Pragmatism by Hillary Putnam

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Pragmatism

Author(s): Hilary PutnamSource: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 95 (1995), pp. 291-306Published by: Wiley on behalf of The Aristotelian SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4545222 .

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XV*-PRAGMATISM

by HilaryPutnam

pragmatism is a verylargesubject.My aimin thisessayis not asurvey,and certainlynot an over-all evaluation of the move-

ment's nsightsanderrors. nstead, wantto examinethoseinsightsand errors with respectto just one issue-an issue which was ofcentral mportance o thepragmatists,butby no meansonly to thepragmatists: erificationism.

Thepragmatistformofverificationism ndhow itdifferedfrom hepositivist form. Although textbooks tend to treat pragmatismprimarily s a theoryof truth and to identify it with thetheorythatthe true s what s satisfying nthelong-run o believe, a theory hat

not one of the classicalpragmatist ctuallyheldl), it is important oremember hatthe principle hat the classicalpragmatistsactuallyregarded s basicwasPeirce'sso-called'pragmaticmaxim'and hatthe theoriesof truth hatPeirce andJamesadvancedwereregardedbythemsimplyasapplications f thismaxim.Here s the maximasstatedby Peircehimself:

Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practicalbearing,we conceive the object

of our conception to have. Thenourconceptionof these effects is the whole of our conception oftheobject.

*Meetingof theAristotelianSociety, heldin theSeniorCommonRoom,BirkbeckCollege,

London,on Monday,19th June,1995 at 8.15 p.m.

I The pragmatistwho is supposedto have held this theory most explicitly is, of course,

WilliamJames.Foran accountof the extremelycomplicatedview thatJamesactuallyhad, see my 'James'Theory of Truth' orthcoming n The CambridgeCompanion oWilliamJames,ed. RuthAnnaPutnam.

2 ?402 of 'How to MakeOurIdeasClear', in CollectedPapersof CharlesSandersPeirce,ed. CharlesHartshomeand PaulWeiss, vol. 5 (Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress, 1960). Furtherreferences to this edition will have the by-now-standardorm[volume number:paragraph umber].








292 HILARYPUTNAM

In the paragraph hat precedes the statementof the pragmaticmaxim [5:401], Peirce identifies these 'effects that might have

practicalbearing'with 'sensibleeffects'. And his application f the

maximin thatparagraphacriticismof the Catholicdoctrineof the'real presence' of Jesus' flesh andblood in the Eucharist)showsthat he takes the pragmaticmaxim to imply that therecan be no

difference in conceptions where there is no difference in thesensible effects thatwe supposewould obtain f one or theotherofthose conceptionswereto be correct.

All this sounds very muchlike the logical positivists' 'verific-ation principle', and, indeed, Carnapand Reichenbachassumedthatthat was more or less what the pragmatistshad been tryingto state. Yettherearea numberof importantdifferences betweenthe ways in which the pragmatistsunderstoodtheir maxim andthe ways in which the positivists understood the verification

principle.First of all, although it later moved away from its initial

phenomenalism, logical positivism began with the idea thatknowledge must be reduced to the knowledge (by the subject,conceived of as a single isolated individual)of sense data,whichwereinitiallyconceivedof as a 'given' incorrigible oundation.Themovement was committedto the epistemological priorityof the'Eigenpsychisch'and to 'methodological olipsism'.3(As Neurathremarked, t is hard to explain how 'methodological solipsism'

differs from real solipsism.) Secondly, logical positivism beganwith the idea that to be meaningfulan idea must be capable ofconclusive verification. (In 1936-7 Carnap described how thepositivists moved away from this position-and one sees from hisaccountwhat a strugglethattook )4

Such ideas were anathema o thepragmatistsromthebeginning.As early (1868) as his 'Questions ConcerningCertainFacultiesClaimed for Man' [5:213-263], Peirce claimed that 'We have no

Power of Introspection, ut all knowledge of the internalworld isderivedby hypothetical easoning rom ourknowledgeof external

3 Rudolf Carnap,Der Logische Aufbauder Welt(Hamburg:Meiner, 1961); unalteredreprintof the 1928 text.

4 'Testability ndMeaning',PhilosophyofScience, Vol.3, 1936,419-471 andVol.4, 1937,1-40.








