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P D 1997 Supreme Court 730
Present: Ajmal Mian, Saiduzzaman Siddiqui,
Muhammad Bashir Khan Jehangiri, Nasir Aslam Zahid
and Khalil-ur-Rehman Khan, JJ
ABDUL HAMEED and 23 others -Appellants
versus
MUHAMMAD MOHIYUDDIN SIDDIQUE RAJA and 3 others -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 1083 of 1995, decided on 16th June, 1997
(On appeal from the judgment of Lahore High Court Lahore dated 3-7-1995 passed in
Civil Revision No.2240 of 1990).
(a) Muhammadan Law---
----Gift---Leave to appeal was granted to consider as to whether under Islamic Law gift of
usufruct of immovable property was permissible---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 185(3).
(b) Muhammadan Law---
7-Gift -Leave to appeal was granted to consider as to whether a gift made by a person to his
issueless wife for life could be construed that it was a gift of immovable property, the condition
of usufruct being void.
(c) Muhammadan Law---
----Gift---Condition attached to gift---Effect---If the corpus of property is gifted then attaching of
any condition derogatory to the gift, i.e., transfer of absolute ownership to the donee is, treated as
void.
Principles of Mohemedan Law by Mullah, para. 164 ref.
(d) Muhammadan Law---
----Gift---Word ---Definition-- means "life grant" and not "life tenancy .--[Words and phrases].
(e) Muhammadan Law---
----Gift---Transfer of property through gift---Validity---Determination---Matter of such transfer
has to be decided in accordance with the Injunctions of Holy Qur'an and Sunnah of the Holy
Prophet.
(f) Muhammadan Law---
Gift---Nature---Determination of---Principles---If the words uttered indicate i.e. making the
other owner of the thing gifted, it will be a gift but if the words indicate making the donee owner
of the usufruct of the thing gifted, then that will be "Ariyat"---If, however, from the words used
both things can be construed in that case decision will base on the intention of the donor---In
each case the intention of the donor will have to be construed for determining the question
whether the gift of corpus of the property was intended to be made or it was only gift of usufruct
of the property.
(g) Muhammadan Law---
----- Gift---Nature---Umra gift---Validity---Intention of. donor---Determination of---Held, in
determining the intention, if the transaction was of the nature of "Umra", that will be a case of
transfer of property absolutely to the donee as the Holy Prophet had disapproved the "Umra" of
the period of Jahlia (pre-Islamic period), and of taking back the property gifted under "Umra"
grants---Whoever is conferred upon a life grant alongwith his descendants is entitled to make use
of the property conferred so long as he lives and his successors also enjoy said privilege---
Property becomes their de facto belonging and donor cannot after declaring Umra lay down any
condition or make any exception for he conferred a grant and as such it becomes heritage, and
right of inheritance abrogated his condition.
(h) Muhammadan Law--
----Gift---Condition attached to gift---Effect---Any condition attached, which is derogatory to the
absolute conveyance of the gifted property is to be treated invalid and thus stands nullified and is
rendered ineffective---If the intention, however, was to grant right of use and enjoyment of the
usufruct then the grant of property made by use of words that "it is for you as long as you will
live" the property will return to its owner after the death of the donees.
(i) Muhammadan Law---
----Gift---Gift of usufruct---Permissibility---Islam recognises, permits and sanctifies the gift of
usufruct.
([) Muhammadan Law---
---- Gift---Umra gift---Any derogatory condition sought to be attached on the Umra gift is void
and not recognised by Islam---Gift of property for life made by a person to any person, who may
be his issueless wife, where intention is to transfer and convey corpus of the property is to be
construed as an outright and absolute gift of property and any condition attached derogatory to
the transfer of corpus in that case would be void.
(k) Muhammadan Law
-..--Gift ---Umra gift---Statement made by donor before Revenue Authorities and Courts clearly
showed that it was the "land itself", the corpus of land which donor gifted in favour of his wife
though he added the condition "till life" therewith and not the mere enjoyment of usufruct
thereof---Such transaction of gift constituted complete gift of the land made by husband in
favour of wife--Disposition of land in question amounted to ' Umra' recognised as one of species
of gift of property under Muslim law.
(1) Muhammadan Law---
---- Gift---Umra gift---Gift of corpus of land---When the declaration of "Umra" is made, it is the
donee who becomes the possessor of the thing donated and it does not revert to the donor, unless
an explicit condition is laid down in regard to it---Words "for life" used clearly indicate that
donor intended to make "Umra" gift---Gift of the corpus of the land as such was complete and
absolute and the condition of "for life" sought to be attached was invalid and ineffective in
circumstances.
(m) Muhammadan Law---
----Gift---If the corpus is gifted and conditions are attached to it, the gift is treated as complete
and absolute for ever and conditions are held to be null and ,void.
(n) Muhammadan Law---
----Gift---Umra gift ---Umra gift is a complete gift and condition derogatory to the absoluteness
of the gift ,is invalid, and the property so gifted does not revert to the donor after the life of the
donee.
Principles of Mahomedan Law by Mulla, para. 164; Mst. Khan Bibi v. Mst. Safia Begum
and others PLD 1969 Lah. 338; Balugh-al-Maram, Hadith No.793 compiled by Al-Hafiz Ion
Hajar Al-Asqalani, published with English Translation by Dar-us-Salam Publications, Riyadh,
Saudi Arabia; Sahih Muslim by Abdul Hamid Siddiqi, Traditions Nos.3975, 3980, Chap.
DCXLV, Vo1.III, pp. 860 to 862; Vol. III, pp. 598 to 606, 607 to 609 by Manzo'or Ahsan
Abbasi, Vol. III, pp.344, 346, 347; Nawab Umjad Ally Khan v. Mst. Mohumdee Begum 1867
Mors. IA 517; Mst. Kaneez Bibi v. Sher Muhammad PLD 1991 SC 466; Fatawa Alamgiri by
Allama Maulana Syed Amir Ali, Vol. VII, pp.72-73; Farid v. Nur Bibi PLD 1970 Lab. 502;
Additional Settlement Commissioner (Land), Sargodha v. Muhammad Shafi and others PLD
1971 SC 791; The State v. Ziaur-Rehman and others PLD 1973 SC 49; Al-Jehad Trust through
Raeesul Mujahideen Habib-ul-Wahab-ul-Khairi and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others
PLD 1996 SC 324; Hedaya by Charles Hamilton, 1975 Edn., pp.488489; compiled by
Muhammad Bin Ali Bin Muhammad AI-Shokani, Vol. VI, pp. 16 to 18; Subul-us-Salam by
Muhammad bin Ismail As-Sanani a Commentary on Bulugh Al-Maram, Vo1.III, pp.91-92; Al-
Mughni by Abi Muhammad Abdullah bin Ahmad bin Muhammad bin Kadama, Vol. V, pp.686
to 692; by Allama Abubakar Alauddin Al-Kasani; Amjad Khan v. As raf Khan AIR 1925 Oudh
568; Amjad Khan v. Ashraf Khan and others AIR 1929 PC 149; Nawazish Ali Khan v. Ali Raza
Khan AIR 1948 PC 134; Fateh Muhammad v. Nathu 1982 CLC 2082; Mst. Bibi Alam Taj and
others v. Mst. Inayat Begum PLD 1963 Pesh. 199; Sar Anjam Khan v. Afzal Khan PLD 1972'
Pesh. 37 and Said Akbar and others v. Mst. Kakai PLD 1975 SC 377 ref.
Malik Muhammad Nawaz, Advocate instructed by Tanvir Ahmad Advocate-on-Record
(absent) for Appellants.
S.M. Zafar, Senior Advocate, S. Zahid Hussain, Advocate instructed by Khan Imtiaz
Muhammad Khan, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents Nos. l to 3.
Respondent No.4: Ex parte
Dates of hearing: 24th and 25th March, 1997
JUDGMENT
KHALIL-UR-REHMAN KHAN, J.--This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the
judgment dated 3-7-1995 of the Lahore .High Court, Lahore, whereby the revision petition of
the appellants was dismissed and thus the judgments of the learned Courts below dismissing
the suit of the appellants/plaintiffs for declaration to the effect that the one square of land
(described in the plaint) which was given to Mst. Karam Noor for life or till remarriage vide
Mutation No. 34 dated 15-3-1949 (wrongly described as 15-9-1949) is in their possession,
use and ownership as per their respective shares being legal heirs of Jatnal Din son of
Makhan Khan and that the defendant have no right to or concern with the said land except to
the extent of the share which Mst Karam Nor is entitled to taccive as a widow and so the right of
defendants extends to 1/8th share only; and the Mutation of Inheritance No.64 dated 15-1-
1987, appellate order of Assistant Commissioner, Gojra dated 18-3-1987 declaring Mst.
