Possible Soviet Responses to the US Strategic Defense ... · SECRET 25X1 SUMMARY ... drop its ballistic missile defense (BMD) plans or, failing that, to ... approaches to solve their

MEMORANDUM FOR: 7 JO% 1984

As you prepare for your NSPG on Tuesday, I thought

you might find this of use for the weekend.

Date

22 June 84SecretNIC M 83-1001712 September 1983

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Intelligence[-Secret--Central 25X1

Director of

DCI

Possible Soviet Responsesto the US StrategicDefense Initiative

Interagency Intelligence Assessment

'511 101 EUS

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NIC M 83-10017

POSSIBLE SOVIET RESPONSESTO THE US STRATEGIC

DEFENSE INITIATIVE

Information available as of 12 September 1983 wasused in the preparation of this Assessment.

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CONTENTSPage

PREFACE

SUMMARY vii

DISCUSSION 1

Political Pressure 1

Active Measures 2

Potential Soviet Military Approaches 2

Soviet R&D Processes and Timelines 5

Technical Responses 6

Land-Based Ballistic Missile Systems 6

Sea-Based Ballistic Missile Systems 8

Cruise Missiles 8

Bombers 9

Conventional ABM Systems 10

Directed Energy Systems 10

Space Systems 11

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PREFACE

On 23 March 1983, President Reagan called for a comprehensive andintensive effort to define a long-term research and development programto begin to achieve the ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed bystrategic nuclear missiles.

Though the media have given considerable attention to the issue andhave focused attention on exotic space-based beam weapons—the so-calledStar Wars systems—the President did not specifically mention any weaponconcepts or basing:

Ballistic missile defense systems could be on air, ground, andsubmarine platforms as well as on satellites; high-energy lasers,particle beams, or microwave systems could become elements of anational ballistic missile defense (BMD) system along with im-proved conventional-technology systems.

It appears likely that any strategic defense scheme will involve somecombination of systems in a layered defense. A space-based directedenergy weapon may be used to destroy enemy ballistic missiles in theirboost phase; ground-based or space-based lasers or conventional weaponsmay be used to destroy buses and reentry vehicles in midcourse; ground-based beam weapons, missile interceptors, and other weapons may be usedto provide terminal defense.

In attempting to neutralize the development and deployment of aballistic missile defense by the United States, the Soviets will be able to se-lect from a range of technical, diplomatic, military, political propaganda,and clandestine measures. Since this range is broad, and since the timescale (20 to 30 years) of the proposed US BMD effort extends well beyondanyone's ability to make accurate forecasts, we can claim no precision inevaluating the Soviets' course of action. We have instead focused ongeneral principles and constraints in the areas of politics, military doctrine,and Soviet research and development practices that will influence theirresponse to a US BMD system. Subsequently, we identified a variety ofmilitary and technological options the Soviets could make at various timesin the future. No attempt has been made to perform evaluations as to therelative advantages of one kind of system or device over another.

Note: This paper was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for StrategicPrograms. It was submitted in sup port of an interagency report in re-sponse to the President's strategic defense initiative( This paper was coordinated at the wotkinglevel by the Central Intelligence A gency and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

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SUMMARY

In the near term, we expect the Soviets to rely principally on a con-certed political and diplomatic effort first to force the United States todrop its ballistic missile defense (BMD) plans or, failing that, tonegotiate them away. There are also certain limited military steps theSoviets could take initially for the purpose of improving their bargain-ing position and for preparing them for initial US deployment should itoccur.

Over the long term, if the United States goes ahead with plans todevelop and deploy its defensive system the Soviets will have a differentset of problems. Assuming they know the likely structure and capabili-ties of US defensive forces, they will look for effective technicalcountermeasures.

It appears that there will be a large variety of possible measures theSoviets can choose from to preserve the viability of their ballistic missileforces. Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) can be upgraded with new boosters,decoys, penetration aids, and multiple warheads. The signatures of thesesystems can be reduced and new launch techniques and basing schemescan be devised which make them less vulnerable to US missile warningand defensive weapon systems. These systems can also be hardened ormodified to reduce their vulnerability to directed energy weapons.

The Soviets can employ other offensive systems, particularlymanned bombers and long-range cruise missiles with improved penetra-tion aids and stealth technologies, to assume a greater burden of thestrategic offensive strike role and to exploit the weaknesses in US air de-fense capabilities.

The Soviets can continue development and deployment of theirown ballistic missile defense systems. The Moscow antiballistic missilesystem can be expanded and improved, and a more widespread systemdeployed, with additional launchers, improved missile detection andtracking capabilities, and more capable interceptors. The Soviets canexpand their ongoing efforts on directed energy weapons, weaponswhich also provide antisatellite capabilities which could be used againstsome space-based elements of a US BMD system. In most of thedirected energy weapons technologies, the Soviets are now on a parwith, or lead, the United States. They are likely to pursue these efforts

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regardless of whether the United States sustains its strategic defenseinitiative.

We believe it is highly unlikely that the Soviets will undertake a‘'crash - program in reaction to US BMD developments, but rather willseek to counter them by steadily paced efforts over the decades theUnited States will need to develop and deploy its overall defense. Theywill look for solutions that are least disruptive to their way of doingbusiness and involve the least possible change to their planned pro-grams. The Soviets are not likely to embrace a fundamental shift in thestrategic environment entailing reliance on strategic defenses by bothsides.

