POW: The Fight Continues After The Battle. The Report . . . On Prisoners Of War - Aug. 1955

8/6/2019 POW: The Fight Continues After The Battle. The Report . . . On Prisoners Of War - Aug. 1955

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POWTHE FIGHT CONTINUES

AFTER THE BATTLE

The Report ofthe Secretary of Defense's Advisory Committee

on Prisoners of War

AUGUST 1955

PRQt#ERTYOF U.S. AAMYTHE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL


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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEWASHINGTON 25 , D. C.

July 29, 1955Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War

Dear Mr. Secretary:Your Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War hasbeen in constant session for the past two months and is pleasedto submit this report of its deliberations and findings.We are certain that many persons have expected this Com mittee to recommend courses of action which would be asrevolutionar.vas the speed and techniques of the latest guidedmissile or jet aircraft.However, our task deals with human beings and the Nation.We can find no basis for making recommendations other thanon the principles and foundations which have made Americafree and strong and on the qualities which we associate withmen of integrity and character. I t is in this common beliefthat we have determined on courses of proposed action whichwe are convinced are best for the United States and for itsposition among free nations.

The Code of Conduct we recommend sets a high standardand a reasonable course for members of the Armed Forces ofthe future. The conscience and heart of all America are neededin the support of this Code, and the best of training that canbe provided in our homes, by our schools and churches and bythe Armed Forces will be required for all who undertake tolive by this Code.America no longer can afford to think in terms of a limitednumber of. our fighting men becoming prisoners of war and inthe hands of an enemy in some distant land. Modern warfarehas brought the challenge to the doorstep of every citizen, andso the Code we propose may well be a Code for all Americansif the problem of survival should ever come to our own mainstreets.And then too the United States must constantly be awareof her high position of world leadership, and the Code wepropose must consider the standard of the Ten Commandmentsand of our Constitution, as well as our pledge to the UnitedNations.

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No Code should overlook the watermarks of America'sgreatness or bow to the easier courses which might entrapmore easily our men as alleged war criminals and weakentheir fiber for the many ordeals they may face. We mustbear in mind the past and future significance of the reserva tion made by Soviet Russia and other Communist nations toArticle 85 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 on prisonersof war.

Past history, the story of Korea and the crises which facedour prisoners of war in that conflict from capture throughOperation Big Switch and after, were all carefully consideredand are presented in our report. The prisoner of war situa tion resulting from the Korean War has received a great dealof adverse publicity. As is stated in our account, much ofthat adverse publicity was due to lack of information andconsequent misconceptions in regard to the problem.A few statistics may prove reassuring to anyone who thinksthe Armed Forces were undermined by Communist propa ganda in Korea.A total of about 1,600,000 Americans served in the KoreanWar. Of the 4,428 Americans who survived Communist im prisonment, only a maximum of 192 were found chargeablewith serious offenses against comrades or the United States.Or put it another way. Only 1 out of 23 American POWs wassuspected of serious misconduct.

The contrast with civilian figures tells an interesting story.According to the latest F. B. 1. statistics, 1 in 15 persons inthe United States has been arrested and fingerprinted for thecommission, or the alleged commission, of criminal acts.

'When one realizes that the Armed Forces come from a cross section of the national population, the record seems fine indeed.I t seems better than that when one weighs in the balance thetremendous pressures the American POWs were under.Weighed in that balance, they cannot be found wanting.

We examined the publicly alleged divergent action taken bythe Services toward prisoners repatriated from Korea. Thedisposition of all cases was governed by the facts and circum stances surrounding each case, and was as consistent, equitableand uniform as could be achieved by any two boards or courts.As legal steps, including appeals, are completed and in light oft.he uniqueness of the Korean War and the particular conditions

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surrounding American prisoners of war, the appropriate ServiceSecretaries should make thorough reviews of all punishmentsawarded. This continuing review should make certain thatany excessive sentences, i f found to exist, are carefully con sidered and mitigated. This review should also take intoaccount a comparison with sentences meted out to other prison ers for similar offenses.

In concluding, the Committee unanimously agreed thatAmericans require a unified and purposeful standard of con duct for our prisoners of war backed up by a :first class trainingprogram. This position is also wholeheartedly supported bythe concensus of opinion of all those who consulted with theCommittee. From no one did we receive stronger recommenda tions on this point than from the former American prisoners ofwar in Korea-officers and enlisted men.

In taking this position and recommending this Code, it waspointed out to the Committee, and the Committee agrees, thatin return America must always stand behind every Americanupon whom befalls prisoner of war status and spare no reason able effort in obtaining their earliest possible release back to ourside.

The Honorable Charles E. WilsonThe Secretary of Defense

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IBACKGROUNDThe Fortunes of War

Fighting men declare it is neither dishonorable nor heroic to .be taken prisoner. In the sense that the victim does not covetit, but finds himself unable to avoid it, capture is an accident.Often, like a motor crash, it comes as complete surprise. Often,too, it is accompanied by injury. Nearly always the upshot ispainful and in the end it may prove fatal. And, as is the casewith many accidents, it is "bad luck."Fighting men speak of "the fortunes of war." In combat,luck cannot smile on all participants. Some are bound tolose. The man taken captive is one of the uniucky-a Soldierof Misfortune. That can be one definition for war-prisoner.

But the prisoner is always a soldier, adversity despite. Fortune can change. In the U. S. Submarine Service there is themaxim: "Luck is where you find it." The POW must keep onsearching. I t may come by way of chance for rescue or chancefor escape. Opportunity or luck may favor him through prisoner exchange. They also serve who only stand and wait. TheLord helps those who hustle in the meantime.These are the views of fighting men. And of men who havebeen prisoners of war-those who have "had it." Their convictions, derived from experience, serve to dispel a popularfallacy-the misconception that a prisoner of war is, perforce, ahero. Conversely, they do not chalk his capture down to inferior performance. Everything depends on the individual andthe circumstances involved.Public Interests and MisconceptionsClearly one should not generalize about POWs, lump themall into a single slot, or jump from "some to all" conclusions.Public opinion tends to settle for generalities because they areconvenient. The "single slot" is easy to handle. The someequals-all deduction, quickly arrived at, does not entail bothersome thinking. But these handy and quick devices serve todistort factuality. Misconceptions result. If, in addition,there has been misinformation or lack of information, publicopinion may go far askew.

In the case of American POWs-in particular, those takenprisoner in Korea-misconceptions are abundant. For themost part they are based on erroneous generalities and someequals-all deductions. Too, for reasons which will become353176---55-2 1


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clear, the public has heretofore not been fully informed on thedetails necessary for balanced judgment.Definitions were and are unclear or lacking. To begin with,just what is a prisoner of war? The man and his situation may

. be readily visualized. But what is his military status? Whatconduct is required of the prisoner in regard to enemy interrogation? What rilles and regillations must he follow during confinement? What are his rights and privileges as codified byvarious international conventions and protocols?What treatment may the prisoner of war expect from the

"detaining power," his captors? What conditions are imposedby the so-called "laws of war?" Can a POW be tried as awar criminal? What is a war criminal?Did the American POW in Korea face some novel andalarming menace from his Communist captors? Were nearlyall prisoners tortured or "brain washed1" Did many POWsin Korea adopt Marxist doctrine? Were there hundreds ofsubverted turncoats, traitors, voluntary collaborators? Inpunishing such malefactors was there divergence in the militaryServices-some lenient; others "Spartan?"

On many of these and similar questions the citizen on thehome front has remained largely uninformed. Too often thePOW, himself, has not known the answers.Appointment of the Defense Advisory Committee

Every war has its disturbing aftermath. There is alwaysanother side to the Victory coin. I f the victory is not clearlyimprinted and the war has ended in what seems a stalemate,the coin becomes suspect. In any event, there is usually apost-war inventory. I f losses have been heavy and objectivesobscure, the coin may seem debased.

The inventory after the War of 1812 was unpleasant. Therewere some rude reactions after the Spanish-American War.In a great war, some battles are inevitably lost. Militaryleaders study these battles, determined to uncover mistakes,i f any were made, so that errors in kind may be avoided in thefuture.

Correction of possible errors and the need for a unified planfor the future led the Department of Defense to examine closelythe prisoner-of-war situation in Korea. The Defense AdvisoryCommittee on Prisoners of War was organized to study theproblem.2


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IIA BRIEF LOOK AT HISTORYFrom the Beginning of Time

For a full understanding of today's prisoner of war problem,background knowledge of the past is essential. History hasestablished precedents which provide the knowledge necessaryto shed light on preparation for the future.Primitive man and his barbarian descendant annihilated orenslaved all foemen who were captured. In time it occurred tothe conqueror to hold a captured headman or leader as hostage.Such a victim was Lot. According to Scripture he was freedby the forces of Abraham-perhaps the earliest prisoner-rescueon record.

