Political Reflection Vol. 2 | No. 3

Published by the Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)

ISS

N 2

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Post-Gaddafi

Reconstruction in Libya

By Prof. Alpaslan Özerdem

Libya: Human Security

Challenges

By Prof. Alan Hunter

The Mistral Warship Deal:

What’s in for France and

Russia?

By Dr. Richard Rousseau

Rebuilding a ‘New’

Libya & Implications for

International Politics

By Dr. Ayla Göl

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4

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

September-October-November 2011 POLITICAL REFLECTION

Contents

World Stories 7

Notable Quotes 9

Africa Review

Post-Gaddafi: Reconstruction of Libya

By Prof. Alpaslan Özerdem

12

Libya: Human Security Challenges

By Prof. Alan Hunter

18

Rebuilding a „New‟ Libya & Implications for

International Politics

By Dr. Ayla Göl

22

Interview

Interview with José-María Siles

By Ali Onur Özçelik

27

Eurasia Review

Bhutan Cements Its Democracy

By Dr. Paul Richardson

33

Afghanistan after a Decade:

Progress and Challenges Ahead

By Dinoj Kumar Upadhyay

36

"Waves" of the Russia's Presidential Reforms Break

About Premier's "Energy-Rocks"

By Dr. Zurab Garakanidze

41

Commentary

A New War on Terror?

By Dr. Azeem Ibrahim

51

23

33

22

27

Commentary

53


What’s in for France and Russia?

By Assoc. Prof. Richard Rousseau

59

Caucasus Review

60

Russia-Georgia Relations:

Among Illusions and Visions By Zaur Shiriyev

China Review

65

Conflict in the ‘South China Sea’: Lessons from

the Dene peoples and the Arctic Conflict?

By Dr. Jean-Paul Gagnon

62

72 The Missing Leader

By Nicholas Miller

Interview

75 Interview with Dr. Alexandros Nafpliotis

By K. Kaan Renda

Global City Analysis

83

NAIROBI: “needs to feel the positive effects of

globalisation…”

By Fatih Eren

Film Review

89 What is so Good About The Sopranos?

By Enes Erbay

71

92 Recent Books 75

39

83

September-October-November 2011 POLITICAL REFLECTION

Contents

75

65

United Kingdom A number of British cities were hit by rioting and loo-ting. The trouble started in an area of north London, when a peaceful protest over the shooting by police

of a black suspect turned violent. Gangs of youths took ad-vantage of the situation to commit severe looting and arson throughout London. The lawlessness soon spread to other cities. After police were criticised for yielding control of the streets to thugs, David Cameron returned from his holiday and promised a robust response. (13.08.2011)

Egypt The trial of Hosni Mubarak, Egypt‘s former president, began in Cairo. Charged with corruption and ordering the killing of protesters, he was car-ried into court at a police academy on a stretcher—and pleaded not guilty. Mr Mubarak‘s sons, Alaa and Gamal, a former interior minister and six offici-als of the former regime are all on trial at the same time. (07.08.2011)

Norway Norway suffered its worst peacetime atrocity. Anders Behring Breivik, a far-right extremist, shot dead at least 68 people at a political youth camp run by the ruling Labour Party and set off a car bomb in central Oslo that killed at least eight others. He was arrested and admitted to the killings. A long document that he posted on the in-ternet hours before the massacre sug-gested he had been motivated by anti-Muslim hatred and the establish-ment‘s liberal stance on immigration. (28.07.2011)

Argentina Mauricio Macri, a conservative, was re-elected as mayor of Buenos Aires, winning 64% of the vote to 36% for his oppo-nent, a supporter of Argenti-na‘s president, Cristina Fernández. Mr Macri‘s victory followed a similar defeat for the president‘s candidate in Sante Fé province, arousing hopes among the opposition that Ms Fernández may find it harder than it seemed to win a second term in October‘s pre-

sidential election. (05.08.2011)

WORLD STORIES | By Aksel Ersoy

7


Horn of Africa The UN‘s World Food Programme sent food to Somalia‘s ca-pital, Mogadishu, in an effort to save the lives of people hit by drought in the Horn of Africa. Aid agencies estimate that 3.7m people in Somalia and millions of others in Djibouti,

Ethiopia and Ken-ya are close to starvation. At a meeting in Rome officials said the UN had received about $1 billion for emergency relief since No-vember but nee-ded $1 billion mo-re by the end of the year. (25.07.2011)

United Kingdom There were more casual-ties in the pho-ne-hacking scandal in Bri-tain. Rebekah Brooks, chief executive of News Internati-

onal and Les Hinton, a close aide to Rupert Murdoch, both resigned; Mrs Brooks was later arrested. As attention turned to the Metropolitan Police‘s bungled handling of the affair, two of its most senior officers quit. On July 19th Mr Murdoch, his son James and Mrs Brooks faced questioning from a parliamentary committee. They batted away their gentle interrogators, for the most part, but Mr Murdoch (senior) was less lucky when an interloper attac-ked him with a plateful of shaving foam. (20.07.2011)

Somalia The UN declared a famine in two regions of Somalia, the first for 19 years. Tens of thousands of refu-gees are attempting to flee to ne-ighbouring Kenya and Ethiopia in search of help. The UN secretary-general, Ban Ki-moon, appealed to donor countries for $300m in aid over the next two months. An esti-mated 11m people are affected by the worst droughts in east Africa in several decades. (18.07.2011)

Canada After five years of minority go-vernment, the Conservative Party won a parliamentary ma-jority in Canada‘s federal elec-tion. The centrist Liberals lost more than half their seats, and were replaced as the official opposition by the leftist New Democrats. Quebec‘s separatist Bloc Quebecois lost 90% of its seats and was nearly eliminated from Parliament. (05.05.2011)

Palestine At least 14 protesters were shot when Palestini-ans sought to cross Israel‘s borders with Leba-non, Syria, the West Bank and Gaza. The de-monstrators were marking the day of the naqba, or catastrophe, the term Palestinians use for Israel‘s birth in 1948. Binyamin Netanya-hu, Israel‘s prime minister, said his country‘s so-vereignty had to be defended. (20.05.2011)

8


WORLD STORIES | By Aksel Ersoy

Com

pile

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ksel E

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iffe

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orld N

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es

Italy Silvio Berlus-coni‘s ruling People of Fre-edom party took a drub-bing in local elections in some of Italy‘s cities. The biggest blow was the failu-re of Letizia Moratti, the major of Mi-lan, Italy‘s fi-nancial capital and Mr Berlus-coni‘s native city, to secure

re-election. (16.05.2011)

Quotes Notable

“We do not see the Syria issue as a foreign prob-

lem. The Syria issue is our internal problem be-

cause we have an 850-kilometer-long border

with Syria; we have family and historical and

cultural bonds with Syria. Therefore, the inci-

dents there do not allow us to simply stand by.

We have to listen to the voices coming from there

and have to do something about it. … Our pa-

tience is reaching its limit, and for that I am sen-

ding the foreign minister to Syria on Tuesday.

He will conduct the necessary talks there. Our

determined messages will be clearly conveyed to

them. What happens after that will be shaped

according to their response and actions."

- Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said before Davutog-lu‘s trip to Damascus.

“British officials should stop meddling in ot-

her people's affairs and instead worry about

their own. Instead of interfering in others' af-

fairs in Afghanistan, Iraq and attacking Lib-

ya, they should deal with their own people."

-After the riots experienced in several signi-

ficant cities in the UK, the president of Iran

Mr. Mahmud Ahmadinejad said.

By Rahman Dağ

“We learned that the United States received a

downgrade by one of the credit rating agencies — not

so much because they doubt our ability to pay

our debt if we make good decisions, but because

after witnessing a month of wrangling over raising

the debt ceiling, they doubted our political

system’s ability to act. The markets, on the

other hand, continue to believe our credit status is

AAA.”

- One of the ratings agency, the Standard &

Poor‘s reduced the credit rating of the United Sta-

tes from AAA to AA+. On this issue, the president of

the United States made a statement and said that.

9


http://abcnews.go.com/US/debt-ceiling-compromise-reached-us-lose-credit-rating/story?id=14181438

Quotes Notable

By Rahman Dağ What do you want? Do you want me to sell

the Peloponnese?

- Papandreou's statement at eurozone

summit . - Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr has publis-

hed a statement calling for US forces to

return home and said:

"Know that we will resist and struggle firmly

and strongly as before, until you leave our land,

even as you would resist and struggle if your

country were exposed to invasion."

- In an interview with the Izvestia newspaper

Russia's NATO envoy, Dmitry Rogozin said:

“NATO is planning a military campaign against

Syria to help overthrow the regime of President

Bashar al-Assad with a long-reaching goal of

preparing a beachhead for an attack on Iran....

The noose around Iran is tightening. Military

planning against Iran is underway. And we are

certainly concerned about an escalation of a lar-

ge-scale war in this huge region"

10


JOURNAL OF

GLOBAL ANALYSIS

Interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary, peer-reviewed academic journal

by CESRAN (Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis)

www.cesran.org/jga

ISSN: 2041-1944

Columbia International Affairs Online (CIAO)

Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ)

EBSCO Publishing Inc.

EconPapers

IDEAS

Index Islamicus

International Bibliography of Book Reviews of

Schorlarly Literature in the Humanities and Social Sci-

ences (IBR)

International Bibliography of Periodical Literature in

the Humanities and Social Sciences (IBZ)

International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)

International Relations and Security Network (ISN)

Lancaster Index to Defence & International Security

Literature

Research Papers in Economics (RePEc)

Social Sciences Information Space (SOCIONET)

Ulrich’s Periodicals Directory

Abstracting/Indexing

O n 19 August 2011, Abdel Hafiz Ghoga,

Vice-Chairman of National Transition

Council (NTC), the rebel group fighting

against the Colonel Gaddafi regime in

Libya announced that ‗The zero hour has started. The

rebels in Tripoli have risen up.‘ This was followed by

important gains made by the rebels in the second

part of August, taking control of strategically impor-

tant coastal cities of Zlitan and Zawiya. However, re-

ferring to the rebels in the capital, Tripoli, ‗Those rats

were attacked by the masses tonight and we elimina-

ted them‘, Gaddafi said [1]. The civil uprising in Libya

against the government forces have been struggling

to make a decisive impact for a victory since Febru-

ary, even though it has been enjoying the military

support of NATO since 19 March 2011. The last five

months were in fact, an environment of a total mili-

tary stalemate between the Gaddafi regime and NTC.

With the aerial support of NATO against Gaddafi for-

ces, the rebels have been fighting over key coastal

cities between their ‗capital‘ city of Benghazi in the

east and Tripoli in the west, taking control of them,

but then losing them to Gaddafi forces, and then

fighting over them again. Nevertheless, as of 24 Au-

gust, the NTC forces are already in Tripoli and Gadda-

fi‘s Bab al-Aziziya compound was overrun by the re-

bels. On the other hand, Gaddafi vowed ‗death or

victory‘ in his fight against NTC and he is believed to

be somewhere in Libya [2]. Is this the end of Gaddafi?

Jonathan Marcus, BBC Diplomatic and Defence Cor-

respondent, questioning the latest NTC gains around

Tripoli as a possible beginning of the end for the Lib-

yan conflict, adopts a cautious position by pointing

out that ‗up to now the rebel fighters have often

shown little military momentum, their advances eva-

porating almost as quickly as they are made. [3]‘

The importance of being cautious about the outcome

of the Libya conflict is something that the author of

this article knows only too well, as I claimed and in

fact, hoped that Gaddafi would follow the footsteps

of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia and Hosni Muba-

rak of Egypt in one of my previous Political Reflection

articles. It was still the early days of ‗Arab Spring‘ then,

and I wrote: ‗Gaddafi was still clinging to power, but

probably not for very long before that he is consig-

Post-Gaddafi Reconstruction of Libya

By Prof. Alpaslan Özerdem*

AFRICA REVIEW AFRICA REVIEW

12


ned to the bloody pages of history as the third dicta-

tor in North Africa, who was removed from power in

February 2011. [4]‘ Five months later, Gaddafi is not in

power but his fight is still not over either, and there-

fore adopting a more cautious line of prediction this

time, I would bear in mind a number of other possibi-

lities such as further prolonging of the conflict or the

rebels being forced to reach a political settlement

with Gaddafi. Nevertheless, as the title of this article

suggests, to elaborate the future reconstruction chal-

lenges in Libya, a post-Gaddafi scenario will be taken

as the most likely scenario.

The objective here is also not to outline specific as-

pects of post-conflict reconstruction in Libya, as this

would largely depend on a number of factors such as

how much longer the fighting would continue and

consequently, the level, type and scope of damage

and destruction incurred by the country‘s infrastruc-

ture, economy and societal structures. How the

conflict comes to an end and who would be the

‗victor‘ of the conflict, with what terms and agree-

ments, would also be another key issue, defining the

boundaries of a future post-conflict reconstruction

process. In terms of actors, bearing in mind the NA-

TO‘s current military involvement and Libya‘s oil and

natural gas wealth (the 9h largest proven oil reserves

in the world), it would be safe to claim that there

would be a significant involvement of the internatio-

nal community [5]. However, a victory by NTC would

mean a much greater involvement by the internatio-

nal community in the re-structuring of Libya‘s gover-

nance, security and economic structures. Leading

NATO countries such as the US, UK, France and Tur-

key as well as a number of Gulf countries such as

Qatar and United Arab Emirates with their strong alli-

ance with NTC are likely to play a prominent role in

such a process. In fact, in the formation of the NATO

alliance for the military intervention and decision on

the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973

which paved the way for such an intervention, such

calculations for post-conflict Libya seemed to have

played a key role. For example, Turkey‘s response was

much more hesitant in showing its solidarity to the

popular uprising at the beginning and it was much

conciliatory towards the Gaddafi regime and trying to

distance itself from the NTC. This was largely due to

its strong economic ties with the Libyan regime and

more significantly, because of a large number of Tur-

kish citizens who live in Libya. In fact, it was the lar-

gest evacuation operation Turkey has ever underta-

ken. Around 25,000 of its citizens and thousands of

other nationals were rescued by deploying civilian

ferries and the Turkish navy [6]. However, when Tur-

key realized that a UNSCR to allow a military interven-

tion became inevitable it switched sides and decided

to take part in the NATO-led operation, knowing that

those who take part in the military intervention

would also be the ones deciding on the future of the

country, as was the case in Iraq.

With these general characteristics in mind and based

on recent reconstruction experiences in Kosovo, Ti-

mor Leste, Afghanistan and Iraq, it would be possible

to list a number of challenges and dilemmas that

might also arise in the context of Libya. First, articula-

ting a vision for the future that is shared by all or

most stakeholders can be crucial to the success of

post-conflict reconstruction, as it can mobilise popu-

lations to contribute to the process effectively. Even if

it is a NTC victory that brings the conflict to an end in

Libya, the task of reconstruction would require the

development of collaborative structures of governan-

ce with the participation of actors from all aspects of

societal and political structures of the country, inclu-

ding those who are currently supporting Gaddafi. The

‗victor‘s peace‘ may seem to be easy to implement,

but if it is purely for the purpose of a regime change,

as was the case in Iraq through the de-Ba‘athification

policy, it can result in new devastating conflict dyna-

mics. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq

started the de-Ba‘athification programme in May

2003, two months after the US led ‗victory‘ against

Saddam Hussein, and the goal was to eradicate the

Ba‘ath Party from the Iraqi political system. This invol-

ved the removal of thousands of civil servants, acade-

Post-Gaddafi | By Prof. Alpaslan Özerdem

13


How the conflict comes to an end

and who would be the ‘victor’ of the

conflict, with what terms and agreements,

would also be another key issue, defining

the boundaries of a future post-

conflict reconstruction process.

“

”

mics, politicians, police officers and army personnel

from their posts. This was considered to be an essen-

tial cornerstone for the ‗democratisation‘ of Iraq but

instead it has created a fertile recruiting ground for

the Iraqi insurgency groups, as only with the demobi-

lisation of the Iraqi military, around half a million sol-

diers and officers started to roam the streets of Bagh-

dad - angry, frustrated and unemployed without pen-

sions [7].

It is very likely that a vast range of large and expen-

sive reconstruction projects for destroyed infrastruc-

ture, housing and services and the re-structuring of

security forces might mean the risk of the process

turning into a „contract grabbing‟ exercise among the

leading NATO countries. Differently from post-

conflict environments such as Afghanistan, Timor

Leste or Sierra Leone, Libya has actually got the

means to pay for its own reconstruction. Therefore,

the risk of turning the reconstruction process into a

lucrative exercise for awarding contracts to the inter-

national private contractors without adequate partici-

pation of national and local authorities is very much

there and this could result in programme failures,

long delays in responding to urgent needs, the waste

of scarce resources, and, most dangerously, renewed

violence. This would be particularly important for the

NTC and its allies to have a strong legitimacy in the

eyes of Libyans. The NTC would need to prove that

they are representing the interests of people but not

the international community. Without earning such

legitimacy, the new regime will not be able to devel-

op and sustain an effective governance system in the

country. The Iraq reconstruction experience is full of

appropriate lessons for the importance of national

legitimacy and differently from Iraq the advantage of

NTC in Libya is that it has been fighting its own popu-

lar uprising rather than being installed there by the

international community on the day after the

„victory‟. Again differently from Iraq, the NATO‟s mili-

tary intervention was through aerial bombing and

therefore, there are no foreign troops in Libya. This

would be an advantage for the NTC and the way they

could establish their own legitimacy, as it is less likely

that they would be seen as collaborators of a foreign

invasion. However, this would also mean that they

need to take the control of the existing security appa-

ratus of the country quickly and gain the trust of peo-

ple, as this would be the only way they could protect

their new regime. Nevertheless, with or without

troops, the international community is likely to exert

pressure on NTC for a key role in the reconstruction

of the country. As experience with the contemporary

practice of establishing a vision for reconstruction

shows, such an external role often means leaving too

little space for the inclusion of the views of internal

actors about what they wish to see the reconstruction

process doing, and how it should take place.

The second key issue with the reconstruction of Libya

would be with the nature, speed and scope of trans-

formation and reform that the political, economic

and security realms of the country would be expec-

ted to go through by the new regime and its interna-

tional allies. It is likely that there might be different

national and international dynamics with this and as

the situation would be changing quickly, frequently

and drastically, it would be difficult to make sensible

projections at this stage. However, the most likely

scenario would be the way the international commu-

nity is likely to be using its liberal peace agenda for

the re-structuring of the Libyan state. This would in-

volve its standard programme packages such as

‗democratisation‘, ‗economic liberalisation and priva-

tisation‘, ‗good governance and decentralisation‘ and

‗security sector reform‘. For example, in order to

strengthen the legitimacy of NTC there is likely to be


14


Differently from post-conflict envi-

ronments such as Afghanistan,

Timor Leste or Sierra Leone, Libya has

actually got the means to pay for its own

reconstruction. Therefore, the risk of

turning the reconstruction process into

a lucrative exercise for awarding

contracts to the international private con-

tractors without adequate participation

of national and local authorities is

very much there and this could result

in programme failures, long delays in

responding to urgent needs, the waste

of scarce resources, and, most

dangerously, renewed violence.

“

”

a general election soon after the ‗victory‘ without

having a proper opportunity for the establishment of

other requirements of a well functioning democracy

such as political parties (they have been banned by

the 1972 Prohibition of Party Politics Act Number 71);

a free media (according to the Freedom of Press In-

dex, Libya had the most censored media in the Mid-

dle East and North Africa); systems of checks and bal-

ances; a strong and resourceful civil society engage-

ment (only a small number of NGOs exist but no

trade unions); and ensuring rule of law and legislative

guarantees for the protection of human rights. The

international community has tried to „democratise‟

many war-torn countries through its liberal peace

statebuilding approach before and the result has of-

ten been a fragile democracy trying to deal with the

challenge of insufficient legitimacy. Therefore, it is

important that the reconstruction process itself is

seen as an opportunity for gaining such legitimacy

and for that reconstruction has to be „process-based‟

rather than „goal-based‟.

The new regime has a responsibility to show that the

Libyans are treated like citizens who have not only

duties and responsibilities but also rights. To em-

power them and give them a chance to remove

themselves from the paternalistic and authoritarian

days of Gaddafi, the reconstruction process would

need to question how to deliver and when, as well as

what to deliver. For example, the security sector re-

form is likely to be seen as a priority in order to deal

with the Gaddafi-loyal elements of the military and

police service. After the disastrous Iraqi experience,

there would be no excuse, if the international com-

munity comes up with a ‗de-Gaddafication‘ program-

me, as this would mean an invitation to a protracted

insurgency problem or high levels of crime in the

country. After a civil war of six months, one of the first

peace dividends the people of Libya would naturally

expect is the establishment of security and stability.

Seeing Libya like a blank sheet for reform in all as-

pects of governance, judiciary, economy and security

would likely to be counter-productive. Whatever re-

form is necessary should be undertaken in a gradual

way and a possible ‗de-Gaddafication‘ policy should

be the last thing to consider in Libya. In order to ma-

intain an environment of security and stability, it is

also important to consider that there might be cer-

tain elements of ‗peace-spoilers‘ in the post-conflict

environment. There can be two effective ways of dea-

ling with this possible challenge. First, the victor‘s

peace should not turn into a humiliation exercise for

Gaddafi supporters within the bureaucracy, security

apparatuses and other governance units. Second, a

peaceful settlement with Gaddafi himself and his

support base in terms of different tribes and other

loyal population groups would be the best guarantee

for the sustainability of peace in the country. The

2002 Bonn Agreement for Afghanistan was a victor‘s

reconstruction plan, which excluded the Taliban and

consequently, now almost 10 years later, the war aga-

inst the Taliban continues.

