Positivist Approaches to Emotion

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Social Constructionist and Positivist Approaches to the Sociology of EmotionsAuthor(s): Theodore D. KemperSource: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 87, No. 2 (Sep., 1981), pp. 336-362Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2778461 .

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SocialConstructionistnd Positivist pproachestotheSociology f Emotions'TheodoreD. KemperSt. John'sUniversity

Social constructionistnd positivist pproaches o the sociology femotions iffernthree espects: 1) social constructionistsenerallyreject he mportancef thebiological nd physiologicalubstratenthedeterminationfspecificmotions, hilepositivistsffirmheop-positeview; (2) social constructionistsupposethat emotions relargely eterminedy socialnorms or emotion, r "feeling ules,"while ositivistsssert hat ocial tructure,articularlyheoutcomesofactors'power nd statusrelations, eterminesmotions; nd (3)socialconstructionists,ollowing symbolicnteractionistodel, ro-pose thatactorsmustdefine ituations efore motionswillbe ex-perienced-buttheydo not explainhow this s done,or whatcate-gories ctorsuse to help themdefine ituations;positivistsn theotherhand offer specificocial structuralategorychemeforde-finingituationsnd determiningheemotionshosedefinitionsro-duce.Theseissues are discussed nd suggestionsorreconcilinghetwoviews reproposed.

Two articles n the sociology femotions ave appearedrecentlyn thisJournal Shott 1979; Hochschild 979). Althoughhe topic s relativelynew, t alreadyreflectsne of thefundamentalivisions fthe discipline,thatbetween ocial constructionistnd positivistpproaches.2hott nd1 Some of the ideas of thispaper were presented t colloquia in the DepartmentsofSociology at the University f California,Santa Barbara, and StanfordUniversity.Requests forreprints hould be sent to Theodore D. Kemper,Departmentof Sociol-ogy,St. John'sUniversity, amaica,New York 11439.2 While these termsare not perfectdesignationsfor the positionsdescribed n thispaper, they are current n discussions of present-dayorientations n sociologyandcapturecertain mportant ifferencesn emphasisthat apply to the studyof emotions(cf. Zeitlin1973; Rossides 1978; Collinsand Makowsky 1978). Here theyare used asideal typesand are meant to differentiateroadlybetween thosewho view emotionsas social constructionsr as interpretiveccomplishments f the actor,and those whoview emotions as more or less jointly determinedby social structure nd biology;between those who emphasize diographic,historical, nd culturalfactors, nd thosewho emphasizenomothetic, ranshistorical,nd cross-cultural nderstanding; etweenthosewho generallyrejectefforts o predictbehavior and emotions, nd those whoventureto do so; between those whose methods nclude participation, ersonal ob-servation, nd an emic (Pike 1967) approach, and those whose methods nclude ex-periments,tatisticalmanipulation f data, and an etic approach.Despite thesediffer-ences, ndividualpractitionersre often clectic nd thusmay not fitneatly nto eitherideal type.? 1981 by The University f Chicago. 0002-9602/82/8702-0004$01.50336 AJSVolume 7 Number

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The Sociology fEmotionsHochschild othespouse he former iew.The purpose f thispaper s toexamine he social constructionistosition nd to argue that t errs ncertainrespects nd in otherspresupposes positivist nderstandingfemotions. o an important egree he two approaches re not so muchantagonistic s complementary. major problem s that the construc-tionist ositions both too ambitious nd not ambitious nough. his willbecome lear as we proceed.In general, ocial constructionistsold that there s greatplasticity ohuman motions ecause emotions re largely isconnected rom iology(e.g., Shott 1979). This allows social and culturalnorms e.g., Hoch-schild's 1979] "feeling ules") to determinelmost xclusively he emo-tionsappropriaten given situations, r significantlyo guide their on-struction y the actor Shott 1979). Cognatewith hese deas is the viewthat ndividuals xperience motions nly after nterpretingnd definingtheir ituation Shott 1979; Hochschild1979; Averill 1980), althoughsocial constructionistsffer ew clues about how actors actually definesituations o produce pecific motions.The positivist pproach, n the otherhand, maintains n importantlink withbiology nd the physiologicaloncomitantsf emotions; ejectstheviewthat ultural orms eterminemotions,ooking nstead o socialstructurend to the outcomes f social relations; nd, while ccepting heconstructionists'iewthatemotions epend n how the ituation as beendefined, nlike them, ffers oncrete, mpirically rounded ormulationsforhow actorsdefine ituations.I shall treat hesedifferencesn turn.Before his terminologicaloteis in order. shall use the term social structure"o mean the verticalarrangementf actorsrelative o each other long the relational imen-sionsof powerand status. Although his s not a common efinition,twillbe seento comeclose to many ociologists' nderstandingf theterm.By power meanactions hat are coercing, orcing,hreatening,unish-ing, nd the ike,producinghereby relationshipf dominationnd con-trolof one actor by the other.This definitionf powerfollowsmoreorless in the tradition f Weber 1946, p. 186), who speaksof power s theability o realizeone's own ends, even over the resistance" f the other(see also Collins 1975). Social structureonsists,n part,of thepositionsof actorsvis-a-vis ach other long the powerdimension.Status, n the otherhand, s a scalar dimensioneflectinghe amountof uncoerced,willing compliance, pproval, deference, eward,praise,emotional r financial upport, ven love, thatactors ccordeach other.As in thecase ofpower, ome ctors rdinarilyeceivemore tatus, thersless. This notionof status has been elaborated n the work of Barnard(1946), Zelditch 1968), and Kemper 1974; 1978b).Formany nalytical urposes he distributionsfpower nd status re

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American ournal fSociologythe importantlements f what we ordinarily iscussunder the rubricsocialstructure.ocial structurehusdefineds a general oncept. t ap-plies at themacrolevel,s in therelations etween ocialcategoriese.g.,male andfemale), rganizations,ocialclasses, r societies; t applies lsoat themicrolevel, here he actors re individualsn interpersonalela-tions.This definitionf social structures thus focused n powerandstatusrelationshipsnd is meant o contrastharplywith ocial andcul-turalnormsndprescriptionss a socialstimulus or motions. s for hepower nd statusdimensionshatform hesocialstructure,shall ustifythesefurtherelow.Here I wishto obtainonlya provisionalssentsothat thedistinctiveeaturesf theargumentetween onstructionistndpositivist iewsof emotions an be broughtharplynto focus. turn othesenow.EMOTIONS AND BIOLOGYSociologists f emotion,whether ocial constructionistr positivist,eekthe social stimulus ourcesof emotions,ntroducingociological nsightintowhatwas oncealmost xclusively psychophysiologicalomain.Butthe psychophysiologistshemselves re split into two camps in theirunderstandingf emotions,nd thishas somebearingon the viewsofsociologists. ne camp holdsthat theunderlyinghysiologicalrocessesfor ll emotionsre thesame, nd thatonlycognitiveabeling nd socialsettingsdifferentiatemotional xperience see Schachter nd Singer[1962] for heclassicstatementfthisposition).This is a verybeguilinghypothesisor ociologists,ndsocialconstructionistsaveeagerlydoptedthisview, ince t allowsforrelativelyreatmalleabilityf emotionsc-cording o certain ocial and cognitive actors Shott1979).Withvirtually o physiologicalomplicationso hinder heway, con-structionistsan support relativelyimple olution o theproblem fexplainingmotions, amely, ultural nd socialnorms, s these re seento apply in thegivensituation. he norms imply ell us whatto feel(Shott1979; Hochschild 979; Averill 980): sad at funeralsnstead fhappy,happyat weddingsnsteadof sad, and glad at our successes n-stead of bad.However, here s a secondpsychophysiologicalpinion,whichholdsthatphysiologicalrocesses ifferordifferentmotionssee Funkenstein[1955] fortheclassicstatementfthisposition).This n nowaynegatesa sociological r social stimulus pproachto emotions.t does stronglyimply hatsocial stimulus nd physiologicalrocess n emotion re notindifferento each other, ut are relatedmore ikekey and lock: par-ticular ocial stimulus eys fitparticular hysiologicalocks to produceparticularmotions. erhapsthe most mportantociological onsequence338



