operation performed by the Australian
government. Those fishermen were alleged to be infringing the EEZ border. It
seemed that in the end of 2005, Indonesia and Australia still faced with the problem
of border over the claim of Laut Timor, either through EEZ or continental shelf
boundaries. The implication was still the arrest of Indonesian fishermen and the
conflict of oil and gas in the Celah Timor. Since then, the issue of asylum seekers,
other that border issue, is being a major challenge to Indonesia-Australia bilateral
relationship.131
129
Rudd, Kevin. Indonesia Mitra Penting Australia. Retrieved October 22, 2014, from Kompas Web Site:
http://cetak.kompas.com/read/xml/2008/06/11/01032174/indonesia.mitra.penting 130
Macintyre, Andrew & Douglas E. Ramage (2008). Seeing Indonesia as a Normal Country : Implications for
Australia. Barton ACT : Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Retrieved October 22, 2014.
131 Christopher B Roberts and Ahmad D Habir. (2014, May 11). Australia‟s relations with Indonesia: Progress
Despite Economic and Socio-Cultural Constraints? Retrieved October 22, 2014, from Australian National
University Web Site: http://nsc.anu.edu.au/documents/Indonesia-Article11.pdf
59
When Indonesia and Australia sought to improve bilateral relations that had
stretched, the two countries still confronted with issues concerning drug smuggling
case by Australian citizens, Schapelle Leigh Corby was arrested on October 2004 by
the Customs officers of Ngurah Rai Airport in Bali for carrying 4.2 kg of marijuana.
He was sentenced to 20 years in prison. After some time it receives a remission, 5-
year granting clemency by President Yudhoyono sparked controversy in May
2012.132
The main challenges of Indonesia-Australia bilateral relations were laid on 3
main aspects:133
1. Security; the presence of transnational security threat such as terrorism,
drug smuggling, people smuggling and other traditional security issues
had in many ways strengthened the relations, but it also perceived as a
major challenges since Indonesia and Australia shares mutual interest on
regional security that sometimes there were differences in dealing with
the issue, particularly because of both countries‘ different background in
multiple aspects.
2. Intelligence; the revelation in 2013 was not the first allegation to rock
Indonesia-Australia relations, several other intelligence issues had
managed to downgrade the relationship (although it was not in a very
devastating way);
3. Asylum seekers; indeed, for two countries which are geographically
attached, border issues are inevitable. Asylum seekers have been a major
challenge for the relationship as Australia is the only country in the
world to ban visa for illegal asylum seekers.
III.3. Edward J. Snowden’s Allegation on Australia’s Spying Conduct
The allegation was widely recognized as a very sensitive issue by the
peoples of Indonesia. Furthermore, the reaction Jakarta showed during the
allegation was also being a major concern by the peoples in Australia that the
132
Ibid 133
Ibid
60
majority wanted the Prime Minister to take the case more seriously. This sub-
chapter will put each event in chronological order as well as critically examine
it. The chronology of allegation can be divided into the beginning and post-
allegation. The beginning will focus more to the emergence of the case which
revealed in the late November 2013, without including the discussion about any
parties‘ concern or responses (this also refers to President Yudhoyono). This will
provide information about the details of the case allegedly conducted by
Canberra, content of allegation and the alleged motive(s) of spying. While the
second section of ‗post-allegation‘ will provide information about significant
occurrences after the allegation revealed and during the attempt of both states‘ to
resolve the issue. This includes the implication of allegation to both countries‘
bilateral partnership. The general chronology of Edward J. Snowden‘s revelation
is as follow:
III.3.1. Beginning of Allegation: Revelation of Wikileaks
The beginning of allegation was revealed through Wikileaks on October 31,
2013134
when afterwards, Sydney Morning Herald, one of prominent mass
Medias in Australia echoed the revelation through publishing the news online
134
The information of revelation is gathered from Sydney Morning Herald Web Site instead of directly from
Wikileaks (http://www.wikileaks.org) due to the unavailability of the web site to keep the information published.
Involved government(s) possibly had requested the web site to take it down.
October 31: Revelation leaked by Edward J.
Snowden pertain Australia's Spy Network; MoFA
Indonesia summoned Greg Moriarty for explanation
November 1: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia held a closed meeting with
Australian Ambassador, Greg Moriarty regarding
spying issue
November 18: Six slides of DSD documents went viral
through Australian Broadcasting Corporation
and Guardian obtained from Snowden's revelation
November 19: Indonesia halted security cooperation & summoned Najib Riphat Koesoma from Canberra
61
and printed. Allegedly, Australian embassies from a number of Asia-Pacific
countries were being covertly used to intercept phone calls and data across Asia
as part of a U.S.-led global spying network. This was revealed by Edward J.
Snowden and one of Australia‘s intelligence officers. It was said that Australian
diplomats were secretly used (without their knowledge) in operation of
clandestine surveillance facilities at embassies by the Defence Signals
Directorate (which now called Australian Signals Directorate), one of
intelligence agencies of Australia‘s government.135
III.3.1.1. Snowden Leaked the Alleged Australia’s Spy Network (U.S.,
Britain, Canada and Australia)
Sydney Morning Herald conveyed on October 31, that Australia had
involved in ―Five Eyes‖ intelligence partners mission including Australia,
Britain, U.S. and Canada. This news was gathered from the revelation of Edward
J. Snowden which re-published by Germany‘s Der Spiegel. U.S. spying
allegation to Germany was also said to be part of this operation that its main
method was to eavesdrop foreign leaders including Angela Merkel, German
Chancellor.136
Picture III.1. Alleged Australia’s Network of Spying Outposts
135 Dorling, P. (2013, October 31). Exposed: Australia's Asia spy network. Retrieved October 22, 2014, from
Sydney Morning Herald: Federal Politics Web Site: http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-
news/exposed-australias-asia-spy-network-20131030-2whia.html 136
Ibid
62
Source: Tim Leslie and Mark Corcoran. (2013, November 19). Explained:
Australia's involvement with the NSA, the US spy agency at heart of global
scandal. Retrieved October 22, 2014, from Australian Broadcasting
Corporation News Web Site: http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-
08/australian-nsa-involvement-explained/5079786
For the region of Asia-Pacific, embassies in Jakarta, Bangkok, Hanoi,
Beijing and Dili, and High Commissions in Kuala Lumpur and Port Moresby, as
well as other diplomatic posts were allegedly being the subject to be used to
intercept foreign leaders‘ phone calls and activities. It was allegedly said that the
programs which involved intercepting radio, telecommunications and internet
traffic were done by, for example, hiding antennas in false architectural features
or roof maintenance sheds in embassies‘ diplomatic facilities.137
However, the
documents did not reveal specific location(s) to which the Defence Signals
Directorate facilities overseas were identified.138
Professor Des Ball, a senior intelligence academic and author from
Australian National University conveyed that Australia took/take part in
UKUSA intelligence agreement which was initiated during World War II
between the U.S. and United Kingdom, and extended to include Australia,
Canada and New Zealand. As previously mentioned, the operation is also known
137
Ibid (The allegation revealed in the documents of NSA. Dorling, 2013) 138
Ibid (Dorling, 2013)
63
as the Five Eyes. This operation divides the globe into collection of areas.
Australia‘s responsibility was from the mid-Indian Ocean across to the western
Pacific and northwards into Southern China.139
As soon as the news revealed, several embassies in Asia Pacific, including
Indonesia, had raising concerns upon the allegation. Indonesia demanded
explanation from Australia recalling the newspaper‘s report on how Australia
allegedly used embassies such as Jakarta to electronically spy on Asian
governments. On November 1, Indonesia‘s Ministry of Foreign Affairs
summoned Australia‘s ambassador, Greg Moriarty, to give official explanation
regarding the news reported in October 31. Michael Tene, Indonesian Foreign
Ministry spokesman stated that the purpose of the meeting was to seek
clarification on the information about the facilities in the Australian embassy in
Jakarta as well as to convey the message that if the information is true, it is
highly not acceptable to Indonesian government and it potentially jeopardize the
bilateral relations between Indonesia and Australia.140
Although several diplomatic measures were taken to gain the explanation, it
seemed that neither U.S. nor Australia managed to provide sufficient
information towards the allegation.
III.3.1.2. Allegation of Spying from Canberra towards Jakarta (November
18)
The relationship began to grow tensed as the revelation of Edward J.
Snowden in October 31 through Der Spiegel revealed. Although it did not
specifically mentioned Australia attempted to spy on Indonesia, Jakarta had been
very concerned upon the issue following there were no clear explanation gained
from the meeting in November 1st. Just then in November 18, 2013, Michael
Brissenden through Australian Broadcasting Corporation News published news
leaked by Edward Snowden pertain Australia‘s spying conduct towards
139
Ibid (Dorling, 2013) 140
Cochrane, Joe. (2013, November 1). Indonesia Confronts Australian Ambassador on Reports of Spying.
Retrieved October 22, 2014, from The New York Times Web Site.
64
Indonesia‘s President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and President‘s several
innermost in the government including his wife Kristiani Herawati.141
Brissenden who was also the National Defence Correspondent for
Australian Broadcasting Corporation News explained the media that Australia‘s
electronic intelligence agency, the Defence Signals Directorate (now: Australian
Signals Directorate) attempted to listen in to Yudhoyono‘s telephone
conversations on at least one occasion and tracked activity on his mobile phone
for 15 days in August 2009, which refer to Prime Minister Kevin Rudd‘s
administration.142
III.3.1.3 Content of Allegation
There were a total of 6 power point slide shows leaked by Snowden
obtained from the ASD (previously DSD). This document was entitled ―3G
Impact and Update‖. On this revealed top-secret documents of Australia‘s
Defence Signals Directorate on November 18, 2013; the bottom-right side of the
documents there were a statement written “Reveal their Secrets, Protect Our
Own”. The details of documents‘ contents are as follow:143
Picture III.2. “3G Impact and Update”
141 Brissenden, M. (2013, November 18). Australia Spied on Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono,
Leaked Edward Snowden Documents Reveal. Retrieved September 18, 2014, from Australian Broadcasting
Corporation News (ABC News): http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-18/australia-spied-on-indonesian-
president-leaked-documents-reveal/5098860
142 Ibid 143
Ibid (Brissenden, 2013)
65
Picture III.3. “IA Leadership Targets + Handsets”
Source: Michael Brissenden, National Defence Correspondent (2013, November 18).
Australia Spied on Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Leaked
Edward Snowden Documents Reveal. Retrieved September 18, 2014, from
Australian Broadcasting Corporation News (ABC News):
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-18/australia-spied-on-indonesian-president-
leaked-documents-reveal/5098860
The documents of one of Australia‘s intelligence Agency, Defence Signals
Directorate (now ASD – Australian Signals Directorate) showed that Australian
intelligence agency was actively pursued a long-term strategy to monitor Susilo
66
Bambang Yudhoyono‘s and several other Indonesia‘s top officials mobile phone
conversations.144
In the first slide show (picture III.2.), the chart shows the attempt of
Australian intelligence agency in keeping pace with the rollout of 3G technology
in Indonesia and across South-East Asia. In another slide, the options were listed
and a recommendation was offered in order to choose one of them to apply it to
the targetted subject. In the second slide (picture III.3.) as listed, there were at
least 10 Indonesian top officials that were allegedly being listened to including
the President and his wife. Another slide entitled ―Indonesian President Voice
Events it was mentioned that allegedly there were attempts to listen in to call
data records (CDR). This device was said to be capable of monitoring the
targeted subjects‘ phone logs without necessarily knowing what the
conversations were about.145
A former intelligence officer told Faifax Media that “the interception
facility at the Australian Embassy in Jakarta played an important role in
collecting intelligence on terrorist threats and people-smuggling, but the main
focus is political, diplomatic and economic intelligence”.146
The allegation also
noted that Australia and the U.S. used the 2007 Bali Climate Change Summit to
collect phone numbers of security officials in Indonesia.147
III.3.2. Indonesia’s Argument on the Spying Allegation
Indonesia‘s main argument regarding the spying row is laid on two general
things: sovereignty and international political ethics among partners. The majority
of Indonesian politicians and government officials viewed the spying row as a
144
Ibid, as cited from the web site of Australian Broadcasting Corporation News:
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-18/australia-spied-on-indonesian-president-leaked-documents-
reveal/5098860
145 Ibid (Tim Leslie and Mark Corcoran, 2013)
146 Dorling, P. (2013, October 31). Exposed: Australia's Asia spy network. Retrieved October 22, 2014, from
Sydney Morning Herald: Federal Politics Web Site: http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-
news/exposed-australias-asia-spy-network-20131030-2whia.html 147
As cited directly from the web site: (Tim Leslie and Mark Corcoran, 2013) http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-
11-08/australian-nsa-involvement-explained/5079786
67
fatal case which already interfere a sovereign state‘s affairs and it is highly
unacceptable. Likewise, the peoples of Indonesia condemned the allegation as an
intolerable insult to Indonesia. Other opinions gathered from same correspondents
but different layers, viewed that the case breached diplomatic norms and ethics
which ideally should be maintained together by close partners. Unless two
countries are in a very serious conflict or in times of war, spying over neighbor
was considered irrelevant by Indonesia.
