Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After
Manfred J. Holler • Hannu NurmiEditors
Power, Voting,and Voting Power:30 Years After
123
EditorsManfred J. HollerDepartment of EconomicsInstitute of SocioEconomicsUniversity of HamburgHamburg, Germany
Hannu NurmiDepartment of Political Science
and Contemporary HistoryUniversity of TurkuTurku, Finland
ISBN 978-3-642-35928-6 ISBN 978-3-642-35929-3 (eBook)DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3Springer Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London
Library of Congress Control Number: 2013931276
� Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part ofthe material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations,recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission orinformation storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilarmethodology now known or hereafter developed. Exempted from this legal reservation are briefexcerpts in connection with reviews or scholarly analysis or material supplied specifically for thepurpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of thework. Duplication of this publication or parts thereof is permitted only under the provisions ofthe Copyright Law of the Publisher’s location, in its current version, and permission for use mustalways be obtained from Springer. Permissions for use may be obtained through RightsLink at theCopyright Clearance Center. Violations are liable to prosecution under the respective Copyright Law.The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in thispublication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exemptfrom the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.While the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date ofpublication, neither the authors nor the editors nor the publisher can accept any legal responsibility forany errors or omissions that may be made. The publisher makes no warranty, express or implied, withrespect to the material contained herein.
Printed on acid-free paper
Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)
Foreword
Political, economic, social life is essentially governed according to the power ofagents, be they individuals, institutions, states, countries, etc. As a consequence, itis not surprising that power is a major ingredient of social science. Although thisappears today as self-evident, it was not the case some decades ago. In 1938, noless than Bertrand Russell devoted a volume to this topic. I am afraid that this bookhas been rather neglected.1 Russell wrote on page 4: In the course of this book Ishall be concerned to prove that the fundamental concept in social science isPower, in the same sense in which Energy is the fundamental concept in physics.
Standard microeconomic theory which culminates with the beautiful con-struction of (Walrasian) general equilibrium theory by Kenneth Arrow, GérardDebreu, and Lionel McKenzie not only neglects power, but, in some sense, negatesit. The general equilibrium framework appears as an ideal situation to whichsociety should tend: perfect competition. The best mathematical tool to modelperfect competition was introduced by Robert Aumann. It consists in assuming acontinuum of agents, so that each agent’s influence (on prices) is negligible.Whatever the formalization, either a finite number of agents, an infinite countableset of agents or a continuum, with perfect competition, agents are so-called pricetakers. However, in the real world, there exist markets where there are only a fewagents (at least on one side of the market) and these agents will possess marketpower. In the microeconomic theory Bible (Mas-Colell et al. 1995), Market Poweris the title of Chap. 12 (there are 23 chapters). Within Aumann’s measure-theoreticframework it has been possible to formalize at the same time negligible andpowerful agents. There is a fundamental difficulty to mix the finite and the infinite,the continuous and the discrete and, in spite of remarkable works by BenyaminShitovitz and others in the 1970s, the mainstream microeconomic research has
1 Bertrand Russell, Power. A New Social Analysis, George Allen and Unwin. My attention wascalled to this book by a paper of Abraham Diskin and Moshe Koppel: The Measurement of VotingPower as a Special Case of the Measurement of Political Power, to appear in Voting Power andProcedures. Essays in Honour of Dan Felsenthal and Moshé Machover ed. by R. Fara et al.,Springer. To my surprise, I discovered Russell’s book in my personal library and I must add, tomy shame, that the copy was like new.
v
followed another route, more or less forgetting the general equilibrium approach, aregression to my view.