Karam Noor as exclusive owner of the said land and the entries incorporated in Revenue
Record after Jamabandi for the year 1949 are invalid and ineffective in law and are liable
to be cancelled; and for permanent mandatory injunction restraining the defendants Nos.l
to 3 to interfere in ownership and possession of the plaintiffs and in having the entries of
the Revenue Record corrected, were upheld.
2. Leave to appeal was granted on 15-11-1995 to consider the following question of
law:--
()) Whether under the Islamic, Law gift of usufruct of immovable property is
permissible?
' (ii) Whether a gift made by a person to his issueless wife for life could be construed that it
was a gift of immovable property, the condition of usufruct being void"?
3. The facts forming background of the controversy subject-matter of the appeal are
that Jatnal Dtri. predecessut-in-interest of the parties was owner of 1(5 squares of land; eight
square. in District Toba Tek Singh, and eight squares in the District of Khair Pur Sind1t. He
had three wives, namely Mst. Fateh Begum, Sardar Begum and Karam Noor. From Mst.
Fateh Begum, he had one son namely Abdul hztz while from Mst. Sardar Begum he had three
issues ttantely. Fazal-e-Hussain, Kataz Fatima and ivist. Aziz, Fatima. Mst. Karam Noor had
no issue,
4. On 25-6-1948, Jamal Dili appealed before the Patwari Halqa and reported to him three
transactions pertaining to his land on the basis of which Mutations. Nos.33, 34 and. 35 were
entered by the Patwari in the Mutation Register. the statements recorded in respect of each
transaction read as under:--
Mutation No.33 (in favour of Abdul Aziz):
Mutation No 34 (in favour of Mst. Karam Noor):
Mutation No 35 (in favour of Fazal-e-Hussain):
These three Mutations came up before the Revenue Officer on 4-7-1948 and the order
recorded on each of these Mutations reads as under:--
Mutation Nv.33:
Mutation No -34:
These mutations came up before the Revenue Officer on 15-3-1949 and were sanctioned by
recording the appropriate orders in each case. These orders read as under:--
Mutation No.33:
Mutation No.34:
Mutation No.35:
4. It is pertinent to note that Sardar Begum and Fateh Begum, the two other wives, had
already died when the land in dispute was got mutated in the name of Mst. Karam Noor. Jamal
Din died on 11-4-1949. Mst. Karam Noor died on 24-4-1985 and the plaintiffs were given their
Sharaee share in the land in dispute while the defendants Nos.l to 3 were given 1/8th share of the
land as heirs of Mst. Karam Noor widow. The defendants/respondents challenged the order of
mutation by filing an appeal before the Assistant Commissioner, Gojra who remanded the matter
to the Tehsildar and ultimately, vide Mutation No.674 dated 15-1-1987 the land in dispute was
mutated in favour of defendants Nos.l to 3, the heirs of Mst. Karam Noor treating her as
exclusive owner of the land in dispute. The appeal filed by the appellants was dismissed on 18-3-
1987 with the observations that the aggrieved party may approach the Civil Court. for.
declaration of their claimed right. This led to the filing of the suit for declaration and permanent
injunction by the plaintiffs/appellants for seeking declaration as indicated above. It may be added
here that Sultan Mahmood respondent No.4 who is son of Abdul Aziz did not join the plaintiffs
(his mother, brothers and sisters as well as heirs of Mst. Sardar Begum, the third wife of Jamal
Din) and as such he was arrayed as defendant No.4 in the array of defendants alongwith the
reversioners of Mst. Karam Noor, defendants Nos. l to 3. The suit was resisted by the defendants
by raising preliminary objections that the suit was barred by time; Civil Court had no jurisdiction
to try the suit which was otherwise not maintainable in its present form; the plaintiffs are
estopped to file this suit by their conduct and record; the suit was bad for non joinder of
necessary parties. It was also pleaded that Mst. Karam Noor was a full owner in her lifetime and
that the plaintiffs had been admitting her as such because Jamal Din had gifted away the land in
favour of Mst. Karam Noor and any condition on the gift is void.
5. The learned trial Court after framing the necessary issues and recording the evidence produced
by the parties dismissed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 21-5-1989 finding Issues Nos.6
and 9 in favour of the defendants and against the plaintiffs. These issues (Issues Nos.6 and 9) are
being reproduced as in the present context other issues are not relevant:--
Issue No. 6;
"Whether Mst. Karam Noor deceased was full owner of the land in dispute and the plaintiffs had
been admitting the status of deceased? If so, what is its effect on this suit? OPD. "
Issue No.9:
"Whether Mst. Karam Noor was limited owner and plaintiffs are entitled to get the suit land
as heir of last male owner jamal Din and Mutation No.674 sanctioned by order dated 15-1-1987
by Tehsildar and by order dated 18-3-1987 passed by A.C., Gojra and entries in the Revenue
record and Jamabandis after 1949 are illegal, void and liable to be set aside? OPP. "
6. -Documentary evidence which mainly consists of copies of the Revenue Record is of
importance. The oral evidence consists of the statements of Patwari produced by each of the
parties and the statements of one of the plaintiffs and the defendants. Learned trial Court held
under Issue No.9 that the nature of transfer of suit land in the name of Mst Karam Noor was a
"Tamleek" which undoubtedly is considered a gift under the Mahomedan Law, therefore, any
condition attached to such a Tamleeknama" is void and "Tamleek" is valid Learned District
Judge Toba Tek Singh dismissed the appeal vide judgment dated 4-6-1990 agreeing with the
view of the learned trial Court relying on
paragraph 164 of the Principles of Mahomedan Law by Mullah. It was also noted that entries in
Jamabandis from 1953-54 to 1981-81, Exhs.o.1, D.4, D.S. 13.6 and D.7 indicate that Mst. Karam
Noor was full owner. The plea of the appellants appearing in the statement of Muhammad Ashraf
P.W.2, that Karam Noor had distributed the disputed land amongst the legal heirs of Jamal Din,
during her lifetime and they were in cultivating possession, in view of the above entries, it was
observed, is not believable, The judgment of the first appellate Court was then assailed by filing
Revision Petition in the High Court and the same was also dismissed by a learned Single Judge
of the Lahore High Court vide judgment dated 3-7-1995 by recording the conclusion that Jwnal
Din made transfer of corpus of property in dispute to Mst Karam Noor and that he (Jamal Din)
made gift of the corpus of property and not gift of its usufruct. Learned Judge, after noting the
precedents, which will be noticed Thereunder, was of the view that the gift made was valid and
condition embodied in Mutation was null and void.
7. Malik Muhammad Nawaz, Advocate,, learned counsel for the appellants contended that
Muslim Law contemplates gift of corpus as well as of usufruct of property and answer to the
question, whether in a given case gift is of corpus of property or of usufruct of the property, is to
be found by ascertaining the intention of the donor from the document of gift or the statement
made, if any, or the circumstances surrounding the grant of the property. He, however, conceded
that the principle is well-established that if the corpus of property is gifted then attaching of any
condition derogatory to the gift i.e. transfer of absolute ownership to the donee, is treated as void.
He referred to paragraph 164 of Mahomedan Law by Sir D.F: Mulla wherein this principle of
Muslim Law is stated as under:--
"Gift with a condition.--When a gift is made subject to a condition which derogates from the
completeness of the grant, the condition is void, and the gift will take effect as if no conditions
were attached to it.
Learned counsel contended that the statements of Jamal Din (donor) contained in the report of
the Patwari dated 25th June, 1948 and the proceedings of Revenue Officer dated 4-7-1948 show
that land in dispute was given to Mst. Karam Noor for maintenance during her life only and this
intention to gift usufruct of the land and not the land itself is manifest. He added that the donor
used the words given for life i.e., "till she lives" in the first statement, and in the second
statement before Revenue Officer he (Jamal Din, the donor) made intention explicit by adding
the .word maintenance. According to him, these words are not used by a donor whose intention
is to gift corpus of the property.
8. Learned counsel, on the above premises argued that the judgments referred to by the learned
Judge in the impugned judgment are distinguishable and that the wrong approach has led to the
recording of wrong conclusion. He relied on the case of Mst. Khan Bibi (PLD 1969 Lah. 338)
and stated that the ratio of this precedent fully applies to the instant case. According to him, the
principles of Muslim Law on the question of Hiba and Ariat have been fully and lucidly stated in
this judgment. He also referred to the Tradition (Hadith No.793) quoted in Bulugh-al-Maram
compiled by Al-Hafiz Ibn Hajar AI-Asqalani, published with English Translation by Dar-us-
Salam Publications, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Hadith 793 reads:--
Translation
"Narrated Jabir Allah's Messenger (PBUH) said, 'What is given in life-tenancy belongs to the
one to whom it is given' (Agreed upon).