But the vanquished of the ancient world usually faced extermination. One finds in Samuel: "thus saith the Lord of Hosts... go and smite Amalek and utterly destroy all they have, andspare them not." Saul was considered disobedient because hetook a few Amalekite prisoners. Six centuries later Hemocritusof Syracuse was exiled for refusing to slaughter all Athenian'captives. But it seemed mankind had a conscience. In respectto humane treatment of captives, it found voice in India in theancient Code of Manu (about 200 B. C.). The Hindu warriorwas enjoined to do no injury to the defenseless or to the subduedenemy.Less humane, the Romans sported with their war-prisoners,often using them for target practice or gladiatorial shows.Captives were tortured for public amusement. Enslaved warriors rowed Caesar's naval galleys to North Africa and Britain,and were killed when they could no longer pull an oar. "Slay,and slay on!" Germanicus ordered his Rhineland invaders."Do not take prisoners! We will have no peace until all aredestroyed." Thumbs sometimes went up for the valiant foreign gladiator or the stalwart warrior who begged no quarter.But mercy to the conquered foe was usually a whim.Medieval Concepts

Chivalry developed in the Western World with the rise ofChristian civilization, the concept of "Do Unto Others." Inthe Dark Ages, soldiering remained savage, but the codes ofknighthood served to temper the warrior's steel. The true

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knight refused to slay for slaughter's sake. Conquering, hecould be merciful to a gallant opponent. His prisoner was nota plaything for sadistic entertainment.

I f the chivalric code was sometimes more honored in breachthan in observance, the ideal-the Golden Rule-was there.I t was threatened by intolerant ideologies and the fanaticismwhich fosters atrocities. Cruel pogroms and religious warsbloodied Medieval Europe. The Islamic conquests weresavagery untrammeled. Woe to the Unbeliever captured bythe stepsons of Abu Bekrl But even as it clashed with thesword, the scimitar acquired tempering. Possessed of his owncode, the Moslem warrior could appreciate gallantry.

The knight was called upon to assume the obligations ofnoblesse oblige. Warrior or liegeman, facing battle, was pledgedto remain true to his king or cause, even if captured. Underany circumstance treason would merit retributive punishment.Treachery, the disclosure of a trust or the deliverance of a friendto the enemy, was perfidious-the mark of Judas the Betrayer.

Thus rules for the fighting man in combat or in captivity werelinked to knightly concepts of duty, honor, loyalty to friend,and gallantry to foe.Some time during the Crusades a rule evolved in regard toprisoner interrogation. The captive knight was permitted todivulge his name and rank-admissions necessitated by thegame of ransom. A necessity for prisoner identification, therule holds today, as imposed by the modern Geneva Conven tions:

"Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, isbound to give only his name, rank, date of birth, and army,regimental, personal or serial number."

In Europe during the 17th Century the concept emerged thatprisoners of war were in custody of the capturing sovereign orstate. No rules for their treatment had yet been formulated,but they were protected from servitude and personal revenge.Later, during the 18th Century, captivity was considered ameans of preventing return to friendly forces. This was a stepforward. Military prisoners were no longer considered guiltyof crimes against the state.The American Revolution

To discourage desertions during the Revolution, the UnitedStates established the death penalty for those prisoners who,after capture, took up arms in the service of the enemy. Am 4


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nesty was granted to deserters but not those who deserted tothe enemy. Duress or coercion was recognized as mitigatingonly in event of threatened immediate death. This was thefirst American definition of required prisoner conduct. In theTreaty of 1785 no standard of conduct was prescribed butconditions of confinement, care and parole were defined.The American Civil War

During the Oivil War there was some regression in the treatment afforded prisoners. About 3,170 Federal prisoners joinedthe Southern forces and about 5,452 prisoners of the Southernarmies joined the Federal army.Prisoner conduct after capture was mentioned in War Department General Order No. 207, 3 July 1863. Among other things,the order provided that it was the duty of a prisoner of war toescape. This order apparently was intended to curb wide spread practices of surrender and subsequent parole to escapefurther combatant service. Prosecution for misconduct wasbased on three criteria:

-misconduct where there was no duress or coercion.-active participation in combat against Federal forces.-failure to return voluntarily. 'Nine years after the Oivil War a declaration establishing therights of prisoners was drafted by the Oongress of Brussels(1874). I t was signed by fifteen nations, none of which ratifiedthe agreement.World Wars I and II

In 1907 the Hague Regulations established rules pertainingto captivity in war. These regulations led to the Geneva Oon ventions of 1929 and 1949. The United States signed all three,and it recently ratified the Geneva Oonventions of 1949. TheOonventions set forth in detail the rights and protections whichshould be afforded prisoners, but they do not specifically prescribe the conduct which a nation may require of its personnelwho may become prisoners. This is rightfully left for prescrip tion by sovereign powers.

There are, however, several provisions of the Oonventionswhich do require specific conduct. Prisoners are subject to thelaws, regulations and orders in force within the armed forces ofthe detaining power. They may be punished for infractions ofrules. They must divulge name, rank, service number and dateof birth.

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A Code of ConductAlthough all the Services had regulations, the U. S. ArmedForces have never had a clearly defined code of conduct applicable to American prisoners after capture. There are piece

meal legal restrictions and regulations but no comprehensivecodification. However, despite this lack of a code, Americantroops have demonstrated through all wars that they do notsurrender easily, they have never surrendered in large bodiesand they have in general performed admirably in their country'scause as prisoners of war.

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IIITHE AMERICAN FIGHTING MAN AND KOREATHE KOREAN BATILEOur cause was simple and just, but our objectives in theKorean War were frequently confused in the public mind.

The Korean War had three aspects. There was the CivilWar aspect-North Koreans fighting South Koreans for control of a divided country. There-was the collective aspect-thefirst United Nations' attempt to stop a treaty breaking aggressor. And there was the Cold War aspect-the Western powersblocking the expansion of Communist imperialism.

The causes of the war, United Nations' objectives and theneed for American intervention were not clearly delineated inthe public mind. This lack of understanding prevailed amongcitizens and American fighting men.

The Communists attempted to exploit to the fullest thiscondition in both international propaga.nda and in dealingwith our prisoners of war.Armed with Soviet weapons, North Korean Communist forcesinvaded South Korea on June 25, 1950. Six days later abattalion of the U. S. 24th Infantry Division was rushed toKorea from Japan. The division was soon inaction againstthe enemy on the outskirts of Seoul.The United States began a piecemeal build-up of the fightingforces in Korea. The first units to reach Korea were not wellprepared for combat. Thousands of reserves were -flown to

Korea. Many were veterans of World War II, but five yearsat a factory or office job can slow up a man's trigger finger.However, by November 1950, the North Koreans had beencompletely beaten, their capital was in Allied hands, and theirremnant forces were scattered and disorganized. The victorywas almost at its climax when the Chinese Red avalanchecrashed over the Yalu.

That was on October 25th. A month later the Chineseopened a massive counter-offensive hurling our forces intoretreat. Early in December, American and Allied Forces weretrapped at the Chang-Jin Reservoir. By fierce fighting theybroke the trap and fought their way to Hungnam where theywere evacuated. There ensued a winter of back-to-wall

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battling in subzero cold. I t was during this gruelling periodthat most of the American POWs were captured.Imprisonment, North Korea

During the Korean War a total of 7,190 Americans werecaptured by the enemy. Of these, 6,656 were Army troops;263 were Air Force men; 231 were Marines; 40 were Navy men.The Army bore the heaviest burden of prisoner losses.

The captives were marched off to various prison camps in theNorth Korean interior. Altogether there were 20 of thesecamps.UDeath Marches"

The first ordeal the prisoner had to suffer-and often theworst-was the march to one of these camps. The NorthKoreans frequently tied a prisoner's hands behind his back orbound his arms with wire. Wounded prisoners were jammedinto trucks that jolted, dripping blood, along broken roads.Many of the wounded received no medical attention until theyreached the camp. Some were not attended to until daysthereafter.The marching prisoners were liable to be beaten or kickedto their feet if they fell. A number of the North Korean officerswere bullwhip barbarians, products of a semi-primitive environment. Probably they had never heard of the GenevaConventions or any other code of war. The worst of this breedwere responsible for the murder of men who staggered out ofline or collapsed at roadside. They were particularly brutalto South Korean captives. Evidence indicates that manyROK prisoners were forced to dig their own graves before theywere shot (an old Oriental custom applied to the execution ofcriminals). Some Americans, with hands tied behind_back,were shot by the enemy.So the journeys to the prison camps were "death marches."Especially in the winter of 1950-1951 when the trails wereknee-deep in snow and polar winds flogged the toiling column.On one of these marches, 700 men were headed north. Beforethe camp was reached, 500 men had perished.Facilities, Food, and Care Were Poor

The camps were what might be expected in a remote cornerof Asia. Prisoner rations were scanty-a basic diet of riceoccasionally leavened with some foul kind of soup. The Red8


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Chinese and Korean authorities pointed out that this larderconformed with the rules of the Geneva Conventions-theprisoner received the same food as the soldiery holding himcaptive. Of course, the Chinese were inured to a rice diet.The average American could not stomach such fare. Sicknessbroke out in the camps. Many of the men suffered long siegesof dysentery.