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The Sociology f Emotionsof thisparticularistsychophysiologicalheorys that t is especially on-genialto a certain ypeof social stimulus: pecifically,ariables enotingtheoperations f social structure-thats, thepower nd statusrelation-shipsof actors.These rather han social norms roduceemotions. if-ferent utcomes n powerand status relationsnstigate ifferenthysio-logicalprocesses,which re in turnrelated o differentmotions. his isthepositivist osition Kemper 1978b).Indeed, a sociological heory f emotions annotbe indifferento thepsychophysiologicalheory ithwhich t mustultimatelyink n any com-plete theory f emotions.Whenconstructionistseject r sharply imit hephysiological ontributiono emotions, hey upport he social-normx-planation hey avor.Whenpositivistsrguefor he mportancef physio-logicalprocesses, hey re supportinghe socialstructuralxplanation.The issue cannotbe settled onclusively ere,but it is instructiveoexamine recent onstructionistnalysis f supposed ocialand cognitivelatitude n the determinationf emotions hatmisconstrueshe data of aflawed xperiment,eading o a wrong nferencebout the role of physio-logical processes, rgo a wrong nferenceboutthe mportance f cogni-tion nd socialnorms. he problematicrguments found n Shott 1979).Accordingo Shott's 1979) summarytatementfher constructionistposition, affectiveabeling f physiologicaltates an be manipulated..within rangeboundedby the recognitionf cues indicatingomemini-mal physiological rousal and by extremelyntense rousal" (p. 1330,emphasis dded). This says, in effect, hat within ery broad limits fphysiologicalrousal,virtually ny emotionalabel can be pinned o thearousal.Hence physiology laysa relativelyestricted ole n thedeter-mination f emotions. his conclusion y a sociologistmust nevitablydependon the workof psychophysiologists,n this case Nisbett andSchachter 1966). They proposed,n wordsthat Shott s paraphrasingabove, but whose carefully ualified pplication he has not renderedaccurately, hat "we shouldbe able to alter the abeling f a bodily tateonly within rangebounded t the owerend by the existence f somearousal, nd at the upperend by experienceso extreme hatno amountofmanipulationf cognitions ill persuade he ndividual o attribute isbodily tateto an artificialource" Nisbett nd Schachter 966, p. 228;also quoted n Shott 1979,p. 1323).Since constructionistsllow forphysiologicalrousal-otherwise herewouldbe nothing o label-the issue seems o turn n thequestion fhow"extreme" he arousal has to be before rbitraryabelingfails. n theexperimentn whichNisbettand Schachter upposedly onfirmedheirconclusion, nd upon which hott's onstructionistroposition elies, hematter omes nto focus n certaindifferencesetween "low fear" anda "highfear"group.

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American ournal f SociologySubjects n the ow-fear ondition eportedn averagefear coreof 52measured y responses n a four-pointelf-ratingcale in which0 = not

at all, and 3 extremely.ubjects n thehigh-fearondition eportednaveragefear coreof .96. The spreadbetween he two meanswas statis-tically ignificant,ut the substantive ifferenceppearsto be slight,essthanhalf-a-pointn the four-pointcale. More important,owever, orevaluating hott's onclusions the ocation f the (high-fear)extreme"groupon the fear cale. Assuming hat he verbal nchorfor he number"one"7on therating cale was a word ignifyinga little," r "somewhat,"the extreme roup n this experiment as feeling ess than"a little"orless than "somewhat" fraid. ince thisgroupfailedto mislabel ts emo-tional tate, hought supposedly ad someopportunityo do so, it musthave passed beyond he extremityimits roposed y Nisbett nd Schach-ter (1966, p. 228) to a pointwhere no amount f manipulationf cog-nitionswill persuadethe individual o attribute is bodilystate to anartificialource."Yet thisgroupwas onlyverymoderatelyfraid.Thus the results eemto showthatthe range f nonmanipulabilityf cognitions orpurposes femotionalabeling i.e., between scoreof less than one and a scoreofthree n the scale) is quite large. Contrary o Shott,whomisconstruedNisbett nd Schachter, e could conclude rom hisexperimenthatonlywithin verynarrow ange, t very owlevels of emotional rousal, anindividualsbe inducedto mislabel theiremotional tates. Hence realphysiologicalues dominate motional ttributionsven at relativelyowintensities f emotion.t means also thatphysiological oncomitantsfemotion lay a much tronger ole n thedeterminationf emotion hansocial constructionistsenerally cknowledge. roperly nterpreted,heresults ppear to support hepositivist osition.

Wouldthat hiswere ll thatneeds o be said aboutNisbett ndSchach-ter's xperiment.he above corrects hott'smisinterpretationf their el-atively areful tatementbout themanipulabilityf emotionalxperienceby cognitiveabeling.Unfortunately,heexperimentontains flaw hatinvalidates ny interpretationt all, whetheronstructionistr positivist.Shott (1979, p. 1323) reportedhat"onlycertain ubjects-those na low-fear,ow-shock3ondition-could e induced o misattributerousalcausedbyshock nd fear o a placebo."The flaw s thatthe experimentalparadigm llowed the supposedlyhigh-fearubjectsto experience eararousal and its symptoms efore earning hat they would also be in-gesting (placebo) drug.Therefore,heywouldnot be likely o attributetheir rousal to the placebo,whichtheyobtainedonly after fearwasaroused.On theotherhand,the low-fear roup,which, ignificantlyor3Theres, nfact, oseparatelow-shock"onditionnthe xperiment.t is the ameas "low fear."340



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The Sociology f EmotionsShott,misattributedts fear and shocksymptomso the placebo,wasentirely isabusedof eitherfearor the likelihood f any effects romshock.They were old: "Beforeyou getworried,et me tellyounot to letthe word shock'bother ou. There'snot going o be anydiscomfortndI'm sure you'll enjoythe experiment"Nisbett and Schachter 966,p.229). These subjectswere told that thesupposeddrug theytook wouldproduce ymptomshat n reality temfrom earor electric hock.We might urmise hat unafraid ubjectswho are naive about thesymptomsccompanyinglectric hock, nd who are specificallyold bya straight-facedxperimentero expect hese ymptoms rom drug, relikely o misattributeheir ymptomso the drug.Even so, only six outof 10 subjectsmade this misattribution.owever, hott mplies com-parisonbetween hisgroup nd a high-fearroup n which nlytwo outof 12 subjectsmisattributedheir ymptomso the placebo.But we seethatsucha comparisons invalid, incethe symptoms f thehigh-feargroupwere nstigatedefore heplacebowas administered.I havegone ntosome detail n order o showhowflawed he evidenceis for heconstructionistonclusion hat ffectiveabeling an be manipu-lated within verywide range, romminimal hysiologicalrousal [to]extremelyntense rousal" (Shott 1979,p. 1330).4Ignoring heflawsust discussed, heres a furtheroint omakeaboutShott's onstructionistrgumentased on theNisbett nd Schachterx-periment. hott cknowledgeshat t some evel of arousalno amount fmislabeling r social construction illwork.Thus, the original timulusof arousal-and there s always ucha stimulus-willead to an authenticandapparently enuineabeling f theemotion. his suggestshatfor heconstructionistshere re two differentrinciplesf emotion: ne is con-structionist,ith rousal presumablyeing abeled howeverocialnormsor cognitiventerpretationouldhave it; the other s labeling ccordingto an authentic,timulus-emotionexus.A positivistmust sk whethertis theoreticallyconomical o endorsetwo principles f emotion,withsome indefinite oundary ine between heiroperations, hus eavingalarge erra ncognitan between, herewe do not reallyknowwhich rin-ciple s operating.The positivist iewhere s more traightforward.ndividualsabel theiremotionsccordingo the relational onditionsftheir ituationthiswill4 Although have dealt exclusively ere with Shott's position on the questionof biol-ogy, other social constructionists old somewhat similarviews, for example,Averill(1980, p. 313), who writes that "basically [he agrees] withmuch of what Schachterhas to say"; or Hochschild (1979, pp. 553-54), who describes n "organismicview"of emotions-"in large part, biological factors ccount for the questions the organis-mic theorist oses" (p. 553) -and dismisses t as insufficientlyociological because itdoes not deal with "feeling rules." Elsewhere, Hochschild (1977) also endorses theSchachter nd Singer position.