Thanks to its high oil revenues, under the Gaddafi

regime Libya had one of the highest GDP per capita

(approx. $11,300) among North African countries and

more importantly, its small population of around 6.5

million enjoyed an extensive social security system,

particularly in housing and education (Libya has the

highest literacy rate in North Africa – 88.3%) [8]. As a

result of the state social policies the prevalence of

poverty in the country is much lower than in its ne-

ighbours and in fact, such direct benefits from the

state was one of the reasons Gaddafi sustained a

strong support base for his regime. Therefore, it is

important that the reconstruction process is not per-

ceived as taking such state benefits from the popula-

tion as the liberalisation of the economy may de-

mand cuts in welfare systems. Such economic trans-

formation processes with heavy handed structural

adjustment programmes led by the Bretton Woods

institutions have meant the worsening of economic

prospects for war-affected communities around the

world such as Uganda, El Salvador and Cambodia. In

former-Soviet countries and some of former Yugoslav

The international community has

tried to „democratise‟ many war-

torn countries through its liberal peace

statebuilding approach before and the

result has often been a fragile democra-

cy trying to deal with the chal-

lenge of insufficient legitimacy.


15


”

“

republics highly valuable state assets such as key in-

dustrial facilities and access to natural resources such

as mines, oil and natural gas reserves were ended up

in the hands of a few individuals who had strong links

with the ruling political establishment. In Lebanon,

the reconstruction of the Beirut Central District thro-

ugh a shareholder private company created a heavy

debt burden for the entire population. Overall, the

risk with the reconstruction process is that if it is not

guided with well-adjusted economic policies accor-

ding to socio-economic realities of the country, the

experience in Libya could be manipulated for the

benefit of powerful elites within the new regime and

their international supporters. This would be highly

damaging both for the legitimacy of NTC and the

prospects of long-term stability in the country. What

Libya should avoid is the creation of a gap between

‗haves‘ and ‗have nots‘ through its reconstruction

experience, which could provide suitable conditions

for a possible insurgency risk against the new regime.

Finally, with the NTC‘s ‗victory‘ against the Gaddafi

regime, the ‗Arab Spring‘ will be opening a new chap-

ter. It is clear that what has been happening in Libya

over the last six months will have serious ramificati-

ons not only in the Middle East and North Africa but

also around the world. The population paid a heavy

price with a death toll of 20,000 people, but the Gad-

dafi‘s totalitarian regime is now almost over. This

would likely to have a strong resonance in other co-

untries under similar totalitarian regimes! I would

probably be focussing on the reconstruction of Syria

in my next Political Reflection article. However, the

real challenge for NTC is actually starting just now

because all decisions to be made over the next few

months will have huge bearings in the future of the

country. Even small mistakes can have serious im-

pacts in fragile environments, and the regime change

experience taking place in Libya could now turn into

something devastating for the entire population.

Therefore, the post-Gaddafi reconstruction of Libya

would need to be handled with upmost care and ef-

fectiveness by bearing in mind the key issues of legi-

timacy, joined-up vision, national ownership, partici-

pation, reform agenda, empowerment and distribu-

tion of wealth.

Notes:

* Alpaslan Özerdem is Professor of Peacebuilding at

Coventry University.

1)BBC, 2011. ‗Libya conflict: Gaddafi says Tripoli attackers

quashed‘, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-

14606081

2)BBC, 2011a. ‗Defiant Gaddafi ‗Vows to fight‘‘, http://

www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14641572

3)Marcus, Jonathan. 2011. ‗Libyan conflict: Beginning

of the end?‘, BBC News Africa, http://


4)Özerdem, Alpaslan. 2011. ‗Turkey‘s Role in the New

Middle East: CPRS Turkey Research Initiative‘, Politi-

cal Reflection, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp: 26-28. http://

cesran.org/index.php?

op-

tion=com_content&view=article&id=1185&Itemid=

224&lang=en

5)Exclusive Economy. 2011. ‗The World‘s Largest 15

Oil Reserves‘. http://

exclusiveeconomy.com/2011/03/top-15-world-oil-

reserves/

6)Yanatma, Servet. 2011. ‗Turkey Demonstrates Suc-

cessful Evacuation Operations in Libya‘, Today’s Za-

man, 27 February 2011. http://

www.todayszaman.com/

newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=236774

7)Ferguson, Charles. 2008. No End in Sight: Iraq’s Des-

cent into Chaos. New York: Public Affairs.

8)OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2010/2011. http://

www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/

media/downloads/publications/ASB2010_2011.pdf;

UNDP, Human Development Index 2010 Libya.

http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/

LBY.html


16


...with the NTC’s ‘victory’ aga-

inst the Gaddafi regime, the

‘Arab Spring’ will be opening a new

chapter. It is clear that what has been

happening in Libya over the last six

months will have serious ramifications

not only in the Middle East and North

Africa but also around the

world.

“

”

http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/LBY.html

http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/LBY.html

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USA | Birol YESILADA, Prof. Portland State University, USA |

JOURNAL OF

GLOBAL ANALYSIS

H uman Security conceptualisation

analyses the interface between secu-

rity, development and intervention.

Traditionally, ‗security‘ mostly refer-

red to the security of nation-states in the context of

military conflicts with foreign powers. Traditional

concepts of security, protection of national borders,

are certainly still relevant and legally enforceable,

but more sophisticated concepts are needed to res-

pond to security dilemmas in today‘s globalised

world. Global events and trends, particularly since

the late 1980s, have to a great extent transformed

the security agenda. One impetus was the changing

nature of violent conflict, with more evident militari-

zed intra-state, ethnic and religious conflicts. In the

past two decades it became increasingly apparent

that communities are also threatened by environ-

mental destruction – induced both by climate chan-

ge and direct human impacts - forced migration, epi-

demics including HIV/AIDS, and other issues.

In the 1990s, institutions and researchers began to

propose alternatives to the conventional security

agenda. In 1994, the UNDP extended policy debate

using the then new concept of Human Security. The

report set out a broad definition of Human Security,

Libya: Human Security Challenges

By Prof. Alan Hunter*


18


including seven core values: economic security, food

security, health security, environmental security, per-

sonal security (freedom from fear of violence, crime

and drugs), community security (freedom to partici-

pate in family life and cultural activities) and political

security (freedom to exercise one‘s basic human

rights) (United Nations Development Programme

1990-). The main benefit from the conceptualisation

should be that by considering these various aspects

in a coherent way, as interactive and synergistic, in-

terventions would be more effective than dealing

with security on an issue-by-issue basis. Hopefully

new leaders in Libya will be able to address many of

these security dimensions: this paper highlights so-

me of the challenges they will face.

In the 2011 conflict in Libya, many security dilemmas

were apparent: the protection of Libyan civilians, the

security of the regime, whether and how the UN or

NATO should intervene, how to protect or evacuate

foreign citizens and refugees, how to protect food

and medical supplies in the midst of armed conflict.

The was became one of those ‗complex emergen-

cies‘ which often raise legal, military and humanita-

rian issues simultaneously. International law and

practice do not provide clear guidelines on such situ-

ations, and responses can be random, contingent on

a variety of factors.

Political elites are faced with many challenges, but

from the above brief discussion we can highlight

three: threats to national existence, which most likely

emanate from hostile foreign countries, typically ne-

ighbouring ones, who threaten invasion, occupation

or annexation; threats to the regime (a change of

government) or to the political system (for example a

communist insurgency against a pluralist market

economy); and threats to the well-being of the popu-

lation especially vulnerable sectors. The emerging

political apparatus in post-Gaddafi Libya will face all

these challenges, and they are closely related to each

other. The new Libya needs to survive in a ‗tough

neighbourhood‘ where there is always potential for

cross-border military action; the new regime may

face internal challenges for example from Islamists;

and it needs to deliver welfare improvements to its

population. Moreover, it needs to construct a new

constitutional and human rights framework, and to

rapidly expand the technical skills and knowledge

base of its population. Evidently the various aspects

of security are synergistic: a population which sup-

ports the political system and which has a relatively

high level of education and health is better able to

contribute to regime stability and national security.

Relations between Western powers and the Gaddafi

regime were on a roller-coaster for decades. For

many years Gaddafi was demonized and ostracised,

mainly because of his alleged support for a wide ran-

ge of terrorist networks including the IRA, ETA, and

others including those responsible for famous Loc-

kerbie incident. From 2004, however, British Prime

Minister Blair started a process of rapprochement

with the regime and facilitated oil investments and

weapons sales, including Foreign Office approval for

sale of armoured cars and water cannon, despite a

ban on the sale of such weapons that could be used

for internal repression.

From a human security perspective, Gaddafi‘s Libya

was in fact a relatively successful state in many res-

pects. In 2009, Libya enjoyed the third highest Gross

National Income per capita and the highest human

development index in Africa. In the UNDP Human

Development Index it ranked in the ‗High‘ category,

alongside countries like Argentina and Malaysia (and

interestingly close to another demonized country,

19


Libya | By Prof. Alan Hunter

For many years Gaddafi

was demonized and ost-

racised, mainly because

of his alleged support for a wide

range of terrorist networks inclu-

ding the IRA, ETA, and others

including those res-

ponsible for famous

Lockerbie incident.

“

”

Cuba); and far better than its neighbours Morocco

and Algeria. This position was achieved, somewhat

as Iraq under Saddam Hussein, by an extensive social

welfare system and other public goods paid for by oil

revenues. Partly no doubt as a consequence of the

rapprochement, it was also experiencing a reasonab-

le GDP growth rate of some 7%. It had also announ-

ced a plan to reform its higher education and scien-

tific research systems through a US$9 billion, five-

year investment programme in collaboration with

the UK and France.

Foreign investment did face some restrictions, but

two new major players – China and Turkey – invested

heavily in Libya, especially in the construction sector

for large infrastructure projects. Libya looked very

attractive for future resource acquisition, holding an

estimated ninth highest oil reserves in the world and

the second highest natural gas reserves in Africa.

Only around 25% of the country‘s surface area has

been explored, meaning that huge potential for

growth.

In short, the Human Security challenges facing the

regime and the population were not those typical of

desperate poverty. The state provided free health

care and education, though quality was often low.

Rather, the population was acutely aware of injusti-

ces, inequalities, corruption and tyranny: a human

rights crisis perhaps, rather than a human security

one.

A factor contributing to the complexity of governan-

ce and modernisation is the prevalence of clan loyal-

ties, which are often stronger than civil society or

state institutions. These may also overlap with the

patron-client networks typical of the bureaucratic

economy. One of the largest tribes, the Warfallah,

dominate West Libya, while Gaddafi‘s own tribe the

Qaddahfa, although small, hold the high positions in

security and military units. Much of southern Libya is

controlled by Tuareg Berbers who until now have

helped transfer mercenaries from Sub-Saharan Africa

to protect the regime.

Yet another factor to consider is the confirmed pre-

sence in Libya of Islamist fundamentalists, appa-

rently including many jihadis who fought against the

Western military in Iraq and Afghanistan. There have

in fact been allegations that the CIA funded Al-Qaeda

to destabilise the Gaddafi regime, and that now the-

re are significant numbers of jihadist groups who will

be looking for space in the new order. We may presu-

me they represent different points on the spectrum

from those who want a global jihad; those who want

sharia law in Libya; and those who want an democra-

tic polity but one which explicitly recognises Islam

as the national religion.

In terms of business, the market was completely do-

minated by state-owned enterprises, who were noto-

rious for providing jobs for cronies, and out-sourcing

major infrastructure work to foreign companies.

There was little opportunity for Libyan private com-

panies to get access to finance, contracts, or permits.

Jobs usually went to foreign migrant workers: it was

estimated that while the population of Libya was

only around 6.5 million, the country was host to so-

me 2.5 million foreign workers, of whom 1.5 million

were from Sub-Saharan Africa. Meanwhile Libyan

youth received some basic education but few profes-

sional skills, and were largely excluded from employ-

ment. They evidently formed a large body of frustra-

ted talent with serious hostility towards the regime.

20



Libya looked very

attractive for future

resource acquisition,

holding an estimated ninth

highest oil reserves in the world

and the second highest natural

gas reserves in Africa. Only aro-

und 25% of the country’s surface

area has been explo-

red, meaning that hu-

ge potential for growth.

“

”

Parallel issues were the lack of opportunities for wo-

men, and disregard for environmental protection.

Most obviously, there was absolutely no space for

political opposition, nor any prospect of reform un-

der the Gaddafi family dictatorship.

In tandem with clan dominance and state-owned

enterprise, corruption was a pervasive feature of life,

with Libya ranking 130 in the global index for cor-

ruption compiled by Transparency International in

2009. This suggests that Libya was far worse than its

peer countries in the Human Development Index,

and closer to those which have chronic severe un-

der-development.

Can Human Security conceptualisation contribute

anything to understanding the issues to be faced by

the new regime? As we have seen, unlike the vast

majority of post-conflict countries, Libya has the

natural resources and hence potential finance to

construct a well-developed nation. However, it will

need extremely careful management, dynamic and

responsible leadership from the new regime. To

avoid the kind of chaos that devastated Iraq the ur-

gent priorities are:

Stabilization, transitional government and

demilitarization

Care for victims of conflict and refugees

Implementation of a new constitution, inclu-

ding human and democratic rights

Negotiation with religious interests

Rebuilding an investment and trade appara-

tus

If these can be achieved somewhat successfully,

it seems to me there will be four crucial longer-term

human security priorities. Libya needs to have

credible, legitimate and responsible military

capacity to deter adventures from potential

aggressors; it needs to establish a political system

that can cope with challenges from fundamentalist

groups, i.e. one that can accommodate the religion

of Islam as an asset for social harmony and

well-being, without it becoming hijacked by

extremist agendas; it needs to establish a credible

anti-corruption regime; and perhaps most impor-

tantly needs to address the issues of youth

and female unemployment. Given its huge resour-

ces, and the enthusiasm of many foreign players –

China, Turkey, EU, USA and others - for resource

acquisition, all these are in theory affordable.

Unless there are serious, unforeseeable geo-

political shifts in North Africa, they could also be

politically achievable. So much seems to depend on

a successful reconciliation in the aftermath

of armed conflict, and the formation of a viable

political system including a security regime. The

Libyan Interim National Council‘s document: A

Vision for a Democratic Libya in fact embodies the

aspiration to address many of the issues raised

above. Yet it is a huge challenge for a population

that has never before enjoyed political or human

rights.

Notes:

* Prof. Alan Hunter is Director of Centre for Peace &

Reconciliation Studies at Coventry University.

Libya needs to have credible, legiti-

mate and responsible military capa-

city to deter adventures from poten-

tial aggressors; it needs to establish

a political system that can cope

with challenges from fundamenta-

list groups, i.e. one that can accom-

modate the religion of Islam as an

asset for social harmony and well-

being, without it becoming hijacked

by extremist agendas; it needs to

establish a credible anti-corruption

regime; and perhaps most impor-

tantly needs to address the issues

of youth and female unemployment.

21



O n 1 September 1969, exactly 42 years

ago, the Libyan ‗revolution‘ was launc-

hed by a coup d’état against King Idris

under the leadership of a young mili-

tary officer, Muammer Gaddafi. Nobody could pre-

dict that Gaddafi would stay in power as a ‗secular‘

dictator until a true Libyan revolution. On 1 Septem-

ber 2011, the hunt for Gaddafi is on, despite his offer

to discuss a ‗transition of power‘ and there is a £1

million reward for his capture ‗dead or alive‘ [2]. How

did Libya reach this point in history? Under Gaddafi‘s

dictatorship, a ‗people‘s revolution‘ was declared and

the official name of the state was changed from the

‗Libyan Arab Republic‘ to the ‗Great Socialist People's

Libyan Arab al-Jamahiriyah‘ in 1977 [3].

However, the Libyan state was neither great nor soci-

alist. During four decades, there were very strong

signs of the regime‘s failure under the ‗whimsical

leadership around Gaddafi‘: no constitutional sys-

tem, no human rights, no opposition, no civil society,

no free media but arbitrary arrest, disappearance,

Rebuilding a „New‟ Libya &

Implications for International Politics

Dr. Ayla Göl*


22


We [the NTC] request from the international community to

fulfil its obligations to protect the Libyan people from any

further genocide and crimes against humanity without any

direct military intervention on Libya soil [1].

detention, and torture. Moreover, it is clear that des-

pite all the rhetoric about ‗revolution‘ and the ‗state

of the masses‘ Gaddafi has abused the oil wealth for

personal and family interests [4]. He created a ‗rentier’

state, of which oil revenues were exploited by the

regime to serve his family, loyalists and international

powers‘ vested interests.

In the international arena, Gaddafi‘s secular outlook

and his hatred of Islamic fundamentalists brought

him into alliance with the West. It was back in the

1970s that Gaddafi did not hesitate to hang the

members of Hizb-ut Tahrir and it would not be too

difficult for him to rhetorically support the Bush-Blair

war against Al-Qaeda in 2000 [5]. After 9/11, the in-

ternational community speculated about political

changes in Libya when the Gaddafi regime rhetori-

cally condemned the use of state terrorism and ag-

reed to abandon its effort to develop weapons of

mass destruction in December 2003 [6]. While Gad-

dafi seemed to be altering the foreign and security

policies of Libya, he hardly introduced significant

political reforms domestically, especially not for the

progress of human rights, good governance and the

freedom of the people. The continuing annual re-

ports of Amnesty International and Human Rights

Watch highlighted the systemic abuse of human

rights whereby Libyans ‗who oppose the ideology of

the Gaddafi revolution may, under Law

71, be arrested and even executed‘ [7]. It is no surpri-

se that the Libyan people rose up for their freedom

under the influence of the Arab Spring. Gaddafi foo-

lishly portrayed himself as a ‗martyr‘, a victim of Wes-

tern colonialism and stated that he would fight for

his cause until the end.

One might wonder why it took four decades to rebel

against Gaddafi‘s brutal rule but there is no doubt

that they are not a bunch of ‗rebels‘ without a

cause. After toppling the regime, anti-Gaddafi

forces established the National Transitional Council

of Libya (NTC) – also referred to as the Transitional

National Council – and issued a statement on

5 March 2011, in which it declared itself as the

legitimate authority of Libya [9]. Their aim has been

to ‗liberate Libya from the hands of the tyrant‘

and then their challenging task is to rebuild a

new Libya based on national and international legiti-

macy [10].

To gain national legitimacy, the protection of state-

hood and nationhood through the establishment of

the Libyan National Assembly is crucial. Despite

historically-rooted tribal divisions and tensions, the

national unity of Libya is vital for the future of

the country. The NTC has stressed that the new Libya

will be pluralist and multicultural, and it ‗will guide

the country to free elections and the establishment

of a constitution for Libya‘ [11]. Moreover, a new

government must be inclusive and based on

democratic principles

that allow all minorities

and political groups to

participate, ‗including

former government offici-

als and other people who

served Gaddafi and his

family in the past, so long

as they were not involved

in illegal activities. A new

Parliament should be

elected through a fair

process that includes

everyone who wants to

run‘ [12]. Therefore, every

effort must be made to

23


Rebuilding a ‘New’ Libya | By Dr. Ayla Göl

Sou

rce:

Th

e E

con

om

ist,

2009 [8]

avoid driving former Gaddafi supporters into

violent opposition but not to hesitate to bring secret

police and others with innocent blood on their

hands to justice. Of course, this is easier said

than done. ‗Reconciliation, as the Council has

called for, is a highly desirable aim, but not all the

militias agree and revenge killings have already

taken place in the Jabal, sometimes on a tribal basis.

[13]‘ In order to establish security and maintain

stability on a national basis, current state institutions,

in particular the army and the police, must be

retained. It is important to note that, aside from the

most hated compounds of Gaddafi and his family

members, there has been little looting of national

treasures.

With regard to international legitimacy, the role of

NATO air strikes in support of the rebels was signifi-

cant in shifting the power balance against Gaddafi

and his loyalists. It seems that the international com-

munity drew lessons from past mistakes in Afghanis-

tan and Iraq. This time, the Libyan intervention was

authorized by the UN Security Council and legitimi-

sed by international law. However, the legacy of the

US-led invasion of Iraq and subsequent occupation is

still with us. It raises the questions, what kind of new

Libya will emerge and what can be done to prevent

the threat of the ‗Iraqization‘ of Libya in the near

future [14]. In order to strengthen international

legitimacy, the possibilities of deploying any kind of

international military force and/or peacekeepers

on the ground - the UN or others – should be

avoided in Libya [15]. These possibilities have already

been rejected by the Libya‘s interim government

[16]. The existence of international ground forces can

easily trigger anti-Western and anti-American

feelings, as experienced in Afghanistan and Iraq,

which will harm the legitimacy of international sup-

port for the Libyan people. The encouraging deve-

lopment for continuing international support is that

the NTC is widely recognised as the ‗legitimate repre-

sentatives‘ of the Libyan people by over 70 countries.

On 27 August, the Arab League became the latest

international organisation to recognise the NTC,

which also confirms its regional legitimacy in the

Arab World [17].

So far, so good: the Libyan Revolution carried the

fading Arab spring into an important historical junc-

ture for the future of the Middle East and North Afri-

ca. However, there are three major dilemmas that the

NTC and international community will face at the

outset. One is that the international community will

insist that ‗democracy‘ is the only game in town in

24



Source: BBC - http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14726292

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14726292

order to prevent the rise of any Islamist group,

especially the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG).

The second dilemma is that democratisation will

require economic growth and stability. As a rentier

state, the Libyan economy relies overwhelmingly on

oil and gas revenues. While oil prices rocketed after

the US-led invasion of Iraq and the subsequent

international economic crisis, Libya‘s oil and gas re-

sources had not been exploited as heavily as other

Arab oil producers, due to the years of UN sanctions.

The third dilemma, therefore, will present itself as

prioritising the production and distribution of oil to

international markets over other issues, such as sol-

ving the urgent national problems of paying salaries

of state officials, supplying water, energy and sanita-

tion. While the new Libyan leaders are busy freeing

themselves from the shadow of Gaddafi, internatio-

nal leaders must help them by avoiding the above

mentioned dilemmas, namely premature democrati-

sation, the push for economic growth, and the rush

for oil.