PRAGMATISM 293

facts.'5Moreover, n every one of his writings,Peirce emphasises

the importance of conceiving of the knowing subject as acommunity.But the differencefrom the positivistsis even greaterwhenwe come to the issue of conclusiveverification.

The positivistsbeganwiththeidea thattheunitof verificationor

falsificationwas the individualsentence.But from the very first,the pragmatistsapplied their pragmaticmaxim to whole meta-physicalsystems and to ethical and religiousbeliefs as well as to

scientific utterancesand theories. Thus it is thatWilliam James

could write, 'Inevery genuinemetaphysicaldebatesomepracticalissue, howeverconjecturaland remote s involved.'6Thusit is thatin his CambridgeConferenceLectures,7Peirce could propose ametaphysical ystem,manyof whose assertionsone could not hopeto test in isolation, butwith the intention hatit should(andin fact

it does) make predictionsabout the geometry of space and aboutother cosmological issues; the whole idea is that a naturalisticmetaphysicscan and should be confirmable n this way. In short,

forthe positivists,the whole idea wasthatthe verificationprincipleshouldexcludemetaphysics evenif theywere mistakennthinkingthat their own ideas were simply scientificand not metaphysical),while for the pragmatists he idea was that it should apply tometaphysics,so that metaphysicsmight becomea responsibleandsignificant enterprise.There is all the difference in the worldbetween these attitudes.

II

Whywe should not accept verificationism.My sympathywith thepragmatistsin this dispute does not mean that I accept veri-ficationism,even in the very liberalsense in which pragmatismscommitted to a kind of verificationism.8An example is the

5 This is Peirce's own summary 5:265]of the upshotof [5:243-249].6 WilliamJames,Pragmatism Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversityPress,1975), p. 52.

7 Charles SandersPeirce, Reasoning and the Logic of Things,ed. K. Ketner with anintroduction y myself (Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress, 1993).

8 Thisrepresentsa change n views whichI heldfor a numberof years;a fuller accountofthoseviews, andof my reasons orgiving upsome of them-in particular,erificationism-can be found in my 'Replies and Comments' in Philosophical Topics 20 (ThePhilosophyof HilaryPutnam),Feb. 1992, as well as in my 'THE DEWEYLECTURES1994:Sense,Nonsense, and theSenses; anInquiry nto thePowersof theHumanMind',








294 HILARYPUTNAM

following:consider he statement hataphysicalsystemof acertain

kind(onewhoseexistence is improbable,butnotactuallyexcludedby physical laws as far as we know)-say a systemof 100 starsarranged t the verticesof a regular100-gon,in a regionof spaceotherwise reeof stars-does nothappen o existanywherenspace-time. It could, of course,be the case that thereis some presentlyunknown law which we do not know which prohibitssuch aformation;butthis seemsunlikely.Letusassumethat his is notthecase, andthat thereis a small finite probabilityof such a system

existing in many different parts of the space-time universe.Especially if the whole space-time universe is finite, it couldneverthelessbe the case thatsuch a systemjust doesn'thappentooccur.Itfollowsfromourpresentscientificworld-picturetselfthatthere s no way we could knowthatthis is the case if it is. Afterall,we cannothave any causalinteraction f anykindwithspace-timeregionsoutsideourlight cone (i.e., withregions such thata signalfrom hoseregionswouldhave to travel aster han

ightto

reachus).There s nopoint in space-time romwhichit is possible forbeingswhohave to rely onphysicalsignals fortheir nformationo surveyall of space-time.Wecan know hat herearesomethingswhicharepossible(possibleaccording o our scientificworld-picturetself),butwhich aresuch thatif they arethe case, thenwe cannotknowthattheyare thecase. If the statement:

(I)Theredo nothappen o be anystarsarranged sthevertices

of a regular 100-gon (in a region of space otherwisefree ofstars).

is true,thereis no way in which we could know that t is true.Yettoconclude romthe factthat, n thecontextof ourpresent cientificworld-picture, I) has no 'consequences that might conceivablyhavepracticalbearing' hat arenotconsequencesof:

(II)No one will everencounterany causalsignals fromagroup

of starsarranged s theverticesof aregular100-gon (inaregionof spaceotherwisefree of stars).

andthattherefore I) and(II)have the samemeaning(or,better,thattheconjunctionof (I) withourpresentscientificworld-picture

TheJournalof Philosophy,vol. XCI,No. 9, September1994.








