Practical deliberation and the voice of conscience in Fichte’s … · volume 14, no. 30 october 2014 Practical deliberation and the voice of conscience in Fichte’s 1798 System

volume14,no.30 october2014

Practical deliberation and

the voice of conscience in

Fichte’s 1798 System

of Ethics

Michelle KoschCornell University

© 2014 MichelleKoschThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons

Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersiprint.org/014030/>

J.G. Fichte’s 1798 System of Ethics, his major work of normative ethics, ranks among themost under-appreciatedworks in the his-toryofmoralphilosophy.Thathasnotalwaysbeenthecase;intheearlynineteenthcenturytheworkwaswidelyregardedasthemostcompleteandsystematicnormativeethicsonKantianfoundations.1 Its laterobscurityhadmanycauses: thedifficultyof the text itself;the earlydisruptionof Fichte’s academic career; and above all theeventualdominanceofHegelianism inGermanphilosophy,whichcemented in theminds of later philosophers and historians somefundamentalmisinterpretationsofFichte’scentralclaims.HereIwillrebutwhatseemtomethemostsignificantofthese,whichconcernhisaccountofpracticaldeliberationandoftheauthorityofindivid-ualconscience.

TheviewsattributedtoFichteare:thatmoraldeliberationconsistsentirely inconsultationofone’sconscience; thatconscience isa fac-ultythatgivesimmediateepistemicaccesstosubstantivemoraltruths;that conformity with the verdict of conscience is the sole criterionof themoral correctness of actions; and that an individual’s consci-entiousdecision is thereforemorally incorrigible.(Iwill refer to theconjunctionof these fourpoints inwhat follows as “the criterial in-terpretation”.)ThiswasbynomeanstheconsensusreadingofFichteonthesetopicsintheearlynineteenthcentury.2Norisitcorrect,asIwillshow.ButHegelattributedthissetofviewstoFichte inseveralworks;3andfromHegelthisreadingoftheSystem of Ethicspassedinto

1. ImakethiscaseinM.Kosch2015.

2. SomereaderswereconfusedbyFichte’sremarksaboutthefunctionofcon-science.Forinstance,Berger,inhisotherwiseexcellentreview,attributedtoFichtetheviewthata“feeling”isa“criterion”ofthegood(J.G.I.Berger1799p.227).Elvenich(mistakenly)sawFichteasproposingtwosubstantivecriteriaofmoralworth,an“outer”andan“inner”one(P.J.Elvenich1830p.305)butinhisinterpretation(correctly)tookthesubstanceofFichte’sdoctrineofdutiestobederivedfromthe“outer”criterion(P.J.Elvenich1830p.290).Schleierm-achermadeadifferentmistake,takingFichte’sclaimtobethatfulfillmentoftheformalconditionguaranteesfulfillmentofthesubstantiveone(F.Schlei-ermacher1803p.184).Buttheseareexceptionsinalargebodyofliteraturefromwhichthecriterialinterpretationislargelyabsent.

3. Cf.Phänomenologie des Geistes§§632–671(G.W.F.Hegel1986vol.3pp.464–494),andespecially§635(G.W.F.Hegel1986vol.3pp.466–467);Grundlinien

ImprintPhilosophers’

michellekosch Practical deliberation and the voice of conscience

philosophers’imprint –2– vol.14,no.30(october2014)

TheimplausibilityoftheviewsattributedtoFichteonthecriterialinterpretationcontinuestoplayaroleintheneglectofhismoralphi-losophy,despitethepopularityofKantianapproachestoethicsandthefactthatFichte’sSystem of Ethicsremainsoneofthemostoriginalandinsightful efforts at a systematic normative theory onKantian foun-dations.InthispapermymainaimistoexplainhowFichteactuallythoughtaboutpracticaldeliberation(§2)andtheroleofconscience(§3).Asubsidiaryaimistoexplainwhythecriterialinterpretationhashadsuchappeal,despiteitsphilosophicalandtextualinadequacy(§4).ButIwillbeginbyoutlining,verybriefly,thestructureofFichte’sethi-caltheory(§1),sinceonlyagainstthisbackgroundcanhisaccountofpracticaldeliberationbeunderstood;andIwillconcludewithsomebriefremarksabouttheinterestFichte’stheoryoughttoevokeinthecontextofcontemporarymoralphilosophy.

1. Fichte’s ethical project

Fichte’s ethics is recognizably Kantian inmanyways. Chief amongtheseisitsfoundationintheideaoftheautonomyofthefreerational

conscienceas“thepositivecriterion”oftruthformoralbeliefs,claimingthatthiscriterion,though“subjective”,isneverthelesstheonlyone,andthatitis,forFichte,immunetoerror(D.Breazeale1996pp.48–50).GunnarBeckar-guesthat,accordingtoFichte,“bydintofourconscience…eachmanhasdi-rect,unmediatedandcompleteawarenessofwhatthemorallawcommandshim…todo”(G.Beck2008p.69).BärbelFrischmannwritesthatforFichteconscienceis“thecriterionforthemoralcorrectnessofourconvictions”(B.Frischmann2008p.322).Wealsofindthereadingingeneralhistories, forinstanceinCopleston,forwhomFichteanconscienceis“anabsolutecriterionofrightandwrong”(F.Copleston1962vol.7p.65)andwhopraisesFichtefortrackingthe“wayinwhichtheordinarymanisaccustomedtospeakabouthismoralconvictions” (bysaying, forexample, “I feel that this is the rightthingtodo”)(F.Copleston1962vol.7p.66).Cf.alsoK.Fischer1884p.580ff.Thereare,asoneanonymousreviewerhaspointedout,manyversionsofthecriterialreadingintheliterature,andthereareimportantdistinctionsamongthem.However,sinceallofthemgiveconscienceafirst-orderepistemicrole,theyareallsubjecttotheobjectionIraisein§3.Ofcoursethisreadingisnotstrictlyubiquitous:asIhavesaid,A.W.Wood1990takeswhatseemstomeadifferentview,andPeterRohsexplicitlyacknowledgestheexistenceofamaterialstandardofcorrectnessofactionsthatisindependentofthedeliver-anceofconscience(P.Rohs1991,p.109).

thegeneralphilosophicalimagination.Itisstillnearlyuniversal,evenamongscholarsofFichte.4

der Philosophie des Rechts§137(G.W.F.Hegel1986vol.7pp.254ff.).

4. Thecontinuingappealofthisreadingwasmadesalienttomeina2012APApresentation byGünter Zöller,who pointed to the “criteriological” role ofconscience as a featureof Fichte’s ethical theory that shouldmake it unat-tractivetocontemporaryKantians.Conscience,accordingtoZöller’sFichte,isasourceofimmediateandinfalliblemoralinsight,andconsultationofitisthesolemeansforidentifyingwhichactionissubstantivelycorrectinade-liberativesituation.“Unlikeinstandardsituationsofapplyingameans-endscalculusaspartofconsequentialistreasoningFichte’sethicaldeliberatordoesnot actually consider the short-,medium-and long-rangeoutcomeof vari-ouscoursesofactionvyingforpreferentialselectionandexclusiveexecution.Rather Fichte’s ethical ego turns tohisorherownconscienceas a sourceofimmediate,allegedlyinfallibleinsight,notweighingconsequencesbutat-tendingtoaninnervoice”(G.Zöller2012pp.5–6).AllenWoodhassupportedZöller’sreadingincorrespondence,anddefendedpartsofthecriterialinter-pretation in a recentpaper, arguing thatonFichte’s account conscience isaninfallibleguidetosubstantivemoralcorrectness,andcontrastingFichte’sviewoftheroleofconsciencewithKant’s(J.B.SchneewindandA.W.Wood2012,pp.479–481)—although,inearlierwork,Woodadvancedaninterpreta-tionthatseemstomemoreinlinewiththeoneIadvancehere(cf.A.W.Wood1990p.176ff).DanielBreazealehasalsodefendedthecriterialinterpretationinarecentpaper.LikeZöller,Breazealecallsconscience’sroleforFichte“cri-teriological”(D.Breazeale2012p.202).LikeWood,hecontrastsFichte’sviewofconsciencewiththatofKant,writingthat“[w]hereasforKant,conscienceisaninnertribunalthatascertainswhetherwehavereallydeterminedourac-tionsaccordingtorespectforthemorallaw,forFichteitisprecisely‘aninnerfeelingwithinourconscience’thatdetermineswhatisandisnotourduty,afeelingthat‘nevererrssolongaswepayheedtoitsvoice’”(D.Breazeale2012p.200).(Iwillarguein§3thatforFichte,asforKant,consciencehasonlyasecond-orderepistemicfunction,andthatthecontrastwithKantdrawnbybothWoodandBreazeale is therefore incorrect.)Breazeale takes theexer-ciseof reflecting judgment tobepartofpracticaldeliberation,butheseesitsfunctionnotasordinarycalculativereasoning(asIwillargueitisin§2)butinsteadasaprocess“whichproducesinmeacertainmental ‘harmony’withmy feelingof independence, a harmony that is perceived as a feeling of ‘ought’” (D. Breazeale 2012 p. 200).He identifies that process of reflec-tionwithconscienceitself(therebygivingconscienceafirst-orderepistemicrole),andattributestoFichtetheviewthatconscienceissubstantivelyinfal-lible. “Whatwehave justdescribed isnothingother than theoperationofconscience,which,properlyunderstood,isourunfailingmoralguideineveryconcrete situation” (D.Breazeale 2012p. 200).These are examples I haveencountered in thepastyear,but thishas longbeenastandard interpreta-tionofFichte,intextsonthehistoryofphilosophyingeneralandinschol-arlyworkonFichteinparticular.InearlierworkBreazealedescribesFichtean