In relation to the first dilemma, i.e. the promotion of

premature democratisation, the experience of

Afghanistan and Iraq prove that democratization is

not an easy task and it is not about having

regular elections and a functioning parliament in

the short run. Democratisation is a complex

and long process with ups and down along the way.

For the second one, the push for economic

growth cannot be sustained by oil exports alone

and, hence, economic diversification must be

encouraged by international companies. For the

third dilemma, the rush for oil, the production

and distribution of oil resources must be used for

the national cause and economy without allocating

privileges to any group or community. Hence,

Libya should not be pushed into premature

elections by the international community – in

particular, US and EU – but must be given time

and resources to organise and mature its mullti-

party system, civil society and public opinion.

This will actively strengthen the economic,

political and social fabric of the new Libya.

Pushing for elections too soon can give too much

credence and undue power to marginilised tribal

factions and Islamic militant groups, especially

LIFG, which is ‗the only likely group to be able to

garner loyalty in the immature Libyan political

landscape. [18]‘

25



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http://www.acus.org/content/libyan-man-walks-past-graffiti-eastern-city-ajdabiya-may-6-2011

http://www.acus.org/content/libyan-man-walks-past-graffiti-eastern-city-ajdabiya-may-6-2011

There are hopeful signs that ‗the TNC can sustain

Libyan unity and commit itself to the building of a

democratic constitutional order and an equitable

economy step by step. It will not be easy, because

Libya has no constitutional experience with citizen

participation, an independent judiciary, or the rule of

law. [19]‘ Once all the conditions are met to establish

the Libyan National Assembly and a constitutional

order, the promotion of democracy and economic

growth is likely to contribute towards freedom, nati-

onal unity and the social peace that the Libyan peop-

le demanded. Based on national and international

legitimacy, the Libyan Revolution has been achieved

by the Libyan people and the political landscape of

their country can only be cultivated by them too. It is

not easy but it is neither too little, nor too late.

Notes:

* Director, Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and

Contemporary Political Violence (CSRV); Lecturer in

International Politics of the Middle East and Islamic

Studies; Department of International Politics;

Aberystwyth University.

1) Founding Statement of the Interim Transitional Na-

tional Council, http://www.ntclibya.org/english/

founding-statement-of-the-interim-transitional-

national-council/

2) ‗£1m for Gaddafi ―dead or alive‖,‘ The Indepen-

dent, 24 August 2011, http://

www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/1m-

for-gaddafi-dead-or-alive-2343032.html

3) ‗Timeline: Libya,‘ BBC News, http://

news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1398437.stm

4) Fred Halliday, ‗Libya‘s regime at 40: a state of

kleptocracy,‘ Open Democracy, 7 March 2011,

http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/libya-s-

regime-at-40-a-state-of-kleptocracy

5) Mark Almond, ‗More make-up (and hair dye) than

his 40 virgin bodyguards, but Libyan leader Gad-

dafi is still a murderous menace,‘ Daily Mail, 12

June 2009, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/

article-1192494/More-make-hair-dye-40-virgin-

bodyguards-Gaddafi-murderous-menace.html#

6) Halliday, op.cit.

7) Ibid.

8) ‗Libya and Muammer Gaddafi‘ 40 years on: how

to squander a nation‘s potential,‘ The Economist,

20 August, 2009, http://www.economist.com/

node/14270103?story_id=14270103

9) The Libyan Interim National Council – Official Web-

site, http://www.ntclibya.org/english/

10) Ibid.

11) Introducing the Council, http://www.ntclibya.org/

english/about/

12) ‗Turkey to Libya: don‘t destroy the country,‘ Hurri-

yet Daily News, 24 August 2011, http://

www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkey-to-

new-libya-don8217t-destroy-country-2011-08-24

13) George Joffe, ‗Libya: what now?,‘ Al Jazeera Eng-

lish, 30 August 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/

indepth/

opinion/2011/08/201182862920434157.html

14) After the US-led invasion of Iraq a negative phra-

se to ‗Iraqize‘ or `arqana‘ was included in Arabic,

which is also used as ‗Iraqization‘ in English social

media. Juan Cole, ‗How to avoid Bush‘s mistake in

Libya,‘ Dark Politrikcs, http://

www.darkpolitricks.com/2011/08/how-to-avoid-

bush‘s-iraq-mistakes-in-libya/

15) ‗Libya‘s interim leaders reject UN military person-

nel,‘ BBC News, 31 August 2011, http://


16) Ibid.

17) Libya regains Arab League seat, Al Jazeera English,

27 August 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/

news/

africa/2011/08/2011827223817990105.html

18) Alon Ben-Meir, ‗Elections in Libya should be de-

ferred,‘ Middle East Online, 31 August 2011, http://

www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=47865

19) Richard Falk, ‗In Libya, decoding an uncertain fu-

ture,‘ Al Jazeera English, 31 August 2011, http://

english.aljazeera.net/indepth/

opinion/2011/08/201182885646839710.html

26



http://www.ntclibya.org/english/founding-statement-of-the-interim-transitional-national-council/



http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/1m-for-gaddafi-dead-or-alive-2343032.html



http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1398437.stm

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1398437.stm

http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/libya-s-regime-at-40-a-state-of-kleptocracy

http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/libya-s-regime-at-40-a-state-of-kleptocracy

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-1192494/More-make-hair-dye-40-virgin-bodyguards-Gaddafi-murderous-menace.html



http://www.economist.com/node/14270103?story_id=14270103

http://www.economist.com/node/14270103?story_id=14270103

http://www.ntclibya.org/english/

http://www.ntclibya.org/english/about/

http://www.ntclibya.org/english/about/

http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkey-to-new-libya-don8217t-destroy-country-2011-08-24



http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/08/201182862920434157.html



http://www.darkpolitricks.com/2011/08/how-to-avoid-bush's-iraq-mistakes-in-libya/





http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2011/08/2011827223817990105.html



http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=47865

http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=47865




Although he was born in the heart of Andalusia,

Spain, those who know him are quick to point out

that his perfectionism in work seems more Swiss

than Spanish. Some would argue that his teutonic

work ethic has something to do with the fact that

he spent long periods of time in Germany as a fo-

reign correspondent for the Spanish National Tele-

vision (TVE). Spending time as a foreign corres-

pondent in Berlin (covering the fall of the Wall),

Rabat, Sarajevo (during the siege), Madrid, Port-

au-Prince, Kinshasa, New York, Washington and

finally Brussels, José-María may have had to acc-

limatize to local cultures, but that has never me-

ant adapting to local working hours. He likes to

define himself as a fighter, never giving up and

always going beyond (and behind) the news, loo-

king for new ways to understand reality.

And it is a great opportunity that Mr. Siles will

discuss his approaches to issues from the Greek

crisis to Euroscepticism.

Interview with

José-María Siles

By Ali Onur Özçelik*

AFRICA REVIEW

INTERVIEW

27


So Mr. Siles, given the fact that Spain, Portugal, Greece and

Ireland have received massive structural funds from the EU,

why do you think all cohesion countries are struggling with

an economic crisis? What is the main reason behind the eco-

nomic crisis in those countries?

I don‘t think both things are related. In terms of the funds, some countries

(like Spain) have used them well, in a transparent and efficient way; others

(like Greece) have not been as efficient at using the money and apparently

the level of fraud has been high. The main cause of the crisis in these perip-

heral countries is the high level of public spending, which far exceeds natio-

nal income. In other words, such states have spent more than they have

produced. They have lived in a bubble of well-being that has exceeded their

means and now they have to pay for what they didn‘t have. And continue

lacking. But because they‘re in the Eurozone their liquidity problems affect

the others.

The Greek crisis has led to fears that this is only the begin-

ning of a deeper sovereign debt crisis that could ultimately

destabilise the Eurozone. Are these fears exaggerated? How

to deal with these problems?

In fact, the Eurozone has already become destabilised. The Greek problem

became everyone‘s problem, just like the Irish, Portuguese, Spanish or Italian

problems. When things become difficult, politicians blame markets, but no

one takes responsibility nor shows leadership. The sovereign debt crisis has

exposed the lack of leadership qualities, courage and vision of European lea-

ders. Every time that they act they do so late and timidly. The measures adop-

ted at the last euro summit, on 21 June, should have been adopted a year

earlier. Let us not forget that the first thing that European leaders did as soon

as Athens‘ real debt and deficit were known was to announce that Europe

would not help Greece. In the last 18 months we have continually seen how

every single measure that has had to be adopted has implied a U-turn or cor-

rection vis-à-vis an earlier policy decision.

What needs to be done to rescue the Greek economy? Is it even

possible to rescue the Greek economy?

I believe that what is being done is the only thing that can be done to save

the Greek economy and the euro. There was no alternative to the bailout,

even though both the first and second phases have not provided sufficient

funds to this end. However much Greece tightens its belt I cannot see them

viably reducing debt to the levels foreseen in the plan, much less if we consi-

der that the austerity measures undermine the possibility of economic

28


Interview with José-María Siles | By Ali Onur Özçelik

“ When things

become difficult,

politicians blame

markets, but no

one takes responsibility

nor shows leadership. The

sovereign debt crisis has

exposed the lack of

leadership qualities,

courage and vision of

European leaders.

growth, putting the public purse under even greater strain. In those count-

ries in which an outside intervention has been necessary to reduce public

debt and excessive deficits, economic recovery has been a longer and mo-

re painful process.

Is there any room for Greek government to stabilize its

economy in the near future? Or is there worse ahead for

Greece?

The problem of the peripheral Eurozone countries is that they have lived for

over a decade beyond their means, in a bubble of the nouveau riche that,

when it burst, has revealed the structural weaknesses of their economies.

When there was prosperity they did not undertake the necessary economic

reforms and now that they in trouble they are being forced to adopt them.

In the case of Greece, with an especially reduced capacity for wealth-

generation currently, I foresee many years of difficulty. I don‘t think that it

will leave the Eurozone because that would imply a huge political failure on

the European stage. However, the Germans, who feel that they have done

their homework, are increasingly reticent to pay for those who have not met

their obligations and have spent what they didn‘t have in the first place.

There are some expectations that the crisis in Greece can

spread to the rest of Europe. What do you make of this?

What are the possible consequences of such a crisis for the

future of European Integration? Do you think a renewed

wave of Euroscepticism is likely?

European leaders agree on the fact that the failure of the euro would mean

the end of European integration, even the end of the European Union. I

think they are exaggerating. No one believes that they are going to allow

the euro to collapse. If we look back, European integration has advanced

slowly, with much hesitation, but never has even one iota of progress ever

been seriously questioned. Well, it has to be said that maybe the current

revision of the Schengen Agreement, in the face of rising xenophobia in a

few European countries and the generalised fear of a massive influx of fore-

igners, bears the seed of a historic step backwards in the process of integra-

tion. But I feel that Schengen will stay in place and that European borders,

once opened, will only be subsequently closed through war. And war is so-

mething unthinkable in Europe precisely because what we have built in the

past 50 years is the best vaccine against nationalism and hatred amongst

the peoples of Europe.

What steps do EU leaders need to take to prevent another

crisis in the eurozone? Do you think that the EU should be


29


“ European leaders

agree on the fact

that the failure of

the euro would

mean the end of

European integration,

even the end of the

European Union.

given more power and responsibility to manage the European

economy?

There is increasingly talk of a European economic government that would

see Member States relinquish further national sovereignty. This sort of

control from Brussels would have prevented the Greek crisis. Well, a real form

of control would have. But there were already rules of the game to the

Eurozone which were supervised from Brussels and which the Member

States have not respected. In terms of the rules on deficit spending not even

Germany, which was on the verge of being punished by Brussels, respected

the 3% rule. Greece manipulated its statistics to be able to join the euro

because its debt already far exceeded the 60% threshold by the beginning of

the 1990s. As a result, it has to be said that the first thing that states need to

do is stick to their commitments while mechanisms need to be put in place

to ensure that those who do not do so are punished. That is what the

Eurozone leaders are working on at the moment. Spain‘s economic policy, for

instance, is now set in Brussels, not just that of countries having already

received a bailout. So yes, I think we have already begun acting, timidly, as

though there was a European economic government. Jean-Claude Trichet,

President of the ECB, called for a ―ministry of Finances for the Union‖. I

think it is real nonsense. I wonder how has a ―de facto‖ European foreign

minister helped to give more weight to Europe. The next step, once

we overcome the taboo that the ECB buy the sovereign debt of those count-

ries in trouble, would be for the ECB to directly issue Eurobonds to cover the

debt of the 17 Eurozone members. But it‘s not going to be an easy task. Re-

jecting the Eurobonds as the solution for the crisis, Mrs Merkel was backed by

her finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, who said during this summer

markets turmoil, that the Eurozone would become an ―inflation community‖

if countries opted to sell a joint bond without first unifying their fiscal

policies.

Do Member States have to relinquish some national sovereign-

ty? Will they be willing?

The extreme case within the European Union, could be the UK, which will

never accept the euro as its currency and the growing (and inevitable) loss of

sovereignty that it would entail. At the other end of the spectrum are those

peripheral countries, both those having received a bailout and those who

haven‘t, who see in the euro the best guarantee against bankruptcy. Ger-

many, whose economy has benefitted the most from the establishment of

the single currency, the issue of relinquishing national sovereignty has been

a tricky one, but it always ends up being accepted. France and Italy, the other

two major European economies, see more gains than losses from monetary

integration and they accept (and even request) more European economic

30



“ Greece manipu-

lated its statistics

to be able to join

the euro because

its debt already far

exceeded the 60%

threshold by the

beginning of the 1990s.


31


governance. I strongly believe that if we don‘t move forward on the issue

of relinquishing sovereignty this is because German public opinion is re-

luctant to pay for others‘ damage and does not want the fate of its public

spending to be decided in Brussels.

The Cyprus Question has been a critical issue in EU-Turkey

relations for quite some time. Do you think the normalisa-

tion of relations between Greece and Turkey during the en-

largement process is threatened by the crisis?

I don‘t think so. We are basically talking about a political problem here. The

recent announcement that Cyprus, also in the Eurozone, might need a bai-

lout has not affected the sovereign debt crisis brought about by the Euro-

zone‘s peripheral members. In the face of fears that Spain and Italy might

fall, the small size of the Cypriot economy renders it an anecdotal case.

Cyprus is a political issue, but not even the lack of agreement over its reu-

nification could stop it from joining the European Union, to the surprise of

some. In terms of relations between Greece and Turkey much the same

can be said. I don‘t think the economic crisis can affect in any way this ot-

her, political crisis.

In light of Turkey’s high rate of economic growth and the

economic crisis faced by the EU, do you think that joining

the EU is no longer an economically attractive prospect for

Turkey?

Turkey‘s entry into the European Union has more to do with psychology

and history than with the economy or politics. It has to be said that Euro-

pe‘s political leaders would have to muster the courage to face up the cho-

ice of either admitting Turkey or rejecting outright its membership appli-

cation. This is what they ended up doing with countries in Eastern Europe,

which were allowed to join mainly for historical reasons (and as a result of

economic interests, particularly those of Germany) rather than because of

their inherent merits or the ability of the EU to absorb them. Europe has to

have a proper debate about this issue. Our leaders have prevented both

those of us in favour and those of us against enlargement to properly dis-

cuss of the issue. In terms of the citizens of Turkey, I understand that they

are tired of this game that has been played for far too long. That being

said, I believe that if the day arrives where we talk about Turkish members-

hip seriously, both in the EU and in Turkey there would be much to say

about.

Note:

* Ali Onur Ozcelik is a Doctoral Researcher at the University of Sheffield.

“ Cyprus is a political

issue, but not even

the lack of

agreement over

its reunification could stop

it from joining the European

Union, to the surprise of

some.

Journal of Global Analysis endeavours to become the foremost international forum for academics,

researchers and policy makers to share their knowledge and experience in the disciplines of polit-

ical science, international relations, economics, sociology, international law, political history,

and human geography.

Journal of Global Analysis is an interdisciplinary refereed e-journal, edited by a group of interna-

tional scholars indicated in the Editorial Board and International Advisory Board. The journal is

published at its own web site http://www.cesran.org/globalanalysis. Journal of Global Analy-

sis welcomes submissions of articles from related persons involved in the scope of the journal as

well as summary reports of conferences and lecture series held in social sciences.

Prospective authors should submit 4.000 - 15.000 articles for consideration in Microsoft Word-

compatible format. For more complete descriptions and submission instructions, please access

the Editorial Guidelines and Style Guidelines pages at the CESRAN website: http://

www.cesran.org/globalanalysis. Contributors are urged to read CESRAN’s author guidelines

and style guidelines carefully before submitting articles. Articles submissions should be sent in

electronic format to:

Ozgur TUFEKCI - Editor-in-Chief - [email protected]

Husrev TABAK - Managing Editor - [email protected]

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Publication Date: Winter issue — January 01

Summer issue — July 01

JOURNAL OF GLOBAL ANALYSIS

(JGA)

CALL FOR CONTRIBUTIONS

http://cesran.org/globalanalysis



A t the end of June the picturesque Hima-

layan Kingdom of Bhutan held its first

ever local elections. Over recent years

this tiny country of around 700,000 has

been undergoing a remarkable political transition

and these were only the third nation-wide polls since

Bhutan‘s revered Fourth King, Jigme Sengay Wanc-

huk, decreed in 2006 that Bhutan was to become a

democratic state. Somewhat ironically, the majority

of Bhutan‘s citizens were at first against the transi-

tion from absolute monarchy to democracy, yet, they

have proved to be quick to adapt to the new reality.

Prior to the elections on 27th June, candidates came

to village meeting places across their district in order

to present their policies and field questions from lo-

cal residents. With only a 60% literacy rate, these me-

etings are vital to the democratic process. On the day

itself voters could not cast their ballot without wea-

ring the national dress and every shop, restaurant,

bar and business were ordered shut down for the

day. The all powerful electoral commission also insis-

ted that until voting had finished at 5pm it would be

a dry day.

During the campaigning, the biggest difference to

emerge between candidates seemed to be not po-

licy but education versus experience. Many former

representatives were up for re-election and were

challenged by ex-monks or younger, well-educated

candidates. As the election results unfolded, both

new and old candidates had gained majorities and

this split reflects the changes taking place across

Bhutanese society: the challenge of bringing Bhutan

Bhutan Cements Its Democracy

By Dr. Paul Richardson*

AFRICA REVIEW EURASIA REVIEW

33


into the modern world through economic develop-

ment while at the same time preserving cultural tra-

ditions.

To overcome this tension the idea of Gross National

Happiness (GNH) has become somewhat of a natio-

nal ideology. GNH has been promoted by the Fourth

King since the 1970s as an alternative to GNP and is a

kind of fusion of sustainable development, environ-

mental protection and egalitarianism. Whether

experienced or inexperienced, virtually all candida-

tes sought to emphasise their loyalty to the GNH

concept.

However, despite the fan-fare over GNH, Bhutan is

not without its problems and behind its quaintness

and the novelty of electoral politics, many of its pe-

ople live in extreme poverty. To the consternation of

the government, just days before the polls opened,

Bhutan was classified as a failed state by Foreign

Policy Magazine, a journal published by the Ameri-

can Think Tank ‗Fund for Peace‘. The long shadow of

Nepalese refugees who fled persecution in the early

1990s, and more recently the banning of all tobacco

products (complete with punitive prison sentences

for violators of the new law), as well as the fact that

virtually all major businesses are connected via fa-

mily ties to the monarchy or through corporations to

the state, present a somewhat striking contrast to

the recent arrival of democracy. The country‘s signifi-

cant community of Buddhist monks are also exclu-

ded from the democratic process and are barred

from both standing and voting in these elections.

Nevertheless, the seriousness with which the eligible

voters, candidates and the electoral commission

conducted themselves last June represented an

extraordinary moment in Bhutan‘s modern history.

Some observers thought that the arrival of elections

was merely a ritual to appease foreign donors and a

means for the monarchy to keep ruling in a different

way. Instead, it seems that many Bhutanese are reali-

sing that how they vote can influence their destiny.

Although heavily influenced by its southern neigh-

bour (India even provided electoral machines on

polling day), Bhutan seems to be forging an electoral

politics in its own mould. Guided by the monarchy,

there are new rules to the game of politics in Bhutan

and politicians and voters are quickly learning them.

When electricity, roads and sewerage are still far

from universal, political decisions can have an im-

mense significance on everyday life.

As people get used to listening to political debates

and questions on the radio, TV, or in the village mee-

ting place, what was promised during election cam-

paigns comes under serious scrutiny. In this quiet

corner of the world, sandwiched between India to

the south and China to the north, a genuine evolu-

tion towards some form of democracy is taking pla-

ce. It remains to be seen how much, and in what

ways, it will change the country but what seems as-

sured is that in one of the world‘s most isolated sta-

tes the relationship between government, society

and monarchy is being altered forever.

Note:

* Dr. Paul Richardson is currently on a Japanese

Society for the Promotion of Science Post-Doctoral

Fellowship, at the Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido

University.

