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Presented by:Robert M. Szozda
Uranium – 233 Disposition ProjectDesign Integration
Work PerformedUnder DOE Contract No. DE-AC05-04OR228600
Isotek Systems, LLC Includes:
DuratekNuclear Fuel
ServicesBurns and Roe
DOE Project Management
Nuclear Facility Operations
Waste Management
Facility Shutdown
Uranium and Special Nuclear Materials Processing
Commercial Nuclear Facility Operations
Safeguards and Security
Facility and Equipment Design
Engineering, Procurement & Construction Management
Problem
Uranium, including highly enriched uranium and 233U stored in a Manhattan Project vintage facility.
Uranium, including highly enriched uranium and 233U stored in a Manhattan Project vintage facility.
Continued 233U storage in Building 3019A at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory represents a significant liability to the Department of Energy
Continued 233U storage in Building 3019A at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory represents a significant liability to the Department of Energy
Situation
Solution: Department of Energy Initiated the U-233 Project to:
Eliminate the costs associated with storage of fissile material, criticality controls, and security
Eliminate the costs associated with storage of fissile material, criticality controls, and security
Reduce long-term facility operating cost and prepare the material for safe low-cost long-term storage
Reduce long-term facility operating cost and prepare the material for safe low-cost long-term storage
Provide medical isotopes for cancer research and treatment
Provide medical isotopes for cancer research and treatment
U-233 Project Work Phases
Work is divided Into three distinct phases
Design
AuthorizationBasis
Safeguards& Security
Operational Readiness
Review
233U Processing
Blenddown
Staging
SafeShutdown
Phase 1
Bldg 3019OperationsTransition
Ongoing S&M
Building 3019 Modifications
Phase 2
Phase 3
3 yrs5.5 yrs
6 mo
Disposition at WIPP/NTS
A Short History of the Building 3019 Complex
National Repository for 233U since 1962
National Repository for 233U since 1962
Pilot plant for numerous chemical recovery processes
Pilot plant for numerous chemical recovery processesOriginally constructed
to separate Plutonium from Graphite Reactor spent fuel
Originally constructed to separate Plutonium from Graphite Reactor spent fuel Chemical explosion in 1950s
spread Pu, some of which is now fixed in place by coating
Chemical explosion in 1950s spread Pu, some of which is now fixed in place by coating
A Short History of 233U
Released from DOE Defense Programs inventory as excessReleased from DOE Defense Programs inventory as excess
Made by neutron irradiation of natural thorium (Th-232) – possible alternative to enrichmentMade by neutron irradiation of natural thorium (Th-232) – possible alternative to enrichment
Characteristics of 233U Present Design Challenges
Dose: 1 ml sample is 2-4 R/hr at 1 cm, some canisters 300 R/hr due to 232U daughter 208Tl, that emits a 2.6 MeV gamma-ray
Dose: 1 ml sample is 2-4 R/hr at 1 cm, some canisters 300 R/hr due to 232U daughter 208Tl, that emits a 2.6 MeV gamma-ray
Physical properties require heavily shielded hot cells with extensive contamination, radiation, criticality, and security controls
Critical Mass (Relative)Critical Mass (Relative)
235U 233U/239Pu
Specific Activity (9.6 x 10-3 Ci/g)Specific Activity (9.6 x 10-3 Ci/g)
10-6
10-4
10-2
100
235U
233U
239Pu
Material form include oxide powder, oxide monolith, metal, and fluoride salts
Material form include oxide powder, oxide monolith, metal, and fluoride salts
The monolith represents more than 2/3 of the material and contains about 19% cadmium and 3% gadolinium.
The monolith represents more than 2/3 of the material and contains about 19% cadmium and 3% gadolinium.
Organic materials are not expected; if present will be removed during pre-treatment.
Organic materials are not expected; if present will be removed during pre-treatment.
Current packaging: double containment, stainless steel, aluminum, welded/bolted, glass, plastic, vermiculite.
Current packaging: double containment, stainless steel, aluminum, welded/bolted, glass, plastic, vermiculite.
