Finding his routethrough the Alpsblocked by a land-slide. CarthaginianGeneral HannibalBarca has his sap-pers heat a boulderwith bonfires, thendouse it with wineand vinegar tobreak it asunder,in a painting byPeter Bianchi.

APOWERFUL ARMY STOOD poised tocmss the Ebro River into northern Spain,comprising soldiere h"om many peoplesand cultures. Yet heterogeneous as the

force was. most all of them wei'e veterans of twodecades ot continuous warfare. It wa.s a cohesiveaiiny built for speed and shock, and it answei ed toone man and one will—Hannibal of Carthage. Swiftlight cavah>' from lhe desert plains ol Numidiascreened the main body hom curious or hostile eyes.Past this barrier the army stretched for miles:massed squadrons of Iberian cavali-y and infantry;mercenary Balearic Lslandei s, trained from child-hood in the ait of the sling; archers; javelin men fromthe tribes of North Africa; mighty elephmils ploddingtonvard like mobile watchtowei"s; veteran Libyanspeamien—more llian 80.000 men all told.

Hannibal Barca of Carthage had brought thisanny to the banks of the Ebro in a fateful year, 218BC. Ten years earlier, the Senate and [people of Romehad forbidden the Carthaginians to cross that riveron pain of war. Now nothing could please Hannibalmore. The young general wiis i"esolvednot only to cross the Ebro but also toconduct an epic mairh across the Pyre-nees, on through Gaul, over the Alpsand into Italy to threaten Rome itself.

The Romans later believed thatHannibal's father, Hamilcar Barca,iiad bequeathed this plan to invadehaly to his son. That great generalwaged a masterlxil gueniila campaignagainst the legions of Rome in west-em Sicily during thc fmal seven yearsof the First Punic War. Undefeated onland, Hamilcar had been forced by anaval defeat to suirendei" Sidly loRome in 241 BC. Bul the end of thatwar brought no respite for Carthage,whieh was soon threatened by abloody mercenary rebellion. Hamil-car ultimately defeated thc rebels in238, but Rome seized the oppoitunityto annex Sardinia and Corsica. That actof naked aggression, lhe Rape of Sar-dinia as the Carthaginians called ii,convinced Hamilcar that his home citywould never know peace as long asRoman power remained unchecked.

Once the n?bels wer^ crxished, Hamil-au embarked on a new expedition toIberia to carve out an empire thatwould replace the lost resources ofSicily and Sar'dinia. Before leavingCaithage. he br ought his 9-year-old sonHannibal to a temple to vow "never tobe a friend of Rome." Hamilcar cam-paigned in Iberia for' nine years, untilhe was killed in battle in 229 BC.

The Iberian command passed to his

son-in-law, Hasdriibal the Splendid, but it was Has-dnrba! whom the Romans had forced in 228 BC tosign lhe treaty pledging never to cross the Ebrounder arms. Hasdiubal continued the e.xpansion ofthe Barcid empire in Iberia for eight more yearsuntil he was felled by an assiissins blade in 221. TheCarthaginian army then acclaimed Hannibal, al-though he was only 25 years old. as its new com-mander. So it tell to Hannibal, wilh his youngerbrothel's Ha.sdrtjbal and Mago, lo cany out theirfather's plan.

Hannibal wasted no time. In two years of hardcampaigning he consolidated the Carthaginian holdon southern Iberia and perfected his army. A di.sputewith the city of Saguntum. allied with Rome butsouth of the Ebro, provided the pretext he neededto provoke a new war In 219 BC he laid siege to Sa-guntum, and atter eight months il fell. Rome sentambassador's to Carthage to demand restitution andHannibal's surrender: When the Carthaginian coun-cil refirsed. the Roman diplomats offered a cluillengeof wiu'^and the Carthaginians accepted. The Second

34 MH.ITAfO'HISTORY MARCH/APRIL 2005

OVER THE

omes GatesIn 218 BC, Hannihal Barca left Iberia to take the Second Punic War

to Rome—leading a disparate 84,000-man army.