The Soviets could choose to allocate the necessary R&D resourcesand could obtain some flexibility for new types of deployment byadjusting other programs. They are likely to encounter technical andmanufacturing problems in developing and deploying more advancedsystems. If they attempted to deploy new advanced systems notpresently planned, while continuing their overall planned force mod-ernization, significant additional levels of spending would be required)This would place substantial additional pressures on the Soviet economyand confront the leadership with difficult policy choices.

If, through some set of circumstances, the Soviets were faced withactual or impending deployment of a US system and had no effectivemilitary counter to it, we think there are various possibilities for Sovietactions, ranging from major arms control concessions, to threats ofmilitary action in other areas, to threatened attacks on space-basedcomponents of a US system, to sabotage against US facilities. In someextreme scenarios, the Soviets could carry out a massive attack againstthe US defensive system, although we think that to be highly unlikely,given the near certainty of thereby initiating general war with theUnited States.

' The Soviets have extensive efforts in the advanced technology area applicable to strategic defense, butwe do not know to what extent these are planned for deployment.

VIII

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DISCUSSION

Political Pressure

1. The Soviets have already begun, and will con-tinue, to try to prevent development and eventualdeployment of US defensive systems, which have inrecent years been the nearly exclusive domain of theSoviet Union, through a variety of political, propagan-da, diplomatic, and negotiating tactics and activemeasures. They will attempt to avoid any majordisruption in their strategic planning by using theseapproaches to solve their problems and will workstrenuously to put themselves in the best possiblebargaining position. We can expect the Soviets to:

— Mobilize existing resources for a targeted peaceoffensive, aimed at exerting domestic politicalpressure in the United States and NATO coun-tries to forgo advanced ballistic missile defense(BMD) technologies completely, or at least topostpone their development indefinitely. Mos-cow will make use of the peace movement, thescientific community, and appeals to the defenseand arms control concerns of NATO opinionleaders. As part of the campaign, the Soviets willbe likely to extol the virtues of the AntiballisticMissile (ABM) Treaty and accuse the UnitedStates of undercutting its provisions.

Utilize various international forums, especiallythose related to arms control interests, such as theUN disarmament and space committees and theGeneral Assembly, or the Conference on Disar-mament in Europe (CDE) which is planned tobegin in January 1984. They could offer publiclyto make strategic arms reductions talks (START)concessions of interest to the United States inreturn for a negotiated ban or limitations onBMD development. They might judge that theadministration is under growing political pres-sure to reach a START agreement and wouldaccept a Soviet offer of this type. But Moscowwould be very reluctant to offer the kind ofoffensive forces concessions the United States islooking for, probably preferring to take itschances on thwarting US BMD plans by othermeans.

— Continue their major arms control campaign toban all weapons from space and to attempt toresume talks with the United States on limitingantisatellite (ASAT) weapons. Last spring, Gener-al Secretary Andropov reiterated the 1981 Sovietproposal for a UN treaty banning all weapons inspace. The treaty would prohibit acts that de-stroy, damage, disturb, or change the trajectoryof any satellite belonging to a treaty memberwho was in compliance with the treaty's ban onweapons. More recently, Andropov unveiled anew initiative to prohibit testing arid deploymentof space-based weapons, eliminate existing ASATsystems, and ban development of new ASATsystems. Embodied in a draft treaty submitted tothe UN and more ambitious than the 1981 effort,this new Soviet initiative reflects Moscow's con-cerns over prospective changes in the militarybalance in space, especially with regard to BMD.Soviet initiatives have been somewhat successfulin stimulating worldwide concern about an armsrace in space.

— Demonstrate Soviet will and capability to re-spond to the US BMD initiative and attempt tokeep pace with the United States in any BMDrace; this could provide them with importantbargaining leverage. One way the Soviets mightdo this is to raise the issue of the ABM Treaty.They have already claimed that we are in theprocess of breaking the ABM Treaty with ourefforts. 2 The Soviets may demand that we discussthis issue sooner, rather than later. The Sovietscould also make some overt references to theirability to deploy conventional ABMs in the nearterm. A Soviet conventional ABM "breakout"would place the United States at a strategicdisadvantage in the near term. The Soviets thusmight calculate that the threat of immediateABM breakout could be used to bring the United

This is actually not correct. the ABM Treaty only bans thedevelopment of air, sea, space, or mobile land-based ABM systems.It does not prohibit research on such technologies.

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States to the negotiating table on somethingcloser to Moscow's terms. While Moscow mightaccept a negotiated revision of the ABM Treaty,they would seek to rule out deployment ofadvanced technology BMD for the foreseeablefuture in any such agreement. At the least, suchnegotiating tactics would buy them some time todevelop their own military response to a USdefensive system.

Active Measures

2. The Soviets consider active measures an offen-sive instrument of foreign policy, designed specificallyto influence the policies of other governments in favorof the USSR. The classic techniques—press place-ments, disinformation, front organizations, friendshipsocieties, and so forth—can be used to disrupt relationsbetween states arrayed against the USSR. The UnitedStates is the primary target. Academicians, journalists,and other agents of influence have been used toconduct political influence operations.

3. We believe that the Soviets will employ measuresto cope with the President's BMD initiative that couldinclude:

— Attempts to cause divisiveness and unrest amongthe US allies by arguing that the US initiative isan attempt to abandon them and that the UnitedStates is reverting to a "Fortress America" policy.

— Attempts to force the administration to withdrawor step down the BMD initiative by trying toconvince the American people that implementa-tion of the President's proposal would seriouslycurtail US social programs.