The men suffered much from cold in winter and heat insummer. Water was often scarce; bathing became difficult.Barracks were foul and unsanitary.In the best of the camps the men behind the barbed wirewere sometimes given tobacco, a few morsels of candy, occasional mail. As will be noted, such items were usually offered

as rewards for "cooperative conduct."A few Red Cross packages got through. However, theenemy consistently refused to permit the International RedCross to inspect prisoner of war camps. There was good reason.Camps Varied from Bad to Worse

In the worst of the camps, the prisoners existed by the skinof their teeth and raw courage. Men 'in the "bad" campswere known to lose 50 pounds weight in a matter of weeks.The "bad" camps included the so-called "Bean Camp" nearSuan, a camp known as "Death Valley" near PUkchin, anothercamp called "The Valley," apparently in the vicinity ofKanggye. Among the worst camps were the "InterrogationCenter" near Pukchin and a neighboring disciplinary centercalled "The Caves." This last was literally composed ofcaverns in which the men were confined. Here they wereforced to sleep without blankets. Their food was thrown atthem. There were no latrine facilities. In "The Caves"the prisoners were reduced to a degree of misery and degradationalmost unbelievable. Those sent to "The Caves" were prisoners accused of insubordination, breaking camp rules, attempting to escape, or committing some other crime (so-called).The testimony of survivors suggests that the "crime" wasseldom fitted by the punishment. Some men who refused totalk to military interrogaters were threatened with, or sent to"The Caves.""Pak's" Was No Palace

Possibly the worst camp endured by American POWs inKorea was the one known as "Pak's Palace." This was a highly353176 -55 -3 9


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specialized interrogation center located near the city of Pyongyang. The place was a brickyard flanked by Korean houses.I t was a North Korean establishment dominated by a chiefinterrogator, Colonel Pak. Pak was ably assisted by a henchman who came to be called "Dirty Pictures" Wong by thePOWs.The camp was under the administration of a Colonel Lee,and there were several other interrogators on the team. ButPak and Wong were symbolic of the institution. Pak was asadist, an animal who should have been in a cage. The teamemployed the usual questionnaires, the carrot-and-prod techniques to induce answers. Failing to induce them, they contrivedto compel them. The "Palace" wanted military information. Coercion was used as the ultimate resort. And forPak, coercion began ,soon after a prisoner refused to talk.Then Pak would use violence. Abusive language would befollowed by threats, kicks, cigarette burns, and promises offurther torture.Several U. S. Army and Navy officers were questioned at"Pak's Palace!' A few Army enlisted men went through thisbrickyard mill. The great majority of POWs held there wereAir Force officers. They took a bad beating from Colonel Pak.But the prisoners found ways to get around the beating.One way was to convince the captors that you were dumb,stupid, the low man in your class. Undergoing interrogation,one officer convinced his inquisitors that he was the stupidestofficer in the service. He was awarded a contemptuous slap,and that was about all.

To the surprise of some prisoners at the "Palace," the interrogation team would sometimes open up with a wild politicalharangue. Then came the word that the enemy had establisheda system of indoctrination courses. The prisoner might startthe hard way-and be punished by restricted rations and otherprivations. I f he began to show the "proper spirit"-to cooperate with his captors-he was lectured and handed Communist literature. A docile prisoner who read the literatureand listened politely to the lectures, was graduated to a betterclass. Finally he might be sent to "Peaceful Valley!' In thislenient camp the food was relatively good. Prisoners mighteven have tobacco. And here they were given all sorts ofMarxian propaganda. T h graduates from "Peaceful Valley"and others who accepted Communist schooling were called

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"Progressives." Prisoners who refused to go along w ith theprogram oftenremainedin toughercircumstances. Theywereconsidered"Reactionaries."Buttheenemy followed no rigidsystem . R ather , h is treatment of prisoners was capric ious. Sometimes he showedcon tem pt for the man who readily subm itted to bullying.Theprisonerwho stoodup tothebluster, threatsandblows ofan in terrogator m igh tbe dismissed with a shrug and sen t toquarters asm ildasany-ifanyprisonbarracks inNorthKoreacouldbe describ edasmild.

All in all, the docile prisoner did not gain much by hisTheprisonerwhodocility-:-andsometimeshe gainednothing.defied Pakand his breed m igh t take a b

eating, but again hem ight not. The ordeal was never easy. But th ings weren'teasy either for the com bat troops ba ttl ing out there in thetrenches.Progressives andReactionariesThePOW "political"schoolsin NorthK orea were, ofcourse,

p a tte rned afterthe Soviet Russian design. Theywerepartofamass program tospread M arxian id eologyandgain converts forIn te rna tiona l Communism. TheProgressives werecalledupon to deliver lectures, write pam phlets , and m ake propagandabroadcasts. Progressive leadersweresent am ong R eac tiona ry groupsto haranguethemen. Theyw rote speeches condem ning Capitalism and "Americanaggression in K orea ." Theyorganized agroup known as "Peace F igh te rs ."

Fo rtuna te ly , on ly . a few officers were Progressives. H ow ever, their influence was un fo rtunate ly s trong on the enlistedmen. I f the C ap ta in can do it, w hy can'tI? I f theCo

lonelsignsa peacepetition andorders therestofusto doit , wehaveto followorders,don'twe? A ltogether theenlistedmenwereonaspot. Thatm any of them refusedto jom theProgressives (and rejecteda promise, sometimes unfulfi lled, of betterfood, m inor luxuries, and m ail call) says som ething for thesp irit of p r iv a tes and non-corns. Themen who gave theProgressives an argument--theactiveReactionaries-werea ruggedgroup.

Breakdown of leadership was exactly what the enem y desired. Officers were usually segregated. Then as soon as anatural leader stepped forward in a cam p, hewas rem oved .AndifProgressiveswereusuallyplaced in leadership position.theyw eren 't obeyedbytheo ther paws, punishm entswereins tore for the "insubordinateprisoners."

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By design and because some officers refused to assumeleadership responsibility, organization in some of the POWcamps deteriorated to an every-man-for-himself situation.Some of the camps became indescribably filthy. The menscufHed for their food. Hoarders grabbed all the tobacco.Morale decayed to the vanishing point. Each man mistrustedthe next. Bullies persecuted the weak and sick. Filth breddisease and contagion swept the camp. So men died for lackof leadership and discipline.Ordeal by Indoctrination

When plunged into a Communist indoctrination mill, theaverage American POW was under a serious handicap. Enemypolitical officers forced him to read Marxian literature. He wascompelled to participate in debates. He had to tell what heknew about American politics and American history. Andmany times the Chinese or Korean instructors knew moreabout these subjects than he did. This brainstorming caughtmany American prisoners off guard. To most of themI itcame as a complete surprise and they were unprepared. Lectures-study groups-discussion groups-a blizzard of propaganda and hurricanes of violent oratory were all a part ofthe enemy technique.A large number of American paws did not know what theCommunist program was all about. Some were confused byit. Self-seekers accepted it as an easy out. A few may havebelieved the business. They signed peace petitions and peddledCommunist literature. It was not an inspiring spectacle. I tset loyal groups against cooperative groups and broke up camporganization and discipline. It made fools of some men andtools of others. And it provided the enemy with stooges forpropaganda shows.Ignorance lay behind much of this trouble. A great manyservicemen were 'teen-agers. At home they had thought ofpolitics as dry editorials or uninteresting speeches, dull asditchwater. They were unprepared to give the commissars anargument.Some of the POWs-among them men who became defectors-had heard of Communism only as a name. Many hadnever before heard of Karl Marx. And here was Communismheld up as the salvation of the world and Marx as mankind'sbenefactor.

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of the POWs knew too little about the United States and itsideals and traditions. So the Chinese indoctrinators had theadvantage.The uninformed POWs were up against it. They couldn'tanswer arguments in favor of Communism with arguments in

favor of Americanism, because they knew very little about theirAmerica. The Committee heard a number of ex-POWs whostated that a knowledge of Communism would have enabledthem to expose its fallacies to their camp-mates. The Redindoctrinators tried hard to win the support of factory workers.But as one of them put it, "We'd heard all that guff before.Back home. We knew their line." Knowledge was a defenseweapon.

While it might be argued that few of the men became sincereconverts to Communism-indeed, the percentage seems tohave been infinitesimal-the inability of many to speak upfor Democracy distressed loyal POWs. Active collaboratorsaside, there were other passive prisoners that "went along."They lacked sufficient patriotism because of their limited knowledge of American Democracy.