ultyofdesire(infact,herejectsthedeepKantiandistinctionbetweenlowerandhigherfacultiesofdesirealtogether).8Heplaysdowntheideaofuniversallegislation,claimingthattheuniversal-lawformula-tion isavaluableheuristicbut innowayaconstitutiveprincipleofpracticalreason.9Hismoralprinciplerequires,instead,thatwepursuethesubstantiveendofrationalagency’sownevergreaterperfectionandindependencefromexternallimitationsofallkinds.

It is this idea that I would like to elucidate, briefly, in this sec-tion.Thebestplacetobegin,incomingtogripswithFichte’sethicalthought, isa summarystatementof themoralprincipleheoffersattheendofthesecondmainpartoftheSystem of Ethics:“Ishouldact freely, that Imaybecome free.”10Thereare,he tellsus, several sensesoffreedominplayinthatsentence.Thefreedomatissuein“becom-ing” free is themoral endqua “objective state of affairs that shouldbe produced, the final end of absolute independence of everythingoutsideofus.”11What I should do isnot simplyproduce thisendbywhatevermeans,butratherproduceitby“act[ing]freely”.Whatisittoactfreely?Fichtetellsusthatactingfreelyhastwoaspects:“howit[viz., theacting]musthappen,andwhatmusthappen.”12Totheseaspectscorrespond“formal”and“material”conditionsofthe“freedom”ofanaction,13wherebythe“freedom”ofanactionFichtemeanstheaction’smoralworth ina familiar sense: that itbedone from themotiveofduty(the“formal”condition)andthatitbewhatdutydemands(the“material”condition).14Thatanactioncansatisfyoneofthesetwocon-

8. J.G.Fichte1971,IV:128–131,177–191.

9. J.G.Fichte1971,IV:234.

10. J.G.Fichte1971,IV:153;cf.60,149,153,209,211–212,229.

11. J.G.Fichte1971,IV:153.

12. J.G.Fichte1971,IV:153.

13. J.G.Fichte1971,IV:153.

14. Fichtealsocallstheformalconditiona“subjective”criterionandthematerialconditionan“objective”one.Healsoatonepointcallstheformalconditionaconditiononactions’“morality”andthematerialconditionaconditiononactions’ “legality”. This last remark is potentiallymisleading (though there

will.5 But if there is one fact about Fichte’s relation to Kant that isgenerallyrecognized,itishisviewthatadherencetothespiritoftheKantian critical philosophy sometimes requires departures from itsletter.Itisunsurprising,then,thatFichte’sSystem of EthicsdepartsfromKant’sethicalwritingsonanumberofkeypoints.

Themostfundamentaldifferenceliesinhisaccountofthenatureofthemoralprincipleuponwhichthecontentofmoraldutyissaidtodepend.ForKant,themoralprinciplerequiresthatwechooseonlyinsuchawaythatthemaximofchoicecanatthesametimebewilledasauniversallawforarealmofrationalagents.6Kantcallsthisprinciple“formal”;amaterialprinciple,bycontrast,wouldprescribetheproduc-tionofanendandjudgethegoodnessofacts,rules,orpoliciesonthebasisoftheirtendencytoproduceorfurtherthatend.

Fichte’smoralprincipleismaterialinjustthissense.HerejectsKant’sreasonforinsistingthatamoralprinciplemustbeformal(viz.,thatallmaterialprinciplesmustberootedinthelowerfacultyofdesire),7be-causeherejectsbothKant’saccountofthecontentofthelowerfacultyofdesireandhisaccountoftherelationofthelowertothehigherfac-

5. FichtedoesnottakeupKant’sterm“autonomy”ashisown,buthedoesclaimthathisaccountofethicsisautonomousinKant’ssense(e. g.atJ.G.Fichte1971,IV:56–57).Heholdsthattheexerciseoftherationalwilliswhatisfundamen-tallyvaluable,andthatotherthingsacquirevalueinvirtueoftheirrelationtothat(asconditionsofitspossibility,orasitsproducts,forinstance).(Itakethesetobefirst-orderclaimsaboutwhatisofvalueandabouttheplaceofmoralconsiderationswithinpracticalreasonmoregenerally.)Healsoholdsthattherationalwillhasthis(itsown)valueasitsconstitutiveend,andthatitinevitablydiscoversthisend(andalsocreatessomeaspectsofit)throughitsownrationalactivity.Rationalwillingisthe“source”ofvalueinthesetwosenses,Ibelieve,forbothKantandFichte.IdonotbelievethateitherclaimcommitseitherKantorFichtetotheattitude-dependenceofvalueornormsacross theboard. (Thispointof interpretation iscontroversial,butnopartofmyargument in thispaperdependsupon it.)Hereandelsewhere IciteFichteaccordingtothepaginationofthefirsteditionofhiscollectedworks,publishedbyhissonI.H.Fichtein1845–1846andreprintedbyDeGruyterin1971.ThispaginationisreproducedinthemarginsofthelatesteditionbytheBavarianAcademyofSciencesandHumanities(J.G.Fichte1962–2011).AlltranslationsofFichtearemine.

6. I.Kant1968,4:420–440;I.Kant1996app.72–89.

7. I.Kant1968,5:21–29;I.Kant1996app.155–162.



theproximate end that justifies them—theprotectionof individual-ity—isdistinctfromthemoralend.)

Themoralprincipledictatesobligationsdirectlyonlywheresuchassociativedutiesdonot:inthespheresetasideasprivatebythelaw,orwherethelawissilentforotherreasons,orwherethepowerofen-forcementisabsent.Itisasourceofself-regardingdutiesandofsomedutiestoothersthatarenotthemselvesdutiesofright(becausetheydonotfalldirectlyoutoftheneedtorendermultipleexercisesoffreeagencycompatible—e. g.dutiestofuturegenerations);anditguidescollectivedeliberationbycitizensaboutwhichlargersocialgoalstopursueamongthemanythatareconsistentwiththeprinciplesofright.

Thedutiesthataredirectlydictatedbythemoralendfallintotwogeneralclasses.Dutiesinthefirstclasshavethesamerationaleasdutiesofright:theprotectionandpromotionofindividualagencyquaindivid-ual,inthepreservationofeachindividual’ssphereofunimpededcausalinteractionwiththesurroundingworld.Theseimposepatient-centeredrestrictionsonthefulfillmentofdutiesinthesecondclass,whichcon-cernthedirectpromotionoftheendofmaterialindependenceofratio-nalagencyfromexternallimitationsofallkinds.Dutiesinthissecondclassaredutiestoprotectandexpandhumancapabilitiesandopportu-nitiesforactionintheoutsideworld:tobroadenourindividualandcol-lectiveabilitytorealisticallyplan(wherethatinvolvesbothincreasingourabilitytoensurethatourplansarecarriedoutifweundertakethemandopeningupnovelpossibilitiesforplanningthroughtechnologicalinnovationandcreativeexpansionofwaysofliving,producing,andin-teracting).Thisfourthcomponentofthemoralendisthemostdistinc-tiveelementofFichte’sethics(thoughithasrootsinKant’sphilosophyofhistory);itprovidesthefoundationofhistheoryofpropertyaswellasofhisaccountofmanyethicalduties(e. g.dutiesofbeneficenceandself-improvement);and itmotivateshis remarkableaccountof themoralimportanceofscientificresearchandeducation.