PRAGMATISM 295

has the same meaningas the conjunctionof (II) with ourpresent

scientificworld-picture)wouldobviouslybe a mistake.Peircewouldalmostcertainlyhaveresponded hat, f thereareno

starsarrangedn thisway,then this is something hatwe couldandwouldfindouteventually f nquirywereindefinitely rolonged.Butthis assumes (1) that futuretime is infinite-something we arenolonger willing to postulate;and (2) that no information s everirretrievablydestroyed-something which also contradicts ourpresent physical theories9(though not, of course, the physical

theoriesof Peirce'stime).Peirce's ownpragmaticmaximrestedona scientific world-picture mportantpartsof which we no longeraccept.(Inview of Peirce'sdesirethathismetaphysics hould tselfbe testable, the fact that he was makingempiricalassumptionsshould not havebotheredPeirce-given his strongandrepeatedlyexpressedcomnmitmentofallibilism,hemighthavebeendelightedto findhimself refuted n thisway.)

Thisbringsmetomy real opic:whyIbelieve that,notwithstandingthe fact that we cannot say that conformityto any verificationprinciple, ncluding he pragmatists'pragmaticmaxim', is even anecessary condition for meaningfulness (or even a necessarycondition for sameness of meaning, for that matter), there is,nonetheless,aninsight n pragmatism.Thisis a controversialssue,as well as a difficultone, and it will take theremainder f my time,not,indeed, odoitjustice (thatwould takeamuch ongeressay than

thisone), but to sketchthe reasonsfor saying whatIjust said-thatthere s some insight n verificationism.

Ill

Whythere is, nonetheless, an insightin verificationism.Becausetheissue is asubtleone, I shallproceedbythe methodof successiveapproximations.Here is a first approximation o an answer:thereasonthatthere is someinsight n verificationism s thatthere s aconceptualconnectionbetweengraspingan empiricalconceptandbeing able to recognizea perceptuallyustified applicationof thatconcept.

9 Hawkinghas shown thatthere is irrecoverable oss of information n Black Holes.








296 HILARYPUTNAM

Please notethateven this 'firstapproximation'o whatI wantto

say does not imply a numberof familiarif problematicphilo-sophical claims. It does not imply, for example, that empiricalconceptsarereducible operceptual nes.Indeed,Ihaveelsewhereargued10 hatwe shouldnot think of talk of 'objectstoo small tosee with the nakedeye' as employinga differentmeaningof theword 'small' thanthat involved in talk of one observablething'sbeing smallerthananother;and the formerkind of talkis clearlynotboundupwiththe kindof directperceptualverification hatis

envisaged here (nor can it be exhaustivelyanalyzedin terms ofindirect verificationeither,but that is anotherstory).It does notimply that perceptual claims themselves are statable in somelanguage hatdoesn'tpresuppose he existence of 'external'objects-indeed, Ihave alreadypointedout that romthebeginningPeirceinsisted hat helanguage nwhichperceptual laims arestateddoespresuppose heexistence of externalobjects.Itdoes notpresuppose

thatperceptualclaims have 'non-conceptualcontent'. All of the'Kantian'points on which Strawson has insisted (rightly,in myview) arefully compatiblewiththisclaim.

Still, one of thereasonsthatthis is only a firstapproximation oa correctstory shouldalreadybe obvious fromexample(I) above.'Groupof starsarranged s theverticesof a regular100-gon'is anempiricalconcept, and (it seems) we graspthis concept withoutknowing what wouldjustify its application.But that is not quite

right. What we do not know how to justify (what seems to beimpossibletojustify,as a matterof physicalnecessity) is a negativeexistentialgeneralization nvolvingtheconcept. But if we were ina position to refer to something we saw in a telescope by thedescription'group of starsarrangedas the vertices of a regular100-gon',we wouldknowhowtojustify thatreferringuse. So evenin the case of anempiricalconceptthatappears n anunverifiable

quantifiedstatement,we do know how to verify a (hypothetical)directapplication.But is this necessarilythe case? Can't we, after all, form an

empiricalconceptwhose applicationwe mightneverknow how toverify?Forexample, thefollowing:

10 H. Putnam, THE DEWEYLECTURES1994', 505 passim.








PRAGMATISM 297

(D) 'Group of stars outside our light cone arrangedas the

vertices of a regular100-gon.'One approach o this questionmightbe to follow Strawson n

distinguishingtwo ways of thinking about reference. One way(associated with the names of Frege, Russell, and Quine) is toidentifyreferencewith the use of definitedescriptions.The otherway, long urgedby Strawsonhimself, is to insist that there is anepistemologicallybasic notion of reference(reference o thistree,

thatcat, etc.) which is not capturedby definitedescriptions,and,indeed,cannot be capturedby the notions of a languagewhich isconstructedas the 'ideal languages' of the logicist traditionareconstructed, anguageslackingboth tenses and indexical words.Thepeculiarityof suchdescriptionsas (D), Strawsonmightsay, isthattheyprecisely cannotbe used to refer.

While I am sympathetic o this line, andI feel sure that it couldbe used to arriveatconclusions similar o theones at which I shall

arrive,I amgoing to takea different ack.The obvious point to notice aboutsuch a descriptionas (D) is

that s builtupwiththe aid of quantifiers nd other ogical constantsout of terms which themselves do have easily verifiableapplications, .g., 'regular100-gon'and 'star'.What theexistenceof descriptions ike (D) shows is thatquantifiersandother ogicalconstantsextend our conceptualpowers beyond the rangeof the

verifiable;1'butthis does notmean thatwe could graspa languagewithout graspingany terms whose understanding s intimatelyconnectedwithverification.

A moreseriousobjection o my 'firstapproximation's that herearemanyempiricalconcepts thatwe grasp,andwhose applicationwe areable to verify, at leastunder avourablecircumstances,butwhose applicationwe arenot often able to perceptually ustify. Ihave in mindtwo sortsof cases:analyticallydefinedterms,such as

'bachelor',and terms with respect to which most of us defer toexperts.Inthecase of 'bachelor' he situation s muchthe sameaswith respect to the descriptions just discussed-in fact, thedefinitionof 'bachelor' manwho is eligible to be marriedbutwho

11 H. Putnam, THEDEWEYLECTURES1994', Lecture III, TheFace of Cognition'.








298 HILARYPUTNAM

has not ever been married)nvolvesa negativeexistentialquantifier

just as do the descriptionswe discussed (andundersome circum-stances one can perceptually alsify the claim that someone is abachelor-by witnessingthe person being married,althoughone

cannot within a reasonableperiodof timeperceptuallyverifythatsomeone is a bachelor). So a second and better approximationwould have to restrict he thesis to termswhich are notanalyticallydefined.

Termswith respectto which we defer to expertsinclude both

technical termsin science and such terms as 'elm' or 'beech' (inthe United States, at least, most people cannot tell an elm from a

beech,butanyonewho knows that 'elm' and 'beech' arethenamesof common sortsof deciduous reescountsasunderstandinghem).A third approximationwould have to restrictthe thesis to termswhich are not under expert control in this way. Still, the greatmajorityof the terms we employ are neitheranalyticallydefinednor such thatwe need to call on an expert to advise us in theirapplicationn everydayuse.

But is it really true,even with these exclusions,that the under-standingof even themostordinary erms-say 'chair' or 'cat'-isintimatelyconnected with verification-indeed, with perceptualjustification?Heretoo, subtle issues are involved.

At firstblush (and,in the end, the first blush answer is largelyright,or so I shall argue),the answer seems clear enough. Under

normalcircumstances,ounderstandheword'chair',forexample,involvesknowingwhatchairs ook like. Butwhatof blindpeople?Yes, blindpeopleknowhowto recognizechairsby touch, andbothblind and sighted people know what it feels like to sit in a chair.Could one graspthe conceptof a chair, grasp our actual ordinaryconceptof a chairand not some made-upsubstitute,andnot knowwhat chairslook like or whattheyfeel like or what it feels like tosit in one? The answerseems to be 'no.