I t seemed that these POWs in question had lost their battlebefore they entered the Service. Good citizens-loyal Americans-the responsibility for their building lies with the home,the school, the church, the community. When men enter theArmed Forces, the Military Services must carryon with thisdevelopment.The Committee, stressing the need for spiritual and educational bulwarks against enemy political indoctrination, recommends that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpowerand Personnel) be directed to initiate exploratory conferenceswith the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, andother agencies and institutions on pre-service training.Brainwashing and Indoctrination

The Committee made a thorough investigation of the "brainwashing" question. In some cases this time consuming andcoercive technique was used to obtain confessions. In thesecases American prisoners of war were subjected to mental andphysical torture, psychiatric pressures or "Pavlov Dogs" treatment.Most of the prisoners, however, were not subjected to brainwashing, but were given a high-powered indoctrination forpropaganda purposes.

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American prisoners went beyond the "absolute" name, rank,number, date of birth restriction.Reviewing the interrogation matter, the Defense AdvisoryCommittee felt that the steps taken up to now by the ArmedForces had been decidedly inadequate.The Committee recommends that the Department of Defensedevise a special training program to teach American service

men the ways and means of resisting enemy interrogators.What Can Be Done?

In a war for the minds of men, the enemy's methods can besuccessfully combatted by military training and civilian education. In battle and in captivity the fighting American is nobetter than his training and education. Military schooling canteach him combat skills. Such know-how is a "must."

The Committee recommends that the Military Servicesinitiate a coordinated training program including-First, general training. This is motivational and informational training to he conducted throughout the career of allservicemen during active and reserve duty. Second, specifictraining. This is designed for and applied to combat-readytroops. A code of conduct must apply uniformly to' all Services,and training must be uniform among the Services to the greatest degree practicable.

In all Services training should be adapted to cover the needsof all ranks from the enlisted man to the commander. I t mustbe realistic as well as idealistic. Above all, it must be presentedwith understanding, skill and devotion sufficient to implanta conviction in the heart, conscience, and mind of the serviceman that full and loyal support of the code is to the best interestsof his country, his comrades, and himself.

But skill must be reinforced by will-by moral character andby basic beliefs instilled in home and classroom long before alad enters the Military Service. Pride in a country and respectfor its principles-a sense of honor-a sense of responsibilitysuch basics should be established long before "basic training,"and further developed after he enters the Armed Forces.

The Committee recommends that the Services find aneffective means of coordinating with - civilian educationalinstitutions, churches and other patriotic organizations toprovide better understanding of American ideals.

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War has been defined as H a contest of wills." A trainedhand holds the weapon. But the will, the character, the spiritof the individual-these control the hand. More than ever,in the war for the minds of men moral character, will, spiritare important.As a serviceman thinketh so is he.

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IVA CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE FUTUREThe ServicesVoiceTheirOpinionsTheleadersof the AmericanA rmedForces-theJointChiefs

ofStaff-TheD epartm en tofDefenseCommittees-thevariousp lanning and policy-making boards-reach decisions throughdiscussion and debate based on facts. In striv ing to designa Codeof ConductforU nited S ta tes fightingmen, theDefenseAdvisoryCom m ittee weighedopposingpoin tsofviewin regard to the"nam e,rank , serialnum beranddateofbirth"provisionembodiedin theGenevaConventions.The trad itional view is that the POW stockade is only an

extension of thebattlefieldwhere the prisonersmustbe taughtto carry on the struggle w ith the only weapons remainingfa ith andcourage.

Theabsoluterestriction-name,rank , num ber,dateofb ir th , and nothing more, hasbeencalled the"SpartanC ode." To some persons, such a restric tive code seemed unrealistic.Especially in the light of m odern in terrogation m ethods.Authorities on the subject of interrogation insisted that theiron-bound "noth ing m ore"oftheSpartanCodewasimpossible.TheypointedoutthatCom m unistin terrogatorshadbentsuch menofsteel asCardinalM indszenty. Doctorsand psychia tr is ts generally conceded that "eve ry man has a breaking point."Manyprisoners in W orldWarIIwere forced beyond "name,rankand serialnum ber." And nearly every prisonerinKoreadivulgedsomething. W hy, then, the asked, shou ld aman endure purgatory when his "breaking" was inevitab le?This view was publicized in an article in a popu lar m agazine.I t wasthe au thor's opinionthatAmericanservicemenshou ld betold that"theymaysignanydocum ent the C om m unis ts wantthem to, or appearonTVanddeliveranyscrip ttheRedshandthem ."Referringto the caseofaM arine colonel, theauthorpointedto a fine officerwhohadbeen coercedin to signinga ge rm w arfare confession. Whyno tletAmerican captives sign anythingat all? TheU nited Statescould announce that all such confessions were obtained under duress, and therefore invalid .

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In addition to the "Spartan view" and the "let them talkview" there were numerous advocates of in-between measurestalk, but don't say anything.In Axis camps and in Korea many prisoners had stood up

against interrogation. Many had refused to sign on any dottedline. The idea that an officer or enlisted man might stand upto a microphone and denounce his country, his President, orihis faith, remained repellent. Moreover, the man who signed

. / a germ warfare or some other confession let himself in for a\./ "war criminal" charge: Having obtained such a confession

the unscrupulous enemy labeled him a war criminal and claimedthat he was beyond the protecting Geneva Convention.

The Committee believes that this practice is another strongreason for our prisoners of war adhering to a well definedcode of conduct in any future conflict.Pro and Con. There was much to be said on both sides. And

there was something to be said by experienced officers who feltthat a man could be taught to hold his own in the battle of witsagainst enemy interrogators. Authorities pointed out that theGeneva Conventions did not impose "absolute silence" on theinterrogated war-prisoner. There were clauses indicating thathe might discuss his employment, his finances, or his stateof health, or "conditions of captivity" i f necessity demanded.In short, he did not have to remain mute.

The Committee agreed that a line of resistance must be drawnsomewhere and initially as far forward as possible.Dhe name,rank and service number provision of the Geneva Conventionsis accepted as this line of resistance.

However, in the face of experience, it is recognized that thePOW may be subjected to an extreme of coercion beyond hisability to resist. I f in his battle with the interrogator he isdriven from his first line of resistance he must be trained forresistance in successive positions. And, to stand on the finalline to the end-no disclosure of vital military information andabove all no disloyalty in word or deed to his country, his serviceor his comrades.Throughout, the serviceman must be responsible for all of hisactions. This in brief is the spirit and intent of the Code of

Conduct which the Defense Advisory Committee recommends.Prominent Civilians Stated Their Views

The Committee discussed sociological and educational problems with leading educators. I t consulted with labor leaders.The religious problem was discussed with leaders of various18


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faiths. The Committee also sought and received the invaluable views of the leaders of the nation's veterans organiza tions. All contributed worthwhile suggestions. All helped toselect a code compatible with American precepts"of honor andjustice.The Recommended Code of Conduct (See Addenda 2)

After long study and earnest deliberation, the Committeecame to its decision. That decision is found in the Code ofConduct now proposed for all members of the Armed Forces.The Committee recommends that the proposed Code ofConduct be promulgated in the form of an Executive Order.

The Code demands high standards. To ensure achievement ofthese, each member of the Armed Forces liable to capture mustbe provided with specific training designed to equip him betterto cope with all enemy efforts against him. He will be fullyinstructed as to his behavior and obligations in combat and inthe event of capture.No prisoner of war will be forgotten by the United States.The support and care of dependents of prisoners of war is pre scribed by law. Every practical means will be employed toestablish contact with, to support and to gain the release of allprisoners of war.

IThe United States serviceman, by his service is protectinghis nation. Any shirking of this responsibility or any unwilling ness to do his full part weakens this defense and invites disaster.I am an American fighting man. I serve in the forces whichguard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to givemy life in their defense.A member of the Armed Forces is always a fighting man.As such, it is his duty to oppose the enemies of the United Statesregardless of the circumstances in which he may find himself,whether in active participation in combat, or as a prisoner ofwar.

I II f individuals and commanders were permitted to surrenderwhenever a situation seems to be desperate it would become anopen invitation to all weak of will or depressed in spirit.I will never surrender of my own free will. If in commandI will never surrender my men while they still have the meansto resist.

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As an individual, a member of the Armed Forces may nevervoluntarily surrender himself. When isolated and he can nolonger infJ.ict casualties on the enemy, it is his duty to evadecapture and rejoin the nearest friendly forces.The responsibility and authority of a commander neverextends to the surrender of his command to the enemy while ithas power to resist or evade. When isolated, cut off or sur rounded, a unit must continue to fight until relieved, or able torejoin friendly forces by breaking out or by evading the enemy.

IIIThe fight is everywhere. Even in the prison camp. Whenthe use of physical weapons is denied, the mental and moral

"will to resist" must be kept alive in every prisoner.If I am captured I will continue to resist by all means avail able. I will make every effort to escape and aid others toescape. I will accept neither parole nor special favors fromthe enemy.