III.3.2.1. Sovereignty
Soon after the allegation revealed in November 18, numbers of Indonesian
politicians and government officials critically commented on the issue. Several
top officials such as Indonesian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Marty Natalegawa;
Indonesian Head of House of Representatives, Marzuki Alie, and; Cordinating
Minister of Economy, Hatta Radjasa regret the allegation and brought Indonesia‘s
sovereignty into their comments. The aspect of sovereignty was frequently
brought by the politicians in conveying their statements. According to their
opinion, Indonesia is a sovereign nation in which any attempt to interfere to the
internal affairs, even more nation‘s top secret, was a fatal breach of sovereignty.
Marzuki Alie when delivering a speech in the plenary session at the opening
of the agenda of the second session year trial period from 2013 to 2014:
“In terms of foreign affairs, the board is very concerned about
the case of spying conducted by the United States and
Australia. The spying is carried out through its embassy in
Jakarta; this is indeed a serious problem for the relations
between Indonesia and Australia. This issue is also a test for
Indonesia in upholding Indonesia‟s sovereignty to the world
leaders. The Council supports the steps the Minister of Foreign
Affairs to summon the charge d'affaires Ad Interim Embassy of
the United States and Australia to asking for an explanation of
this spying issue. As a sovereign nation, Indonesia shall not
subscribe to a pragmatic paradigm only for the sake of
68
diplomacy alone, but this issue must be seen as a test of
Indonesia's national sovereignty as well.”148
Marzuki frequently mentioned that it was the sovereignty of Indonesia that
had been breached and tested by the issue. Member of Commission I
Susaningtyas Nefo Handayani Kertopati also asserted that the spying action has
entered the territory of a violation of international conventions. According to him
stealing information can also deception carried out by intelligence agents called
lifedrop. He also added that the Parliament will conduct joint partnership with
several agencies to declare actions. “Parliament can only give a warning, so that
they do not interfere with Indonesia‟s sovereignty,” he added. He and many other
members of the commission suggested to the government to grant a persona non
grata to Greg Moriarty and other Australian officials in Jakarta.149
On November 21, there was a mass protest in front of Australian Embassy
in Jakarta due to the spying revelation. It was reported that around 150 uniformed
protesters from various nationalists and society groups demanding an official
apology from Canberra. Australian flags were burnt and the mob chanted
―Australia, go to hell‖ repetitively. A spokesman for the protesters, Akbar Husein
stated, “Australia is the enemy of Indonesian people. We are neighbors; we have
been friends since Soekarno‟s administration. We are extremely disappointed with
Prime Minister Abbott‟s dismissive attitude and his refusal to apologise. This is
what we are protesting.” It was also noted that the protesters were angered by the
alleged fact that Indonesia‘s sovereignty had been extremely undermined at that
time.150
148 Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia. (2013, November 18). DPR RI Kecewa Penyadapan Yang
Dilakukan Amerika Serikat dan Australia. Retrieved October 22, 2014, from DPR RI Official Web Site:
http://www.dpr.go.id/id/berita/paripurna/2013/nov/18/7064/dpr-ri-kecewa-penyadapan-yang-dilakukan-amerika-
serikat-dan-australia
149 Ibid
150 The Guardian. (2013, November 21). Australian flags burn in Jakarta as anger over phone tapping mounts.
Retrieved October 22, 2014, from The Guardian News Web Site :
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/21/australian-flags-burn-embassy-jakarta
69
III.3.2.2. International Political Ethics among Partners
The second main aspect of Indonesia‘s argument over the spying row was
political ethics among partners. President Yudoyono mentioned in his speech
regarding the issue that; if two countries which are having a severe conflict or in
times of war, it is understandable for those countries to conduct spying towards
one another. But, if two neighboring countries which are widely known as close
partners and having a robust developing partnership, the conduct of spying is
very questionable and irrelevant.151
Based on this view, the peoples of Indonesia
saw the spying row in a less positive way. Not because the statement of
Yudhoyono, it was rather to the motives of the neighboring country who spied
which did not make any sense.152
Marty Natalegawa made his statement that Indonesians were realistic
enough to know that the method of intelligence-gathering was not a brand new
issue in international politics, but he also believed that even between the so
called ‗strategic partners‘, there were some things that should be off-limits and
we could not force the idea of transparency to a nation‘s top secret.153
He also
issued a statement over the spying row on October 31 soon after the revelation
of the alleged Australia‘s spying network involving Jakarta: “It should be
emphasized that if confirmed, such actions are not only a breach of security, but
also a serious breach of diplomatic norms and ethics, and certainly not in tune
with the spirit of friendly relations between our nations.”154
TB Hasanuddin,
Vice Chairman of Defense Commission in the House of Representatives also
made a public statement: “…this case is about NKRI‟s sovereignty; hence it is a
very crucial case. In which, the spying is a breach of international norms,
151
Ministry of State Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia. (2013, November 20). Pernyataan Presiden RI
Terkait Penyadapan Australia. Retrieved October 22, 2014, from Ministry of State Secretariat of the Republic of
Indonesia Web Site:
http://www.setneg.go.id/index.php/index.php?lang=en&option=com_content&task=view&id=7526
152 Ibid
153 Ibid
154 Ibid
70
agreements between Indonesia and Australia and most importantly our
friendship as close partners…”155
Hasanuddin argue that the allegation was a breach of international norms
and most importantly, the friendship of Indonesia and Australia. This was also
said by several members of commissions in the House of Representatives that
the allegation was not only violating Indonesia‘s sovereignty, but also seen as
Australia‘s failure to respect Indonesia. Moreover, by the rejection coming from
Canberra to take the case seriously, many politicians in Indonesia suggested the
President that the bilateral relationship with Australia shall be removed in an
instant.156
Of all the critical comments directed to the case, including the peoples of
Indonesia‘s mass protests against Australia, President Yudhoyono during his
speech on November 20, asked Indonesia to settle down. He saw this case as an
unacceptable happening but he suggested the public to remain rational and calm.
This was because Indonesia and Australia were good friends in a way that the
relationship they built did not occur overnight but in years. Hence, any reckless
decision will determine the future of their relationship which could turn into
quarrel. Yudhoyono was aware of Indonesia‘s anger upon the case; he
mentioned it frequently in his speech that he‘s affirmative to the irrelevancy of
the allegation. However, he did not subscribe to any coercive or immediate
decision in order to avoid prolonged hostility with Australia and could settle the
strain down peacefully. This reaction was also bought by Marty Natalegawa and
other ministers so that the diplomatic approach can run smoothly.157
155 Hasanuddin, T. (2013, November 18). Penyadapan Langgar Persahabatan. (T. One, Interviewer) 156
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia. (2013, November 18). DPR RI Kecewa Penyadapan Yang
Dilakukan Amerika Serikat dan Australia. Retrieved October 22, 2014, from DPR RI Official Web Site:
http://www.dpr.go.id/id/berita/paripurna/2013/nov/18/7064/dpr-ri-kecewa-penyadapan-yang-dilakukan-amerika-
serikat-dan-australia
157 Ministry of State Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia. (2013, November 20). Pernyataan Presiden RI
Terkait Penyadapan Australia. Retrieved October 22, 2014, from Ministry of State Secretariat of the Republic of
Indonesia Web Site:
http://www.setneg.go.id/index.php/index.php?lang=en&option=com_content&task=view&id=7526
71
III.3.3. Australia’s Argument on the Spying Allegation
As for Australia, their responses to the allegation were rather varied. Some
major voices stated that the allegation was extremely exaggerated while some
minor voices said that Canberra should seek to maintain the best relationship
with Indonesia by explaining and showing remorse upon the allegation.
However, the major debate was occurred inside the parliament whether or not to
give statement to Jakarta upon the case. The ruling government (Greens Party)
with the Labor Party, which was the government opposition, had different views.
Abbott argued that Australia should not be asked for any apology upon the
actions taken in the event to advance its national interest. On the other hand,
Labor Party did not solely shared similar idea. They were rather aware that
Indonesia was Australia‘s close ally. Australia should respect Indonesia in a way
that the government must strive to the betterment of both countries‘ relationship.
In a nutshell, there were different opinions as to whether the allegation was
considered acceptable or questionable in Australia.
III.3.3.1. National Interest
The first major argument of Australia over the spying allegation was to
defend Australia‘s national interest.158
Several hours after the allegation on
November 18, Prime Minister Tony Abbott and his government officials
including Julie Bishop, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, were reluctant to
give any statement upon the issue. On several interviews in mass media the next
day, Abbott gave diplomatic statements when it came to the ongoing case. As
recorded, in an interview with Leigh on Australian Broadcasting Corporation
News, which was the first interview since his election, Abbott mentioned:
“…this operation is allegedly took place under the former
government. We do not comment on operational matters, but
they have been reports on the press. And based on the reports in
158 As stated by Tony Abott on his speech for the House of Representatives on November 20, 2013 from Prime
Minister of Australia, The Hon Tony Abbott MP Web Site. Retrieved October 22, 2014, from:
http://www.pm.gov.au/media/2013-11-19/statement-indulgence
72
the press, this so called spying allegedly took place under the
former government. All countries, all governments, gather
information. That‟s hardly a surprise, it‟s hardly a shock. We
used the information that we gathered for good, including to
build a stronger relationship with Indonesia. And one of the
things that I have offered to do today in my discussion with the
Indonesian Vice President is to elevate our level of information
sharing. Because I want the people of Indonesia to know that
everything, everything that we do is to help Indonesia, as well as
to help Australia.”159
Abbott stressed that all governments gather information and furthermore he
chose not to give any statement on the operational matter as to whether the
allegation does take place or not. Yet even if it did take place, Abbott then
mentioned that it was implemented under the former government (Kevin Rudd).
This was certainly perceived as an act from Abbott not to take any significant
responsibility out of what the former government did. However, receiving those
comments, Abbott‘s government remained passive on giving any significant
detail about the allegation. The following is Tony Abbot‘s statement for the
Australian Parliament House in response to the allegation case on November
18.160
“In the past 24 hours there have been calls for Australia to detail
our intelligence operations and to apologise for them.
Madam Speaker, the first duty of every government is to protect
the country and to advance its national interests.
That‟s why every government gathers information and why every
government knows that every other government gathers
information.
159 Abbott, T. (2013, November 19). All Government Gather Information - PM Tony Abbott on Asylum Policy
and Spying. (L. f. News, Interviewer)
160 Prime Minister Tony Abbott. (2013, November 19). Statement of Indulgence. Retrieved October 22, 2014,
from Prime Minister of Australia, The Hon Tony Abbott MP: http://www.pm.gov.au/media/2013-11-
19/statement-indulgence
73
Madam Speaker, there is no greater responsibility for a prime
minister than ensuring the safety of Australian citizens and the
security our borders and that, indeed, is why we do collect
intelligence.
National security, Madam Speaker, requires a consistent
determination to do what‟s best for Australia and that‟s why this
government will support the national security decisions of
previous ones as we will expect future governments to respect
ours.
Madam Speaker, Australia should not be expected to apologise
for the steps we take to protect our country now or in the past,
any more than other governments should be expected to apologise
for the similar steps that they have taken.
Importantly, in Australia‟s case, we use all our resources,
including information, to help our friends and partners, not to
harm them.
Similarly, Madam Speaker, Australia shouldn‟t be expected to
detail what we do to protect our country any more than other
governments should be expected to detail what they do to protect
theirs.
Others should ask of us no more than they are prepared to do
themselves.
Madam Speaker, I want to make it absolutely crystal clear that
Australia has deep respect for Indonesia, for its government and
for its people.
I regard President Yudhoyono as a good friend of Australia,
indeed as one of the very best friends that we have anywhere in
the world.
That‟s why, Madam Speaker, I sincerely regret any
embarrassment that recent media reports have caused him.
But Madam Speaker, it is in everyone‟s interests – Indonesia‟s no
less than Australia‟s – that cool heads prevail and that our
relationship grows closer, not more distant.
I pledge myself to build the strongest possible relationship with
Indonesia.
After all, due to its size, proximity and potential to be an
emerging democratic superpower of Asia, it is the most important
single relationship that we have.”161
161 As cited directly from Tony Abbott‘s speech for the House of Representatives of Australia on November 20,
2013 from Prime Minister of Australia, The Hon Tony Abbott MP Web Site. Statement of Indulgence. Retrieved
October 22, 2014, from: http://www.pm.gov.au/media/2013-11-19/statement-indulgence
74
There are at least 5 main points that explained his argument in his speech for
indulgence for the House of Representatives:
1. National Interest; Australia gathers information in the event to
advance its national interest and Abbott did not see why Australia
should be apologizing upon that concern;
2. Border Security; Australia spied in order to ensure and protect its
citizen by maintaining border security;
3. To Help Australia’s Partners; Australia uses the information
gathered for the betterment of their partners and their relationship
with Australia, not to harm them;
4. National Security decisions; the operation was allegedly took place
during the former government. Abbott stated that he respected the
decisions of the former government in order to advance Australia‘s
national interest. Therefore, he also expected the future government
to respect the national security decisions taken under his
administration;
5. Respect for Indonesia; Responding to the upheaval caused by the
media in Indonesia, Abbott sincerely mentioned that Indonesia is a
highly respected country to Australia.
