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Prepared for the University Committee on Planning and Budget and the University Committee on Faculty Welfare by Jim Chalfant and Helen Henry
The Academic Senate has not yet developed a response to the PEB recommendations, so any opinions expressed should be interpreted as the views only of the authors of these slides.
Substantial unfunded liabilities UCRP Retiree Health
Uncompetitive salaries
The UC Budget: Inadequate State support
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How will the PEB Recommendations help with these problems??
UCRP has an unfunded liability of $12.9 Billion (7/01/09) due to 20 years of no contributions to the Plan whose annual normal cost is 17.6%.
Restarting contributions is overdue and absolutely necessary.
A long-term financing plan is needed.
Reducing Benefits? No effect on unfunded liability, only on “normal cost” for future benefits.
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UC salaries are below market averages for nearly all employee groups.
Competitive benefits help, to varying degrees by different employee groups.
Total remuneration is still uncompetitive
Cutting benefits therefore further erodes our competitiveness.
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State support is inadequate and far from historical levels, posing a direct threat to UC’s excellence.
Alternative revenue sources are welcome and critical, but there should be no illusions about their potential to fully replace state support.
The current budget situation cannot be an excuse to delay dealing with the unfunded liability.
The unfunded liability grows at 7.5% annually. $2 of non-state contributions are lost for every $1 of
state contributions that are not made.
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Retiree health cuts cannot fix the operating budget.
We do not “pre-fund” retiree health.
The unfunded liability means that it will be 20 years before benefits cuts could make a difference in UC’s operating budget.
Developing a long-term plan for benefits is critical, but the report misses an opportunity to document the need for competitiveness.
Benefits cuts are not a solution to the budget problem.
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Providing incentives to delay retirement Eligibility changes for retiree health benefits Increases in targeted retirement ages
A long-term financing strategy that recognizes that we cannot invest the problem away
Achieving competitive total remuneration is required for UC excellence Faculty and Staff need salary increases with
current benefits We need even greater salary increases to
compensate for reduced benefits to remain where we are now
New tier plans have No effect on accrued pension liability. Little effect on future liability for years. No effect on the operating budget for 20
years.
It is impossible to build or maintain a great University by paying faculty and staff 85 cents on the dollar.
Savings from cutting benefits are illusory.
What effect will the actions we take now have on our excellence over the next few years and the next few decades?
Our heirs may be glad we did not prolong the 20% employer contribution any longer than necessary. But they will have to wait until 2030 for the
first 1% reduction in employer costs. By then the damage to the University will
likely be irreversible.
More likely, our heirs will be glad we did everything we could to preserve UC’s excellence through competitive total remuneration.
Structured to incentivize retirement at a later age
Reduce UC’s maximum contribution to 70% of premiums
Eligibility for maximum contribution requires age 65 and 20 years service Half at age 60 (i.e. 35% of premium) Reduced by service years < 20, also linearly
We need to be looking at pre-funding, which reduces the GASB liability
Affordability for retirees
Estimated Long-Term
Total Normal Cost
Member Contribution
Rate(s)
Estimated Long-Term Employer
Normal Cost Integrated with Social Secruity
Option A – 1.5%/3.0% 11.9% 3.5% / 9.5% 7.3%
Option B – 2.0%/3.0% 13.8% 4.0% / 8.2% 9.0%
Not Integrated with Social Security Option C – 2.50% 15.1% 6.1% 9.0%
The slashes indicate the break point of Social Security Covered Compensation (SSCC) which is currently around $60K and rises over time with wages.