BYDANIELA. FOURNIE

MARCH/APRIL 2005 MILITARY HISTORV 3S

4

n

Having secured thefar bank of theRhone Riveragainst hostileCeltic Volcae. theCarthaginians takeextraordinarymeasures to rafttheir elephantsacross, in HannibalCrossing lhe Rhone.by Henri-PaulMotte.

Punic War. or the Hannibalie Wai; had begun.In Iberia, Hannibal sent his army into winter quar-

ters and released his Iberian contingents for a finalhome leave before commencing the great marchagainst Rome. Spies and ambassadors were sentahead to reconnoiter the route and negotiate withtribal Ieadei"s. Gold and silver helfX'd pave the way.Key lo Hannibal's plan was an anticipated alliancewith the Boii and Insubres o( the Po River valley.These Celtic tribes chaied at their recent subjugationby Rome and eagerly accepted an alliance thatpromised revenge and freedom. For Hannibal, tlieyoffered a base in Northern Italy and manpower.

Hannibal mobilized thix:e annies foi' his wai' of ivt-ribution. To defend against anticipated Roman inva-sions, he brought Airican conscripts to Ilxfria whiledispatching 13,850 Iberian foot soldiere, 1,200 hon^'-men and 870 Balearic slingers for the defense ofAfrica. An additional 4,000 infantry ganisonedCarthage, along with the home fleet of aboul 100 war-ships. Hannibal designated his brother Hasdnibal tohold Iberia in his absence and provided him withthe following forces: \ 1,850 Libyan spearmen, 500Balearic slingers. 300 Ligurian infantry 1.800 Nu-niidian light cavalry, 450 Libyan heavy cavali>, 300Ibenan horsemen. 21 wai elephants and 57 wai'ships.

Hannibal's army in Iberia reportedly totaled90,000 infanlT-y and 12.000 cavalry, although thosefigures most pn>bably included Ha.sdrubars foicesas well as his own. The expeditionary force wouldstill number as many as 75.000 foot soldiers and

9,000 horsemen. Hannibal departed New Carihage(Cartagena, Spain) in lale May. maivhing 290 milesthniugh Iriendly temtoiy to ariive at lhe Bbro by laleJune. Accompanying him were Mago, his youngestbrother; Maharbal. his deputy; Hasdmbal, thequartermaster general; and Hanno, son of Bomilcar.That gixiup of generals would pitwe to be one ol his-toi-y's most talented and capable commarul teatns.

Unlike with the Barcid invasion scheme, whiehhad hatched over two generations, Rome hurriedlydeveloped war pUins in the crisis attn<jsphere en-gendered by the fall of Saguntum in 218 BC. Romemobilized 64,000 infantiT and 6,200 cavaliy for thecoming year. The Senate planned an offensive two-hx>nt war against Caiihage. The two c{msuls electedfor that year (who weie both chief magistrates andgenerals) would each lead an invasion.

Publius Cornelius Scipio wiis assigned two legions(of 4,000 fool and 300 horse eaeh), with 14,000 allietlItalian inlanliy, l,600cavaliy and 60 warships lodobaltle wilh Hannibal in Iberia. The Senate dis-patched his colleague, Tilx'rius Sempronius lx>ngiis,to Sicily with a larger force of two legions, 16.000allied Italian f(K)t, 1.800 cavahy and 172 wai-shipsto prepaiv for' invading Caiihage, in Afr ica. Two ad-ditional legions with 10,000 allied foot soldiere and1,000 cavalry werx? sent to Cisalpine Gaul to overawethe restless Cells.

By the time 1 lannibal's army crossed the Bbro, lhetreaty violation it repivsented was of little conse-quence, as Carthage and Rome were ali-eady at war.

36 MILOARV HISTORY MARCH/APRIL 2005

Hannibal conducted a lightning campaign to con-quer northern Iberia. Hard fighting subdued fourmajor tribes. The coastal cities were bypassed ratherthan besieged—Hannibal needed to cro.ss the Alpsbefore winter. He had e.xpected to meet a Roman in-vasion army in northeiTi Iberia, but none appearedby late summer. Hannibal decided to press on acrossthe Pyrenees in August, having co\'ered 180 milessince crossing the Ehro. He gairisoned the newlywon region with a detachment of 11,000 troops. Atthe Pyrenees, he released another 11,000 Iberiantroops who displayed reluctance to leave lheir home-land. Hannibal reportedly enter'ed Gaul with 50.000foot soldiers and 9,000 horeemen.