Bhutan Cements Its Democracy | By Paul Richardson

34


JOURNAL OF

CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION

AND SECURITY

Peer-reviewed Academic journal

By CESRAN (Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis)

Editor-in-Chief

Prof. Alpaslan Ozerdem, Coventry University, UK

Managing Editor

Dr. Rebecca Roberts, Coventry University, UK

Assistant Editors

Mr. Richard Slade, Coventry University, UK | Mr. Husrev Tabak, UCL, UK

Book Review Editor

Dr Sung Yong Lee, Coventry University, UK

Editorial Board

Prof. the Baroness Haleh Afshar, University of York, UK | Prof. Bruce Baker, Coventry University, UK | Dr Richard Bowd,

UNDP, Nepal | Prof. Ntuda Ebode, University of Yaounde II, Cameroon | Prof. Scott Gates, PRIO, Norway | Dr Antonio Giu-

stozzi, London School of Economics, UK | Dr Cathy Gormley-Heenan, University of Ulster, UK | Prof. Paul Gready, Universi-

ty of York, UK | Prof. Fen Hampson, Carleton University, Canada | Prof. Mohammed Hamza, Lund University, Sweden |

Prof. Alice Hills, University of Leeds | Dr Maria Holt, University of Westminster, UK | Prof. Alan Hunter , Coventry Universi-

ty, UK | Dr Tim Jacoby, University of Manchester, UK | Dr Khalid Khoser, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Switzerland | Dr

William Lume, South Bank University, UK | Dr Roger Mac Ginty, St Andrews' University, UK | Mr Rae Mac Grath, Save the

Children UK Somalia | Prof. Mansoob Murshed, ISS, The Netherlands | Dr Wale Osofisan, Help Age International, UK | Dr

Mark Pelling, King's College, UK | Prof. Mike Pugh, University of Bradford, UK | Mr Gianni Rufini, Freelance Consultant,

Italy | Dr Mark Sedra, Centre for Int. Governance Innovation, Canada | Dr Emanuele Sommario, Scuola Superiore Sant‟An-

na, Italy | Dr Hans Skotte, Trondheim University, Norway | Dr Arne Strand, CMI, Norway | Dr Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, Uni-

versity of Po, France | Dr. Mandy Turner, University of Bradford, UK | Prof. Roger Zetter, University of Oxford, UK

www.cesran.org/jcts

T he Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security (JCTS) pro-

vides a platform to analyse conflict transformation as the pro-

cesses for managing change in a non-violent way to produce equi-

table outcomes for all parties that are sustainable. Security is un-

derstood as encapsulating a wide range of human security concerns that can

be tackled by both „hard‟ and „soft‟ measures. Therefore, the Journal‟s scope

not only covers such security sector reform issues as restructuring security

apparatus, reintegration of ex-combatants, clearance of explosive remnants

of war and cross-border management, but also the protection of human

rights, justice, rule of law and governance.

I t has been almost a decade since international

community with mandate of United Nations

has intervened in Afghanistan to oust the Tali-

ban regime, dismantle the web of terror and

above all to rebuild its economy, state institutions and

polity. The consensus emerged in international com-

munity to fight the war against terrorism and also for

providing assistance for post-war reconstruction and

development of Afghanistan was unprecedented.

Currently more than 130,697 ISAF troops from 48

countries are deployed, and almost every major inter-

national development organization has been en-

gaged in humanitarian and development activities in

the country. According to Donor Financial Review

2009, Ministry of Finance, Afghanistan, the internation-

al community has pledged to provide $ 62 billion

($1241 per Afghan) in assistance to Afghanistan since

2001. Much water has flowed since fall of Taliban re-

gime, and Afghanistan has witnessed numerous

changes and development in its polity, society, econo-

my and strategic, both regional and global, milieu

over last ten years. After a decade long engagement,

now deadline has been set to withdraw the interna-

tional security force and formally transfer the respon-

sibility of security of country to Afghan national army

and police. Speculations are rife whether international

community, particularly the United States and Euro-

pean countries, is going to abandon the country again

and flow of development assistance would gradually

decline as their geo-strategic objectives are achieved.

Experts on Afghan affairs also call for exploring alter-

native security arrangement in case of withdrawal and

diversifying domestic revenues for meeting the public

expenditure and facilitating the reconstruction and

development. In such a scenario, the article intends to

take an account of progress made by Afghanistan in a

decade and what are the major challenges the coun-

try would face in times to come.

Progress So Far

Building the effective, efficient and legitimate state

institutions are central to maintaining durable peace

and security as well as reconstruction and develop-

ment process in Afghanistan. In 2001, Afghanistan

was a classical case of state failure. Years of war and

lawlessness had destroyed the entire country and

state was unable to provide any welfare services to its

citizens. Following September 11, 2001 and its subse-

quent events, intervention of international communi-

ty was indispensable in Afghanistan not only for hu-

Afghanistan after a Decade: Progress and Challenges Ahead

By Dinoj Kumar Upadhyay*

AFRICA REVIEW

EURASIA REVIEW

36


manitarian reasons but also for security of world com-

munity. International community led by the United

States took the responsibility of security and peace,

endeavored to build the state institutions and facili-

tate reconstruction and development process. It

seems axiomatic today to say that the country has

achieved considerable progress. A constitution based

on the broad principles of constitutionalism has been

adopted and a democratically elected government at

the helm of the country. New constitution is broad

based and intends to incorporate interests of all sec-

tions of society and provisions of equal rights for men

and women, individual liberty freedom of express and

association, the right to vote and stand for office,

property, and religious freedom. A political design

and structure for establishing unified system of gov-

ernance and facilitating unification of country has

already in place. Institutions of professional national

army and police have been established. According to

Brooking Afghanistan Index, strength of Afghan na-

tional Army is 164,003 in April 2011 and Afghan Na-

tional Police is around 1,22,000. Thus, combined

strength of security forces would be 286,003. Started

from the scratches, foundations of modern judiciary

have already been laid down and judges had been

trained and laws and infrastructure of modern judicial

system has been gradually developing.

Establishing law and order and reaching out to people

in rural and remote areas of Afghanistan was the for-

midable challenges for international community as

well as national government in Kabul. To get the legit-

imacy for a uniform political structure from the people

who historically known for autonomy and tribal loyal-

ty is not only socio-political challenge but also is a

security issue for Afghan government. The largest

development and governance launched by the Af-

ghan government so far, National Solidarity Pro-

gramme (henceforth NSP) has been considerably suc-

cessful in rural areas. According to Ministry of Rural

Rehabilitation and Development, Afghanistan, nearly

70 per cent of rural communities have mobilized, and

more than 25,000 have elected local councils to repre-

sent themselves. These Community Development

Councils (CDCs) are engaged in planning and imple-

menting development projects at the local level of

society and it is reported that over 55,000 subprojects

made possible by block grants that have already sup-

plied more than $ 800 million to community-driven

rural reconstruction and development. The NSP has

laid the foundations for local governance in almost

361 districts and every province in the country. An

Impact Evaluation Study conducted a group of re-

searchers in villages finds that the programme is con-

siderably successful in improving people perceptions

of their economic conditions and of government rep-

resentatives and officials and even some nongovern-

mental actors. Its observation on gender empower-

ment is encouraging. People participation particularly

women participation has been significantly enhanced.

The NSP creates new village institutions for women,

increases men‟s openness to women participating in

local governance and decision making, and improves

the responsiveness and accountability of local leaders

to women‟s needs [1]. Such a change in attitude is

remarkable in Afghan society and governance at the

grassroots level.

Considering scenario a decade before and fragile se-

curity environment, reconstruction and development

appears to be a significant success. National economy

was entirely ruined and only monoculture of opium

production had flourished before 2001. Basic infra-

structure even for survival of human being was negli-

gible. War had rendered millions to flee in neighbor-

ing countries. Now much has been changed for bet-

ter. Though Afghanistan has not joined the league of

developed nations, basic facilities, road, public health,

education, etc has really improved. Report of Commit-

tee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, Evaluat-

ing U.S. Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan published on

8 June 2011, does not paint a gloomy picture of pro-

Afghanistan after a Decade | By By Dinoj Kumar Upadhyay

37


“ Establishing law and order

and reaching out to people in

rural and remote areas of Af-

ghanistan was the formidable

challenges for international com-

munity as well as national govern-

ment in Kabul.

gress made by Afghanistan and states that the coun-

try has achieved „some real successes‟. Paul D. Miller,

who was director for Afghanistan in the US National

Security Council under President George W Bush and

Barack Obama argues in his article, published in For-

eign Affairs, January/February 2011, result of one of the

largest interventions of international community for

reconstruction and development, relief in the world,

was „an unheralded and dramatic success‟. Afghani-

stan is one of the fastest growing economies in the

world averaging 13.5 per cent of annual growth; GDP

growth was around 15 percent in 2003, around 16 per

cent in 2005 and after a drought in 2008, it again

reached to 20 per cent in 2009. Average growth of 8

per cent is forecasted for next two years. Total GDP

has quadrupled since 2002. Share of opium in GDP

got squeezed as opium production substantially de-

clined by half and 20 of 34 provinces are poppy free.

After 10 years, there has been a sevenfold increase in

the number of children attending school and signifi-

cant improvement in health care. By 2008, 80 per cent

of the population had access to basic health services

and Afghan children were immunized against diph-

theria, pertussis and tetanus at the same rate as chil-

dren in the rest of the world. The infant mortality rate

deceased by a third and life expectancy moved up-

ward. Today one third of roads in the country were

paved by 2008 against 13.3 per cent in 2001. Uses of

telecom services have spectacularly risen, around

three quarters of population have access to telecom

services in 2009. Access to water is more than dou-

bled; and electricity & sanitation also has improved

significantly since the fall of the Taliban regime [2].

Discovery of huge sources of minerals, natural gas and

oil rekindles new hope for this war-ravaged country.

The New York Times report, 14 June 2010 estimated

worth of these minerals gas and oil is more than $ 1

trillion and reports from the Pentagon says that unex-

pectedly vast deposits of iron, copper, cobalt, gold

and critical industrial metals like lithium can funda-

mentally transform the Afghan economy and have

potential to develop a viable and vibrant mining in-

dustry in the country. For instance, lithium is of enor-

mous significance because it is well suited to light-

weight energy storage, thus it has been used in mo-

bile phone and laptop batteries as well as electric car

batteries. As the threat of climate change looms large

and emphasis has been given for clean energy tech-

nologies, lithium can be a critical element for the en-

ergy efficient equipment too. Afghanistan is also en-

dowed with natural gas and oil. United States‟ Geo-

logical Survey estimates up to 36.5 trillion cubic feet

of natural gas in the northern region of Afghanistan

and oil up to 3.6 billion barrels. Due to wars and politi-

cal instability, the country remains still unexplored,

though no one denies hidden deposits of natural re-

sources.

Beyond any doubt, these minerals and petroleum are

sources of massive revenues to generate viable state-

hood for Afghanistan and have the potential to attract

investment on a large scale. The Afghan government

begins to seek foreign direct investment in the sectors

and its share in GDP was 9 per cent in 2009. Turkey is

the largest investor so far, followed by USA, China and

UAE. United States, the largest donor of development

assistance, will be the major source of investment in

minerals and natural gas in the future, as these discov-

eries definitely prompt USA to think beyond the geo-

political interest in the country. Chinese, European

and some major Indian companies are also inclined to

invest in the mining and natural gas sectors of the

economy. China has agreed to invest around $ 3 bil-

lion in copper mines and major Indian steel compa-

nies have been shortlisted for the iron ore industries.

For evaluating the impacts and assess psyche of the

nation, surveys conducted by news agencies and non-

governmental organization such ABC news, BBC, ARD

and the Asia Foundation show the rise of people faith

in government system and on going political process.

ABC news and BBC‟s survey shows that 70 percent


38


“ United States‟ Geological Sur-

vey estimates up to 36.5 trillion

cubic feet of natural gas in the

northern region of Afghanistan and

oil up to 3.6 billion barrels.

people believe that the country is on the right path of

progress and only 21 per cent people think the coun-

try is going in wrong direction. People opinion ap-

pears to be positive on the reconstruction and devel-

opment process. 69 per cent of respondents see im-

provement in schools, 50 per cent in health clinic, 56

per cent in road and 46 per cent in police. People

opinion mentioned in Human Development Report

2007 of Afghanistan shows 85 per cent of respond-

ents agree on whether they have access to state

courts (41 per cent strongly agree and 44 somehow

agree). Last year survey of Center for International

Private Enterprise and Charney Research (CIPE) 2010,

points out that three-forth of respondents were hope-

ful about economic growth of country and more than

half felt that economy was better than previous year.

This positive opinion reflects the positive changes

happened in the country. Once Afghans were deemed

as lawless tribes living in Paleolithic ages of civilization

and democratic values and good modern institutions

of governance are not considered to be compatible

with their nature and society. Despite system lacunas,

their responses to democratic process were

tremendous. These favorable opinions would provide

not only political legitimacy to democratic process

but also impetus to social unification and nation

building. Contrary to conventional wisdom on Afghan

national psyche against presence of foreign powers

on their soils, presence of ISAF is well tolerated and

people believe that they are here to stabilize our

country.

Challenges Ahead

As discussed above, Afghanistan has made measura-

ble progress in state-building, setting up a democratic

polity, human development and building basic infra-

structure since 2002. Today country is on the march of

progress. There are still a number of challenges that

impinge on economic development, state-building

and human development. Afghanistan remains one of

poorest and most volatile countries in the world. Se-

curity is still prime concern for the government and

international community. The security situation has

continued to deteriorate in many parts of the country,

the overall number of security incidents having in-

creased by 69 per cent in 2010 compared to previous

year (Afghanistan Conflict Monitor, 15th November

2010) [3]. In many parts of the country, a sense of in-

security among people is rife. It has often been report-

ed that the insurgents still kill children, put poison in

the food of school girls, throw acid in the face of

school girls, and burn schools. Taliban still holds sway

in remote areas of the country and runs their parallel

security and judicial system. Security forces got big-

ger, still their performance has not reached to at the

level to adequately manage the law and order. High

level of corruption, illiteracy, violence of human rights,

drug abuse, etc has been regularly reported. A sense

of professionalism and virtues of modern bureaucracy

are still missing. Afghan police, which is more signifi-

cant than army for maintaining law and order and

internal security is low paid and ill-equipped. Current

government system of Afghanistan is riddled with

corruption and malpractices. Afghanistan ranks 176,

third from the bottom on the Transparency Interna-

tional Corruption Perceptions Index, 2010. Kleptocrat-

ic elites are fulcrum of graft and greed and controls

international contracts across the country.

Here it is worth to be discussed that excess reliance on

international development assistance has wider and

long term implications for state-building process. Ac-

cording to the World Bank, an estimated 97 per cent

of Afghanistan‟s GDP is derived from spending related

to the international military and donor community

presence. Afghanistan could suffer a severe economic

depression when foreign troops leave in 2014. These

trends would undermine extractive power of the state

and its independent role in international community.

In addition, warlords, feudal culture and corruption

are severe impediments to nascent democracy and

democratic process.


39


“ Contrary to conventional wis-

dom on Afghan national psyche

against presence of foreign pow-

ers on their soils, presence of

ISAF is well tolerated and people be-

lieve that they are here to stabilize our

country.

Agriculture is the mainstay of the economy and also

provides employment and livelihood to 80 per cent of

population. But, only 12 per cent of land is arable and

6 per cent is irrigated. Discovery of minerals offers

some hope of revenues generation and development

industries in the country, but hostile security environ-

ment and regional politics are conducive for invest-

ment.

Geostrategic location of Afghanistan has proved a

bane for it so far. Great powers and later super powers

rivalries and regional strategic dynamics immensely

contributed to state failure and social and political

fragmentation throughout its history. Current interna-

tional system is qualitatively different from the Cold

War, but regional

powers could not

reconcile their di-

verging interests to

constructively con-

tribute to a peaceful

and stable Afghani-

stan. The region has

immense potential

to develop intra re-

gional trade and as

Afghanistan, is at

the pivot, would be

greatly benefitted.

Concluding Remarks: Prospects for Future

To sum up, hope to stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan

has not despaired yet. Afghanistan figures still high on

the strategic priorities of the United States and the

major European countries. Security strategy of United

States or European security strategy explicitly recog-

nizes the threats emanating from failed or fragile

states pose serious implications for their society and

national security and spillover effects of socio-political

instability and underdevelopment have been felt be-

yond national boundaries, therefore, call for to take

comprehensive measures both security and develop-

ment to quell these threats. It is evidently possible

that they would avoid heavy military engagement but

supply of development assistance would not be stop

in future. The United States and North Atlantic Treaty

Organization indicated that there would not be a

complete withdrawal from Afghanistan by 2014. Now

much of onus lies with national government and lead-

ers to strengthen governance and democracy, thus

dividends of development can reach to common man.

It is not expected from a foreign power to unify a so-

cially fragmented country, rather is primary task of

national leadership and government to bring back all

sections of the society in nation-building and devel-

opment process. Impacts of development assistance

ought not to be evaluated in isolation. International

development assistance yield positive results in fragile

countries if prerequisites like institutional set up, socio

-political stability and good governance, coordination,

active participation of civil society organizations and

transparency exist there. International community

and Afghan government need to infuse advance in-

formation and communication technologies to

strengthen governance and provide basic services to

people in rural areas. Common wisdom on develop-

ment says poverty, deprivation and underdevelop-

ment exist due to not only lack of resources but also

lack of good and effective institutions of governance.

Dividends of democracy and development must be

percolated to bottom level of the society, only then

„hearts and minds‟ of Afghan people can be won and

peace would be durable and development would be

inclusive.

Notes:

* Currently pursuing PhD in International Relations at

the Center for European Studies, School of Interna-

tional Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi

and also working as Research Analyst at Integrated

Research and Action for Development, IRADe, New

Delhi.

1) National Solidarity Programme: Randomized Im-

pact Evaluation, URL: http://www.nsp-ie.org/

2) Data has been taken from article of Paul Miller,

Report of Senate Committee (2011) and World

Development Indicators (2010), Donor Financial

Review (2009), Ministry of Finance, Afghanistan

3) Afghanistan Conflict Monitor, School of Interna-

tional Studies , Simon Fraser University, Accessed

on 5 November 2010, (Online: web) URL: http://

www.afghanconflictmonitor.org/

incidents.html#docs1


40


“ Common wisdom on

development says pov-

erty, deprivation and

underdevelopment exist

due to not only lack of re-

sources but also lack of

good and effective institu-

tions of governance.

41


AFRICA REVIEW

EURASIA REVIEW

"Waves" of

the Russia's Presidential Reforms Break About Premier's "Energy-Rocks"

By Dr. Zurab Garakanidze*

Story about the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s initiative to change the

make-up of the boards of state-owned firms, especially energy companies.

In late March of this year, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev demanded that high-ranking

officials – namely, deputy prime ministers and cabinet-level ministers that co-ordinate state

policy in the same sectors in which those companies are active – step down from their seats

on the boards of state-run energy companies by July 1. He also said that October 1 would be

the deadline for replacing these civil servants with independent directors.

The deadline has now passed, but Medvedev‟s bid to diminish the government‟s influence in

the energy sector has run into roadblocks. Most of the high-level government officials who

have stepped down are being replaced not by independent managers, but by directors from

other state companies in the same sector. Russia‟s state-owned oil and gas companies have

not been quick to replace directors who also hold high-ranking government posts, despite or-

ders from President Dmitry Medvedev. High-ranking Russian officials have made a show of

following President Medvedev‟s order to leave the boards of state-run energy companies, but

government influence over the sector remains strong.

This indicates that the political will needed for the presidential administration to push eco-

nomic reforms forward may be inadequate.

Russia's Presidential Reforms | By Dr. Zurab Garakanidze

42


At the end of March in Magnitogorsk, Russian Presi-

dent Dmitry Medvedev announced plans for remov-

ing high-level civil servants from the boards of state-

owned energy-companies. So far, though, the gov-

ernment has not fully executed this order, particular-

ly with respect to companies active in the energy

sector.

Medvedev has justified his decision by pointing out

that government officials who are responsible for

setting policy in a certain area – for example, energy

– are serving as directors of competitive companies

active in that same area. This causes conflicts of

interest, he said, and leads to discord between the

government, with its reformist agenda, and mem-

bers of parliament, who are influenced by energy

lobbyists.

The president has officially charged the government

with executing his initiative in several stages. By

July 1, state-owned companies must discharge all

deputy prime ministers and cabinet-level ministers

that co-ordinate state policy in the same sectors in

which those companies are active and replace them

with independent directors at their shareholder

meetings.

By October 1, state-owned companies involved in

the energy sector, as well as some state-run military-

industrial firms, must elect supervisory board chair-

men who are not civil servants.

October 1 has also been designated as the deadline

for finalising the replacement of all high-level civil

servants with independent directors. (Board seats

will still be open to officials at the level of deputy

minister and departmental director, as these are not

considered to have independent political influence.)

State involvement

The high number of government representatives on

the boards of state-run companies stems from the

fact that the Russian state has a high level of direct

involvement in many sectors of the economy.

In other words, the Russian economy has yet to be

extensively liberalised. Although more than a decade

has passed since the so-called “Chubais” wave of

post-Soviet privatisation (a reference to former First

Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Chubais), Russia is still

home to many state-owned enterprises, not least in

the oil and gas sectors.

After a period of consolidation of state interests un-

der former President Vladimir Putin, now serving as

prime minister, the push for reform took on renewed

urgency because of the world economic slowdown

that erupted in 2008.

In 2009-2010, the government of the Russian Federa-

tion again began actively considering serious re-

forms. However, the tortuous recovery from the crisis

and the return of high oil prices have stymied Mos-

cow‟s efforts to move in this direction.

Moreover, the state has even raised its stake in some

companies. This year, for example, the government

has upped its interest in the Russian oil pipeline mo-

nopoly Transneft by 3.5%.

Sechin’s moves

Now, though, Medvedev is pushing for a change. He

won his first victory in April, when Deputy Prime Min-

ister Igor Sechin agreed to leave his post as chairman

of the board of directors of Rosneft, the state-owned

oil company.It should be noted that Sechin is still in a

position to influence Rosneft, as his departure coin-

cided with the promotion of another board member

who is completely loyal to him – Sergei Shishin, the

vice president of state-owned VTB Bank. According

to a source close to the oil company‟s board, Shishin

has “good relations with both Igor Sechin and with

the directorate of the FSB [Russia‟s Federal Security

Service, the successor to the KGB] – in particular, with

[FSB director] Alexander Bortnikov. [1]”

the government has

upped its interest in the

Russian oil pipeline monopoly

Transneft by 3.5%.

“

”


43


Sechin had intended that Shishin would succeed him

as chairman, but his hopes were not realised. Rather,

an independent director – Alexander Nekipelov, the

vice president of the Russian Academy of Sciences –

has been appointed acting chairman.