— Claims that the United States is upsetting thestrategic balance and planning for a nuclear war-winning capability, disrupting the peaceful coex-istence between East and West which has been sosuccessful in maintaining peace since the end of

"Active measures" is a Soviet term referring to activities world-wide that are intended to promote Soviet foreign policy goals, butwhich go beyond traditional diplomatic, propaganda, and militarymeans. Such measures are intended to influence or subvert thepolicies of foreign governments, disrupt relations between othercountries, undermine confidence in foreign governments and insti-tutions, and discredit opponents of Soviet policy.

World War II, and is starting a dangerous newspiral in the arms race.

-- Veiled threats of Soviet response, including state-ments implying that undefined countermeasuresare already under way.

Potential Soviet Military Approaches

4. The Soviets will position themselves to competeeffectively in a new strategic environment. They willprobably seek to:

Increase their efforts to obtain US and Westerntechnology which may bear on the BMD prob-lem and step up their intelligence collectionefforts on US plans and intentions.

Increase their investment in military R&D, stra-tegic forces, and space programs. This couldforce them into explicitly trading near-term mili-tary capabilities for future capabilities, depend-ing on the size of the initial effort and theresources required.

Also, they will possibly:

Emphasize in their program the early demon-stration of the potential to match and counter USBMD, in order to increase their bargainingleverage.

5. An area which we believe to be of great impor-tance in conditioning the Soviet response is that ofeconomics. They will be reluctant to divert scarceassets to expensive technological efforts in response toUS advanced BMD unless they are convinced thatsuch efforts are essential to maintaining their securityand political position and that they have identifiedpotentially viable counters. Such solutions are likely tobe expensive not only in terms of Soviet defensebudgets, but more important, if they involve majorrestructuring of their strategic offensive and defensiveforces, in the degree of disruption they would causethroughout the military forces and command andcontrol structure. In addition, the Soviets are increas-ingly less likely to go for big, overall changes to theirposture, because they have more to lose if they investin the wrong strategy.

6. Over the longer term, the Soviets could choose toallocate the resources necessary to sustain research anddevelopment of a large-scale advanced strategic de-

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fense program. They could obtain some flexibility fornew types of deployments by adjusting other pro-grams. The resources devoted to strategic offensiveand defensive programs make up only 20 to 25 percentof total military costs. Based on some recent experi-ence, however, they are likely to encounter technicaland manufacturing problems that arc inherent indeveloping and deploying more advanced systems. Ifthey attempted to deploy new advanced systems notpresently planned, while continuing their overallplanned modernization of strategic and general pur-pose forces, significant additional levels of spendingwould be required. This would place substantialadditional pressures on the Soviet economy and con-front the leadership with difficult policy choices.

7. The Soviets will try to cope with deployment ofUS advanced technology BMD with the least possiblechange to their planned programs. Historically, theSoviets have proceeded at their own pace to developany necessary counter to US systems and initiativesover the long term. They will look for solutions thatare least disruptive to their way of doing business—those programs that are already under way or areconsistent with present trends in their strategic forceposture. This is not to say that large and expensive newprograms would not be undertaken in response; ratherin choosing among their options, the Soviets will preferthose which do not represent a radical departure fromestablished patterns of strategic behavior. It is highlyunlikely that the Soviets will undertake a "crash"program in reaction to US developments, but insteadwill seek to counter them by steadily paced effortsover the decades the United States will need todevelop and deploy its overall defense.

8." Moscow will seek to maintain the effectiveness ofits strategic offensive forces as the primary means ofmaintaining its strategic position. Measures consistentwith this approach would include proliferation ofwarheads and launchers, mobility and covertness formore of its strategic forces, and development ofpassive or defensive countermeasures, such as boostphase decoys and booster hardening. These measureswould represent a continuation of the current Sovietmilitary approach.

• The Soviets have extensive efforts in the advanced technologyarea applicable to strategic defense, but we do not know to whatextent these are planned for deployment.

9. The Soviets are not likely to embrace a funda-mental shift in the strategic environment entailinggreatly increased reliance on strategic defenses by bothsides. On the one hand, according to Soviet militarywritings, only with a strategy that emphasizes offen-sive operations could the Soviets achieve their objec-tives in nuclear war. On the other hand, the Sovietsinsist that defensive operations are an essential compo-nent of a viable nuclear strategy. They see theiroffensive and defensive operations as closely coupled;by maintaining the initiative in offensive strikes, theycan greatly reduce the burden borne by the defensiveforces to attempt to limit damage and guard their war-fighting capability. We have no reason to expect anymajor alterations in Soviet doctrine and strategy in the1980s and beyond. They will not view strategic forcetrends as requiring them to reduce the offensive,counterforce orientation of their strategy in favor ofsome assured level of survivability, as would be im-plied by a defense-dominated strategy.

10. Even if the Soviets tacitly accept a regime ofdefensive emphasis in response to US developmentprograms, they would be reluctant to depend ondefensive technologies over the long haul to confer thestrategic advantage they seek. Consistent with theirdialectic approach, the Soviets would tend to view amutual shift to strategic defenses as a temporaryphenomenon in the ongoing superpower strategic rela-tionship and not as a permanent solution to strategicproblems. Thus, Soviet military planners would neverstop working the problem of how to overcome USstrategic defenses, and they would probably expect theUnited States to behave similarly.

11. Soviet planners would rely heavily on the diver-sity of their responses to frustrate US defensive sys-tems. In the offensive forces area, this would probablymean increased emphasis on cruise missiles andmanned bombers—areas of current major Sovietdevelopments.