Proposed Plan- Age Factor
HAPC UCRP Option A Option B Option C
$60,000 $45,000 $19,440 $25,920 $32,400
$90,000 $67,500 $38,880 $43,740 $48,600
$120,000 $90,000 $58,320 $64,800 $64,800
Pension Alternatives with Retirement: Age = 60 Years of Service = 30
%HAPC is shown in parentheses
(75%) (32%) (42%) (54%)
(75%) (43%) (49%) (54%)
(75%) (49%) (54%) (54%)
HAPC UCRP Option A Option B Option C
$60,000 $45,000 $27,000 $36,000 $45,000
$90,000 $67,500 $54,000 $60,750 $67,500
$120,000 $90,000 $81,000 $90,000 $90,000
Pension Alternatives with Retirement: Age = 65 Years of Service = 30
%HAPC is shown in parentheses
(75%) (45%) (60%) (75%)
(75%) (60%) (68%) (75%)
(75%) (68%) (75%) (75%)
Employee Group Current UCRP
With 5% Contribu8ons
Op8on A Op8on B Op8on C
Overall +10% -‐43% -‐27% -‐22% Ladder Rank Faculty -‐8% -‐41% -‐30% -‐26%
Senior Management Group
+19% -‐6% -‐2% +2%
Librarians & Other Academics
+50% -‐19% +5% +13%
Management & Senior Professionals
+24% -‐33% -‐17% -‐14%
Professional & Support Staff—Policy Covered
+25% -‐52% -‐30% -‐22%
Professional & Support Staff—Represented
+25% -‐54% -‐31% -‐25%
Service Workers +43% -‐43% -‐17% -‐8%
Options A, B, and C: Comparisons to Market and to Current Benefits, for
Faculty and Policy-Covered Staff Group/
Cash Comp. Lag Re2rement Re2ree Health Total
Re2rement Total
Remunera2on Current UCRP with 5% employee contributions
Faculty -‐10% -‐8% +56% +2% -‐2%
PSS-‐PC -‐13% +27% +485% +85% -‐2%
Option A: 1.5%/3% with 3.5%/9.5% employee contributions
Faculty -‐10% -‐41% -‐3% -‐36% -‐11%
PSS-‐PC -‐13% -‐52% +212% -‐18% -‐11%
Option B: 2%/3% with 4%/8.2% employee contributions
Faculty -‐10% -‐30% -‐3% -‐26% -‐9%
PSS-‐PC -‐13% -‐30% +212% +1% -‐9%
Option C: “UCRP Lite” with 6.1% employee contributions
Faculty -‐10% -‐26% -‐3% -‐23% -‐9%
PSS-‐PC -‐13% -‐22% +212% +8% -‐8%
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20% for Options A, B, and C
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1. No pension plan should be adopted if it is competitive only after future hypothetical salary increases.
2. Option A is unacceptable because it would not be competitive even if the salary gap were closed.
3. Options B and C could be competitive if the salary gap is closed.
4. It can be argued that Option C is superior to Option B for simplicity and transparency.
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5. If “Choice” between remaining in UCRP or joining a new tier is implemented, the employee contribution for UCRP should not exceed 7%.
6. We oppose attempts to undermine the Total Remuneration studies and their results.
7. We support the cuts in Retiree Health described in the Report but oppose any further cuts in this area.
8. We support steps proposed and taken to put UCRP on a sounder financial footing.
The budget problem (and potential shrinkage of work force) arises from the unfunded liability, which we have no way to reduce.
A new tier will initially apply to only a few people, so there is little reduction in future liability early on in any Option.
Borrowing from STIP* (at 2.5-3%) to address the unfunded liability results in identical effects of Options A, B, and C on the operating budget for two decades.
*STIP = Short Term Investments Pool
Under Option A, there will be fewer employees, and there might be layoffs.
Since they cost the same until 2030, Options B and C will not cause any additional layoffs.
Option A could even cause more harm, since it requires higher salaries just to match Options B and C in total remuneration.
Option A cannot be competitive unless salaries move to levels above market.
Integration with Social Security is not an overriding goal and has disadvantages, among which is complexity.
What matters is total remuneration!
How to formulate a better strategy? LAO call for long-term financing plan The PEB Task Force Report is a missed
opportunity to make the case for remaining competitive and for UC excellence.
“Sustainability” vs. Quality