However, this move is widely viewed as problematic

in light of Sechin‟s history as a strong advocate of

Rosneft‟s interests within the government. Even

Nekipelov, who had been Medvedev‟s preferred can-

didate, said at Rosneft‟s shareholders meeting on

June 10 that the deputy premier‟s departure posed

“certain risks. [2]”

Nepotism

Sechin‟s bid to raise Shishin‟s profile within Rosneft

has found echoes at other companies. In recent

months, some of the officials who serve on the

boards of state-owned companies have tried to ap-

point their own children to take their places.

In early May, for example, the presidential

administration spoke out in opposition to the

proposed appointment of the son of Deputy Premier

Sergei Ivanov as the board chairman of

Rosselkhozbank. (The younger Ivanov, also named

Sergei, is already serving as the general director

of the energy-insurance company SoGaz.) As

a source in the Kremlin noted, Ivanov would

have replaced another fortunate son – namely,

the son of Dmitry Patrushev, the secretary of

Russia‟s Security Council, who has headed

Rosselkhozbank since May 2010. Movement in the

direction of reducing the influence of government

officials, most of them Putin‟s favourites, from com-

pany boards is seen by some as positive and as evi-

dence of reform [3].

Since February 1, moreover, Denis Bortnikov, the

son of FSB chief Alexander Bortnikov, has been

appointed as chairman of the board at VTB Bank-

Northwest. Meanwhile, the new vice president of

Vnesheconombank, Russia‟s foreign trade and

investment bank, is Pyotr Fradkov, the son of Mikhail

Fradkov, the director Russia‟s Foreign Intelligence

Service (SVR) [4].

Gazprom’s board

This is not the only type of horse-trading to have oc-

curred. On June 2, for example, it became known

that Gazprom, the state-run natural gas monopoly,

would no longer count Economic Development Min-

ister Elvira Nabiullina or Energy Minister Sergei

Shmatko as members of its board of directors. How-

ever, First Deputy Premier Victor Zubkov, who al-

ready serves as chairman of the board, will keep his

seat.

According to the Russian press, the Kremlin has yet

to find a replacement that satisfies both the govern-

ment and Gazprom. As such, it is not beyond the

realm of possibility that Zubkov will keep his post as

chairman, at least until October, 1.

Gazprom shareholders are due to elect board mem-

bers at an extraordinary general meeting (EGM) on

June 30, immediately following the regular annual

general meeting (AGM). In total, the Russian govern-

ment has nominated six candidates for seats on the

board. Besides Zubkov, it has put forward the names

of Alexei Miller, Gazprom‟s executive director; Vladi-

mir Mau, the rector of the Russian academy of na-

tional economy and civil service; current board mem-

bers Igor Yusufov and Farit Gazizullin, and also An-

drei Akimov, the head of Gazprombank. The list of

candidates has already presented to shareholders for

approval.

The gas giant‟s board may also include Timur Kuliba-

yev, the chairman of the Kazakhstan‟s state welfare

fund Samruk-Kazyna. Kulibayev has held a number of

“ Sechin‟s bid to raise Shishin‟s

profile within Rosneft has

found echoes at other compa-

nies. In recent months, some

of the officials who serve on the

boards of state-owned companies

have tried to appoint their own chil-

dren to take their places.


44


high-ranking posts at Kazakhstan‟s state-owned oil

and gas companies – Kazakhoil, Kaztransoil and

KazMunaiGaz. He is also the son-in-law of Kazakh-

stani President Nursultan Nazarbayev and one of the

richest businessmen in the Central Asian contry.

(Forbes has estimated his assets at US$1.3 billion) [5].

Meanwhile, the Russian government is reportedly

talking about inviting former German chancellor Ger-

hard Schroeder to join Gazprom‟s board as a replace-

ment for Shmatko or Nabiullina. According to media

reports, no final decision on this plan has been made

yet. Schroeder is currently serving as the head of the

committee of shareholders at Nord Stream AG, the

consortium set up to build and operate the Nord

Stream gas pipeline [6].

As for other state-owned companies, it was an-

nounced in early June that Transneft President Niko-

lai Tokarev would head the board at Zarubezhneft, a

Russian state-owned firm that carries out foreign oil

projects. RusHydro will be headed by Vladimir Tatsy,

the first vice president of Gazprombank, while Ilya

Yuzhanov, the former anti-monopoly policy minister,

will take over at Svyazinvest. Prince Alexander

Trubetskoi, the co-manager of a Russian-French trad-

ing company, is to become the board chairman of

Alrosa.

Doubts

These changes have had a mixed reception. On one

hand, movement in the direction of reducing the

influence of government officials, most of them

Putin‟s favourites, from company boards is seen by

some as positive and as evidence of reform.

On the other hand, some have pointed out that state

-owned energy companies‟ boards will continue to

include civil servants (again, many of them Putin ap-

pointees), even if they hold lower ranks, as inde-

pendent directors. These board members, they say,

still represent interests closely connected with the

government.

This lays the groundwork for future disputes, and

there are already signs of movement in that direc-

tion.

Arkady Dvorkovich, the top economic advisor

to President Medvedev, recently declared that

the Kremlin had “serious doubts” about a number

of board nominees who were due to be

confirmed by July 1. He said that the

presidential administration probably would not

approve the candidates who are believed to be on

“Sechin‟s list. [7]”

The deputy premier had earlier suggested the

appointment of Sergei Chemezov at Inter RAO UES,

an electricity trading company, and Andrei Akimov

at Rosneftegaz, the parent company of Rosneft.

He also put forward the names of Tokarev, the

head of Transneft, and Mathias Warnig, a German

national, for board seats at Transneft and Rosneft.

(Warnig, who served in the East German state securi-

ty agency, known as the Stasi, is one of Putin‟s old

colleagues; he now serves as managing director at

Nord Stream AG.) In early June, it was reported that

Akimov and Chemezov had been accepted as

nominees.

According to the Russian media, eliminating Cheme-

zov and Tokarev could pose certain problems for

President Medvedev. Specifically, some observers

view the dismissal of experienced government offi-

cials from state-run companies‟ boards as negative

for the investment climate.

Some have also pointed out that efforts to diminish

the influence of Putin and his circle, which includes

Sechin and Chemezov, may have deleterious eco-

nomic effects

“ Arkady Dvorkovich, the top

economic advisor to President

Medvedev, recently declared

that the Kremlin had “serious

doubts” about a number of board

nominees who were due to be con-

firmed by July 1.


45


Political ties

Under Medvedev‟s decree, the main changes envi-

sioned have to do with the formal mechanisms of

state control over so-called strategic assets.

Since 1999, the current president‟s predecessor –

Vladimir Putin, now serving as prime minister – has

appointed loyal government officials to the boards

of large state-owned companies active in the energy,

transport, military-industrial and air transport sec-

tors.

Many of these appointees were close allies of Putin,

who of course got his start in the KGB. However,

even liberal members of the government fall into this

category.

For example, Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin has

served as chairman of Alrosa, Russia‟s national dia-

mond-mining company, and VTB Bank, the state-

owned foreign trade bank. Medvedev himself, when

serving as first deputy prime minister before the

presidential election in 2008, was chairman of the

board of directors at Gazprom, the biggest state-

owned company in Russia.

Following instructions

On the surface, high-level officials have been fairly

quick to follow the president‟s instructions. For ex-

ample, Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin, who over-

sees the fuel and energy complex, didn‟t wait for the

July 1 deadline. Rather, he stepped down as chair-

man of the board at Rosneft on April 11, setting an

example to other officials.

Additionally, Sechin, along with Energy Minister Ser-

gei Shmatko, has said he will leave the boards of sev-

eral other state-owned companies – Rosneftegaz

(the largest shareholder in Rosneft), RusHydro (the

national hydropower concern) and Inter RAO UES (an

electricity trader) – by August 31.

The deputy premier and the energy minister an-

nounced plans to step down from their board seats

at Inter RAO UES in June. It is worth noting, however,

that while Sechin left his post as chairman on June

24, the electricity trader‟s majority shareholder is

Rosatom, the state nuclear concern. The latter com-

pany, which is 100% owned by the government,

holds a 57.3% stake in Inter RAO UES.

The trader‟s supervisory board includes many high-

level officials, including Shmatko as well as three

presidential advisors (Larisa Brycheva, Anatoly

Dvorkovich and Sergei Prikhodko). Its chairman is

Igor Shuvalov, a first deputy prime minister.

As such, even though two high-ranking civil servants

are stepping down at Inter RAO UES, the govern-

ment will still retain strong influence at the company

through its control of Rosatom. Moreover, Shmatko‟s

seat on the Rosatom board indicates that very little

change is likely.

Holding off

There are other signs that Moscow is losing the polit-

ical will needed for pushing ahead with economic

reforms.

For example, the Russian Ministry of Economic De-

velopment had earlier announced plans to sell an 8%

stake in RusHydro, 50% minus one share in

Rosagroleasing and 100% of Rosinteragroservice

(RIAS), the state grain company, by 2013. The minis-

try also said that between 2013 and 2015, the state

share in Sovkomflot, the shipping company that has

teamed up with Transneft for the second Baltic Pipe-

line System (BPS-2) project, would be decreased to

50% plus 1 share and that a stake in Russian Railways

(RZhD) of 25% minus one share would be sold. The

Russian government also actively discussed pro-

posals for the privatisation of the Sheremetyevo in-

“ Since 1999, the current presi-

dent‟s predecessor – Vladimir

Putin, now serving as prime minis-

ter – has appointed loyal govern-

ment officials to the boards of large

state-owned companies active in

the energy, transport, military-

industrial and air transport sectors.


46


ternational airport, which is, like the other companies

listed above, fully state-owned.

However, the Kremlin has backtracked, apparently as

a result of an influx of oil revenues – that is,

petrodollars – into the economy in 2010-2011. The

size of the stakes being offered in some state-owned

companies has gone down; for example, Moscow

now intends to sell 7.6% of Sberbank, the state

savings bank, rather than 9.3% as previously

announced.

Meanwhile, plans for the sale of the Sheremetyevo

airport have simply been postponed. (They may be

shelved altogether, given that the government is

now talking about consolidating it with Vnukovo,

another airport near Moscow, and then possibly join-

ing both to Domodedovo, the third airport serving

the capital.)

Meanwhile, Aeroflot – the country‟s biggest airline,

which is 51.17% state-owned – has not even been

considered for privatisation. Nor have Svyazinvest,

the national telecommunications company, or the

Agency of Housing and Mortgage Lending (AIZhK).

As for Transneft, the state oil pipeline operator,

and Zarubezhneft, a state-owned company that is

mostly active in foreign projects, no plans have

been made to sell major stakes that might give an

outsider investor significant control. The same path

is being followed with respect to Rosneft,

Rosselkhozbank (the national agricultural bank), VTB

and RusHydro.

Moreover, Moscow appears to be putting off making

decisions on the fate of state-owned companies

for as long as possible. For example, it was decided

at a government meeting led by Putin in October

2010 to wait until 2014-2015 to sell part of the

state‟s stake in VTB, and until 2016 for Rosneft.

The officials also decided to defer a decision on

the RusHydro stake, saying that a sale was only

possible if a “reliable investor” came forward before-

hand.

These moves were endorsed by Putin, who has not

always seen eye to eye with Medvedev on matters of

economic reform. By contrast, Dvorkovich, who

serves as the top economic advisor to the president,

has said that Moscow may revise its plans for the sale

of a stake in Rosneft.

Conflicts

Following these delays, a commission set up

by Medvedev approached the Russian government

with a proposal for completely eliminating state

ownership of several companies – namely, VTB,

Rosneft, Rosselkhozbank and RusHydro. The presi-

dent has responded positively, and his administra-

tion has said it will not rule out a full exit from VTB

and Rosneft.

This, along with the push to remove high-ranking

civil servants from the boards of state-run firms,

indicates that liberalisation and privatisation

remain among the president‟s top priorities.

However, officials who would see their

influence dwindle as a result of these campaigns

are likely to fight back. If they do, the boards of

these state-run companies may become

battlefields between the Kremlin and the White

House.

For example, in mid-June, it became known that

Medvedev had blocked the government‟s move to

nominate Yuri Kudimov, the general director of VEB

Capital, to the board of Sheremetyevo airport. In-

stead, the president put forward Yuri Medvedev, the

deputy director of the Gazoturbinconstruction Salute

company.

According to press reports, this was at odds with the

government‟s plan, which called for Kudimov to be

replaced by Anatoly Tikhonov, the first vice president

“ Aeroflot – the country‟s biggest

airline, which is 51.17 % state-

owned – has not even been consid-

ered for privatisation.


47


of Vnesheconombank, VEB Capital‟s parent organisa-

tion.

The presidential administration apparently did not

co-ordinate its choice of nominees with the govern-

ment because it feared that this would allow VEB to

play a more prominent role in the process of amal-

gamating the airport‟s terminals.

The presidential administration explained its deci-

sion to nominate the Gazoturbinconstruction Salute

chief by describing the nominee as “a skilled manag-

er with a very good reputation.” It also noted that

Yuri Medvedev, as the deputy director of Rosimush-

chestvo (Russia‟s State Property fund), had never

been involved up in any scandals or conflicts.

However, there may have been horse-trading in-

volved here too.

The decision to nominate Yuri Medvedev was

made by Dvorkovich, the president‟s top economic

advisor. Meanwhile, Dvorkovich‟s wife, Zumrud

Rustamova, is a member of the Sheremetyevo air-

port‟s board of directors. In the past, Rustamova was

also one of Yuri Medvedev‟s colleagues at

Rosimushchestvo.

So once again, board members at a state-owned

company are being replaced by directors with ties to

the government. The difference is that this time,

state-owned companies are not swapping one high-

level civil servant for another but for the directors of

another state-owned company active in the same

sector of the economy.

These trends are not conducive to improving the

image of the Russian economy in the eyes of foreign

investors, as they increase the likelihood of clashes

between the different factions represented on com-

pany boards. Disputes of this type, especially in Rus-

sia‟s regions, have already made many investors skit-

tish in the past.

President Dmitry Medvedev is confronting a difficult

situation in some regions of the Russian Federation

with respect to his push to reduce the government‟s

influence over the boards of public sector energy

firms. In the republics of Tatarstan and Chechnya, for

example, the president‟s decree calling for high-level

officials to leave their board posts has not been ac-

cepted.

The presidential order was issued in late March of

this year. The following month, though, the presi-

dent of Tatarstan, Rustam Minnikhanov, declared

that high-ranking officials would not have to step

down from their seats on the boards of state-owned

companies in Tatarstan [8].

As for Chechnya, high-level officials continue to hold

prominent posts in local energy companies. For ex-

ample, Ramzan Kadyrov, Chechnya‟s president,

serves as chairman at Grozneftegaz.

Tatarstan

In late May, the Tatneftekhiminvest holding con-

vened its annual general meeting (AGM) under the

chairmanship of Minnikhanov.

The shareholders present at the gathering elected a

new board of directors nearly identical to the one

already in place – with the Tatarstani president stay-

ing on as chairman, in violation of Medvedev‟s order.

In total, shareholders appointed 22 persons to Tat-

neftekhiminvest‟s board. (Previously, the board had

21 members.) Along with President Minnikhanov,

several other high-ranking republican officials kept

their places on the board: Prime Minister Ildar Hali-

kov; First Deputy Prime Minister Ravil Muratov; In-

“ The decision to nominate Yuri

Medvedev was made by Dvorko-

vich, the president‟s top econom-

ic advisor. Meanwhile, Dvorkovich‟s

wife, Zumrud Rustamova, is a member

of the Sheremetyevo airport‟s board of

directors. In the past, Rustamova was

also one of Yuri Medvedev‟s colleagues

at Rosimushchestvo.


48


dustry and Trade Minister Ravil Zaripov; Renat Sabi-

rov, an assistant to the president, and Renat Mus-

limov, the president‟s advisor on oil and gas issues.

Meanwhile, new board members included the re-

public‟s minister of energy, Ilshat Fardiyev (who is,

incidentally, the nephew of Tatarstan‟s former Presi-

dent Mintimer Shaimiyev); Economy Minister Midhat

Shagiakhmetov, and the prime minister‟s assistant

for energy, natural gas and chemical issues, Almaz

Galeyev. Overall, almost all members of the holding‟s

board are politicians.

The matter does not end there. Tatneftekhiminvest is

the main shareholder in Tatneft, the republic‟s oil

company. Immediately after its AGM in Almetyevsk

on June 23, Tatneft‟s board met in its new configura-

tion and elected Minnikhanov as its chairman, even

though he was already serving in the same capacity

at the oil company‟s parent organisation.

Meanwhile, members of the republic‟s cabinet of

ministers also hold board seats at Tatarstan‟s other

large energy enterprises – Nizhnekamskneftekhim

and Kazanorgsintez.

Chechnya

The presidential decree will also be difficult to exe-

cute in other regions of the Russian Federation. In

Chechnya, for example, republican officials are still

determined to maintain control over the revenue

streams coming in from the oil and gas sector.

The republic‟s main fuel and energy enterprises are

Grozneftegaz and Chechenneftekhimprom. Both

were registered in 2001.

The first company is involved in the extraction and

transportation of Chechnya‟s oil resources. A minori-

ty 49% share in the company belongs to the govern-

ment of the Chechen republic, while the remaining

51% is in the hands of Rosneft, a company owned by

the Russian government.

In 2001, Akhmad Kadyrov, then serving as Chech-

nya‟s president, was appointed chairman of Groz-

neftegaz‟s board of directors. Currently, his son, Ram-

zan Kadyrov, who has succeeded his father as presi-

dent, is serving as chairman. Musa Eskerkhanov, the

company‟s general director, is a close relative of Pres-

ident Kadyrov.

The second company was originally founded as an

affiliate of Grozneft, which was established during

the Soviet period. It was included in the privatisation

programme of 2004, but so far it remains under the

control of Russia‟s federal government. In 2004,

Chechenneftekhimprom‟s general director was ar-

rested and replaced by a member of Kadyrov‟s inner

circle.

At present, Grozneftegaz has no title to any energy

production and transportation facilities in Chechnya,

while Chechenneftekhimprom‟s property rights exist

only on paper. All licences and titles are under the

control of the company‟s majority shareholder, Ros-

neft.

More than six years ago, Chechenneftekhimprom‟s

oil-producing assets were transferred to Rosneft on

the basis of a lease agreement. Since then, the lead-

ers of the Chechen republic have sought repeatedly

to regain control over this oil. In fact, the first at-

tempts to revise the lease agreement were made by

Akhmad Kadyrov, the father of the current president,

who informed his inner circle one week before his

murder that he intended to hold serious talks on the

matter with Vladimir Putin, then serving as Russia‟s

president.

Money matters

The Chechen leadership is motivated by money. Ac-

cording to official data from Rosneft, Grozneftegaz

“ ...members of the republic‟s

cabinet of ministers also hold

board seats at Tatarstan‟s

other large energy enterprises

– Nizhnekamskneftekhim and Kaza-

norgsintez.

extracted around 1.9 million tonnes (38,000 barrels

per day) of oil in 2008 and 1.6 million tonnes (32,000

bpd) in 2009. Assuming a price of US$90 per barrel,

this oil is worth around US$1.1-1.2 billion per year.

Officials in Grozny have complained that all of the

crude is exported and that none of the proceeds

remain in the republic. These complaints are likely to

be renewed if, as predicted, oil prices continue to

rise – even though Chechnya receives more than

US$1 billion per year in direct subsidies from the

Russian government.

The true disposition of Chechen oil revenues is not

so clear-cut, however, and official Russian statistics

offer no clarity.

Crude is currently exported from the republic by

pipeline and rail and loaded onto tankers for deliv-

ery, with much of it being sold to offshore compa-

nies registered in Cyprus, the Seychelles or else-

where. These buyers use offshore accounts in other

countries such as Liechtenstein to make their pay-

ments, with some of the money going to Russia‟s

state treasury and the rest going into a special ac-

count held by the Russian Energy Ministry.

However, the price for Chechen oil set by the Energy

Ministry does not take account of the volumes used

for blending with lower-quality Russian and Central

Asian crude in Transneft‟s pipelines. In fact, the

amount of Chechen oil blended in this fashion and

exported via the Novorossiisk and Tuapse terminals

is classified as a state secret.

In practice, this allows the owners of the companies

involved in the business to collect even larger

profits, while none of these firms‟ board members

asks about the transparency of money transfers.

Who benefits?

According to the Russian media, those in position to

benefit include Chechnya‟s president, Ramzan

Kadyrov. As noted above, Kadyrov serves as chair-

man of Grozneftegaz. He has frequently clashed with

Russian Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin, who

served as chairman of Rosneft before Medvedev

launched his initiative, over the matter of manage-

ment of oil revenues.

Another player is Vakha Agayev, the founder and

board chairman of the Yugnefteproduct holding,

which was previously controlled by offshore compa-

nies. The firm had strong links to Tuapsenefte-

product and the Tuapse refinery before they came

under Rosneft‟s control. Agayev is considered to be

a close friend to Ramzan Kadyrov. His son has served

as chairman of the Krasnodar refinery, formerly state

-owned but now under the management of Russ-

Neft, a private company. Another prominent name is

that of Nikolai Bukhantsov, a former Russian Energy

Ministry official who was involved in the founding of

Naftatrans, one of the main players in Chechen oil

exports. In 2002-2003, Bukhantsov served in the de-

partments of the Energy Ministry where all data on

quotas, export transactions, shipments and produc-

tion are collected. During the same period, he also

acted as an advisor to former Energy Minister Igor

Yusufov, who then headed the board of Rosneft.

Bukhantsov and Yusufov both lost their positions in

2004, when Sechin took up his position.

Meanwhile, the Magomadov brothers, the scions of

an influential family in the Chechen republic, are

holding the reins at Chechenneftekhimprom. The

elder brothers, Lema and Abdul-Khamid Magoma-

dov, are members of Kadyrov‟s government, one

serving as a deputy premier and the other as the

minister of economic development and trade.