The ideal of equality has its social choice theoretic version as anonymity.Equality here means basically equality of power. Having equal power for agentsdoes not mean that they have no power (unless we consider that they are elementsof a continuum). Rather it means that they have the same power, possibly weakdepending on their number. Having the same power leads to the possibility thatsome agents may have more power than others. Then rather than viewing power asan absolute concept we can consider that it is a relative concept where the differentpower of various agents can be compared. In the three famous impossibility resultsof social choice theory (Arrow, Sen and Gibbard–Pattanaik–Satterthwaite Theo-rems), the notion of power is implicit, hidden in admissible or repulsive concepts.In Arrow’s Theorem, given independence of irrelevant alternatives, a sufficientheterogeneity of agents’ preferences and some level of collective rationality, thereis a consistency problem between unanimity—the fact that all the agents takentogether as a group are powerful over all social states—and the absence of dic-tatorship—the fact that a given single individual is powerful over all these socialstates. In Sen’s theorem (the impossibility of a Paretian liberal) there is aninconsistency between unanimity again and the fact that at least two agents arepowerful over at least two social states, this fact being justified by an interpretationin terms of individual rights or freedom of choice within a personal sphere, an ideagoing back to John Stuart Mill. In Gibbard–Pattanaik–Satterthwaite’s theorem, theconflict is basically between non-dictatorship again and the possibility for an agentto obtain a benefit from acting strategically by misrepresenting her ‘sincere’preference.
It is certainly in the part of social choice devoted to voting and in (cooperative)game theory that the notion of power has, at last, reached preeminence. Althoughequality is an ideal in some configurations, it is not in others. This is particularlytrue when voters represent institutions such as constituencies of different size,states in a federal system, countries, etc. In 1986, William Riker called ourattention to Luther Martin (!), a delegate from Maryland to the ConstitutionalConvention in Philadelphia in 1787. Luther Martin made calculations of the votingpower of the (then) 13 American states on the basis of a fictitious weighted votinggame in which representatives of a given state voted together. According toWilliam Riker the method he proposed is very similar to what John Banzhafproposed in the 1960s—or, according to Philip Straffin, to what J. Deegan andE. W. Packel proposed in 1978 or, according to Dan Felsenthal and MoshéMachover, to what Manfred Holler proposed in 1982. (We now know, principallythanks to Felsenthal and Machover’s book, that Banzhaf was also preceded byLionel Penrose). Lloyd Shapley and Martin Shubik developed in the 1950s agame-theoretic approach to the measurement of (voting) power based on the so-called Shapley value. In cooperative game theory, a basic structure introduced byJohn von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern is the simple game structure. Groupsof agents/players (coalitions) are either powerful or without power. A simple gamebasically amounts to identify the coalitions which are powerful (called ‘winning’).
vi Foreword
In the real world, these winning coalitions can be established on the basis of a quitestrong inequality among the players as within the Security Council of UN wheresome countries have a veto, the so-called permanent members of the Council (awinning coalition must include all permanent members plus a sufficient fraction ofnon permanent members who are elected by the General Assembly—the numberof non permanent members and consequently the minimum number of non per-manent members to form a winning coalition has varied since the creation of UNand the treatment of abstentions of permanent members has been rather ambigu-ous). Winning coalitions can also be established on the basis of weights given toplayers when the players are states, countries etc. A remarkable and recentexample of the difficulties related to a priori voting power is the choice of weightsand quota for the countries in the Council of Ministers of the European Union.
This book is a major contribution to the advancement of our knowledge onpower and specifically voting power by some of the most important scholars in thisarea. The two editors themselves made brilliant contributions to the measurementof power (Manfred Holler has his name associated to a well-known power index towhich I previously alluded) and more generally to voting analysis (Hannu Nurmipublished a number of books which became classical).