12. The Soviets are likely to attempt to developmeans of neutralizing or significantly degrading USBMD by exploiting "weak links" in the system. Suchan approach would be consistent with existing Sovietdoctrine and practice. They are likely to look foroptions to develop offensive countermeasures to USBMD—in effect, a strategy of defense suppression.One possible outgrowth would be the adoption of a

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— The Soviets had not achieved the offensive capa-bilities necessary to penetrate US defenses.

If this were to occur, which is highly unlikely, Moscowwould be faced with a radical, and highly undesirable,shift in the balance of power. It is possible the Sovietswould consider options such as the following:

— They could make a concerted last-ditch effort tostop deployment through arms control. Underthe circumstances, the Soviets would be in a veryunfavorable bargaining position. They wouldprobably have to offer major concessions in othernegotiating arenas (for example, START orMBFR).

— The Soviets could threaten to undertake militaryactions against US and allied interests in areaswhere the Soviets enjoy military or politicaladvantages.

— The Soviets, citing danger to their supreme inter-ests, could threaten to attack space-based compo-nents of the new US defensive system while theywere still in a highly vulnerable stage of deploy-ment. They would certainly accompany anythreat to attack by intense political action andpropaganda portraying themselves as the defend-

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hen it is possible that such a propagandacanafiaign would enjoy some success.

— It is also possible, but very unlikely, that theywould threaten to undertake military action or


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strategy of strikes against US defensive systems duringthe conventional phase of a conflict with the UnitedStates; space-based components would be particularlyattractive targets. They probably would not rely ondefense suppression alone, but would combine it withthe kinds of steps outlined above to ensure that enoughof their offensive forces could penetrate a degradedbut still operative US BMD system,

13. The Soviets will attempt to develop their ownadvanced BMD, using programs they already haveunder way, even if the technology is somewhat inferi-or to US systems. (In some areas, such as most of thedirected energy weapons technologies, the Soviets noware on a par with, or lead, the United States.) Thiswould provide them a basis for later improving thesystem, while also furthering their political goal ofremaining competitive with US developments. Theyare likely to pursue these efforts regardless of whetherthe United States sustains its strategic defense initia-tive. The Soviets are not confident that, over the longhaul, they could match US technology if the UnitedStates makes a high-level sustained effort, and theywould be reluctant to be drawn into a technological- race" with the United States. They would always feara US breakthrough in offensive technologies that couldoverride Soviet defenses and US achievement of amuch better defensive system.

14. The Soviets will have to compensate for thethreatened loss of their perceived strategic edgeagainst the United States. The US defense initiativeprobably came as a surprise to Soviet planners, andthey are probably not in a position to react quicklywith major changes in their own strategic plans andprograms.

15. While Moscow will continue to look for negoti-ated solutions to the problems presented by US strate-gic defenses, the Soviets are not likely to view armscontrol as their only, or even their best, hope. Theymay be economically pressed to carry out a full rangeof military responses, but they are not likely to makemajor arms control concessions to the United Statesstrictly as a means of relief from any such economicstresses. The Soviets view arms control as but one ofmany instruments—political, diplomatic, and mili-tary--available to them in the pursuit of their strategicgoals. Soviet arms control policy is well integrated intotheir overall approach to the United States and the rest

of the world, and they are not likely to acquiesce inagreements which are fundamentally inconsistent withtheir strategic policies and plans.

16. Consider a set of circumstances arising at somefuture time in which:

— The United States intended to deploy defensesthat appeared highly effective against ballisticmissiles as well as against cruise missiles andbombers.

— The Soviets had not achieved a comparabledefensive status.

— The United States had not greatly reduced itsoffensive forces.

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sabotage against launch facilities or critical com-mand, control, and communications elements on

US soil. Since threats to attack US territory wouldentail a more serious risk of precipitating a war,the Soviets would be correspondingly reluctant toraise the possibility.

17. Finally, if despite all efforts to forestall andprevent deployment of a US system, the Soviets shouldbe faced with an imminently operational, viable USstrategic defense, while lacking effective countermeas-ures and a comparable defense system of their own,they would need either to accept a prolonged periodof clear strategic inferiority to the United States or totake dramatic measures to redress the situation. Somepossible measures include:

— Implementing their previous threats of an attackagainst the US defensive system. If-this entailed amassive attack against sites in the United States,it would carry with it the near certainty ofinitiating general war with the United States. Wethink it highly unlikely the Soviets would takesuch massive action, even under the circum-stances just outlined.

— Attempting, covertly, to destroy important partsof the US system, using techniques like electronicwarfare or directed energy ASAT weapons. Theability to conduct such operations covertly ispossible, given the likely complexity of the spaceenvironment in the next century.

— Emplacing nuclear or biological weapons inWestern cities, and announcing that they will beemployed if the USSR is attacked.

— Claiming to have built the ultimate destructiveweapon, a -doomsday" device.

Soviet R&D Processes and Timelines

18. There are several features of Soviet weaponsdevelopment practice that will be important in limit-ing the speed with which they can respond to USdefense initiatives:

— To a greater degree than in the United States,applied "research" is distinct from weapons -de-velopment." However, applied research can, and

often does, extend to the fabrication and testingof design alternatives—that is, well into the -6.3"stage of US weapons procurement.'

— Fully funded development ("6.4") of a Sovietweapons system is initiated only when the re-sponsible design authority is assured that he willhave appropriate technologies on hand whichwill allow the military's performance specifica-tions to be met. While this does not mean thatresearch on subsystems technologies will not beundertaken during development, it does meanthat the principal system designer must believeeither that the research is relatively low risk, orthat alternative technologies are available.

