PRE-BAR LECTURES IN REMEDIAL LAW - Dean Virgilio B. Jara

CIVIL PROCEDURE

Procedure always begins with substantive law. It is impossible to talk about procedure without touching on substantive law.

The important substantive laws in relation to procedure are the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (BP 129), the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1948, and their amendatory laws. These substantive laws provide for the jurisdiction of the courts. These are the laws that created the courts, which resolve actual controversies between litigants.

We have an integrated judicial system, with the Supreme Court being the only Constitutional Court. Take note that the Sandiganbayan is only a Constitutionally-mandated court.

The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is given in the Constitution and not in BP 129. But the Judiciary Act of 1948 also speaks of the Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The question arises: Didnt BP 129 repeal the Judiciary Act of 1948? The answer is NO. The repealing clause of BP 129 only repealed the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948, which are inconsistent with the provisions of BP 129. There is no conflict between BP 129 and the Judiciary Act of 1948 because BP 129 speaks nothing about jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Besides, in Sec.9, BP 129, there is a qualifying phrase therein which provides that the Court of Appeals possesses appellate jurisdiction over cases except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of sub-paragraph (1) of the third paragraph and sub-paragraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

Notice that in the Constitution, in the Judiciary Act of 1948 and the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, jurisdiction is classified into original, appellate and concurrent. One of the purposes why BP 129 was enacted is, to do away with concurrent jurisdiction. But although this was the purpose, we cannot really do away with concurrence - and by implication, it still applies.

An example is, under the Constitution, the Supreme Court exercises original jurisdiction over public ministers and consuls. However, BP 129 grants the same to the Regional Trial Courts. Since the Constitution does not use the word exclusive, hence, both courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction.

Another example is the vesting of the Constitution unto the Supreme Court of original jurisdiction over certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus cases. BP 129 grants to the Court of Appeals original jurisdiction over the same cases whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Hence, reading the Constitution and BP 129, three courts have original jurisdiction over certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus cases - the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court. This simply means there is coordination and congruence in these courts when it comes to these cases. The conclusion, therefore, is the three courts exercise original and concurrent over the above-mentioned cases although BP 129 does not mention the term concurrent.

The petitioner in any of these cases is given three choices - he may go directly to the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or the Regional Trial Court. Should this be the interpretation in light of BP 129? Under Sec. 4, Rule 65, the petitioner is not given much choice because the Supreme Court has included this Principle on the Hierarchy of Courts meaning, the petitioner should first file the petition for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus cases with the Regional Trial Court or the Court of Appeals before resorting to the Supreme Court although it has original jurisdiction over the same petition.

Also, under BP 129, the Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction over certiorari, prohibition, mandamus whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. The qualifying phrase whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction is not found in the Constitution. Similarly under BP 129, this phrase is not found

in the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over the same cases.So why is there such a qualifying phrase? Take note of the Judiciary Act

of 1948, where the Court of Appeals was also given original jurisdiction to try certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus but only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. When BP 129 was enacted, it desired to give the Court of Appeals original jurisdiction whether or not it is in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, hence, the change or amendment.

Does the law still use the qualifying phrase in aid of its appellate jurisdiction in allocating the power to try certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus? The answer is YES, when it comes to the Sandiganbayan which tries petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus cases, but only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

When it comes to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, there seems to be an inconsistency between the constitutional provision on this matter, and that contained in the Judiciary Act of 1948. The constitution says, that the Supreme Court shall have the power to review, revise, modify or affirm on appeal or on certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, cases involving, then there is an enumeration of five sentences, such as the constitutionally or validity of a treaty, law, executive order, where the jurisdiction of an inferior court is in controversy and so on. In the Judiciary Act of 1948, it is expressly provided that the appellate jurisdiction over these cases is exclusive.

In other words, while the Constitution gives to the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over these cases, the Constitution does not tell us whether the appellate jurisdiction is exclusive. Unlike in the Judiciary Act of 1948, it seems that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over the cases mentioned in the Constitution - that is, the power to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal in cases mentioned in the Constitution - is no longer exclusive. It is plainly the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. It means to say, there is nothing wrong if the Court of Appeals, for instance, decides to take cases brought to it on appeal. After all, the decisions of the Court of Appeals can still be reviewed by the Supreme Court through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

In the enumeration of cases cognizable by the Court of Appeals, BP 129 makes use of the descriptive words original and exclusive, when it comes to the authority of the Court of Appeals to annul judgments of the Regional Trial Court. So BP 129 says, that the Court of Appeals exercise original and exclusive jurisdiction to annul judgments rendered by the Regional Trial Courts. When the law says original and exclusive - well, the message is simple - it is only the Court of Appeals that can try and decide at the first instance a case involving the annulment of a decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court.

In other words, a petition to annul a judgment rendered by a Regional Trial Court and filed before the Supreme Court will not be entertained by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain at first instance a petition to annul a judgment of the Regional Trial Court. It is only the Court of Appeals which is vested with authority to annul a judgment rendered by the RTC.

Since the Court of Appeals can annul a judgment rendered by the RTC, then does it follow that the Court of Appeals can also annul the judgment rendered by the Metropolitan Trial Court? The answer is NO. The annotation of jurisdiction under BP 129 is that a petition to annul a judgment rendered by trial courts to the Court of Appeals is limited to judgments rendered by the Regional Trial Court. It does not extend to annulment of judgments rendered by an inferior court, by the Metropolitan Trial Court.

Now for purposes of annulment of judgments, all you have to do is to turn your Rules of Court to Rule 47.

Does it mean to say now that a decision of an inferior court, the Metropolitan Trial Court, is immune from annulment because BP 129 speaks only about the Court of Appeals annulling judgments of the Regional Trial Court? Well, if you read Rule 47, the answer is NO. In the last section of Rule 47, it is provided that annulment of judgment rendered by an inferior court (MTC), is cognizable by

the Regional Trial Court.Where did the Supreme Court get the idea that a judgment rendered by an

inferior court would also be the subject of petition to annul the judgment and confer it upon a Regional Trial Court? If you read BP 129, there is nothing mentioned in BP 129 about the annulment of judgment rendered by an inferior court. BP 129 speaks only about annulment of a judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court. So, it would be logical, and others will agree, that since BP 129 speaks only about annulment of a judgment of the Regional Trial Court, there is no such thing as annulment of judgment rendered by an inferior court.

But again, here comes the last Section of Rule 47, which tells us that there could be a petition for the annulment of a judgment rendered by an inferior court. What is the justification for including this section in Rule 47, considering that jurisdiction is substantive law and not a matter of procedure, over which the Supreme Court has authority? Then, the justification is that under BP 129, the Regional Trial Court is a court of general jurisdiction. As a court of general jurisdiction, the Regional Trial Court, can try and decide all kinds of cases and controversies, which are not allocated especially to other courts.

What is now the justification in saying, that a Regional Trial Court is a court of general jurisdiction? Does BP 129 say so? The answer is NO. BP 129 does not tell us expressly that the Regional Trial Court is a court of general jurisdiction. While BP 129 does not tell us expressly that the Regional Trial Court is a court of general jurisdiction; there is however, a mention that Regional Trial Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over all types of cases and issues, which are not especially allocated to other courts. That is the justification for considering that the Regional Trial Court is a court of general jurisdiction.

In this context, the Supreme Court cannot be considered as a court of a general jurisdiction. The Supreme Court is a court of limited jurisdiction. If were going to follow also BP 129, the Court of Appeals is a court of limited jurisdiction. Municipal Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts are also courts of limited jurisdiction. It is only the Regional Trial Court that is considered as a court of general jurisdiction because of the vesting of allocation of authority unto Regional Trial Courts, over all kinds of cases that have not been especially allocated to the other courts. We do not find a similar vesting upon the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or inferior courts.

We must also consider, in relation to jurisdiction, that it is axiomatic in procedure that jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law. We have come across this axiom several times that jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law. That is not a very accurate statement of the principle of jurisdiction.