Scipio had indeed hoped to be in Iberiaby the summer. In anticipation of Hanni-bal's anival, however, the Boii and Insub-res tribes rase in revolt and ambushed theRoman garrison arm>. The Senate orderedScipio to dispatch one of his legions, ialong with 5,000 allies, lo relieve the be-leagtiered for'cc. His invasion had to wait,

Meanwhile, the Carthaginian advanceinto western Gaul had excited alann andhostility among the indigenous Celtictribes. Hannibal an:anged a meeting withthe Celtic chieftains, and after plyingthem with gifts, convinced them to allowhis army to pass through their territoryunmolested. Thereafter, the marrh fiomthe Pyrenees to the Rhone River, another-180 miles, proceeded smoothly Anixinoat the Rhone in September. Hannibal'sarmy numbered 38,000 infantry, 8.000cavalry and 37 elephants. r

The Carthaginian army reached a pxiint ;,on the Rhone four" day.s' march from the ;sea. The Celtic tribe inbabiting the Rhone iValley, the Volcae, massed on the easternshore to resist the crossing. Hannibal ordered hismen to purchase all available canoes and craft humthe Celts living on the west bank, and set about con-structing even more boats.

As the multitude of hostile Volcae grew on the farbank, Hannihal realized that a direct assault wouldlikely end in disaster. Therefore, on the third nightafter reaching the river, he secretly dispatched a de-tachment of his army, under the command ofHanno, led by native guides on a 25-mile forcedmarch upriver to a suitable crossing point. Gather-ing a few boats, the column rapidly crossed the river.Many of the Iberians swam across, assisted by in-flating the leather bags in which they carried theirgear: Hanno pitched a camp on the fai .shor'e and al-lowed his men a day of rest.

Meanwhile. Hannibal openly prepared his amiyfor an assault river crossing, fixing the attention ofthe Volcae Celts. On the morning of the fifth day, heobserved the prearranged smoke signal he had beenawaiting from Hanno and sent his men into the

water. The lai'gest boats were stationed upstream, lobrx'ak the force oi' the cuirent. The cavalry horsesswam behind the boats, tixxjpei-s in the stern of eachcraft holding lheir reins. Infantn' crossed in canoesand other small cr'aft.

Even with the iai-ge number of boats Hannibal hadcollected, only a fraction of his army could cross inthe fii-st wave. As the armada surged toward the op-posite shore, the Volcae swamied out of their campto occupy the beach. From one bank the Carthagin-ian army shouted encouragement to their comradesin the water; from the other the wild Celts issuedtheir challenge to battle.

Ju.st then Hannos detachment stonned into the

rear of the Volcae host while a few of his units setfrre to the Volcae camp. A lew ol' ihc Volcae rtishedback to save their camp, while the remainder re-mained focused on repelling ihe amphibious assault.Hannibal brought his fir-st wave aslioi e ami launcheda vigorou.s attack. The Volcae, undei' attack from twodirections, broke and scattered. Hannibal quicklybrought most of his arniy across the river, save for arearguaixl and the elephants. That evening, hf)\ve\er;his .scouts brought unexpected news—a Romananny had artived at the mouth of the Rhone. Han-nibal dispatched a sqtradron ol 500 Numidian cav-alxT to reconnoiter the enemy foi ce.

After detaching a legion tu .suppress the Boii andInsubies in Cisalpine Gaul, Scipio had humedly con-ducted another levy when he received the alaiTningnews that Hannibal h id not only crossed the Ebrobut was advancing through the Pyrenees. Scipio de-cided to sail to the IriendK Greek city of Massilia(modem Marseille), at the mouth of ihe Rhone,which he could use as a secure base to campaign

Roman plans toinvade Iberia whiiesimultaneouslysecuring Sicily as abase from which toattack Carthageitself were upsetby Hannibal'sunexpectedly swiftmarch across theAlps and into Italy.

MARCH/APRIL 2005 MILITARV inSTOiO' 37

Hannibal's van-guard comesunder Celtic attackin the narrowpass of the upperDurance Rivervalley nearpresent-dayBriangon, in anillustration byPeter Connolly.