Characteristics of 233Uin Building 3019A
Some Representative Canister Types
Summary of 233U Downblending & Dispositioning
In-process Storage
Inner Container
Crush
Dissolution
Package Retrieval1 at a time
Un-package& Inspect
Empty
container
Measure BurialPackage Sortingin Tube Vaults
Pre-treatment
Calcine
233UDepleted Uranyl nitrate
Enrichment Down Blending
Interim Storage
ShieldedOverpack
Denitration
NOx Scrubber
233U
238UUranyl Nitrate
Uranyl Nitrate
Uranyl Nitrate
Less than 1% fissile
UO3Concentrator
Package for Transport to WIPP and to NTS
Accountability
Controls are Part of theDesign Basis
Shielding designed for < 0.5 mR/hr for occupied work areas
Shielding designed for < 0.5 mR/hr for occupied work areas
Pipes and tanks limited to 4 inches in diameter
Pipes and tanks limited to 4 inches in diameter
Slab tanks or sumps limited to 1 inch depth
Slab tanks or sumps limited to 1 inch depth
R/hrmR/hr
Major Capabilities Added toBuilding 3019A Include
New shielded hot cell with manipulators for canister opening, pretreatment, and dissolution
Adding equipment to existing shielded cell for NMC&A measurement, and downblending
New shielded hot cell with manipulators for canister opening, pretreatment, and dissolution
Adding equipment to existing shielded cell for NMC&A measurement, and downblending
Major Capabilities Added toBuilding 3019A (cont.)
Adding equipment for denitration and product packaging
Installing new analytical labs, shielded glove boxes and a process off-gas scrubber
Adding equipment for denitration and product packaging
Installing new analytical labs, shielded glove boxes and a process off-gas scrubber
Key Technical Issues Addressedin Design Phase
• Dissolution rate
• Denitration technology
• Radon hold-up in off-gas systems
• Product packaging
• Security prior to and during processing
• Dissolution rate
• Denitration technology
• Radon hold-up in off-gas systems
• Product packaging
• Security prior to and during processing
Downblending Process
Depleted Uranium
Approximately 210 MTU needed for testing and processing:
2 MTU in 201126 MTU per quarter beginning in 2012
Approximately 210 MTU needed for testing and processing:
2 MTU in 201126 MTU per quarter beginning in 2012
The DU must meet transportation regulations.The DU must meet NFS license conditions relative to fission product and transuranic attributes in incoming material: Less than 0.25 millicuries of fission products per gram of uranium Less than 10E-6 grams of plutonium per gram of uranium Less than 1.5E-5 grams of transuranic materials (including plutonium) per gram of uraniumThe DU must exhibit less than 0.1% insolubles when dissolved in nitric acid.
The DU must meet transportation regulations.The DU must meet NFS license conditions relative to fission product and transuranic attributes in incoming material: Less than 0.25 millicuries of fission products per gram of uranium Less than 10E-6 grams of plutonium per gram of uranium Less than 1.5E-5 grams of transuranic materials (including plutonium) per gram of uraniumThe DU must exhibit less than 0.1% insolubles when dissolved in nitric acid.
ESH&Q Integrated fully into project designESH&Q Integrated fully into project design
ESH&Q Status
Safety AnalysisNuclear Criticality
Safety
Training
Emergency Preparedness
Quality Assurance
Waste Management
Environmental Protection
Occupational Safety & Health
Radiological Control
“The IA Team concluded that Isotek is ready to assume operation and management activities for Building 3019 Complex contingent on completion of the M2 List of open items and resolution of the two IA pre-mobilization findings.”
“The IA Team concluded that Isotek is ready to assume operation and management activities for Building 3019 Complex contingent on completion of the M2 List of open items and resolution of the two IA pre-mobilization findings.”
Proficiencies included: “it was obvious that integrated organization was working well” “Isotek management’s approach, communication, and attitude are exemplary”
Proficiencies included: “it was obvious that integrated organization was working well” “Isotek management’s approach, communication, and attitude are exemplary”
Independent Assessment (IA)
“. . . I have reviewed the evidence of completion for these M2 items and found it complete. . . This concludes actions by the IA Team.”
Julie Wallen, IA Team Designee
“. . . I have reviewed the evidence of completion for these M2 items and found it complete. . . This concludes actions by the IA Team.”
Julie Wallen, IA Team Designee
Integrated Safety Design
Implemented the 10 CFR 830 requirements for integration of safety basis with the design and operation of the modifications to the existing facility following ISMS:
First integrated design meeting in December 2003 Major integrated design meetings about every 60 days UT-Battelle personnel for facility knowledge and experience NFS personnel for process design and operations experience BREI personnel for nuclear facility upgrade experience Merrick personnel for hot cell design experience Designated Operations Manager with nuclear facility upgrade
experience Supporting safety staff with DOE facility safety and operations
experience
Design concepts reviewed for technical feasibility of meeting both defined DOE safety requirements and safety requirements resulting from safety analysis of the modifications following ISMS Core Functions.