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American ournal f Sociologybe discussed elow). If someone nsults s, we usuallyknow t, and theangerwe feel s not tackedonto our arousal out of a grab bag ofpossi-bilities, hich swhat heSchachter nd Singer aradigm ssentiallyffers.We maynotalwaysbe awareofwhat caused us to feel given motion,orevenwhatemotionwe are feeling. ut this s differentrom aying hatonce aroused-in ordinary ircumstances-any motional abel can beassigned o our feeling.Currently,he entire radition f work n psychophysiologystartingwith he classicSchachter nd Singer 1962] experiment) hich nderliesthe social constructionists'iew that physiologicalrousal does not sig-nificantlyiscriminate motions s now underheavy attack (Kemper1978b,chap. 8). Somerecent xperimentsttemptingo replicate r con-firmhis workhave failed to do so (Maslach 1979; Marshalland Zim-bardo 1979). Even in experimentsupposedly avorable o the tradition(e.g., Erdemann nd Janke 1978) results re ambiguous t best (seeKemper1980).Furthermore,ocial constructionistsnaccountablygnorethe largebody of contraryvidence hatdoes find hysiologicalifferencesetweendifferentmotions. refer o the "Funkenstein ypothesis"Funkenstein1955), evidence orwhichpermits he furtherurmise hat physiologicalprocessesspecificallyhose nvolving he chemical eurotransmittersor-epinephrinend epinephrine) nd social relations fhuman ctors spe-cifically hose nvolving ower nd status cts) maybe linked n a singletheoretical rameKemper 1978b). While thisview s clearly peculativeat present, hatmustbe counted mportants that here s any groundtall for uch a position. This linkbetween hysiologyndsociologys notrelated n any wayto the controversialpproach f sociobiologyWilson1975]. Space does notpermit resentation ere of thefulldetailsof theargument, hichhas been abundantly eveloped n Kemper [1978b].)From positivistoint f view, here s nothingntisociologicalnfind-ing that physiologylays a differentiatingnd crucialrole in the emo-tions.There s still sufficientoomfor ociological onsiderations,s willbe presented elow.55 There are two hindrances o a rapprochement etween sociology and physiology.One is that sociologistswould have to learn some physiology.This is not difficult,since the fundamentals f the field re well-ordered, nd, generally, nowledge s reli-able. But it would be arduous keeping up with the literature.The second is thatsociologistsmay fear giving up their birthright hrough any accommodation withbiology. Although ociology eriouslybegins where biology eaves off Kemper 1978b,p. 27), the controversial ieldof sociobiologymakes the extravagant laim that soci-ology s subsumableunder the rubric f biology Wilson 1975). These difficultiesside,sociologistsmightwant to consider that somewhere n human behavior and physicalstructure here s an interface etween social and biological phenomena.The Funken-stein hypothesis, nd its further evelopmentn Kemper (1978b), is valuable becauseit gives us a glimpseof that point of contact between the two disciplines nd their342



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The Sociology f EmotionsCULTURAL DETERMINISM OF EMOTIONSHaving argely ejected he nfluence f biology n emotions,ocial con-structionistsenerally rgue that cultural rescriptionsnd social normsarethemost mportanteterminantsf emotions.With he dea of"feelingrules,"Hochschild 1979) elevates hesenorms o the statusof a specialconcept. he writes, If we reconsider he nature f emotion . . we arestruck y the imperial cope of social rules" (1979, p. 551); and "Thesocial guidelines hatdirect owwe wantto try o feelmaybe describableas a set of socially hared, lbeit often atent not thought boutunlessprobed t), rules" 1979, p. 563). These feeling ulespresumablyxplainwhy"generally peaking, . . people feelgay at parties, ad at funerals,happy at weddings" 1979, p. 552). For Averill 1980, p. 305), "emo-tions are . . . transitoryocial roles,or socially constitutedyndromes.The social normswhichhelp constitute hese yndromesre representedpsychologicallys cognitive tructures." verill furtherinks roles to-gethern the appropriate ramaticmetaphor f a "plot." He continues:"In the case of social roles, he plot is the cultural ystem. his meanstheemotions an only be understood s part of the culture s a whole"(1980, p. 315).

Shott (1979, p. 1319) too sounds the cultural heme: "Social normsclearly have substantial mpact on the interpretation,xpression,ndarousalof emotion, point succinctlymade by Clifford eertz (1973,p. 81): 'Not only deas, but emotions oo, are cultural rtifacts.'"In order to establish hat social normsdetermine motions,onstruc-tionists oint to differencesn emotional xpressionn differentultures(Shott 1979, p. 1320; or to changes n feeling ules over time (Hoch-schild 979,pp. 567-68); orto be theexistence f normative uides o be-havior n situations nvolving eelings nd emotions, uch as The Art ofCourtly ove by AndreasCapellanus [ca. 1185] 1941) datingfrom he12th entury.6All this is very classically ociological.Question: What explainstheuniformitiesf behavior or feeling) n society?Answer:Culturalnorms.By thisargument, ailure o emote according o social rule is deviant(Hochschild 1979, p. 560] even speaks of "affective eviance") andmustbe understood ccording o such standard xplanations s culturalor subcultural ifferencesShott 1979; Hochschild1979), failed social-ization (Shott 1979), or pathological ersonality Shott 1979, p. 1330;Hochschild 979,p. 560; Averill 980, p. 331).very differentevels of phenomena. The social constructionistpproach to emotionsseverelyminimizes nterestn this nterface nd the questions t poses.6This references found n the preprint f Averill 1980) but was apparently ditedout because of space limitations.

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American ournal f SociologyExplanations f this kindhave been tried before n sociology.Forexample,Parsons (1954) explainedgender roles in thisway. Lewis's

(1964) "culture f poverty"s a similar ypeof explanation. he troublewithbothof these, s has been pointed ut-and the majorfailing f allcultural orm xplanationsf social regularities-is hat heygnore ocialstructure.f womenhad chosen n the past (takingParsons'sdescriptionas accurate) to pursue nlycertain oles, t was not simply ecausethatwas the cultural orm, hough ndeed t was a norm.t was becausemenand womenwere relatedto each other n a relatively irm tructurefdominance nd submissionpower) and of differentialeferencend de-meanor status) in whichmalespreemptedhe roles heydesired ecausetheyhad morepowerto do so and thus could promotemorestatusforthemselves.Women'sroleswere residual, nd the norms implyunder-wrote he existing tructuref power nd status Kemper1974).In the case of the so-called ulture f poverty,t has been shown hatsocial structure,ot culture, ominates nderclass ehavior nd outlook.The actions f ower-classndividuals re not so much heresult fa cul-tural pattern cquired throughocialization s they are an adaptationto very ow powerand very ow status n society, s expressedn un-employment,nderemployment,nd associateddeprivationsf housing,nutrition,nd cultural menitiesValentine1968; Coward,Feagin,andWilliams 974).Nor need theexplanationfemotions elyon cultural r socialnorms.There are, of course,norms hat prescribe ertain motionsn certainsituations. hus, there ertainlys a cultural rescriptionorfeeling adat a funeral. ut what f thedead personwas yourpersonal nemy r abarbarous olitical yrant?Must we thengo to another ultural rescrip-tion or to failedsocialization r to pathology o explainwhy one mightin the circumstancesescribed eel happy at the funeral?And if one isgay at a party, s one respondingo social norms o "feelgay"? Wouldthatemotionalifewere s plastic s the social constructionistsaintain!In that ase therewouldrarely e dull parties.The ineluctable act s thatsocial relations f power nd status, ome-timescrystallizednto an enduring tructure,ometimes luid nd eva-nescent, etermine ur feelingst funerals, arties,weddings,nd similaroccasions f nteraction.refer ereto real emotions, otforced miles tpartieswherewe feelbored, rput-on ragicmiens t funeralswherewefeel ndifferent.t is whatour fellow articipants o tous andwhatwedoto them-the social relations hat onstituteheexistingocial structure-that voke ur emotions. ta partywhere thers ater o usbytheirwarmwelcome nd expressed leasure t ourpresence, here hey eed urmindwithwitty alk or funnyokes,where ur visual sense s treated o the344