Muslim has: 'Keep your properties for yourselves and do not squander them, for it anyone
gives a life-tenancy it goes to the one to whom it is given, both during his life and after his death,
and to his descendants.
A version has: 'The life-tenancy which Allah's Messenger ( PBUH ) allowed was only
that in which one says, ' It is for you and your descendants' When he says, 'It is yours as long as
you live', it returns to its owner.
Abu Da'ud and An-Nasa'i have: 'Do not give property to go to the survivor and do not
give life-tenancy, for if anyone is given either, the property goes to his heirs. "
It may be pointed out that the word has been translated as 'life-tenancy' in the English
version by the translator which is misleading, as means 'life grant'. This word is so translated in
the English version of 'Sahih Muslim', by Abdul Hamid Siddiqi. The definition of "(£ I " given
by the jurist-consults also supports the translation of " CS3-6-IJ f " in paras. below, as 'life grant'.
Likewise, the translation of the words 'a version has', as well as 'life tenancy' used while
translating the tradition (Hadith) is misleading and does not depict the true meaning. The prefix
'a version has' is misleading as if there is another version of the same Hadith (Tradition) quoted
above. These traditions have . been quoted as Traditions Nos.3975 and 3980 in Sahih Muslim in
Chapter DCXLV 'Al-Umra (Life Grant)' to Volume III (translation by Abdul Hamid Siddiqi).
Learned counsel also relied on the comments contained in the Book Volume III at pages
598 to 606 in Chapter "Kitab-ul-Aiiat" and at pages 607 to 609 to Chapter 'Kitab-ul-Hiba', to
point out the distinction between Hiba Umra and Ariat He also referred to Urdu translation by
Manzoor Ahsan Abbasi of Volume III, pages 344, 346 and 347 for discussion on the concept of
Ariat. The concept of 'Umra' has been discussed at page-394 as under:--
'Riqba' has also been defined at the same page as under:--
10. Mr. S.M. Zafar, Senior Advocate, learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand
argued that instant case is a case of transfer of corpus of property and the words are to be
treated according to the well established principles of Shariah to be ineffective and void as any
condition sought to be attached by the donor which is derogatory to the passing of the exclusive
ownership in the donee is treated as void. The gift made remains valid and the condition is
ignored. Learned counsel relied on the cases relied upon by the learned Judge in the impugned
judgment particularly, the Privy Council case Nawab Umjad Ally Khan v. Mst. Mohumdee
Begum (1867 Moors. IA 517) and the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Mst.
Kaneez Bibi (PLD 1991 SC 466). He pointed out that in this case as well, a reference to the
mutation No-34 shows that Mb. Karam Noor was recorded as owner in Column of ownership in
substitution of Jamal Din donor recorded in column No.3. The new situation so obtaining and
the transfer of possession so admitted by producing Mst. Karam Noor the donee, coupled with
the use of word " would show that the conveyance of the land described in the statement was
absolute transfer of the corpus of the land and not a mere permission to receive usufruct of the
land for or during life. He added that the words before the words cannot be construed to mean
"Ariyat". According to him, this was gift and as such the words are to. be ignored as ineffective
in law. He added that even if Jamal Din donor intended to allow a life grant then according to
the Traditions of the Holy Prophet (p.b.u.h.) and the instance/decision quoted at page 345 of the
judgment of Lahore High Court in the case of Mst. Khan Bibi (supra), the condition has to be
treated as invalid and the "Hiba" is to be treated "Umra" ailo on the death of the donee the
property is to pass on to the descendent of the donee ants is nut to revert to the 'descendants of
the donor. Learned counsel for the respondents argued that in this view of the matter, no
justifiable exception can be taken to the concurrent judgments of the three learned Courts below.
. 11. Learned counsel for the respondents also referred to the comments appearing on pages 72
and 73 of the "Fatawa Alamgiri" Volume VII which is translated by Allama Maulana Syed Amir
Ali. It read as under:--
Learned counsel also referred to paragraph 5 of the judgment in the case -of Mst. Khan Bibi
(supra), wherein difference in the concept of gift and Ariat has been highlighted.
12. We have given serious consideration to the contentions urged by the learned counsel for
the parties and have gone through the case-law on the subject. In view of the observations of this
Court recorded in the case of Mst. Kaneez Bibi (PLD 1991 SC 466) as to the view taken by him,
(Mr. Justice Muhammad Afzal Zullah) in the case of Farid (PLD 1970 Lahore 502) it appears
appropriate to notice the main features of the new constitutional dispensation referred to in the
said judgment. It will be recalled that soon after independence of the country, the West Punjab
Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1948 (Punjab Act IX of 1948) was enforced on
15th March, 1948. The rule of Custom or usage in all questions regarding succession, special
property of females and gifts etc. was done away with and even in respect of immovable
property held by a Muslim female as a limited owner under the Customary Law, it was provided
that succession shall be deemed to open out on the termination of her limited interest to all
persons who would have been entitled to inherit the property at the time of the death of the last
full owner had the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) been applicable at the time of such death. This
law was then amended from time to time and then Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application
Act, 1962 terminated all limited estates under the Customary Law. The limited estates of females
under Customary Law contains concept different and distinct from the life-grant (Umra) or grant
of usufruct envisaged in Muslim Law. For understanding the concepts of widows' estate under
Custom, reference may be made to Additional Settlement Commissioner (Land), Sargodha v.
Muhammad Shafi and others (PLD 1971 SC 791) wherein Mr. Justice Hamoodur Rehman, the
then Chief Justice, very lucidly described the position of widow's estate under Custom which
was analogous in nature to a widow's estate under Hindu Law according to which she notionally
represents her husband as if her deceased husband is, for the purposes of the management and
user of his properties, kept alive in her, and it is for this reason that it is said that during the time
the widow if alive or does not remarry, the whole estate of her husband vests in her absolutely as
if the husband is for all intents and purposes alive in her and at her death the estate reverts to the
heirs of the last male owner and she never becomes a fresh stock of descent.
13. It will further be recalled that Objectives Resolution was passed by the constituent assembly
in 1949, wherein. the ideals to be achieved by the nation were declared. The Objectives
Resolution formed Preamble of every Constitution of Pakistan adopted and enacted from time to
time. This Court in the State v. Zia-ur-Rahman and others (PLD 1973 S.C. 49) with reference to
the Objectives Resolution declared that the "Objectives Resolution of 1949, even though it is a
document which has been generally accepted-and has never been repealed/renounced, will not
have the same status or authority as the Constitution itself until it is incorporated within it or
made part of it". The Objectives Resolution was then made substantive part of the Constitution
of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 by adding Article 2A. The Objectives Resolution thus
became substantive part of the Constitution and the effect of the same was noted in the Al-Jehad
Trust through Raeesul Mujahideen Habib-ulWahab-ul-Khairi and others v. Federation of
Pakistan and others (PLD 1996 SC 24) by making the following observations by the Honourable
Chief Justice, Sajjad Ali Shah:--
"As stated in the short order, if we look at the Constitution of 1973, we find that the title is "The
Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan" and Article 2 thereof commands that Islam is to be
its State religion. Preamble to the Constitution says that the principles of democracy, freedom,
equality, tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam shall be fully observed and
independence of judiciary fully secured. Objectives resolution as reproduced in the Preamble has
been made a substantive part of the Constitution by Article 2A inserted by P.O No. 14 of 1985.
Part IX of the Constitution contains Islamic provisions in which Article 227 envisages that all
existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the
Holy Qur'an and Sunnah."
Manzoor Hussain Sial, J. observed as under:--
"At this juncture, I may point out that the principles and provisions set out in the Objectives
Resolution now form substantive part of the Constitution, wherein it is categorically provided
that independence of Judiciary shall be 'fully secure as also Article 227 of the Constitution
mandates that all existing laws are shall be brought in conformity with the Injunctions of Islam
as laid down in the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah'. Ajmal Mian, J., further observed at page 478 that
principles of Islamic Jurisprudence will have to be invoked while: construing the provisions of
Constitution. It is, therefore, the necessity that these very principles are invoked in the
construction of the Laws and the instruments. Article 227 of the Constitution further provides
that all existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in
the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah, and no law shall be enacted which is repugnant to the Injunctions
of Islam.