— A consequence of conservatism in initiating sys-tem development is that major technologies tendto be frozen relatively early in development.Thus, a major new system deployed M a givenyear will incorporate the technologies of theSoviet state of the art eight to 12 or more yearsearlier.

During system development, the Soviets adhereto an elaborate schema which, in fact, is formallycodified in Soviet law. While this works well inbringing order to development projects, it is anadditional major factor in making it unlikely thatthey will undertake "crash" programs.'

— The Soviets are persistent in the pursuit ofprogram goals. We know of several programsthat the Soviets have continued after majorsetbacks.

The primary effect of acquiring technology from the West is tocircumvent or accelerate "research" rather than "development."That is, acquired technology may allow the Soviets to initiatedevelopment sooner, but it does not have a great effect on develop-ment times per se. At most, it can be an alternative to subsystemresearch during system development. But even in this case, thedesigners will have available alternative, if less advanced, technol-ogies to fall back on if Western techniques cannot be obtained.

'Under Khrushchev, a number of ambitious programs wereundertaken in which research and development were run concur-rently. Examples are the SL-X-15 moon rocket, very large win g-in-ground-effect vehicles, and the A-class submarine. All of theseprograms have encountered major problems (some catastrophic),and even when a system was finally deployed the overall develop-ment time amounted to almost 20 years. These unhappy experiencesundoubtedly reinforce the Soviets' reluctance to try to short-circuitthe orderly process which has served them, in the main, very well,

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19. We have found that one result of the Soviets'development practices is that they need considerabletime to introduce technological changes throughout aforce, The necessary time is, of course, dependent onthe degree to which the changes represent new tech-nologies or only different applications of old ones.Whether modifications to existing systems or com-pletely new designs are involved is also a crucialfactor. In general:

— Minor modifications to existing systems takeabout five years to enter a force.

— Major modifications take eight to 12 years.

New systems based on existing or only moderate-ly advanced technology take around 15 yearsfrom initial requirements to deployment.

— Systems based on new or significantly advancedtechnology, which requires substantial researchbefore design inception, can take 15 to 20 ormore years.

— Systems which the Soviets term "new in princi-ple" require lengthy research programs preced-ing weapon system development and can takeupward of 20 years to produce a fieldablesystem.

20. In the last two cases, the factor of technologytransfer can be particularly important, since it enablesthe Soviets to piggyback on much more efficientWestern research and initiate a design project consid-erably sooner than if they had to depend on their ownrather sluggish research establishment.

Technical Responses

Land-based Ballistic Missile Systems

21. The Soviets have invested enormous monetaryand human resources in creating the ballistic missilecomponent of their strategic attack forces. They nowpossess four major design bureaus that develop thesetypes of weapons and have several new and unprovedintercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and subma-rine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in develop-ment. In addition, their military has structured theirstrategic war plans around ballistic missiles, and prizesthe military advantages inherent in ballistic systems—the ability to strike decisive blows quickly and accu-rately over great distances, with a minimum of warn-

ing. For these reasons, we believe it very likely thatthey will try to retain ICBM and SLBM systems in atleast the near term and midterm by employing tech-nological fixes that will enhance the missiles' surviv-ability in the face of US defensive systems. Due totheir strong and experienced design teams, it is proba-ble that they will be able to implement modificationsto existing missiles quite soon (five to 10 years),followed by more effective systems further in thefuture.

22. In the near term,' the Soviets could seek toincrease the survivability of their ICBMs or the num-ber of weapons surviving by:

– Deploying larger numbers of boosters, decoys,and penetration aids.

-- Continuing or quickening the present trend tosolid-propellant missiles, which tend to be struc-turally less vulnerable to continuous-wave (CW)laser damage' and have higher acceleration thanliquid-propellant ICBMs.

— Further fractionating (increasing the number of

reentry vehicles) systems currently deployed orin development.

' In the remainder of the paper, we define the "near term" to bethe period to 1995, the "midterm" to be 1995 -2005, and the "farterm" to be after 2005. These definitions are meant for orientationand are obviously not to be taken literally.

8 Note that many measures that would help against lasers wouldhave little or no effect against particle beam weapons.

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— New PBVs that dispense RVs earlier than atpresent could be put on existing missiles.

23. In the midterm (1995-2005), the Soviets couldundertake more radical measures to harden presenttypes of missiles. Toward the end of the period, theycould begin to deploy new missiles which have beendesigned to reduce the effectiveness of US defensivemeasures as the Soviets understood them in the middleto late 1980s:

New guidance systems that would allow continu-ously rolling airframes could probably be devel-oped, tested, and installed in existing missilestoward the beginning of the period. Continuousroll is estimated to be two to three times aseffective as oscillatory role in increasing CWlaser burnthrough times.

— Also in the first half of this period, currentmissile types could be modified with an ablativecoating to further protect against CW laser at-tack. Studies indicate that for missiles of the SS-17, -18, and -19 classes a continuously rollingairframe with a thin ablative coating will in-crease burnthrough times by a factor of about 15over the present systems.

— It is possible that some degree of X-ray harden-ing could be incorporated with an ablative coat-ing on the postboost vehicle (PBV), thus reducingvulnerability as wellas other lasers.

— Other laser hardening measures, such as a smoke-screen, could be installed.

First-generation boost-phase decoys could bedeployed.

— Measures to reduce or alter the infrared (IR)signatures of booster plumes would also bepossible.