It is jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of the action that is a matter of substantive law. But when it comes to the jurisdiction over the person of the parties, the jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, jurisdiction over the res, or jurisdiction over the issues, these aspects of jurisdiction are no longer substantive in character. They are purely procedural. So what is covered only by substantive law is jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of the case. The other aspects of jurisdiction, jurisdiction over the person of the litigants, jurisdiction over the issues, jurisdiction over the res or the thing involved, is a matter of procedure. Thats why we find in the Rules of Court provisions concerning service of summons, for service of summons affects jurisdiction of a court over the person of the defendant. That is no longer the turf of substantive law. BP 129 allocates jurisdiction unto the various courts - enumerated in the law, and this refers to jurisdiction over the subject matter of the litigation, or over that nature of the case.

While the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court exercise appellate jurisdiction, the same is true with Regional Trial Courts. The Regional Trial Courts also exercise original and appellate jurisdiction. In our judicial system there is only one court, which exercises plainly original jurisdiction - that is, the Municipal Trial Court or Metropolitan Trial Court.

It is not hard to understand why a Metropolitan Trial court cannot be co

nferred appellate jurisdiction, just like the Regional Trial Court or the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. Its because there is no court lower than the Metropolitan Trial Court so it cannot be allocated appellate jurisdiction power to review decisions rendered by other courts.

When it comes to appellate jurisdiction, you will notice that the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is much broader than the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Generally, when you are faced with a problem on appeal, your first instinct should always be that the proper appellate court is the Court of Appeals. If you go through BP 129 or the Constitution, the Supreme Court exercises appellate jurisdiction over various instances. In fact, when a decision is rendered by a quasi-judicial body, chances are the decision of this quasi-judicial body or agency is reviewable not by the Supreme Court but by the Court of Appeals, as a general rule. So your first instinct whenever it comes to a question of appellate jurisdiction is that, the Court of Appeals exercises appellate jurisdiction. For this matter, you have to read Sec. 9 of BP 129, which tells us the scope of the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, compared to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

Now we go to the Regional Trial Court. The original jurisdiction of a Regional Trial Court is divided by BP 129 into two parts - purely original jurisdiction, and the original and exclusive jurisdiction. So the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, when it comes to purely original jurisdiction, is limited to cases of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and its original jurisdiction over cases involving ambassadors, public ministers and consuls. It is in the exercise of original and exclusive jurisdiction where BP 129 enumerates several instances cognizable by the Regional Trial Court.

The first civil action cognizable by the Regional Trial Court exercising exclusive original jurisdiction covers cases which are not capable of pecuniary estimation. BP 129 does not give us the standard or yardstick in ascertaining whether or not a civil action is capable of pecuniary estimation. So we have to depend on jurisprudence on cases decided by the Supreme Court, where the standard, if we are going to summarize the cases decided by the Supreme Court, is that, if the recovery of money is only incidental to the relief that is prayed for in the complaint, that action is not capable of pecuniary estimation.

The usual example given is that, a complaint for specific performance plus a prayer for recovery of damages. There is a prayer for recovery of damages it is true, but it is not the principal relief that is sought by the plaintiff so that, where the case is for specific performance, that is a civil action which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, hence, cognizable exclusively by the Regional Trial Court.

But there are instances where the recovery of money is the principal relief that is sought in the complaint or the petition, and yet the case is classified as one which is not capable of pecuniary estimation. For instance, in an expropriation proceedings or eminent domain, it is not correct to say that the recovery of money is the principal relief. Payment of just compensation is one of the principal reliefs that will be sought by petitioner.

Another example is the foreclosure of real estate mortgage. If a mortgagee files a complaint for the foreclosure of mortgage, and the mortgage is founded upon contract of loan which has not been paid, a contract of loan that has been defaulted, the principal purpose of the mortgagee in filing a petition to foreclose a mortgage is to recover this unpaid loan. In fact, in a foreclosure of real estate mortgage, if the debtor pays the loan, the foreclosure proceedings will become academic, they will be mooted and they will have to be dismissed. So in a foreclosure of real estate mortgage that is founded on a contract of loan which has not been paid, the complaint foreclosure of mortgage will always carry with it a relief for the payment of the loan. In these instances, since it is pretty obvious that the purpose of the plaintiff is to recover a sum of money, does it not mean to say now that foreclosure of real estate mortgage is an action which is capable of pecuniary estimation

? Well according to the Supreme Court, even if the principal purpose for the foreclosure of mortgage is to recover an unpaid loan, still, foreclosure of mortgage is an action which is not capable of pecuniary estimation. We apply that same principle to expropriation proceedings. Even if the purpose is expropriating properly is to pay just compensation which is always in terms of pesos and centavos, the complaint for expropriation cannot be considered as an action that is capable of pecuniary estimation. The case is still an action, which is not capable of pecuniary estimation. Why is this so? There are two instances where the recovery of money is the principal issue that is the sought by the complaint or the petition, and yet we dont consider these actions as actions that are capable of pecuniary estimation. The answer is, in these two actions, there is another principal issue that is involved. And this other principal issue must first be decided before the recovery of money, which is another principal issue to be resolved by the Court. In foreclosure of mortgage, the first principal issue that should first be resolved by the Court is whether or not the mortgagee has the right to foreclose. Is that capable of pecuniary estimation? Of course that is not capable of pecuniary estimation. Also in expropriation proceedings, the first principal issue is, whether or not the plaintiff has the right to expropriate. So that is always the issue that must be resolved by the Court in expropriation proceedings, whether or not the plaintiff possesses the right to expropriate the property. Again, that question is not capable of pecuniary estimation. So the second principal issue that revolves around the payment of money cannot be determined by the Court unless this first issue is resolved. Can not the Court in a foreclosure proceeding order the payment of the loan, and then decide the issue of foreclosure? Is that possible? Before the Court can resolve the issue of payment of the loan, the Court must first adjudicate the issue of whether or not the plaintiff has the right to foreclose. Now we apply the same principle in expropriation. Can not the court immediately order the payment of just compensation and then later on decide whether or not the plaintiff has the right to expropriate? It is not possible. The court must first determine whether or not the plaintiff has the right to expropriate, and if there is affirmative ruling that is the only instance where the court can rule on the issue of payment of just compensation. One of the cases allocated to the RTC exercising exclusive and original jurisdiction is a real action, a case involving title to or possession of real property where the assessed value exceeds P20,000 or P50,000 as the case may be. Going back to the examples we had a while ago, that is the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage, and expropriation of real property, do we not consider foreclosure of real estate mortgage and expropriation of real property as real actions? Dont they involve title to or possession of real property? Of course, they do because expropriation of real property, the State or the expropriating agency of the State takes over the possession of real property. The same is true with foreclosure of real estate mortgage. The collateral, the security, is going to be sold at public auction, and the ownership and possession of the collateral will be taken over by the highest bidder. So, do we now classify expropriation of real property and foreclosure of real estate mortgage as real actions? The answer is YES, they are so classified. But then, if they are so classified, why can we not make the case fall within the jurisdiction of the inferior court where the assessed value of the real property does not exceed P20,000 or P50,000, as the case may be? Well, the answer is we cannot do that because it is also one which is capable of pecuniary estimation. In other words, if an action possesses several characteristics, that, the issue is one that is not capable of pecuniary estimation but it is also simultaneously a real action, it is always cognizable by the RTC. In other words, that feature of not capable of pecuniary estimation will always prevail over the other characteristics of the action being a real action. That is the reason why foreclos

