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Presented to: SBAS Technical Interoperability Working Group
Date: 21 June 2005
Federal AviationAdministrationCertification of the
Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS)
Dan Hanlon
WAAS Program Manager
Federal AviationAdministration
2Certification of the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS)21 June 2005
A New Paradigm
• WAAS was the first navigation aid to be certified nationally
• As such, many of FAA’s standard certification criteria had to be tailored to fit the program
Federal AviationAdministration
3Certification of the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS)21 June 2005
Steps to Certification
• FAA Administrator Directs Establishment of an Independent Review Board (IRB) – Role: Perform an Independent Assessment of the
Need for a Satellite Based Augmentation System and to Independently Review the Technical Solution Proposed by the WIPP
– Reported Findings to the Administrator
• WAAS Program Office Establishes a WAAS Integrity Performance Panel (WIPP)– Role is to Establish Technical Approach and
Solution for Meeting Integrity
Federal AviationAdministration
4Certification of the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS)21 June 2005
Steps to Certification
• WIPP Comprised of WAAS Experts……(FAA, Academia, Industry)
• WIPP Meetings with Contractor Held Monthly to Review and Evaluate Contractor’s Progress
• FAA Briefed Status of WIPP Activities to IRB who then Reported Back to Administrator
Federal AviationAdministration
5Certification of the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS)21 June 2005
Role of the WAAS Integrity Performance Panel (WIPP)
• Provided The Needed Expertise To Help Define The Actual Threats Or Threat Models That WAAS Would Have To Be Designed To Protect Against
• WIPP Was Charged With Defining The Extent Of The Threats Including Their Description And Likelihood
• WIPP Judged The Completeness Of A Monitor’s Design
• WIPP Insured That The Threat Models Generated Fully Spanned All Feared Events
Federal AviationAdministration
6Certification of the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS)21 June 2005
FAA Certification
In-Service DecisionJRC
Safety Certification Operational Certification Security Certification
Safety Assurance Process P(HMI) Integrity Analysis FMECA Fault Tree Analysis Performance Analysis Test & Validation
In Service Review (ISR)Checklist
Human Factors Logistics & Support ATC Procedures &
Training IAP Procedures Maintenance Procedures &
Training
Security AssuranceProcess
Vulnerability Analysis Risk Assessment Security Plan Security Certification
Accreditation Plan (SCAP)
Federal AviationAdministration
7Certification of the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS)21 June 2005
Certification by Program Phase
• System Development– System Owned by Contractor
• Contractor Must Prove System Meets Safety Certification Criteria Prior to FAA Acceptance
• Contractor Acceptance Inspection (CAI)– Program Office Formally Accepts Ownership of System
• Operational and Security Certification Period Begins
• Joint Acceptance Inspection (JAI)– Field Satisfied That System is Functioning and All Support
Material Is in Place• Commissioning
– Requires JRC In Service Decision– System Becomes Part of National Airspace System
Federal AviationAdministration
8Certification of the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS)21 June 2005
Types of Certification
• Safety Certification– Performed By the Product Team Prior to Acceptance From the
Contractor– Design Assurance Process Used to Provide Sufficient Proof
That The Integrity Requirements Are Achieved• Operational Certification
– Performed by Airways Facilities• Validation that WAAS is Working Properly Within the NAS
Infrastructure• Equipment is Functioning Within Limits• Operators and Maintainers Are Trained • Procedures Are in Place and Being Followed
• Security Certification– Compliance With Security Requirements, Procedures &
Training
Federal AviationAdministration
9Certification of the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS)21 June 2005
WAAS Integrity Issue
• WAAS Integrity Design Did Not Provide Proof of Compliance For Integrity Requirement
– Traditional Testing Methods Showed That the Design “Did Not Fail”
• Complete Definition of the Potential Threat Models Was Not Performed
– Standards In Place At That Time Did Not Require This Level of Assurance
• Integrity Monitoring Algorithms Were Not Designed To Support This Type Of Analysis
• In Response– WAAS Program Office Formed WAAS Integrity Performance Panel (WIPP)– FAA Administrator Requested Independent Review Board (IRB)
• WIPP Activities Were Integrated With System Engineering and Development Activities
Federal AviationAdministration
10Certification of the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS)21 June 2005
Summary
• Complex Architecture Requires Detailed Process and Documentation for Capturing and Assuring WAAS Safety
• FAA efforts to involve many stakeholders was crucial in resolving the integrity risk
• Future Changes to WAAS must undergo the same safety assessment activities to ensure continued system safety