24. New missiles appearing in the 15- to 20-yeartime frame might incorporate the following features:

— High-acceleration boosters that burn out below100 kilometers, thus eliminating boost-phase vul-nerability to X-ray and neutral particle beamweapons. '°

— Airframes designed to minimize vulnerability tospot heating from CW lasers and impulsive loadsfrom pulsed lasers.

— Multiple high-acceleration PBVs to minimize RVdispensing times and proliferate PBV targets.

— Maneuvering RVs to reduce accuracy degrada-tion caused by early, rapid RV dispensing.

— PBVs designed to dispense many decoys per RV.

25. In the far term, from 2005 onward, the Sovietswill be able not only to refine responsive measurestaken earlier, but also will have had time to performresearch and development on radically new conceptsand to deploy those which prove out:

— Highly fractionated, hardened, high-accelerationICBMs could be developed as evolutionary fol-low-ons to first-generation responses of the late1990s.

— Further development of boost-phase decoys andsignature reduction/alteration techniques couldmake early characterization of an attack andweapon targeting very difficult.

— New means of launching RVs, such as railgunsand other electromagnetic devices, could elimi-nate boosters entirely.

Nuclear rockets could be used in boosters capableof depressed (height less than 100 km) trajectory,perhaps very fast (greater than circular velocity)attacks.

— Missiles could be put in high Earth or solar orbitto be deorbited on enemy targets.

10 The beams from both X-ray lasers and neutral particle beamweapons are seriously degraded by passage through the atmosphere.

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Sea-Based Ballistic Missile Systems

26. Many of the measures to make the Soviet land-based ICBM force less vulnerable to defensive systemswould be applicable as well to the strategic SLBM force


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Ablative coatings of the airframes and continuouslyrolling airframes would be possible by the end of thecentury, as would initial measures to reduce or maskvisible, infrared, and radar signatures of boosters,PBVs, and RVs. By the end of the midterm, newSLBMs designed specifically against currently pro-posed US defensive systems could be in test or theearly stages of deployment. These, like the ICBMs ofthat time, could incorporate airframes designed tomimimize vulnerability to CW and pulsed laser ef-fects, high-acceleration boosters, and multiple PBVsthat could rapidly dispense RVs and decoys. Advancedsignature reduction techniques for boosters and RVscould also become available at this time.

27. SLBMs do possess peculiarities that both restrictpossibilities for some responsive measures that areavailable to ICBMs and, conversely, offer some uniqueopportunities:

— By the early years of the next century, the Sovietscould design, develop, and deploy depressedtrajectory SLBMs that would not exit the Earth'satmosphere and would have very short times offlight, if launched from 3,000 to 4,000 km fromtheir targets. The fact that such systems neverleave the atmosphere would stress the capabilitiesof the defensive systems even more severely: X-ray and neutral particle beam weapons would beof little use against them. Moreover, such SLBMswould, by necessity for their own survival inflight, employ hardening measures which wouldalso be effective against CW lasers. In addition toattacking time-urgent counterforce and counter-value targets, these weapons would be veryuseful for attacking ground-based components ofthe US BMD system, particularly command,control, and communications elements and inter-ceptor missile launch sites.

— Boost-phase decoys would be more difficult todevelop and might not be worth the space they

would take on a submarine. (But decoys could belaunched from cooperative surface vessels.)

— A submarine-mounted electromagnetic RVlauncher is probably not a practical prospectfor the next quarter of a century. Thus, subma-rine-based ballistic systems will continue todepend on rocket engines (perhaps nuclear inthe far term) for accelerating their payload.

Cruise Missiles

28. If the United States develops a ballistic missiledefense, an obvious way for the Soviets to try to defeatit is to place greater emphasis on nonballistic strategicoffensive systems. One of these is long-range cruisemissiles, which remain in the atmosphere and aresusceptible to further reduction of their IR, visible,and radar signatures, which are already small. Inaddition to attacking the target sets formerly allottedto ballistic missiles, cruise missiles could be potentdefense suppression weapons. Using combinations ofspeed, stealth, and launch points near the UnitedStates, they could attack ground-based elements of theUS BMD system, clearing the way for a subsequentballistic missile attack.

29. A major disadvantage of cruise missiles is, ofcourse, that if they can be detected, they can bebrought under attack by fairly conventional air de-fense systems. This, however, might not be seen as acompletely negative point by the Soviets, since theenormous expense needed to provide the United Stateswith an effective air defense system would mean thatthese resources would not be available for otherprograms. In the longer term, visible and IR space-based lasers of the sort that might be incorporated inthe endoatmospheric boost-phase segment of a UnitedStates BMD system would also be effective weaponsagainst cruise missiles, again assuming they could belocated. In the near term, submerged-launched ver-sions of two Soviet long-range cruise missiles nowunder test, if deployed on submarines off the coast ofthe United States, could provide an initial circumven-tion of a BMD system.

30. Also by the mid-1990s, initial steps to applystealth technology to cruise missiles could be taken bythe Soviets. In all probability, these would take theform of modifications to missiles already in design ortest. The Soviets also may choose to develop subsonicintercontinental cruise missiles. Their slow speed

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would be offset by the Soviets' ability to launch them

surreptitiously from the USSR and, in the midterm, bythe use of stealth technology.

31. By the end of the midterm (2005), the Sovietsprobably could develop and start to deploy supersonicand hypersonic cruise missiles that would use stealthtechnology and speed to penetrate air defense systems.Submarine-launched cruise missiles with speeds in therange of Mach 3-5 could arrive at their targets in thesame time period as ICBMs launched from the USSR.They would be difficult to detect because of their size,small IR signature, and small radar cross section. Usingterminal guidance, these systems could have accura-cies below 10 meters. Such missiles could performmany of the missions now assigned to ballistic missiles.