The respond from Tony Abbott was supported by many of Australian
politicians, academics and people. The point of Abbott‘s argument was not that
Abbott rejected to apologize because it occurred under the former government; it
was rather to the point that Australia did not intend any harm to its partners from
gathering information out of them, but merely to advance Australia‘s national
interest and help their partners.162
Bruce Baer Arnold from University of
Canberra argued that for modern governments, intelligence-gathering is
important, that is why governments have been watching each other even since
before the telegraph invented. He mentioned that it is widely legal for Australian
intelligence agencies to collect information from Indonesian leaders. Many
162
Ibid
75
people in Australian government took the view of British previous Prime
Minister that Britain had no permanent friends or enemies, only permanent
interests. In which, due to the fact that countries spy on one another, it is
sensible to keep friends monitored in order to manage risk. Arnold viewed the
case from the rational legal perspective that there is no law about spying, but
countries do it eventually.163
After the statement coming from President Yudhoyono pertain the spying
allegation on November 20, 2013, Australian House of Representatives held a
meeting in respond to Jakarta. The following is Hansard transcript of statement
to the House by Prime Minister Tony Abbott:
“A short time ago President Yudhoyono made a statement in
Jakarta. I have to say that I was encouraged by the president‟s
remarks about the strength of the relationship between
Australia and Indonesia although obviously there are very
serious issues which do need to be worked through in the near
future between us.
Again, I want to express here in this chamber my deep and
sincere regret about the embarrassment to the president and to
Indonesia that has been caused by recent media reporting. The
president indicated that he would shortly be writing to me. I
would like to reassure the House that I will be responding to
the president‟s letter swiftly, fully and courteously. As always,
I am absolutely committed to building the closest possible
relationship with Indonesia because that is overwhelmingly in
the interests of both our countries.”164
163 Arnold, B. B. (2013, November 21). I Spy, You Spy, We All Spy - But is it Legal? Retrieved October 22, 2014,
from The Conversation Web Site: http://theconversation.com/i-spy-you-spy-we-all-spy-but-is-it-legal-20540
164 Australian Politics. (2013, November 20). Indonesia Demands Spying Explanation, Suspends Co-operation;
Abbott To Respond; Shorten Invokes „Team Australia‟. Retrieved October 22, 2014, from Australian Politics Web
Site: http://australianpolitics.com/2013/11/20/indonesia-escalates-dispute-over-spying.html
76
III.3.3.2. Labor Party’s Response to Australia’s Rejection
While the ruling government and the major of Australian people supported
the views coming from Abbott, there was another debate upon the allegation
coming from the Labor Party known as the government opposition party. In
responding Tony Abbott‘s statement upon the allegation, Labor Party suggested
that the government view the case from another diplomatic perspective way. To
put the statement, the following is Bill Shorten‘s statement (Labor Party leader)
in response to the government in the House of Representatives:
“We agree with the Prime Minister of Australia there is not a
more important relationship than with Indonesia. As I said
yesterday in this place, the opposition believes that our
relationship with Indonesia can recover and it can thrive and
prosper. But it also requires Australia to recognize that our
Indonesian friends have been offended. What the government
and the opposition must continue to do is to unite in our
commitment to improving and repairing this relationship in a
timely way.
This parliament, all of us, respects Indonesia as a successful
democracy. A strong and constructive relationship is
fundamental to our national interest. It is particularly
fundamental to the work that we do to help stop people
smuggling, to improve regional security and the strong trade
and to the business interests between our two countries. That is
why our position continues to be one of support for the
government.
I believe that the example of the United States in a way that it
handled the similar issue with Germany provides the
opportunity for us to consider the same course of actions.
The days ahead remain of the utmost importance and these
matters should continue to be resolved.
We do not underestimate the seriousness of this matter or the
sense of offence that our Indonesian friends are feeling. We will
77
support the government in these efforts. As I said yesterday in
this place, it is impossible to imagine our futures without a
positive and constructive friendship and dialogue between our
governments. That is why, again, I reiterate on behalf of Labor:
we want the government to be successful in rebuilding the
relationship and trust with Indonesia. We will support the
government in its efforts. This is indeed a „team Australia‟
moment. This is something that is happening to both Indonesia
and Australia. We need to walk this road together. Other
nations have resolved these similar issues. We can too.”165
Shorten stressed that the Labor Party supported the government in any
means that determined to be taken in advancing Australia‘s national interest.
However, the opposition was highly aware of Indonesia‘s concern upon the
sensitiveness of the revelation. Labor Party recognized Indonesia as a sovereign
nation which demanded an explanation from Australia and Australia shall just
maintain the diplomatic relations by putting it into concern. In addition, Labor
Party suggested the government to refer to the case of U.S. spying allegation
towards Germany Chancellor, Angela Merkel. The Labor Party‘s main point was
to encourage the government to prioritize the efforts to recover Indonesia‘s trust
that had been loosened by the allegation.166
The view that Canberra should put the case into serious matter was also
widely supported by some people in Australia as well as its politicians,
academics and government officials. Greg Barton, a research Professor for the
Study of Indonesia at Monash University conveyed that the allegation case had
undoubtedly caused Canberra and Jakarta to have a stormy weather. He argued
that the ruling government should redouble their efforts in publicly meeting
President Yudhoyono‘s inquiries for a more meaningful response from
165
As cited from Bill Shorten‘s speech for the House of Representatives of Australia on November 20, 2013 from
Australian Politics. (2013, November 20). Indonesia Demands Spying Explanation, Suspends Co-operation;
Abbott To Respond; Shorten Invokes „Team Australia‟. Retrieved October 22, 2014, from Australian Politics Web
Site: http://australianpolitics.com/2013/11/20/indonesia-escalates-dispute-over-spying.html
166 Ibid
78
Canberra.167
Barton stated that the respond coming from Canberra failed to echo
the demand of Jakarta, which was to take the case seriously, with remorse and
clear explanation. He recognized that Indonesian top officials as well as the
President were very concerned upon the issue while in Australia; the government
seemed to be reluctant to give statements. Moreover, Marty Natalegawa once
mentioned a term of ―irreparable damage‖ that might come to reality if the
government of Australia left the case neglected. Apart from Barton‘s view, there
were also voices in Australia recalling the statement of Tony Abbott during his
campaign which was; “More Jakarta, Less Geneva”.168
The results of a poll of a
leading Australian newspaper, Sydney Morning Herald (SMH), showed that
about 62% of the 10.717 respondents in Australia actually agree that the
Australian Government apologized to the Government of Indonesia for the
spying allegation news, regardless that in fact the incident was carried out for 15
days in 2009 under the regime of Prime Minister of Australia Kevin Rudd, who
served in 2007-2010.169
III.3.4. Post-Allegation: Implications of Spying Allegation to Indonesia-
Australia’s Bilateral Partnership
The allegation exposed by Wikileaks, ABC, Guardian and Sydney Morning
Herald obtained from Edward J. Snowden‘s revelation was undoubtedly
contributed to the decreasing performance of Indonesia-Australia bilateral
relationship. The diplomatic responds coming from Indonesia did not taken the
next day or months after the allegation but several hours after the news went
viral. There were 3 major fields that experience negative changes in Indonesia-
Australia bilateral relationship after the allegation; political, economic and
security cooperation. For political ties, it was primarily caused by the withdrawal
of Najib Riphat Koesoma, Indonesian Ambassador for Australia back to
167 Greg Barton. (2013, November 21). Diplomatic Crisis: Can the Prime Minister Mend our Relationship with
Indonesia? Retrieved October 22, 2014, from The Conversation Web Site:
http://theconversation.com/diplomatic-crisis-can-the-pm-mend-our-relationship-with-indonesia-20551 168
Ibid
169 Ibid
79
Indonesia. This depicted the suspension of diplomatic partnership among the two
nations. While in terms of security cooperation, it was primarily damaged
because of the suspension of several areas of partnership including the asylum
seekers cooperation which gave the relationship even more burden.
III.3.4.1. Political & Economic Ties
The Political ties of Indonesia and Australia refers to the diplomatic
relationship the two countries hold and share, encompassing information sharing
until its membership in international organizations. As reported, Najib Riphat
Koesoma, Indonesian Ambassador for Australia was summoned back home
several hours after the revelation made public on November 18, 2013. President
Yudhoyono demanded reports from Koesoma together with Marty Natalegawa
and Indonesia‘s Minister of Law and Security to discuss about possible actions
that should be taken over the spying row. This withdrawal of Indonesian
Ambassador was aimed as a signal of suspension of diplomatic ties especially
politically, that without a person in charge representing Indonesia for Australia,
the countries could not resume their cooperation in terms of politics.170
The implication of the revelation to both countries‘ ties did not end there.
President Yudhoyono and several Ministers had conducted a specific meeting
addressing the issue and agreed to have a decision that Indonesia would be
reviewing several areas of cooperation with Australia. One of the cooperation
that decided to be halted is intelligence and information sharing, which is very
crucial to both countries‘ political ties.171
This was perceived by most people as
a major step taken by Indonesia in dealing with the issue.
This suspension was extremely perceived as a major disturbance to
Indonesia-Australia bilateral relationship during the late 2013. There were also
170 Aljazeera America. (2013, November 20). Indonesia halts cooperation with Australia over spying claims.
Retrieved October 22, 2014, from Aljazeera Americ Web Site:
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/11/20/indonesia-halts-cooperationwithaustraliaoverspyingclaims.html
171 As cited from President Yudhoyono‘s speech in the National Palace on 20 November 2013, from The
Guardian Australia. (2013, November 21). Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono‟s speech on phone tapping – full
translated text. Retrieved October 22, 2014, from The Guardian News Web Site:
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/21/susilo-bambang-yudhoyonos-speech-translated
80
several cancellations of Indonesia‘s government officials‘ visit to Australia
resulting in the delay of many more negotiation of prospective cooperation for
both countries. For example, the visit of Indonesia‘s Vice President, Boediyono
was cancelled due to the revelation. Until the end of the month, diplomatic ties
between Canberra and Jakarta did not show any significant development. The
political ties between the two countries remained tense until the end of 2013.172
As for the economic ties, the revelation did not significantly affect the
particular field of cooperation, but it sure did cause several critical
considerations from Indonesia in terms of its trade cooperation with Australia.
One of the considerations was to review the cattle import from Australia. Gita
Wirjawan, Indonesian Trade Minister had told the parliament on November 23
that Indonesia should consider other countries to support the food security, such
as India or Brazil, in which apparently the price of cattle were way more
affordable and the bilateral relationship with those countries were in good
terms.173
Wirjawan pledged to stand firmly against the conduct allegedly taken
by Australia in the field of trade cooperation. He also stated that Indonesia could
not manage to resume the trade partnership with the ongoing severe distrust
between two nations. Indonesia was a significant importer of Australian
agricultural with its trade ties worth over US$ 11 billion last 2012. With the
given fact, Tim Harcourt from Australian School of Business conveyed that this
short term distrust could potentially damage long-term strategic partnership
among the two democracies.174
Tony Burke, Australian Minister of Immigration and Border Security made
his public statement:
“Any more suspension on bilateral cooperation will cause
serious damage to Australia. Our cooperation with Indonesia
172
Ibid
173 Australian Broadcasting Corporation News. (2013, November 23). Tony Abbott Writes to Indonesian
President Over Spying. Retrieved October 24, 2014, from ABC News Web Site:
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-23/tony-abbott-writes-to-indonesian-president-over-spying/5112886
174 Aljazeera America. (2013, November 20). Indonesia halts cooperation with Australia over spying claims.
Retrieved October 22, 2014, from Aljazeera Americ Web Site:
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/11/20/indonesia-halts-cooperationwithaustraliaoverspyingclaims.html
81
is highly, highly significant. The cooperation has been built
from time to time. It is not something that can be easily
initiated or halted. If we were to lose this cooperation, there is
no turning back or even to achieve what we already have now
This is very significant and one of the reasons why it‟s
important for this to be resolved.”175
Burke believed that Indonesia-Australia‘s relationship was one of
Australia‘s priorities over the past few decades. Building it was something that
required reciprocal efforts and commitments. Hence, halting or suspending it
even just for a day, was a significant change to Australia and to the bilateral
relationship. He stressed the importance of asylum seekers cooperation which
was being the major concern of the two neighboring states that the suspension
can highly affect Prime Minister Tony Abbot policy on asylum seekers.176
III.3.4.2. Security Cooperation
The next day (November 20, 2013) through a speech for national media,
President Yudhoyono asked Indonesian government to suspend 2 other fields of
cooperation namely:177
1. Security Cooperation which entails joint military exercises and any other
joint activities related to it (navy, army and air forces);
2. Co-ordinated military operations targeting people smuggling.
Yudhoyono stressed that it was nearly impossible for Indonesia to resume
its cooperation with Australia if they are not sure whether or not Australia still
spy on them. The security cooperation was very crucial to Indonesia-Australia
relationship since it represent the strength of the two countries‘ regional security 175 Tony Burke. (2013, November 20). Freeze over boats disastrous, says Tony Burke – The Australian.