ure of real estate mortgage or expropriation of real property will always be cognizable by the RTC. We do not factor in the assessed value of the property in ascertaining the jurisdiction of courts. If the real property involved in litigation does not have an assessed value, could that happen? The answer is YES. There are several properties in the country which have not been assessed for tax purposes. In other words, they dont have any assessed valuation at all in the office of the municipal or city assessor or the provincial assessor. So, how do we now know / determine the jurisdiction of the court if the property involved has no assessed value? Well, all you have to do is to go to the neighboring lots, until you locate the property that has an assessed value. And that will be the basis in ascertaining the jurisdiction of the court. But we should note that assessed valuation of the property plays an important role in determining the jurisdiction of the court, only if the property is real property. But when the property is personal property, we can forget about assessed value as the basis in determining the jurisdiction of the court. You see, in our system, we dont generally base assessed valuation to personal property. So, if the case is for the recovery of a car, the jurisdiction of the court will not be based on the assessed value or even the market value of the car. Now, if the plaintiff seeks to recover property, a car, how do we determine the jurisdiction of the court? Jurisdiction is determined by the valuation given by the plaintiff to the car. So, if the plaintiff in the complaint says that the car is worth P500,000, then the case is cognizable by the RTC. Supposing that the valuation given by the plaintiff of P500,000 is really bloated. It is unreasonable. Will the case still fall within the jurisdiction of the RTC? The answer is YES. Jurisdiction of the court in the recovery of personal property will depend on the valuation given by the plaintiff in his complaint. But in our system, after the filing of the complaint, the defendant is given the chance to present his side by responding to the complaint by filing an answer. Can not the defendant in his answer now set-up the defense that the court does not have jurisdiction because the legitimate value of the car is only P150,000? The answer is NO. The jurisdiction of the court when it comes to the recovery of personal property, or for the recovery of money for that matter, will depend on the allegations contained in the complaint. Even if the valuation given is exaggerated or bloated, the jurisdiction of the court will always be ascertained by allegations contained in the complaint. Does it mean to say then that in personal actions, the jurisdiction of the court would rely solely on the whim and caprice of the plaintiff? The answer is YES. All he has to do is to bloat his claim if he wants to have the case filed before the RTC. If the debtor owes the creditor only P150,000 but in his complaint the creditor says that the debtor owes him P1M, that the case will be cognizable by the RTC. For the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of the court, we rely solely on the allegation embodied in the complaint. We do not take into account the truthfulness or falsity of these allegations. The truthfulness or falsity will be determined later on by the court but that will not affect the jurisdiction of the court. That is simply the principle of adherence of jurisdiction. Once a court acquires jurisdiction over a case based on the allegations contained in the complaint, the court continues to exercise jurisdiction until the case is finally adjudicated. We should always remember that the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts has been expanded. So, even admiralty and maritime cases are now cognizable by the inferior courts depending on the amount involved. In the law providing for expanded jurisdiction of inferior courts, in RA7691 which was enacted in 1994, there is a section which says that five years from the effectivity of the law, the amount will be increased in so far as Metro Manila courts are concerned from P200,000 to P400,000 and then, for inferior courts outside Metro Manila from P100,000 to P200,000. That was in 1999. There is also a provision which says that for the second five-year period, the jurisdiction of inferior courts shall be increased to P300,000. I thing we are in the second-five year period. As of no

w, the jurisdiction of inferior courts outside Metro Manila should be raised to P300,000, but with respect to Metro Manila inferior courts the jurisdictional amount will be P400,000. In classroom examinations, it is a standard question to ask whether or not a complaint for the recovery of P1M is cognizable by a RTC or by an inferior court. Most of the time, the answer given is the whole claim is cognizable by the RTC. Thats NOT correct. Under the expanded jurisdiction of inferior courts, there are three items that should be excluded in the determining the courts jurisdiction when it comes to recovery of money, interests, attorneys fees, damages and charges of whatsoever kind should not be included in ascertaining jurisdiction of the court, but they should be included in fixing filing fees. So, if the complaint is for the recovery of the plaintiff of P1M, it is not correct to say right away that the case is cognizable by the RTC. That case could be cognizable by the inferior court depending on the details of P1M embodied in the complaint. If the principal sought to be recovered is only P200,000 but the balance of P800,000 covers expenses, attorneys fees, damages and interests, the case is cognizable by an inferior court. So we always factor in the excluded items in determining the jurisdiction of courts whenever it comes to the recovery of money. Do not jump to the conclusion right away that the complaint for the recovery of more than P200,000 is cognizable by the RTC. That amount of P400,000 pertains only to the principal sought to be recovered by the plaintiff. If the amount in excess of P400,000 will already include expenses, attorneys fees, and other charges, there is a chance that that case will be cognizable by an inferior court. In certain cases, the problem that comes out where the plaintiff fills a complaint for the recovery of the principal sum of P500,000 before the RTC, and during the hearing, the plaintiff introduces evidence which convinces the court that the plaintiff is entitles not only to P500,000 but to P1M. The first inquiry is, could it be done? Could a complaint for the recovery of P500,000 and up, but with an award of P1M because is what the evidence has clearly demonstrated? The answer is YES. If there is a complaint to recover P500,000, the plaintiff can introduce evidence to show that he is entitled not only to P500,000 but to P1M. That is allowed, if the defendant does not object to the presentation of this evidence. The pertinent rule is Rule 10 when it comes to this situation, the provision in Rule 10 on amendment to conform to evidence. So, if there is a complaint for the recovery of P500,000 and the plaintiff introduces evidence that he is entitled to P1M, and there is no objection that is interposed by the defendant, the court will admit the evidence. And after admitting the evidence, the court can give an award of P1M, although that is not the figure that is sought by the plaintiff in his complaint. Supposing that in the same case, the plaintiff seeks to recover P500,000. So, the case is filed before the RTC. During the trial, the plaintiff is able to prove that his entitlement is only P150,000, which is below the jurisdictional amount of the RTC. Can the RTC render validly a judgment for the payment of P150,000? The answer is YES. That is the principle of adherence to jurisdiction. Once the court acquires jurisdiction over the case, the court continues to exercise jurisdiction until its final adjudication. If we start with a complaint of P500,000 but the amount that should be awarded is only P150,000, the RTC has jurisdiction to ve that award of P150,000 even if this amount is below the jurisdictional amount given in BP 129. If it is the other way around, then we follow the principle of ancillary jurisdiction. Here is a complaint for the recovery of P150,000. The case is cognizable by an inferior court. During the trial, the plaintiff presents evidence to show that he is entitled not only to P150,000, but to P700,000. Can the inferior court give an award of P700,000? The answer is NO. This time, the inferior court cannot give an award of P700,000 because the inferior court will be violation its limited jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the inferior court is limited to either P200,000 or P400,000. So, that rule works only if it is a RTC thats trying the case, the value could be reduced. But when the case is before an inferior court and the amount to

be awarded goes beyond the jurisdictional amount given in BP 129, the court cannot give an award of P700,000. What should the plaintiff do if he is able to prove that he is entitled to P700,000 but the court cannot give an award for this amount? Well, one of the options given to the plaintiff is just waive his entitlement to the excess of P400,000 because the inferior court can give an award of up to P400,000 or P300,000, as the case may be. But if he insists a ward of P700,000, that decision will be null and void because it goes beyond the jurisdictional limits given by BP 129 to an inferior court. You should also take note that the jurisdiction of the RTC in cases that used to be adjudicated by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court which were allocated to the RTC has also been changed, given the creation of Family Courts which exercise exclusive and original jurisdiction over these cases: guardianship, adoption, family-related cases. They are now cognizable by the Family Courts. They are no longer entertained by the RTC. When it comes to jurisdiction of inferior courts, which we say has already been expanded, can we now assert rightfully that inferior courts should also be treated as courts of general jurisdiction because of their expanded jurisdiction, i.e., maritime cases, probate, etc. Practically all cases that are triable by the RTC could not be tried by an inferior court, depending on the amount involved. Does it not make these courts, courts of general jurisdiction? The answer is NO. Even if we take into account the expanded jurisdiction of inferior courts, they are still courts of limited jurisdiction. As we said earlier, it is only the CFI that is vested with authority to try and decide cases of any kind, which are not allocated to other courts. This provision is not contained in the allocation of cases given to inferior courts by BP 129 and the amendatory statutes. In the jurisdiction of inferior courts, in section 33, BP 129, you should memorize the very short provision, the qualifying phrase which embodies the totality test in jurisdiction. There is a totality test also contained in the Rules of Court but is a very simple one. The complete totality test in determining jurisdiction is found in BP 129 that is in sec. 33. Now, it says that the totality of all the claims shall be the basis in determining jurisdiction, that is the totality of all claims embodied in one complaint, shall be the test in determining jurisdiction, whether or not these claims arise out of the same or different transaction, or whether they belong to the same or different persons. That is the complete totality test in determining jurisdiction, which is not the totality test that is embodied in the Rules of Court. Is it proper for BP 129 to provide the totality test in determining jurisdiction? The answer is YES, because jurisdiction over the subject matter and nature of the action is really substantive law. That is a prerogative given exclusively to the legislature. So, if you feel that there is any inconsistency between the totality test contained in the Rules of Court and that contained in BP 129, the totality test in BP 129 should always prevail whether or not the claims belong to the same or different persons, and whether or not these claims arise out of the same or different transaction. As long as they embodied properly in one complaint, the totality of all the claims shall be the basis in determining the jurisdiction of the court. Inferior courts also are given what we call delegated jurisdiction. That is to try land registration and cadastral cases, regardless of the value, if the case is uncontested. The delegation should be limited to properties the values of which do not exceed P100,000. In the vesting of delegated jurisdiction to inferior courts, we should also notice that the appeal from these cases should not be to the RTC. The cadastral and land registration cases are tried by an inferior court. The inferior court acts as if it were a RTC. So, if theres an appeal from these cases, it should be brought to the Court of Appeals. This is the only lone instance in the Rules on appeal, where appeal from a decision rendered by an inferior court is taken directly to the Court of Appeals. Generally, decisions rendered by an inferior court are appealable to the RTC. We follow in appeals the step ladder approach, so from the inferior court we go to the RTC, from the RTC we go to the Court of Appea