Reference
Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M. D. & Green, J. R. (1995). Microeconomic Theory.Oxford: Oxford University Press
Caen, December 3, 2012 Maurice [email protected]
Foreword vii
Contents
Reflections on Power, Voting, and Voting Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Manfred J. Holler and Hannu Nurmi
Part I Power
Social Power and Negative Freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27Ian Carter
Causation and the Measurement of Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63Matthew Braham
Part II Voting
Models and Reality: The Curious Case of the Absent Abstention . . . . 73Dan S. Felsenthal and Moshé Machover
A Test of the Marginalist Defense of the Rational VoterHypothesis Using Quantile Regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87Serguei Kaniovski
Intensity Comparisons, the Borda Rule and Democratic Theory . . . . . 103Eerik Lagerspetz
List Apparentements in Local Elections: A Lottery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123Friedrich Pukelsheim and Peter Leutgäb
Voting and Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137Annick Laruelle and Federico Valenciano
ix
Decisiveness and Inclusiveness: Two Aspects of the IntergovernmentalChoice of European Voting Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151Thomas König and Thomas Bräuninger
Minimax Multi-District Apportionments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169Gianfranco Gambarelli and Arsen Palestini
Gridlock or Leadership in U.S. Electoral Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187Evan Schnidman and Norman Schofield
Part III The Measurement of Power
A Review of Some Recent Results on Power Indices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231J. M. Alonso-Meijide, B. Casas-Méndez and M. G. Fiestras-Janeiro
Power, Cooperation Indices and Coalition Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247Rafel Amer and Francesc Carreras
The Power of a Spatially Inferior Player . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265Mika Widgrén and Stefan Napel
On the Nucleolus as a Power Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283Maria Montero
Coalition Configurations and the Public Good Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301José M. Alonso-Meijide, Balbina Casas-Méndez,M. Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro, Manfred J. Holler and Andreas Nohn
Circumstantial Power: Some Hints for Finding OptimalPersuadable or Bribable Voters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315Josep Freixas and Montserrat Pons
Part IV Applications of Voting Power Measures
Power Indices and the Design of Electoral/Constitutional Systems. . . . 333Ron Johnston
Fair Voting Rules in Committees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347František Turnovec
On Penrose’s Square-Root Law and Beyond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365Werner Kirsch
x Contents
A New Analysis of a Priori Voting Power in the IMF: Recent QuotaReforms Give Little Cause for Celebration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389Dennis Leech and Robert Leech
A Priori Voting Power and the US Electoral College . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411Nicholas R. Miller
Do Voting Power Considerations Explain the Formationof Political Coalitions? A Re-Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 443Vincent C. H. Chua and Dan S. Felsenthal
A Note on Communication Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 467Vito Fragnelli
Shareholder Voting Power and Ownership Control of Companies. . . . 475Dennis Leech
Part V Voting Power in the European Union
Calculus of Consent in the EU Council of Ministers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 501Hannu Nurmi, Tommi Meskanen and Antti Pajala
The Creation of European Economic and Monetary Union . . . . . . . . . 521Madeleine O. Hosli
Apportionment Strategies for the European Parliament . . . . . . . . . . . 541Cesarino Bertini, Gianfranco Gambarelli and Izabella Stach
Strategic A Priori Power in the European Union’s CodecisionProcedure Recalculated for EU28 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 553Stefan Napel, Mika Widgrén and Alexander Mayer
Square Root Voting System, Optimal Threshold and p . . . . . . . . . . . . 573Karol _Zyczkowski and Wojciech Słomczynski
The QM Rule in the Nice and Lisbon Treaties: Future Projections . . . 593Dan S. Felsenthal and Moshé Machover
Part VI The Aggregation of Preferences
Explaining All Possible Paired Comparison Problems. . . . . . . . . . . . . 615Donald G. Saari
Contents xi