Theorderingofthesecomponentsisnotobviouslylexicographic,though there are some clear priority relations between duties fromthedifferentcategories.Fichte’saimwastodescribeamoralsituation

ditionswithoutsatisfyingtheother—that theseare indeedindepen-dentnecessaryconditionsonanaction’smoralworth,asFichteherestates—isdeniedbythecriterialinterpretation,andispartofwhatIaimtoestablishinwhatfollows.

The formal condition (“how itmust happen”) imposes a sort ofdue-diligenceconstraintonthepursuitof themoralend. Itrequiresthat theagentbeconsciousof thegroundsofheraction, that thesegroundsbethattheactionistheonetheagentjudgesmoralitytode-mand,andthattheagentbesufficientlysubjectivelyconfidentinthatjudgment.Thematerialcondition(“whatmusthappen”)requiresthattheactionbepartofa seriesatwhoseendonewouldarriveat themoralendquastateofaffairs.

Progresstowardthisendisprogressalongmanyirreduciblydiver-gentaxes,whichcanbecollectedunderfourmaincategories.

First,themoralendsubsumestherightorderingofindividuals’re-lations tooneanotherqua free individuals in a communityof right.Fichtethought(andtriedtoshowinhisFoundations of Natural Right of1796–1797)thatacertainformofintersubjectiveinteractionisacondi-tionofpossibilityoffreeagencyconsciousofitselfassuch,andthatcertain principles of right fall out of an examination of the require-mentsofsuchinteraction.IntheSystem of Ethicshearguesthatpartici-pationinacommunityofrightisamoralduty,asiscompliancewiththe lawsof any such community ofwhichone is amember. Theselawsanswerthegreaterpartofthequestionsaboutwhatourdutiestoothersare.15Somefurtherquestionsareansweredbytheassociativedutiesthatarisefromthesocialdivisionoflabor.16Fichte’sjustificationoftheseassociativedutiesisexternal:onehasthedutiesbecausetheyarepartiallyconstitutiveofpractices thatconduce to,or themselvespartiallyconstitute,thecollectivepursuitoftheothercomponentsofthemoralend.(Politicaldutiesarealsojustifiedexternally,although

wasprecedentforitinKant),since‘legality’referstosubstantivemoralcor-rectness(notaccordancewithpositivelawora prioriprinciplesofright).

15. J.G.Fichte1971,IV:238–239,259,285–287,301,306–309.

16. Cf.J.G.Fichte1971,IV:271–273;325–365.



deliberation is that of determining which courses of action arepossible in a given situation,which among the possible courses ispermissible given the constraints of positive law (and, sometimes,non-political associative duties), and which permissible action ismostlikelytoleadtowardtheendofmaterialindependence.Hereisonedescription:

Themorallaw,inrelationtoempiricalhumanbeings,hasa determinate starting point (the determinate limitationin which the individual finds himself) …; it has adeterminate(ifneverreachable)goal (absolutefreedomfrom all limitation); and a completely determinateway alongwhichit leadsus(theorderofnature).Thereforeforeverydeterminateindividualinagivensituationthereissomethingdeterminatethatisrequiredbyduty—andthis,we can say, iswhat themoral lawdemands in itsapplicationto[thatindividual].19

This account of practical deliberation is very different from Kant’s,andFichtewascarefultounderscorethisdifferenceatseveralpointsinthetext.

Inonesuchpassage,heclaimsthatdeliberationbelongsentirelytothetheoreticalfaculty,tothe“powerofreflectingjudgment”.20Themoralprinciplespecifiesonlythemoralend,anddoesnotdirectlypre-scribeorproscribeanydeterminateactions(oractiontypes),eitheringeneralor inany individualcase.Theethicaldrive thusdeterminesthepowerofjudgment“notmaterially,bygivingitsomething…butinsteadonly formally, by determining it to seek something”, namelythatactionxthat,inthecircumstances,istheoneprogresstowardthemoralenddemands.21Because“thepracticalfacultyisnotatheoretical

19. J.G.Fichte1971,IV:166.

20.J.G.Fichte1971,IV:165.

21. J.G.Fichte1971,IV:166.

nolesscomplexthantheoneweactuallyinhabit,inwhichtradeoffsbetweenheterogeneous,notpreciselycomparablegoodsareroutine.

That, then, is a brief outline of the structure of Fichte’s ethicaltheory.17Twofeaturesofitareespeciallyimportantforwhatfollows.First,moraldeliberation isend-oriented forFichte,andthatmakeshisaccountofitprofoundlydifferentfromKant’s.Thisisseldomap-preciated,andtheassumptionthathisaccountofdeliberationmustbesimilartoKant’shascontributedtothemotivationofthecriterialinterpretation.Second,forFichtemoralworthhastwodistinctnec-essaryconditions,oneformalandonematerial.Hisaccountofcon-scienceformspartofhisaccountoftheformalcondition.Proponentsofthecriterialinterpretationeitherdenytheexistenceofaseparate,materialcondition,orelseunderstandFichteasarguingthatsatisfac-tionof the formalconditionguaranteessatisfactionof thematerialcondition.Neither reading can be squaredwith the relevant texts,andboth arephilosophically implausible (though fordifferent rea-sons).Their implausibility accounts for the incredulitywithwhichmostwhoacceptthecriterialinterpretationregardFichte’saccountofpracticaldeliberation. Iwillexpandonallof thesepoints intheremainingsections.

2. Practical deliberation

Fichte thought that all practical reasoning is reasoning aboutwhatwouldbringabout,orwhatwouldconstitute the fulfillmentof, thevarious components of themoral end. That is, he thought that allpractical deliberation is purely calculative.18 The task of practical

17. ForamoredetaileddiscussionofFichte’stheoryofagency,seeM.Kosch2013.ForalongeroverviewofFichte’snormativeethicaltheoryandadiscussionofthephilosophicalmotivationbehindtheideaofmaterialindependence,seeM.Kosch2014,fromwhichpartofthissummaryistaken.

18. Hereby ‘calculative’IhaveinmindroughlythesensedefinedinC.Vogler2002.ButalthoughFichtethinksthatallpracticaldeliberationiscalculative,hedoesnotthinkthatallreasonsarisefromsuchdeliberation.Wehaverea-sontopursuethemoralend,butthisreasondoesnotemergefromanypro-cessofdeliberation,sincewedonotreasonaboutwhethertoadoptit.Itisgiventous,asareason,byourconstitutionasagents.



In a second passage apparently aimed at distinguishing his ac-count of practical deliberation from Kant’s, Fichte discusses “theKantianprinciple:act insuchaway thatyoucan think themaximofyourwillasauniversallaw”.26Hearguesthattheprincipleiscor-rect inthatsince“[t]hemoralendofeveryrationalbeingis…theself-sufficiencyofreasongenerally”weshouldallinprincipleagreeabouttherightthingtodoinagivensituation.27Buthegoesontoarguethattheuniversality(inthissense)ofmoraljudgmenthasatmostheuristicsignificance:

exerciseofreflectingjudgmentasjustanotherwayofsayingthatitinvolvesonlyregulativeprinciples.Whatistrueisthat,intuitively,moraljudgmentsof the sortKant describes in theGroundwork are instances of determiningjudgment.Practicalreasonprovidesaconcept(<suitableforuniversallegisla-tion>),andpractical judgmentdetermineswhetheragivenmaximfallsun-derthatconcept.Theconceptisgiven a priori andsois(also)constitutiveofpracticalreasoning.OnemightthinkthatforFichtemoraljudgmentsshouldworkinthesameway.Wehaveaconcept(<conducivetothemoralend>),andpracticaljudgmentdetermineswhetheragivencontemplatedactionfallsunderit.WhyisthatnotFichte’sview?Oneproblemmightarisefromthefactthatactingon themoralend involvesbalancingcompetingconsiderationsthatarenotpreciselycomparable.But I thinktherealproblemarises fromthefactthatworkingoutwhatisconducivetothemoralendisveryoftenamatterofexercisingcreativity,bothbecausesolutionstotechnicalproblemsinvolvecreativityandbecausethemoralenditselfinvolvesthecreativeex-pansionofactionpossibilities.ForFichte,muchmoralprogressresultsfrominvention(technologicalinventionisthemoststraightforwardinstance,butartistic,conceptual,andotherformsofinventionarealsoinvolved).Noticethatempirical-conceptformation(aparadigminstanceofKantianreflectingjudgment)issimilarlycreative.So,giventhesortofproblem-solvingFichtethinkspractical reasoning involves, it isnosurprise thathedescribes itasemployingreflectingratherthandeterminingjudgment.Thankstotheaudi-enceatthe2012BostonUniversityWorkshopinLateModernPhilosophyforforcingmeto thinkabout thisquestion,andtoananonymousrevieweratthisjournalforpromptingmetoaddafootnoteaddressingit.