ls. But not when the inferior court exercises its delegated jurisdiction to try and decide cadastral and land registration cases. There is also the vesting of interlocutory jurisdiction, or what BP 129 calls special jurisdiction of inferior courts, that is to habeas corpus cases when judges of the RTCs in that region are absent. This is an exercise of special jurisdiction by inferior courts. In the matter of jurisdiction, you must have met also the term primary jurisdiction. BP 129 does not use the word or the term primary jurisdiction. This term is used in special legislation, like the Agrarian Reform Code. In the Agrarian Reform Code, it is provided that primary jurisdiction over land reform cases shall be exercised by the Department of Agrarian Reform. So what does primary jurisdiction mean in relation to the concept of jurisdiction given in BP 129? Primary jurisdiction refers to situations where the case is cognizable both by the court of justice and a quasi-judicial or administrative agency. But when that case needs for its resolution special skills and expertise of an administrative or quasi-judicial body, then jurisdiction should be given initially to the quasi-judicial body or administrative agency. The jurisdiction of the court can only come later after the administrative or quasi-judicial body has decided the case. So whenever the adjudication of litigation needs expertise, the special skills which are not possessed by regular courts of justice, primary jurisdiction should be given to the administrative agency or quasi-judicial body. We also met the term residual jurisdiction in our study of BP 129. Residual jurisdiction is one that is left to be exercised by the trial court after the case has been appealed to the higher court. The concept of residual jurisdiction refers to a situation where a case decided by trial courts has been appealed. Generally, our concept is that when a case has been appealed, the jurisdiction over the appealed case is now vested with the appellate court, which is correct. But there are certain incidents that could still be decided by the trial court, notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal. These incidents that would still be decided by the trial court after the perfection of the appeal are covered by Rule 41 and Rule 42, called as the residual jurisdiction of the trial court. Now, we go to the Rules of Court. I suggest that you read BP 129, and relate these several sections of BP 129 with the Judiciary Act of 1948 when you study civil actions. You have concentrated too much on your textbooks. There are many provisions of BP 129 and the Judiciary Act of 1948 which are not really touched by our textbooks. Although they are self-explanatory, they should also be read. Anyway, these laws are very short. They are not lengthy. The Rules of Court on civil actions, the subject of this lecture, is part one of the Rules of Court, which is a product of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court is given the authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice and procedure. These rules of court are designed to be procedural in nature. Although they are procedural in nature, there are some provisions in the Rules of Court which acts upon substantive rights of persons. An example is in Criminal Procedure. There is a rule dedicated only to the rights of the accused. It does not mean that the Rules of Court is substantive simply because there are some provisions which cover the rights of a person. In the same way that we cannot consider the Civil Code as procedural, simply because there provisions in the Civil Code which refer to the issuance for instance of injunction whereas the concept of injunction is purely procedural. But even if we find them in the Civil Code, it does not mean to say that the Civil Code is a procedural law. The Civil Code, notwithstanding these provisions on some procedural principles, remains to be substantive in character. So in the same way in the Rules of Court, they contain provisions pertaining to the rights of a person, but it does not mean that the Rules of Court have now been converted to substantive law. It remains to be purely procedural. The first part of the Rules of Court gives us the manner by which it is going to be interpreted. Unlike other laws, the Rules of Court should be liberally construed not in favor of the plaintiff, not in favor of the defendant, not in favor of anybody but for the sole purpose of providing for a speedy and inexpensive disposition of the case. So, we interpret the Rules of Court liberally, nei

ther in favor of the plaintiff nor the defendant. But according to the Supreme Court, there are certain provisions of the Rules which cannot be interpreted liberally. There are certain provisions which public policy requires to be applied and interpreted strictly, so that the speedy adjudication of cases will not be impaired. A good example of a procedural principle which will always be applied strictly is the procedure on appeal of cases. The Supreme Court has been very emphatic in saying that when it comes to appealed cases, the dates provided to perfect an appeal should be applied strictly. Can the Courts disregard the application of the Rules of Court if the courts feel that its application will lead to injustice? The answer is no. It is only the Supreme Court that can waive the application of the Rules of Court if the Supreme Court feels that its application will lead to an injustice. But the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts and the inferior courts cannot disregard the Rules of Court even if these courts feel that the application of the Rules will lead to an injustice. It is only the Supreme Court that is given the privilege, the waiver of the application of the Rules of Court. Well its not that hard to understand why the Supreme Court is given this authority. After all, the Rules of Court is a product of the Supreme Court. Take note of the limitations concerning the prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules in pleadings, practice and procedure. And the first limitation is that the rule should be uniform in all courts of the same grade, so that they should have one set of rules applicable to all trial courts, RTCs or inferior courts. There are certain instances when special rules can be promulgated by the Supreme Court in the adjudication of cases. A good example is the rule on summary procedure. That applies principally to cases that are triable by inferior courts. Then another limitation is the Rules of Court should not modify, limit or increase substantive rights given by substantive law. By way of history, we should also note that the rules on civil actions that took effect on 1 July 1997. Before 1997, we have the interim Rules of Court. The interim rules were promulgated by the Supreme Court following the enactment of the Judiciary Reorganization Act, BP 129. Prior to the interim rules of court, we had the rules of court which took effect on 1 January 1964. And before 1 January 1964, we had the rules of court which took effect on 1 July 1940. So between 1940 and 1964, we had the same set of procedural rules. Actions in the rules of Court are classified expressly in Rule 1 into: Criminal actions, civil actions, and special proceedings. The other classification of action in the Rules of Court are scattered in the different parts of the Rules. For instance, a real action and personal action are both mentioned in Rule 4, for purposes of venue. An action in rem and an action in personam are mentioned in Rule 39, sec. 47. So, when you meet these terms, personal action and real action; action in rem and action in personam, all you have to do is to refer to Rule 4 when it comes to personal and real actions, and then action in rem and action in personam under Rule 39, specifically sec. 47, which is execution of judgments. Although sec. 47 does not use the word in rem, it does not also use the word in personam, but the concept of judgments in rem and in personam are embodied in Rule 39, sec. 47. Jurisprudence has created sub-classifications, like an action quasi-in rem to distinguish it from an action which is pure in re, and an action which is purely in personam. Jurisprudence also created another classification when it comes to real and personal actions into mixed actions. So when an action vests the characteristics of personal and real actions, court decisions call this action as a mixed action. Is it important for a litigant to know the classification of his action, whether it is a special civil action or special proceeding, or whether the action is real or personal, or whether the action is in rem or in personam? The answer is YES. If the action under real or personal, different rules on venue should have to be applied. If the action is in rem or in personam, the effect of the judgment will be different. Can an action be in rem and a personal action at the same time? Can an ac