The duty of a member of the Armed Forces to continueresistance by all means at his disposal is not lessened by themisfortune of capture. Article 82 of the Geneva ConventionsRelative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12,1949, pertains, must be explained, and covered in the trainingprograms to be carried out by the Services.Article 82 provides as follows:

"A prisoner of war shall be subject to the laws, regulationsand orders in force in the armed forces of the DetainingPower; the Detaining Power shall be justified in takingjudicial or disciplinary measures in respect ot any offencecommitted by a prisoner of war against such laws, regulationsor orders. However, no proceedings or punishments contraryto the provisions of this Chapter shall be allowed.

" I f any law, regulation or order of the Detaining Powershall declare acts committed by a prisoner of war to bepunishable, whereas the same acts would not be punishableif committed by a member of the forces of the DetainingPower, such acts shall entail disciplinary punishments only."He will escape if able to do so, and will assist others to escape.Parole agreements are promises given the captor by a prisonerof war upon his faith and honor, to fulfill stated conditions, suchas not to bear arms or not to escape, in consideration of special

privileges-usually release from captivity or lessened restraint.He will never sign or enter into a parole agreement.20


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IVThe most despicable act an American can commit is to giveaid and comfort to the enemy by informing or otherwiseharming fellow prisoners. Failure to assume responsibilitiescommensurate with rank is equally reprehensible.I f I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with myfellow prisoners. I will give no information or take part inany action which might be harmful to my comrades. If I amsenior, I will take command. If not, I will obey the lawfulorders of those appointed over me and will back them up inevery way.Informing, or any other action to the detriment of a fellowprisoner, is despicable and is expressly forbidden. Prisoners ofwar must avoid helping the enemy identify fellow prisoners who

may have knowledge of particular value to the enemy, and maytherefore be made to suffer coercive interrogation.Strong leadership is essential to discipline. Without discipline, camp organization, resistance and even survival maybe impossible. Personal hygiene, camp sanitation, and care ofsick and wounded are imperative. Officers and non-commissioned officers of the United States will continue to carry outtheir responsibilities and exercise their authority subsequent tocapture. The senior line officer or non-commissioned officerwithin the prisoner of war camp or group of prisoners willassume command according to rank (or precedence) withoutregard to Service. This responsibility and accountability maynot be evaded. I f the senior officer or non-commissioned officeris incapacitated or unable to act for any reason, command willbe assumed by the next senior. I f the foregoing organizationcannot be effected, an organization of elected representatives,as provided for in Articles 79-81 GenevJt Convention Relativeto Treatment of Prisoners of War, or a clandestine organization, or both, will be formed.

VEvery serVICeman possesses some important military in formation of value to the enemy. By revealing it they maycause the death of comrades or disaster to their unit, or even

the defeat of major forces of the nation.When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am. bound to give only name, rank, service number, and date ofbirth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmostof my ability. I will make no oral or written statements dis 21


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loyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause.When questioned, a prisoner of war is required by the Geneva

Conventions and permitted by this Code to disclose his name,rank, service number, and date of birth. A prisoner of warmay also communicate with the enemy regarding his individualhealth or welfare as a prisoner of war and, when appropriate,on routine matters of camp administration. Oral or writtenconfessions true or false, questionnaires, personal history state ments, propaganda recordings and broadcasts, appeals to otherprisoners of war, signatures to peace or surrender appeals, selfcriticisms or any other oral or written communication on behalfof the enemy or critical or harmful to the United States, itsallies, the Armed Forces or other prisoners are forbidden.

I t is a violation of the Geneva Conventions to place a prisonerof war under physical or mental torture or any other form ofcoercion to secure from him information of any kind. If,however, a prisoner is subjected to such treatment, he willendeavor to avoid by every means the disclosure of any information, or the making of any statement or the performanceof any action harmful to the interests of the United States orits allies or which will provide aid or comfort to the enemy.

Russia and the Communist Bloc nations have made a sig nificant reservation to Article 85 of the Geneva Conventions of1949. Under this reservation a prisoner of war who may beconvicted of an alleged war crime under the laws of the captors,loses the protection afforded a prisoner of war by these Con ventions. Therefore the signing of a confession or the makingof a statement by a prisoner is likely to be used to convict himas a "war criminal" and thus, according to this CommunistBloc device, deny to him any protection under the terms of theGeneva Conventions, including repatriation until his sentenceis served.

VIAn American is responsible and accountable for his actions.Prisoner of war status doesn't change this nor does it change

the obligation to remain faithful to the United States and to theprinciples for which it stands. Throughout his captivity, aprisoner should look to his God for strength to endure whatevermay befall. He should remember that the United States ofAmerica will neither forget, nor forsake him, and that it willwin the ultimate victory.

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VKOREAN SUMMARYMisconductbya M inority

A totalof 4,428 American fighting m en were recovered from enemyprison camps inKorea. Theprisoner exchangesbegan w ith Operation "Little Sw itch" in April 1953-significantlyenough, the month afte r S ta lin died and M alenkov assumedSoviet leadership . The Korean War was over. Some 600Allied prisoners were re tu rned in exchange for ten tim es thatmanyCommunist Chinese and NorthKoreans. Duringsubsequent Operation"B ig Sw itch" most oftheAmerican prisonerswere recovered. Atth is time itwas learned that2,730Americans had died in Korean prison camps. Th is ghas tly dea thtoll-38%-was the worst since the Revolu tionary W ar.Byjo in t action oftheservices, all of the prisonersrecovered

were screened bymilitary intelligence agencies. O f the 565whose conduct was questioned, 373 were cleared or dropped afte r investigation. Of the remaining 192 suspects, 68 weresepara ted from theservices; 3 resigned; 1received reprimand;2weregivenrestric ted assignments; 6wereconvictedbycourtsmartial. As of July 20, 1955, 112 cases are pending. Thecases pending are in various stages of investigation. Manymay never come to tr ia l for various reasons. O the rs will bedisposed of by m inor disciplinary ac tion or may be cleared.However, itis fairly certain that thenumber brought to

trialw ill be substan tia lly less than the 112, pending, perhaps lessthan half thatmany. Some of these last are m en who weredischarged soon after war's endandnowhavea civilianstatus.Information which came to ligh t after the ir separa tion madefurther action indicated. The Comm ittee feels that ju s tice mustbedonein thesecases-themen whokeptfa i th withtheircoun try and fellow prisoners need have no fear-but thosewho didnotshouldbeb rough t to trial.TheCommittee recommends that separa ted servicemenbe

brought to tria lifthey arechargedw ith crimes sim ilartothosewhich brought about theprosecution ofotherserv icemen .

Obviouslya change from uniform tocivilian clothes doesnotdivest a gu ilty wrong':doer of responsibility for a crime. A

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civilian criminal would not be permitted to wear Army uniformas protective coloration. I f action is indicated, the dischargeesshould be prosecuted in civil courts. When they cannot betried in civilian courts and the evidence warrants it, they canbe brought to trial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.The Committee finds the Uniform Code of MilitaryJustice adequate for the prosecution of misconduct cases ofprisoners of war in Korea. The Committee recommends that

the Uniform Code of Military Justice should govern the finaladjudication of cases still pending.None Were Tried Unjustly

Establishing facts in the case against a prisoner charged withmisconduct is a lengthy process. Evidence must be studiedand assessed. Witnesses must be produced. Depositionsmust be obtained. In the Armed Forces this amounts to theequivalent of the work a District Attorney's office must dobefore it presents a case to a Grand Jury. Consequently,there may seem to be a long delay before an accused serviceman is brought to formal trial. The Army has not been dilatory in trying the present cases. Rather it has been thoroughand exacting in its research and investigation.The Committee finds that those servicemen who have beenprosecuted and those who are facing trial were charged withserious crimes. Charges included homicide, and treasonablecollaboration with the enemy, combined with informing onfellow prisoners. No man of any service-Army, Air Force,Navy or Marines-who might have been charged with 8uchcrimes would have escaped disciplinary action. As in the past,the crimes enumerated are major offenses in the Armed Forces.(Of course, such alleged misconduct must be substantiated byevidence before disciplinary action is taken.)While the six thus far tried and sentenced to prison have beenenlisted men, one officer was also disciplined; one was tried andacquitted; and other cases coming up involve officers. Theydo not make pleasant reading.A typical case involves an officer who is accused by 180POWs of delivering anti-U. S. speeches, informing on fellowprisoners, hoarding food, teaching classes in Communism, andordering men to sign peace petitions. There is no evidence hesuffered duress.Another case involves a sergeant accused by many witnessesof "ratting" on his prison-mates, beating a sick prisoner, stealing26


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a wallet from a dying man, forcing a fellow prisoner out in to the snow and leaving h im there to die, and drowning three U. N . prisonerscrossing a stream .