Moreover,it is notjust that normal possessorsof the conceptknow whatchairs ook like or feel like, etc.; they also know how totell that they are in the presence of a chair by means of these'sensible effects' (as Peirce called them). In short, they have thepracticalability to verify-to verifyperceptually-that they are inthepresenceof something hatfalls under heconceptin question.(The reference to being 'in the presence' of something is closely








PRAGMATISM 299

connected with the Strawsoniannotion of reference,by the way,which is why I believe that there is a Strawsonianroute to myconclusions.)

IntheendIbelievethat hisis a correct ineof argument, utthereis animportant bjectionto it thatI have to consider,one thatwillrequireacarefulexaminationof whatwe mean-or better,whatweought to mean in philosophy-by speaking of a 'conceptualconnection' between abilities. But first, a word about my ownreasons orbeingespeciallyinterested n thistopic.

As some of you know, for a number of years I defended theprinciple hata statement s true f andonly if its acceptancewouldbe justified were epistemic conditionsgood enough. While I nolongeracceptthisprinciple-our consideration f (I)has shown ushowitcanhaveexceptions-I think t is importantodetermine heextent to which itholds as well as to pointout instances n which itfails. And whatI contendis that,in the case of the greatmajorityof oureverydayassertions,assertionsabout hefamiliarobjectsand

persons and animals with which we interact, ruthand idealizedrationalacceptabilitydo coincide. The reasonthatthey so oftencoincide is not, however, that truth means idealized rationalacceptability,butthat,first,it is built into ourpictureof theworlditself that these statementscan be verified under good enoughconditions (when they are true); and, second, the existence ofstatements f this kind s aconceptualprerequisite f ourbeingabletounderstand languageatall. (Whythis is apartialvindicationofpragmatism s a subjectto whichI shallreturn.)

IV

The revolt against conceptual analysis. AlthoughBritish philo-sophy appears not to be so profoundly affected as Americanphilosophycontinues to be, I can hardlyafford to ignorethe fact

that a greatmanyanalyticphilosophersnow rejectthe entireideaof a differencebetweenconceptualandempirical ruth.This is, ofcourse,explainedbytheinfluenceof W.V.Quine'scelebrated TwoDogmasof Empiricism'.If thereis no suchthingas a 'conceptualconnection',then,a fortiori, I ammistaken n claimingthatthereis a conceptualconnectionbetweengraspingcertainconceptsandbeing able to verify (in certainsorts of situations) hatthey apply.








300 HILARYPUTNAM

To certainphilosophers,whatI have been writingwill appearas

'hopelessly pre-Quinian'.One can see how profoundthe influence of this thought ofQuine's is in the writingsof JerryFodor-himself an influentialthinker,especially among philosopherswho feel themselvespartof the 'cognitive science' movement.In a recentbook which hecoauthoredwith Ernest Lepore, Fodor insists that there are no'conceptual onnections'at all betweenany concepts; heveryideaof conceptualconnection is a senseless one.12 In conversation,

Fodor has indicatedthathe likewise (not surprisingly, suppose)sees no significant epistemologicaldifference at all between amathematicaltruth, say '5+7=12', and an empirical truth, say'Water expands when it freezes'. Both are simply statementsof

fact, and both areequallyrevisable.13I have been recentlyreading he workof JosiahRoyce,a thinker

who is too much neglected, and one evening I suddenly had theexperience of re-seeing Quine's celebratedpaper; seeing it asRoyce mighthave seen it. [Myreaderswill recallthatQuinearguedthat if there were such a thing as two terms A and B being'synonymous',then there would be analytictruthsof the form, 'xis an A, if andonly if x is a B'. (Premise One) He arguedthatinthatcase, we would have unrevisableknowledgeof the truthoftheseconditionals.Evidentlyusingan unstatedpremiseof the form:analytic truths, f such therebe, are the sort of truthof which we

have unrevisableknowledge-call this PremiseTwo.) But, Quineargued (and with so much I agree) no truth-claim s immunetorevision; hence, he concluded, synonymy (having the samemeaning) is an unacceptablenotion.] Royce considered himselfboth a pragmatistand an idealist, and partly because analyticphilosophydefined itself in oppositionto idealism in its very firstmoments in 1903, and partlybecause Royce's most interestingworkappearsnbooks whose titles seem to havenothing o do with

meaning and reference,14analytic philosophers (apart from his

12 Jerry Fodor and ErnestLepore,Meaning Holism: A Shopper's Guide (Oxford: BasilBlackwell, 1992).

13 For a criticismof thisview, see 'RethinkingMathematicalNecessity', in my Words ndLife(Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress, 1994), which also develops the viewof 'conceptual' ruthurgedherein moredetail.