14. Reference at this stage may also lie made to the "Enforcement of Shariah Act, 1991 " (Act
X of 1991) section 4. of which provides that "while interpreting the statute-law, if more than one
interpretation is possible. the one consistent with the Islamic Principles and jurisprudence shall
be adopted by the Court". Thus, the Constitutional mandate as well as legal requirement of the
Enforcement of Shariah Act, 1991 and the Muslim Personal Law (shariat) Application Act is that
the matter of transfer of property through gift is to be decided in accordance with the Injunctions
of Holy Qur'an and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (p.b.u.h.).
15. We, therefore, proceed to examine the two legal questions raised in the leave granting order
in the light of the Traditions of the Holy Prophet as interpreted and propounded by the Muslim
jurists in respect of which admittedly there exists no difference of opinion amongst the different
schools of thought. The Traditions noted in Sahih Muslim (English Translation by Mr. Abdul
Hamid Siddiqi) in Volume III, Chapter DCXLV - Al-Umra (Life Grant) at page 860 to 862, read
as follows:--
"3972. Jabir b. 'Abdullah (Allah be pleased with them) reported Allah's Messenger (may peace
be upon him) as saying: Whoever a person is gifted a life grant, then it is for him (belongs to
him and to his posterity, for it belongs to him who has been given it). It would not return to
him who gave it for he conferred it as a gift (it becomes the property of the donee and as
such) rules of inheritance will apply to it. ,
3973. Jabir b. 'Abdullah (Allah be pleased with them) reported Allah's Messenger (may peace be
upon him) as saying: He who conferred a lit grant upon a person, it becomes his possession
and that of his successors, for he surrendered his right in that by his declaration. (This
property) now belongs to one to whom this lifelong grant has been made, and to his
successors. Yahya narrated in the beginning of his narration: Whatever man is given a life
grant, then it belongs to him and his posterity.
3974. Jabir b. 'Abdullah Al-Ansari (Allah be pleased with him) said: Allah's Messenger (may
peace be upon him) said: Whoever a person conferred 'Umra' (Life grant) upon a person and
he says: I confer upon you this and upon your descendants and anyone who survives you,
and that becomes his possession and that of his posterity. It would become (a permanent
possession) of those who were conferred upon this gift, and it would not return to its owner
(donor), for he gave that as a gift in which accrued the right of inheritance
3975. Jabir b. 'Abduliah (Allah be pleased with him) said: The 'Umra' for which Allah's
Messenger (may peace be upon him) gave sanction that a person may say: This (property) is
for you and for your descendants. And when he said that is for you as long as you live, then
it will return to its owner (after the death of the donee Ma'mar said: Zuhri used to give
religious verdict according to this
3976. Jabir b. 'Atdullah (Allah be pleased with them) reported that Allah's Messenger (may
peace be upon him) commanded that whoever is conferred upon a life grant alongwith his
descendants is entitled to make use of the property conferred so long as he lives and his
successors (also enjoy. this privilege). That (Property) becomes their de facto belonging. The
donor cannot (after declaring Umra) lay down any condition or make any exception. Abu
Salama said : For he conferred a grant and as such it becomes heritage, and the right of
inheritance abrogated his condition.
3977. Jabir b. 'Abdullah (Allah _ be:, pleased with him) reported Allah's messenger.(may peace
be upon him) as saying: Life grant is for one upon. whom it is bestowed. '.
3978: Jabir b. 'Abdullah reported a Hadith like:this through another chain of transmitters.
3979. Jabir reported this Hadith directly from Allah's Apostle (may peace be upon him)
3980. Jabir b. 'Abdullah (Allah be .pleased with him) reported Allah's Messenger (may peace be
upon him) having said: Keep your property, to yourselves and do not squander it, for he who
conferred a life grant upon another that property will belong to him upon whom it is
conferred whether he lives or dies, and (would pass on) to . his successors (as heritage).
3.981. This Hadith is narrated on the authority of Jabir through other chains of transmitters, but
(with this addition of words) that the Hadith transmitted on the authority of Ayyub (these
words are found): "The Helpers (Ansar) conferred the benefit of 'Umra' upon the Emigrants
(Muhajirin), whereupon Allah's Messenger (may peace be upon him) said: Keep your
property to yourselves. -
3982: Jabir b. 'Abdullah (Allah, be pleased with him) reported that a woman gave her garden as a
life grant to her son. He died and later on she also died and left a son behind -and brothers
also. The sons of the woman making life .grant said (to those who had been conferred upon
this Umra). This garden has returned to the sons of the one who had been given life grant
said: This belonged to, our father, during his lifetime and in case of his death. They took
their dispute to Tairq, the freed salve -of 'Uthunat, He called Jabir and he gave testimony of
Allah's Messenger (may peace be upon him) having said: Life grant belongs to one who is
conferred upon this (privilege). Tariq gave this decision and then wrote to 'Abd al-Malik and
informed him. Jabir bearing witness to it 'Abd al-Malik said: Jabir has told the truth. Then
Tariq gave a decree and , as a result thereof, it is to this day that the garden belongs to
descendants of one who was conferred upon the life grant. - F
3983. Sulaiman b. Yasar reported that Jabir gave this verdict. The inheritor has a right (to inherit)
the life grant according to the statement of Jabir b. 'Abdullah (Allah be. pleased with him)
which he narrated from Allah's Messenger (may peace be upon him.)
3984. Jabir b. 'Abdullah reported Allah's Apostle (may peace be upon him) . as saying : Life
grant is permissible.
3985. Jabir b. 'Abdullah (Allah' be pleased with them) reported Allah's Apostle (may peace be
upon him) as saying: Life.grant.is the heritage of one upon -whom it is conferred.
3986. Abu Huraira (Allah be pleased with him) reported Allah's Apostle (may peace be upon
him) As saying: Life grant is permissible:
This Hadith is narrated on the authority of ,Qatada with same chain of transmitters. "
Footnotes 2057 and 2059 being instructive , and_ illustrative are, being reproduced:--
"2057. Al-Umra.--This is a form of giving a gift and is based .upon the Arabic word 'Umra (life).
The declaration of this gift is made thus: I give you this house as a gift and you are fully
authorised to make use of it as long as you live.' Al-Umra has, according to jurists, these forms:
(a) The donor may say: I give you this house for use so long as you live, and when you die it
may pass on to your heirs. This form of ' Umra is like that of gift (Hiba) and the inheritors of
the donee are entitled to their shares in it and it will not go back to the donor.
(b) The donor says: I give you this house for use so long as you live or make .use of it. In this
case the gift would automatically revert to the donor or his heirs at the death of- the. donee
or when he abandons his possession of it.
Imam Shaukani observes: ,"An overwhelming majority of the jurists is of the opinion that
when the declaration of 'Umra is made, it is the donee who becomes the possessor of the thing
donated and it does not revert to the donor, unless an explicit condition is laid down. in regard to
it" (Nail ul-Autar, Vol. VI, p.16). This condition, according to the Hanafi school of thought, is
not valid as -we find in Hidaya.
Ruqba is a generic name fur all limited estates. It includes both 'Umra (life grant) and
Sukna (right of use). "
2059. (Footnotr to Tradition No.3986): There seems to be an apparent contradiction
between these and the former Ahadith but it can be resolved if we take them to signify two
different kinds of grants:--
(a) if the usufruct (and not the corpus) of property is transferred for life, it is valid and
permissible for the life of the grantee;
(b) if the corpus is gifted and conditions are attached to it, the gift will be complete and absolute
for ever and the conditions would be null and void."
.
16. In fact there is no contradiction or conflict between the two Traditions as each applies to
different situation; the one dealing with "Umra" (Gift)
pertaining to corpus of the property and the other to the usufruct of the property, as ownership in
the' corpus remains with the donor. To same effect are the comments contained in the "Hedaya"
by Charles Hamilton 1975 Edn. at pages 488 and 489:--
"If a person makes a gift of a house to another, on condition that the donee give back a part of
it,--or, if a person make a gift of his house in charity to another on condition that the receiver of
cite charity give him something in exchange for part of the house,--such gift or charity, is valid;
but the condition annexed is invalid, because it is contrary to the spirit or intendment of the
contract; and neither gifts not charities are affected by being accompanied with an invalid
condition because the Prophet approved of Amrees (gifts for life), but held the conditions
annexed to them by the granter (namely, the condition of restoration upon the demise of the
grantee) to be void .. .. ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...Case of life-grants.--An
Amree: or life-grant, is lawful to the grantee during his life, and descends to his heirs, because of
the tradition before quoted.--Besides, the meaning of Amree in a gift of a house.(for example)
during the life of the donee, on condition of its being returned upon his death.--The conveyance
of the house, therefore, is valid without any return; and the condition annexed is null, because the
Prophet has sanctioned the gift ,in this instance, and annulled the condition, as before mentioned.