A Geometric Approach to Paradoxes of Majority Voting:From Anscombe’s Paradox to the Discursive Dilemmawith Saari and Nurmi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 645Daniel Eckert and Christian Klamler
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions to Make the Numbers Count . . . . 661Marlies Ahlert and Hartmut Kliemt
Limit Property of a Multi-Choice Value and the Fuzzy Value. . . . . . . 669Rie Ono-Yoshida
Pure Bargaining Problems and the Shapley Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 681Francesc Carreras and Guillermo Owen
Veto Players and Non-Cooperative Foundations of Powerin Legislative Bargaining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 703Andreas Nohn
Distortion-Free Logrolling Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 709Hannu Vartiainen
Coalitions and Catastrophic Climate Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 725Norman Schofield
xii Contents
Contributors
Marlies Ahlert Department of Law and Economics, Martin-Luther-UniversityHalle-Wittenberg, Halle, Germany, e-mail: [email protected]
J. M. Alonso-Meijide Department of Statistics and Operations Research, Uni-versity of Santiago de Compostela, Santiago de Compostela, Spain, e-mail:[email protected]
Rafel Amer Department of Applied Mathematics II and Industrial and Aero-nautical Engineering School of Terrassa, Technical University of Catalonia,Colom 11, 08222 Terrassa, Spain, e-mail: [email protected]
Cesarino Bertini Department of Management, Economics and QuantitativeMethods, University of Bergamo, via dei Caniani 2, 24127 Bergamo, Italy, e-mail:[email protected]
Matthew Braham Institute of Philosophy, University of Bayreuth, Universi-tätsstr. 30, 95447 Bayreuth, Germany, e-mail: [email protected]
Thomas Bräuninger University of Mannheim, 68131 Mannheim, Germany,e-mail: [email protected]
Francesc Carreras Department of Applied Mathematics II and Industrial andAeronautical Engineering School of Terrassa, Technical University of Catalonia,Colom 11, 08222 Terrassa, Spain; ETSEIAT, P.O. Box 577, Terrassa 08220,Spain, e-mail: [email protected]
Ian Carter Department of Political and Social Studies, University of Pavia,Pavia, Italy, e-mail: [email protected]
Balbina Casas-Méndez Department of Statistics and Operations Research,University of Santiago de Compostela, Santiago de Compostela, Spain, e-mail:[email protected]
Vincent C. H. Chua SIM University, Clementi, Singapore, e-mail: [email protected]
xiii
Daniel Eckert Institute of Public Economics, University of Graz, 8010 Graz,Austria, e-mail: [email protected]
Dan S. Felsenthal University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel; Centre for the Philosophy ofthe Natural and Social Sciences, London School of Economics and Political Sci-ence, Lakatos Building, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK, e-mail:[email protected]
M. G. Fiestras-Janeiro Department of Statistics and Operations Research,University of Vigo, Vigo, Spain, e-mail: [email protected]
Vito Fragnelli Department of Science and Technological Innovation, Universityof Eastern Piedmont, Viale T. Michel 11, 15121 Alessandria, Italy, e-mail:[email protected]
Josep Freixas Department of Applied Mathematics III and High EngineeringSchool of Manresa, Technical University of Catalonia, EPSEM, Av. Bases deManresa, 61-73, 08242 Manresa, Spain, e-mail: [email protected]
Gianfranco Gambarelli Department of Management, Economics and Quanti-tative Methods, University of Bergamo, via dei Caniani 2, 24127 Bergamo, Italy,e-mail: [email protected]
Manfred J. Holler Institute of SocioEconomics, University of Hamburg,Von-Melle Park 5 Hamburg, 20146, Germany; Public Choice Research Centre,University of Turku, Turku, Finland, e-mail: [email protected]
Madeleine O. Hosli Department of Political Science, Leiden University, P.O.Box 9555, 2300RB Leiden, The Netherlands, e-mail: [email protected]
Ron Johnston School of Geographical Sciences, University of Bristol, UniversityRoad, Bristol, BS8 ISS, UK, e-mail: [email protected]
Serguei Kaniovski Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO), P.O. Box91, 1103 Vienna, Austria, e-mail: [email protected]
Werner Kirsch Fakultät für Mathematik und Informatik, FernUniversität inHagen, Hagen, Germany, e-mail: [email protected]
Christian Klamler Institute of Public Economics, University of Graz, 8010 Graz,Austria, e-mail: [email protected]
Hartmut Kliemt Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, Frankfurt,Germany, e-mail: [email protected]
Thomas König University of Mannheim, 68131 Mannheim, Germany, e-mail:[email protected]
Eerik Lagerspetz Department of Behavioural Sciences and Philosophy, Uni-versity of Turku, 20014 Turku, Finland, e-mail: [email protected]
xiv Contributors