V:

against Hannibal in Gaul. Five days at sea broughthis 24,200 men and 60 ships to Massilia. There.Scipio was shocked to learn that Hannibal's armywas JList a lew day s' march upriver. He had never ex-pected the Carihaginians to march so far so quickly.Scipio sent a picked force of 300 cavalry, reinforcedwith Celtic mercenary horsemen, to scout out the re-ported enemy.

C. THBIR ELHPHANTS ACROSS the Rhoneposed special problems for the Carthaginians. Theanimals refused to board boats or small rafts for thecnjssing. Hannibal directed his pioneers to constructa number of large rafts. 25 feet square. These werelashed together in pairs, and eight paii"s were at-tached to the bank, lorming a pier 50 feet wide andextending 200 feet into the river. Two additional raftswere attached to this pier and connected w ith tow-lines to boats. The ?"est of the elephants had reftrsedto venture onto boats in the l'iver, so the pier was dis-guised as di v land, covered with dirt. The elephantswere led by two compliant females across the pierand onto the raft. Then the rafts were cut free andtowed across the river. The elephants panicked atfir"st but eventually crowded toward the center of theraft and made the crossing safely. The proeess wasrepeated a number of times, and though a few of thefrightened elephants fell into the water, even theymanaged to swim actoss.

Meanwhile, the reconnaissance foaxes dispatched

by Hannibal and Scipio collided. A fierce battleensued, which the Romans and their Celtic allieswon, killing more than 200 Numidians while Icising160 of their own men. The Romans rode on to ob-sene Hannibal's camp, then hur-ried back the 50miles to Scipio's camp lo issue a full report. With-out hesitation, Scipio put his army in battle orderand advanced to engage ihe Carthaginian host.

Hannibal briefly considered offering battle toScipio's aiTny, but the anival of Magilus, a chief oflhe Boii. convinced him lo make all haste to crossthe Alps. Magilus assured Hannibal that the Boiiwould rise up in fxril strength upon his anival andwould minimize his ditfrculties in crossing the Alps.Hannibal arranged a mass a.ssembly of his amiy sothat Magilus and his delegation could addtess thetroops and encourage them with promi.ses of aid andsuppori in Italy. Hannibal then started his infanti-ymarching north while his cavalrT screened the rear.

Scipio's anny an*ived at the Carthaginian crossingsite to lind an empt\ camp. Hannibals rear guardhad departed three days earlier. Scipio was not keento pursue the Carthaginians into the tracklesswildemess. so he marched his anny back lo tiiccoast. He now had to make some harxi decisions. TheSenate had ordered him to invade Iberia andengage Hannibal, but Hannibal was well on his wayto Italy.

Scipio reaehed a strategic decision that proved tobe one of the most important of the war He dis-

38 MILITARY HISTOIO' MARCH/APRIL 2005

patched the bulk of his army under the command ofhis older brother, Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio, to canyon with the invasion of Iberia. Publius Scipio him-self ha.stened back lo Italy. He planned lo take com-mand of lhe Roman troops already in CisalpineGaul. With that aiTny, he would engage Hannibalwhen, or if, he emerged fromthe mountains.

MLIANWI III.I:, Hannibal piessedon toward the Alps and his .<destiny. After marching lourdays, the army reached theconlluence of the Rhone andIskaras (either the modernIsere or Aygues) rivers. Thisarea was known as the "island,"hemmed in on two sides b>r'i\ers and on the third bymoirntains. There, Hannibalintenened in a local tribalsuccession dispute betweentwo brothers. With Hannibal'said the elder brother, Brancus,became chid. In gratiuide,Biancus provided the Cartha-ginian army with rations,cold-weather gear, guides andescorts. The next 10 days'marching was unevenlful. llhad been 160 miles fix)m the Rhone crossing to wherethc Carthaginians rx'ached the Alps in mid-Oclober:They now entered the tenilon of the lleree imd I K)W-

erful Allobroges Celts, who were vehemently op-posed to allowing any foreign army into theii lands.