Retrieved October 28, 2014, from Melbourne Daily Star News: http://www.melbournedailystar.com/freeze-over-
boats-disastrous-says-tony-burke-the-australian/ 176
Ibid
177 As cited from President Yudhoyono‘s speech in the National Palace on 20 November 2013, from The
Guardian Australia. (2013, November 21). Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono‟s speech on phone tapping – full
translated text. Retrieved October 22, 2014, from The Guardian News Web Site:
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/21/susilo-bambang-yudhoyonos-speech-translated
82
support and shared their geopolitical values. As stipulated in Lombok Treaty on
2006: “…the two countries shared mutual goal of peace, security and prosperity
in the region and recognize the importance of continuing close cooperation on
matters affecting their common security as well as their respective national
security”178
The Lombok Treaty mainly aimed to counter traditional and non-
traditional security threats (including transnational crime e.g. terrorism) in the
region by strengthening Indonesia and Australia‘s joint military cooperation.
This agreement depicted both countries‘ commitment of partnership and showed
how important was the cooperation as they shared mutual goals. A suspension
that was posed by Indonesia over the allegation was considered as a highly
disadvantaging step for Australia recalling the agreement.
III.4. Chapter Summary
The allegation exposed by Wikileaks and other national media of Australia
had damaged the bilateral relationship that was developing between Australia
and Indonesia. From each other‘s perspective, the argument on the tolerability of
spying was widely divided. Indonesia saw the allegation as a serious breach of
sovereignty and ethics that jeopardized their trust to Australia. Strong statements
from Indonesian politicians, media, ministers, top governmental officials,
academics and major citizen had proven that Indonesia was highly upset with its
ire and chose to diplomatically scold its partner with disappointment. On the
other hand, Australia generally perceived the case as a rather regular
governmental activity which had been exaggerated by media.
The implication on several layers of cooperation such as diplomatic,
information sharing and security had taken place since November 20. Although
Indonesia was still in the stage of considering the alternative of trade opportunity
other than Australia, it was said that the relationship could have been worse in a
178 Australia-Indonesia. (2006, November 13). Agreement between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on
the Framework (Mataram, Lombok, 13 November 2006). Retrieved October 25, 2014
83
longer term if diplomatic negotiation did not occur. From the discussion in this
chapter, it is concluded that the bilateral relationship between Indonesia and
Australia had at least experienced a tense strain; hence diplomatic settlement
was highly necessary in order to resume the cooperation and re-strengthen the
relationship. To this end, both countries realized the importance of some sort of
agreement to guide the future continuation of strategic partnership and
cooperation.
84
CHAPTER IV
THE ROLE OF PRESIDENT YUDHOYONO’S
IDIOSYNCRASY IN THE STRAIN SETTLEMENT:
THE AUSTRALIA-INDONESIA CODE OF CONDUCT
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
As in the previous chapter II, the author has briefly provided the background
of President Yudhoyono‘s leadership characteristic which is considered as a soft
power-oriented leadership as well as his preference in maximizing his soft
power of diplomacy in order to rebuild Indonesia‘s international confidence
towards the world. Further in chapter III the author critically examined the
spying allegation case exposed by Edward J. Snowden in chronological order
from the beginning of the allegation until its prolonged implication towards
Indonesia-Australia bilateral relationship by the end of 2013. Seeing from the
sensitiveness of the issue, both parties agreed to settle the strain to resume the
cooperation.
The strain settlement between Indonesia and Australia was undertaken since
the early days after the allegation revealed. Although some different opinions
emerged between them, the officials managed to at least agree on the method of
settlement. As can be seen from the discussion in chapter III, President
Yudhoyono‘s role in navigating the process of dealing with the settlement
method was highly significant. This chapter will elaborate the discussion in
chapter II and chapter III to furthermore answer the research question as to what
extent did President Yudhoyono‘s idiosyncrasy in leadership influenced the
strain settlement between Australia and Indonesia. The discussion entails his
strategy in foreign policy towards Australia, his direct responses and the
idiosyncratic factors of political leaders that influence his course of actions in
decision making progress.
85
IV.1. President Yudhoyono’s Direct Diplomatic Responses to the Spying
Allegation
The revelation of Australia‘s spying conduct was allegedly sought to keep
President Yudhoyono himself, his wife and several other top government
officials under surveillance. Hence, it was widely perceived also that the
President had been insulted personally because keeping national leaders under
surveillance and moreover, their family was not something that could easily be
professionally tolerated. President Yudhoyono was the first and the most
influential actor in navigating the process of settling the strain with Australia.
President Yudhoyono‘s term in office would end in October 2014. Paying
attention to the rapid restoration of diplomatic relations between the two
countries, the President did not seem to want to leave the burden of international
affairs strain to the new government. Therefore, before ending his term,
restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries became one of his
priorities to be achieved by the end of the presidential administration. In other
words, the President actually wanted to start the process of re-establishment of
trust and confidence that no misuse of technologies by countries that have more
advanced technology to neighboring countries.
He believed that the bilateral relationship between two countries was the
priority so he referred to diplomatically respond to the allegation. His first
respond was through social media. Afterwards, he made a national statement
publicly through press conference while stating Indonesia‘s 3 steps of resolution
and furthermore, he wrote personally on behalf of the people of Indonesia to
Australian Prime Minister in the event to solve the tension. In which in this
letter, he proposed a set of mechanism to both parties; the Six Road-Map of
Settlement.
IV.1.1. Social Media
For some world leaders, having an account in social media is inevitably
necessary. Its main purposes are for public diplomacy, participation in
democracy and keeping the followers up to date with ideas; it is definitely the
86
ultimate media to directly interact with the public. On November 19, early hours
after the revelation and Australia‘s Prime Minister Tony Abbot‘s response
towards the allegation in Australian media, President Yudhoyono for the first
time responded towards the issue. The following are President Yudhoyono‘s
statement which was conveyed to social media called Twitter. President
Yudhoyono initials enclosed in asterisks, it has been the sort of agreement which
means that the tweet was written directly by the President. While tweets without
initials flanked by an asterisk that means that the statement is conveyed by the
President and reiterated by his staff.179
"Since no information of the allegation of US & Australia to several Asian
countries, including Indonesia, we have a strong protest.” *SBY*
"Secretary of State and government officials are also doing effective
diplomacy, while asking for an explanation and clarification from the US
and Australia." *SBY*
"Today, I have instructed Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa to summon
Indonesian Ambassador for Australia. This is an assertive step of
diplomacy." *SBY*
"Indonesia had also asked Australia to give an official & understandable
answer to Indonesian people over the allegation" *SBY*
"We will also review a number of bilateral cooperation agenda as a respond
to Australia's hurtful conduct." *SBY*
"U.S. and Australia‟s actions has jeopardized their strategic partnership
with Indonesia, as fellow democratic countries." *SBY*
"I also regret that the Australian PM statement that belittled the allegation
against Indonesia, without any remorse." *SBY*
In his tweets President Yudhoyono stressed that the allegation was
somewhat ―hurtful‖ for Indonesia-Australia‘s friendship. Furthermore, President
Yudhoyono ordered Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa to conduct effective
diplomacy while asking for an explanation of Australia. President also ordered
Marty to recall the Indonesian Ambassador in Australia, Najib Riphat Kesoema.
179 Kompas. (2013, November 19). Lewat Twitter, Presiden SBY Sikapi Penyadapan oleh Australia. Retrieved
November 1, 2014, from Kompas Web Site:
http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2013/11/19/0534522/Lewat.Twitter.Presiden.SBY.Sikapi.Penyadapan.oleh.Aust
ralia
87
President Yudhoyono‘s choice to use Twitter to respond the issue on the
first hand is called Twiplomacy. Twiplomacy is the new emerging global study
of world leaders‘ diplomacy on Twitter firstly developed by an international
communications firm headquartered in New York City, Burson-Marsteller.180
Almost all of the 193 United Nations member states have their account
registered to Twitter including Presidents, Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers
and other top Government Officials. By the end of 2013, there were more than
643 Twitter accounts of heads of states and government in 161 countries all over
the globe. The main core of this study is to analyze the use of rapidly growing
social media used by world leaders in the event to interact with other world
leaders and public as well as to develop wider connections. The study entails
specific analysis on each leader‘s Twitter profiles, history and their connection
with each other. Twiplomacy enables world leaders to; 1) Get direct access to
public, 2) Opens up debates and discussion to a wider audience, 3) Allows for
better responses to today‘s challenges, and; 4) Allows for efficiency,
transparency and effective communications. Some of world governments such as
Canada, Mexico and several other America Latin countries have considered
Twiplomacy as a tool to improve State‘s policy dissemination of information to
public.181
According to data collected using Twitonomy in June 2014, President
Yudhoyono was ranked #3 as Most Followed World Leaders right after Barack
Obama in the first position and Pope Francis followed afterwards. In fact,
President Yudhoyono is the most followed political leader in Asia with more
than 5,068,417 followers. Meaning that, President Yudhoyono‘s presence on
Twitter was widely popular and his statements are rather influential. President
Yudhoyono used Twitter for public diplomacy and his ultimate media to interact
with Indonesian people. Through this social media, President Yudhoyono also
180 Burson-Marsteller. (2014, June 25). Twiplomacy 2014: How World Leaders Connect on Twitter. Retrieved
November 3, 2014, from The Burson-Marsteller Official Web Site: http://www.burson-marsteller.com/bm-
blog/twiplomacy-2014-how-world-leaders-connect-on-twitter/#sthash.GSiqsxjj.dpuf
181 Bruson-Marsteller. (2014, June 25). Twiplomacy; Heads of State and Government and Foreign Ministers on
Twitter. Retrieved November 3, 2014, from Visually Video eBook Web Site:
http://visual.ly/twiplomacy?view=true
88
actively engaged in many conversations and discussions with other world
leaders. With this level of acknowledgment in cyber network, President
Yudhoyono‘s statements had always manage to gain concern and attention from
the world including during the Australia‘s allegation case; President
Yudhoyono‘s tweets was considered as a very important official statement from
Indonesia that influenced Australian Parliament to declare statements.
On the other hand, this respond was highly debated from many perspectives.
Some argued that President Yudhoyono‘s statements through social media were
irrelevant and useless. An Australian politician, Mark Textor through his Twitter
account stated that it was very irrelevant for President Yudhoyono to address the
current ruling government to give proper explanation and even apologize to
Indonesia, simply because the ruling government was a different government
that ruled when the allegation took place (Kevin Rudd‘s administration in 2009).
But it appeared that later in the next days he removed the tweets and apologize to
the public that seemingly red his statement. The same atmosphere of reaction
was also depicted by Prime Minister Tony Abbott himself. He on behalf of
Australia refused to give further explanation and even apology since it was
conducted for the sake of Australia‘s national security interest.182
Meanwhile, this action was nothing in line with the majority of Indonesians.
President Yudhoyono‘s take on twitter was seen as a very informative statement
that it enlightened what Indonesia had done in the event to settle the strain with
Australia directly from the President himself. Even one of UK‘s online media
called The Register noted that President Yudhoyono‘s tweets was probably the
first serious application of Twitter (social media) to international diplomacy.183
IV.1.2. Indonesia’s 3 Steps of Resolution
182 Prime Minister Tony Abbott. (2013, November 19). Statement of Indulgence. Retrieved October 22, 2014,
from Prime Minister of Australia, The Hon Tony Abbott MP: http://www.pm.gov.au/media/2013-11-
19/statement-indulgence
183 The Register. (2013, November 19). President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono unleashes epic rant against
spying. Retrieved November 3, 2014, from The Register Web Site:
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/11/19/indonesia_creates_twitter_diplomacy/
89
Since the declaration of ―not business as usual‖ situation from Jakarta to
Canberra followed by the withdrawal of Indonesia‘s Ambassador to Australia,
President Yudhoyono immediately commanded his relevant officials in his
cabinet; Minister of Foreign Affairs Marty Natalegawa, Coordinating Minister
of Politics, Legal and Secuity Djoko Suyanto, Minister of State Secretary Sudi
Silalahi, Cabinet Secretary Dipo Alam and the Head of BIN Liutenant Marciano
Norman. This meeting was an immediate response from Jakarta that it occurred
hours after the revelation went public. The objective of the meeting was to
address the issue of Indonesia‘s further temporary foreign policy that should be
taken following the case.184
In response to allegation exposed on November 18, President Yudhoyono
made his presidential statement in the national palace of Indonesia on November
20, 2013.
“I am aware that Indonesians are upset and angry about what
Australia has done to Indonesia. But in international relations, in
dealing with certain situations, we cannot be emotional, we must
remain rational. Our reactions will determine the future of the
relationship and friendship between Indonesia and Australia which
actually have been going well. The relationship between the two
governments has been going well. When disasters occurred in
Indonesia, Australia responded swiftly with assistance. I find it
personally hard to comprehend why the tapping had to take place.
We are not in a cold war era. Indonesia and Australia aren‟t in the
position of being against each other or fighting. What‟s the direction
of this intelligence? Why was the friend and partner – not the enemy
– tapped? This problem is serious.
It‟s in violation of international law and regulations, human rights
and the right to privacy. It‟s also related to morality and ethics as
neighbors, partners and friends, and maintaining good relations
184
Badan Intelijen Negara. (2013, November 19). BIN Telah Berkomunikasi dengan Pimpinan Intelijen
Australia. Retrieved November 15, 2014, from Badan Intelijen Negara Web Site:
http://www.bin.go.id/nasional/detil/247/1/19/11/2013/bin-telah-berkomunikasi-dengan-pimpinan-intelijen-
australia
90
between two countries. For a president like me, in regards to state
secrets, I can‟t talk about them over the phone anyway. I will call the
ministers to see me and talk to them directly. I don‟t understand why
it had to happen. Why Australia did it to Indonesia. I am expecting
an official statement and stance from the Australian government. We
really want an explanation. We also want to know what measures
Australia is going to take on the tapping issue. And if Australia
wants to maintain good relations with Indonesia.