26. J.G.Fichte1971,IV:233–234.

27. J.G. Fichte 1971, IV: 233.The context is thediscussionof theobligation toseekconsensusincasesofmoraldisagreement.Disagreementisaprima facie problem,becausetheresultoftheprocessofdeliberationhasthestatusofanimperativewhosecharacterisuniversalinthatit(implicitly)claimstobetheoneanyrationalagentinexactlythissituationwithexactlythissetofback-groundbeliefswould,onsufficientreflection,cometo.FichtehereclaimsthattherealmeaningofKant’sformulaofuniversallawisthatmoralitydemandsthatweactasifwewere“everyman”.

faculty…itcannotgivethisx;ratherthisxistobesoughtthroughthe(herefreelyreflecting)powerofjudgment”.22

FichteherereferstoadistinctionKanthaddrawnintheintroduc-tiontotheCritique of the Power of Judgment.Kanthadclaimedthatwith-inwhatwewould call “practical reasoning” in a loose sense (delib-erationaboutwhattodo)weshoulddifferentiatebetweenapartthatisproperlypracticalandapartthatisonly“technically-practical”andthatbelongs,strictly,totheoreticalreason.23By“technically-practical”Kanthasinmindreasoningaboutwhatwouldbringabout,orwhatwouldconstitute the fulfillmentof,agivenend—calculative reason-ing,inotherwords.Hearguesthatsuchreasoningbelongsstrictlytothe theoretical faculty, not to the practical, because it involves onlycausalandmereologicaljudgmentsandconceptsdrawnfromnaturalscience(inasensebroadenoughtoincludepsychology),andthesearetheoretical.24Fichte’sassertioninthispassageisthatallpracticaldeliberationistechnically-practicalinKant’ssense.25

22. J.G.Fichte1971,IV:166.

23. I.Kant1968,5:171–173;I.Kant2000pp.59–61.

24. “[A]lltechnically-practicalrules(i. e.thoseofartandskillingeneral,aswellasthoseofprudence…)…mustbecountedonlyascorollariesoftheoreticalphilosophy”(I.Kant1968,5:172;I.Kant2000p.60).

25. Some (cf. e. g. A.W.Wood 2000) have taken Fichte’s remark that practicaldeliberation involves reflecting judgment to suggest akinship toaestheticjudgment(Fichte’stalkof“harmony”herealsoinvitesthis);others(e. g.someaudiencemembersatthe2012BostonUniversityWorkshopinLateModernPhilosophy,atwhich thispaperwas read)have taken it tobeaneffortonFichte’spart tosay thatpracticaldeliberation involvesonly regulativeprin-ciplesbutnoconstitutiveones.Bothconclusionsseemtomeinsufficientlysupportedbythetextualevidence.AccordingtothedistinctionKantdrawsinthethirdCritique,determiningjudgmentiswhatweemploytoplaceagivenparticularundera “rule,principle, law”ofwhichwearealready inposses-sion;whereasreflectingjudgmentextractsauniversalfromagroupofgivenparticulars(I.Kant1968,5:179).Bothdeterminingandreflectingjudgmentare involvedintheoretical inquiry, forKant;soFichte’sreferencetoreflect-ingjudgmentshouldnotsuggestthataestheticjudgment,orsomethingim-portantly analogous to aesthetic judgment,must be at issue. And the dis-tinctionbetweentheregulativeandconstitutiveuseofconceptscutsacrossthedistinctionbetween reflective anddetermining judgment, forKant; sothereisnoreasontotakeFichte’sdescriptionofpracticaldeliberationasthe



constitutiveprinciple,isclaimingthatsomeversionoftheinstrumen-talprincipleistheonlyconstitutiveprincipleofpracticaldeliberation.30

Fichte can hold this more austere view of practical deliberationbecause his ontology of practical reasons is likewise more austerethanKant’s.Fichteacceptsonlyimpartial,agent-neutralreasonsatthegroundlevel(althoughheadmitssomederivativeagent-relativerea-sons—somegivenbypoliticalandotherassociativeduties;othersbynaturalsolutionstomoralcoordinationproblems).The“self-sufficien-cyofreasongenerally”isanagent-neutralendandthesourceofagent-neutralreasons.Sometimes(perhapsordinarily)pursuingone’sownself-sufficiencyisthebestwaytopursuethisend;butwhereitisnot,Fichte’sposition is thatwehave, associativeduties aside,no reasontopursueourownbeforeothers’.Thisiswhatsimplifieshisaccountofpracticaldeliberation:itcaninvolveonlycalculativereasoningbe-causeitisorientedtowardanendthatisnotessentiallyagent-relative.

Kant, by contrast, admits non-derivative agent-relative reasons.Hispracticaldeliberatorbeginsfromadefaultpositionofpursuinganendthatisessentiallyagent-relativeandthatsetsindividualinterestsagainstoneanother,namelythatoftheagent’sownhappiness.31Thecategorical-imperativetestthenactsasaconstraintonthatpursuit.

30.Hethusiscommitted(asIbelievewasKanthimself)tothedenialofKors-gaard’sthesisthat“[t]hefamiliarviewthattheinstrumentalprincipleistheonly requirement of practical reason is [not just false but] incoherent” (C.Korsgaard1997p.220).ItmightbeworthrecallingatthispointthatFichtetakesthesolutionofcoordinationproblemsnottobeanobjectofindividualmoraldeliberation,butinsteadtobesolvedbymembershipinacommunityofrightandbytheassociativedutiesarisingfromthesocialdivisionoflabor.

31. Myconceptionofmyhappiness,forKant,isacomparativeconceptionofmyoverallwell-being.Theendisagent-relativebecauseitismywell-beingthatismyend,nothumanwell-beingingeneral.Thecomparativeelementintheendofhappiness—thefactthatwhatIwantinwantinghappinessistobewell-off compared tomypeers, and ideally tobebetter-off than them—iswhatsets individuals’ interests inopposition tooneanother.Because it in-volves,essentially,thiscompetitiveelement,theendofhappinesswilloftenconflictwithwhatmoralityrequiresevenunderthebestof(material)circum-stances.Yet the agent-relative aimof one’s ownhappiness is rationally re-quired,accordingtoKant.Thisisthesourceoftheantinomyofpracticalrea-son.FormorediscussionofKant’sconceptionofhappiness,seeA.W.Wood

But inmyviewweneed to add… [that] thisprincipleisonlyheuristic(IcanverywelluseittotestwhetherIhaveerred inmy judgmentofmyduty);but it is innowayconstitutive.Itisnotevenitselfaprinciple,butonlyaconsequenceofthetrueprinciple,thedemandfortheabsolute self-sufficiency of reason. The relationship ofthe two is not: because something can be a principleofuniversal legislation, for that reason it shouldbe themaxim of my will; but instead the opposite: becausesomething should be the maxim of my will, for thatreasonitcanalsobeaprincipleofuniversallegislation.28

Herewehaveadisagreementaboutthenatureofpracticalreasoningthat goes very deep. This difference has been overlooked in theliterature on Fichte’s ethics, and since I believe that oversight hascontributedtotheplausibilityofthecriterialinterpretation(asIwillexplain), I will pursue this contrast with Kant a bit further beforeturningtoexamineFichte’saccountofconscience.

RecallthatKant,intheGroundwork,recognizedtwo a priori princi-plesofpracticalreason:theinstrumentalprincipleandthecategoricalimperative.Thefirstrulesoutmaximsthatareindividuallyself-defeat-ing; thesecondrulesoutmaxims thatarecollectivelyself-defeating(even if individually self-serving), or elsemaxims that conflictwithcertainnaturalendsofrationalbeings.Technically-practicalreasoningissubordinatetotheinstrumentalprinciple,andalthoughKantdoesnotclaimthat the instrumentalprinciple is itselfaprincipleof theo-reticalreason(assomephilosophershavedone29),hedoesholdthatallreasoningsubordinatetoitistheoretical.Fichte,inclaimingthatalldeliberationaboutwhattodoinvolvesonlytheoreticalreasoning,andinclaimingthatthecategoricalimperativeisaheuristicratherthana

28. J.G.Fichte1971,IV:234.

29.ForarecentstatementseeK.Setiya2007.



inaccordancewithduty:first,thatoneshouldactnotblindlyandim-pulsivelybutthoughtfullyandwithconsciousnessofone’sduty;and,second,thatoneshouldneveractagainstone’sconviction.32HerewecanseeashiftinfocustowardsepistemicconcernsandawayfromthemotivationalfocusofKant’sownaccountofactionfromduty.Therearetworeasonsforthisshift.