Annick Laruelle BRiDGE, Foundations of Economic Analysis I, University ofthe Basque Country (UPV/EHU), Avenida Lehendakari Aguirre, 83, 48015 Bilbao,Spain; IKERBASQUE Basque Foundation of Science, 48011 Bilbao, Spain, e-mail:[email protected]
Dennis Leech Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry CV47AL, Centre for the Philosophy of the Natural and Social Sciences, London Schoolof Economics and Political Science, Lakatos Building, Houghton Street, LondonWC2A 2AE, UK, e-mail: [email protected]
Robert Leech Imperial College, London, UK, e-mail: r.leech@imperial. ac.uk
Peter Leutgäb Institute for Mathematics, University of Augsburg, 86135 Augs-burg, Germany, e-mail: [email protected]
Moshé Machover King’s College, London, UK; Centre for the Philosophy of theNatural and Social Sciences, London School of Economics and Political Science,Lakatos Building, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK, e-mail:[email protected]
Alexander Mayer Department of Economics, University of Bayreuth, 95440Bayreuth, Germany, e-mail: [email protected]
Tommi Meskanen Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University ofTurku, 20014 Turku, Finland, e-mail: [email protected]
Nicholas R. Miller Department of Political Science, University of MarylandBaltimore County, Baltimore, MD 21250, USA, e-mail: [email protected]
Maria Montero School of Economics, University of Nottingham, UniversityPark, Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK, e-mail: [email protected]
Stefan Napel Department of Economics, University of Bayreuth, 95440 Bay-reuth, Germany; Public Choice Research Centre, University of Turku, Turku,Finland, e-mail: [email protected]
Andreas Nohn Public Choice Research Centre, University of Turku, Turku,Finland; Institute of Socio Economics, University of Hamburg, 20146 Hamburg,Germany, e-mail: [email protected]
Hannu Nurmi Department of Political Science and Contemporary History andPublic Choice Research Centre, University of Turku, 20014 Turku, Finland, e-mail:[email protected]
Rie Ono-Yoshida Faculty of Law and Economics, Chiba University, 1-33 Yayoi-cho Inage-ku, Chiba 263-8522, Japan, e-mail: [email protected]
Guillermo Owen Department of Mathematics, Naval Postgraduate School,Monterey, California, e-mail: [email protected]
Contributors xv
Antti Pajala Public Choice Research Centre, University of Turku, 20014 Turku,Finland, e-mail: [email protected]
Arsen Palestini MEMOTEF, Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy, e-mail:[email protected]
Montserrat Pons Department of Applied Mathematics III and High EngineeringSchool of Manresa, Technical University of Catalonia, EPSEM, Av. Bases deManresa, 61-73, 08242 Manresa, Spain, e-mail: [email protected]
Friedrich Pukelsheim Institute for Mathematics, University of Augsburg, 86135Augsburg, Germany, e-mail: [email protected]
Donald G. Saari Institute for Mathematical Behavioral Science, University ofCalifornia, Irvine, CA 92697-5100, USA, e-mail: [email protected]
Maurice Salles CREM (UMR - CNRS 6211) and Institute for SCW, Universityof Caen, Caen Cedex 14032, France; CPNSS London School of Economics,Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AB, UK; Murat Sertel Center for AdvancedEconomic Studies, Bilgi University, Istanbul, Turkey, e-mail: [email protected]
Evan Schnidman Department of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge,MA, USA, e-mail: [email protected]
Norman Schofield Center in Political Economy, Washington University in SaintLouis, 1 Brookings Drive, Saint Louis, MO 63130, USA, e-mail: [email protected]
Wojciech Słomczynski Institute of Mathematics, Jagiellonian University, ul.Lojasiewicza 6, 30-348 Kraków, Poland, e-mail: [email protected]
Izabella Stach Faculty of Management, AGH University of Science and Tech-nology, Krakow, Poland, e-mail: [email protected]
František Turnovec Institute of Economic Studies, Charles University in Prague,Opletalova 26, 110 00 Prague 1, Czech Republic, e-mail: [email protected]
Federico Valenciano BRiDGE, Applied Economics IV, University of the Bas-que Country (UPV/EHU), Avenida Lehendakari Aguirre, 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain,e-mail: [email protected]
Hannu Vartiainen HECER, University of Helsinki, Arkadiankatu 7, 00014Helsinki, Finland, e-mail: [email protected]
Mika Widgrén (deceased) Turku School of Economics and Public ChoiceResearch Centre, University of Turku, 20014 Turku, Finland
xvi Contributors
Karol _Zyczkowski Institute of Physics, Jagiellonian University, ul.Reymonta 4,30-059 Kraków, Poland; Center for Theoretical Physics, Polish Academy of Sci-ences, Al. Lotników 32/46, 02-668 Warszawa, Poland, e-mail: [email protected]
Contributors xvii