Tonight I will send an official letter to Tony Abbott. There are three
things Indonesia is going to do:
1. Over the next few days Indonesia will wait for an explanation and
admission from Australia.
2. Because of the tapping, some co-operation agendas are going to
be reviewed.
At the moment we are holding off the following co-operations:
– Information sharing and intelligence exchange. It will be held off.
– Joint military training for the army, navy and air force is to be
held off.
– Co-ordinated military operations targeting people smuggling. This
overwhelming issue for Indonesia and Australia will be held off. We
can‟t possibly continue with it when we‟re not sure that there isn‟t
tapping on Indonesia‟s national forces.
3. In all future co-operations, Indonesia requests a code of conduct
and guidance principles that are binding and clear in nature.
I hope – and I‟m sure Australia shares the same hope – that our
good relationship will continue after this problem is resolved. I know
Australia respects Indonesia sovereignty, which is the most
important basis for co-operation. The Indonesian and Australian
governments have a duty and obligation to resolve this problem.”185
185 As cited from President Yudhoyono‘s speech in the National Palace on 20 November 2013, from The
Guardian Australia. (2013, November 21). Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono‟s speech on phone tapping – full
91
Right after President‘s command issued, Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI)
stopped the exercises between the TNI Air Force with the Royal Australian Air
Force, and withdraw five F-16 (Fighting Falcon) Air Forces from Darwin. In
addition, the President also brought people smuggling into his statement, hence
Indonesian-Australian cooperation on people smuggling boats was also halted.
In his speech, President Yudhoyono clearly stated that Indonesia‘s stance in
the allegation case. However, although the President himself was being the main
target of the alleged spying, President Yudhoyono remained calm in handling
the pressure from Indonesia‘s major citizen to suppress Australia especially
Prime Minister Tony Abbott to apologize accordingly. He stated that Indonesia
should be rational in dealing with the issue. Simply because Indonesia‘s
relationship with Australia is one of the most significant relationships Indonesia
has. The President did not see the issue as a minor disturbance to the bilateral
relations but he was also aware with the importance of soft power during any
circumstances.186
IV.1.3. President Yudhoyono’s Letter to Canberra
President Yudhoyono‘s attempt of diplomatic approach was also seen by his
initiative to send a formal direct letter to Prime Minister Tony Abbott in regards
to the allegation of spying revealed by Edward J. Snowden. The content of
President Yudhoyono‘s letter to Australia was mainly to seek for explanation,
apology and stating Indonesia‘s stance in the allegation issue. The letter also
mentioned the three steps President Yudhoyono conveyed during his national
press conference on November 20. President also proposed a code of conduct to
be negotiated by both parties to address the future of Indonesia-Australia
bilateral relations.187
translated text. Retrieved October 22, 2014, from The Guardian News Web Site:
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/21/susilo-bambang-yudhoyonos-speech-translated
186 Ibid
187 Situs Resmi Presiden Republik Indonesia. (2013, November 20). Tiga Langkah Indonesia untuk Australia.
Retrieved September 20, 2014, from Presiden Republik Indonesia Dr. H. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Web Site:
http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/fokus/2013/11/20/9626.html
92
Many had questioned the effectiveness of President Yudhoyono‘s
diplomatic approach to directly convey messages to Tony Abbott regarding the
issue, including the people of Indonesia. Some said that it was Prime Minister
Tony Abbott himself that should be sending anything related to statement of
remorse or explanation towards Jakarta, not the President of Indonesia which
was allegedly being the main target of spying. On the other hand, some other
said that President Yudhoyono‘s diplomatic approach was very smart and
assertive that it prioritized soft power rather than extremely pressuring Australia.
Because in a crisis no one wins and no one loses in an absolute term, but there
will be at least a certain side which got disadvantaged.188
Upon receiving the letter from the Prime Minister Abbott, the President
expressed the commitment of Australia after a limited cabinet meeting at the
Presidential Office, Jakarta, on Tuesday (11/26/2013). President Yudhoyono
asserted that Australia still wanted to maintain and continue the bilateral
relationship with Indonesia. There were three important things from the contents
of the letter presented by the President during the meeting. First Australia
wanted to maintain and continue the bilateral relationship with Indonesia.
“Prime Minister Abbott assess the relationship between the two countries is
currently strong and growing,” President Yudhoyono asserted. Secondly, the
Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott reiterated Australia's commitment not to
do something in the future that will disrupt and harm Indonesia‘s national
interest. “Third, the Australian Prime Minister agreed to Indonesia's proposal to
restructure the bilateral cooperation, including the exchange of intelligence, to
draw up protocols and codes of conduct are clear, fair and adhered to,” he
continued.189
188
The Daily Telegraph Australia. (2013, November 21). National crisis as Indonesia cuts ties with Australia
over spying scandal. Retrieved November 3, 2014, from The Daily Telegraph Australia Web Site:
http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/nsw/national-crisis-as-indonesia-cuts-ties-with-australia-over-spying-
scandal/story-fni0cx12-1226764830399?nk=6e2d3f3175ba53f2c15673f1ddd4a7df
189 The New Yok Times. (2013, November 26). Indonesia Ready to Work with Australia Again. Retrieved
November 3, 2014, from The New York Times Web Site:
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2013/11/26/world/asia/ap-as-indonesia-australia-spying.html?ref=asia&_r=0
93
The three points Abbot's reply indicated the success of Indonesia's
diplomacy in response to the Australian intelligence wiretapping case.
Indonesian Coordinating Minister of Economy, Hatta Radjasa asserted that the
decision of Australia to agree to the proposed code of conduct and a
commitment to not do things to harm Indonesia‘s national interest in the future
strongly indicated Australia‘s seriousness in resuming the strategic partnership
with Indonesia.190
IV.2. President Yudhoyono’s Six Road Map for Code of Conduct
President Yudhoyono‘s decision was further to set a roadmap for strain
settlement. He believed that Indonesia and Australia shared similar hopes and
values in terms of peace and cooperation. After announcing the content of Prime
Minister Tony Abbott‘s reply, President Yudhoyono initiated steps Indonesia
shall take in the event to settle the diplomatic strain with Australia. This
instruction was widely known as Six-Roadmap of Settlement. The details of the
mechanism is as follow:
Picture IV.1. Diagram of President Yudhoyono’s Six Roadmap
190 Hatta Rajasa. (2013, November 27). Penyadapan Australia dan Diplomasi Indonesia. Retrieved November 2,
2014, from Hatta Rajasa Official Web Site: http://hatta-rajasa.info/read/2380/penyadapan-australia-dan-
diplomasi-indonesia
94
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95
Source: Ministry of State Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia. (2013,
November 20). Pernyataan Presiden RI Terkait Penyadapan Australia.
Retrieved October 22, 2014, from Ministry of State Secretariat of the
Republic of Indonesia Web Site:
http://www.setneg.go.id/index.php/index.php?lang=en&option=com_co
ntent&task=view&id=7526 191
1. Special Envoy for Settlement Process
President Yudhoyono will assign a special envoy to discuss in-depth,
serious including sensitive issues including bilateral relations between
Indonesia Australia after the allegation. “For me this is a pre requisite
and stepping stone and the formulation of bilateral cooperation protocols
which I proposed and already approved by the Prime Minister of
Australia.192
On December 4 2013, President Yudhoyono furthermore
assigned Minister of Foreign Affairs Marty Natalegawa to serve as
Indonesia‘s representative in the discussion of drafting the code of
conduct with Australian counterparts.193
Australia show signs of seriousness to maintain and continue the bilateral
relationship with Indonesia. Having previously Prime Minister Tony
Abbott welcomed the offer of President Yudhoyono‘s letter about the
need to re-establish the mutual trust between the two countries prior to
the restoration of bilateral relations, this time Canberra sent the
Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop to discuss continuation of the
relationship between the two countries. A press release the Ministry of
191 The diagram is drawn based on President Yudhoyono‘s statement of instructions for the process/steps of
resolution (retrieved from (Ministry of State Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia Web Site:
http://www.setneg.go.id/index.php/index.php?lang=en&option=com_content&task=view&id=7526), the author
illustrates the flow of the sic roadmap in chronological order to explain briefly each step.
192 Ibid
193 The Jakarta Post. (2013, December 4). SBY assigns Marty to lead talks with Oz. Retrieved November 4, 2014,
from The Jakarta Post Web Site: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/12/04/sby-assigns-marty-lead-talks-
with-oz.html
96
Foreign Affairs of Australia on December 4 mentioned that Secretary
Bishop will lead a high level delegation to Jakarta for a wide ranging
discussion on bilateral relations, following the recent statement of
President Yudhoyono.194
On December 25 2013, Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop arrived
at Jakarta to attend a special meeting with Indonesian Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Marty Natalegawa at Ministry of Foreign Affairs Office, Jakarta.
The meeting between Marty with Julie Bishop lasted almost 4 hours. In a
press conference after the meeting, Julie expressed remorse for the
revelation that had endangered Indonesia-Australia diplomatic
relationship. Julie also mentioned that Australia shall commit to not to
harm Indonesia‘s national interest in the future. Indonesian Foreign
Minister Marty Natalegawa said he will soon report to the President
regarding the results of the meeting. The meeting was said to be very
constructive. Marty asserted that this particular meeting was the first
stage of the six stages required by the President.195
The main agenda of the meeting was to introduce and discuss the 6 road-
map President Yudhoyono initiated. It is said his meeting with Australian
Foreign Minister, Julie Bishop, would contribute to the continuation of
the relationship between Indonesia and Australia. But the meeting did not
affect the cooperation between the two countries. Marty states will not
send the Ambassador to Australia. “Cooperation remained suspended.
No change at all. As required by the President, this meeting is the first
194 Sekretariat Kabinet Republik Indonesia. (2013, December 4). Kunjungi Jakarta, Menlu Australia Diskusikan
Kelanjutan Hubungan Bilateral. Retrieved November 2, 2014, from Sekretariat Kabinet Republik Indonesia Web
Site: http://old.setkab.go.id/berita-11309-kunjungi-jakarta-menlu-australia-diskusikan-kelanjutan-hubungan-
bilateral.html
195 The Jakarta Post. (2013, December 5). Marty plays down substance of Bishop‟s visit. Retrieved November 7,
2014, from The Jakarta Post Web Site: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/12/05/marty-plays-down-
substance-bishop-s-visit.html
97
step out of 6 points of road-map that has been set for the settlement.”
Marty said in the office of the Foreign Ministry of Indonesia.196
2. Discussion on Protocols/Code of Conduct
After the mutual understanding and mutual agreement of both parties
prevailed, the negotiation should continue with the discussion of
protocols and codes of conduct of both countries. Since the meeting of
Marty Natalegawa and Julie Bishop in December 2013, the discussion
continued to be discussed frequently among both countries.
On February 20, 2014, Marty Natalegawa reported to the press that the
discussion is held daily with Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop. “I
keep in touch with State Secretary Bishop to ensure that progress is
being made, and we are in the stage of exchanging the CoC”. Marty
asserted that the settlement process was at that time in the stage of
exchanging draft of code of conduct that soon will be ratified by both
countries before President Yudhoyono leave the office in October 2014.
He also mentioned that the code of conduct would serve to govern the
Indonesia-Australia future diplomatic relationship. The benchmark of the
code of conduct would be Indonesia-Australia‘s agreement of security
cooperation, the Lombok Treaty.197
During the early weeks on 2014 until March, the discussion of code of
conduct seemed to be very constructive and progressive. Australia‘s
Foreign Minister Julie Bishop addressed the draft as Joint
Understanding. She then mentioned that the intelligence matters (spying
allegation) would also be the main concern of the Joint Understanding.
Bishop noted that the 3 field of cooperation between Indonesia and
196 The Jakarta Post. (2013, December 4). SBY assigns Marty to lead talks with Oz. Retrieved November 4, 2014,
from The Jakarta Post Web Site: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/12/04/sby-assigns-marty-lead-talks-
with-oz.html 197 Special Broadcasting Service. (2014, February 20). Aust waiting for Indonesia on relations plan. Retrieved
November 6, 2014, from Special Broadcasting Service Web Site:
http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2014/02/20/aust-waiting-indon-relations-plan
98
Australia remained halted. “…I was in Indonesia in early December and
Australia agreed to a six point plan proposed by President Yudhoyono
and one of the early points was to develop a joint understanding.