tion be in rem and real action at the same time? The answer is YES. You see the basis for classifying these actions into real or personal, in rem or in personam are different from one another. As we have mentioned, real and personal action are based on their privity to the kind of property involved, whether the property involved is real or personal property. When it comes to in rem or in personam, the basis of classifying these actions is the binding effect of the judgment. If the judgment will bind anybody who has an interest in the case, then the action is one that is in rem. If it is purely in personal, the binding effect of the judgment is limited only to the parties involved or the successors in interest. How do we classify an action for the recovery of real property (that is accion reinvidicatoria)? Is it a real or personal action? Of course, it is a real action because it involves title to or possession of real property. Is it in rem or is it in personam, or is it a case that cannot be classified as in rem or in personam? Accion reinvidicatoria, although it is a real action, is an action in personam. When the action involves real property, title to or possession of real property, it is always a real action. But it does not mean to say that it is an action in rem, because the judgment in an accion reinvidicatoria will bind only the plaintiff and the defendant and their successors in interest. Accion reinvidicatoria is filed by A against B, for the recovery of title to a piece of land. Let us say that the judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff as the owner of the land. Judgment is now final and executory. So A is now the owner of the land. Later on, can X, a third party, file a complaint against A for the recovery of the ownership of that same land? The answer is YES, because X is not bound by the judgment in the first case between A and B. Here is an action that involves title to or possession of real property, which is classified still as action in personam. Judgment will bind only the plaintiff and the defendant and their successors in interest. The usual example in textbooks about an action in rem is a land registration or cadastral proceeding. I think that example is the source of answer to the effect that whenever an action involves title to or possession of real property, it should be classified as an action rem. A land registration and cadastral proceeding is really an action in rem. It is also a real action because it involves title to or possession of real property. But it does not mean to say that all actions involving title to or possession of real property are actions in rem. It is only land registration or cadastral proceeding, which is a real action, could be classified as action in rem. All other actions for recovery of title to or possession of real property, accion reinvidicatoria, they are real actions but they could not be classified as action in rem. They are simply classified as actions in personam. If an action or a proceeding involves personal property; therefore, it is classified as personal property. Could it also be an action in rem? The answer is YES. A good example is the intestate proceeding or the settlement of the estate of a deceased person. That is an action in rem, because the Civil Code says that an action for the probate of a will binds anybody that has an interest in the estate of the decedent. But if the estate of the decedent consists only of personal property, that action in rem should be classified as a personal action because it does not involve title to or possession of real property. The point is, when the Rules classify actions in rem, in personam, real or personal, it does not mean to say that when an action has been classified as in rem or in personam, they could no longer be classified into personal or real. Even if an action has been classified as in rem or in personam, they could still be further classified as real or personal action depending on the nature of the property. The classification of actions into in rem and in personam is also important in ascertaining whether or not jurisdiction could be obtained by the court after publication of summons that is in Rule 14. If an action starts as an action in personam, will it remain to be in personam throughout the life of the case? For instance, a good example of an action in personam is a complaint for the recovery of money filed by the creditor against the debtor. This is an action in personam. Will it remain to be in personam

throughout the life of the case? The answer is NO. If an action starts as an action in personam, it could converted into an action in rem or quasi-in rem depending on the conduct of the lawyer for the plaintiff, depending upon the plaintiff himself. How could we convert this action in personam into an action in rem or quasi-in rem? If you read Rule 57 on preliminary attachment, sec. 1 thereof provides that preliminary attachment could be issued in cases where the defendant could not be served with summons that is by personal or substituted service. Now, the rule is, in actions purely in personam, if the defendant could not be served with summons, either by personal or substituted service, the REMEDY of the plaintiff is to ask for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, and then attach the properties of the defendant so that the court will acquire jurisdiction to try the case at least over the attached properties. The attachment of the defendant will convert the action in personam into an action in rem or in quasi-in rem so that after the attachment of the properties of the defendant the plaintiff can now go in court and ask permission from the court to cause the publication of the summons, this will enable the court to acquire jurisdiction not over the person of the defendant but over the property he has been attached and the court can go ahead with the trial of the case. So, here is an instance where an action starts as an action in personam but it is converted into quai-in rem or in rem as the case may be. Could it be further re-converted into an action in personam? The answer again is YES. After the preliminary attachment of the property and the publication of summons, there are two possibilities: the first possibility is that the defendant will NOT answer at all. The other possibility is that the defendant will answer the complaint. If the defendant answers the complaint after the publication of the summons, the case is re-converted into in personam. So, a case starts as in personam, it is converted into in rem or quasi-in rem and after the filing of the responsive pleading, it is reconverted into an action in personam. But if the defendant does file a responsive pleading at all and the court does acquire jurisdiction over his person, then the case remains to be classified as an action quasi-in rem or in rem. Will it make a difference if this action is classified as in rem or quasi-in rem or it is now classified again as an action in personam? The answer is YES, it makes a lot of difference insofar as the decision, which the court could eventually render. If the defendant answers and therefore the case are converted from quasi-in rem to in personam, the court can render a judgment that will direct the defendant to pay the obligation as proven by the plaintiff. Lets give figures. The complaint is for the recovery of P1M. So the case is being tried by the RTC. If theres no response from the defendant after the properties of the defendant have been attached, the case will be treated as an action quasi-in rem. The court has the authority to decide the case. But after the trial, if the plaintiff is able to prove the existence and validity of his claim, the court cannot render a judgment directing the defendant to pay P1M to the plaintiff. The award of the court will be limited to the value of the property that has been attached. So if the value of the property that has been attached in only P200,000 that is the limit, which the court can award in that case. But if we reconvert the action quasi-in rem into an action in personam by virtue of the appearance of the defendant or by virtue of his filing a responsive pleading, the court later on can render a judgment directing the defendant to pay P1M. What is the justification for this difference in the manner by which the court can give the award? The reason is that when the action remains to be quasi-in rem, the jurisdiction of the court is limited only to the property that has been attached, so the jurisdiction of the court is limited to awarding to the plaintiff the value of the attached properties. But if the defendant appears or files an answer, the jurisdiction of the court will not be limited to the property attached, the jurisdiction of the court will extend to the person of the defendant and, therefore, the court can render a judgment directing the defendant to pay the entirety of the claim.

In our system, an action is always commenced by the filing of a complaint and, the rule is very clear, that an action is commenced by the filing of the original complaint. So if the complaint is later on amended under Rule 10, whether as a matter of discretion on the part of the court, the commencement of the action is always reckoned not from filing of the amended complaint but from the filing of the original complaint. The rules also tell us that if an additional defendant is impleaded thereafter, in so far as the additional defendant is concerned the filing of the complaint is reckoned from the date of the filing of the original complaint. The justification for this difference in the treatment by the Rules is in order to observe the rules on prescription in so far as the additional defendant is concerned the period of prescription should be counted from the time that the amended complaint is filed by the plaintiff. You are also familiar with the doctrine that even if a complaint has been filed a court will not be able to acquire jurisdiction over the case if the docket fees have not been paid. The failure to pay docket fees will deprive the court an authority to hear and decide the case. But in subsequent rulings of the court, if there is failure to pay the correct docket fees, as long as the plaintiff pays the correct docket fees within the prescriptive period, the court will acquire jurisdiction. So, what is strictly followed is the non-payment at all of docket fees. If the docket fees are not paid at all the court the court is deprived of jurisdiction to try the case, but if docket fees are incorrectly paid the plaintiff is given a chance to rectify his error, pay the correct docket fees and the court will be considered as having acquired jurisdiction from the time of the filing of the original complaint. Before a plaintiff files a case in court, the natural assumption is that the plaintiff has a grievance against the defendant. A person will not go to court and sue somebody else unless this person feels that his right has been violated by this other person, and this situation gives rise to the concept of a cause of action. You will note that the Rules say that for every civil action, thats an ordinary civil action, but in Rule1 there is a classification of civil actions into ordinary and special civil actions. But when it comes to the statement of the doctrine on the existence of a cause of action, the law says that for every ordinary civil action there must be a cause of action. Does it mean to say that when the action is a special civil action there is no longer a need for a cause of action? That will not be a correct assumption. The only reason why the Rules emphasize that there must always be a cause of action to support an ordinary civil action is because there are certain special civil actions, which can be filed in court even without a cause of action. So it is not possible to draft a rule which says that in all civil actions there must be a cause of action. Its not possible for the court to do that. The Rules also enumerate the special civil actions, and we will take this up later. There are at least two special civil actions, which can be filed properly even if there is no cause of action. Meaning to say, that ever, if the plaintiff has not suffered any violation of his right, he can nonetheless, file this special civil actions. The first is complaint for interpleader, which is the first special civil action. The other one is a petition for declaratory relief which is another special civil action. In interpleader and declaratory relief, there is no cause of action that is alleged in the complaint. In interpleader and declaratory relief, the plaintiff does not allege that he has a right and that this right has been violated by the defendant. Do we apply the same principle to the other special civil actions? The answer is NO. Another special civil action is forcible entry and unlawful detainer. In forcible entry and unlawful detainer, the plaintiff cannot file a complaint for forcible entry unless he alleges the plaintiff alleges that he has a right to possess the property and that this right has been violated by the defendant. So in the existence of a cause of action, if the civil action is an ordinary civil action there must always be a cause of action, otherwise the complaint is going to be dismissed under Rule 16. Failure to allege a cause of action is