The younger brothers, Yunus and Yusup Magoma-

dov, worked at the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 2003-


49


“ Crude is currently exported from

the republic by pipeline and rail

and loaded onto tankers for delivery,

with much of it being sold to offshore

companies registered in Cyprus, the

Seychelles or elsewhere.

2004. They held posts in the department charged with

ensuring the security of the republic‟s oil pipelines –

that is, with protecting the infrastructure of

Chechenneftekhimprom.

For his part, Adlan Magomadov served as plenipoten-

tiary representative of the Chechen republic in Mos-

cow until July 2004, and after personnel shifts, he be-

came the head of the Impexproduct company. This

firm, which had a central office in Moscow and

branches in Kazakhstan and Ukraine, was until recent-

ly the main oil trading concern of RussNeft – which

was, incidentally, founded by Mikhail Gutseriyev, a

businessman from Ingushetia.

Another name in the mix is that of Pyotr Suslov, a for-

mer officer in Russia‟s Foreign Intelligence Service

(SVR), who has been an active participant in Russian

oil, energy and construction projects. Suslov has at

various times crossed paths with Sechin.

Family ties

Meanwhile, the Magomadov brothers, the scions of

an influential family in the Chechen republic, are hold-

ing the reins at Chechenneftekhimprom. The elder

brothers, Lema and Abdul-Khamid Magomadov, are

members of Kadyrov‟s government, one serving as a

deputy premier and the other as the minister of eco-

nomic development and trade.

The younger brothers, Yunus and Yusup Magomadov,

worked at the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 2003-2004.

They held posts in the department charged with en-

suring the security of the republic‟s oil pipelines – that

is, with protecting the infrastructure of

Chechenneftekhimprom.

For his part, Adlan Magomadov served as plenipoten-

tiary representative of the Chechen republic in Mos-

cow until July 2004, and after personnel shifts, he be-

came the head of the Impexproduct company. This

firm, which had a central office in Moscow and

branches in Kazakhstan and Ukraine, was until recent-

ly the main oil trading concern of RussNeft – which

was, incidentally, founded by Mikhail Gutseriyev, a

businessman from Ingushetia.

Another name in the mix is that of Pyotr Suslov, a for-

mer officer in Russia‟s Foreign Intelligence Service

(SVR), who has been an active participant in Russian

oil, energy and construction projects. Suslov has at

various times crossed paths with Sechin.

Dead end

The examples of Tatarstan and Chechnya provide fur-

ther evidence that Medvedev‟s effort to push govern-

ment officials out of state-owned energy companies is

at a dead end.

The president‟s campaign has not led to any apprecia-

ble growth in foreign investments and has not made

these companies more transparent. Rather, govern-

ment control over the companies mentioned in this

series has not been reduced.

Notes:

* Dr. Zurab Garakanidze is an author in News Base E-

magazine.

1) Татьяна Становая . ДИРЕКТОРА ИЗ СОВЕТОВ.

http://www.politcom.ru/12097.html

2) Татьяна Становая . ДИРЕКТОРА ИЗ СОВЕТОВ.

http://www.politcom.ru/12097.html

3) На места чиновников в советах директоров

компаний придут единоросы. http://

neftegaz.ru/news/view/99064/

4) Ibid.

5) В совет директоров Газпрома может войти

Тимур Кулибаев. http://www.oilcapital.ru/

news/2011/05/231021_167842.shtml

6) Герхард Шредер стал претендентом на

должность в Газпроме. http://www.oilcapital.ru/

news/2011/05/231022_167843.shtml

7) Татьяна Становая . ДИРЕКТОРА ИЗ

СОВЕТОВ. http://www.politcom.ru/12097.html

8) Президента Татарстана снова выбрали

председателем совета директоров. http://

www.regnum.ru/news/1407454.html


50


“ The examples of Tatarstan and

Chechnya provide further evidence

that Medvedev‟s effort to push govern-

ment officials out of state-owned ener-

gy companies is at a dead end.

J ust when the threat of Islamist terrorism

seemed to be successfully suppressed, the

actions of Breivik bring awareness of the

evil engendered by other extremist ideo-

logies.

When a Muslim terrorist commits an act of violence,

Muslims all over the world tend to be blamed. As

soon as an outrage is reported, the media jump to

the conclusion that it must be Muslim terrorism.

But when it turns out that a white Christian has

committed an unspeakably violent act, then he

is always a lone wolf. The recent horrific shootings

in Norway prompted a rush to judgment by certain

irresponsible commentators and bloggers that

was soon contradicted by the facts. Like

Timothy McVeigh in Oklahoma, we have a new

name to add to the list of lone, white extremist

murderers of children -- the Norwegian, Anders

Behring Breivik.

His bombing of government buildings in Oslo that

Friday, followed by the slaughter of around 86 young

victims on an island adds a chilling new dimension to

Western-Muslim relations. Breivik was not Muslim and

his victims were not Muslims and he did not bomb a

mosque or a Muslim neighborhood. Fueled by his

twisted Islamophobia, he chose instead as his target

the "multicultural elites" who he believed were res-

ponsible for supporting Muslim immigration into Eu-

rope, accusing left-wing politicians in Europe of al-

lowing Muslims to overrun the continent.

Calling himself a Christian conservative, patriot and

nationalist, he said in his online manifesto that the

"indigenous Europeans" responsible would be punis-

hed for their "treasonous acts." So with convoluted

logic, Breivik bombed government buildings in Oslo

where the leading Labor party was headquartered

and he targeted young people gathered at an annual

Labor Party summer retreat.

A New War on

Terror?

By Dr. Azeem Ibrahim*

AFRICA REVIEW COMMENTARY

51


Countries in the European Union are feeling particu-

larly vulnerable to the latent and sometimes overt

Islamophobia manifesting itself recently. Germany's

leader, Angela Merkel acknowledged publicly that

"multiculturalism has failed" and the rise of nationalist,

racist movements in Britain are causing deep concern.

The European Union with its borderless inclusion of

immigrants is currently under severe economic stress

as the eurozone is on the brink of collapse. Any eco-

nomic turmoil allows resentments to surface against

the "other" -- usually hardworking immigrants whose

relative success is due to working long hours under

difficult conditions, unlike the local unemployed whi-

te youth with their welfare entitlement mentality. It

can be an explosive situation, especially if the immig-

rants are of another race, language, religion and cultu-

re, and Norway has been welcoming in recent years to

thousands of refugees from Pakistan, Iraq and Soma-

lia. The Muslim population of Norway is only 1.8 per-

cent, small compared with Germany and France's im-

migrant populations, but obviously outstanding in a

homogenous population such as Norway's.

Once again, we are forced to try to understand the

mentality of a violent extremist such as Breivik. As the

prescient Molly Ivins said in 2001 about the Oklahoma

bombing, "Exactly how a supposed code of honor

could drive someone to murder 168 people is beyond

me, but it is obviously not unique to McVeigh."

Breivik's 1,500 word online manifesto lacks any inner

logic. He identifies with the Knights Templar, predicts

a major European war to drive out Islamic influence by

2083, and quotes American Islamophobic bloggers

and writers, such as Daniel Pipes and Robert Spencer

who runs the Jihad Watch website. Some of the U.S.

writers are quick to deny any responsibility for Brei-

vik's actions, in spite of his numerous citations of their

anti-Islamist views. Of course they must bear responsi-

bility for motivating Breivik and giving a spurious legi-

timacy and language for his inchoate views. Parts of

the manifesto were taken almost word for word from

the writings of "Unabomber" Ted Kaczynski, substitu-

ting the word "multiculturalism" for "leftism." Breivik's

manifesto is a ragtag collection of other people's beli-

efs emerging as a garbage can of fringe and racist

writings from the internet.

What makes a sick thinker move from internet ramb-

ling to cold-blooded murder is going to be a subject

for long debate and endless speculation to come.

Breivik's situation can be described as something simi-

lar to "the banality of evil" or "normalizing the unthin-

kable", where doing things in an organized and syste-

matic way, such as documenting it in detail in a diary,

results in normalizing routine actions that normally

would be degrading, murderous, unspeakable.

"People do great wrong, not because they are unawa-

re of what they are doing but because they consider it

to be right." It will be interesting to see if the

Norwegian justice system allows him to testify in co-

urt so he can expound in public his extreme nationa-

list philosophy.

Breivik's violent extremism based on his Islamophobia

is particularly shocking when one considers the dra-

matic reduction in Islamic extremism in recent years.

Radical Islamist plots have almost disappeared, thanks

to better policing and intelligence work. In 2009, only

one out of 294 attacks in six European countries was

attributed to Islamists. Common perceptions about

terrorism in Europe are misplaced and young Muslim

activists are more likely to be concerned about po-

verty, unemployment and exclusion, just like their

Western counterparts. According to a recent Pew

Center Global Attitudes study, Muslim countries are

just as concerned about Islamic extremism and violen-

ce in their own countries, and overall there is a notice-

able thaw in Europe and the US in Muslim-Western

relations since 2006.

Just when the threat of Islamist terrorism seemed to

be successfully contained and suppressed, the actions

last Friday of the Norwegian white supremacist, Brei-

vik, has brought about a horrified new awareness of

the evil engendered by the continuation of the war on

terror.

Note:

* Dr Azeem Ibrahim is a Fellow and Member of the

Board of Directors at the Institute of Social Policy and

Understanding and a former Research Scholar at the

Kennedy School of Government at Harvard and World

Fellow at Yale.

More writings here: http://www.azeemibrahim.com

A New War on Terror | By Dr. Azeem Ibrahim

52


http://www.azeemibrahim.com/

53


AFRICA REVIEW COMMENTARY

A fter two years of negotiations, Russia

and France signed a treaty of military

cooperation on June 17, 2011 under

which two Mistral-class amphibious

assault ships, together with their full technological

complement, will be sold to Russia. This deal marked

the largest transfer of sensitive military equipment

from one country to another in history. The agree-

ment is designed to stimulate each country‟s stag-

nating economy – slowed down by the world crisis –,

revive Sarkozy‟s domestic support, appease the

French electorate‟s discontent and satisfy the French

military lobby‟s demands. Russia is seeking to renew

its outdated military and technological base in order

to restore the effectiveness of its military deterrence

at the regional level. Meanwhile, France will take ad-

vantage of this commercial windfall to expand into

new arms markets and further boost its foreign poli-

cy initiatives [1]

In March 2009, less than one year after the August

2008 Russian-Georgian War over South Ossetia and

just a few months after the stock market crash in

Moscow, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev an-

nounced a major economic recovery plan, which

included a targeted infrastructure program designed

to reinvigorate the Russian economy and to bring

economic growth indicators back to 2000-2007 lev-

els. In addition to supporting the usual energy and

raw material export activities, the plan, most im-

portantly, also stipulated that significant sums would

be spent on streamlining and modernizing the Rus-

sian military [2].

The details of these expenditures were disclosed on

February 24, 2011, when Deputy Defense Minister

Vladimir Popovkin announced a long-flagged rearm-

ament plan, set to run through 2020. This ambitious

$650 billion weapons procurement program is de-

signed to counter what is perceived as U.S. military

encroachment in what the Kremlin regards as its

“sphere of privileged interests.” Russia intends to

simultaneously acquire and develop new technolo-

gies with both military and civilian applications,

which will allow it to reduce the size of the armed

forces and turn them into professional organizations

[3].

The program also includes a downsizing process

within the Russian armed forces. Some 200,000 offic-


What‟s in for France and Russia?

By Assoc. Prof. Richard Rousseau*

Mistral Warship Deal | By Assoc. Prof. Richard Rousseau

54


ers will be sent on compulsory retirement and 200

General Officer positions will be abolished (the Rus-

sian Armed Forces have some 1,100 General Officers

and 350,000 other officer positions). Meanwhile, the

number of lieutenants will be increased from 50,000

to 60,000 in order to decentralize the decision-

making process and more effectively delegate au-

thority. The lion‟s share of the new spending will be

funneled towards Russia‟s nuclear submarine fleet

(eight new ones are planned) and the next genera-

tion of anti-missile defense (S-500) that will replace

the already popular S-300 antimissile system. In addi-

tion, by 2020 the Russian Navy will have at its dispos-

al 35 corvettes, 15 frigates and 400 new ships. Air

Force procurement will total 600 warplanes and

1,000 helicopters. However, Russian Army insiders

already play down these numbers and allude to the

fact that the Ministry of Defense is already behind

schedule with this program [4]. They claim that insuf-

ficient funds have been allocated from the budget to

carry out the proposed changes. With the global eco-

nomic crisis potentially gaining momentum, such

problems and recriminations are not likely to disap-

pear any time soon.

The Russian armed forces will benefit from the adop-

tion of the new multi-role Mig-35 fighter jet and su-

perior equipment, such as the new the Sukhoi Su-35,

while a fifth-generation prototype stealth fighter, the

Twin-engine jet fighter Sukhoi PAK FA (“Prospective

Airborne Complex of Frontline Aviation”), is being

developed through tests. The production and updat-

ing of the Mil Mi-28 Havoc attack helicopters, Mil Mi-

24 gunship and attack helicopters, the two-seat Ka-

mov Ka-52 “Alligator” and the Ka-60\60U\60R “Orca”

series of medium transport multi-role helicopters are

also accelerating. The army will also be equipped

with the Italian light armored vehicle Iveco LMV M65,

which was particularly appreciated in Afghanistan

when it was used against Improvised Explosive De-

vices (IDEs), also known as roadside bombs.

The nuclear strategic forces, which will be cut by one

third (33%) under the New START agreements (this

agreement supersedes the 2002 Treaty on Strategic

Offensive Reductions (SORT)) signed with the United

States in April 2010, will be radically modernized –

especially missile launchers – to ensure the effective-

ness of nuclear deterrence. The Russian Ministry of

Defense is also trying to quickly bring into operation

the RSM-56 Bulava missile, a three-stage, solid-

fuelled, submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)

capable of delivering a nuclear warhead launched

from submarines. However, the Bulava has a trou-

bled history. After years of failed tests, it was finally

successfully test-launched in October 2010. There

are, however, still doubts about its operationaliza-

tion, as a test launch from the Yurii Dolgorukii SSBN

submarine scheduled for December 2010 has been

postponed until mid-2011 [5].

While RSM-54 Sineva SBLM intercontinental ballistic

missiles are already installed and operational on the

Delta IV class submarines, the Russian submarine

fleet will be further supplemented by six new Yasen/

Severodvinsk class nuclear submarines, considered

the jewels of the Russian Navy, with its 120 meters in

length and capable of carrying 24 ballistic missiles

with a range of 5,000 kilometers. This submarine‟s

propulsion system is considered by the U.S. Office of

Naval Intelligence as the quietest – or the least de-

tectable – submarine manufactured anywhere in the

world.

The Importance of the Mistral Warship for Russia

The most important aspect of Russia‟s naval modern-

ization plan is, however, the purchase of the two

French Mistral-class warships which will be delivered

to Russia in 2014 and 2015 from the Saint-Nazaire-

based STX shipyard located in the northwest of

France. The two countries are continuing their nego-

tiations for two more Mistral class warships that

would be build in Russia, this time under French li-

censes.

...by 2020 the Russian Navy will have at its dis-

posal 35 corvettes, 15 frigates and 400 new ships. Air

Force procurement will total 600 warplanes and 1,000 helicopters.

“

”


55


The Russian navy consists of outdated but still

popular vessels, such as the Sovremenny class

missile destroyer, built in the mid-1980s by the Sovi-

et Navy. Russian leaders, however, complain about

grave weaknesses of these vessels, citing the slow

pace of naval movements during the war against

Georgia in August 2008 [6]. Each 21,300 ton

Mistral-class ship is a BPC (Bâtiments de projection

et de commandement) capable of carrying 16 to 20

heavy combat helicopters, four air-cushioned crafts

for landing troops ashore, several dozen vehicles

(13 battle tanks and 60 armored vehicles) and

from 450 to 900 combat ground troops carrying

their weapons for both long and short term

deployment. It also can carry on board a floating

hospital and an operational command and control

centre.

Negotiations between the French and Russian Minis-

tries of Defense began to intensify during a meeting

at the shipbuilding hall in St. Petersburg in June

2009. They then laid the foundations for future coop-

eration. Negotiations over the Mistral really picked

up steam the following year when the French com-

pany Thales signed an agreement with the Ural Opti-

cal Mechanical Plant, located in Vologda, on the sup-

ply of night vision technology to be installed in T-

90U tanks. Finally, Franco-Russian cooperation was

formalized on January 25, 2011, with the signing of

the Cooperation Treaty concerning the Mistral war-

ships.

The agreement set up a joint venture between

France‟s Direction des Constructions Navales (DCN)

and Russia‟s United Shipbuilding Corporation (USC),

two state owned companies, to construct four fully

armed and operational Mistrals on the basis of the

formula “2 +2,” i.e. two ships will be built at the Saint

Nazaire shipyard and two at the Admiralty Shipyard

in St. Petersburg. Both shipyards take their direction

from the French and Russian governments respec-

tively. Paris has given Moscow its assurances that the

Sinik 9, a highly sophisticated control and communi-

cation system that is installed on the Charles de

Gaulle aircraft carrier, will be transferred to Russia as

part of the deal. Negotiating this agreement was of-

ten a complex task because, at the insistence of Paris,

clauses on the transfer of sensitive “know-how” had

to be framed in precise and elaborate legal terms. In

addition, agreeing on a price for the two French war-

ships is a daunting task, so much so that it has not

yet been established, though it will presumably fall

between $1.15 and 1.3 billion.

In addition to providing a significant economic boost

and substantial revenue, Medvedev‟s technological

rearmament plan also aims to reconnect the govern-

ment with the heavy industry lobby, the military es-

tablishment and those “siloviki” (former KGB men

and military officers) who have complained about a

lack of structural investment in defense and opera-

tional shortcomings that predominantly stem from

the obsolescent military arsenal [7]. In mid-May 2011,

Alexander Postnikov, Commander-in-Chief of the

Russian Ground Forces, stated in effect that it was

cheaper to buy three modern German Leopard 2

tanks than one Russian T-90.

The regeneration of the armed forces has been un-

dertaken in accordance with the new Russian Nation-

al Security Strategy made public on May 12, 2009 [8],

which insisted on the need for military reforms and a

quick transfer of geostrategic focus from the global

to the regional arena, in particular to the Caucasus,

Central Asia, and the Far East. The newly purchased

French hardware is designed to increase Russia‟s ca-

pacity to intervene in short and medium range thea-

tres of conflict. It comes as no surprise, then, that the

In addition to providing a significant economic boost and substantial revenue,

Medvedev‟s technological rearma-ment plan also aims to reconnect the government with the heavy industry lobby, the military es-t a b l i s h m e n t a n d t h o s e “siloviki” (former KGB men and military officers) who have com-plained about a lack of structural

investment in defense and opera-tional shortcomings that predom-inantly stem from the ob-solescent military arsenal.

“

”


56


Kremlin has announced that the first two Mistral

ships will be allocated to the Pacific Fleet, while the

third and fourth will be deployed as part of the Baltic

and Black Sea fleets, respectively.

Sarkozy and the French Economic and Military

Revival

France, in keeping with tradition, has once again

lived up to its reputation for being one of the most

independent and flexible members of the North At-

lantic Treaty Organization (NATO). However, its new

strategic business partner, Russia, has a troublesome

military past and it is still in conflict with the West

over NATO‟s expansion into Eastern Europe. Moreo-

ver, the Unites States‟ insistence on moving forward

on the installation of an anti-missile defense system

on the territory of former members of the Warsaw

pact (now new NATO member countries) may have

unintended consequences on Russia‟s home front.

According to Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO Gen-

eral Secretary, the Mistral agreement should not be

labeled as politically dangerous. If one considers that

Russia is a reliable partner, then, it should be treated

consistently in areas such as defense. NATO mem-

bers and Russia have worked together for decades to

maintain peace, stressed Rasmussen during a meet-

ing of the NATO-Russia Council on June 8, 2011 in

Brussels. Nevertheless, the General Secretary‟s argu-

ments and reassurances have not changed the per-

ception, especially in Central and Eastern Europe,

that the Franco-Russian deal, much to their dismay,

will give Moscow more military and diplomatic clout

in its relations with the former Soviet republics and

satellite countries [10].

Nicolas Sarkozy gives a lot of consideration to the

development of the French industrial sector, seeing

it not only as a driver of economic recovery but as a

means of restoring his own political standing. In ad-

dition, he thinks that an upgraded industrial sector

would provide France with an opportunity to regain

its national pride. The Mistral deal is one step in that

direction. Economic and political expediency are

joined up and play center stage to closer and mutu-

ally beneficial relations between France and Russia.

The French industry has encountered rough waters

in recent years. Many sectors have been faced with

dire times, resulting in massive job losses, manufac-

turing output down across various sectors, and polit-

ical and economic strife at home. The downward

economic spiral in the industrial sector started out

with a 13% freefall in 2009. Almost two hundred

thousand jobs vanished in that sector in a short peri-

od of time, which totals 42% of all job losses. Moreo-

ver, France‟s share of exports in the euro zone

dropped from 16% to 12.5% since 2000. The indica-

tors of rough sailing ahead are reflected in most sec-

tors of the French economy. There are major cracks

in infrastructure, frequent breakdowns in the rail

transport system, drops in production of nuclear en-

ergy due to ageing equipment, recurring power

shortages and grid failures in various regions of the

country [11].

Tough times for international trade have been tied in

with these industrial setbacks in the last decade. For

instance, Siemens‟ withdrew from a joint venture

with Areva, a French public multinational conglom-

erate and the world‟s largest manufacturer of nuclear

reactors, which forced Avera to buy back shares in its

own nuclear reactor for approximately 2 billion Euros

(US $3 billion) in January 2009. Then there was the

Areva‟s reactor construction disaster in Finland in

September 2009. As part of the proverbial fallout the

French state-owned nuclear power group had to

come up with billions of Euros in penalties to cover

the delays and cost overruns in a face saving effort.