The Allobroges occupied the high ground domi-nating the trail inlo the moirntains. Hannibal haltedhis amiy and sent out his scouts. They discoveredthat the Allobroges only manned their outpostsduring daylight, returning to their villages eachnight. After dar"k, Hannibal dispatched light infantryto occupy the key positions. At dawn, as his armyiidvanced into the ra\ine, the hostile Celts, scr"am-bling to get into position, were dismayed to find Car-thaginian infantr"\' already occupying the highgr-ound. The Allobr"oges hesitated, unsure of whatcouree to follow. Nevertheless, when they observedthe long column, str-ung out and vulnerable, theycouldn't r-esist launching an attack.

The Carthaginian column was thrown into tur-moil, with many of the beasts of burden stamped-ing, fiannibais light troops counter-attacked, routingthe Allobroges below them, but thai only added tothe confusion. Both sides suffered heavy losses asmen and beasts fell from precipitous cliffs or wereir-ampled or cmshed by falling i"ocks. Hannibal's lighlinfantry puT"sued lhe broken Allobroges back to their\'illages, capturing food and supplies to make goodsome of the losses.

Hannibal rested his army for one dav and restored

order. The Carthaginians were able to march on un-molested for the next thi'ee days. Then the elders ofanother mountain tribe came out lo meet Hannibalv\ith gifts and promises of aid. The genertil leniainedsuspicious, but some of his fears were allayed whenthe Celts provided bim food, hostages and guides to

lead them through the next portion of the moun-tains. At first all seemed well, bul the treacherousguides led the Carthaginians into a steep ravinewhere their wanioi's waited in ambush. Hannibal,having foreseen that possibilily, had placed all hiscavalt> and baggage at the head of the column, whilehis inlantr> brought up the rear: When the ambushwas spiTjng. the cavahy and baggage column golthrough with few losses. The infantiT had some har dfighting, but it was the lerr'ain itself, and the boul-ders rolled down from above, that resirlted in lhemost casualties. Hannibal eventually brought hisanny through the ambush.

This proved to be the last major' attack theCarthaginians faced, as the higher moirntains werespar-sely populated. Yet .small bands continued to be-leaguer- his army with occasional raids and skir-mishes. The elephants proved their worih during thisleg of the mairh, as the tribal vvanioi>; leared to e\enapproach the strange beasts w herever they werx- sta-tioned along the column, From here on. however,nature itself became the enemy. Soldiei s bom andbred in the sunny lands of Aliica and southcm Iberiasuffered iionibly hom the bitteicold, short rationsand thinning air—and then the snow began to fall.

On thc ninth day since entering thc Alps, the armyreached the summit and Hannibal set up a camp tor'est his wcai>' men for two days. Stntg^lers and packanimals continued to wander into this camp, follow-ing the columns tracks. The snow was falling heavily.

A fanciful19th-centui-yEnglish lithographemphasizes theincongruity ofAfrican elephantsmaking their waythrough the fresfilyfallen Alpine snow,which proved ashazardous toHannibal's men asit was to his beasts.

MARCH/APRIL 2005 MILITAIO'HISTOm' 39

Publius CorneliusScipio Minordefends hiswounded fatherdirring the Battle ofthe Ticinus River in218 BC. LikeHannibal, theyounger Scipiowenl on to a moredistinguished careerthan his father's.He finally defeatedHannibal atZama16 years later.

and the aimy was in low spirits. To restore courageand ix'solve in his men, Hannibal brought them for-wajxl to a point from which they could .see the lirshgreen plains of the Po Valley in Italy in the distance.

Thoirgh the going was now tlownhiii. it did nolbecome any easier for Hannibals tired, hirngntrcxjps. The slopes were actiralls' steeper on the Ital-ian side of the pass, and fresh-fallen snow on top ofcompacted ice made for extremely treacherous foot-ing. Many e.\hausled soldier's fell and slid to the sideof the trail. Stjme were too tiivd to get up at once, andmany were never to rise again. Adding to the diffi-culty, a lar^e portion of the trail had been blocked hya landslide. Thc Carthaginian scouts could discoverno detour. Hannibal was for'ced to send his sappersto work. They cut tluxjugh a gr 'at Ixmlder. fii"st heatedwilh bonfires and then doused with wine and vin-egar. A nan'ow trail was cleared in a day, and thehor-ses and mules were rushed across to reach fodderbelow the iree line before they succumbed to star-vation. Two more days of labor were required towiden the path enough for the elephants, and thenthe vest of the infantw followed.

