Presentation "Institutional Power, Collective Acceptance and Recognition"

Institutional Power, Collective Acceptance and Recognition

Institutional Power, Collective Acceptance

and Recognition

Titus Stahl

Goethe-Universitat, Frankfurt a. M., GermanyMacquarie University, Sydney, Australia

Collective Intentionality VI: Social ChangeJuly 11-14, 2008

University of California at Berkeley

Titus Stahl Goethe-Universitat Frankfurt


Power in social institutions

Powera capacity to do things

Social powerthe capacity to influence other people’s actions

Institutional powercapacity of a person to influence other people’s actionsthis capacity being created by a system of rules in virtueof the fact that this system of rules entitles a person toissue demands upon the actions of others and that it iscollectively accepted by others
















Dispersed institutional powercapability not bound to persons or specific statuspositions(e.g. language)

Institutional power in a narrow sensecapability bound to persons by virtue of them occupyingdifferential status positions accorded by institutional rules(e.g. political power)




Dispersed institutional powercapability not bound to persons or specific statuspositions(e.g. language)

Institutional power in a narrow sensecapability bound to persons by virtue of them occupyingdifferential status positions accorded by institutional rules(e.g. political power)



Constitutive and non-constitutive power

“Intra-institutional” powerpower in an institution accorded by institutional rules

Constitutive powerpower to change or challenge existing rules, to introducenew rules and statuses



Constitutive and non-constitutive power

“Intra-institutional” powerpower in an institution accorded by institutional rules

Constitutive powerpower to change or challenge existing rules, to introducenew rules and statuses



Three constraints on a pragmatic analysis

A plausible account of institutional power must

conceive of institutional power as a capacity

be able to account for the difference between institutionalpower and coercion

be able to account for the difference between(intra-)institutional power and constitutive institutionalpower

















Obedience and intentional states are not

constitutive of power relations

Obedience is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existenceof institutional power.(Hart’s argument)

The existence of specific beliefs, intentions or mental states isneither necessary nor sufficient as well.(relational character of power, non-intentional acceptance,inconsistency between intentions and behavior)



Obedience and intentional states are not

constitutive of power relations

Obedience is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existenceof institutional power.(Hart’s argument)

The existence of specific beliefs, intentions or mental states isneither necessary nor sufficient as well.(relational character of power, non-intentional acceptance,inconsistency between intentions and behavior)



A more plausible model

Intuition: Either conforming to one’s obligations to someoneor accepting accountability for failing to do so.

An intuitive analysis:A accepts B as having a specific institutional status connectedwith specific entitlements which give rise to obligations of A,if and only if

A either accepts being accountable for failing to fulfill herobligations or

A fulfills these obligations but would acceptaccountability if she had failed to fulfill them.



A more plausible model

Intuition: Either conforming to one’s obligations to someoneor accepting accountability for failing to do so.

An intuitive analysis:A accepts B as having a specific institutional status connectedwith specific entitlements which give rise to obligations of A,if and only if

A either accepts being accountable for failing to fulfill herobligations or

A fulfills these obligations but would acceptaccountability if she had failed to fulfill them.



Acceptance of one’s being accountable I

A sanctioning account:An agent A has certain institutional powers, that is, powersstemming from her status position in an institution in practiceover a set of persons B1...Bn to the extent that these personsgenerally and in most cases accept (sanctioning) evaluations oftheir behavior in regard to the legitimate demands that A putson them.

The pragmatic meaning of “acceptance”:The absence of a serious contestation to the sanction.



Acceptance of one’s being accountable I

A sanctioning account:An agent A has certain institutional powers, that is, powersstemming from her status position in an institution in practiceover a set of persons B1...Bn to the extent that these personsgenerally and in most cases accept (sanctioning) evaluations oftheir behavior in regard to the legitimate demands that A putson them.

The pragmatic meaning of “acceptance”:The absence of a serious contestation to the sanction.