Australia prepared a draft, we sent it to Indonesia within days of my
return home and I'm waiting to hear from Indonesia as to the contents of
our proposed draft. Once we receive that draft back from Indonesia then
we can progress to the other steps. But otherwise there are about 60
areas of cooperation between Australia and Indonesia, covering about
22 Australian Government departments and agencies and authorities and
that is continuing.”198
On June 6, 2013, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Prime
Minister (PM) of Australia Tony Abbott agreed to discuss the steps more
effective cooperation between the two countries in the fields of economy,
trade, investment, food security, and education, to discussions related to
the dynamics and development region.199
In a joint press statement in Nongsa Point Marina and Resort, Batam,
Riau Islands, on Wednesday (4/6) afternoon, the President said efforts to
resolve issues or problems that could disrupt bilateral relations between
Indonesia and Australia, the phone tapping case in 2013 became
important points discussed in the meeting with Prime Minister Tony
Abbot. For half an hour the two heads of government discussed the
matter over the meeting, in order to improve relations, as well as to the
process of normalization of mutual trust. This meeting was the first
meeting held since the deterioration of relations between the two
countries as a result of the revelation of Australia spying allegation that
by Australian intelligence in 2013. “The spirit we are looking for
198 ABC Radio Australia. (2014, March 20). Julie Bishop says new code of conduct with Indonesia will cover
spying. Retrieved November 5, 2014, from Australian Broadcasting Corporation Radio:
http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/2014-03-07/julie-bishop-says-new-code-of-conduct-with-
indonesia-will-cover-spying/1276366
199 Sekretariat Kabinet Republik Indonesia. (2014, June 4). Presiden SBY dan PM Tony Abbot Sepakat Cari
Peluang Kerjasama Baru. Retrieved November 2, 2014, from Sekretariat Kabinet Republik Indonesia Web Site:
http://old.setkab.go.id/berita-13197-presiden-sby-dan-pm-tony-abbot-sepakat-cari-peluang-kerjasama-baru.html
99
solutions to such problems. We are also sure to find the opportunities
that the new cooperation, for example, intelligence cooperation is
indispensable both state and military cooperation could be improved,”
said President Yudhoyono.200
The President conveyed in a meeting with Prime Minister Tony Abbott,
the two countries agreed to solve problems that could interfere with the
bilateral relationship, and look for new opportunities to increase
cooperation. According to President Yudhoyono, what can be done by
Indonesia and Australia to resolve issues that could interfere, will bring
great benefits for both countries. “The peoples of Indonesia and
Australia want to stay friends,” said President Yudhoyono. According to
Yudhoyono, good relations between the two countries will bring great
benefits to both parties. “Almost a million Australian tourists are visiting
Indonesia every year. And there are more than 150 thousand Indonesian
students studying in Australia. In addition, we have agreed to continue to
seek new opportunities,” he said.201
Meanwhile, Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbot in his statement said
his meeting with the President had opened greater opportunities for
collaboration and partnership for Australia and Indonesia. Prime Minister
Tony Abbott stressed that relations with Indonesia are very important for
Australia. "For me, the President is a good friend and a good friend of
Indonesia is also for Australia," said the Abbot. Abbott believed his
meeting with the President will make the relations between the two
countries will further strengthen until a couple of months, years, and
decades to come. “I also believe that the two countries will find
opportunities for new cooperation,” Australian Prime Minister added.
3. President Yudhoyono’s Review
200
Ibid 201
Ibid
100
President Yudhoyono stated that he would personally check the protocol
and code of conduct. During the process of code of conduct drafting
since early months of 2014, President Yudhoyono held a paramount role
in reviewing the draft himself whether or not the content manage to
fulfill Indonesia‘s national interest of transparency in terms of
intelligence cooperation. He personally received reports coming from
Minister of Foreign Affairs Marty Natalegawa pertain the progress of
discussion and the drafting of provisions. “The third step, I will
personally check the draft of code of conduct whether it is already
adequate and accommodate Indonesia‟s objective after the
revelation.”202
4. Official Ratification
Once the protocols and code of conduct passed, President Yudhoyono
wanted the ratifications to be held in the presence of the head of
government, “I am as the President of Indonesia and Tony Abbott as the
Prime Minister of Australia.”203
5. Implementation
After ratification, President Yudhoyono commanded Marty Natalegawa,
as Indonesia‘s representative over the negotiation of strain settlement to
ensure that the mechanism for reviewing shall be determined in order to
monitor the process of implementation of agreement. As the President
said, ―The task of the two countries is therefore to ensure that the code of
ethics to run, therefore, carried out observation and evaluation. I think it
is reasonable and necessary,” This implementation stage is now still
ongoing whether the provisions in the code of conduct were respectively
implemented by both countries.204
202 Ministry of State Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia. (2013, November 20). Pernyataan Presiden RI
Terkait Penyadapan Australia. Retrieved October 22, 2014, from Ministry of State Secretariat of the Republic of
Indonesia Web Site:
http://www.setneg.go.id/index.php/index.php?lang=en&option=com_content&task=view&id=7526 203
Ibid
204 Ibid
101
6. Resume the Cooperation
The final step is, after the two countries, especially Indonesia, have
returned the trust and then the protocol and code of conduct successfully
executed, and then President Yudhoyono would perceive that bilateral
cooperation which brings together the benefits can be continued. “This
also includes military and police cooperation between the two
countries.” The details of the process of restoring the halted cooperation
will be discussed in the next sub-chapter.
On May 30, 2013, President Yudhoyono commanded Nadjib Riphat
Koesoma to be back in office. By the return of Indonesian Ambassador
for Australia, the relationship between the two democracies seemed to be
more at ease. However it did not melt the tension on the 3 layers of
cooperation that was suspended. After 6 months of diplomatic freeze,
Indonesia still sought to obtain details from Australia, if not, the
agreement on the Code of Conduct concerning both countries‘ stance
towards the strain. While Indonesian Ambassador returned to Canberra,
the cooperation remained halted and the discussion over the code of
conduct was in the stage of active discussion.205
IV.3. Indonesia-Australia Code of Conduct on Framework for Security
Cooperation
After getting through the steps required by President Yudhoyono in his 6
road-map of resolution, the ratification of Joint Understanding on a Code of
Conduct in implementation of Framework for Security Cooperation (The
Lombok Treaty) finally took place on 28th
of August 2014 in Laguna Resort,
Bali. The code of conduct was partly set on intelligence measures to search
information. State officials accompanying President Yudhoyono during his visit
205 The Jakarta Post. (2014, May 27). Indonesian ambassador returns to Australia. Retrieved November 5, 2014,
from The Jakarta Post Web Site: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/05/27/indonesian-ambassador-
returns-australia.html
102
in Bali were including State Secretary Sudi Silalahi, Coordinating Minister for
Political, Legal and Security Affairs Djoko Suyanto, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Marty Natalegawa, Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro Chairul,
Coordinating Minister for the Economy, Education and Culture Minister
Muhammad Nuh, Public Works Minister Djoko Kirmanto and State Secretary
Dipo Alam.206
Marty conveyed the Code of Conduct signed contains a commitment not to
deploy resources owned by the two countries to take any surveillance activities
that may harm each other‘s national interest. The detailed provision stating the
substance is as follows:
I. The Parties will not use any of their intelligence, including
surveillance capacities, or other resources, in ways that would harm
the interests of the Parties.
II. The Parties will promote intelligence cooperation between relevant
institutions and agencies in accordance with their respective national
laws and regulations.207
The Code of Conduct focuses on two main things; article 1 is in line with
Indonesia‘s demand to Australia as well as to govern the intelligence
cooperation and act between the countries. President Yudhoyono demanded the
surveillance activities (in any form including spying) shall not take place in the
future of Indonesia-Australia bilateral relationship in ways that may offend the
national interest and deteriorate the partnership.
Furthermore, in article 2, the main substance was concerned upon the
expected cooperation in the field of intelligence; defense and protection of the
border between Indonesia and Australia were restored by the signing. ―…we
206 The Jakarta Globe. (2014, August 28). Indonesia, Australia Sign Deal to End Spying Row. Retrieved
November 7, 2014, from The Jakarta Globe Web Site: http://www.indonesia-digest.net/2485australiarel.htm
207 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2014, August 28). Joint Understanding on a code of conduct
between the Republic of Indonesia and Australia in implementation of the agreement between the Republic of
Indonesia and Australia on the Framework for Security Cooperation ("The Lombok Treaty"). Retrieved
November 6, 2014, from Australian Government Official Web Site: https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/indonesia/joint-
understanding-lombok-treaty.html#site-header
103
both believe that the strong intelligence partnership is vital for both countries
and is the most effective way to defeat those who could do harm to the people of
Australia and the people of Indonesia,” Bishop asserted after the ratification of
the agreement process ended. Marty Natalegawa stated that the ratification of the
code of conduct was the new chapter in the relationship between Indonesia and
Australia for Security Cooperation. He also asserted that this was the first time
in history that Indonesia managed to stand strong against surveillance issue.208
Secretary Bishop also used this opportunity to appreciate the outstanding
contribution Marty and the President in terms of bilateral relations between
Indonesia and Australia. “Echoes of President Yudhoyono is not only heard at
the regional level, but also internationally. President Yudhoyono is a good
friend to Australia. Under his leadership, New Colombo Plan revived. This year
550 Australians will come to study and live in Indonesia.” According to Bishop,
the signing of the Code of Conduct was to prove that, in spite of the challenges,
Indonesia and Australia are able to work together very well.209
The stipulation of Joint Understanding on Code of Conduct was a big
stepping stone for Indonesia and Australia in resuming both countries‘
cooperation. President Yudhoyono mentioned that the Code of Conduct was also
serving as the implementation of major provisions in Lombok Treaty regarding
sovereignty and security cooperation.210
Lombok Treaty was stipulated in 2006
when the two countries agreed to tie cooperation in the security agreement. Prior
to the signing of the security agreement between Indonesia - Australia in 2006,
the discourse on the talk about the need for the two countries conduct security
cooperation has been seen since 2003, when Yudhoyono served as Minister of
Politics, Legal and Security and visited Australia a year after the Bali bombing I.
208
Ibid
209 Kementrian Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia. (2014, August 29). Pulihkan Komunikasi Penuh, RI-Australia
Tandatangani Code of Conduct. Retrieved November 4, 2014, from Kementrian Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia
Web Site: http://www.kemlu.go.id/_layouts/mobile/PortalDetail-NewsLike.aspx?l=id&ItemID=218b3802-1ea4-
4436-8a15-1cd93bbf0d32
210 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2006, November 14). Agreement Between the Republic of
Indonesia and Australia on the Framework for Security Cooperation. Retrieved November 9, 2014, from
Australian Government Official Web Site: https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/indonesia/ind-aus-sec06.html#site-header
104
Yudhoyono at the time stated that in order to be able to combat security threats
both traditional and nontraditional, the two countries need to improve their
ability. Departing from this, the framework of security cooperation is a necessity
for both countries. Inside the agreement, it was also strongly mentioned about
the respect to both countries‘ sovereignty and integrity. Recalling the case of
Papua and East Timor, Indonesia felt that there should be a bilateral agreement
that binds both countries to stop on committing any form of intervention into one
country‘s sovereign territory in the event to boost good relations and
cooperation.211
Therefore, the was in line with provisions in Lombok Treaty
regarding to respect to each other‘s sovereignty as detailed bellow in the charter:
II. Mutual respect and support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity,
national unity and political independence of each other, and also
non-interference in the internal affairs of one another;
III. The Parties, consistent with their respective domestic laws and
international obligations, shall not in any manner support or
participate in activities by any person or entity which constitutes a
threat to the stability, sovereignty or territorial integrity of the other
Party, including by those who seek to use its territory for
encouraging or committing such activities, including separatism, in
the territory of the other Party.212
Echoing the past agreement on the security cooperation, Indonesia and
Australia re-emphasized the provision of Article 2 clause I and II by including
the provisions to the Joint Understanding stipulated in the event to govern the
intelligence activities. Furthermore, the two countries agreed to increase
intelligence cooperation to respond to security challenges facing the region
between the two countries, including the threat of an extremist group from the
211 Wangke, H. (2014, September). Efektivitas Kesepakatan Code of Conduct Indonesia-Australia. Retrieved
November 8, 2014, from Sekertariat Jendral DPR RI; Info Singkat Hubungan Internasional Vol.VI,
No.17/I/P3DI/September2014: http://berkas.dpr.go.id/pengkajian/files/info_singkat/Info%20Singkat-VI-17-I-
P3DI-September-2014-4.pdf 212 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2006, November 14). Agreement Between the Republic of
Indonesia and Australia on the Framework for Security Cooperation. Retrieved November 9, 2014, from
Australian Government Official Web Site: https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/indonesia/ind-aus-sec06.html#site-header
105
Middle East conflict. In other words, the deal includes points that set the two
countries do not take action that could harm one another.
Indonesia‘s role in the strain settlement led to the agreement which not only
shared both countries‘ mutual interest, but also accommodated Indonesia‘s
request for Australia to limit and govern the act of surveillance or intelligence
applied to both countries. Here, President Yudhoyono who was also becoming
the target of the alleged spying managed to exert Indonesia‘s power of
cooperation with Australia to settle the strain peacefully without any force or
hard power. Whereas, as noted there were some anarchic protests took place in
front of Australian Embassy in Jakarta that depicted Indonesia‘s fierce anger
upon the allegation which could not be taken lightly. With soft power of
diplomacy, Indonesia managed to accelerate its value of democratic identity
which recognizes transparency as the prominent requirement for a good and
strong mutual trust in bilateral partnership.
IV.4. The Concept of Presidential Power and Relationship between Leadership
Characteristic and Foreign Policy Making
In assessing the role of President Yudhoyono as an individual decision
maker during the early strain settlement method proposal, process until the
ratification of code of conduct, it is very prudent for this research to relate to the
relationship between leadership style of a political leader in foreign policy
making since it describes the influence of leadership characteristic in
determining steps to be taken for the good of the sole nation in foreign policy.