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The Sociology fEmotionsstylish nd revealing arbof others,wherehostshave shown hemselvesto have spentor laboredmightilyo offers gooddrinks r foods,wherewecanmakephysical-sexualontactwith ther ersonswhounmistakablywelcome our touchand firm mbrace,and so on . . . it appears that then-ourstatus o enhanced-wemight eelgay.Otherwise,ocial norms othecontrary, orgett!Similarly, e do not grieveor feel the depressed motional tateofmourningt a funeral, eeling ules to thecontrary, nlesswe were n astateofhappyrelationshipo the dead person, r to his or hersurvivors,which vokesgrief rmourningentimentsrom s becauseof the oss ofthatrelationshipr oursympathy or hosewhohave lost t. Ifwe hatedtheson-of-a-bitch,hat s, ifhe used so muchpower n us,orgaveus somuch ess statusthanwe feltwe deserved, e willmore han ikelygo tothegraveunmournedy us; except nsofar s anydeath s a premonitionof ourowndeath and thusgives us a depressingenseof thefutilityfour strivings.Cultural nd social norms orfeelings o exist.But theseare epiphe-nomenal, ointing o themere urface f thephenomenon,ather hantoits explanatoryore. Social constructionistsite Durkheimn support ftheir osition e.g.,Hochschild 979, p. 556). But Durkheimwas not asocialconstructionistn thequestion f emotions. onsider he following:

If,as often appens, esee nthe rganizationfthefamilyhe ogicallynecessaryxpressionfhumanentimentsnherentnevery onscience,earereversinghe rue rder f facts. nthe ontrary,t s the ocial rga-nization f therelationsf kinship hich as determinedherespectivesentimentsfparentsndchildren.heywould avebeen ompletelyif-ferentf the ocial tructuread beendifferent,nd theproof fthis s,ineffect,hat aternalove s unknownn a greatmany ocieties.Durk-heim 1933) 1964,pp. 349-50]But shouldwe assumethatpaternal ove is unknown,s Durkheim ays,becausesocial norms orpaternal ove are lacking?They may ndeedbelacking, ut Durkheim[1933] 1964) explainshisassertionn a footnoteto thematerial uoted:"Thisis thecaseinsocietieswhere hematriarchalfamily ules" (p. 350, emphasis dded). If thisdoes not conclusivelys-tablishwhereDurkheim tood n the conflict verwhether ulesor socialstructureakesprecedence,hefollowinghould lso be considered:

There re certain ays fmutual eaction hich,indinghemselveseryconformableo thenaturef things,re repeatedery ftennd becomehabits. henthesehabits, ecomingorceful,re transformedntorulesofconduct.he pastdetermineshefuture.n otherwords heres a cer-tain ortingfrightsnddutieswhichsestablishedyusage ndbecomesobligatory.he rulethen . . only expresses n clear-cut ashion he re-sultofa given ituation.Durkheim1933) 1964, . 366]345



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American ournal f SociologyMutatismutandis, e can say thesameabouttherelationshipf rulesforfeeling o the underlyingocial interactionalealities hat give rise tofeelings. irst comes the social relationship, ith ts concrete ehavioralpattern nd its characteristicmotions. nly ater does a rule emerge oguardtherelational attern y guarding heemotionst evokes.The relationshipetween ocial structurend normsforemotionwasbrilliantlyonveyed y Elias ([1939] 1978), who analyzed he historicaldevelopmentf table-and-toiletehaviors, hich ave becomencreasinglycircumscribedy rules of courtesy, tiquette, ivility, nd the like,andhow, as a result, he frontiersf such emotions s shame,disgust, ndcontempt ave shifted verthe centuries.uch an argument ouldordi-narilyfuelthe social constructionistosition, ince t seemsto say thatwe feelthese motions ecausesocial norms ave arisen o define ertainsituations s deserving hem.Yet, as Elias shows, ocial structureeter-mines the norms nd the ensuing motions.As the social structurefRenaissance urope changed-thecentralizationf power, he emergenceof court ifewith ts dependencef courtiersn the pleasure nd prefer-enceoftheir rinces nd rulers, he growthf a bourgeoisie hoserisingpower hreatenedhe favoredtatusof courtiersnd the associatednobil-ity, he apparent eed of thebourgeoisie o distance tself rom et owerstrata n society peasantsand urbanproletariat)-as these ocial struc-tural conditions merged, o did the prescriptionsor behaviorwhoseviolation ngenderedpecificmotions. ut, as Elias makes ncontrovert-ibly clear, theprocessof behavior hange, f prescription,f emotionaldifferentiationesulted rom he efforto maintain r enlarge tatusdif-ferences,o demarcate ocial relations nd social structure ithunmis-takableclarity,o thatall would knowthat ust preciselyuch-and-suchwas requiredn order o meetthe demands f statusdue.

Elias indicates wo social relational rocesses t work.First, rulingelite s a group,nmore r ess frequentnteractionn theenvironsf theroyal court,developedparticular atterns f behavior nvolvingpeech,food,toilethabits, tc. This was inevitable, ince it appearsthat everyhumangroupn close contact evelops ts ownbehavior attern. his pat-ternwasdesigned o render he appropriatetatusdue to one'speers,withwhom ne ived n therelativelylose quarters f thecourt, nd especiallygreat courtesy o the prince,upon whosefavorsone's standingn thecourtdepended. et this courtier roup amein contact lso with owergroups,whosemanners nd behaviorpatterns,nurturedmong them-selves,were nevitably ifferent. hosemanners f speech,of dress, ttable, etc.,would take precedence?t is, in fact, he very ignofhigherstatus hatthe owergroupwill defer, hat ts pattern f behaviorwill betreated s less desirable, ot only by thehigher roup, ut by the owergroup s well.This is a true tatus ystem, s described yWeber 1946).346



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The Sociology fEmotionsYet, if the lowergroupdoes notvoluntarily efer, heruling lite alsohas the power o enforcets way. Nor need the power how n more hana sneer.Thus a set of rules forrelational onductdeveloped y a smallleading group took precedence s the code for all groups.Violation fthe code not onlyrevealed ocial incompetence, hich voked mbarrass-ment nd shame, ut also betrayed ne's ess thancourtier rigins, hichevoked ontemptrom ne'ssuperiors.A secondprocesshelpedfurthero differentiateannersnd emotions.The pattern f the ruling lite nevitably iffused ownto thoseof lowerstatuswho were n contactwith t, thusblurringhe statusdistinction.fthebourgeoisie ad table manners s refineds those faristocrats,hatwas to tell them part? Refining urtherhe original ifferences,ushingfurtherhefrontierfemotional ifferentiation,ecame wayof reaffirm-ing the social structure,o that the owerrankwas virtually lways offbalance, o to speak: behind he times, uzzled t the new, omical n itsarrivisteuffingnd panting o keep up, and contemptibleecause of itsinevitable aucheries n trying o do so. Ultimately, hanges n socialstructurebolished hisgame,for he aristocracyailedfor ackofmoney.The bourgeoisie ot to buy "everything,"s Weber 1956, p. 179) put it(cited n Form nd Rytina1969,p. 20), evento become he eading rbi-tersof taste,manners, nd the proper motions f thealimentaryanal.Rules of etiquette,manners, tc., are thus code books for the kindofbehavior hat allows status to be conveyed o persons f differentank.They are guides ohow to enact social relationshipf a givenkind.TheEtiquette f Race Relations n the Southby Doyle (1937) was the accu-rately itled escriptionf the relational ehaviors hatwhites nd blacksengaged n to reflect nd preserve he social structureor relationship)between lacks and whites.Violation f racial etiquette y blacks wouldevokewhite ngerand black fear,because angerfollows rom loss ofstatuswhere heother s responsible or he oss, and fear s evokedwhenone is relatively efenseless, s blacks were, against the power of theother Kemper 1978b, hap. 6).In the matter f etiquette t the milder evel of mere ourtesy, ailureto observe he implicit elational ules provokes motions f contempt,embarrassment,r mildanger,depending n who is sinned gainst ndwhodoes the sinning.Some senseof theproblematic ature f socialnorms s theprincipaldeterminantsffeeling an be foundn the followingtatementyHoch-schild 1979,p. 563, n. 10):

Thatwecan single ut uch things "feelingules" s itself commen-tary n the ronic osturef the elf egitimatednmodernulture. od-ern rbanulturesoster uchmore istancethe tance ftheobservingego) from eeling hando traditionalultures . . [which] ut people347



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American ournal fSociologydirectlynside heframeworkffeelingules nd removeronic istanceand sense fchoice bout hem.