one of the grounds for the dismissal of a civil case. But when the civil action is a special civil action there may or may not be a need for the existence of a cause of action. Again, there are two special civil actions whose filing is appropriate even if the plaintiff does not allege that he has a right which has been violated by the defendant. The definition of a cause of action will give us the impression that the defendant must have violated the right of the plaintiff. Is it necessary that the plaintiff wait for the actual violation of his right before he can file a complaint in court? The answer is NO. You have to relate the definition of a cause of action to the definition in Rule 2, to the definition of an action that is contained in Rule 1. In Rule 1 an action is defined as one filed in court for the protection or enforcement of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong. So even before a wrong is committed, as long as there is a threat to violate the right of the plaintiff, the plaintiff can now go ahead and file a complaint in court. So even if the Rules say that a cause of action consist of a violation of a right by the defendant, the plaintiff does not have to wait until his right is actually violated before he could go to court. One of the purposes of a civil action is to prevent the commission of a wrong that will violate the right of the plaintiff. A good example is a complaint for injunction. In injunction, the plaintiff will allege that the defendant is threatening to violate his right. So there is no actual violation yet at the time of the filing of the complaint for injunction. The definition in the Rules of a cause of action will give us the idea that a cause of action consist really of two essentials. The first one is the existence of a right, and then the second is of course the violation or a threat to violate the right. Is it necessary or is it essential for the plaintiff also to allege that as a result of the violation of his right, that he has suffered damages? The answer is NO. The Rules only require that there is a right and that this right has been violated. The plaintiff can go to court properly even if he does not allege that he has suffered damages as a result of the violation of the right. We take the provisions of the Civil Code as an example. In the Civil Code, for breach of contract the remedy suggested by the Civil Code that is it right of action suggested by the Civil Code is specific performance or rescission of contract with of contract with damages in either case. The Civil Code does not say that if the creditor or the right holder files a complaint for specific performance or a complaint for rescission of contract, he must always accompany his claim for the payment of damages that is left entirely to the discretion of the right holder. So he can file ac complaint for specific performance without including a claim for the payment of damages. He can also file a complaint for rescission of contract even without incorporating in his complaint a claim for damages. So in civil cases, as long as the plaintiff alleges in his complaint that he has a right and then that right has been violated by the defendant, then he has cause of action. If these two essentials are present in the complaint, is it possible that this complaint does not adequately allege cause of action? The answer is also YES. Even if the complaint has alleged the two essentials that is the existence of a right and a violation of the right, it is possible that the complaint has not adequately alleged a cause of action. Why is this so? Because under our present Rules there are several conditions precedent required by these Rules before a cause of action could accrue. For instance, prior barangay conciliation is a condition precedent. Another one is arbitration clause in contracts, which contains this arbitration clause. Another one is the certificate of non-forum shopping, and another one is the requirement in the Civil Code that if the litigation is between members of the same family, earnest efforts towards a compromise must have been made before going to the court. So again, in a complaint if the plaintiff alleges that he has a right, his right has been violated, it may not be enough to establish a cause of action, he must also allege in his complaint that conditions precedent that are

required by law to be incorporated must be alleged. So if a creditor files a complaint against the debtor for the recovery of an unpaid loan, and the creditor alleges that he gave a loan, the loan has matured, but it has been unpaid by the defendant, but his case is covered by the requirement on prior barangay conciliation, the case will be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. If the creditor also files this complaint but in the contract of loan there is what we call an arbitration clause and then he goes to court without observing the provisions of the arbitration clause, the complaint will also be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. So you should always read carefully questions involving the existence or non-existence of a cause of action. The fact that the complaint has alleged the existence of a right, the violation of the right may not be enough to sufficiently allege a cause of action. Of course as we go further, we will learn that there are some civil cases, which are not covered by the rule let us say on prior barangay conciliation. There are certain civil actions, which do not come within the coverage on the requirement that in litigation between members of the same family, earnest efforts towards a compromise must first be made. But the rule is, you should wary about this conditions precedent that is established by other statutes. It is not enough to state in the complaint that a right exists and that this right has been violated. For this matter, if a case is covered by prior barangay conciliation and there is no allegation that this condition precedent has been satisfied, the absence of the allegation does not deprive the court of jurisdiction. The court still has jurisdiction over the case. The ground for dismissal will be founded on failure to state a cause of action. In numerous contracts or relations between and among citizens, the problem that usually arises is the number of causes of action that could be sourced from a violation of the right. Does the rule tell us that one wrongful act will give rise to only one cause of action? There is such statement in the Rules, so do not be misled by a statement which, for instance, could be found in some books, which says that one wrongful act will give rise only to one cause of action. One wrongful act could give rise to two or more causes of action, depending on the number of rights that are violated by this wrongful act, as long as these rights belong to different persons. This is illustrated by an old case, which you might have read in your study of Torts and Damages. A train belonging to the then Manila Railroad Company was passing by a village and sparks started to come out of the railroad tracks. These sparks caused three houses to be burned. The question was how many wrongful acts were committed by the Manila Railroad Company? There was only one wrongful act of negligence that is sparks came out of the railroad tracks owned by the Manila Railroad Company. Since three houses were burned, does it mean to say that there are three causes of action that accrued from this one wrongful act? The answer will depend on how many persons owned the three houses. If these three houses belong to three different individuals, this single wrongful act of the Manila Railroad Company gives rise to three causes of action because, three independent rights belonging to three different persons have been violated. So in this example, since three causes of action have accrued from a single wrongful act means to say that three complaints could be filed against the Manila Railroad Company. The rule is that for every cause of action, one complaint can be filed, therefore if there are two causes of action two complaints can be filed, if there are three causes of action three complaints could be filed. Supposing that there is just one contract between A and B but the contract between A and B require the performance of an obligation in separate installments. B, the debtor borrows money from A, the creditor, P1M. The obligation is payable on installment, let us say four equal installments of P250,000 each. The first installment will be defaulted. Will the default in the payment of the first installment give rise to one cause of action? The answer is YES. So, if the 1st installment will be defaulted tomorrow, next month the creditor can file 1 complaint for the recovery not of P1M but of P250,000, which is the amount that has