The Car'thaginians had covered another 140 mileson this last leg of the march through the Alps, br'ing-ing the total journey to nearly 1,000 miles. They fi-nallv reached Italy in late October, live months after

departing New Cailhage and 15 days after enteringthe Alps. Hannibal now took stock of his army. Amere 20.000 infantn and 6,000 cavaln remained,but these wei e the hai'diest of men. veterans of brutaleonllict with man and nature.

IN ROMP..Till: SI-NAII: WAS Stunned. All had ex-pected to fight this wai- in Iberia and Alnca, but nowa Carthaginian army was in Italy. Hannibal hadseized the initiative, and Rome's leadership, un-hinged by this boll from the blue, could only react.They canceled the invasion of Africa and or'deredConsul Sempronius to bring his army from Sicily asquickly as possible to reinforre Scipio.

While Hannibal's ai'my was approaching thc Alps.Scipio had iTrshed to Cisalpine Gaul to take com-mand of the two legions and allied troops stationedthere. Scipio knew he was outnirmbered hut rea-soned that Hannibal's arTn\ musl be in miserablecondition alter crossing the mountains. He also knewthat any hesitation to engage the Carthaginianswould lead the Celtic tribes into widespread defec-tions, so he hastened towirr d Hannibal's ivpor'tcd location. Hear the Ticinus Ri\'ei; Scipio led out his 2,000cavalr\' and 4.000 light infantry, seeking the enemy.

After a brief rest, the Carthaginians had recoveredenough stamina to mareli once mort;. Betore moving

MIt.lTARY HiSJ'OKY MARCH/APRIL 2005

Wliick Pass?EXACTLY WHICH PASS Han-nibal used to cross the Alpshas Iwcn a controversial qires-tion for more than two mil-lennia. The Greek historianPolybius (circa 200-118 BC)pei'sonally r'etr-aced the routea few decades after the SecondPunic War. He punided a de-tailed account of the crossing,bul unfor-tunatelv there ar-enot enough landmai'ks refer-enced to fix the pass with cer-tainty. The later Roman histo-rian Titus Livius. or Livy, (59BC-17 AD) wrote the only othersignificant survi\ing account.By his day, the question ofwhich pass Hannibal hadcrossed was already a matterof lively debate. The versionsof Polybius and Livy agree ingener'al. yet there are subtlevariations in the details, com-plicating precise identificationof the pass. Many factors havebeen analy/.ed, especially dis-tances and ten'ain configura-tions. The summit must havea view of the Po Valley. Thepass should issire into the ter-ritoiy of the Taurini tribalhomelands. The pass must beof sufficient elevation to account for year-round snow. Theremust also be a flat, open area near the summit large enough foran anny of 30,000 to encamp.

Amazingly, based on these same two accounts, historians andscholars have never" reached a consensus. Along with the schol-ars, generals and emperor-s have advanced their own pet theo-ries. Five Alpine passes have been considered most often. Fromnorth to south these iuv the Little Saint Bernard (ele\'atit)n 2.188meters), the Mount Cenis (2.083), the Col du Clapier (2,482),

Carthaginians secure another mountain pass in tfie course or uieir Alpine trek, in ilic fakingof Thelesia by Hannibal and His Army, by Benedict Masson.

the Mont Genevre (1,850) and the Col de la Traversette (2,914),A recent survey of 24 modem historians yielded the followingresults: Four chose the Little Saint BerTiar'd, six selected theMont Cenis, five designated the Col du Clapier and three namedthe Travei'sette. Napoleon Bonapaile declared the Mont Cenisas Hannibal's mute. Per haps only the discfwery of archeologi-cal remains may someday settle the issue, Until then, each suc-ceeding generation of historians will be free to champion itsclaim regarding the one tiue pass. D.A.E

against the Romans. Hannibal staged a display of gladi-atorial combat. He brought Celtic prisoners, taken inlhe Alps, belore the amiy in chains. Hannibal askedthe prisonei-s who would be willing to engage theirfellow prisoners in moriiil combat, the victor winningfreedom and rich prizes, the loser finding an end toslavery in death. All the prisoner-s excitedly beggedfor- the chance. A few pairs were chosen by lot andfoughl to the death befoi'e the assembled army.