An Amree, moreover, is nothing but a gift and a condition; and the condition is invalid; but a gift
is not rendered null by involving an invalid condition, as has beers already demonstrated..
If one person say to another, 'my house is yours by way of Rikba,' it is null, according to Haneefa
and Muhammad. Aboo Yoosaf has said that it is valid, because his declaration 'my house is
yours,' is a conveyance of the house; and the condition of Rikba is invalid; because the meaning
of this phrase is 'if I die before you then my house is yours,'--that is to say, he waits in
expectation of the other's death, that-the house may revert to himself: --Rikba, therefore,
resembles Amree.--The arguments of Haneefa and Muhammad upon this point are twofold,--
First, the Prophet has legalised Amree and annulled Rikba. -Secondly, the meaning of 'my house
is yours by way of Rikba,' is 'if I die before you, my house is yours,' which is a suspension of the
conveyance of property upon the decease of the donor previous to that of the donee: and this is a
matter of doubt and uncertainty, and consequently null.--It is to be observed that Rikba is derived
from In-tikab, which means expectation; for the donor is, as it were an expectant of the death of
the donee. " ,
17. A discussion on the subject of "Hiba". "Umra" and "Rikba" in " which is and compiled
by Muhammad bin Ali bin Muhammad Al-Shokani in Volume VI at pages 16, 17 and 18 is also
to the same effect. Relevant discussion (Urdu translation) is being, reproduced:
The comments contained in the Fatawa Alamgiri, Volume VII on the question of gift and Ariyat
have already been noted above. These are to the . same effect that if the Words uttered negate i.e
making the other owner of the thing gifted, it will be a gift but if the words indicate making the
donee owner off the usufruct of the thing gifted, then it will be "Ariyat" and if from the words
used both things can be construed, in that case decision will base on the intention of the donor. It
is so stated in Mustafa Sharha Nafai (page 73 of the Fatawa Alamgiri, Volume V11) Thus. as
pointed out in the case of Mst. Khan Bibi (PLD 1969 Lahore 338) by late Justice K.E. Chauhan.
to each case the intention of the donor will have to be construed for determining the question
whether the gift of corpus of the property was intended to be made or it was only gift of usufruct
of the property. In view of the principles noted from afore noted treatises in determining the
intention is of the nature of "Umra", it will he a case of transfer of property absolutely to the
donee as the Holy Prophet (PBUH) had disapproved the "Umra" of the period of Jahlia (,pre-
Islamic period), and of taking back the property gifted under "Umra" grants. The Holy Prophet
(p.b.u.h.), according to the Tradition narrated by Jabir bin ' Abdullah commanded that "whoever
conferred upon a life grant alongwith his descendants is entitled to make use of the property
conferred so long as he lives and his successors (also enjoy this privilege), that (property)
becomes their de facto belonging. The donor cannot (after declaring "Umra") lay down any
condition or make any exception. Abu Salarna said: For he conferred a grant and as such it
becomes heritage; and the right of inheritance abrogated his condition" The rule propounded by
all schools of thought, therefore, is that any condition attached. which is derogatory to the
absolute conveyance of the gifted property is to be treated invalid and thus stands nullified and is
rendered ineffective. But if the intention was to grant right of use and enjoyment of the usufruct
then again on the basis of the Tradition of the Holy Prophet (No. 3975), the grant of property
made by use of words that it is for you as long as you will live, then the property will return to its
owner after the death of the donee.
21. The case-law on the subject may now be analysed with a view to examine the approach
of the Privy Council and the Courts in the sub-continent to the aforenoted views of the
Muslim jurists. The question came up for consideration before the Privy Council in Nawab
Umjad Ally Khan v. Mussumat Mohumdee Begum and otnerN (1867 Mooteb tndiau Appeals
Cases 517). In this case, a gift inter vivos of Government Promissory Notes, negotiable
securities, by a father to his only son (Mahomedam of the Sheah Sect), accompanied by
delivery of possession, and a transfer into the son's name, without arty reservation of the
dominion over the corpus by the donor, though there was stipulation for the right to the
accruing interest on the notes during the donor's life, to be applied by him to certain religious
and charitable purposes, was held to be a valid gift. It was held that this arrangement creates a
trust on the donee to pay the interest to the donor during his life. The pertinent observations
recorded on pages 543 and 544 read as follows:--
"The first in order of these matters involves an important point of Mahomedan Law relating to
gifts, inter vivos.
If the gift be sustained as a valid gift, inter vivos, it will. be unnecessary to review the evidence
as to the genuineness of certain documents propounded by the appellant, anti said to constitute a
valid testament by the Mahomedan Law, or to consider, in any way the validity or effect of those
documents.
The effect of the non-assent of co-heirs to a bequest to an heir by a Mahomedan of the Sheah
Sect becomes also immaterial as a subject of inquiry here, if the gift be valid as gift inter vivos.
Before the validity of this gift, as one inter vivos, is determined, it must first be considered by
their Lordships what the real nature of the transfer was. The legal title in the promissory notes
was undoubtedly in the appellant, in his father's lifetime, by virtue of an act of the father.
But though the transfer of a legal title will satisfy that provision of the Mahomedan Law which
relate to the point of seizin, in its legal and technical sense, yet that alone will not suffice where
no intention exists to transfer the beneficial ownership, either present or future. The facts relating
to the gift have been most carefully investigated by Mr. Fraser, the Civil Judge. The Judicial
Commissioner, paying a just tribute of commendation to Mr. Fraser on his accurate investigation
of the facts, expresses no dissent from his conclusion as to them, but reverses his decision as to
this gift erroneous in point of law. Mr. Fraser's observations as to the mode of dealing amongst
Natives living amongst themselves as a family, in a state of family union, and dealing in this
state with the proceeds of property standing in the names of separate members of the. family, to
whom it has been transferred by the parent and heat of the family, and on the deference to his
wishes and arrangements, and acquiescence in them commonly exhibited, are forcible as
arguments to exclude the motion of fraudulent concealment or design in a transfer circumstanced
as the present. They strengthen the probability of an intended transfer of property in the lifetime
of the donor, with a reservation of the use or proceeds of the money transferred during the
lifetime of the donor only." .
Again at page 547 the observations recorded read as under:--
"It remains to be considered whether a real transfer of property by a donor in his lifetime under
the Mahomedan Law, reserving not the dominion over the corpus of tire; property, nor any share
of dominion over the corpus, but simply stipulating for acid obtaining a right to the recurring
produce during his lifetime, is an incomplete gift by the Mahomedan Law. The text of the
Hedaya seems to include the very proposition and to negative it, The thing to be returned is not
identical, but something different. See Hedays. tit "Gifts." Vol-III, Book XXX, p.294 where the
objection being raised was a participation of property in the thing given invalidates a gift, the
answer is "The donor is subjected to a participation in a thing which is not the subject of his
grant, namely, the use of the whole indivisible article for his gift related to the substance of the
article, not to the use of it". Again, if the agreement for the reservation of the interest to the
father for his life be treated as a repugnant condition, repugnant to the whole enjoyment by the
donee, here the Mahomedan Law defeats not the grant, but the condition. Hedaya, tit "Gifts,"
Vol. III, Book XXXp.307. But as this arrangement between the father and the son is founded on
a valid consideration, the sons undertaking is valid, and could be enforced against him in the
Courts of India as an agreement raising a trust, and constituting a valid obligation to make a
return of the proceeds during the time stipulated. The intention of the parties, therefore, is not
found to violate any provision of the Hedaya, and the transfer is complete."
22. Wazir Hasan, learned A.J.C. in Amjad Khan v. Ashraf Khan and others (AIR 1925 Oudh
568) noted the cases decided by the Privy Council till then and examined the doctrine accepted
by Hanafi lawyers that a gift to 'A' for life conferred absolute interest on ' A' after examining
appropriate text and relevant decisions of the Privy Council, learned A.J.C. pointed out the
distinction in Muslim Law between corpus and the usufruct i.e. between the things itself and
the use of the things. On the construction of the deed which was in question in the case before
him, he came to the conclusion that the donor intended to confer upon his wife not the corpus
but a life interest only and that such life interest could take effect as a gift of the use of the
property and not 'as part of the property itself and that there was nothing in Muslim Law
which compelled him to hold that the intended gift of a life estate conferred an absolute interest
on the donee. Operative part of the deed in this case read as follows:--
"I, therefore ... ... have made a gift without consideration of my entire property detailed below ...