ThefirstarisesoutofFichte’saccountofpracticaldeliberation it-self:sinceitisaspronetoerrorasanyexerciseofreflectivejudgment,Fichteowesusanaccountofwhatcouldgiveanagentsufficientcon-fidenceinitsresultstojustifyaction.(Kant,bycontrast,seemstohaveseentheapplicationofthecategorical-imperativetestasepistemicallylessproblematic.)ThesecondarisesfromFichte’sdistinctiveaccountofweaknessofwill(whichhewilloutlineinthesectionthatfollows):sincehedenies that a rational agent canbemoved todowhat sheclearly sees to be unjustified, Fichte sees all morally blameworthy(though not all substantivelymorally incorrect) action as rooted inepistemic irresponsibility.33 (ForKant, by contrast,weakness ofwillmanifestsitselfinthetransitionfromreflectiontoaction,aswellasinfailuresofreflection.)

SowhileFichteaims,inthissection,tocapturetheKantianideaofactionfromthemotiveofduty,hisconceptionofwhatthatrequiresfo-cusesonepistemicresponsibility,becausehethinksthatthisiswhereagentsforthemostpartgowrong.34Thisiswhyheformulatesthefor-malconditiononmoralworthashedoes:“Actalwaysaccordingtoyourbestconvictionofyourduty;or:actaccordingtoyourconscience.”35

Thisconditionmight seemeasy to fulfill; and ifhowwe fulfill itweretriviallyobvious,Fichtewouldstophere.Butheseesapotential

32. J.G.Fichte1971,IV:155–156.

33. J.G.Fichte1971,IV:191–193.

34. ThankstoananonymousrefereeatthisjournalforpressingmetoclarifythisshiftinemphasisinFichte’saccountofactionfromduty.

35. J.G.Fichte1971,IV:156;cf.IV:173:“Theformalconditionofthemoralityofouractions…consists inourdecisiontodowhatconsciencedemandsbe-causeconsciencedemandsit.”

ForFichte’spracticaldeliberator,then,thereisnotwo-stepprocesscorrespondingtothetwo-stepprocessofmaxim-formationandmax-im-testinginKant.Thefactthatthecategorical-imperativetestinitsKantianformisabsentfromFichte’saccountofpracticaldeliberation,andthecorrespondingthinnessoftheaccount(Fichte,likeKant,hav-inglittletosayabouttheinstrumentalprinciple),ispartoftheback-groundoftheinterpretiveproblem,towhichIcannowreturn.

3. Conscience

TheaccountofpracticaldeliberationIhavejustreconstructedistakenfromthefirstsectionofthethirdmainpartoftheSystem of Ethics,whichisdedicated toexplicating the formalconditionon themoralworthofactions.Thissection isalso the locusof the interpretiveproblem,becausein itFichtehasappeared, tomany,toofferaquitedifferentaccountofpracticaldeliberation,onwhichanagentdecideswhattodoinagivensituationbysimplyconsultingherconscience.Conscienceistaken,onthisinterpretation,tohaveafirst-orderepistemicfunction:toprovideimmediateepistemicaccesstothedeterminatemoraltruthabout what the agent should do in the situation. This assumptionthat conscience has a first-order epistemic function, coupled withFichte’s assertion in the section that conscience cannot err, has ledreaderstoattributetoFichtetheviewthatconscientiousdecisionsaresubstantivelyinfallible.

ThatsuchanaccountisimplausiblehasbeenchargedbyvirtuallyeveryonewhohasattributedittoFichte,beginningwithHegel.Thatmakesitspersistenceapuzzle.Butthestretchoftextthatgivesrisetoitis,itmustbeadmitted,especiallythorny.Iwillbeginbydescribinghowitoughttoberead,andthen,inthenextsection,offersomesug-gestionsastowhyithasnotalwaysbeenreadinthisway.

Fichteprepareshisdiscussionof theformalconditionbyremark-ingthattwoconsequences“followimmediately”fromtheKantianideathatmorallyworthyactionmustbeactionfromduty,notjustaction

2001;formorediscussionofhowFichte’saccountofpracticalreasonsallowshimtoavoidKant’santinomy,seeM.Kosch2015.



whatIshoulddo?”).Thesecansoundlikethesamequestion.(Indeeditisplainthattheyhave,tomostofFichte’sreaders.)Andevenonceonesucceedsindistinguishingthem,itcanstillseemthatwhatmoti-vatesthesecond-orderworrycanonlybeconcernthatthefirst-orderjudgmentmight be in error. In fact, though, the two questions aredistinct;andinfactFichtehasalreadyexplainedthereason,beyondconcernwiththefirst,foraskingthesecond:itistheagent’sconcernwithwhethersheisfulfillingtheformal(notthematerial)conditiononthemoralworthofactions.Forshecannotactonconvictionifsheisunsureaboutwhethershehasaconvictiontoacton.

Fichtehasalreadytoldusthatthefirst-orderconvictionhehasinmindisnon-factive(“JustasIcanerrinmyjudgmentoftheindividualcase…”).Andinthediscussionthatfollows(afterafewpages)ofcon-scientiousmoraldisagreement, Fichtepresupposes that this second-ordercertaintyisnoguaranteeofthesubstantivetruthofagents’first-orderconvictions:forifitwereaguaranteeoftruth,itwouldtherebyguaranteetheabsenceofconscientiousdisagreement.39Somyaim,inlookingfora“criterionofcorrectnessofmyconvictionconcerningmyduty”, cannot be to become convinced that I am correct inmyfirst-orderjudgment.ItcanonlybetobecomeconvincedthatIaminfactconvincedofmyfirst-orderjudgment.

Theanswer to this second-orderquestion is, according toFichte,easytocomeby.Oursubjectiveconfidenceinhavingcometoacon-cretemoraljudgmentisnomoreproblematicthanourconfidenceinhavingcometoaconcretetheoreticaljudgment,heargues,sincethe

39.Fichtehasat leastonefurthercommitmentthatentailsthatsubjectivecon-victiondoesnot guarantee substantive correctness. Forproperly exercisedreflectivejudgmenttobeinfallible,practicalreasonerswouldneednotonlytobeperfectlyrationalintheirinferences;theywouldalsoneedtostartfromallandonly truepremises.But if Fichte thoughtwe (already) reason fromallandonlytruepremises,hewouldhavetodenyeitherthatwecanmakeprogressinourtheoreticalunderstandingoftheworld,orthatsuchprogresscouldhaveanypractical relevance.Sincehedoes think thatwecanmakeprogressinscienceinthefuture,andsincehedoesthinkthatsuchprogresswouldbepracticallyrelevant,hemustassumewedrawfalseconclusionsinmanyinstancesofpracticalreasoningtoday.

problem.Hesuggeststhattheformalconditionmightbeimpossibletomeetifacertainsecond-orderworrycannotbeputtorest:“JustasIcanerrinthejudgmentoftheindividualcase,soIcanerrinthejudg-mentofmyjudgment,inmyconvictionofmyconviction.”36Ifactionfrom duty requires acting on conviction aboutwhat duty demands,andifIcouldjudgewronglythatIhavesuchconviction—thatIaminfactconvincedthatIshoulddosomeactionxnow—thenIcouldactintheabsenceofthesubjectiveconvictionthattheformalconditionrequires,without recognizing that it is absent.

TheproblemFichteseesisthat,werethatpossible,fulfillmentofthe formal conditionwould be “dependent upon accident”.37 Fulfill-ment of thematerial demands ofmorality is “dependent upon acci-dent”inastraightforwardsense,becausethesedemandsaresubstan-tive andbecause practical judgment can err in its determination ofthem. Satisfaction of the formal condition, by contrast, is supposedtobeimmunetomoralluck,entirelyundertheagent’scontrol.(Thatisbecauseitistosatisfactionoftheformalconditionthatpraisewor-thiness andblameworthiness attach.) Inorder for fulfillmentof theformalconditionnot tobedependentuponaccident,Fichtegoeson,theremustbe“anabsolutecriterionofthecorrectnessofmyconvic-tionconcerningmyduty”.38TheavailabilityofsuchacriterionwouldruleoutthepossibilitythatImight,unbeknownsttomyself,failtoactonthemotiveofduty.ThatistheworryFichteistryingtolaytorestinthediscussionthatfollows.