This seemsto say that n traditional ultures lmost veryone eelswhathe or she is supposed o feel, nd thereforehere s no need to "manage"feelingsccording o social norms.Werethere ucha need,therewouldhave to be feeling ules; but since there s no need,feeling ulesdo notexist.The idea of"peopledirectlynsidethe frameworkffeeling ules"appearsto be a circumlocutionorthis dea. But if there re no feelingrules n traditional ultures, ow do members f such culturesearn tofeelglad at parties, ad at funerals, tc.? Or couldit be that there refeeling ules,but they re usually uccessfullynternalizedn childhood,thus not requiring urtheronsiderationn adulthood?This would betantamount o claiming hatsocialization f feelings s virtually totalsuccess.But if socialization f feelingss so successful, hynotperfectbehavioral ocialization s well, whichmay be less difficulthan theperfectocialization f feeling?n which ase,deviance, ikefeeling ules,wouldproveto be a peculiarlymodern oncept.It is easy to see that ogicalproblemsre engendered y Hochschild'sefforto accommodatehe notion hatfeeling ulesmay notbe accessiblein all cultures.Of course, nother olution o thisdilemma s to viewemotions s products f social relational utcomeswhichdirectly vokeemotions, hat s, to take a positivist ocial structuralpproach.Feelingrulesmay then xist n modern ocieties, ut only as part of ourgreaterself-consciousnessboutprocesses arried n by othermeans, n perhapsthesameway thatboth we and primitiveultures ave art,butonlywehave developedwhat is virtually n art about art-criticism-and, toshowhow far thiscan be taken, rt about art about art, as exemplifiedby I. A. Richards's 1948) elegantwork.Averill 1980, p. 320), apparently lso uncomfortablebout some n-accessible spectsoftheconstructionistechanism, rites hat adults[']emotionalreactions re likelyto proceedautomatically . . withoutverbalmediation." e meansheresomething littledifferentromwhatHochschildeems o meanbypeoplebeing directlynside heframeworkof feeling ules,"but there s the same sense of a "blind spot"wheretheprocessdisappearsfrom iew. A nagging roblem ora positiviststhatbothHochschild nd Averill bandon rules forfeeling ust at thepointwhere t wouldseemmost crucialforthemto be availableif the

case for hem s to be proved.It is not as if somehint of the relational roveniencef emotionsstotallyacking mong ocialconstructionists.hott 1979, p. 1318) citesKemper's elational utcome efinition.7verill 1980,p. 314) writes hat7 Emotions resultfrom"real, imagined, nticipated, r recollected utcomes of socialrelationships"Kemper 1978a, p. 32).348



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The Sociology f Emotions"the personwho says, That makesmeangry' r I loveyou,' s not sim-ply labeling n internal tate; he is enteringnto a complex elationshipwith nother erson."Whilehe does notgoon to see the relationalmatrixthatgivesrise to such emotionsn the first lace,at least a sense of rela-tionships indicated.However, he most nterestingelational llusion sfoundn Hochschild 1979).She is concernedwith theproblem f "managing motions," hat is,getting ne's emotions o conform o what one understandshe"feelingrule" to be. She suggests ertaintechniques or emotionmanagement,including thecognitive":

Theremaybe various ypes f cognitivemotion ork.All can be de-scribed s attemptso recodify situation.y recodificationmeanre-classificationf a siuation ntowhat re previouslystablished entalcategories f situations. s in an initial,more automatic odificationf asituation,eliberateecodificationeans skingneselfa) What ategoryin my classificationchema f situations its hisnew situation?theschemamay ncludelame-inituations,lame-outituations,redit-initu-ations,credit-outituations, tc.). . . . In deliberaterecodifications,netries o change heclassificationf outwardnd nward eality.Hochs-child 979, . 562,n. 9, emphasesdded]This statements noteworthyn that t offersome definitionsf situa-tionsthat are relationaln character. lame-in ituationsmustbe wherethe actorwas agent n hurting r harming nother; n blame-out, gentand victim re reversed. redit-in ituationsmustbe where he actorwastheagentof an act meriting eward rom thers; n credit-out,he otheris the agent and deserves he reward.These formulationsint at somesystematicway of classifyingituations n relationalterms.The fewgiven re assimilated asily ntothecomprehensiveower-statuselationalscheme ound n Kemper 1978b).A second and revealingpoint about Hochschild's tatements theacknowledgmentf two kinds of relational lassification: he "initial,more utomatic odificationf a situation" nd the"deliberate ecodifica-tion."Significantly,othdo the same thing, amely, lassify ituationsrelationally, nd this produces the emotion.A brief xample llustrates his point: I see my spouseat a distanceand I feelauthentic appiness she is the epitome f the ideal personinhow she treatsme and others).On another ccasion, see my spouseat a distance nd (forwhatever eason) I do notfeelhappy,but I knowthefeeling ule that says I should. then think bout the perfectwayshe treatsme and others, nd I become authentically appy. In bothcases, the emotionwas produced,not by a feeling ule,but by under-standingmy relationship ithmy spouse.There are two final ssues to examinen thematter f the cultural e-

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American ournal fSociologyterminationf emotions. he first s that somesocietiesdo not appeartoreport he ameemotions s does ours; the econd s that ome tandardemotionsn these societies re expressed ifferentlyrom ur modeofexpression. hese societalvariationseem to support hesocialconstruc-tionist iewofemotions. ccordingo Shott 1979, p. 1319), theexistenceofsocial normswould ead us to "expectdistinct ocabularies femotionto characterize ifferentocieties, nd, in fact,theydo." An illustrationof this s that amongTahitians such emotions s fear and shame . .are culturally xpected nd encouraged nd used as a principle f ex-planation,whilepassionate eelingsparticularly ostile r sad ones) aremade 'culturallynvisible,' lmost naccessible o communicationLevy1973,pp. 273, 307,324). Thus,a Tahitianwhosematehas died nterpretsthesubsequentstrange' eelings f loss as illness Levy 1973, p. 324)"(Shott1979,p. 1320).Levy's (1973) work n the Tahitians s of relevance o both ssues.Onthequestion f differencesmong ocieties n theirvocabularies f emo-tion, evy distinguishesetween motionshat re"hypercognated"hav-inga relativelyxtensive motional ocabulary, llowing ornuances ndrelatively cute discriminationsf feeling)and emotions hat are "hy-pocognated" with a relativelymeagervocabulary, llowing ewaffectivediscriminations).mong ahitians, ypercognatedmotionsnclude nger,shame, nd fear,whilehypocognatedmotionsnclude oneliness, epres-sion, and guilt Levy 1973, p. 287). Socialization ractices, s reportedby Levy, undergirdhisdifferentiatedmotional ocabulary.Adopting social constructionistosition, ne mightbe tempted obelieve hathypocognatedmotions renot experienced,utLevy (1973,p. 324) writes:

When ihoni a Tahitian], eelingtrangefter eing eparatedrom isvahinewife],nterpretsis feelingss illness nd in so doing cceptspervasiveulturalattern f playingownfeelingsf loss, t is evidentthatnsomeway nd at some evelhemust now hathehas sufferedsignificantoss.That s why is eparationrom is vahinemadehimfeelsickor strangenthefirst lace.Thatis, one "feels" onsiderably orethan ultural orms ake onsciouslyccessible.