... without the exception of any right or part to my wife Mst. Waziran ... ... subject to the
condition that out of .the entire property mentioned in the deed of, gift she shall remain in
possession of shares worth Rs.5,000 with power to make at her pleasure any sort of alienation
like mortgage, sale or gift in respect thereof and that, as to the rest, worth Rs.10,000, she shall
not possess any power of alienation but she shall remain in possession thereof for her lifetime.
After the death of the donee the entire property gifted ... ... shall revert to the donor's collaterals,
viz ... ... Ashraf Khan, Basharat Khan and their heirs, in equal shares, and those heirs of mine
shall become owners with full proprietary powers and the own heirs of the donee lady shall not
inherit the same and the donee and my aforesaid heirs have accordingly agreed and consented to
this. I have put the lady donee in possession of the property, gifted to her, and therefore from
today I have ceased to possess any right or claim in respect of the gifted property and my wife,
Mt. Waziran, from today became owner and possessor of the aforesaid property in accordance
with the terms of this deed."
The motive of the gift was stated by the husband "to avoid any difficulty to my wife in
obtaining possession over the willed property after me". As regards the use of words in the deed
"I make a gift", the observations were recorded at page 582 of the report (AIR 1925 Oudh 568),
in the following words:--
"Now, so far as the language of the document is concerned, there can be, no doubt that the
technical expression 'I make a gift' was used with reference to the entire subject-matter of the gift
including the three items, and in describing the exception the donor used words indicating
the corpus and not the usufruct of the excepted property ".
After quoting these observations, the learned AJ.C. observed as under:--
"It must be taken, therefore that in construing the deed of gift as a whole their Lordships reached
the conclusion that by the use of the expressions quoted above the intention of the donor was to
reserve the usufruct for her own use during her lifetime. If such a reservation in favour of the
donor is valid in law as it must be held to be on the authority of the two decisions of their
Lordships of the Privy Council, I see no reason for holding that a similar reservation of a creation
of an interest having the same effect in favour of the donee is invalid."
This case was taken in appeal to the Privy Council and is reported as Amjad Khan v. Ashraf
Khan and others (AIR 1929 PC 149). The Privy Council agreed with Sir Wazir Hassan on the
construction of deed in question that only a life interest was intended and ,held that if the wife
took only a life interest, it came to an end on her death and the appellant who was her heir took
nothing, and if the life interest was bad the Wife took no interest at all and the appellant was in
no better case,
23. Next case is the case of lawazish Ali than v. Ali Raza Khan (AIR 1948 C 134). In
paragraph 19 of the Judgment it was observed as under :_
"In their Lordships` opinion this view of the matter introduces into Muslim law legal terms anal
conceptions of ownership familiar enough in English lave, but wholly alien to Muslim law. In
general. Muslim law draws no distinction between real and personal property. and their
Lordships know of no authoritative work on Muslim law. whether the Hedaya car Baillie or more
modern works. and no decision of this Board which affirms that Muslim law recognises the
splitting up of ownership of land into estates, distinguished in point of quality like legal and
equitable estates, or in point of duration like estates in fee simple, in tail, for life, or in remainder.
what Muslim law does recognise and insist upon, is the distinction between the corpus of the
property itself (ayn) arid the usufruct in the property (Hanafi). Over the corpus of property the
lave recognises only absolute dominion, heritable and unrestricted in print of time.; and where a
gift of the corpus seeks to impose a condition inconsistent with such absolute dominion the
condition is rejected as repugnant: but interests limited in point of time can be created in the
usufruct of the property and the dominion over the corpus takes effect subject to any such limited
interests."
It was rioted in the judgment that gifts of the corpus (Hiba), gifts of the usufruct (Ariyt) and
usufructuary bequests contain distinct concepts. It was also observed that "no doubt where the
use of a house is given to a man for his life he tray, not ineptly. be termed a tenant for life, and
the owner of the house, waiting to enjoy it until the termination of the limited interest may be
said trot inaccurately, to possess a vested remainder. But though the same terms may be used in
English and Muslim law, to describe touch the same things, the two systems of law are based on
quite different conceptions of ownerships. English law recognises ownership of land limited in
duration; :Muslim law admits only ownership unlimited in duration, but recognises interests of
limited duration in the rise of property ... .. ... _.... Limited interests lave long been recognised
under Shia haw t, The object of "Hobs" is "the empowering of a person to receive the profit or
usufruct of a thing with a reservation of the owner right of property ire it . . _ . .. I haw a
bestowed on thee this mansion .. . for thy life or my life- or for a fixed period is binding by
seizin on the part of the donee.( Bailli 11 226). See also 32 tom. 172 at page 179. Their
Lordships think that there is no different between the several Schools of Muslim law in their
fundamental conception of property and ownership. A limited interest take effect out of the
usufruct under any of the schools. Their Lordships feel no doubt that in dealing with a .gift under
Muslim law. the first duty of the Court is to construe the gift. If it is a gift of the corpus,' hen any
condition which derogates from absolute dominion over the subject of the gift will be rejected as
repugnant; but if upon construction the gift is held to be one of a limited interest the gift is held
to be one of a limited interest the gift can take effect out of the usufruct, leaving the ownership of
the corpus unaffected except to the extent to which its enjoyment is postponed for the duration of
the limited interest".
24: This very question came under consideration of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, in the
case of Mst. Khan Bibi v. Mst. Safia Begum and others (PLD 1969 Lahore 338). In this
judgment, Justice K.E.Chauhah, as he then was, examined the case-law on the subject, the
treatises on the Muslim Law, the traditions of the Holy Prophet (p.b.u.b ) and at pages 355 and
360 noted the salient points of difference between 'Hiba' and 'Arias' in the form of a Table. It was
pointed out that in considering the nature of a transaction, the English word "gift" is generic and
must not be confused with the technical term of Islamic law 'Hiba' and 'Arias' according to which
alone a transaction in a given case should be scrutinized The learned Judge also lucidly dealt
with the concept of "property' in English Law and in Muslim Law. The result of the difference
between the two concepts was noted in the following words:--
"(a) If a gift (or bequest) of the corpus is made it cannot he limited in duration of extent in
respect of the corpus. Any such limitation being void,
(b) but if a gift (or bequest) of the usufruct is made, it may be limited in duration; and
(c) the corpus may vest in one person and usufruct in another. "
The learned Judge, after considering the law on the subject analysed the nature of the
transaction by constructing the transaction as contained in the deed of gift. The relevant extracts
of the deed are reproduced hereunder:--
This deed was interpreted to indicate that we donor did not gift the corpus of the house to the
donee; a right of residence during lifetime .vas provided tire interests created for the donee were
only for the lifetime and so in transaction was in the nature of ' Ariyat' and not ' Hiba' . It was
held that the learned Civi! Judge erred in assuming that the above deed purported to transfer the
corpus of the house. This as well as other cases were noted by Justice Aftab Hussain of the
Lahore High Court in Fateh Muhammad v. Nathu (1982 CLC 2082) observing that in the present
case the. donor had made a gift of property in favour of his sister's son for life that after his death
the property would revert to him or his children. So this case appears to be a case similar to the
case of Mst. Bibi Alam Taj and others v. Mst. Inayat Begum (PLD 1963 Pesh. 199) wherein the
cases decided by the said Court (Peshawar High Court) were noticed and it was observed that
Muslim Law recognises interest of limited duration in usage of property but holds ownership to
he of unlimited duration; that a person can create life-interest in property in favour of particular
individual with absolute remainder in favour of himself and his descendants; and that after
termination of such limited interest, successors can validly claim their respective Sharia share out
of estate of the deceased. In this case the disputed property originally belonging to Qazi Mir
Alam had been gifted by him to his widow and four daughters on the basis of three mutations
which were held to be "Guzara" mutations. It was noted that the mutations relating to the
property were clearly "Guzara" mutations as was so apparent also from the report of the Patwari
and order of the Revenue Officer. as entry in Column No. 13 in one case of the mutations
showed that the word "Guzara" was cut and "Hibba" was overwritten. In Fateh Muhammad's
case (supra), the learned Judge concluded as under:--
"I am of the view that if the gift had been only subject to right of reversion without any
additional condition in accordance with the uniformity of view about Muhamnnadan Law it
would have amounted to an absolute gift and the condition of reversion, would be a nullity. But
in the present case the intention of the donor appears to be that he did not wish to divest himself
or his children of the ownership of the property but wanted to confer only a right of mesne
profits of the property on the donee during his lifetime It is for this reason that he had imposed a
condition that the donee would have no right to transfer the property in any mariner whatsoever.
