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Presented at:
The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration
Moscow, Russian Federation
December 2013
Demography, “The Deal”, and the Rise of Equity Politics in Israel’s Democracy
Richard Cincotta
Wilson Center Global Fellow
Demographer-in-residenceThe Stimson Center
1.Special Case (1) for Political Demography: Liberal democracy where the secular majority has passed through the demographic transition, and where two minorities that are antagonistic to the state as it is currently institutionalized, have not.
2.Special Case (2) for Political Demography: A minority that was organized to counter secularization and fertility decline (ultra-Orthodox); a minority organized to perpetuate settlement (religious orthodox settlers).
Objective: To reasonably forecast some aspect of future elections based upon minority demographic trends, and majority public and political response to those trends.
ISRAEL
Projections: Cincotta & Kaufmann, 2010
Projected changes in the composition of Israel’s age structure, 2005 to 2030.
Shifting composition in a relatively stable age structure
Ethno-religious demographic trends
Data: Paltiel et al. 2012 (Israeli Bureau of Statistics)
Figure: Cincotta, 2013
Votes
Arab-led parties
Ultra-Orthodox-led parties
Other parties
Pop
ulat
ion
(x1
,00
0)
Ultra-Orthodox
Sources: Paltiel et al., Central Bureau of Statistics (Israel), 2012; Election Commission (of Israel), 2013
1999 2003 2006
2013 2009
Source: Election Commission (of Israel), 2013
Fringe parties
Left, Center, Right
Coalitions
Trends in Knesset seats
Source: Election Commission (of Israel), 2013
UTJ
Arab-led
Shas
Source: Election Commission (of Israel), 2013
Election
Votes (1000s) and MKs
ultra-Orthodox-led and Arab-led parties
Votes (1000s) and MKs remaining parties
Year
Kne
sset
Shas UTJ Arab-
led Left Center Right Total
Left plus
Center
Right plus
Center
1999 15 430.7
[17]
125.7
[5]
267.9
[10]
924.0
[36]
569.2
[20]
794.7
[32]
2288.0
[88]
1493.2
[56]
1364.0
[52]
2003 16 258.9
[11]
135.1
[5]
230.7
[8]
619.3
[25]
473.3
[18]
1299.3
[53]
2392.0
[96]
1092.6
[43]
1772.7
[71*]
2006 17 399.1
[12]
147.1
[6]
252.9
[10]
590.7
[24]
876.7
[36]
788.0
[32]
2255.3
[92]
1467.3
[60]
1664.6
[68*]
2009 18 285.3
[11]
148.0
[5]
314.8
[11]
434.5
[16]
758.0
[28]
1333.0
[49]
2525.5
[93]
1192.5
[44]
2091.0
[77*]
2013 19 331.9
[11]
195.9
[7]
348.9
[11]
604.5
[21]
811.7
[27]
1231.0
[43]
2647.3
[91]
1416.2
[48]
2042.7
[70*]
Election Outcomes: Votes & Knesset seats, 15th to 19th Knessets
Source: Election Commission (of Israel), 2013Figure: Cincotta, 2013
Conclusions:
1. Ultra-Orthodox parties (or Arab-led parties) are unlikely coalition partners in post-election governments for the foreseeable future.
2. Coalitions of rightist and centrist parties are the most likely outcomes of Israeli elections for the foreseeable future. Unification governments are less likely possibilities.
3. The possibility of center-vs-right reformist rivalries looms on the horizon. While reformists are unified on issues of minority-relevant reforms, divisions exist over Israeli-Palestinian territorial questions.
Unsettled Demographic Issues:
1. Continued high fertility among minorities: Ultra-Orthodox, Israeli Arabs (particularly Bedouin), and West Bank settlers.
2. Institutional reinforcements of differentiation: Four educational systems, deferments from conscription (reforms occurring), state support for yeshiva and stipends for students, exclusion from national service (Muslim and Christian Arabs), absence of secular family law (marriages, divorces).
3. Residential segregation. Perhaps the most powerful impediment to “demographic integration”, is unlikely to be altered.
Projections: Cincotta & Kaufmann, 2010
Are standard methods of projecting the aggregate population appropriate for states with significant ethno-religious fertility differentials? [No, of course]
Shifting composition in a relatively stable age structure