Here Levy is in factsupporting positivist iew of emotions, orhe issayingthat, despitethe lack of culturalvocabulary, he feeling f lossstill resultsfrom he fact of loss, from he relationship ow severed.(Tihoni'sproblemwas that his wife had refused o returnwith him totheirhome slandafter everal months f visiting er father. he alsokepttheir nly childwithher. t is clearly he relationaloss that stim-ulatedTihoni'sdiscomfort.) ut, ngeneral, uch feelingsrenot frequentamong Tahitians.Levy (1973, p. 306) explains: "For one thing,mostpeople are seldomalone. When they ose someone hrough esertion r350



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The Sociology f Emotionsdeath, hey oonfind omeone o takehis place." Here,again,Levysup-portsa positivist, ocial structural xplanationfor the relatively owprevalence f sadness r loneliness, nd,therefore,or hehypercognationof thisemotion.Social constructionistslso makea pointof the fact that the sense ofloss amongTahitians s expressed erbally s a feeling f illness Shott1979,p. 1320), rather han n a conventionalanguage f oss.Levywritesthat "thereare no unambiguous ermswhich representhe concepts fsadness, onging, r lonelinessn thesense of depressed' r sad' becauseof lack of friends,ompanionship,nd so on" (p. 305). Tahitiansmightuse such terms s: " 'feeling roubled' . . 'not feeling sense of innerpush' . . 'feeling eavy' . . 'feeling atigued' . . and a variety f otherterms ll referringo a generally roubled r subduedbodily tate" (p.305). Thus, again,social constructionppearsto dominate heemotions.But thesebodily ymptomsre part ofa general yndromef depression.Murphy,Wittkower,nd Chance (1970) surveyed sychiatristsn 30countries o determine hether r not there s a common, ross-culturalsyndromefdepression. heirconclusion as that hemostreliable ymp-toms, ross-culturally,ere "depressivemood,fatigue,nsomnia, nd lossof interestn the social environment"p. 480). While the fit betweenthe itemsof thecross-culturalyndromend Tahitiansymptomss notperfect, learly here s a sufficientverlapto show that Tahiti is notculturally nique n its expression fdepression.Levy (1973, pp. 325-26) also concludes:

Althoughe have eenvarious pecial ahitianhapes nd nuancesf thephenomenassociated ith arious eelingsnd emotions,hecentralen-dencies eferredo by suchterms s riri anger),ri'ari'a fear),here(love),mikigrief), ndmauiuipain) are the ame s those n thewords sed ogloss hem.Thus, although uancesdifferentiateahitianforms fexpression f emo-tionfrom hoseof the West, and a differentorm f social organizationleads to a lower ikelihood f certain motions e.g., loneliness r de-pression), he crucialpoint s that,whenemotions re felt, t is becauseof thesamefundamentalelational onditions hatevoke them lsewhere,and, in important espects, he "centraltendencies" f their xpressionare notdifferentromwhatwe experiencen the West.CONSTRUING, INTERPRETING, OR DEFINING THE SITUATIONAccordingo social constructionistshe normative eterminationf emo-tionsdoes not occurautomatically.omethingntervenes etween eelingrule and feeling,pecifically, stimulus ituationwhichmust be con-strued, nterpreted,r defined.

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American ournal f SociologyOn thispoint, hott xplicitlydoptsa symbolicnteractionistrienta-tion,which focuses n the actor'sdefinitionsnd interpretationsnd on

theemergent,onstructedharacter . . of an emotion" Shott 1979, p.1320). Averill 1980, pp. 309-10), too,takesthesymbolicnteractionistposition: The experiencef emotionnvolves n interpretationf one'sown behavior," nd "theobjectof an emotions dependent ponan in-dividual's ppraisalof the situation . . a meaning mposed n theen-vironment-a ognitive onstruction,o to speak."Hochschild 1979, p. 566), on the otherhand, ntroduceshenotion f"'framing ules' . . according o whichwe ascribedefinitionsrmeaningstosituations. or example,n individual an define he ituation f gettingfired s yet another nstance f capitalists' buse of workers r as yetanother esultof personalfailure."Elsewhere: A situation such as afuneral) ften arrieswith t a proper efinitionf itself 'this is a timeof facing oss'). This official rame arrieswith t a senseof what t isfittingo feel (sadness)" (1979, p. 563).Hence social constructionistsgreethat the situationmustbe definedor construed efore n emotion an be experienced. nlythemost un-reconstructedehavioristwould disagree. But questions remain:Howshoulda science of emotions escribe ituations?s there systematicway to do so? Ought he ociology f emotions ttempt o define ituationsbeforehand,ticly Pike 1967), so that emotions re predictable? anwe assumethat actorsare capable of definingituationsn a standardway,so that,regardless f who the actor s, if a situation s definedna certainway,one andonlyone emotionwill be experienced?Social constructionistsppeartopartcompanyn these uestions. romtheapparent mplication f "framing ules,"we may gather hat Hoch-schildwould accept a predictable et of emotions,f the framing ules(and the feeling ules whichgo withthem) were known. hott, n theotherhand, appearsto follow radically diographic erspective,s herfrequent itations f Blumer how. (Blumer [1962] is acknowledged obe the majorproponent f what might e called the "indeterminacyrin-ciple" in the analysisof humanaction. Because of the emergent atureof action and emotion,we presumably annot know thembeforehand.)Yet, if emotions ependon the interpretationf the situation, t seemsthat all who define he situation imilarly ughtto experience he sameemotion. he problem,npart, omesdown o whether r not t is possibleto have a standard et of categories or defining ituationswhichwilllinkthem ogically nd empirically ith motions.The social constructionistsave not provided his.A fainthintof sucha scheme s given by Hochschildn the notions f blame-in, lame-out,etc.,citedabove. But thesedo notconstitute comprehensiveet, nor sthere ny attempt o articulate hemwithspecific motions. hott,who352



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The Sociology fEmotionsit might e thoughtwouldescheweffortso classify ituations priori,nonethelessoesso. Forexample, uilt s evokedwhen n actor pparentlyconstrueshesituation o meanthat he "commits r contemplatesome'immoral' ction, hentakes the roleof thegeneralized ther or somesignificantther)andaccepts tsperceivedudgmentfoneselfs morallyinadequate" (Shott 1979, p. 1325). Also, "shame is provokedby therealizationhatothers . . consider ne's self eficient, hile mbarrass-ment risesfromwareness hatothers . . viewone'spresentationf selfas inept" Shott1979,p. 1325,emphasisn original).As in the case ofHochschild's ituations, hott'sare ad hoc and incomplete. he socialconstructionistsrovideno overarchingrameworkfsituationsowhichonemay refer orthepredictionf emotions.The positivist iewpoints thatforheuristic urposes useful lassi-ficatoryystem fsituations oesexist. t stems rom multitudinousetof observationsf actors n differentituationsudging ach other's c-tions, r beingratedby observers. he evidencefora delimitedet ofsituational ategoriess trulympressive,nd it is importanto note thatno contradictoryvidence as beenoffered.I am referringereto the iteraturereviewed xtensivelyn Kemper[1978b]) that identifieswo dimensions f relationshipn interactionsettings. hese have beenvariouslyabeled, as maybe seen in table 1,buttheunderlyingelational hemes re coercive ontrol fone actorbyanother,nd positive ocial relations, r power nd status, s theyweredescribedbove.