This appears to be a case of the gift of usufruct only and not corpus.'°
25. Mr. Justice Muhammad Afzal Zullah as he then was, in the case of Farid (represented by
heir) v. Mst. Nur Bibi (PLD 1970 Lah. 502) held that normally where a widow takes an estate
under the technical condition, i.e. she takes a life estate in the property and not mere right to
maintenance out of the usufruct of the property. The latter mode of devolution, i.e. for the
purpose of maintenance, is often described in the Revenue Records with the suffix of "Barai
Guzara added to the expression. Learned Judge noted that in that case the word "Guzara" or any
other similar expression indicating maintenance, was not only not used during the mutation
proceedings but also was not mentioned throughout the period of 22 years, after which the suit
was instituted. He concluded that use of the words by the Revenue Authorities means nothing
else than for 'estate t-o a property, i.e. in the corpus of the property and not only the usufruct of
the property for maintenance and, therefore, the corpus of the land in dispute was gifted away by
the appellant to the respondent that the gift of the land was that of corpus of the land and that the
condition attached to it, being only for life of the donee or till her remarriage, was void.
26. The Peshawar High Court in the case of Kazim v. Muhammad Iqbal through 9 L.Rs,.
(PLD 1987 Pesh. 152) held that where deed of gift by husband in favour of his wife, was by
necessary intendment, a dower deed and thereafter in Revenue Record, ownership in suit land
was transferred in favour of donee wife within knowledge of her husband, such wife would be
deemed as full owner of suit land and her title thereto, could not be questioned, and any
condition laid. down in the deed that donee would enjoy usufruct of property during her lifetime,
would be void and of no effect. Reliance in this case. was placed on 'the cases of Sar Anjam
Khan v. Afzal Khan (PLD 1972 Pesh. 37) and Said Akbar and others v. Mst. Kakai (PLD 1975
SC 377). In the case of Said Akbar, the deed was described as Tamliknama which was termed as
commonplace word to denote outright gift of property though ordinarily Tamlik connotes
disposal, transfer or conveyance of property and it is well-established principle that description
of an instrument is not always decision of its true nature. This Court, after considering the terms
of "Tamliknama" of the said case recorded the conclusion noticing various precedent cases
appearing on the subject that the gift in favour of the lady was of the corpus and was not merely
of the usufruct till her life rather it constituted her to be full owner of the property and the
prohibition against any transfer or mortgage of the property by her during her lifetime, being in
defeasance of her rights under the gift under the well-settled principle of law became void. It was
noted that in the deed words , which expression is derivative of the Arabic word " the equivalent
of which is the "lord" or "possessing absolute authority" and the words were used alongwith the
other stipulations one of which was that the executing as well as his heirs will be completely
divested of any right whatsoever in the land and the real motivation for making the gift was the
impending marriage of the donee with Said Afzal. Learned Judges further observed:
"The further provision which also goes a long way to demonstrate that the intention was to create
a gift of the corpus and not of mere usufruct of the property is that Mst. Totia Begum was
constituted a fresh stock of descent in respect of the property which clearly militates against life
estate. The instrument expressly provides that on her death the property will devolve upon her
husband and any children born out of the wedlock who were the persons entirely different from
the line of heirs of the donor, under the Muslim Law of Inheritance. Therefore, upon proper
construction of the instrument we have no doubt whatsoever that the learned Judge in the High
Court came to the right conclusion that the gift in favour of Mst. Totia Begum was corpus of the
property, which constituted her to be an absolute owner of the property, and, therefore, the
condition prohibiting the sale or mortgage of property by her during her lifetime became void."
27. A Bench presided over by Mr. Justice Muhammad Afzal Zullah, the then Chief Justice of this
Court examined this very proposition in the case of Mst. Kaneez Bibi and another v. Sher
Muhammad and 2 others (PLD 1991 SC 466). The entries of the mutation noticed in this case
read as follows:--
As regards the statement showing that only usufruct was gifted to the donee by use of the words
it was observed that "in all probability the donee and her parents might not have agreed to it",
therefore following words were also used by the Revenue Officer who heard the donor making
the statement:--
The entries of the mutation were then construed by this Court in the following words:--
"Not only this, the entries in various columns of the mutation also are very clear that it was the
land, the corpus thereof which was being mutated and not only the income therefrom. These
suggestions are further strengthened by the language used in the order of attestation of the
mutation; wherein gift was accepted as if the land had also been transferred under the gift. The
phraseology relating to and specification and the particulars of the land in question together with
the word; which could refer to the new entries in the various columns of mutation, are indicative
sufficiently of the fact that the gift was of the corpus of the land; as it did contain very clear vivid
coalition of. i.e., during lifetime. The use of the word " o~ " in the light of the above discussion
was only an embroidery. Thus, it was a case of gift of corpus and not only of the usufruct."
After recording the aforequoted observations, learned Court further observed as under:--
"Had it been gift of the usufruct only we might have examined the correctness or otherwise of
the views expressed by the Lahore High Court in a Division Bench judgment wherein can be
found a very elaborate discussion on various aspects of this subject. Scores of decided cases were
cited therein and a distinction was sought to be made between the two types of gifts in cases like
the present one leading to different effects. It has been found necessary to make these remarks
about the judgment in the case of Mst. Khan Bibi v. Mst. Safia Begum and others PLD 1969
Lahore 338 because it might need further examination to hold; whether in the changed
circumstances, as already noted, in the present Constitutional set-up the same defect or disability
regarding gift of usufruct would continue to be attachable to it as was visualised in the said case
of Mst. Khan Bibi. Same would apply to the reference of the said case in a later Lahore High
Court judgment by one
of us (Muhammad Afzal Zullah, C.J.) in Farid v. Nur Bibi PLD 1970 Lahore 502."
28. In view of the abovenoted observations, the legal questions required to be determined in
this case assume further importance.
29. In the light of the above dissuasion it is crystal clear that Muslim Law recognises, permits
and sanctifies the gift of usufruct as well. So our answer to the first question is' that gift of
usufruct of immovable property is permitted and recognised by the Islamic Law. Answer to the
second question is that a gift of property for life made by a person to any person, who may be his
issueless wife, where intention is to transfer and convey corpus of the property is to be construed
as an outright and absolute gift of property and any condition attached derogatory to the transfer
of corpus in that case would be void. In other words, any derogatory condition sought to be
attached on the "Umra" gift will be void and shall not be recognised.
30. Applying the principles noted above, nature of the gift made by Jamal Din vide Mutation
No. 34 sanctioned on 15-3-1949 may now be determined. Statement made on 25-6-1948 reads as
under:
Statement made on 4-7-1948 before the Revenue Officer reads as under The proceedings
recorded by the Revenue Officer on 4-7-1948 omitting the statement of Jamal Din read as
under:-- The order recorded by the Revenue Officer sanctioning mutation on 15-3-1949 to the
following effect:--
31. It -will be seen that entry of the name of Mst. Karam Noor in column 10 of the Mutation
Register as owner and words used by Revenue Officer in the order attesting the mutation cannot
form valid basis for construing intention of the maker of the alleged gift. Such an intention is
obviously to be gathered by giving natural meaning to the words used by the maker. The
Revenue Officer in fact added words in the order attesting the mutation on his own as these
words were not uttered by Jamal Din in his either of the statements dated 25-6-1948 or 4-7-
1,948. It appears that Revenue Officer added these words as if Jamal bin-had made a grant
similar to the "widow's estate" under Custom and as such the same is to ensure till .death or till
remarriage of the grantee wife. The use, of the words pointing' towards the entry incorporating
name. of Mst: Karam Noor in the 'column of ownership' as owner and the word in the order
attesting mutation are of no consequence. Even the appellants/plaintiffs appear to be labouring
under misconception that the giant made by Jamal Din vide Mutation No. 34, dated 15-3-1949
amounted to widow's life estate. The title of the plaint filed by them reads as under:--
Again, the appellants in paragraph &their plaint alleged as follows
32. Similarly in para. 5 of the plaint, the following grounds were urged by the appellants in
support of cancellation of mutation in favour of Mst. Karam Noor:--
(Underlining is ours).
33. Issue No. 9 which arose out of the pleadings of the parties, was as follows
"9 Whether Mst. Karam Noor was limited owner and plaintiffs are entitled to get the suit land
as heir of last male owner Jamal Din and Mutation No. 674 sanctioned by order dated 15-1:
1987 by Tehsildar and by order dated 18-3-1987 passed by A.C., Gojra and entries in the
Revenue Record and Jamabandis after 1949 are illegal, void and liable to be set aside? O. P.
P. "
Muhammad Ashraf, one of the appellants, appeared as P.W. 2 in the case. He made the
following statement in his examination-in-chief:-- .