There wasanofficerwho allegedly courted favors of his captors as soon as he reached prison camp. He is charged w ith confiscating the small tobacco ra t ion dea lt to the o ther menand eating morethanhis share ofthe food. Itis recorded thathe made the heartless remark, "Themore m en who die here,the more food for therest of us." Hesigned peace petitions,m ade propagandabroadcasts, and evidently "ratted"onotherprisoners. Thereis no evidence thathewas coerced.

There is evidence thatan enlistedman informed on fellowHewrote R ed li te ra ture for hisprisonersplanning to escape.Hewasputinchargeof a spysystem whichresultedcaptors.in thepunishment of "Reactionaries" in his camp. Heasked

for thejob. No "brainwashing"here.Manyof theaccused informed on their prison-mates, some

timesw ith dire consequences for thevictims who were usually severely punished. The man who tr ied to escape and wasvictim ized by "ratting" was indeed a Soldie r of M isfortune .Invariab ly hewas accused of breakingcamprules-avio la tion which "en ti t led" his captors to punish him . He might beplaced in a hole in thegroundandforced to endureananimalHemight beexistence. Hemight be sen t to "TheCaves ." compelled to standfor hours in a latrine.Tothecombat veterans, "ratting"was a crime as unforgiv

able as treason.TheTurncoatsThe21 turncoats who decidedto staywith theCommunists

here was another group of "exceptions." The ir number in cludedmenaccused ofinforming-whichsuggestsa good reason for electing to remain in theenemy 's country . Ev idence ind icates that few of these 21 were "sincere" converts to Com munism . Expediency,opportunism ,andfear ofreprisa ldoubtless influ encedsome of the group.PromisesWereNotBrokenIthasbeenstatedthat menwere"lured"back totheAmeri

can side by promises of clemency. Th is m isconception, like27


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many others concerning the POWs, is far from the truth. TheArmy possesses a tape recording of the broadcast made to themen in question. No promise to the effect that they would notbe prosecuted was offered. What the broadcast said in substance was this: H the men returned they would not be chargedwith desertion. "Ratting" was another matter entirely. Alsoother crimes which were subsequently revealed by investigation.Finally the Uniform Code of Military Justice is devised fordefense as well as prosecution. A military court often bendsover backward in the interest of the accused. The man isassured a conscientious defense. I f he cares to, he may procure civilian lawyers. There is nothing "star chamber" abouta modern military trial. After witnessing the trial of a confessed "Progressive" charged with collaborating (and confessingto the charge), a reporter for the Christian Science Monitorwrote: ". . . . perhaps a word of advice is not amiss; make atrip to one of your local, federal, state, or municipal courts;watch the procedures, then look in at a general court-martial."

The reporter went on to observe: "The (military) code provides for post-trial procedure, including automatic reviews bythe Staff Judge Advocate of the First Army and a specialboard of review in the Pentagon. H this does:not satisfy theprisoner-and he can show good' cause-the conviction andsentence can go to the Court of Military Appeals, composed ofthree civilian judges appointed by the President." Andclemency is possible through the Executive branch of ourgovernment.

rService Action Not DivergentThe public has been under the misapprehension that some ofthe men court-martialed and sentenced for misconduct while inPOW camps "had the book thrown at them" while others wentfree.

Each of the Services thoroughly investigated all alleged cases ofmisconduct. They used generally identical criteria in determining the disposition of each case. Criteria considered type ofmisconduct, duress, and indications of informing or "ratting."The Department of Defense maintained surveillance overcases brought to trial.

The disposition of all cases was governed by the facts andcircumstances surrounding each case and was as consistent,equitable, and uniform as could be achieved by any two or moreboards or courts.28


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No case was brought for court-martialaction inwhich therewas evidence of duress, brainwashing or any other type ofcoercion.The Committee finds that there was no divergent actionamong the services. The relatively large number o f ArmyPOWs naturally shifted the largest number o f misconductcases into the Army's column. All services employed thesame screening procedures in examining repatriated POW s.All services applied the same standards in weighing allegedcharges ofmisconduct. Resultant service actionswere based !on the evidence ineacJt%case. Prisoners Unrecovered

TheKorean Armistice Agreement contained a proviso that"eachside would directlyrepa tr ia te all thoseprisoners ofwarwho desired repatria tion ." The COmlnunists d id not honorthisagreement. A fterrepatria tion operationswere concluded,th e U. N . cOmlnand listed 944 servicemen as "m issing" andpresumably in enemy hands. N ineteen of th is numberwerefinally accounted for by theCOmlnunists. ByourownU . S.efforts thislist hasbeenreducedto470, someofwhom wehavereason to believewereatsome timeinth e handsof theenemy.In th e United Nations, the United S ta tes has consistently demanded an accountingfor them .TheCommitteebelievesthatthe Communistsshouldbeheldstrictly accountable for the 470 men still missing in action.Information indicates they were at one time or another inCommunist hands.

Allhavebeendeclaredlegallydead. Nevertheless, theCommunists should account for them inaccordancewitha signedagreement w ith theUnited S tates.TheCommunistsadm itted holding15,A irForcemenandtwoD epartm en tof Defensecivilian employees. Their detainmentwas in direct violation of the Armistice Agreement and theGeneva Conventions.Concern ofEx-PrisonersThe Committee also concerned itseHwith the question of

service men who were discharged at the close of the KoreanWar--menwho have been re tu rned to civil ian status. Alsorepatria ted POWswhomayhave remained inuniform .

Because of them isconduct charges brough t agains t a smallnumber ofPOWs,andthe accusationsofm isconductlevelledat

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a slightly larger number, some of the former POWs may havegrown uneasy about the matter. The Committee considersthat no man with a clear conscience need worry about a possiblecharge.The repatriated POW has been entitled to special compensation for the period of his confinement. Every repatriated POW could receive this money by applying for it, withthis exception: The war-prisoners who voluntarily, knowingly,and without duress gave aid to, collaborated with, or in anymanner served the enemy, are excluded. All repatriatedprisoners who receive this compensation have been cleared

of any such misconduct charge.

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VITHE ROAD AHEAD FOR AMERICA AND THEARMED FORCES

TotalWar for the Minds ofMenAmericamustview the Communist treatmentof captives as

but another weapon in the world -wide war for theminds ofmen. The nation must recognize the duplicity of an enemywhichpaysno moreth an lip serviceto the GenevaConventions.

However, the United S ta tes cannot oppose duplicitywith asimilarpolicy. To do somight be fighting firewithfire. Butthe Un ited S ta tes refuses to sacrifice principle for expediency.Sucha justificationof meansfor endwouldmean theabandonment of the cause for which America fights. The na tiona lconscience would revolt atsuch a solution.

The nationmust continue to oppose Communism , or any o ther threatto Democracy, w ith American weapons andprinciples. The machines ofwarare assured byAmerican en te r prise, science and industry . The principles, home-forged byAmerica's founders, are more than an heirloom heritage forThey are precepts which mustbepracticedshowcase display.i fthenation is to rem ain the guard ian ofman'sliberties thatitis.

The responsibility for the main tenance andpreservation ofthe United S ta tes andall itstands for is one whichmustbe shared by every citizen. EveryAmerican is in the f ron t linein the war for the minds of men.Code ofAmerican Conduct

The battlefield of modern warfare is all in clusive. Todaythere are no d is tan tfront lines, remote noman'slands, far-offrea r areas. The homefront isbutan extension of thefightingfront. Inthedreadedevent of ano ther all-outwar-athermonuclearwar-thedoorstepmaybecome the Nation's first lineof defense. Under such circumstances, the new code of conductfor theAmericanservicemanmightwellservetheAmericancitizen. 31


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The C o d e ~ s high standards will serve as guides)or .Americansin uniform. Backed by adequate training and education, theywill support the assurance of Armed Forces leaders that .Amer ican fighting men will be fully prepared to meet the enemy onany front.The Korean story must never be permitted to happen again.

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ADDENDA1. TermsofReference2. CodeofConduct3. Citizens,FormerPrisonersofWar,andGovernmentRepresentativesWhoConsultedwiththe Defense

Advisory Committeeon Prisonerso f War4. PrisonersofWarin History5. Bibliography6. Charts

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ADDENDA NO.1TERMS OF REFERENCE

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEWASHINGTON

May 17, 1955MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE ADVISORYCOMMITTEE ON PRISONERS OF WARSUBJECT: Terms of Reference

I am deeply concerned with the importance to our national securityof providing Americans who serve their country in battle with everymeans we can devise to defeat the enemy's techniques. To assure thesuccess of our Armed Forces it is equally as essential to arm them withthe best weapons of the mind and body as it is to provide them with themachines of war.