TABLE 1POWER AND STATUS FACTORS AND THEIR SOURCES

Power Status SourceIndividualprominence Sociability Carter 1954)and achievementAssertiveness Likeability Borgatta,Cottrell, ndMann (1958);Borgatta 1964)Authoritarianontrol Hostility-rejection Zuckerman t al. (1958)Control Affection Schutz (1958)Autonomy s. control Love vs. hostility Schaefer 1959)Dominance-submission Hostility-affection Laforge in Foa 1961)Dominance Friendliness Burkeand Bennis 1961)Psychological utonomy Acceptancevs. rejection Schaefer1961)vs.psychologicalontrolControl Affection Lorrand McNair (1963)Power Leader-memberelations Fiedler 1964)Interpersonal eprivation Interpersonaleeking Longabaugh 1966)Unacceptabletechniques Acceptabletechniques Marwelland Schmitt(1967)Equal vs. unequal Friendly s. competitive Wish,Deutsch,andand hostile Kaplan (1976)Power Status Myers 1977)

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American ournal f SociologyAlthoughhepower ndstatusdimensionsave emergedn recent earsas a result f systematic bservation f interaction,hey re notnew in

theanalysis f human ction.The earliestknown ersion f thesedimen-sions is found n the work of the pre-Socratic reek philosopher m-pedocles,who postulated wo dynamicforces n the universe, amely,love and strife Cleve 1969). These can easily be assimilated o statusand power, espectively.reud ([1937] 1959,pp. 349-50), in fact,de-clared that Empedocleswas his "great predecessor," or ove and strife(status and power) are also akin to Freud's own eros and thanatos. hetwo-dimensional odelof social relations as found upportnot only nstudiesof small groups nd in the clinicalworkof Freud,but in cross-culturalwork s well.Triandis 1972, p. 270) found hat uperordination-subordinationpower) and intimacy status) were the "fundamentali-mensions f human social behavior that are obtained with differentmethods f human nvestigation."n a science with few generalizationsthat hold up across time nd space,the two-dimensional odelof socialrelationss a significantxception.Because of the compelling ature of the model, many authorsnowemploy t as an organizing ramework or observation r analysis, n-cludingWinch 1958), Couch (1960), Brim t al. (1962), Straus 1964),Cancian (1964), Pepitone 1964), Mishler nd Waxler (1968), Carson(1969), Boulding 1970), Triandis 1972), Swenson 1973), and Benja-min 1974), among thers. mith-Lovin1979) has shown ow thepowerand statusdimensionsre cognatewith hebasicdimensionsfthe eman-ticdifferential.There can be no ultimateguarantee hat the power-statusmodel scorrect.As with all models t can serve only heuristically,n this caseto bringunder ne conceptual mbrella he full rangeof possibledefini-tions, nterpretations,nd constructionsf relational ituations or thepurpose funderstandingmotions.The power-statuspproach llows the analystto predict, orexample,that f an actor construes,efines,r interpretsn interactionalutcomeas a gainof status for elf (one is better iked,more ppreciated,morerewarded, tc., in any of the vast number f culturally pecific tatuscurrencies y which uch mprovementsf status re payable), the actorwill experience certainemotion, sually happiness Kemper 1978b).The actorwillexperiencehis motion ecausehappinesss directlyvoked.No feeling ule forhappiness s necessary ccording o the positivist p-proach,once the actor has construed he relational ituation s statusgain forhimself.Couldit happen that theactor s not happywhen tatusgainoccurs?Yes, if the actor expectedmore tatus gain than was actually ttained;orifthestatusgainedwas from personow nhishierarchyfsalience;354



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The Sociology f Emotionsor fat the ametimehegained tatus, e also learned hathis childmaybe fatally ll; or if someonehe was competing ithgained even morestatus thanhe did, and so on.What s importantbout these eeming xceptionso thegeneralizationabout tatusgain eading o happiness s that,while heymodifyheemo-tional outcome, heydo so only by enlarging he relational anvas, n-cluding ther ctors, ther elationships,he previous istory f therela-tionship in the form f expectations), nd the ike. But in all cases,therelational lassificatoryrameworkf power nd statusremains he same.Hence, social constructionistsre no moredevoted o the problem f de-fining nd interpretingituations han are positivists. he differencesthat,while the constructionists erelydeclare the importancef doingso, positivistsffer oolsfor he task,whichmakespossible hepredictionofparticular motions rom articular ocial relational utcomesKemper1978b).CULTURE IN THE STUDY OF EMOTIONSThe argument eveloped hus far might eem to denyculture nd normsa seriousrole in the production f emotions.Nothing ould be furtherfrom he truth. he positivist osition ccepts hatthere re feeling ules,and that theserules vary by culture.But culture ontributeso theun-derstandingf emotions ifferentlyrom he way social constructionistsbelieve t does. Feeling rules are interestingnly afterthe fact, so tospeak, when there s a felt need to manage feelingsn a moresuitabledirection. ulture, owever, lays a crucialrole n the generationfau-thenticnot managed) emotionsn the first lace. It does this n severalways.

First, ulture-via norms,models, tc.-prescribes hepower nd statusrights nd deserts f actors n differentelationships,nd the tolerablelimits f theserights. or example, t says thatparentsmay spank theirchildren, ut a strangermaynot; that n employermay fire recalcitrantworker ut not put him n chains; that spouses houldhonor ach otheruntildeath; that pupils n a classroom houldmake an efforto answerquestionswhen alled on by teachers; nd thatpartners oa business ealwhose terms re specified y contract re not obligated o inquire bouteachother's amilies. hese are all instances f the way nwhich ulturalprescriptionspecify hedegree f status nd power hat ctors n specificrelationshipswe, deserve, r are permitted is-a-vis ach other.Hoch-schild's 1979) "framing ules" are of this character. iolation f thesecultural rescriptionsn thepower-statusomain roduces motions, hileconformityroducesyet other motions.f there s a feeling ulethatspecifies he emotion,t is there nly after he fact, s Hochschild 1979,

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American ournal f Sociologyp. 562) recognizes,hat s, after he actual power-statuselationshiporviolation f its culturally pecified onditions)has alreadyevoked theauthentic motion.ndividualswho fail to experiencehe emotions suallyevoked n a givenrelationship ay become ware of a feeling ule,but nfact they are sensing hat thepower-statuseatures f the relationshiparenotfollowinghe culturallyrescribed attern or hatrelationship.A second mportantontributionf culture o the productionf emo-tions s that it specifies hepowerand status relational ignificancefoccasions. he pageantryf a royal oronation r of the funeral f a na-tional eader s directed oward voking he important ower nd statusimplicationsf the throne r officeust vacatedin death,but which sagain immediately illed.The very great effort o arouse emotions ymusic, olorful nd rich ttire, hythmicatterns f marchingy massedgroups fparticipantssoldiers, hildren arrying lags, tc.) is directedtoward nhancinghe enseofpower nd status f the figure ho s eitherbeginningr ending is publiccareer.A sense of reverence,we,majestyis generated ecausethese ccasions re of great ignificanceor hepowerand status system f the society, nd because,as a consequence, hetechnologyfemotional xcitations brought ully o bear (Collins1975,p. 59).A thirdmportantontributionfculture oemotionss that t specifiesthepower ndstatus ignificancef concrete ehaviorsnd objects.Thus,in Western ocieties, o dress nblack s to signifyoss,one's ownchangedstatus.To sendflowerss to signify ffection,heelevated tatus/regardonehas fortheother.To raisethethird ingerf one'shand to anotheris to signify isdain nd contempt, power ct designed o indicate helow status n which ne holdsthe other. n the famous xample iscussedby Hall (1959), Latin Americanspproachverynearto one to indicatefriendshipnd interest, hileNorthAmericans equiremuchgreater is-tance forthe acceptance f suchstatus-enhancingentimentsrom ela-tive trangers.ultural ariabilitys greatest t the evelofbehaviorsndobjects.Yet underlyinghevariabilitys the fact thatany particular e-havior r object erves o indicate culturally efinedevel ofpower ndstatus in a relationship ith others. t would be heuristicallybsurdto adopt the view that behaviors nd objects do not have relationalsignificance.While theactors, ccasions, ehaviors,nd objects re the stuffut ofwhich ituationsre definednd constructed,he positivistpproachtoemotions nderstandsll these n their ower-statuselationalignificance.Thus knowingheculture llows one to interprethe behavior fothers,todefineituations,nd topredict motions.Withthese deas in place,we may ook nowat Durkheim's iscussionof mourningcited by Hochschild1979, p. 566) for ts bearing n the356