32. In the far term, the Soviets will be able to applymany advanced technologies to cruise missile design, ifthey now elect to begin work on them. Exampleswould be:

— Cruise missiles with an intercontinental subsoniccruise phase and supersonic or hypersonic termi-nal attack phase.

— Cruise missiles with very long (several days)preattack loiter times.

— Multimode cruise missiles capable of operating,for example, in submerged, aerodynamic, andballistic regimes.

— Nuclear-powered intercontinental cruise missiles.US studies during the late 1950s and early 1960sdemonstrated the feasibility of nuclear ramjetpropulsion for a low-altitude, supersonic cruisemissile, and open literature of the late 1950sdemonstrated USSR understanding of the propul-sion principles involved. Such a missile would belarge by modern US standards (about 1.5 metersin diameter), but would have a greater payloadcapability, range, and ability to deploy advanceddefensive electronics than present small cruisemissiles.

Bombers

33. After a relatively long lull in which the Sovietsproduced no new bomber for intercontinental mis-sions, they have begun testing a new aircraft, the

Blackjack, which is clearly intended to be capable ofintercontinental attack. It is expected that this bomberand its future variants will remain operational wellinto the next century. In addition, a new variant of theBear bomber capable of carrying strategic cruisemissiles to intercontinental ranges is now being de-ployed. Like cruise missiles, bombers are largely im-mune to space-based X-ray lasers and particle-beamweapons, but are susceptible to conventional air de-fenses and space-based lasers that operate in the visibleand IR regions of the spectrum.

34. In the near term (to 1995):

— We expect the Soviets to deploy the Blackjackand to perfect its use as a carrier of cruisemissiles and gravity bombs to intercontinentalranges. Various penetration aids, principallyelectronic warfare equipment, will be installedand upgraded. It is possible that the Soviets couldadapt a large aircraft, perhaps the IL-86, to serveas a cruise missile carrier in addition to the newBear variant.

35. In the midterm (1995-2005):

— Defense suppression weapons such as the USshort-range attack missile could also be availablefor use on the Blackjack and possible stealthbomber in the early part of the midterm.

— The principal development expected is the appli-cation of stealth technology to manned aircraft.This may include a manned bomber.

— Some degree of hardening against ground- andspace-based laser weapons could be incorporatedon aircraft.

36. In the far term:

— Hypersonic aircraft are possible. These couldincorporate stealth technology, considerablehardening against laser weapons, and extensivecountermeasures against conventional antiair-craft systems.

— Nuclear propulsion for aircraft could be avail-able. This would give greatly extended rangeswithout the need for refueling and might makeindirect, high-speed, low-altitude a pproaches to atarget practical.

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Conventional ABM Systems

37. The Soviets have an extensive program of R&Don conventional ABM systems that dates back to the1950s. The program they are currently pursuing in-cludes development of components which are suitablefor use in an extensive deployment to protect keymilitary, industrial, and urban population centers.These components include a large, quasi-transportableengagement radar, an endoatmospheric interceptor,and a missile guidance radar, Additionally, they areimproving the Moscow ABM system by making it atwo-layered system, increasing the number of inter-ceptors to 100, and building a large, phased-arrayengagement radar. In addition, large, phased-arrayradars to upgrade their ballistic missile detection andtracking capabilities are under construction. Giventheir already extensive research and upgrade pro-grams, we do not believe that the Soviets' initialresponse to a US BMD effort would involve any majoralterations to their own conventional BMD deploy-ment. At most, the Soviets might position themselvesto be better able to break out with a conventionalBMD deployment through acceleration of the poten-tial timelines for construction and deployment. If theABM Treaty were to be abrogated by either side, webelieve the Soviets would undertake rapidly pacedABM deployments to strengthen their defense atMoscow and cover key targets in the USSR, and to'extend protection to key targets east of the Urals. Suchwidespread defenses could be in place by the late1980s or early 1990s.

38. In the midterm, the Soviets could choose todevelop a more capable exoatmospheric interceptor,perhaps with a homing capability, multiple warheads,and a sensor capable of discriminating RVs from chaffand decoys. Also, for endoatmospheric or low-altitudeengagement the Soviets could develop the capability todiscriminate RVs from precision decoys. Supportingsystems, such as more powerful computers and areliable wideband communications system, would beneeded and could be developed and deployed by theend of the century.

39. In the long term, the Soviets could pursue avariety of improvements to conventional ABM sys-tems, such as multiple-warhead interceptors, dualmode exoatmosphericiendoatmospheric interceptors,

mobile launchers, and so on. Some of these develop-ments would probably eventually occur even withouta US R&D program. These include general improve-ments in the capabilities of interceptors and radars. AUS R&D program might cause the Soviets to acceler-ate the pace of these developments, but need not altertheir fundamental nature.

Directed Energy Systems

40. The Soviet Union has had a large, military-sponsored, high-energy laser weapon program sincethe 1960s. One of the primary motivations for thiseffort is probably the development of ballistic missiledefense weapons. Our best evidence in this areaconcerns a major program to develop the technologynecessary for a ground-based laser weapon for termi-nal ballistic missile defense. Soviet research also hasincluded a project to develop a space-based laserweapon, probably for ASAT applications initially, butwe believe that the more difficult BMD mission is alsoof interest to them. The result of these longstandingand well-funded programs is that the Soviets are nowon a par with, or lead, the United States in most of thedirected energy weapons technologies.