French industry‟s woes continued when it lost a con-

tract for four reactors to Abu Dhabi (South Korea

won the contract). This failure was blamed on Presi-

“ The French industry has en-

countered rough waters in re-

cent years. Many sectors have

been faced with dire times, re-

sulting in massive job losses, manu-

facturing output down across vari-

ous sectors, and political and eco-

nomic strife at home.


57


dent Sarkozy, who had personally promoted the deal

with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). He had even

flown to Abu Dhabi to promote Areva‟s bid. France‟s

failure to win the construction project for 42 high-

speed rail lines in China, and then a similar contract

in Saudi Arabia, (the Medina-Mecca railway project),

constituted disappointments of huge proportion in

French political circles. Poland‟s decision in 2004 to

award China a 49 kilometer highway project instead

of France was also hard to swallow. The plethora of

problems facing the French industrial sector is so

serious that the respected French weekly magazine

Le Point, in its February 4, 2010 issue, ran an article

entitled “Why We [France] Lose Mega Projects” [12]

The French economy is tied to its industrial base. In

contrast to the British economy, service, financial and

construction sectors are not strong enough to sup-

plement the industrial production and achieve sus-

tainable prosperity. In effect, it is estimated that for

each job created in the industrial sector between 6

and 10 additional positions are generated in the ser-

vice sector. Two million jobs have been lost in the

industrial sector in the last the decades and the cur-

rent world economic turbulence is only accelerating

this trend. Highly industrialized economies of the

Euro zone – Great Britain, Germany and Holland

come to mind here – are more diversified, forward

thinking in R&D (research and development), and

more integrated into the global economy, achieving

by the same token greater productivity gains.

President Sarkozy wants to reverse the current nega-

tive trends in the French economy, which Jacques

Attali and Nicolas Baverez, two prominent French

economists and intellectuals, describe as the French

“déclinisme” (declinism). On March 4, 2010 Sarkozy

announced that the French government would take

all necessary steps to support the French industrial

and manufacturing sectors. The Mistral deal with

Russia is reflective of this new emphasis on assisting

French industrialists [13].

Another contributing factor that impacts on the justi-

fication for the Mistral sale is France‟s relative eco-

nomic slump in relation to Germany‟s vibrant econo-

my in the last decade. Germany has aggressively de-

veloped closer economic cooperation with Russia.

Great strides have been made in German since the

fall of the Soviet Union and the reunification of the

country in 1990. German industrialists are still in-

creasing Germany‟s competitiveness and productivi-

ty, and much of this gain is attributed to the

strengthening of the high-tech sector. France wants

to be able to compete with Germany on the Russian

market, at least in terms of finding a commercial

niche in the arms trade in what is perceived to be a

booming market [14].

Germany is now able to gain a windfall from the up-

swing in emerging markets (47% of German exports

are to emerging markets, as compared to only 25%

of total French exports). Berlin‟s effective employ-

ment policies have helped contain unemployment

(7.%, as against 9.7% in France in 2010). Germany has

also run a lower structural budget deficit than France

(3.5% in Germany versus 6% in France) and kept pub-

lic spending to 45% of GDP, despite the $2 billion

spent on the reunification, whereas in France this

indicator is more than 50% of GDP.

There are many reasons for Paris to be concerned

about the ever-evolving German-Russian strategic

partnership. In 2008, that is, before the global eco-

nomic downturn, German-Russian foreign trade vol-

ume jumped by 19.8% to more than 68 billion Euros.

That made Russia Germany‟s top trading partner in

Eastern Europe, ahead of Poland. That same year,

German exports to Russia were worth 32.3 billion

Euros, almost equal to its export volume to China (34

billion Euros). More than 6,000 German companies

“ Germany is now able to gain a

windfall from the upswing in

emerging markets (47% of Ger-

man exports are to emerging

markets, as compared to only 25% of

total French exports). Berlin‟s effective

employment policies have helped con-

tain unemployment (7.%, as against

9.7% in France in 2010).

are registered in Russia, with investments that had

reached $17.4 billion by the end of 2008. In reality,

the investment volume may be significantly higher,

as many German enterprises channel investments

through third countries, such as Austria or the Neth-

erlands. Economic relations between Germany and

Russia did slow in 2009 and 2010 but only slightly.

The Elysee in Paris fully is fully aware that the long-

term sustained growth of German-Russian trade

stands in sharp contrast to the dropping develop-

ment of France-Germany or Germany-U.S. business

relations. Consequently, France‟s new foreign policy

toward Russia and the Mistral sale are examples of

Paris seeking to regain the capacity to affect on

global issues as a major player on the international

scene.

Finally, Sarkozy‟s record low popularity among

French voters is perhaps one of the most pragmatic

reasons of his intense efforts on pulling off a suc-

cessful big deal with Russia [15]. It is only one year

until the next French presidential election, and as

there have been many policy failures, it would be

Russian Roulette to refuse to conclude a contract

with Russia that is worth a few billion euros and

which creates, or at least maintains, “real jobs” for

thousands of French workers. Any political leader

facing such pressing economic pressures on the

home front would easily be willing to turn a blind

eye to allegations that Russia is a military threat,

whether eminent or not, to French, European or

even NATO‟s interests. Any attempt to derail the

deal out of an alleged security threat would bring

French workers out onto the streets in mass and

their protests could turn violent.

For many observers and European leaders, the Rus-

sia of today is not the bogeyman of yesterday. For

Russia, this deal is multi-layered, not only on a geo-

strategic level but in terms of how an efficient and

modern military will serve as a powerful deterrent to

what Russia considers hostile elements in countries

of the former Soviet Union, especially in the South

Caucasus and Central Asia. It is in some of these

newly independent states that real threats are per-

ceived on the horizon by the Kremlin and Russian

army generals. Moreover, Russia is fully aware of Chi-

nese economic penetration and demographic reali-

ties, and sees these factors as threatening its inter-

ests at home and in its “near abroad.”

Cooperation with NATO remains important to

Medvedev, especially if it helps to decrease the cur-

rent technological gap between Russia and the

West. For its part, France, while seeking to maintain

its competitive strength in military exports, also in-

tends to further diversity and expand its presence in

foreign markets. The current war in Libya provides

an excellent opportunity to showcase its military

hardware and standing as an international player.

Notes:

* Dr. Richard Rousseau is Associate Professor and

Chairman of the Department of Political Science and

International Relations at Khazar University in Baku,

Azerbaijan and a contributor to Global Brief, World

Affairs in the 21st Century (www.globalbrief.ca) and

The Jamestown Foundation.

1) Irina Titova, Russia buys 2 Mistral-class warships

from France, Associated Press, June 17, 2011; Ed-

ward Cody, Russia to Buy Two Warships in Deal

with France, The Washington Post, December 25,

2010; Russia to Buy 4 Mistral Class Warships from

France – Sarkozy, Interfax, Military News Agency,

March 2, 2010; Russia Hopes to Build Mistral-Class

Warships on Its Own - Gen. Staff, Interfax. Russia

& FSU General News, February 24, 2010;

Medvedev Confirms Russian Plan to Buy Mistral

Class Warships from France, Interfax. Russia & CIS

Business & Financial Newswire, March 1, 2010;

Sarkozy: Russia, France Starting Talks on Russian

Purchase of 4 Mistral-Class Warships, Interfax.

Russia & CIS Business & Financial Newswire,

March 1, 2010.

2) Russia's economy to reach pre-crisis level by late

2012, RIA Novosti, December v16, 2009 http://

en.rian.ru/business/20091216/157255443.html ;

Рейтинг – труба (Reiting truba), Kommersant,


58


http://www.globalbrief.ca/

http://en.rian.ru/business/20091216/157255443.html

http://en.rian.ru/business/20091216/157255443.html

December 9, 2008 http://www.kommersant.ru/

doc.aspx?DocsID=1091360.http://

www.kommersant.ru/doc/1091360 ; Matthews,

Owen; Nemtsova, Anna, The Medvedev Doctrine,

(cover story), Newsweek (Atlantic Edition), De-

cember 1, 2008, Vol. 152 Issue 22, p. 44-47.

3) Russia's $650B Arms Drive Misguided, Agence

France Press, March 17, 2011. http://

www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=5986005 ;

Russian Military To Be Fully Rearmed By 2020, RIA

Novosti November 24, 2008 http://en.rian.ru/

russia/20081119/118402887.html

4) Fred Weir, With Russia's $650 billion rearmament

plan, the bear sharpens its teeth, The Christian

Science Monitor, February 28, 2011 http://

www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2011/0228/

With-Russia-s-650-billion-rearmament-plan-the-

bear-sharpens-its-teeth; Russia announces rearm-

ament plan, BBC, March 17, 2009 http://

news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7947824

5) Sharon Squassoni, Jane Kaminski The New START

Agreement, Center for Strategic and International

Studies (CSIS), April 12, 2010 http://csis.org/

publication/new-start-agreement ; Senate must

ratify new START agreement on nuclear arms, The

Christian Science Monitor, November 15, 2011

http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/the-

monitors-view/2010/1115/Senate-must-ratify-

new-START-agreement-on-nuclear-arms

6) Kanet, Roger E., Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st

Century, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010; De Haas, Mar-

cel, Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st

Century, Putin, Medvedev and Beyond, Taylor &

Francis, 2010.

7) Spechler, Dina Rome, Russian Foreign Policy Dur-

ing the Putin Presidency, Problems of Post-

Communism, Sep/Oct 2010, Vol. 57 Issue 5, p. 35-

50; Hahn, Gordon M., Medvedev, Putin, and Pere-

stroika 2.0, Demokratizatsiya, Summer 2010, Vol.

18 Issue 3, p. 228-259; March, Luke, Nationalism

for Export? The Domestic and Foreign Policy Im-

plications of the New 'Russian Idea', Conference

Papers -- International Studies Association, 2009

Annual Meeting, p. 1-23; Markoff, Jeffrey, Russian

Foreign Policy and the United States After Putin,

Problems of Post-Communism, Jul/Aug 2008, Vol.

55 Issue 4, p. 42-51; Osborn, Andrew, Medvedev

Enters, but Putin Is Omnipresent, Wall Street Jour-

nal - Eastern Edition, May 8, 2008, Vol. 251 Issue

108, p. A10.

8) Richard Rousseau, „The “New” Russian Foreign

Policy: A Time-Honored Russian Tradition,‟ Eu-

rope‟s World, May 24, 2010 http://

www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home_old/

PartnerPosts/tabid/671/PostID/1441/language/

en-US/Default.aspx

9) Vladimir Socor, NATO Disinclined to Debate Mis-

tral Affair, The Jamestown Foundation, Eurasia

Daily Monitor, December 9, 2010 http://

www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/ ; France

ready to build Mistral for Russia in 2013 The

Jamestown Foundation, Eurasia Daily Monitor,

October 29, 2010; Vladimir Socor, Russia Launch-

es International Tender for Warship Procurement,

The Jamestown Foundation, Eurasia Daily Moni-

tor, October 10, 2010; Vladimir Socor, US Embassy

in Moscow Indicates Acceptance of Mistral

Deal,The Jamestown Foundation, Eurasia Daily

Monitor, May 3, 2010.

10) Nicolas Baverez, L'industrie française victime du

colbertisme, Le Point, February 25, 2010.

11) Pourquoi les mégacontrats nous échappent, Le

Point, January 28, 2010 http://www.lepoint.fr/

archives/article.php/420510

12) Guisnel Jean, Le Mistral accueille des hélicoptères

russes, Le Point.fr, January 12, 2009; Négociations

exclusives entre la France et la Russie pour la

vente de quatre navires Mistral, Le Point, January

3, 2010

13) Malgré la reprise, l'économie française ne devrait

pas rattraper son retard, Agence France Press,

June 18, 2010 http://www.lepoint.fr/societe/

malgre-la-reprise-l-economie-francaise-ne-

devrait-pas-rattraper-son-retard-18-06-2010-

467927_23.php

14) Sylvain Besson, Sarkozy se met en retrait, Le

Temps (Genève), February 13, 2010.


59


http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1091360.http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1091360



http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=5986005

http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=5986005

http://en.rian.ru/russia/20081119/118402887.html

http://en.rian.ru/russia/20081119/118402887.html

http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2011/0228/With-Russia-s-650-billion-rearmament-plan-the-bear-sharpens-its-teeth




http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7947824

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7947824

http://csis.org/publication/new-start-agreement

http://csis.org/publication/new-start-agreement

http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/the-monitors-view/2010/1115/Senate-must-ratify-new-START-agreement-on-nuclear-arms



http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home_old/PartnerPosts/tabid/671/PostID/1441/language/en-US/Default.aspx




http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/

http://www.lepoint.fr/archives/article.php/420510

http://www.lepoint.fr/archives/article.php/420510

http://www.lepoint.fr/societe/malgre-la-reprise-l-economie-francaise-ne-devrait-pas-rattraper-son-retard-18-06-2010-467927_23.php




L eaving public opinion aside, the leader-

ship of all post-Soviet countries enjoy rea-

sonably amicable relations with Russia The

exception is Georgia, whose ongoing con-

flict with Russia is recognized as the most acute

across the entire post-Soviet territory. Following the

August War in 2008, Russia and Georgia are now offi-

cially enemies: direct diplomatic relations between

the two countries has been cut. Relations between

Moscow and Tbilisi have been seriously damaged by

Russia‟s official recognition of Abkhazia and South

Ossetia as “independent states”, or, in reality, Russian

protectorates. In light of the worsening political rela-

tions between Georgia and Russia, ordinary Geor-

gians overwhelmingly desire a positive relationship

with Russia. According to a poll undertaken by the

Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC) in August

2009, 54% of Georgians continued to favor extremely

close political cooperation with Russia [1]. But this

bilateral dispute is highly personal, with Russia‟s

leadership saying it will not engage with President

Saakashvili. And the dispute between these two

countries is not based on a misunderstanding; it is a

power conflict rooted in specific choices made by

the political leaders of Russia and Georgia.

Most local analysts believe that relations will improve

with new leadership, and have focused on the search

for short-term political parallels in the 2012 presiden-

tial elections that will take place in both Russia and

Georgia: will Saakashvili use the “Putin Model”? If so,

who will be the Georgian “Medvedev”? But there is

no speculation that really illuminates Georgia‟s politi-

cal trajectory and its future relations with Russia. Per-

haps the most striking issue is that personal relations

at the highest level are extremely poor; the mutual

dislike between Russian Prime Minister Vladimir

Putin and Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili has

in some ways come to define the current relationship

between Russia and Georgia. The impact this clash

has had on relations between the two countries re-

flects the intense role that personality plays in gov-

ernments of the former Soviet states. The infor-

mation war between Russian and Georgia after the

August War was based largely on the mutual accusa-

tions of culpability between leaderships [2]. It seems

that the problem is to do with the leadership; the

majority desire of Georgians for close cooperation

with Russia changes when the focus is placed on

Moscow‟s current government. According to a Gal-

lup poll, Georgia is the country with the highest per-

Russia-Georgia Relations:

Among Illusions and Visions

By Zaur Shiriyev*

AFRICA REVIEW CAUCASUS REVIEW

60


centage of people who do not approve of Russia‟s

leadership (76%) [3].

Tbilisi's choices

Saakashvili and his government face a dilemma with

regard to next year‘s parliament elections and af-

terwards presidential elections. Either they can try to

focus on the problems more important than regain-

ing the lost territories, or they can continue to dangle

the illusions of future EU and/or NATO membership.

Most Georgians – and this is true across the demo-

graphic - would be convinced by a short term gov-

ernment commitment to liberate Abkhazia and

South Ossetia and make them part of Georgia, and

moreover, few are willing to pay the costs associated

with further military action, after the August War [4].

The net result is that Georgia can neither change the

reality nor accept it. The Georgian government does

not believe that there is any point in forming rela-

tionships with Sukhumi and Tshkinvali, official or

otherwise, on the grounds that at this stage, the is-

sue is Russian occupation. Thus for as long as that

continues, there is nothing to be gained by engaging

with these de facto authorities [5]. There are two pil-

lars of the government‟s current policy: non-

recognition [of independence] and diplomatic en-

gagement. While both of these approaches entail

maintaining or establishing contact with the people

of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, they do not neces-

sarily sit easily together. The Parliamentary Elections

next year and Presidential elections in 2013 will be

politically decisive, and the current government‟s

concrete planning is in tension with fear about a

change in government.

Parliament and Presidential Elections: defining

Georgia’s political future

“The Putin Model”, where the post of Prime Minister

follows Presidency, will be tested next year in Tbilisi,

and lies at the heart of the political speculation in

Georgia, and many other lines of speculation are

connected to this notion. In the meantime, Saakash-

vili's constitutional reforms have strengthened the

position of Prime Minister. Members of the Georgian

opposition before and after the August War, con-

nected powerfully with the population through ex-

hortations to “change the present authorities

through demonstrations”; now this seems to have

lost its applicability, even though, arguably there

are autocratic elements in Saakashvili‟s ruling meth-

ods. The Georgian public doesn‟t want to see pro-

tests and demonstrations, which will likely have a

negative impact on Georgian statehood. This senti-

ment is summed up in Alexander Kukhanidze‟s

words: “We know that Saakashvili is not ideal, but

he is the best choice [6]. The constitutional changes

that will come into effect from 2013 were introduced

in order to strengthen the position of Prime Minis-

ter, and have fueled speculation that President Saa-

kashvili is hoping to continue his political career as

Prime Minister. Under these reforms, the powers of

the president have been curtailed: the state‟s devel-

opment will no longer depend quite so much on the

presidential whim. The prime minister and parlia-

ment will play a more significant role, and serve as a

serious check on the actions of the future head of

state. However, the public supports the attitude of

the current government, which is “if you want to

change the leadership, the only way is through

elections”. President Saakashvili is neither denying

nor confirming such speculation, saying simply:

"No. Theoretically, there is such an opportunity. But

I'd like to repeat that this opportunity is useful for us

[7]. With Saakashvili not actively denying this specu-

lation, many of the opposition parties and analysts in

Tbilisi have no doubt that the president intends to

become prime minister. Irakli Alasania, leader of Our

Georgia Free Democrats (OGFD) and a former Tbilisi

mayoral candidate, has declared, "The proposed

61


Russia-Georgia Relations | By Zaur Shiriyev

“ “The Putin Model”, where the post

of Prime Minister follows Presi-

dency, will be tested next year in

Tbilisi, and lies at the heart of the

political speculation in Georgia, and

many other lines of speculation are con-

nected to this notion.

model is an attempt to tailor the new position per-

sonally for Saakashvili."

Arguably, Georgians are not happy to see political

models named after Putin; they want to see their

own model, which ideally should entail the continua-

tion of the current government, less emphasis on the

personality of the President, and improvements in

Russian-Georgian relations. Importantly, the first

elections scheduled in Georgia will be the Parliament

Elections in October 2012, followed by the Presiden-

tial Elections in January 2013. For this reason, the

implementation of the “Putin Model” now seems out

of the question. The outcome of the Russian Presi-

dential election will refine the speculation about Saa-

kashvili‟s future plans.

One thing that can be said about Saakashvili‟s Geor-

gia in 2011 is that it is a very different environment to

Putin‟s Russia in 2000. But for Saakashvili‟s legacy to

be one of a genuine reformer, he must personally

endorse and demonstrate democratic reform in ac-

tion, and step down from power in 2013; it is clear

that head of government will be elected by a majori-

ty in parliament, where at the moment the Presi-

dent‟s United National Movement has an unchal-

lenged majority. There is no need to focus on per-

sonalities so much, because party policies are unlike-

ly to change very much.

Conclusion

The future relations between Russia and Georgia are

strongly dependent upon these elections, upon who

will be the future leader. One thing is clear: in both

Moscow and Tbilisi, the new leaders will come from

current political ruling elites. If future relations con-

tinue to be pre-dominated by conflict resolution and

the attitudes of leaders, the relationship will not de-

velop beyond a dialogue of illusions. There is a cru-

cial need to find areas of common ground as points

for discussion, such as economic relations. The best

example of this is the Enguri hydroelectric power

plant, which is being used by both Abkhazia and

Georgia. Enguri produces up to 40% of Georgia‟s

winter electricity supply needs. The plant is located

in Abkhazia, and the dam is located on undisputed

Georgian territory – and yet there have not been any

significant disruptions in transmission to undisputed

Georgia since the 2008 conflict. The same principles

could be applied more broadly to Russian-Georgian

relations. For instance: if Georgia broke its embargo

of Russian membership to the World Trade Union

(WTO), Russia would end its embargo on Georgian

wine, mineral water and agricultural produce, be-

cause such an embargo contravenes WTO rules. The

golden rule is: improving economic relations will

improve state relations at a political level.

Notes:

* Zaur Shiriyev is foreign policy analyst at the Center

for Strategic Studies in Baku, Azerbaijan.

1) http://home.gwu.edu/~cwelt/

Russian_Analytical_Digest_68.pdf

2) Vladimir Putin 'wanted to hang Georgian Presi-

dent Saakashvili by the balls', The Sunday Times,

November 2008, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/

tol/news/world/europe/article5147422.ece

3) Russia's Leadership Not Popular Worldwide, Au-

gust 2011, http://www.gallup.com/poll/148862/

Russia-Leadership-Not-Popular-Worldwide.aspx

4) Author‟s discussion with members of expert com-

munity of Georgia, 14-23 August 2011

5) Interview with Professor Ghia Nodia, full text to be

published in Second issue of “Caucasus Interna-

tional”

6) Author‟s discussion with Professor Alexander Ku-

khanidze, 17 August, 2011, Tbilisi, Georgia

7) Saakashvili cannot be like Putin, http://

www.georgiatimes.info/en/articles/57595-1.html

“ Georgians are not happy to see

political models named after

Putin; they want to see their

own model, which ideally

should entail the continuation of the

current government, less emphasis on

the personality of the President, and

improvements in Russian-Georgian re-

lations.