Implemented the 10 CFR 830 requirements for integration of safety basis with the design and operation of the modifications to the existing facility following ISMS:
First integrated design meeting in December 2003 Major integrated design meetings about every 60 days UT-Battelle personnel for facility knowledge and experience NFS personnel for process design and operations experience BREI personnel for nuclear facility upgrade experience Merrick personnel for hot cell design experience Designated Operations Manager with nuclear facility upgrade
experience Supporting safety staff with DOE facility safety and operations
experience
Design concepts reviewed for technical feasibility of meeting both defined DOE safety requirements and safety requirements resulting from safety analysis of the modifications following ISMS Core Functions.
Defined Design Requirements
ESH Design Expectations provided to all personnel from December 2003 to about August 2004
Early definition of hazardous chemical design expectations including Waste Acceptance Criteria
Established a Work Smart Standards Set
10 CFR 830 requirements
DOE O 420.1A design for nuclear safety, fire protection, nuclear criticality prevention, and natural phenomena resistance
DOE G 420.1-1 for nuclear safety defined design requirements
Early definition of fire protection requirements from DOE-STD-1066
Early independent review of DOE O 420.1A nuclear criticality design requirements with DOE criticality safety branch
Integrated defined design requirements from DOE G 420.1-2 for natural phenomena hazard mitigation, using DOE-STD-1020
ESH Design Expectations provided to all personnel from December 2003 to about August 2004
Early definition of hazardous chemical design expectations including Waste Acceptance Criteria
Established a Work Smart Standards Set
10 CFR 830 requirements
DOE O 420.1A design for nuclear safety, fire protection, nuclear criticality prevention, and natural phenomena resistance
DOE G 420.1-1 for nuclear safety defined design requirements
Early definition of fire protection requirements from DOE-STD-1066
Early independent review of DOE O 420.1A nuclear criticality design requirements with DOE criticality safety branch
Integrated defined design requirements from DOE G 420.1-2 for natural phenomena hazard mitigation, using DOE-STD-1020
Operations Design Input
Essential that Operations is Integrated Early in Design
System Owner and Operator Ensures appropriate integration between
various support organizations
Safety Analysis
Nuclear Criticality Safety
Environmental Safety & Health
Radiation Protection
Essential that Operations is Integrated Early in Design
System Owner and Operator Ensures appropriate integration between
various support organizations
Safety Analysis
Nuclear Criticality Safety
Environmental Safety & Health
Radiation Protection
Operations Design Input
Essential For Design Team to Understand the Hazards and Required Controls
High Rad Levels – Dose Mapping needs to be Completed at the Conceptual Stage
Involve Operations and Maintenance Staff in the Design Hot Cell Technicians
Manipulator Repair Personnel
Single Point Failure
Remote Work – Mock Up as Much as Possible even the Simple Activities
Operations Design Input
Experience Pays High Dividends Site Specific Experience – ORNL, Y-12, LANL,….
DOE Department Experience – EM, NE, NNSA, ..
Isotope Specific Experience – U-233
Chemical Processing Experience – Uranium Processing – NFS
Remote Operations
The more Unique the System, The Higher the Return on Experience
Complete Job Hazard Analysis as early as possible
Experience Pays High Dividends Site Specific Experience – ORNL, Y-12, LANL,….
DOE Department Experience – EM, NE, NNSA, ..
Isotope Specific Experience – U-233
Chemical Processing Experience – Uranium Processing – NFS
Remote Operations
The more Unique the System, The Higher the Return on Experience
Complete Job Hazard Analysis as early as possible
Lessons Learned
Communication, Communication, Communication Site visits ~ 1 day of pay
Integrate Design at the Conceptual Stage Denitration
Strong ES&H is necessary for Complex Systems Establish Design Basis Early
Evolves with Design
Establish Operations interface for all disciplines and systems System Engineers Operations Supervisors Technical Support Personnel
Communication, Communication, Communication Site visits ~ 1 day of pay
Integrate Design at the Conceptual Stage Denitration
Strong ES&H is necessary for Complex Systems Establish Design Basis Early
Evolves with Design
Establish Operations interface for all disciplines and systems System Engineers Operations Supervisors Technical Support Personnel
Lessons Learned
Multiple Design Firms – Establish a Single Design Process
Work Closely with Your Customer Early Design – Be Conservative
Involve All Disciplines (Rad Protection, Crit. Safety, Env., ES&H, …)
Reveal All – All Things Are Discovered – Just a Matter of When
Make Progress on Big Issues Early
Stay Informed – Rules, Expectation, Approach, Regulation Changes Daily
Multiple Design Firms – Establish a Single Design Process
Work Closely with Your Customer Early Design – Be Conservative
Involve All Disciplines (Rad Protection, Crit. Safety, Env., ES&H, …)
Reveal All – All Things Are Discovered – Just a Matter of When
Make Progress on Big Issues Early
Stay Informed – Rules, Expectation, Approach, Regulation Changes Daily