14 JosiahRoyce, TheWorld nd theIndividual New York:Macmillan,1901), andProblems








PRAGMATISM 301

studentC.I. Lewis), seem never to have read him. But to RoyceQuine's argumentwould have seemed a

crazyone. For

Royce-who was influencedby Peirce-the statementthat two termshave the samemeaning s a statement hat nvolves interpretation,and for both Royce and Peirce, interpretation s an endlesslyrevisableprocess. The leap from 'there are conceptualtruths'to'thereareunrevisable ruths' thisis, of course,where theunstatedPremiseTwo is needed )is utterlyunjustified.

This is not to deny that Quine's essay containsan important

insight.Manyanalyticphilosophersdid think hatconceptual ruthswere somehow unrevisablyknown to us, and against a notionofconceptualtruththat carriesthatconsequence, Quine'sessay is asalutaryandpowerfulcorrective.But againstwhatI mightcall thepragmatistnotion of conceptual ruth t has no force at all.

Indeed, even Premise One fails when A and B are words indifferent languages.15Moreover, one must resist the tendency-which PremiseOne perhapsexemplifies-to take every claim

thatsomethingor otheris a conceptual ruthas a claim thatsomesentenceorother s analytic.Certainly t is unhappy o thinkof anarithmeticalruth uch as '5+7?13' asanalytic either ntheKantiansense, or, less metaphysically,nthe sense of beinga 'verbal'truthlike 'all bachelors are unmarried');but nonetheless there is asignificantsense in which we can say thatit is a conceptual ruththat5+7?13, namelythatwe simply do not understandwhatthey

wouldbeasserting, fsomepeople were toclaimthatfiveplussevenis sometimes hirteen,or thattheyhadjustfound out thatfiveplusseven is sometimes hirteen.

Of course,it can sometimeshappen hatwords to whichwe arenotpresentlyableto attacha senseturnout to havesignificance.Atone time we couldattachno sense to the words 'two straight inescan beperpendicularo athirdstraightine and stillmeet at apoint'(if intendedas a seriousclaim, andnot,say, as a partof a proofby

reductio ad absurdum).It took the invention of a whole newtheory-more precisely, of a new kind of theory-to give thosewords a sense, thatis, to providethemwith a use in whichwe can

of ChristianityNew York:Macmillan,1916).

15 WhenA and B are in different anguage, 'x is an A if andonly if x is a B' is in generalnota well formedsentence of anylanguage.








302 HILARYPUTNAM

see the sense. Once they had been providedwith such a use, we

could also come to see thatuse, that 'new sense', as an inevitableextension of the way theyhadalwaysbeen used-a new sense, inthissense,is notthe same thingas a newmeaning.But it is a matterof methodological importance,not just of sociological fact, thatsome statements annotbe falsified unlesssomeoneinventsa kindof theory, or better,a kind of use of language,'6that we cannotpresentlyforesee (and that we do not know whether any use oflanguage hat nvolves saying thatsevenplusfive sometimesequal

thirteen would be one which we could regardas an inevitablecontinuation of our present uses of the words 'seven', 'five','thirteen', plus', 'equals'and 'sometimes').

Similarly,when I say that there is a conceptual connectionbetween understanding he concept 'chair' and being able toperceptuallyverifythatone is in the presenceof a chair,I am nottalkingof analytic ruthsof the 'allbachelorsareunmarried' ariety-these bake nophilosophicalbreadandcut nophilosophicalce-but of the limits of sense as we presentlyexperience hoselimitsinourlives andin ourthought.Thatthose limits may, in a phraseofJames,17sometimesprove 'casual'-that we may, n thefuture, eehow they could have been transgressed-does not make themphilosophically nsignificantornonexistent.