Then Hannibal addressed his men, explaining that

this display was a vivid representation of their ownsituation. They too were offered the same choice: vie-toi-y or death in battle. Or did anyone think it wouldbe possible to retreat tlie way they had come? Con-quer or die, and the prize was the wealth of Italy laidout before them. The Carthaginians clamored to beled into battle, and Hannibal obliged them.

Hannibal preceded the column with his 6.000 cav-alry and met Scipio's forxe at the Ticinus. TheCarthaginian cavalry was not in the best condition,

MARCH/APRIL 2005 MII-ITARY HISTORY

Soon after com-pleting his crossingof the Alps.Hannibal defeatsthe first of manyRoman amiies sentagainst him, in TheBattle at Ticinus. byGiulio Romano. InDecember 218 BC.he finished aremarkable year byrouting the com-bined forces ofConsuls Scipio andTrberius SemproniusLongus at theTrebbia River

but it still proved more than a match for Scipio's con-script hoi'semen and light infantry. Thc Romanswere routed, and Scipio himself was wounded andnear-ly captured. Only a heroic charge led by his 17-year-old son and namesake saved the woundedconsul. That same youth would one day defeat Han-nibal at Zama and earn the title "Alricanus."

SCIPIO \MU. HACK TO m e n ground on the TrebbiaRiver, awaiting the anival of his colleagire. Hannibalallowed Sempnmius' army to link up with Scipio's onthc Trebbia. He needed a decisive victory' quickly, asit was alr-eady December and well past the usual cam-paigning season. For his part. Sempranius sought aglorious victory before his year as constrl came to anend. ilannibal chose the time and the place for thecoming battle. He fii-st placed his brother Mago witha detachment in ambush. His soldiers ate an earlybreaktast, then warmed themselves before fires andrubbed down their limbs with heiited oil. Hannibalsent out his Numidian cavalry to provoke the Romans,and Sempronius ordered his entire aiTny out ofcamp^without breakfast. The Numidians led themback through the freezing watei s of the TrebbiaRiver and onto Hannibal's cho.sen grT)und.

Hannibal's army had grown to 28.000 f(X)tsoldiersand 10,000 horsemen as Celtic recruits str*eamed in.Sempronius' army comprised 36,000 infanti'v and4,000 cavaliy The Roman legionaries, wet, eold andhungiy. launched a frontal as.sault. Hannibal's cavalry,spearheaded by elephants, quickly routed the out-

numbered Roman hftrsemen, then Hanked the Romiuiinfantiy while Mago's picked force stiTrck thL-ni inthe reiu: Hemmed in on all sides, the Romans loughton. Some 10,000 leglonaiies cut their way throughthe Carthaginian center and reached safety. Nezurlyall the remaining Romans were killed or captured.Hannibal had achieved the decisive victoiy he soughton the Trebbia, the culmination of his great maixh.

Over the next two years Hannibal's aiTiiy wouidblaze a histoiic path of one glorious victory after an-othei' over the legions of Rome. Thr ee consuls and amaster of horse were humbled and tens of thousandsof Romans were slain or captui'ed at the Battles o\UikcTrasimene, Geroniumand Hannibal's irltimatetactical masteipiece, Cannae.

Although the Carthaginians would ultimately lo.sethe Second Punic War, for 16 year's Hannibal's armyin Italy seemed invincible. His crossing of the Alps,which so unnerved the Romans at the start of thewai; would also capture the imagination of genera-tions to come. Hannibal had ehallenged not onlyRome but nature itself, and even the Alps could notdefeat his will. MH

An inielligence analyst at the Defense IntelligenceAgency and a U.S. Army Reserve officer, Daniel A.Fonmie has written on the Punic Wars lorpcuit Issueso/ Military History: Fur further reading, he recom-mend.';: The War With Hannibal, M' lit us Livy; Han-nibal's March, hy Sir Gavin deBeer; and HannibalCrosses the Alps, by John Prevas.

hi MILITARY HISTORY MARCH/APRIL 2005