Acceptance of sanctioning authority

An agent A accepts an agent B as being entitled tosanction performances according to a specific rule R in aspecific context C, if and only if

in all cases in which (1) a performance P of A violates R,(2) P happens in context C and (3) P is sanctioned by B,

A either does not contest this sanction at all or only putsit into question.

If the entitlement of B to sanction A’s performances of aspecific type in context C is habitually either not contested atall or only put into question by A, we say that A grants B astandard authority to sanction.



(Individual) acceptance of institutional authority

(Individual) acceptance of institutional authority:

An agent A (individually) accepts the institutional authorityof an agent B if A accepts B and/or other agents as beingentitled to sanction A’s performances according to a rule Rwhich grants B a status entailing the entitlement to issuedemands on A’s behavior in a specific context C.



Excursus: Authority distributions

Institutional power relations

asymmetric power relation: A has power of a specifictype, but B has no power of the same type over A

symmetric power relation: A and B have power of thesame type over each other

Power distributions in groups: Some cases

monopolization: A has power over everyone else,everyone else has no power at all over A

symmetry: Each agent has power over all other agentsat least in regard to one type of power

egalitarian symmetry: Each agent has power over allother agents in regard to the same type of power



Excursus: Authority distributions

Institutional power relations

asymmetric power relation: A has power of a specifictype, but B has no power of the same type over A

symmetric power relation: A and B have power of thesame type over each other

Power distributions in groups: Some cases

monopolization: A has power over everyone else,everyone else has no power at all over A

symmetry: Each agent has power over all other agentsat least in regard to one type of power

egalitarian symmetry: Each agent has power over allother agents in regard to the same type of power



The case for collective acceptance

Collective acceptance is a requirement shared byimportant theories of institutions

Reason 1: Collective acceptance is necessary to explainobligating character

Reason 2: Collective acceptance is necessary to accountfor shared rule-following

But what are the pragmatic features of collective acceptance?



The case for collective acceptance

Collective acceptance is a requirement shared byimportant theories of institutions

Reason 1: Collective acceptance is necessary to explainobligating character

Reason 2: Collective acceptance is necessary to accountfor shared rule-following

But what are the pragmatic features of collective acceptance?



The case for “recognition” I

Starting from Gilbert’s account of collective acceptance 1

Pragmatic significance of collective acceptance: Justifiesmutual criticism (“rebukes”)

Collective acceptance is realized by a social arrangementwhere agents accept each other as entitled to evaluateeach other’s actions

1Margaret Gilbert. Modelling collective belief. Synthese, 73(1):185–204, Oct 1987.



The case for “recognition” II

Collective acceptance can be described as mutualattribution of institutional power (“Every other memberin the community counts as someone who is entitled toevaluate my behavior in a specific context in relation toinstitutional rule R”)

Authority ascription is mutual and symmetric



The case for “recognition” III

If interpretation of institutional rule is understood to becollectively governed, authority ascription must also berecursive.Otherwise: collapse into individualist account.



The case for “recognition” IV

Recognition

Recognition is the readiness for symmetric and recursiveascription of authority between a number of agents in regardto a specific rule.



Institutional Power – final account

(Collectively Accepted) Institutional Power – final account

An agent A has institutional power over a set of personsB1...Bn

if and only if B1...Bn are part of a group in which the membersdisplay a constant readiness or disposition to grant each otherthe recursive and symmetric authority to evaluate each other’sbehavior in regard to a norm which prescribes B1...Bn toaccept accountability (that is, to accept sanctions andevaluations of their behavior) in regard to the normativeconsequences entailed by A’s institutional status.



Consequences

Consequences for study of power:

Power not to be measured as conformity

Socially shared attitudes towards normative behavior /sanctions

Study of discourses about power

Conception of institutional power provides an ideal type



Consequences

Consequences for study of power:

Power not to be measured as conformity

Socially shared attitudes towards normative behavior /sanctions

Study of discourses about power

Conception of institutional power provides an ideal type



[email protected]


Documents

Presentation "Institutional Power, Collective Acceptance and Recognition"