V

But does the connection exist? My point might also be expressedby saying that conceptual truthsdepend not only on the inter-pretationof words but also on the interpretation f ways of life.18

But even if one grants this, one might still doubt whether theparticular onceptualconnectionsthatI have claimed to find arereally there. Let us see if we can really perform the thoughtexperimentof imagininga being who grasps a concept of the sort

16 This is a better way to put it, because scientific revolutionsdo not just producenewtheories; heyrenegotiate he limitsof whatcountsas a 'theory'atall.

17 Jameswrites, 'Wecall those things [Ptolmaicastronomy, uclideanspace, aristotelianlogic, scholastic metaphysics] only relatively true, or true within those borders ofexperience."Absolutely"hey arefalse; for we know thatthose limits werecasual, andmight have been transcendedby past theorists ust as they are by presentthinkers.'Pragmatism Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1975),p. 107.

18 Peircefamously saidthat manis a sign [6:344].








PRAGMATISM 303

thatI have been talkingabout,say, the concept of a chair,whilehavingno idea of how to perceptuallyverify thatsomethingis achair, ndeed,no idea of what chairs ook like, feel like, etc.

If thebeinghassenseorgans ike oursand maginative apacitieslike ours, then, even if we introduce the notion by means of adescription,f thebeingreallyandtruly'grasps'theconceptit willacquire the ability to tell that somethingis a chair when it doesfinally see one, or sit in one, even if has notexercised thatabilitybefore. Indeed, if it cannot, then we will doubt that it has truly

grasped he concept.But let us imaginea being thatdoes not havesuch sense organs (and whose 'mentalimages' are not visual ortactile, etc., as ours are). The astronomerDyson once imaginedintelligentbeingswhose bodiesweregaseeous nebuli.Suchbeingswouldpresumablyhaveconceptsof spaceandtime,andbe able tolearnthe laws of physics; couldwe teachthem to graspour notionof achairby supplyinga definition n termsof thesehighlyabstractscientific

concepts?(1) Iftheanswer s 'Yes,we canalreadyattachaclearsensetothenotionof doingthat',thena verylargerevisionwill be required nmy claim that the understanding f even the most ordinary erm-say 'chair' or 'cat'-is intimatelyconnected withjustification.Theclaimwill still be true, f whatIhave so farargueds at allright,in the sense thatunderstandingheterm'chair'or 'cat' will require-both inthe caseof theNebulousPeople and nourowncase-the

masteryof some empiricalconcepts whose use is linked to per-ceptualverification,but it will bepossibletomakelargealterationsin the system withoutremovingthe understanding f the concept'chair',orwhatever. twill, we aresupposing,bepossible to under-stand tbyanexplicitdescriptionntermsofthefundamental otionsof physics,where thosenotionsthemselvescanbe givenempiricalcontentin an indefinitevarietyof differentways. Understanding

'this is a chair', 'this is a cat', etc., will presuppose he abilitytoverifysomeperceptually ontrolledproposition rother,butexactlywhich perceptuallycontrolledpropositionwill be a matteraboutwhichvery ittlecanbesaid.Myfirstapproximationo aformulationof theinsight n verificationismwill havebeen fartoo 'molecular'.(Although herewill havebeen aninsight in verificationism,nonethe less, namely that the grasp of concepts requiresthat there








304 HILARYPUTNAM

somewherebe anabilityto verify something.)But I shallargue hat

we need notretreat o suchan extremeholism.(2) My reasons for thinking that we cannot, in fact, presently

make clear sense of the idea of acquiring he notion of a chair(orwhatever t may be)in themannerjust uggestedareconnectedwith

a remarkby the psychologist Eleanor Rosch, and a remarkofWittgenstein's.Rosch at one time defendeda theory according o

which we perceptuallyrecognize chairsby seeing thatthey havecertain 'distinctive features'-features which are themselves

supposed o be recognizablewithoutknowingwhata chair s. I wasonce present at a meeting at which she explainedthat one of her

reasons for giving up this theory was encountering he beanbagchair. 'My subjectsdidn'trecognizea beanbagchair as a chairbyseeing that it had a back,' she said, 'they recognized thatit hadaback becausethey recognizedit as a chair.'