It might seem a strange worry to have, and I believe it is thatstrangeness that hasmade the passage so easy tomisread.We canunderstandwhatFichtesayshereonlyifwekeepclearlyinviewthedistinctionbetween(1)afirst-orderquestionaboutwhatIshoulddo(“IsxreallywhatIshoulddo?”)and(2)asecond-orderquestionaboutmyjudgmentthatxiswhatIshoulddo(“AmIreallyconvincedthatxis

36. J.G.Fichte1971,IV:164.

37. J.G.Fichte1971,IV:164.

38. J.G.Fichte1971,IV:164.



theformalrequirementtoactaccordingtoone’sconvictionofone’sduty)tobe,instead,aprocedurefordeterminingwhatthethingtodoisinagivensituation(andsotoprovideinsteadthematerialcontentofone’sdutyinthatsituation).

4. Textual and other temptations to the criterial interpretation

Fichteseemshimselftobeawareofthepotentialformisunderstandinghere,andtakesmeasurestoforestallitatseveralpoints—pointingoutexplicitlythedistinctnessoftheformalandmaterialconditionsatthestartof thediscussion;43emphasizingalongthewaythat the formalcriterionissubjectiveandinner,not“anouter,objective”criterion;44 andreturningtothecontrastbetweenformalandmaterialconditionsat the end of the discussion.45 These protestations, along with thearchitectonicoftheSystem of Ethicsandthevariousformulationsofthemoralprinciple,rulethecriterialinterpretationoutcategorically.But,unfortunately, Fichtemakesmany remarks in this section thathaveseemedtoinviteit;andsome(notillegitimate)assumptionshaveledreaderstoacceptthatinvitation.

ThemostimportantamongtheassumptionsarisesfromfailuretoseethedistancebetweenFichte’saccountofpracticaldeliberationandKant’s. The absenceof a deliberative procedure like the categorical-imperative testhas led readers toput consultationof conscience initsplace.Thecriterialinterpretationtakesconsultationofconscienceto be a first-order procedure of practical deliberation (somethinganalogoustorunningone’smaximthroughthecategorical-imperativetest),wheninfactthefunctionFichteattributestoconscienceisverylikeoneof the functionsKanthimselfattributed toconscience:con-science tells us whether or not we have deliberated adequately (inKant’s terms,whether or notwe have submitted ourmaxim to the

43. J.G.Fichte1971,IV:156.

44. J.G.Fichte1971,IV:170.KantdrawsthesamedistinctionatI.Kant1968,6:401;I.Kant1996app.529–530.

45. J.G.Fichte1971,IV:172–173.

formerissimplyaspeciesofthelatter.(It isatthispointinthetextthatwefindthediscussionofreflectivejudgmentreconstructedin§2above.) The process of engaging in practical deliberation and com-pletingitisjustthesame,subjectively,asanyinstanceoftheoreticalreasoning:our theoretical facultiesgo theirwayuntil theyhituponsomethingthatsatisfiesthedemandtofindtheactionxthatistheonethat,inthesecircumstances,ismostconducivetoprogresstowardtheendofabsoluteindependence.Whathappens,subjectively,whenourtheoretical facultieshavehitupon thatsomething is theoccurrenceofafeelingof“coolapproval”thatisexactlysimilartotheonethatac-companiesthediscoveryoftheanswertoanytheoreticalquestion.“Inactionwecallwhatisapprovedinthiswayright;incognitiontrue”,butthefeelingofsettledconvictionthatreplacesthefeelingofdoubtthatprecedesitisthesame,becausethesamecognitiveprocessunderliesboth.40Inthemoralcase,thenameforthatfeelingofsettledconvic-tionis“thevoiceofconscience”.

Fichteisquiteexplicitherethatheismakingaphenomenologicalpointaboutwhatitfeelsliketocometoajudgment—“whetherIamdoubtfulorcertain,I learnnotthroughargument…butthroughanimmediatefeeling”41—andthatthisanswersthequestionofhowonecanbeassuredthatthiselementoftheformalcriterionismet(whenitis)byansweringthequestionofhowonecanbeconfidentthatonehasindeedcometoamoraljudgment.

Theinterpretiveproblemarisesfromhiswayofputtingthisidea:“ifaction fromduty is tobepossible, theremustbeanabsolutecri-terion of the correctness of our conviction of our duty”.42 Tomanyreaders the “correctness”at issuehasseemed tobe thesubstantivecorrectness of thefirst-order judgment that the agent has come to.Theinterpretivemistake,then,istotakeawayofdeterminingwhenonehasamoralconvictiontoacton(andsocaninprinciplesatisfy

40.J.G.Fichte1971,IV:167,170.

41. J.G.Fichte1971,IV:169.Fichte’sdiscussionherecallstomindPeirce’sin‘TheFixationofBelief’(C.Peirce1877).

42. J.G.Fichte1971,IV:165.



Themost importantamong theunfortunate remarksare thefirstandthirdcorollariesinthissection.Thefirstcorollaryistheclaimthatconsciencecannoterr.48ThisindeedfollowsfromwhatFichtehassaid;but ifweunderstand thesortofverdictconsciencedelivers,weseethatitdoesnotfollowfromthisthatanindividualcannoterrinhersubstantive first-order judgment (which is, apparently, what HegeltookFichtetomeanwiththeclaimthatconsciencecannoterr).Here,again,FichteagreeswithKant.49

Thethirdcorollaryistheclaimthatconsciencecannotbereplacedbythejudgmentofanexternalauthority,andthatactingonexternalauthorityratherthanonone’sownindividualjudgmentisnecessarilyactinginawaythatlacksmoralworth.50Thefirsthalfofthisconjunc-tionalsofollowsfromwhatFichtehassaid,sincethefeelingofcertain-tythathehasdescribedcomesonlytoonewhohasmadeajudgmenthimself: “it is theexclusiveconditionofpossibilityofsucha feelingthatthesubjecthimselfactuallyjudged.Andsocertaintyandconvic-

48. J.G.Fichte1971,IV:173–174.

49. Kant also claimed, both in ‘On theMiscarriage of All Philosophical TrialsinTheodicy’ (quoted above) and inThe Metaphysics of Morals, that “an err-ing conscience is anabsurdity”. InThe Metaphysics of Morals,he continues:“ForwhileIcanindeedbemistakenattimesinmyobjectivejudgmentastowhethersomethingisadutyornot,IcannotbemistakeninmysubjectivejudgmentastowhetherIhavesubmittedittomypracticalreason(hereinitsroleasjudge)forsuchajudgment;forifIcouldbemistakeninthat,Iwouldhavemadenopracticaljudgmentatall,andinthatcasetherewouldbenei-thertruthnorerror”(I.Kant1968,6:401;I.Kant1996app.529–530;cf.I.Kant1968,8:267–268;I.Kant1996bp.34,quotedabove).Kantgoesontonotethatitfollowsfromthisthat“toactinaccordancewithconsciencecannotitselfbeaduty;forifitwere,therewouldhavetobeyetasecondconscienceinorderforonetobecomeawareoftheactofthefirst.Thedutyhereisonlytocultivateone’sconscience,tosharpenone’sattentivenesstothevoiceoftheinnerjudgeandtouseeverymeanstoobtainahearingforit”(I.Kant1968,6:401;I.Kant1996ap.530).Unfortunately,Fichteisnotsocarefulanddoesoftenspeakasifactinginaccordancewithconsciencewereitselfaduty.Buthemeans,Ibelieve,onlytoagreewithKant’sjudgmentthat“ifsomeoneisawarethathehasactedinaccordancewithhisconscience,thenasfarasguiltorinnocenceisconcernednothingmorecanberequiredofhim.Itisincum-bentuponhimonlytoenlightenhisunderstandinginthematterofwhatisorisnotduty”(I.Kant1968,6:401;I.Kant1996ap.530).


categorical-imperativetest).46Forboth,theepistemicfunctionofcon-scienceisentirelysecond-order.ThatiswhyFichtecantakehimselftobeagreeingwithKantaboutconscienceinthissection.47

46. I. Kant 1968, 6: 401; I. Kant 1996a pp. 529–530.Of course conscience hasfurtherfunctions,forKant,thatitdoesnothaveforFichte.Italsoexamineswhetherwehavefollowedthrough, inouractions,onourconsideredmor-al judgments;anditpunishesusfornotdoingso(I.Kant1968,6:438ff.; I.Kant1996app.559ff).ConsciencedoesnothavethesefunctionsforFichte,becausehethoughtthatwearealwaysadequatelymotivatedtoactinaccor-dancewithwhatweclearlyseetobeourbestreasons.