already matured and is unpaid by the debtor. Cannot the creditor recover the whole of the P1M under the example? The answer is NO, because the only amount that is due and payable is P250,000. The balance has not yet matured and the creditor has no right to enforce the collection of the balance of 750,000. Is it possible that the creditor after the default of the 1st installment can file a case for the recovery not of P250,000 but of the entirety of P1M? Well the answer is also YES, provided that in the contract there is what we cal in Civil Law as an acceleration clause. The default in one installment will cause the entirety of the obligation to become due. But in the absence of an acceleration clause, the rule is the default in the payment of one installment will give rise to one cause of action, so a complaint could be filed for the recovery of the defaulted installment. If the 2nd installment is also defaulted, then another complaint can be filed by the creditor because each installment due and unpaid will give rise to one cause of action. But the limitation to this rule is that if at time of the filing of the complaint all the installments have become due and are defaulted, only one complaint can be filed by the creditor. So in our example, if the P1M obligation of the debtor payable in installments has become due and demandable in its entirety at the time of the filing of the complaint, the creditor can file only one complaint for the recovery of P1M. If he files four separate complaints for the recovery of the four defaulted installments, he will be violating the rule on splitting a cause of action and it is possible that all the complaints will be dismissed by the court. So, the rule is: each installment due and unpaid will give rise to one cause of action. But if the time of the filing of the complaint, all installments have already become due only one complaint can thereafter be filed by the creditor. In the example, where the defendant binds himself to pay his P1M loan in four separate equal installments even before the 1st installment becomes due, can the creditor file a complaint for the recovery of any of the installments or of the entire obligation? Of course the answer is NO. He cannot because his right has not yet been violated before the maturity of the 1st installment. The creditor can expect to enforce payment only when the 1st installment matures. Before the maturity of the 1st installment, the plaintiff does not have a right to enforce / to compel payment by the debtor of the 1st installment. May there be a situation where the creditor can file a complaint for the recovery of the whole obligation even before maturity of the 1st installment or of the entire loan, as the case may be? Well, this situation is answered by that old case of Blossom vs. Manila Gas, which gave us the rule on anticipatory breach of contract. The general rule is that a creditor cannot compel the debtor to perform his obligation before maturity. But if the debtor tells the creditor before maturity that he has no intention at all of paying his obligation, then civil law considers that as a breach of contract. That is the principle of anticipatory breach enunciated in the case of Blossom vs. Manila Gas. In procedural law, it is called anticipatory breach; in civil law, it is simply referred to as one where the debtor loses the benefit of the period. In obligations with a period, the rule in civil law is that the period perceivably for the benefit of both the debtor and the creditor. If the debtor loses the benefit of a period, the obligation becomes due immediately. So this is simply the rule on anticipatory breach; it is simply an application of the civil law principle that if the debtor loses the benefit of the period then the obligation becomes due right away. In filing one complaint, founded on one cause of action, the plaintiff will be complying with the provisions of Rule 2. But if he files two or more complaints founded on the same cause of action, the plaintiff will be violating the Rules and the procedural principle that is violated is the rule against splitting a cause of action. Splitting a cause of action is the act of dividing one cause of action into several parts and making each part a basis for a separate complaint. In the illustration that we have given, if the creditor is entitled to recover from the debtor P1M, the creditor should file just one complaint to recover P1M plus the

interest, other charges and attorneys fees. But if the creditor files, let us say, two complaints to recover P1M. The creditor will be guilty of splitting a cause of action. If the creditor files a 1st complaint for the recovery of only P200,000 out of the P1M obligation and then later on he files another complaint for the recovery of the balance of P800,000, then that is clearly a case of splitting a cause of action, which is not allowed by the Rules. But if you are going to analyze the act of the creditor in filing the complaints, one for the recovery of P200,000 and the other for the recovery of P800,000, even if we assume that the plaintiff is going to win in those cases he will only be recovering from the defendant the amount that is really due to him. If he wins in case #1, he will recover P200,000, if he wins case #2, he will be able to recover P800,000. The totality of the amount recoverable by the creditor will still be P1M, an amount to which he is rightfully entitled. If he does not split his cause of action, he files one complaint to recover P1M and he wins in the same complaint, he will be able to recover P1M, an amount that is rightfully due to the creditor. So, if in the filing of several complaints founded on the same cause, the plaintiff will be able to recover only the amount that rightfully belongs to him. Is there any reason at all why the Rules preclude splitting a cause of action? If we look at the situation from the point of view of recovery by the creditor, there will be no justification for disallowing splitting a cause of action, because as we have said even if in all the cases the plaintiff eventually wins, he will recover from the defendant only the amount which really belongs to him. The REASON why the Rules prohibit splitting a cause of action is, there is a great danger, there is a great possibility that the different courts trying these different cases found on the same cause might render conflicting decisions, which is not good for the court. If we are to analyze further the two cases filed by the creditor, it is possible that in case #1 for the recovery of P200,000, the creditor will win; it is also possible that in case #2 for the recovery of P800,000, the creditor will lose the case. If the creditor wins in case #1 but he loses in case #2, then it is hard to explain why he could win in case #1 and lose in case #2 when the two complaints are founded upon the same cause of action. It is founded upon the obligation to pay P1M. That is the danger which the rule on splitting a cause of action tries to prevent the possibility that different courts will be rendering conflicting decisions involving the same cause of action. In our example, where the creditor splits his cause of action in violation of the Rules, what is the remedy of the defendant? The defendant can, of course, file a motion to dismiss since splitting a cause of action could lead either to litis pendencia or res judicata. If one of the cases has been decided, then that decision, if it becomes final and executory, could be set up as a justification for the dismissal of the pending cases. But if the two cases have not yet been decided, they are still pending before these two different courts, then, he can make use of a motion to dismiss founded on litis pendencia. Supposing the defendant does not invoke litis pendencia, he does not file a motion to dismiss, can the court, on its own, dismiss anyone of the cases based on litis pendencia? Well, the answer is YES, and you have to refer to Rule 9, which enumerates the grounds for dismissal and which are not waivable. So, even if a defendant does not avail or does not invoke the dismissal by reason of litis pendencia, the court on its own, if it discovers the existence of litis pendencia, can order the dismissal of one of the cases. You have to memorize the non-waivable grounds for dismissal in Rule 9. (Absence of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendencia, res judicata and prescription). At any time the court discovers that these factors are involved in a pending litigation, the court on its own, even with motion coming from the defending party, can order the dismissal of the cases. So, in our example, if the creditor splits his cause of action but the defendant does not move at all, he does not file a motion to dismiss founded on litis pendencia, the court could still order the dismissal of one of the cases. In litis pendencia, you should also note that although the court can on i

ts own order the dismissal of a case, the Rules do not authorize the court to dismiss all the cases. If there are two cases filed by the creditor founded on the same cause of action and the defendant invokes litis pendencia as a ground for dismissal, the court cannot dismiss the two cases. The court can dismiss one of the cases and retain the other case. So, in litis pendencia, although it is a violation of a procedural principle, the sanction is not dismissal of all the cases but a dismissal of one or some of the cases; but there should be a case retained between the plaintiff and the defendant. In our example, which of the two cases will have to be dismissed? Is it case #1 or case #2? Generally, it is the subsequent case that should be dismissed but this is just a product of jurisprudence. The Rules do not tell the court which of the cases is going to be dismissed. It relies solely on the discretion of the defending party and also of the court. So, if the defending party files a motion to dismiss case #1 instead of case #2, then it is case #1 that will have to be dismissed, and vice-versa. This situation, where a plaintiff splits his cause of action, should also be evaluated in relation to the principle of forum shopping under Rule 7. It is now settled that the requirements of forum shopping are the same as the requirements of litis pendencia. So, we can say as a matter of course that if there is litis pendencia, then, there is also a violation of forum shopping. Rule 7 tells us the contents of the certificate on non-forum shopping, and I said that you should also memorize the contents of a certificate on non-forum shopping. If a complaint or other initiatory pleading is filed without the correlative certificate on non-forum shopping, this complaint or initiatory pleading will be dismissed. Will the ground for dismissal be absence of jurisdiction? The answer is NO. The absence of certificate on non-forum shopping has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court. The ground for the dismissal of the complaint or other initiatory pleading does not provide for a certificate of non-forum shopping is failure to state a cause of action. In Rule 7, it is clearly provided that this deficiency cannot be cured by amendment. So, if a complaint does not contain a certificate of non-forum shopping and later on the plaintiff discovers the error, he cannot file an amended complaint that will incorporate a certificate on non-forum shopping. This is one of the deficiencies in a pleading, which is not curable by amendment. So, if the defending party is faced with a situation where the creditor/plaintiff is guilty of splitting a cause of action, Rule 7 gives him another option that is: he can file a motion to dismiss based on the violation of the principle of forum shopping. As we said a while ago, the elements of forum shopping are identical to the elements of litis pendencia. Therefore, if there is litis pendencia, there is also a violation of the principle of forum shopping. Will it give any advantage to the defending party if he invokes forum shopping as a ground for dismissal? The answer is YES. In Rule 7, if there is forum shopping, all the cases will be dismissed; unlike in litis pendencia, where one of the cases will be retained. But in forum shopping, if that is the ground invoked by the defending party, he can ask for the dismissal of all the cases. So that he is left with no case to defend at all. Another advantage of invoking forum-shopping instead of litis pendia is that, if the defending party can demonstrate to the court that forum shopping was deliberately resorted to by the plaintiff, the dismissal of all the cases is a dismissal with prejudice. Meaning to say, after the dismissal of all the cases, the plaintiff can no longer file a complaint for the recovery of the same claim contained in the various cases. But before the dismissal could be treated as dismissal with prejudice, it must first be shown that forum shopping was resorted to deliberately. If not resorted to deliberately, there will still be a dismissal of all the cases but the dismissal will be a dismissal without prejudice. The Supreme Court has come with some new decisions describing to us how forum shopping could be resorted to. Forum shopping could be violated outright, that is upon the filing of two or more complaints simultaneously or successively against the same party and founded on the same cause. Or it could be violated if the case is already on appeal. If the trial court has decided a case and then t