Rosch's remark leads naturallyinto Wittgenstein's remark.

Wittgensteindiscussed the word 'game', writing:'One might saythattheconcept "game" s a conceptwithblurred dges. "But s a

blurredconcept a concept at all?"-Is an indistinctphotographaphotographof a personat all? Is it even always an advantage oreplacean indistinctpictureby a sharpone? Isn't the indistinctoneoften exactlywhat we need?'19 To replace a concept with blurrededges by a rigidly limited concept is not to analyse the originalconcept, but to replace t with a differentconcept.20 f we imagine

defining'chair' n termsof geometricaland physicalprimitivesweare imagining replacingthe concept 'chair' by a very differentconcept.

Orcould we proceedin the following way? we describe one ortwoexamplesof chairs,andthen say that 'chair'applies o anythingwhich is 'sufficientlysimilar'.But then we need to supposethat he

Nebulous People have a termthatwe can translateas 'sufficiently

similar', and that the objects they count as 'similar' are just theobjectswe count as similar,not withstanding he differentnatural

19 LudwigWittgenstein,PhilosophicalInvestigations,2ndedition,ed. G.E.M.Anscombe(Oxford:Basil Blackwell, 1958), ?71.

20 Op. cit., ?68: 'I can give the concept "number" igid limits... that is, use the word,"number"or a rigidly limitedconcept,butI can also use it so thattheextension of theconcept is not closed by a frontier.'








PRAGMATISM 305

histories, the fact that they know our objects only through

mathematico-physical escriptions,tc ..........

Moral:we can make no clearsense of theidea of grasping hesefamiliarconcepts apart rompossessing theappropriate erceptualverificationabilities. If this seems too loose a status to justifyspeakingof thestatementhatgrasping uchconceptsrequires omeability to perceptually verify the presence of the object as a'conceptual ruth', hen call it a 'hinge proposition' f you like.21suggest that what has been called 'conceptualanalysis' is best

(re-)conceivedof as thedescriptionof thehingeson whichtheveryunderstanding f ourlanguage urns.

VI

Butwhat does thisall have todo withpragmatism? wantto closewith a wordabouttherespects n which thisis a partialvindicationof pragmatism.WhatI havedefended s the ideathat ourgraspof

empiricalconceptsdependsonourperceptual erificationabilities.I have emphasized that on the pragmatist picture perceptualverifications not identifiedwith knowledgeof privateobjects,andalso does notinvolve any sortof incorrigibility.To roundouteventhisverypreliminary xaminationof thepragmaticmaxim,I needto mentionone further act. From the earliest discussions in the'MetaphysicalClub' nwhichPeirce,James,ChaunceyWrightandothersparticipated, he idea of 'belief' as simply a free-standingmentalabilitywas resolutelyopposed.Thepragmatists ne and allsaw beliefs as complexandmulti-tracked abitsof action.What sinsightandwhatis error n that formulationwould requireanotheressay at least as long as this one But certainlyat least this muchdeservestobelistedon the 'insight'side of theledger:abelief, eventhe belief that I am seeing a chair, s not a self-identifyingmentalstate. Whatidentifiesit as the belief thatit is, at least inpart, its

connection with action-including, of course, further ntellectualaction.Theinsistence,notjuston theinterdependence f ourgraspof truth-claimsand our grasp of verification,but also on the

21 Thecomparisonof propositionson which the languagegame turns o 'hinges' comes, ofcourse,fromLudwigWittgenstein,On Certainty,ed. G.E.M.Anscombeand G.H. vonWright Oxford:Basil Blackwell, 1969), ?342.








306 HILARYPUTNAM

interdependence of our conceptual abilities and our practical

abilities is at the heartof pragmatism.Given the profoundorigin-ality of their vision, it is hardlyto be wondered f the pragmatistssometimes depicted the relationships between these variousabilities as simplerthan it actuallyis. But they were profoundlyright in supposing that it is an important ask of philosophy toexploreanddescribetheir nterdependence.

Departmentof PhilosophyHarvardUniversityCambridgeMA 02138USA

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Pragmatism by Hillary Putnam