47. Cf. J.G.Fichte1971, IV: 173,whereFichte insists that “[c]onscience…doesnot provide thematerial; this is provided only by the power of judgment,andconscienceisnopowerofjudgment.Itprovidesonlycertainty,andthissortofcertaintyoccursonlytogetherwiththe[first-order]consciousnessofduty.”Fichte’sinterpreters,bycontrast,takehimtobedisagreeingwithKant(andsotakehisclaiminthissectionthatheagreeswithKanttobeamistake).Forinstance,SchneewindandWoodcontrastFichte’sandKant’saccountsoftheroleofconscienceindeliberation(J.B.SchneewindandA.W.Woodpp.480–481).Breazealedoesthesame,writing:“WhereasforKant,conscienceisaninnertribunalthatascertainswhetherwehavereallydeterminedourac-tionsaccordingtorespectforthemorallaw,forFichteitisprecisely‘aninnerfeelingwithinourconscience’thatdetermineswhatisandisnotourduty,afeelingthat‘nevererrssolongaswepayheedtoitsvoice’”(D.Breazeale2012p.200).Onmyinterpretation,bycontrast,Fichteiscorrectinhisassessment.InfacthiswholewayofframingtheissueechoessomeremarksofKant’sinhisessay‘OntheMiscarriageofAllPhilosophicalTrialsinTheodicy’,whichappearedintheBerlinische Monatsschriftin1791.Kanttherewrites:“Onecan-notalwaysstandbythetruth ofwhatonesaystooneselfortoanother(foronecanbemistaken);however,onecanandmuststandbythetruthfulness ofone’sdeclarationorconfession,becauseonehasimmediateconsciousnessofthis.Forinthefirstinstancewecomparewhatwesaywiththeobjectinalog-icaljudgment(throughtheunderstanding),whereasinthesecondinstance…wecomparewhatwesaywiththesubject(beforeconscience).…Wecancallthistruthfulness‘formalconscientiousness’;‘materialconscientiousness’consistsinthecautionofnotventuringanythingonthedangerthatitmightbewrong,whereas‘formal’conscientiousnessconsistsintheconsciousnessofhavingappliedthiscautioninagivencase.—Moralistsspeakofan‘erringconscience’.Butanerringconscienceisanabsurdity;and,ifthereweresuchathing,thenwecouldneverbecertainwehaveactedrightly,sinceeventhejudgeinthelastinstancecanstillbeinerror.Icanindeederrinthejudgmentin which I believe toberight,forthisbelongstotheunderstandingwhichalonejudgesobjectively(rightlyorwrongly);butinthejudgmentwhether I in fact believe toberight(ormerelypretendit)Iabsolutelycannotbemistaken,forthisjudgment—orratherthisproposition—merelysaysthatIjudgetheob-jectinsuch-and-suchaway”(I.Kant1968,8:267–268;I.Kant1996bp.34).



Alloftheseargumentspresupposethatmoraljudgmentiseducable;andwhatismoreFichtedoesnotoffertheusualKantianreasonsforde-nyingthattherecanbemoralexpertise.Insteadhetakespainstoarguethattheultimateauthorityofindividualconscienceisconsistentwiththedemandforopennesstomoralpersuasionbyothers.57Whathemeanstoruleoutisonlythemoralpermissibilityofactingagainstone’sownfirm,consideredconvictionandactinginsteadontheexpressedconvic-tionofsomeotheragentactinginaprivatecapacity(oroftryingtocauseanyoneelsetodothesame).58Itisworthnotingthatthisishardlyanex-tremeposition;infactitistakentobethedefaultpositioninthecontem-poraryliteratureonmoraldeference.59Allthatbeingsaid,theobjection(nowdetachedfromthecriterialinterpretation)mayyethavemerit.60

Another remark that seems to invite the criterial interpretationcomes before the corollaries, at the close of the main discussion: “[C]onscience is the immediate consciousness of our determinateduty.”61Fichtequalifiesthisstatementintheverymomentofmakingit,cautioningthatitmustbetakeninexactlythewayithasbeenlaidout in the preceding pages, “[f]or the consciousness of somethingdeterminate,assuch, isneverimmediate,but isonlyfoundthroughanactofthought.”62“Materially,theconsciousnessofourdutyisnot

57. J.G.Fichte1971,IV:245–247.

58. J.G.Fichte1971,IV:233.

59.Thatpuremoraldeferenceisproblematicistakenasthedefaultpositionbothbythosewhodefendthatposition(cf.e. g.S.McGrath2009,A.Hills2009;foranearlyandinfluentialstatement,seeR.P.Wolff1970)andbythosewhoseektochallengeit,defendingpuremoraldeferenceinprinciple(cf.e. g.P.Soper2002andD.Koltonski2010).

60.Soperdistinguishesa“harmless”versionoftheprinciplethatautonomyfor-bids deference, “the truism that autonomous individualsmust, in the end,makejudgmentsforthemselves”,fromthemoresubstantivedenialthatdef-erencecouldeverbejustifiedforanautonomousindividual(P.Soper2002p.8).Fichteseemstoendorsethemoresubstantiveprinciple(inprivatecon-texts;herejectsitinthepoliticalsphere)alongwiththeharmlessone,andindeedtodrawnodistinctionbetweenthem.

61. J.G.Fichte1971,IV:173.

62. J.G.Fichte1971,IV:173.

tionofforeignjudgmentssimplydoesnotoccur;andconsciencecanabsolutelynotallowitselftobeledbyauthority.”51

Ofcourseonemightconcedethattherelevantfeelingcannotbepresentwhenoneactsonsomeoneelse’snormativeauthority,andyetstillarguethatmoralitycansometimesrequirejustthat.52ThiswouldbetodenythattheformalconditionasFichtepresentsitisindeedanecessaryconditionofthemoralworthofactions,anditisprobablythemainthrustofHegel’scriticism,mostcharitablyconstrued.

Whenconsidering thisobjection, it is important tobear inmindwhatFichtemeanstoclaimhere.First,aswehaveseen,hedoesnotclaimthatsatisfactionoftheformalconditionissufficientforsubstan-tivecorrectness.Second,hedoesnotmeantograntblanketpermis-siontoconscientiousobjectiontopoliticalauthority.53Third,hedoesnotmeantoruleoutthepossibilitythatindividualsmightlearn,mor-ally, fromother individuals; in factheadmits thenecessityofaseg-mentofsocietydedicatedtothemoraleducationofpeoplegenerally,54 endorsesageneraldutyofeveryonetosetamoralexample,55andar-guesthatdiscussionaimedatreachingamoralconsensusincasesofdisagreementisitselfamoraldemand.56

51. J.G.Fichte1971,IV:175.

52. Cf.e. g.J.Raz1979andP.Soper2002.

53. J.G.Fichte1971,IV:239–240.

54. J.G.Fichte1971,IV:348–353.

55. J.G.Fichte1971,IV:313–325.

56. J.G.Fichte1971,IV:230–233.Muchofpart3section2—nominallydevotedtotheexplicationofthematerialcondition—isinfactdevotedtotheproblemofdisagreementamongpeers.Intherecentliterature,thedebateaboutpeerdisagreementcentersonhowtheagentshould(unilaterally)adjusthercre-dencesinthefaceofit(cf.A.Elga2007,D.Christensen2007,D.Enoch2010,andR.FeldmanandT.A.Warfield2010).Fichte’sproposalismoreinlinewithouractualpractice(atleastinsomeareas):hethinksweshouldargueuntilwereachagreement(cf.J.G.Fichte1971,IV:229–253passim).Infacthecon-ceptualizestheneedforthechurchasasocialinstitutionintermsoftheneedforaforumthatfacilitatessuchconsensus(not,asonemighthavethought,asaforumfordisseminatingthejudgmentofamoralauthority).



inabsurditywhencombinedwiththeparallelFichtedrawsbetweenpracticalandtheoreticalreasoning.68

Onemight,finally,worryaboutasetofremarksFichtemakesasheturns fromdiscussionof the formalconditiononmoralworthtodiscussionofthematerialone.69Thefirstpointhemakes,atthattran-sition,isthatinorderforactiontoconformtotheformalcondition,itneednotbemotivatedbydutydescribed as he is about to describe it.Theformalconditionrequiresactionfromconviction,basedonthedeliv-eranceofconscience;butitdoesnotrequireactionfromtheexplicitlyformulatedaimofabsoluteindependence.This isunproblematiconitsown;itsimplyfollowsfromthewaytheformalconditionhasbeendefined.Buthe then remarks that the systematic elucidationof thematerialconditiononwhichheisabouttoembarkisrequiredonlyaspartofascienceofmorals,andthatthevoiceofconsciencesufficesforordinarymorallife.70Onemightwonderhowthisisconsistentwithmyclaim(in§2)that forFichtepracticaldeliberationconsists incal-culativereasoningtowardthesetofendsfurtheringwhichconstitutesthematerialconditiononthemoralworthofaction.