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The Sociology of Emotionsconstructionistargument. Durkheim ([1915] 1965, p. 442) writes:"Mourning is not the spontaneous expressionof individual emotions. Ifrelationsweep, lament, mutilate themselves, t is not because they feelthemselves personally affectedby the death of theirkinsman. Of courseit may be that in certain particularcases, the chagrinexpressedis reallyfelt."Here Durkheim distinguishesbetween those who experienceauthenticemotionsof grief and a largerportionwho put on theirgriefby actingas if they were truly affected.The latter appear to be respondingto asocial norm for feeling (although, given Durkheim's description,we cansee that it is a norm forenactingthe behavioral accompaniments f griefratherthan for feeling an emotion). Why do they do this? AccordingtoDurkheim ([1915] 1965, p. 443):

It is a duty mposedby thegroup.One weeps,not simplybecausehe issad, but because he is forced o weep. It is a ritual ttitudewhichhe isforced o adoptout ofrespect orcustom . . independentfhis affectivestate.Moreover, hisobligations sanctioned y mythical r socialpenal-ties.... Therefore,n order o squarehimselfwithusage,a man some-timesforces earsto flowby artificialmeans.We see here that while sadness is enjoined, all that is actually requiredis the simulacrumof sadness. One's emotions, xcept perhaps fear of sanc-tions for nonperformance,may remain relativelyuntouched. Durkheim([1915] 1965, p. 446) continues,however:

An individual . . if he feelsstronglyttached o thesociety f whichheis a member, eels that he is morally eld to be participatingn its sor-rows nd joys; not to be interestedn themwouldbe equivalent o break-ingthebonds uniting im to thegroup; it wouldbe renouncingll desirefor t and contradictingimself.Here we have a somewhat different ase, since the mourner now startswith an emotion of loyalty to society and a "desire" forattachment.Whatfollowsthen s behavior that conforms o society's (i.e., one's own) wishesin the given instance, namely, to put on the mourningface, even thoughthe loss is not personal. Though attenuated, it is nonetheless one's ownloss, because it is society's loss. In this sense, in small societies, whole-hearted commitmentto one's group engenders a true emotion, thoughprobably of lesser intensitythan for immediate kin, whenever a memberof that small group dies. Durkheim ([1915] 1965, p. 446) has a furtherpoint to make that bears on the argument:

Whenthe Christian, uring he ceremonies ommemoratinghe Passion,and theJew, n the anniversaryf the fall of Jerusalem,ast and mortifythemselves,t is not in givingway to a sadness whichthey feel sponta-neously.Under thesecircumstances,he internal tate of the believer sout of all proportiono thesevere bstinences o which hey ubmit hem-357



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American ournal f Sociologyselves.f he is sad, t is primarilyecause e consentsobeing ad,andhe consentso do it in order o affirmis faith. he attitude f theAustralianuring ournings tobeexplainedn the ameway.f heweepsand groans,t snotmerelyo expressn individualhagrin;t is toful-fill duty f which he urroundingociety oesnot failto remindim.

Taken at face value (see Hochschild 979, p. 566) this seemsto affirmthe normative eterminationf the emotions f thebelieversnd mourn-ers. ndeed,without orms o prescribehebehavior, o formalized ourn-ingbehaviorwould akeplace,no ritualwouldbe enacted.However, itual,arouses emotions ot presentbefore ts enactment.Whatever parkofingbehaviorwould akeplace,no ritualwouldbe enacted.However, itualand the emotion roused may not be theputativedesideratumf theoccasion (e.g., sorrow t a funeral r recollectionf a tragichistoricaloccurrence).n fact,the net resultof enactingmourning ituals s tomakethe mournerseelgood:

The foundationfmournings the mpressionf a loss which hegroupfeels .. which esultsnbringingndividualsogether.. . Of coursetheyhaveonly ad emotionsn common,ut communicatingn sorrowis still ommunicating,nd every ommunionnmind,nwhateverormit may e made, aises he ocialvitality.... This surplus nergyffacesthemore ompletelyhe ffectsfthe oss. . . Presentlyne topsmourn-ing, ndhe does so because f the mourningtself. Durkheim1915)1965, p. 447-48]

Thus, whether r not one is a primarymourner ith uthentic motionsof sadness,participationn the mourning ites nd ceremonies nergizesthegroup fwhich ne s a member nd thereby ives omforto the truemourners hile arousing he authentic motions f communionnd sol-idarity mong ll, even thosewith lesser orrow.Perhaps ociety s too smart o expect hat njunctions o feela givenemotionwillbe, or can be, followed. t is just smart nough,however,to recognize hat f the social organizationalnd social relational ondi-tions re met, he desired motions ill flow f themselves,uthentically.And t is these onditionshat re framed s rules.CONCLUSIONSocial constructionistshostudyemotions ave sought o explainemo-tionsby social rules for feeling. n this theyhave been too ambitious,since genuine eeling esults rom real, anticipated,magined, r recol-lected outcomes f social relationships"Kemper 1978a, p. 32, cited nShott1979,p. 1318). Additionally,he empirical ata do not support heconstructionistheory hatradically etaches motions rom hysiologicalunderpinnings.n the otherhand, social constructionistsave correctly358



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The Sociology f Emotionsidentified he requirementhat actors dentify he relationshipnd itsoutcomebefore n emotionwill be felt. But here they have not beenambitious nough, or heyhave failed o explainhow actorsdo that.The positivist pproach o emotions ccepts n importantinkbetweensocial relational onditions hat evoke emotions nd the typesof physio-logical response hat produce specific motional eactions. hough thedata are not conclusive n thispoint, here s an open doorherefor deasand research o pass in bothdirections,ltimatelyo build a sociophysiol-ogy.The positivist lso acceptswhat Hochschild 1979, p. 553) calls the"organismicpproach" o emotions,nwhich motions re "automaticallytriggered"p. 554) once the ocial stimulus, roperly efined ythe ctor,is in place. This approach s primaryn the studyof emotions,ince texplains he authentic eelings f individuals egardless f whetherheysquare with ocial conventions, ithwhatother eople re feeling,rwithwhat one felton the ast similar ccasion.Positivists nderstand he n-terestn social rulesforfeelings ut see the rules s epiphenomenal.vensocial constructionistsnderstand hat the rules do not directly roduceemotions;whatdoes produce hem s to create, ctually r imaginatively,the socialorganizationalr social relational onditions hatdirectly vokefeelings. inally, ositivists ccept the need to define nd interpretitua-tionsbefore he emotion an be experienced. iththepower-status odel,they ffern empiricallyerived ormulationf social relationalituationsthat re intimatelyinkedwith motions.REFERENCESAverill,JamesR. 1980. "A Constructivist iew of Emotions."Pp. 305-39 in TheoriesofEmotion,edited by Robert Plutchik nd HenryKellerman.New York: AcademicPress.Barnard, Chester I. 1946. "Functions and Pathology of Status Systemsin FormalOrganizations."Pp. 46-83 in Industry and Society, edited by William F. Whyte.New York: McGraw-Hill.Benjamin,Lorna S. 1974. "StructuralAnalysisof Social Behavior."PsychologicalRe-view 81 (September): 392-425.Blumer,Herbert.1962. "Society as Symbolic nteraction."Pp. 179-97 in Human Be-haviorand Social Processes: An Interactionist pproach, dited by ArnoldM. Rose.Boston: HoughtonMifflin.Borgatta,Edgar F. 1964. "The Structure f PersonalityCharacteristics." ehavioralScience9 (January): 8-17.Borgatta,Edgar F., Leonard S. Cottrell, nd John H. Mann. 1958. "The SpectrumofIndividual InteractionCharacteristicsnd Interdimensional nalysis."PsychologicalReports (Monograph Supplement ) 4:279-319.Boulding,Kenneth E. 1970.A Primerfor Social Dynamics.New York: Free Press.Brim,Orville G., Jr., David C. Glass, David E. Lavin, and Norman Goodman. 1962.Personality nd DecisionProcesses.Stanford,Calif.: StanfordUniversity ress.Burke, Richard L., and Warren G. Bennis. 1961. "Changes of Perception of Self andOthersduringHuman RelationsTraining."Human Relations 14 (May): 165-82.

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Positivist Approaches to Emotion