This sub-chapter will analyze the personal characteristic of a political leader in
influencing his/her leadership style, and continued with discussing the leadership
characteristic (style) of President Yudhoyono in influencing the foreign policy
behavior.
IV.4.1. Presidential Power
106
To explain the role of leadership in a certain foreign policy making, it is
important to know about specific kinds of leadership in which in this case,
President. The process of settlement between Indonesia and Australia had shown
President Yudhoyono‘s domination in leading the flow of negotiation which
means he was a powerful actor in the allegation case. This power inextricably
linked with his authority as a President that enables him to execute actions,
determine policies and persuade advisers (followers, inner circle, counterparts,
and partners) which furthermore called as Presidential Power.213
The term
presidential power refers to Richard Neustadt‘s theory of the capability of a
certain leader/president to execute ―personal influence of an effective sort of
governmental action‖. This is closely related to persuasive power a certain
president can accelerate.
Neustadt observation centered upon the notion that due to limited
institutional power, presidents are forced to rely upon their interpersonal skills
and arts of persuasion to carry out their policies. Presidents who are categorized
as powerful due to their interpersonal skills and arts of persuasion are those who:
1) Have political expertise; 2) Have unpretentious self-confidences in their
abilities, and; 3) Enjoy the job or willingly to contribute more than enough to the
development of their role and nation.214
IV.4.2. Implementation of the Use of Presidential Power (Leadership and
Foreign Policy Making)
After analyzing about the power a certain political leader (President) possess
in the government, the discussion shall be continued to how the power of
president (namely their personal characteristic) influence the decision making
process. In order to execute his/her presidential power, presidents need to have
its own leadership characteristic. The study of personal characteristic of political
213
Neustadt, R.E. (1960/1990) Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from
Roosevelt to Reagan. New York: Free Press. 214
Neustadt, R.E. (1960/1990) Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from
Roosevelt to Reagan. New York: Free Press.
107
leaders in influencing the foreign policy behavior is closely related to Margaret
G. Hermann‘s seminal study on political leaders as individual decision makers in
foreign policy making. Hermann developed 4 components in examining their
characteristic of political leaders, namely; beliefs, motives, decision style and
interpersonal style.215
Hermann assessed that these types of personal
characteristic also serve as means of making political decisions which further
affect both the style and content of foreign policy.216
Beliefs explain a certain political leader‘s fundamental assumption towards
the world. This type also includes whether leaders view the events based on
human interaction; whether they are predictable; their ability to control the
events, and; whether he/she thinks the national interest is the main objective of a
nation.217
Belief is the result of a leader‘s interpretation of a certain occurrence
which further influenced their decision in form of strategies employed.218
President Yudhoyono‘s belief is identically characterized by democratic
identity (non-violent conflict resolution, rule of law, compromise and
transparency).219
As mentioned in Chapter II discussing Indonesia‘s foreign
policy under Yudhoyono, he was the first President to be chosen democratically
by majority of Indonesian people and was the first President to uphold
democratic system of government post New Order. As a supreme democratic
leader, his excellency in accelerating Indonesia‘s international confidence
towards global community was recognized by many major international
institutions. On major occasions, President Yudhoyono had always referred to
democratic values in exerting Indonesia‘s cooperation in international affairs.
215 Hermann, M. G. (2012, January 4). Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics
of Political Leaders. Retrieved November 11, 2014, from JSTOR Official Web Site:
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp 216
(Hermann, 2012, p. 10)
217 This view also developed by Axelrod, 1976; Verba, 1969; DeRivera, 1968; Frank, 1968; Holsti, 1967; Jervis,
1976)
218 (Hermann, 2012, p. 9)
219 Zeev Maos & Bruce Russett. (2006, August 23). Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace.
Retrieved November 4, 2014, from JSTOR Web Site:
http://www.uky.edu/~clthyn2/PS671/MaozRussett_1993APSR.pdf
108
Motive(s) refers to reasons or rationale why political leaders do what they
decide to do. It also influences political leaders‘ interpretations of their
environment and the strategies they use.220
Hermann suggested two different
kinds of motives political leaders can be considered of. First is need for power
which indicates a political leader that has high level of nationalism, strong belief
in one‘s own ability to control the events and has a relatively high level of
distrust towards others. The second type is need for affiliation, which
characterized by participatory leadership, has relatively low nationalism and
rather low distrust towards others. However these two types do not apply rigidly
to all subjects being examined. It rather can be affected by situations, actors
involved and level of risk that potentially occurred.221
Yudhoyono‘s motive was somewhere between the two types of motives
described. During the allegation case, he was rather participatory, meaning that
he was tolerable to the strain in a way that it can be resolved without coercion. In
exercising his authority, he was certainly having relatively high level of
nationalism since his main departure point was to defend Indonesia‘s
sovereignty in privacy and uphold political ethics among partners for strong
mutual trust. Therefore, he had a rather low level of distrust towards Australia
regardless the allegation revealed was showing that he was the main target of the
surveillance conduct. Yudhoyono considered many other mutual factors that
bound Indonesia and Australia together as partners rather than choose to
abruptly dismiss all the partnership over the damaged trust issue.
Political leaders surely have their own preferred method of deciding
policies. Hermann suggested that how leaders make decisions are characterized
by looking at their openness to new information, preference for certain levels of
risk and ability to tolerate ambiguity. Decision style also identifies the character
of political leaders.222
220
Barber, J. D. (1965) The Lawmakers. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press. 221
Hermann, M. G. (2012, January 4). Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics
of Political Leaders, page 22. Retrieved November 11, 2014, from JSTOR Official Web Site:
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp 222
(Hermann, 2012, p. 10)
109
Often in his speech, Yudhoyono mentioned about how the majority of
people of Indonesia reacted to the allegation exposed by Edward J. Snowden.
Yudhoyono kept himself informed with the development of Australia‘s stance
towards Indonesia‘s demand before taking any firm decision. As can be seen
from Chapter III, President Yudhoyono conveyed Indonesia‘s 3 steps of
resolution in his national press conference as well as his direct formal letter to
Canberra. In the first point, it stated that Indonesia shall provide chance for
Australia to explain the details of the revelation. This means that he tried to
obtain further information as to whether the spying does take place rather than
directly jumping into the conclusion that Australia did spy on Indonesia
specifically on him. His steps were very beneficial in determining prudent
actions that might be taken for Indonesia in the case so that there shall be
relatively low level of risk would cost Indonesia. This also shows that he
accelerated a degree of toleration towards the ambiguity of Australia‘s stance
since Australia denied to comment on the issue.
Interpersonal style refers to the specific ways the of policy makers deal with
other policy makers. This describes also leaders‘ nature of behavior in
responding the occurrence(s) that take place.223
In this case, President
Yudhoyono was indeed a very considerate and thoughtful leader in the event of
responding allegation exposed by Snowden. He showed some regret and strong
diplomatic statements through social media and national press conference yet
still managed to tone down the massive rage of Indonesian people that directed
to Canberra. Yudhoyono is a dedicated leader who subscribes to the use of soft
power and diplomacy in dealing with states‘ constraints. It can be obviously seen
by looking at foreign policy he set as Indonesia‘s priority during his 2 terms in
office. There was also a slogan he conveyed during APEC Summit, “Million
friends, zero enemies.” Although not everyone could buy this paradigm,
Yudhoyono strived to exercise soft power in a form of diplomacy to major
occasions he faced as a President of Indonesia rather than coercive actions.
223
Hermann, M. G. (2012, January 4). Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics
of Political Leaders, page 22. Retrieved November 11, 2014, from JSTOR Official Web Site:
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
110
Thus, during the case of spying allegation with Australia, Yudhoyono referred to
diplomatic yet assertive policies to be applied to the partnership.
IV.5. The Influence of President Yudhoyono’s Idiosyncratic Factors in the
Strain Settlement of Spying Allegation (Triangle Relationship among Authority,
Objectives and Cognitive Balance)
As we can tell from explanations about President Yudhoyono‘s decision in
foreign policy, he primarily influence the decision making process by his
cognitive ability which comes from his rational, democratic and tendency of
using soft power. This makes Yudhoyono‘s trait in Leadership is characterized
by his cognitive balance. President Yudhoyono‘s choice to accelerate soft power
in a form of diplomacy in settling the strain Indonesia and Australia faced after
the spying allegation revealed by Edward Snowden was primarily influenced by
intervening factor of cognitive capability which formulated Cognitive Balance.
As discussed previously in Chapter II in foreign policy analysis section as well
as in Chapter I; theoretical framework section, cognitive capability of a political
leader is enhanced by his idiosyncrasy in leadership and personality which
enables them to gain cognitive balance. As mentioned in previous section,
Yudhoyono‘s idiosyncrasy in leadership is characterized by rational, democratic,
positivism and optimization of soft power. This is closely related to
Yudhoyono‘s belief of democratic values. Furthermore, Yudhoyono‘s
democratic leadership was also influenced by his background of leadership since
his high school period, prominent figure in TNI, until when he was chosen as
Minister of Politics, Social and Security during Megawati‘s administration
where he was always refer to interest of group/community.224
In order to
promote the values of democracy as Indonesia‘s national identity, Yudhoyono
exercises the use of soft power of diplomacy in facing constraints. Dino Patti
Djalal, former Ambassador of Indonesia for United States mentioned in his book
224 Budiyono, Z. A. (2012). Memimpin di Era Politik Gaduh. Jakarta: DCS Publication.
111
that President Yudhoyono was one of the best foreign policy Presidents of all
time.
“… (President Yudhoyono) is leader who is able to make
decisions anytime, anywhere, and in any condition. It is so far
away from what some people think that (the President) is not
so decisive, slow and often in doubt. As a professional
diplomat, I think President Yudhoyono is one of the best
„foreign policy President‟ of all time.”225
To sum up the process of decision making and to examine the essence of
President Yudhoyono‘s influence during the process, the following diagram will
have it explained briefly.
Picture IV.2. Diagram of Yudhoyono’s influence during Indonesia-Australia’s
strain settlement process
225 Dino Patti Djalal. (2008). Harus Bisa (Seni Memimpin Ala SBY). Jakarta: Red & White Publishing.
Individual
Psychology
Yudhoyono’s
idiosyncratic
factors
Group
Psychology
- Indonesia’s
citizen
- Politicians
Cognitive Balance
(Yudhoyono‘s
Idiosyncrasy &
group voices)
Decision Making
Yudhoyono‘s 6 Road-
Map of Settlement
Mechanism
Implementation
Australia-Indonesia
Joint Understanding
Agreement
International &
Domestic Politics
Governed surveillance
activities
112
Picture IV.2. Modified diagram of decision making as steering process during Indonesia-
Australia strain settlement.226
As can be seen from the diagram above, President Yudhoyono navigated
almost every part of the decision making process. In the first stage (oval
columns) Yudhoyono‘s idiosyncrasy in leadership (personality; physical &
mental health; ego and ambition; political history & experiences; and
perceptions & operational reality) had contributed to Yudhoyono‘s individual
psychology as an individual decision maker. While group psychology refers to
the voices coming from Indonesia‘s citizen and politicians who also played as an
influential actor in the decision making process. As elaborated in chapter II,
Yudhoyono‘s idiosyncrasy in leadership is characterized by soft power and
democratic values. While in chapter III, the discussion had examined
Indonesia‘s view upon the revelation case as a whole with also brought
Indonesia‘s citizen and politicians‘ view. Indonesian people wanted to
completely remove all bilateral partnership Indonesia and Australia had at that
time. They viewed the revelation as a breach to Indonesia‘s sovereignty and
disrespectful behavior of a neighbor. Likewise, the majority of Indonesian
politicians saw the case as a very unacceptable conduct and suggested the
government to grant persona non grata to every Australian governmental
officials working in Indonesia including Greg Moriarty, Australian Ambassador.
The group psychology resulted from these views were rather intense and
demanded somewhat strong actions. President Yudhoyono had a slight different
opinion upon the matter that matters. Obviously he shared the same view with
the majority of Indonesians, not to mention he was the targeted subject of the
alleged spying; the difference is, Yudhoyono did not directly jump to the
conclusion that Indonesia and Australia‘s relation should be completely shut
down. With his idiosyncrasy, the decision making process could manage to run
without any exaggeration on the provisions ratified.
Yudhoyono‘s cognitive balance is a result of his idiosyncratic factors in
leadership combined with group psychology. To explain the cognitive balance
226 John T. Rourke & Mark A. Boyer. (2013). Levels of Analysis and Foreign Policy. In International
Politics on the World Stage (pp. 127-129). Huntington College Press. The diagram is modified by
author in order to sum up President Yudhoyono‘s influence during strain settlement.
113
factor in individual level, the discussion shall now highlight the triangle
relationship among authority, objectives and perceptions & operational reality.
Out of idiosyncratic factors mentioned in previous discussions; President
Yudhoyono‘s Perceptions & Operational Reality is the most influential factor of
his idiosyncrasies in determining his choice of actions towards a certain
situation. This perception of democracy and operational code of soft power had
influence Yudhoyono in deciding foreign policy during the strain settlement.