(Underlining is our)
34. It is an admitted position on record that after 1950 till the filing of the suit, Mst.Karam
Noor was shown as the full owner of the disputed land in the Revenue Record and no objection
was ever raised by any of the appellants to these entries. It is also not disputed that in 1960-61
during consolidation proceedings Mst.-Karam Noor was given Murabba No.27 in lieu of
Murabba No.29 treating her as the owner of the land. The above referred admitted facts leave no
room for any doubt that the appellants' case throughout was that Mst.Karam Noor was a limited
owner of the disputed land and, therefore, after her death the land reverted back to the appellants
as heirs of late Jamal Din.
35. The grant made by Jamal Din is not to be evaluated on the touchstone of customary law as
the same did neither apply to the alienation in question nor Jamal Din held the land as last male
owner under Custom. Jamal Din was absolute owner of the land. He, in the capacity of absolute
owner, disposed of the land by gift to his two sons, and one daughter-in-law as well as. to
Mst.Karam Noor, his wife. Since 1950, Mst. Karam Noor was shown as 'full owner' of the land
in question in the Revenue Record and then in consolidation proceedings conducted in 1960-61,
Mst.Karam Noor was given land treating her as owner.
36. The plea that Mst.Karam Noor or her heirs the respondents/defendants are entitled to
receive 1/8th share i.e. widow's share in the land in dispute is not premised on any rule of
customary law. It was rather based on plea that Jamal Din had given the one square of land to
Mst. Karam Noor for life or till remarriage the land on her death is to revert to Jamal Din except
to the extent of Sharee share as wife.
37. Learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs argued that the intention was to make gift of
usufruct as Jamal Din in his statement dated 4-7-1948 made to Revenue Officer clarified that
he is' desirous of giving the land to the wife till she lives for maintenance. The contention of
the learned counsel for the respondents/defendants on the other hand was that the words "till
life or till remarriage" being derogatory to the absoluteness of the gift were inconsequential
and invalid. The question thus is of determination of the true scope and intent of the
transaction of gift made by Jamal Din in favour of Mst. Karam Noor. Whether Jalam Din
made gift of corpus or of the mere usufruct of the land?
38. The statement made by Jamal Din before Patwari and Revenue Officer. the order attesting
the mutation as well as the contents of the plaint and statement made during trial reproduced
above, clearly show that it was the "land itself". the corpus of land which Jamal Din gifted in
favour of his wife Mst.Karam Noor though he added the condition of till life therewith and
not the mere enjoyment of usufruct thereof. The case of the appellants throughout was that
land in dispute was gifted to Mst.Karam Noor and that she was limited owner of the land
which after her death reverted back to the appellants as heirs of late Jamal Din. This stand was
deviated to some extent before us as learned counsel submitted that the gift made was not of
corpus but of usufruct only. However, this deviation in the stand is not possible because of the
admitted position noted above. The appellants nowhere pleaded that late Jamal Din had only
transferred the usufruct of the land and retained ownership over the corpus of the land. The
first statement made before the Patwari indicated that Jamal Din transferred the disputed land
for life in favour of his wife and to give effect to the disposition as aforesaid he had delivered
possession of the land to her.
39. The transaction of gift so reported to the Patwari constituted complete gift of the land
made by husband in favour of the wife. Disposition of land in question amounted to 'Umra'
recognized as one of species of gift of property under Muslim Law. Reference at this stage may
appropriately be made to Ahadis of the Holy Prophet (p.b.u.h.) which have also been quoted in
paragraph 8 above, i.e. 'Narrated Jabir Allah's Messenger said: 'What is given in life-grant
belongs to the one to whom it is given.' (Agreed upon)." This very tradition/Hadith has been
quoted in Sahih Muslim in the following words:--
"3972. Jabir b. 'Abdullah (Allah he pleased with them) reported Allah's Messenger (may peace
be upon him) as saying: whoever a person is gifted a life grant, then it is for him (belongs to
him and to his posterity), for it belongs to him who has been given it. It would not return to
him who gave it for he conferred it as a gift (it becomes the property of the donee and as
such) rules of inheritance will apply to it.
3973. Jabir b. 'Abduilah (Allah be pleased with them) reported Allah's Messenger (may peace be
upon him) as saying: He who conferred a life grant upon person, it becomes his possession
and that of his successors, for he surrendered his right in that by his declaration. (This
property) now belongs to one to whom this lifelong grant has been made, and to his
successors. Yahya narrated in the beginning of his narration: Whatever man is given a' life
grant, then it belongs to him and his posterity.
3977. Jabir b. 'Abdullah (Allah be pleased with him) reported Allah's Messenger (may peace be
upon him) as saying: Life grant is for one upon whom it is bestowed."
40. The Prophet of Islam, Muhammad (peace be upon him) reported by Jabir b. 'Abdullah
(Allah be pleased with them) has said that "keep your property to yourselves and do not squander
it, for he who conferred a life grant upon another that property will belong to him upon whom it
is conferred whether he lives or dies, and (would pass on) to his successors (as heritage)'
(Tradition No.3980 in Sahih Muslim). At this stage, the two decided cases one by the Holy
Prophet, Muhammad (peace be upon him) himself and the other by Tariq, the freed salve of
Uthman (Allah be pleased with him), quoted in paras. above may be reproduced as these fully
apply to the facts of the instant case:--
The Tradition No.3982 quoted in Sahih Muslim reads as under
"Jabir (Allah be pleased with him) reported that a woman gave her garden as a life grant to her
son. He died and later on she also died and left 9 son behind and brothers also. The son`s of the
woman making life grant said (to those who had been conferred upon this Umra): This .garden
has returned to us. The sons of the one who had been given life grant said: This belonged to our
father, during his lifetime and in case of his death. They took their dispute, to Tariq, the freed
slave of 'Uthman'. He called Jabir and he gave testimony of Allah's Messenger (may peace be
upon him) having said: Life grant belongs to one who is conferred upon' this (privilege). Tariq
gave this decision .and then wrote to 'Abdul-Malik and informed him, Jabir bearing witness to it.
'Abd alMalik said : Jabir has told the truth. Then Tariq gave a decree and, as a result thereof, it is
to this day that the garden belongs to descendants of one who was conferred upon the life grant."
41. It was because of the aforesaid 'traditions of the Holy Prophet, Muhammad (peace be upon
him) that Imam Shaukani observed that "an overwhelming majority of the jurists is of the
opinion that when the declaration of 'Umra is made' it is the donee who becomes the possessor of
the thing donated and it does not revert to the donor, unless an explicit condition is laid down in
regard to it". This condition, according to the Hanafi School of thought, is not valid as has been
noted in Hidaya. It is for this reason that if the corpus is gifted and conditions are attached to it,
the gift is treated as complete and absolute for ever and conditions are held to be null and void.
42. In the instant case, the words used clearly indicate that Jamal Din intended to make
'Umra' gift. The gift of the corpus of the land as such was complete and absolute and the
condition of sought to be attached is to be held as invalid and ineffective and it was so rightly
held by all the learned Courts below.
43. Further, statement of Jamal Din recorded by Revenue Officer on 4-7-1948, which was
emphasised upon by the learned counsel for the appellants was as follows : --
This statement was just a step to give effect to the. original disposition of the property
reflected in the statement before the Patwari on 25-6-1948. This statement was explanatory in
nature, disclosing the reason which prompted him to make the gift and, therefore, the same could
not alter the nature of the disposition of the property. From this explanation, it cannot be inferred
that the disposition related only to the usufruct of the land and not its corpus as the words
appearing in both the statements unambiguously retained to the corpus of the property and not to
the usufruct. Even the appellants/plaintiffs, as has been shown font the contents of the plaint and
statement of Muhammad Ashraf, one of the plaintiffs, never treated the gift as the gift of usufruct
and not of the land. The admitted fact, emerging from the record leave no room for any doubt
that Mst. Karam Noor was accepted as an owner of the disputed land though it was pleaded that
she was a limited owner of the property and after her death the land reverted back to the
appellant as heirs of late Jamal Din. This plea is without merit as the gift made was 'Umra' gift
which. according to the principles or 'Muslim Law deduced from the Tradition of the Holy
Prophet (peace be upon him), is a complete gift and condition derogatory to the absoluteness of
the gift is invalid, and the property so gifted does not revert to the donor after the life of the
donee.
44. For the! reasons given above we agree and affirm the view which prevailed with the
learned three Courts below that the transfer in favour of Mst.Karam Noor was a gift and,
therefore, the condition attached to it was void and transfer by way of gift was valid. The
conclusion arrived at by the Courts below is neither perverse nor based on misreading of
evidence so as to justify interference by this Court. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed but in the
circumstances of the case, we will make no order as to costs.
M.B.A./A-7/S Appeal dismissed.