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there is good evidencethat in the late 1960s the Soviets were giving seriousthought to both explosive and nonexplosive nuclearpower sources for lasers of an unknown type. In anyevent, Soviet scientists are certainly capable of carry-ing on this kind of work and will undoubtedly do sonow that there are reports of successful US tests andpublic discussion of nuclear-pumped X-ray lasers aspotential BMD weapons.

42. The Soviets are known to be aware of thepotential of radiofrequency (RF) weapons, whichwould damage the electronics of target systems withintense fluxes of microwaves. They are world leadersin the development of certain types of high-powermicrowave generators applicable to RF weapons, andalso exhibit great talent and creativity in constructingpulsed power systems that could drive such weapons.The utility of RF devices in the present context, exceptperhaps as antisatellite or air defense weapons, isunclear to us, and we are correspondingly uncertain ofthe likelihood that the Soviets will choose to develop

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them for BMD. If they should do so, they are in astrong position to match or exceed any advances madein the United States or elsewhere.

43. There is good evidence of Soviet military-spon-sored R&D projects on particle beam weapons (PBW),although work here is in an earlier stage and on amuch smaller scale than that in lasers. Soviet particlebeam weapon research might eventually have someASAT or BMD applications, but the achievement of aprototype system for such uses would be at least 10 to15 years in the future. DIA believes that a space-basedPBW system, intended to disrupt the electronics ofballistic missiles and requiring significantly less power,could probably be developed and deployed in the1990s.

44. Soviet directed energy programs already haveimportant internal Soviet advocates, and support forthem will be enhanced by aggressive US pursuit ofdirected energy weapons. We can expect the Soviets tocontinue or expand their laser BMD efforts, in part asa hedge against technical and strategic uncertainties.Continued or expanded Soviet effort on directedenergy BMD weapons would provide them with theoption of developing a counterpart Soviet defense tomatch any future US development and preserve thestrategic balance, or to serve as leverage in armscontrol negotiations to limit or curb such weapons.

45. Besides forming a component of a BMD system,Soviet directed energy weapons could also be used tonegate or destroy space-based elements of a US BMDsystem, since most laser weapons designed for BMDfunctions are even better ASAT weapons. High-energylasers in orbit conceivably could have eventual appli-cation in an air defense role and be used for attackingunhardened targets on Earth.

46. We believe there is a high probability that aSoviet prototype high-energy laser ASAT weapon willbe tested in low orbit by the early 1990s. A space-based laser of the 1-megawatt class could be tested inthe late 1980s at the earliest, but prototype testing ismore likely to occur in the early 1990s. If testingproves successful, an initial operational low-altitudesystem consisting of a few satellite weapons, eachhaving an ASAT range in the hundreds of kilometers,could be available by the mid-1990s.

47. There is a moderate-to-high likelihood that thedevelopment of low-orbit space-based lasers, coupledwith a heavy-lift launch capability, will result intesting of laser ASAT weapons in geosynchronous orbitby the late 1990s, although CIA ascribes a low proba-bility to operational deployment by the year 2000.DIA believes that, while deployment of a geosynchro-nous space-based laser would probably take place afterdeployment of a low-altitude system, there is a moder-ate chance of deployment of a geosynchronous space-based laser by the mid-1990s. Space-based weaponsfor ballistic missile defense will require greater tech-nological advances than those needed for an ASATmission. Thus, the Soviets are unlikely to have aprototype space-based laser BMD system until at leastthe mid-1990s, or an operational system untilyear 2000. There is also some possibility that

could beready tor operational use by the end of the midterm.

48. In the long term, the Soviets will have had timeto perfect shorter wavelength devices such as the free-electron and excimer lasers. These have several advan-tages over weapons operating in the infrared, includ-ing better coupling of the laser radiation to the target,and ability to produce a more intense flux on thetarget for a given diameter of output optics. Inaddition, most of these can be designed to operate withnuclear power sources, thus obviating the need tocarry great amounts of fuel into orbit. Also in the farterm, Soviet work on particle beam weapons couldproduce a workable space-based weapon for BMD orASAT use.

Space Systems

49. The Soviet space program is unlikely to changemarkedly in response to the US BMD initiative. Theprogram is well funded with a number of short-rangeand midrange goals that are not likely to change.However, the Soviet R&D effort could shift moretoward developing components for ballistic missiledefense and antisatellite use if the United Statesemphasizes space-based BMD, probably at the expenseof the manned-space and communications satelliteprograms which have recently accounted for largershares of Soviet space costs.

50. At present, we estimate that 17 new militaryand civil space systems will be tested, and most of

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these will be deployed, in the next 10 years. These newprograms will result in improvements across the boardin existing capabilities; in addition, the new spacetransportation system (shuttle) and an associated Saturn-V—class heavy lift launch vehicle will add a new dimen-sion to the manned and unmanned Soviet programs.These new vehicles will be available in the late 1980s

and will allow the Soviets for the first time to putpayloads of 130,000 to 180,000 kilograms into lowEarth orbit. The Soviet space program will have anincreasing manned component: their shuttle, spacetug, and space stations will be used to conduct technol-ogy-oriented research and development in space, in-cluding ASAT and perhaps BMD system development.

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Possible Soviet Responses to the US Strategic Defense ... · SECRET 25X1 SUMMARY ... drop its ballistic missile defense (BMD) plans or, failing that, to ... approaches to solve their