Our national military needs must be met. This requires that eachmember of the Armed Forces be thoroughly indoctrinated with a simple,easily understood code to govern his conduct while a prisoner of war.However, this military need must be met in a manner compatible withthe principles and precepts basic to our form of government. Enforcement must be accomplished with justice and understanding.I have appointed this Committee to advise me on this matter. I requestthat you consider the methods we may expect our potential enemy to employ, the obligation which national military needs impose on members ofthe Armed Forces and the obligation of the United States to afford pro tection to it s citizens in the custody of a foreign power. I direct yourdeliberation toward the development of suitable recommendations for aCode of Conduct and indoctrination and training on preparation forfuture conflict. You will also consider certain other related Prisoner ofWar Problem areas which I will make known.Staff support will be supplied in the form of a Secretariat, with theStaff Director from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense(M&P), the Deputy Staff Director from the Office of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, and one officer each from the Army, Navy, Air Force and MarineCorps for full-time staff duty.Legal counsel will be provided by the Office' of the General Counsel(OSD), and research assistance will be supplied through the Office of theAssistant Secretary of Defense (R&D).Liaison between this Committee and government agencies outside theDepartment of Defense will be conducted with the help of the appro priate office in the Office of the Secretary of Defense as coordinated bythe Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (M&P).

I t is desired that this Committee submit its recommendations withintwo months after its first meeting. .,.~ . E. WILSON.

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ADDENDA NO. 2CODE OF CONDUCT

39
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/POW-code-of-conduct.pdfhttp://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/POW-code-of-conduct.pdfhttp://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/POW-code-of-conduct.pdfhttp://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/POW-code-of-conduct.pdfhttp://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/POW-code-of-conduct.pdfhttp://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/POW-code-of-conduct.pdfhttp://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/POW-code-of-conduct.pdfhttp://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/POW-code-of-conduct.pdfhttp://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/POW-code-of-conduct.pdfhttp://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/POW-code-of-conduct.pdfhttp://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/POW-code-of-conduct.pdfhttp://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/POW-code-of-conduct.pdfhttp://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/POW-code-of-conduct.pdfhttp://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/POW-code-of-conduct.pdfhttp://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/POW-code-of-conduct.pdfhttp://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/POW-code-of-conduct.pdfhttp://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/POW-code-of-conduct.pdf


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ADDENDA NO. 3CITIZEN$, FORMER PRISONERS OF WAR, AND GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES WHO CONSULTED WITH THE

DEFENSE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PRISONERS OFWAR

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CITIZENS, FORMER PRISONERS OF WAR, AND GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES WHO CONSULTED WITH THEDEFENSE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PRISONERS OFWAR

DR.ARTHUR S. ADAMSPresid ent, AmericanCouncil on EducationandChairman, Reserve Forces Policy BoardHONORABLE ROBERT B. ANDERSONDeputy Secretary ofDefenseMAJOR CLARENCE L . ANDERSON, U. S . ArmyMedical CorpsMR. MAC ASBELL, JR .Chairman, Subcommittee for M ilitary Affairs-Peace and Preparednes8

CommitteeAmerican Veterans ofWorld W ar II COMMANDER RALPH M.BAGWELL, U. S. NavyDR. A. BIEDERMANOfficers Education and Research LaboratoryAirResearch and Development CommandU. S . AirForceMR. GEORGE BROWNAssistan t to the PresidentAmerican Federation ofLaborHONORABLE HERBERT BROWNELL, JR .The Atto rney General ofthe United StatesHONORABLE WILBER M . BRUCKERthen General Counsel, Department ofDefense, nowSecretary oftheArmyDR. LEONARD CARMICHAELSecretary, Sm ithsonian InstitutionCOLONELA. P. CLARK, U. S . AirForceChief, Promotions & Separations DivisionDirectorofM ilitary PersonnelSTAFF SERGEANT RODERICK G . CONN, U. S.Air ForceGENERAL ORVAL R. COOK, U. S.Air ForceDeputy Commander inChief-EuropeDR. MEREDITH P. CRAWFORDDirector, HumanResources Research OfficeGeorge Washington UniversityCAPTAIN BERT CUMBY, U. S . Army

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MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM F . DEAN, U. S. ArmyDR. HAROLD W. DODDSPresident, Princeton UniversityM R. ALLYN DONALDSONDirector, Office of Special Counselor ServicesDepartment of StateCAPTAIN RAY M . DOWE, JR., U. S. ArmyADMIRAL DONALD B . DUNCAN, U. S. NavyVice Chief of Naval OperationsLIEUTENANT GENERAL G . B. ERSKINE, U. S. Marine Corps (Ret.)Director, Special OperationsOffice of the Secretary of DefenseCAPTAIN J . S. FAHY, U. S. NavyOfficer Personnel BranchBureau of Naval PersonnelM R . CHARLES E . FOSTERAssistant Director of LegislationDisabled American VeteransREAR ADMIRAL D . V. GALLERY, U. S. NavyChief, Air Reserve TrainingREAR ADMIRAL ELTON W . GRENFELL, U. S. NavyAssistant Chief for Personnel Control andACNO for Military Personnel SecurityBureau of Naval PersonnelLIEUTENANT COLONEL MONROE J . HAGOOD, U. S. ArmyChief, Returnees SectionG-2 Intelligence, General StaffCORPORAL JAMES L . HALE, U. S. Marine CorpsFATHER THEODORE HESBURGHPresident, Notre Dame UniversityDR. LAWRENCE HINKLENew York HospitalBRIGADIER GENERAL S. W . JONES, U. S. ArmyAssistant Judge Advocate General for Military JusticeM R. MILES KENNEDYDirector, National Legislative CommissionThe American LegionM R . OMAR B. KETCHUMDirector, National Legislative ServiceVeterans of Foreign WarsMAJOR GENERAL A . M. KUHFIELD, U. S. Air ForceThe Assistant Judge Advocate GeneralCOLONEL H . S. LEVIE, U. S. ArmyChief, International Affairs DivisionOffice of the Judge Advocate GeneralAMBASSADOR HENRY CABOT LODGE, JR .United States Representative to the United Nations

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COLONEL K. K. LOUTHER, U. S. Marine CorpsAssistant Director of PersonnelPersonnel DivisionLIEUTENANT COLONEL DAVID F. MACGHEE, U. S. Air ForceM R . S. L . A. MARSHALLChief Editorial WriterThe Detroit NewsREVERN W I L L I A ~ MARTINPresiding Bishop of Methodist Churches, Dallas, TexasD R. CHARLES MAYOThe Mayo ClinicRochester, MinnesotaLIEUTENANT COLONEL JAMES L . MONROE, U. S. Air ForceDefense Prisoner OfficerOffice of the Director of PlansREAR ADMIRAL 1. H . NUNN, U. S. NavyThe Judge Advocate GeneralLIEUTENANT GENERAL EMMETT O'DONNELL, JR., U. S. Air ForceDeputy Chief of Staff, PersonnelCAPTAIN PAUL T . O'DOWD, U. S. ArmyD R . WINFRED OVERHOLSER, M . D .Superintendent, St. Elizabeths HospitalWashington, D. C.HOSPITALMAN 3D CLASS TED P AILLETTE, U. S. NavyGENERAL W . B. PALMER, U. S. ArmyVice Chief of StaffMAJOR MARION R . P ANELL, U. S. ArmyG-3 Operations, General StaffRABBI DAVID D E SOLA POOLNational Jewish Welfare BoardADMIRAL ARTHUR W . RADFORD, U. S. NavyChairman, Joint Chiefs of StaffM R. VICTOR REUTHERAssistant to the President. Congress of Industrial OrganizationsDR. SCOVEL RICHARDSONChairman, U. S. Board of ParoleDepartment of JusticeHONORABLE ROBERT TRIPP R o s sAssistant Secretary of Defense(Legislative and Public Affairs)D R . H. J . SANDEROfficers Education and Research LaboratoryAir Research and Development CommandU. S. Air ForceD B . CARLETON F. SCOFIELDHuman Resources Research OfficeGeorge Washington University

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DR . JULIUS SEGALHuman Resource8 Research OjficeGeorge Washington UniversityMAJOR HENRY A. SEGAL, U. S. ArmyMedical CorpsGBNERAL LEMUEL C. SHEPHERD, JR.Commandant, U. S. Marine CorpsD R . FRANK STANTONPresident, Columbia Broadcasting SystemHONORABLE ROBERT T . STEVENSthen Secretary oj the ArmySERGEANT MARVIN E. TALBERT, U. S. ArmyHONORABLE HAROLD E. TALBOTTSecretary oj the Air ForceLIEUTBNANT COLONEL WILLIAM G . THRASH, U. S. Marin. CorpaHONORABLE CHARLES S. THOMASSecretary oj the NavyLIEUTENANT COLONEL C. H . THURSTON, U. S. ArmyG-1 Personnel, General StaffGENERAL NATHAN F . TWINING, U. S. Air ForceChiej oj StaffM R. BERNARD WEITZERNational Legislative DirectorJewish War Veteran8 oj U. S. A.D R. HAROLD WOLFDepartment oj MedicineCornell University

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ADDENDA NO. 4PRISONERS OFWAR IN HISTORY

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PRISONERS OF WAR IN HISTORYDungeon, Cell and Stockade

The captive knight languished in a "donjon." The languishing wasusually rugged. Facing "durance vile," many Medieval warriors preferred death to capture, refusing to surrender and battling until they fell.The Medieval foot soldier continued to risk death or enslavement at

the hands of a conquering enemy. But in the 17th Century he found a.notable spokesman in Hugo Grotius-Dutch lawyer, humanist, one of theworld's great democratic thinkers. At one time, Grotius himself wasimprisoned. He contrived a remarkable escape. Thereafter, he dedicated himself to a study of international law, attempting to devise a set ofrules which combatant nations could follow to mutual advantage. Hisefforts to humanize warfare by legal means did not meet with immediatesuccess. But they did publicize the problem and place it on humanity'sconscience.