PartofFichte’smotivationforthisremarkmaylieintheworrythatmuchofwhathe isabout tosaywill soundcounterintuitive; forheoftentriestodownplaythedegreetowhichhismoralphilosophyre-visesmoralcommonsense(althoughitplainlydoesso).Butanothermotivationissurelythesimpletruthoftheclaimthatforthemostpartthefeelingofcertaintyinone’sconvictionisallthatoccurs,conscious-ly,tothedeliberatingagent.Wecanacceptthisclaimwithoutinferring

68.Fichtedoesnotspeakoftheoretical“conscience”nordiscusswhethertherecanbejustifieddeferencetoepistemicauthorityonnon-moralquestions.Butifthecriterialinterpretationofthedeliveranceofconsciencewerecorrect,itwouldfollowfromthisparallelthatFichteiscommittedtothe“immediacy”(inthesamesense)ofallscientificknowledge.TheclaimwouldbethatthewayIfindanswerstoquestionslike‘IsMercuryorMarsclosertothesun?’isbyseeinghowIfeelaboutthem,andthatmyfeelingcannoterr insuchmatters.

69.Cf.J.G.Fichte1971,IV:208–210.


immediate…theconsciousnessofdutyis[only]formallyimmediate.Thisformalconsciousnessisabarefeeling.”63“Conscience…doesnotprovidethematerial;thisisdeliveredonlybythepowerofjudgment,andconscienceisnopowerofjudgment.”64Hereiteratesthepointinthesecondofthethreecorollaries:

Sothattheword‘feeling’doesnotgiverisetodangerousmisunderstandings:a theoreticalproposition isnotandcannot be felt; what is felt is rather the certainty andsure conviction connected with the thought of [thatpropositionwhenithasbeen]broughtaboutaccordingtotheoreticallaws.65

Hisclaimsabout immediacyandfeeling, inotherwords,arenottobetakentoimplythatoneacquiresthefirst-orderconvictionthatx is the action to be performed in a given situationby “immediatelyfeeling”it.66

Butdespitetheclarificationsoffered,thestatementitselfhasbeentakenasevidencethatFichtethoughtofconscienceasasortoffacultyforimmediateapprehensionofethicaltruths.67Suchanaccountwouldofcourseconflictwith theexplanationof theroleof reflective judg-mentthatIhavereconstructed(in§2),andwould,inparticular,result

63. J.G.Fichte1971,IV:173.

64. J.G.Fichte1971,IV:173.

65. J.G.Fichte1971,IV:174–175.

66.Fichtewritesthatthissamefeelingofcertaintyisthe“feeling”(J.G.Fichte1971, IV: 167) thatariseswhen “theoriginal Iand theactual [I]are inhar-mony” (J.G.Fichte 1971, IV: 166).This,of course,doesnothelp, since theharmonyoftheoriginalandtheactualIlookslikeamaterialcriterion,andso this comment also invites the view that the feelingofharmony consti-tutesevidencethatagivenmoraljudgmentiscorrect.BothWood(A.W.Wood2000p.105)andBreazeale(D.Breazeale2012p.200)readthe“harmony”commentinthisway.

67. Forexamples,seefootnotes2,3,and4above.AndindeedwecanagreethatFichtewouldhavedonebettertowriteherethat“conscienceistheimmediateconsciousnessofourconviction concerningourdeterminateduty”.



independence and the non-welfarist consequentialist normativeethicshebuildsuponit.73

ThetruthofFichte’sclaimthatfidelitytothespiritoftheKantianphilosophyoftenrequiresdeparturesfromtheletterofKant’stextsisalreadyinevidenceinthecontemporaryliterature,bothintheworkofmoreorthodoxKantiansand,toanevengreaterextent,intheworkofthosetryingtopushKantinaconsequentialistdirection(aneffortthathaditsfirstinstantiationintheSystem of Ethics).74ButFichtehasmuchtoaddtothesedebates.ManyofhisapplicationsoftheKantianapproachhavenocounterpartsinthecontemporaryliterature.75Oth-ershavebeenindependentlyreproduced,afactthatisinterestingforquitedifferentreasons.76Atthemostbasiclevel,though,appreciationofFichte’sworkcanshedlightonaquestionthatarisesforeveryoneworkinginthistradition:what isthespiritofKantianethics,mostfun-damentally,andhowareitsdiverseandoftencompetingcomponentsbestsquaredwithoneanother?77

73. Cf.M.Kosch2014.

74. ThecontemporaryconsequentialistKantianismIhaveinmindisexemplifiedbyD.Cummiskey1996andD.Parfit2011.

75. Onegood example is his account of themoral importanceof scientific re-searchandeducation.

76.Forexample,BarbaraHerman’saccountofKantiandutiesofbeneficence(B.Herman1993and2007)seemstomeclosertoFichte’sthanitistoKant’sown.JenniferUleman’sinterpretationofKant(J.Uleman2010)alsodevelopssomeofKant’sleadingideasinFichteandirections.Forfurtherdiscussion,seeM.Kosch2014,especiallynote47.

77. ThankstoGünterZöllerforpermissiontoquotefromhisAPAsymposiumpaper,andtoFrederickNeuhouser,AllenWood,participantsinthe2012Bos-tonUniversityWorkshopinLateModernPhilosophy,andtwoanonymousrefereesforthisjournalforcommentsonearlierdrafts.

fromitthatFichteattributestoconscienceafirst-orderepistemicfunc-tion,aslongaswealsoacceptthatmanyoftheinferencesinvolvedinpracticaldeliberationaremadeautomatically andoutsideof con-sciousawareness,andthattheyareoftenbasedonpremisesthattheagenthasneverconsciouslyarticulated.71Hereagaintheparallelwiththeoretical(e. g.perceptual)judgmentisclarifying.72AndtheremarkisquiteinlinewithFichte’sview,expressedatseveralpointsinthetext,thatsystematicethicsisaphilosophicaldescriptionofordinarymoralagency,butinnosenseaprerequisiteforitsexercise.

Conclusion

Rescuing Fichte’s ethical thought from two centuries of more orless total neglect is not thework of a single paper. This is one ofseveral dedicated to bringing Fichte’s contribution back into thefocusofphilosophersworkingonethicsinabroadlyKantianspirit.At the center of this larger project—and not discussed here—isan explanation and defense of Fichte’s conception of material

71. Some twentieth-century moral philosophers have inferred intuitionism inmoralepistemologyfromthefactthatmoraljudgmentseems(inmanycases)likebeingfacedwith“theimmediateconsciousnessofourdeterminateduty”.Sturgeonexplainshowthedenialthatmoral inferencescantakeplaceout-sideofconsciousawarenesscanmotivateintuitionisticconclusions,andwhythisisamistake,inN.Sturgeon2002(p.205ff).Sturgeon’spointisilluminat-inghere,becausethesame(mistaken)conclusionseemstohavebeendrawnbymanyofFichte’sreaders.

72. Forexample,whenweareaskedtojudgewhethertwoitemsarethesamedistanceawaybutdifferentsizes,ordifferentdistancesawaybut thesamesize, insomecasesweknowtheanswerimmediatelyandcanstateitwithconfidence,andinothersweareunsureandawarethatweareunsure.We(quaperceivers)needbeabletogivenoaccountoftheperceptualcuesandtheinferencesmadefromthemthatallowustojudgeconfidentlyinthefirstcase.Wemaybeawareonlyofthejudgmentandofourdegreeofconfidenceinit.Butthereareinfactsuchcues,andweinfactdrawcomplexinferencesontheirbasis,withoutbeingconsciousofdoingso;and,moreover,boththecuesandtheinferencescanbeexaminedandlaidoutsystematically(astheyareinworksofcognitivepsychologyandthephilosophyofperception).Fich-teispointingoutthatsomethingsimilar(relevantlysimilar:IdonotmeantosuggestthatFichtetakesmoraljudgmenttobeinanyotherrespectlikeperception)istrueinthepracticalcase.



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Practical deliberation and the voice of conscience in Fichte’s … · volume 14, no. 30 october 2014 Practical deliberation and the voice of conscience in Fichte’s 1798 System