Many politicians and academics assessed that President Yudhoyono‘s belief in
democratic values which furthermore manifested in a form of ideology has
helped Indonesia in shaping its identity internationally. He received numbers of
acknowledgment and awards from upholding his belief as well. Furthermore, in
explaining the influence of Yudhoyono‘s idiosyncratic factor of perception and
operational reality in the making of foreign policy decisions during the strain
settlement, it is important to examine its correlation with his authority as
President of Indonesia and the Objectives or motives of the actions.
Figure IV.I. Triangle Relationship of Yudhoyono’s idiosyncratic factors
Figure IV.1. Triangle Relationship among Authority, Objectives and Perceptions &
Operational Reality of Yudhoyono‘s idiosyncratic factors in influencing foreign policy
decision making.
The figure above draws an illustration of correlation among Authority,
Objectives and idiosyncratic factor of a political leader, Perceptions &
Operational Reality. The three factors above are the most influential components
Authority
Perceptions & Operational Reality Objectives
Cognitive Balance
114
through which the Code of Conduct on Framework for Security Cooperation
between Indonesia and Australia could be enacted. President Yudhoyono as an
individual decision maker in the strain settlement progress, President
Yudhoyono‘s idiosyncratic factors indeed played a great role since his
initiatives, proposals and statements were considered very influential by
majority of public.
The first component is authority. Authority enables Presidents to exert and
exercise their power in the government on which he/she is assigned to.227
In this
context, the authority lies in Yudhoyono‘s position as a supreme leader in
Indonesia, the President of the Republic of Indonesia. This also explains that his
decisions are top decisions in the government and in the country. Regardless the
target of the spying allegation (whether it was him or other individual(s) among
the top governmental officials), President Yudhoyono still had to take actions
and measures to Australia since it represents Indonesia‘s demand in obtaining
details of information and apology.
While objectives and perceptions & operational reality are reciprocally
correlated towards each other as it explains the interdependence process of
objective affecting the perceptions and the operational conduct and vice versa.
As mentioned frequently that Yudhoyono‘s objectives (main goal) in settling the
strain that damaged Indonesia-Australia‘s diplomatic relationship were to defend
Indonesia‘s sovereignty over state privacy and to rebuild the trust between
Indonesia and Australia for a stronger future bilateral partnership. These
objectives served as a fuel for Yudhoyono‘s further perception on the case that it
should be resolved through diplomatic means which entails maximization of the
use of soft power.
The perception that the allegation of spying was not very acceptable gave
the notion to the public that President Yudhoyono would take strong actions by
cutting all bilateral relationship between Indonesia and Australia. But President
Yudhoyono managed to drive his perception of intolerable spying conduct into a
more positive thought so that he could come to the conclusion that it should be
227 Stein, J. G. (2002). Psychological Explanations of International Conflict. Palgrave.
115
resolved peacefully with patient and rational.228
Perception is important during
Yudhoyono‘s decision making progress as it lets Yudhoyono to filter the
information he received based on his – as mentioned before – belief. Yudhoyono
perceive the case as a very unacceptable conduct, but did not just abruptly erase
Australia from Indonesia‘s list of best friends. Therefore, he chose to exercise
soft power (diplomacy) as his operational reality or operational code in the event
to restore the relationship. These three elements has contributed to the
attainment of cognitive balance.
Other idiosyncratic factors also play relatively significant role in President
Yudhoyono‘s decisions, as mentioned on Chapter II in Individual Foreign Policy
Analysis, they are; personality, physical & mental health, ego & ambition and
political history/personal experiences.229
Yudhoyono‘s personality was
frequently mentioned in this thesis as an exemplary personality which also
influenced by his family primarily from parents. His leadership skill and
capability has been building from time to time through a series of experiences
granted to him to become a leader. Dino Patti Djalal depicted his leadership as a
very strict yet forgiving leadership. Means that Yudhoyono is very assertive in
commanding orders to his lower officials, yet he is also very forgiving when
certain slander directed upon him even when it extremely disadvantaging his
position. This also explains why and how Yudhoyono managed to keep rational
during chaotic upheaval caused by the spying allegation.230
Physical and mental stability of a political leader are also affecting very
much to the process of decision making as it supported the leaders to easily exert
his/her thoughts without any disturbance. President Yudhoyono‘s physical and
mental stability was unquestionably steady that Yudhoyono managed to stand by
to face any situation that needs his fast decision. However, Yudhoyono did not
generally considered as an egoistic leader because he kept on putting Indonesia‘s
228
President Yudhoyono‘s speech in the National Palace on 20 November 2013, from The Guardian Australia.
(2013, November 21). Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono‟s speech on phone tapping – full translated text. Retrieved
October 22, 2014, from The Guardian News Web Site: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/21/susilo-
bambang-yudhoyonos-speech-translated 229 Haney, S. &. (2013). Foreign Policy. In S. &. Haney, American Foreign Policy in a New Era Plus
MySearchLab with eText (pp. 127-129). Pearson. 230
Dino Patti Djalal. (2008). Harus Bisa (Seni Memimpin Ala SBY). Jakarta: Red & White Publishing.
116
interest above all else. That was why he was very considerate to Indonesian
people‘s protests towards the spying allegation.231
To this end, it can be concluded that President Yudhoyono as a leader
(authority) managed to exerted his objectives of defending Indonesia‘s state
privacy and restore trust (objectives) through idiosyncratic factors that contribute
to Yudhoyono‘s process of filtering information (perception), to which further
accelerated by the method of soft power or diplomacy (operational reality) in the
event to gain cognitive balance to manage the strain between Indonesia and
Australia.
IV.6. Chapter Summary
Critically, President Yudhoyono‘s final term in office would end when the
next round of Presidential elections held in July. Interlocutors from government
and academia, in Canberra and in Jakarta, have generally agreed that the current
leadership in Indonesia is likely to represent a highpoint for relations with
Australia. Since his duty as Minister of Political, Social and Security, he had
contributed to the betterment of Indonesia-Australia‘s bilateral relationship.
Hence further in his administration as a President, Yudhoyono strived to
maintain and restore the damaged relationship.
As an individual decision maker, President Yudhoyono‘s idiosyncratic
factor(s) hold a very important role in determining the foreign policy set towards
the strain. The combination of his belief in democratic identity and rational
calculation in cognitive balance resulted in his decision to suspend military
cooperation that has a more short-term repairable cooperation rather than
economic cooperation that costs more on both countries.
231 Poole, A. (2013, September 2013). A ―Democratic‖ Process? Change and Continuity in Foreign Policymaking
in Indonesia. pp. 1-11.
117
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
Who leads matters. The allegation on Australia‘s spying conduct revealed
by Edward J. Snowden in the late 2013 had jeopardized Indonesia and
Australia‘s bilateral relationship to its nadir. As the worst result of the allegation,
Indonesia reviewed several bilateral partnerships and ended up suspending 3 of
them namely intelligence sharing cooperation, coordinated military operations in
combating people smuggling and joint military exercise in navy, air forces and
army. Not to mention, Indonesia recalled its Ambassador from Canberra and due
to massive protests in Indonesia, Prime Minister Tony Abbott issued a travel
warning to Jakarta for Australians. Different views coming from different
perspectives came from various layers of public whether it was from Australia or
Indonesia. Some viewed the case in a less negative reaction while the rest
responded relatively negative.
International relations study has developed inadequate study discussing
espionage or spying. Its tolerability is widely questionable and state-oriented.
Some scholars such as Wright argued that spying is highly intolerable seeing
from the concept of non-intervention the United Nations established in its
charter, and agreed by the 193 UN member states as well. On the other hand,
Baker counter-argued that living in the world of technology and advanced
communication methods; international system cannot avoid the practice of
surveillance since it rather enhances cooperation among states than damaging it.
Since there is an absent of international norm/agreement/legal provision
governing the act of spying, countries determine their own regulation in order to
restrict or grant the use of surveillance. To this end, state leaders played a great
role and are bound to be highly thoughtful in deciding foreign policy to be
issued whenever the issue of spying emerged and is involving another country.
Australia generally saw the case had been exaggeratedly commented by the
public and chose to give no comment on the issue. While Indonesia viewed the
118
allegation as a very hurtful conduct therefore they demanded explanation and
since apology from Canberra. However, the international legal norm had been
silenced by the presence of spying conduct so Indonesia and Australia could not
come to any absolute conclusion onto whether the conduct was relevant to the
pursuit of state security or the other way around; violating other state‘s
sovereignty. Hence, instead of debating the relevancy of the conduct, both states
put the developing cooperation to priority. Still, the initiatives seemed to be
lacking from both sides at the beginning.
President Yudhoyono as the first President to be democratically elected by
the peoples of Indonesia managed to show a distinguished leadership during his
two terms in office (2004 – 2014). Many believed that Indonesia‘s democracy
under Yudhoyono had improved a lot and still is developing overtime.
Yudhoyono focused on the use of soft power and diplomacy in determining
policies. Although Indonesians are not solely agree with the “million friends
zero enemies” President Yudhoyono mentioned, Yudhoyono managed to lead
Indonesia peacefully until his term expired in October 2014. President
Yudhoyono‘s leadership in the government however was influenced by several
idiosyncratic factors as well as external factors. Primarily, his idiosyncratic
factors of perspective and operational reality had led him to his decision in
determining foreign policies towards Australia during the allegation case. His
belief in some degree influenced by Indonesia‘s democratic values and his
perspective of peaceful resolution had brought him to decide using soft power in
solving the strain. This had enabled Yudhoyono to gain cognitive balance as the
intervening factor to the decision making process.
Regardless of Australia‘s statements that declined the truth of the allegation
exposed, President Yudhoyono chose to initiatively come to proposal of
settlement mechanism and its pre requisites. During the beginning of
Yudhoyono‘s settlement proposal written in a form of formal letter to Prime
Minister Tony Abbott until the ratification of Code of Conduct on Framework
for Security Cooperation, Yudhoyono as outstandingly played as the main
navigator of the discussion and materials to be negotiated while at the same time
accelerating Indonesia‘s interest of transparency and respect to sovereignty. His
119
Six-Roadmap had ultimately guided the flow of negotiation during the 6 months
settlement progress between Indonesia and Australia, leaving Indonesia-
Australia at a more stable status quo.
The study idiosyncratic factors affecting leadership characteristic of political
leaders in determining foreign policy towards other countries has provided
analytical explanation about the its correlation with authority the political
leaders have. The case of Australia‘s spying allegation revealed by Edward J.
Snowden had shown how President Yudhoyono as an individual decision maker
(President of Indonesia) became the lead navigator of the negotiation to
primarily settle the strain between Indonesia and Australia. His nature of
dominance in the settlement process was generally influenced by his leadership
characteristic (idiosyncrasy) that used soft power as the means of negotiation
and cooperation as the ultimate objective.
120
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132
APPENDICES
Appendices 1
Source from: Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Web Site
https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/indonesia/joint-understanding-lombok-treaty.html#site-header
Joint Understanding on a code of conduct between the Republic of Indonesia
and Australia in implementation of the agreement between the Republic of
Indonesia and Australia on the Framework for Security Cooperation ("The
Lombok Treaty")
The Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of Australia
(hereinafter referred to as the "Parties");
Reaffirming and pursuant to the Agreement Between the Republic of Indonesia and
Australia on the Framework for Security Cooperation of 13 November 2006 ("The
Lombok Treaty");
Building upon the purposes and principles enshrined in Articles 1 and 2 of the
Lombok Treaty;
Reaffirming also the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;
Reaffirming further the human rights and fundamental freedoms enshrined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and relevant international human rights
treaties;
Have agreed on the following Joint Understanding on a code of conduct:
1. The Parties will not use any of their intelligence, including surveillance capacities, or
other resources, in ways that would harm the interests of the Parties.
2. The Parties will promote intelligence cooperation between relevant institutions and
agencies in accordance with their respective national laws and regulations.
133
In implementation of the above and within the framework of the annual meeting of
the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Parties, the Heads of intelligence agencies of
the Parties shall meet and consult on a regular basis.
This Joint Understanding on a code of conduct will come into effect upon signing.
Done at Bali on 28th of August 2014 in 2 (two) original copies in both Indonesian
and English languages, each text being equally authentic. In case of divergence in
the interpretation, the English text shall prevail.
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
[SIGNED]
R.M. MARTY M. NATALEGAWA
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF
AUSTRALIA
[SIGNED]
THE HON JULIE BISHOP MP
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Appendices 2
Source from: Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/indonesia/ind-aus-sec06.html#site-header
Agreement Between the Republic of Indonesia and Australia on the
Framework for Security Cooperation
ARTICLE 2
PRINCIPLES
134
In their relations with one another, the Parties shall be guided by the following
fundamental principles, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Equality, mutual benefit and recognition of enduring interests each Party has in the
stability, security and prosperity of the other;
2. Mutual respect and support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, national unity
and political independence of each other, and also non-interference in the internal
affairs of one another;
3. The Parties, consistent with their respective domestic laws and international
obligations, shall not in any manner support or participate in activities by any person
or entity which constitutes a threat to the stability, sovereignty or territorial integrity
of the other Party, including by those who seek to use its territory for encouraging or
committing such activities, including separatism, in the territory of the other Party;
4. The Parties undertake, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, to settle
any disputes that might arise between them by peaceful means in such a manner that
international peace, security and justice are not endangered;
5. The Parties shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of the other, in accordance with the UN Charter;
6. Nothing in this Agreement shall affect in any way the existing rights and
obligations of either Party under international law.