The concurrent rise of nationalism aggravated the prisoner problem.As national armies grew, so did the complexities of war and soldiering.Usually the conquering army had few facilities for confining a mass ofcaptives. Castle dungeons were few and far between. Great bastilleswere built to hold prisoners. The British constructed Dartmoor as aprison for soldiers captured during the Napoleonic Wars.As cells overflowed, the captives were crowded into miserable stockades.They were packed into airless prison ships or bleak compounds. Becauseguards were shorthanded, prisoners were frequently chained in droves.

Fortunately for the war-prisoner two lenitives eventually developed.One came in the device of the prisoner exchange. The second stemmedfrom the concept that the soldier in a national army was a servant of hisgovernment. As such he could not be held personally responsible for theactions of that government. Hence, he was not subject to punishment forgoing to war. The prisoner had right of reparation, and i t was due fromthe "detaining state" and not from individual captors. The point bearson the problem of the "war criminal"-one of the serious questionsinvolving the modern POW.

The issue arose during the American Revolution. So did other issuespertinent to the POW problem of today-questions involving treatmentof captive by captor; prisoner conduct and allegiance; prison break andescape; truce exchange or prisoner rescue. The American patriot's firstexperience with these issues was not a happy one.The First American POW's

George III decreed that all Americans who revolted against Crownauthority were war criminals subject to hanging. Doughty AbrahamWhipple of Rhode Island reminded the king, "Always catch a man beforeyou hang himl" But every Revolutionary soldier and sailor went to warunder shadow of the gallows. The noose was relaxed only because itproved impractical and English liberals deplored suoh high-handed

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tyranny. Soon after the outbreak of hostilities prisoner exchanges werebegun and paroles arranged. Whipple himself was eventually captured.The Red Coats considered the "Informal Commodore" worth more ashostage than hangee.

Captive A,;merican seamen were lodged in the worst of England's navalprisons, the "Old Mill" at Plymouth. Early in the war Dr. Franklininformed Lord Stormont in Paris, "The United States are not unac quainted with the barbarous treatment their people receive when theyhtlve the misfortune of being your prisoners in Europe." Lord Stormont'sanswer was blunt. "The King's Ambassador receives no applicationsfrom rebels unless they come to implore His Majesty's mercy." Mal treatment of captured Yankees led Paul Jones to raid Nova Scotia ina daring rescue effort. "Justly indignant at the suffering of these Ameri cans, I resolved to make the greatest efforts to succor them." His sensa tional raid on England featured an attempt to kidnap the Earl of Selkirkto force a prisoner exchange.A view of Red Coat prisons in America comes from the pen of EthanAllen, himself made captive. "The prisoners who were brought to NewYork were crowded into churches by the slavish Hessian guards . . . .I have seen sundry of the prisoneril in the agonies of death, in consequenceof very hunger; and others speechless and near death, biting pieces ofchips; otherS pleading for God's sake for something to eat, and at thesame time shivering with cold. . . . The filth was almost beyond de scription. . . . I have seen in one of the churches seven dead at the sametime, lying among the excrement of their bodies. . . . I saw some suckingbones after they were speechlesil. . . I was persuaded that it was apremeditated and systematized plan of the British Council to destroy theyouth of our land.", From Bunce's Romance of the Revolution comes an equally harrowingaccount. "Of all the atrocities committed, those in the prison ships ofNew York are the most execrable ... there is nothing in history toexcel the barbarities there inflicted. Twelve thousand (American pris oners) suffeted death . on board the filthy and malignant ships.The scenes enacted in these prisons almost exceed belief." Worst of theprison ships was the hulk "Old Jersey" anchored in Wallabout Bay,Brooklyn. The many dead, thrown overside, silted the bay with skele tons. A poet patriot engraved the picture in verse:

"Let the dark Scorpion's hulk narrate,"The dismal tale of Red Coat hate;"Her horrid scenes le t Jersey tell,"And mock the shades where demons dwell "

The Red Coat leaders countered that the Yankees tarred and featheredTory loyalists and that captive British soldiers were worked in brutalmines. The claim was made (in some instances substantiated) that Con tinental Navy captains slew naval prisoners. But "Old Jersey" remaineda blot on the record.

In the "Old Mill" at Plymouth, England, some of the Revolution'sgreatest sea warriors were imprisoned. The prisoners were chained andplaced under heavy guard. Yet the "Mill" featured two of the mostremarkable escapes in history-exploits which inspire American fightingmen to this day. With almost superhuman determination, Captain50


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Gustavus Conyngham and a group of fellow prisoners tunneled out andmade a get-away. Thereby, as Conyngham dryly put it, "committingtreason through His Majesty's earth." Aided by friends in the Englishunderground, the intrepid Joshua Barney contrived an over-the-wallescape. Eluding pursuers, he bluffed his way across England, and reachedHolland in disguise-an exploit to rival anY'thing in Dumas. So wasborn the tradition that the American POW does not meekly acceptcaptivity."The Meaning of Treason"

Laws affecting military discipline were evolving. Of course, the basiccodes prevailed. Treason was punishable by death. Treachery couldnot be countenanced. The question of treasonable collaboration while aprisoner of the enemy came up during the Revolution. The case andits decision-a precedent-was recorded in 1781. Respublica vs. M'Carty.The accused fac,ed trial for serving in enemy uniform after capture. Heclaimed he was forced to do so under compulsion of duress. The courtheld that the duress was insufficient, only the threat of imminent deathwould constitute adequate excuse.Clearer cases of treason were made against enlisted men who desertedtheir posts and went over to the enemy. Paul Jones had such a traitor inhis raider, the Ranger. The man, a David Freeman, fled ship at Whitehaven and tried to alarm the town. I f Jones had caught him-I

During the Civil War many prisoners of war changed uniform. Some3,170 Union captives exchanged blue for gray. About 5,450 Confederateswent over to the Federal side. One famous company of "reconstructedRebs" was sent West to man a frontier outpost and relieve a Union garrisonneeded on the front.

In cases involving disloyal prisoners of war, the question of duress-or degree of duress--was weighed in the balance. The Union JudgeAdvocate General recognized coercion as a defense. I t was held that"extreme suffering and privation which endangered the prisoner's life"might justify his enlistment with the enemy. However, i f the prisonermade no effort to escape when opportunity offered, he was liable to adesertion charge. War Department General Order No. 207 (July 1863)provided that it was the duty of a prisoner of,war to escape. The orderwas designed to curb wholesale surrenders by men eager to obtain paroleand evade further military service.

The war was opposed by Northern "Copperheads." Lincoln wasinclined to be lenient. Referring to "Copperhead" leaders, he asked,"Should I hang a young soldier, and free a wily politician who induceshim to desert?"

Lieber's CodeCivil War prison camps were harsh. In Southern camps, particularlyAndersonville and Florence, men suffered greatly from malnutrition andlack of medication. The Union prison on Johnson's Island in Lake Eriewas a bleak Alcatraz, and Union stockades at Point Lookout on thePotomac were described as "hell holes."

Humane citizens, North and South, appealed for lenient treatment ofcaptive soldiery. In 1863 President Lincoln requested Professor Francis51


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Lieber to prepare a set of rules for immediate promulgation. Lieber'sInstructionsfor the Government of Armies of the United States were probablythe first comprehensive codification of international law issued by agovernment. Based on moral precepts which recognized the enemy as afellow human with lawful rights, they embodied the first code pertainingto prisoners of war. Lieber's code contained the following injunctions:No belligerent has the right to declare that he will treat every capturedman in arms . . . . as a brigand or a bandit.A prisoner of war is subject to no punishment for being a public enemy,nor is any revenge wreaked upon him by the intentional infliction of anysuffering, or disgrace, by cruel imprisonment, want of food, by mutilation, death. or any other barbarity.A prisoner of war remains answerable for his crimes committed beforethe captor's army or people. (for crimes) committed before he was captured. and for which he has not been punished by his own authorities.A prisoner of war . . . . is the prisoner of the government and not ofthe captor.

Prisoners of war are

Documents

POW: The Fight Continues After The Battle. The Report . . . On Prisoners Of War - Aug. 1955