he losing party files more than two appeals involving the same judgment. That is also forum shopping. So, bear in mind that this concept of forum shopping could apply at the outset, upon the filing simultaneously or successively of two or more complaints founded on the same cause of action and against the same party, or even if a case has been decided by the trial court, if two or more appeals are brought by the losing party before the same or different appellate court. That will constitute form shopping. In one case, the Supreme Court made a distinction between practices which may or may not constitute forum shopping. In one case involving Gordon, a petition for certiorari was filed before the Supreme Court. The lawyers for the petitioner studied the petition carefully and then they resolved that the filing before the Supreme Court may have been erroneous because they did not follow the principle of hierarchy of courts. They came to the conclusion that the petition for certiorari with temporary restraining order should have been filed either before the RTC or Court of Appeals. After they realized their error the possibility that they violated the principle of hierarchy of courts, they immediately filed a notice to withdraw the petition before the Supreme Court. An hour after filing the notice of withdrawal before the Supreme Court could approve the withdrawal of the petition for certiorari, the lawyers filed a similar petition this time with the RTC. Was there forum shopping on the part of the petitioner? The Supreme Court said, NO. There was no forum shopping because the petitioner and his counsel realized the error and they wanted to rectify the error so there was no filing successively of cases. But in the same decision, the SC cited another almost identical that the SC said there was forum shopping. A petition for certiorari was filed before the SC. After filing this petition with the SC, the petitioner filed a similar petition before a RTC. After the petitioner was able to convince the judge of the RTC that the issuance of the TRO was proper in that petition for certiorari, the petitioner went to the SC and told the SC we are withdrawing our petition for certiorari. The SC said that was forum shopping because clearly the petitioner in this case had in mind filing two or more petitions with the idea of obtaining a favorable judgment on one of these cases. In this second case, it was very clear that the petitioner acted in bad faith. He filed two cases and when he was assured that one of them would be resolved in his favor he decided to withdraw the other case. But in the case of Gordon, after the counsel realized that he has committed an error, he filed a petition to withdraw the one filed before the SC and thereafter filed a similar petition before the RTC so that the SC has always been strict in implementing the rules on forum shopping. It is called a malpractice by lawyers that is filing simultaneously or successively two or more petitions founded on the same cause against the same party for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment in any one of these cases. In the case of Gordon, the SC also clarified that the justification for their strict implementation on the rule on forum shopping is similar to that of litis pendencia. In forum shopping, there is always the danger that the courts would be rendering conflicting decisions founded upon the same cause and against the same party. So again it is now settled that the elements of forum shopping are identical to the elements of litis pendencia. So if the defending party is faced with this situation, he is given options. The first is to ask for dismissal based on litis pendencia. The second is to ask for dismissal on the ground of violation of the rules on forum-shopping. We said earlier that if the defending party fails to invoke litis pendencia, the court can still dismiss some of the cases by virtue of the provisions of Rule 9. Litis pendencia is one of the non-waivable defenses. Could we apply this to forum shopping? The answer is NO, because forum shopping is not one of the grounds mentioned in Rule 9 as a non-waivable ground for dismissal of a case. You will in Rule 9 there are 4 non-waivable grounds for dismissal, these are: lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendencia, res judicata and prescription. Forum shopping is not one of them and besides a violation of the rule on forum shopping will only affect the existence or non-existence of a cause of

action, and this ground is a waivable ground under Rule 16. Failure to state a cause of action is really a ground for a motion to dismiss but if it is not so invoked, then the defending party is deemed to have waived this as a ground for dismissal of the case. (Break) The opposite of splitting a cause of action is joinder of causes of action. While splitting is prohibited by the Rules, joinder of causes is encouraged by the Rules. And you should note the rule mon joinder of causes of action as embodied in BP 129. Yesterday, we said that the totality rule on determining jurisdiction of courts involves joinder of causes of action and it is the totality rule in BP 129 that should always be reckoned with, not the totality rule in the Rules of Court. The totality rule in BP 129 is quite clear when it says that in ascertaining the jurisdiction of a court when causes of action are joined in one complaint is the totality of all his claims even if these claims arise out of the same or different transactions and even if these claims pertain to the same or different parties. These qualifications are not contained in the totality test embodied in the Rules of Court. So in the joinder of causes, the assumption is that there are at least two causes belonging to the same plaintiff, to the same right-holder. And as presently envisioned, there is hardly any limitation as to the number of causes that could be joined in one complaint by a plaintiff against the same defendant, except those expressly mentioned now in section 5 so that generally, a plaintiff can join in one complaint accion reinvidicatoria and/or complaint for recovery of damages, and a complaint for recovery of sum of money arising from a loan. This joinder will be allowed unless some of the limitations contained in sec. 5 are present. Why does the Rule allow joinder of causes even if they arise out of the same or different transactions? Well, principally, its for the economy of time. In one complaint a court can decide as many disputes as there presented by the parties in the same action. Joinder of causes of action should not be interpreted to mean that it always involves the principle of joinder of parties mentioned in Rule 3 Section 6. Joinder of parties is entirely different from joinder of causes of action, there could be joinder of causes of action even without joinder of parties. So if there is just one plaintiff filing a complaint against one defendant, the plaintiff can allege in one complaint a first cause of action, a second cause of action, a third cause of action without limit as to the number of causes that he will be alleging in that complaint. So the singleness of a plaintiff and a singleness of a defendant will allow the joinder of as many causes of action as there are which the plaintiff is willing to allege in his complaint unless again the limitations contained in Section 5 are present. One of the limitations is of course joinder of parties, and if there is just one plaintiff and one defendant then this limitation cannot conceivably arise because joined of parties is based on the assumption that there is plurality of plaintiff or plurality of defendant or both, that is plurality of plaintiff and plurality of defendant. But if there is just one plaintiff and just one defendant then it is hard to imagine how joinder of parties could be made applicable. Can the plaintiff in one complaint allege as his first cause of action a recovery of money in the sum of Php500,000 and then as a second cause accion reinvindicatoria recovery of a piece of land where the assessed value is Php100,000, the complaint to be filed with a Regional Trial Court even if the recovery of title of property is totally unrelated to the recovery of sum of money? The answer is yes, because the Rules allow the plaintiff to allege as many causes of action as he may have against the same defendant. But if he files a complaint involving the same causes of action and one of the causes is not within the jurisdiction of the court, he can still allege the two causes if the complaint is filed before a Regional Trial Court? The answer is YES. So if the first cause of action is for the recovery of a loan in the sum of Php500,000 which is cognizable by a Regional Trial Court and the second cause

is accion reinvindicatoria but the assessed value of the property is only Php5,000 which is not cognizable by a R