62


Russia-Georgia Relations | By Zaur Shiriyev

http://home.gwu.edu/~cwelt/Russian_Analytical_Digest_68.pdf

http://home.gwu.edu/~cwelt/Russian_Analytical_Digest_68.pdf

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article5147422.ece

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article5147422.ece

http://www.gallup.com/poll/148862/Russia-Leadership-Not-Popular-Worldwide.aspx

http://www.gallup.com/poll/148862/Russia-Leadership-Not-Popular-Worldwide.aspx

http://www.georgiatimes.info/en/articles/57595-1.html

http://www.georgiatimes.info/en/articles/57595-1.html

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I ntroduction

The dispute in the „South China Sea‟ is, as

widely known, a multistate affair. Cook (2011),

in an interview with Ian Storey, showed that

tensions have been escalating in this area since

around 2007 [1]. In majority, it is two sets of islands

(atoll and reef chains), the Paracel‟s and Spratly‟s

(including a number of submerged shallow islands)

that are at the centre of this multinational dispute.

Key players include China (the PRC mainland, Taiwan,

Hong Kong, Macau), Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia,

and Brunei. Notable secondary actors include the

USA, ASEAN, Indonesia, Thailand, the UN, EU and Sin-

gapore. These key players have, over the past 4 years,

been escalating disputes over a number of key issues

which are: a build-up of militarism and a lack of diplo-

macy by all except Brunei (especially in the Spratly‟s);

access to oil, natural gas and other minerals; access to

lucrative fisheries; control over lucrative lanes of

trade; defining national territorial waters versus iden-

tifying international waters; objections by China for

the involvement of secondary actors in the dispute

(Anonymous, 2010; Buckley, 2011); the Beijing Con-

sensus being used against China and the Washington

Consensus using war-games to flex its muscles; Tai-

wanese sovereignty; and overall mixed signals from

each key player (the PRC, for example, expressed

goodwill for the region yet also continued the devel-

opment and deployment of blue water naval ships

and the offloading of materiel in the Spratly‟s).

There is something of a stew of growing nationalism

at present (such as the Philippines renaming the

„South China Sea‟ to the „West Philippine Sea‟: see

Conflict in the

„SOUTH CHINA SEA‟ Lessons from the Dene peoples and the Arctic Conflict?

By Dr. Jean-Paul Gagnon*

AFRICA REVIEW

CHINA REVIEW

65


Foreword

Before we engage this enthralling subject, I should like to point out an added detail to the works cited in this paper.

This is obviously not an original development, but it is a new attempt in my research. As can be seen, the evidence has

been divided under third order subheadings that categorize different types of publications. This is done to explicitly

detail the ‘weight’ of evidence and allow the reader to gain a greater grasp of the evidentiary bias that is present here-

in. A portion of this effort is to try to include ‘new media’ (such as blogs) as part of the traditional media drawn upon.

Cheng 2011 for more). We see, in another example,

Vietnam passing a conscription bill which is in many

ways worrying. However, I feel that the likelihood to

this dispute mounting to serious violence to be an

exaggeration (an opinion that is widely shared in the

extant literature). What this rise in nationalism will do,

rather, is hinder regional cooperation and collective

growth. Violence would do untold harm to China‟s

efforts for global goodwill and South-South relations

(i.e. trade, research and culture swaps) which it has

been building over the past 20 years. Cheng (2011)

adds to this reasoning as China has restated its com-

mitment to a non-violent resolution to the conflict

(see also Anonymous, 2011). We also have to consider

the diplomatic efforts that have been making inroads

through the Treaty of Amity of Cooperation, the Dec-

laration of Conduct and the „South China Sea‟ Work-

shop as barriers to violence.

Overall, it comes down to what many commenta-

tors have been saying for some time: focus on di-

plomacy, do not play to nationalist currents at the

expense of other citizenries and the ASEAN+3 re-

gion, and work on a friendly and cooperative strat-

egy for the betterment of the region. This paper

will try and provide a small prescriptive measure

for realistic progress to be made in that direction.

Origins & Evolution

It would be a very difficult undertaking, although

a greatly interesting one, to try and map the his-

tory of „South China Sea‟ disputes between states

bordering that Sea. The focus here is rather on

the last ten years. What exactly happened that

sparked this renewed escalation of militarism,

nationalism and international belligerence? One

analyst (Nordhaug, 2011), argued that part of the

reason could stem from the Republic of China

(ROC or Taiwan). The ROC could use this dispute

to its diplomatic advantage by lining up its inter-

ests with non-PRC claimants to try to limit the

PRC‟s influence in the Sea. Thus, by acting-up

about the PRC‟s growing presence and trying to

disrupt the PRC‟s „sphere of influence‟ it might

make matters easier for the ROC to increase its

diplomatic recognition.

Li and Li (2003) demonstrate that we should also take

into consideration the famous “9 dotted line map” (I

counted 13 lines) created by the PRC in 1947 [2] (see

Map 1). It is reasonable to agree with non-PRC posi-

tions that argue this map to have no legal relevance. It

is obviously a map designed to maximize a freshly

consolidated militaristic power and looks more like a

map of empire than of a socialist democracy as the

PRC supposedly considers itself to be. Nevertheless,

this map could serve to raise the eyebrows of several

non-PRC powers in the region. Should we go further

and tie in the growth of the People‟s Liberation Army

Navy (or PLAN) in the Sea, it is understandable why

tensions have been escalating. With a map like this

and the means to enforce it, counter-measures should

be taken even if such a goal for the PRC would be pre-

posterous [3].

Conflict in the ‘South China Sea’ | By Dr. Jean-Paul Gagnon

66


*From Li and Li (2003:228)

Map 1 – China’s ‘9 Dotted Line’ Map

A speech by the Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary

sums up the situation better than I could have hoped

to:

Excellencies,

In the interest of utilizing preventive diplomacy

measures as a means of averting the escalation of

tensions into serious conflict, the Philippines would

like to share our experience in the last five months in

the West Philippine Sea, also known as the South Chi-

na Sea. The Philippines have suffered at least seven

(7) aggressive intrusions since late February into

where we maintain we have sovereign rights. These

intrusions happened within eighty-five nautical miles

from the nearest Philippine island of Palawan and

nearly six hundred nautical miles from the nearest

coast of China.

When the Philippines protested these

intrusions, the response was a denial

that no such intrusions occurred be-

cause of China's 9-dash line claim over

the entire South China Sea. The Philip-

pines contends that the 9-dash claim of

China has no validity under interna-

tional law, specifically the United Na-

tions Convention on the Law of the Sea

or UNCLOS. If Philippine sovereign

rights can be denigrated by this base-

less claim, many countries should begin

to contemplate the potential threat to

freedom of navigation in the South

China Sea.

The preventive diplomacy solution as

advocated by ARF may be achieved in

either of two ways: one, through a pro-

cess of segregating the disputed features from the

non-disputed waters which will have to be vetted by

the ASEAN maritime legal experts scheduled to meet

in September in Manila; two, in the alternative, the

Parties may wish to consider subjecting the 9-dash

line to validation in accordance with UNCLOS. The

Philippines believes that a rules-based approach is

the only legitimate way in addressing disputes in the

South China Sea. (Rosario, 2011)

But, as Emmers (in a presentation associated with his

2009 monograph) convincingly argued, the PRC is not

the only party to blame. In the following map (Map 2),

we can gain a sense (as of 1996) as to what the situa-

tion was like in the Spratly‟s. [4] Because of these dis-

puted zones, we saw ASEAN take a diplomatic lead

and establish the aforementioned agreements to

forge a path for a peaceful and perhaps even logical

resolution to this dilemma. This is probably the most

prevalent argument in the literature on the subject:

that diplomacy is the key to successful resolution

(Swanström, Joyner, and Snyder offer papers arguing

similarly). Most, it appears, have however come to the

conclusion that ASEAN must formulate stronger mul-

tilateral agreements with more robust recommenda-

tions that are capable of settling these disputes and

allowing the region to move forward.

In June, 2011, we saw an interesting turn of political

events between the Philippines and the USA (see San-

tolan, 2011, for more). The US Embassy in the Philip-

pines stated that it would not take sides in regional

disputes (despite the Mutual Aid Treaty) which

prompted a response from President Benigno Aquino

attempting to encourage the US to live up to its

agreement. From this reading, it appears that the US

is perhaps being unwantedly drawn into backing anti-


67


Map 2 – 1996 Dispute of the Spratly Islands


68


China positions. However, the US shortly thereafter

stated its support for the Philippines which is perhaps

why the Philippino government is pushing forward

plans for oil extraction in the contested Spratly‟s

(Kate, 2011).

Finally, Zeliger (2011) argues that the „South China

Sea‟ conflict has been ongoing for decades and that

what is presently happening is not an entirely new

affair. With the rise of China, countries with a stake in

the sea are arguing that the PRC is trying to claim the

entire Sea for itself (both an unpopular move at home

as much as it is abroad). One voice in the Zeliger piece

offered a good analogy. What China is supposedly

trying to do is the same as if the USA claimed the en-

tire Atlantic for itself.

Parallels with the Arctic

A natural geopolitical zone for comparison in this dis-

cussion is the Arctic Ocean and the dispute over min-

erals therein. Canada, Russia, the USA, Denmark (via

Greenland), and Norway are all squabbling over who

gets what under that ocean. Rather than elaborate on

what, in many respects, are similar arguments be-

tween both international disputes, I should like to

highlight an argument that came from a former indig-

enous politician in Canada‟s Northwest Territory. Ste-

phen Kakfwi, in a presentation [5] with John Raulston

Saul, argued that each country must come to view the

Arctic as a zone of commonwealth. It belongs to all

citizens and nations of the Arctic and should be ap-

proached in the same cooperative spirit. As will

come to be seen below, this is the crux of the pre-

scription I will make.

Prescriptions for Resolution & Conclusion

Most, through a cursory glance at the geograph-

ically disputed islands, would come to an easy

conclusion that the PRC is stretching its claims

thin for the Spratly Islands (see Map 3). If any-

thing, these islands are fair game for the Philip-

pines, Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam. Where this

cursory glance becomes useless is over the Para-

cel Islands (I include Pattle Island, Passu Keah and

Woody Island under Paracel) [6]. These are within

normative distances for territorial claims

(although these distances are not legitimate as they

were not democratically ratified through inter-

citizenry agreements at the international level). Per-

haps a „fairer‟ stake at national territorial waters in this

geopolitical zone should concern shallow plateaus (as

indicated on Map 3) where most visible sea-life is

based. Of course, this enters this discussion into long-

standing disputes over what exactly (and who exactly)

designates „national‟ territorial waters over

„international‟ waters (see the Convention on the Ter-

ritorial and the Contiguous Zone, 1958, for more)

which is beyond the scope of this article.

As can be seen on Map 3, these „shallow‟ plateaus are

given different colours: Red, for China‟s flag colour

(there is no sub-meaning with this choice of a san-

guine colour); yellow for other ASEAN countries; and

green for a zone between the PRC and Vietnam which

requires bi-lateral resolution. From Map 4, we can see

distances from the PRC‟s Hainan province to the Para-

cel Islands. Similar measurements with Vietnam show

that the distance is slightly greater which favours Chi-

na‟s stake. However, these are measurements from

the „shallow‟ plateaus. Given that these islands (and

other submerged elevations suitable for oil and min-

eral exploitation/exploration) are in „blue waters‟, my

argument is that China and Vietnam should have a

mutual and shared stake concerning interests in and

or around the Paracel islands. The same is argued

about the Spratly‟s and the Philippines, Brunei, Malay-

sia and Vietnam.

Map 3 – Area of Conflict and Marked Shallow Plateaus

*Powered by Google Maps Earth Application


69


Kakfwi‟s example of various indigenous nations work-

ing together in the Northwest Territory through the

use of logical and fair rules is an important one to

transplant to the „South China Sea‟. Influence, and

legitimate stake, of minerals and oil decreases from a

country as the distance grows greater and increases

as the distance grows nearer. Where, for example,

there are areas that the distance is near for two par-

ties (see for example the waters between Vietnam‟s

Lai Tao and China‟s Qiziwan in Hainan), numbers

should dictate the split. In other words, measure the

distance from coast to coast to coast, and divide that

number equitably. That way chance dictates who gets

what and removes any use of violent conflict through

the machines of war (the latter is an obscene stupidity

in my opinion). Should China‟s sought after minerals

fall into the hands of Vietnam (or vice versa), then

trade for the bloody goods and increase the regions‟

comparative advantage. Naturally, I would prefer if

this entire process took a strong democratic approach

and involved the citizenries of the key players in dia-

logue and decision making. That is unfortunately un-

realistic. One, nevertheless, can dream.

Notes:

* Dr. Jean-Paul Gagnon is a social and political the-

orist with a Ph.D. in political science. He completed

his doctorate at the Queensland University of Tech-

nology under the aegis of Australia‟s prestigious En-

deavour Award.

1) The reader should, however, note that inter-

national tensions have, for decades if not cen-

turies, been present in this geopolitical arena.

2) Some, however, date this map at 1951.

3) However, it appears that this map is being

taken seriously by the PRC as it submitted the

map to the UN on May 7, 2009 (Jamandre,

2011). The Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and

Indonesia among others have all lodged for-

mal protests within the UN due to this action.

4) Should it be of interest, Cossa (1998) elaborat-

ed on possible conflict triggers.

5) These two talks on aboriginal sovereignty in

the Arctic were hosted by the Canadian Inter-

national Council and delivered on January 13,

2011, at 6:30 pm (Vivian and David Campbell

Conference Facility, University of Toronto).

6) Other islands to consider in this dispute are

the “Macclesfied Bank” and “Pratas.”

Works Cited

Media

Anonymous. 9/21/2010. “China to US: Keep Out of

South China Sea Dispute,” Huffington Post. Available

at: <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/09/21/

china-tells-us-to-keep-ou_n_732977.html>

(accessed 7/22/2011).

Anonymous. 6/23/2011. “Armed Conflict for

Control of South China Sea Unlikely,” The

China Post. Available at: <http://

www.chinapost.com.tw/editorial/world-

issues/2011/06/23/307134/Armed-

conflict.htm> (accessed 7/19/2011).

Buckley, Chris. 6/14/2011. “China Warns

Outside Nations to Stay out of Sea Dispute,”

Reuters. Available at: <http://

www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/14/china-

vietnam-idUSL3E7HE0GR20110614>

(accessed 7/22/2011).

Cheng, William. 6/15/2011. “PH [Philippines]

Welcomes China Statement on Sea Dis-

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7/22/2011).

Kate, Daniel Ten. 7/24/2011. “Philippines to Test

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Ocean Development & International Law, 34: 287-295.


70


http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/06/15/11/ph-welcomes-china-statement-sea-dispute



http://ph.news.yahoo.com/blogs/the-inbox/ph-protests-china-9-dash-line-claim-over-20110413-064347-870.html



http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-24/clinton-calls-for-global-response-to-rising-s-china-sea-risks.html




http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2011/7/17/asia/9105222&sec=asia

http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2011/7/17/asia/9105222&sec=asia

http://ph.news.yahoo.com/chinas-9-dash-claim-over-entire-west-philippine-110002489.html



http://www.wsws.org/articles/2011/jun2011/scse-j15.shtml

http://www.wsws.org/articles/2011/jun2011/scse-j15.shtml

http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/06/20/a_guide_to_the_escalating_conflict_in_the_south_china_sea




http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_1_1958_territorial_sea.pdf



http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=151

http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=151

http://www.southchinasea.org/docs/Joyner,%20Spratly%20Islands%20Dispute.pdf



http://www.southchinasea.org/docs/Nordhaug.pdf

http://www.southchinasea.org/docs/Nordhaug.pdf

http://www.usip.org/publications/south-china-sea-dispute-prospects-preventive-diplomacy



http://www.southchinasea.org/docs/Swanstrom.pdf

http://www.southchinasea.org/docs/Swanstrom.pdf

http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm



About the

CESRAN | Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis

The CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS (CESRAN) is a private, non-political,

non-profit, internet-based organization of scholars who are interested in world politics, and

enthusiastic about contributing to the field of international relations as not only academics,

but also practitioners. The underlying motive behind the foundation of the CESRAN is a need

to bridge the gap between the students of international relations and practitioners of inter-

national politics. In this regard, the main ideal is gathering people, who come from different

backgrounds and have different perspectives, around the CESRAN in order to yield fresh and

illuminating insights as to how the international relations is carried out in a globalizing world.

To this end, the CESRAN aims at establishing and maintaining close contact with and be-

tween politicians, bureaucrats, business people, and academics that would lead to the devel-

opment of better policies.

We invite anyone who shares these interests to become a member and participate in our ac-

tivities.

Email: [email protected]

Members of the Executive Board of the CESRAN:

Özgür TÜFEKÇİ, Chairman (King’s College London, UK)

Alper Tolga BULUT, Vice-Chairman (University of Houston, USA)

Kadri Kaan RENDA, Vice-Chairman (King’s College London, UK)

Aksel ERSOY, Member (University of Birmingham, UK)

Ali Onur ÖZÇELİK, Member (University of Sheffield, UK)

Hüsrev TABAK, Member (University College London, UK)

Abdullah UZUN, Member (Karadeniz Technical University, Turkey)

Members of the Council of the CESRAN:

Prof. Mark BASSIN (Södertörn University, Sweden)

Prof. Bülent GÖKAY (Keele University, UK)

Dr. Ayla Göl (Aberystwyth University, UK)

Prof. Bayram GÜNGÖR (Karadeniz Technical University, Turkey)

Prof. Alp ÖZERDEM (Coventry University, UK)

Mr Bill PARK (King’s College London, UK)

Prof. İbrahim SİRKECİ (Regent’s College, UK)

Prof. Birol YEŞİLADA (Portland State University, USA)

www.cesran.org

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W here is Jiang?

As the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was celebrat-

ing its 90th anniversary on July 1, 2011 one of the key

things that fixated China Watchers was that former

Communist Party Secretary and China President Jiang

Zemin was not present during the ceremonies. Two

of Jiang‟s former senior cadre members- Premier Li

Peng and Zhu Rongji were at the celebration but

their boss was mysteriously absent. The Party gave no

official reason as to why Jiang was absent from the

event or even acknowledged that he was not in at-

tendance. While there were rumors within China that

he had died Hong Kong Asia TV Limited News was

the first and only Mainland news source to report that

Jiang had died. They later retracted and apologized

for the story. In addition to the Hong Kong media the

Japanese and Korean media announced Jiang‟s death

while Western new sources reported that the possible

reason for Jiang not attending the event was ill health

because of his age [1]. For China Watchers one of the

main sources that were used to monitor the spread-

ing of the rumors about Jiang Zemin was the China‟s

micro-blogging site Weibo, On July 6th, Weibo users

stated that the roads of Beijing‟s premier military hos-

pitals, Hospital 301, were blocked off and a series of

black Mercedes-Benzes were seen driving into the

hospital. Mercedes-Benz is the vehicle of choice for

the elites within the CCP.

There is no evidence that the roads to Hospital 301

were closed or that the roads were closed for Jiang

Zemin or that Jiang has even died. The speculation of

Jiang‟s illness or death were only heightened by the

government‟s censoring of twenty words such as

“Jiang”, which means river, and “301”. It was only until

July 7th that the state media, Xinhua News, released

the first official statement regarding the rumors say-

ing that Jiang Zemin‟s ill health were just rumors and

that he is currently just resting in his home [2]. China

Watchers need to take the information gleaned from

Weibo carefully as the content is still screened inter-

nally to ensure subversive ideas are not disseminated

and the messages can be difficult to verify. Despite

the uncertainty faced in verifying the accuracy from

Weibo it is sometimes one of the few sources that

The Missing

Leader By Nicholas Miller*

AFRICA REVIEW

CHINA REVIEW

72


allow China Watchers a chance to see things that the

Party does not want outsiders to see or know.

Traditionally the health of senior or retired Party

officials is considered a state secret. When an official

does die it usually announced within one to two

days of their death. It should be noted that

this was not the first time that there has been

speculation on Jiang‟s health. He did not appear at

the funeral of former Chinese Foreign Minister Huang

Hua in December 2010, which lead to Chi-

na Watchers questions whether he had taken ill or

died.

Who is Jiang Zemin?

Jiang Zemin was one of the key members of the Third

Generation of Chinese leaders, and served as the

General Secretary of the CCP from 1989-2002, Presi-

dent of the People‟s Republic of China (PRC) from

1993-2003, and Chairman of the Central Military

Commission (CMC) from 1989-2002. Jiang rose to

prominence in 1989 after Zhao Ziyang, then CPC

General Secretary, was purged after his involvement

in Tiananmen. Jiang was chosen by Deng Xiaoping to

succeed Zhao Ziyang as a compromise between the

Party elders and younger leaders to prevent further

political fracturing within the CCP. Initially when

Jiang took over as President in 1992 China Watchers

were uncertain whether he would be able to manage

the various factions and his tenure would be similar

to Hua Guofeng, who was anointed by Mao to be his

successor on his deathbed in 1976 and was eventual-

ly ousted by Deng Xiaoping and his allies losing all his

major positions by 1981. Jiang‟s ability to consolidate

his power amongst the various factions during the

1990s proved the initial doubts against him wrong.

During Jiang‟s tenure he weathered the PRC through

collapse of the USSR and its satellites throughout

Eastern Europe and the hand over of Hong Kong from

the United Kingdom to the PRC. Jiang is credited with

carrying out Deng‟s goal to further spread the eco-

nomic liberalization throughout the country along a

gradual path rather then the shock treatments that

occurred in Russia during the 1990s and the develop-

ment of his own political philosophy, the Three Rep-

resents, into the Party Constitution. Jiang also insti-

tuted the policy of mandatory retirement of Party

members once they reach the age of 70, which was to

begin with the 14th Party Congress in 1992. Jiang ex-

empted himself from this policy initiative as he

turned 71 at the 15th Party Congress and was 76 when

he retired in 2002 [3]. Next, he had all the top leader-

ship positions – General Secretary, President, Chair of

the Standing Committee of the NPC, and Premier to

be limited to a maximum of two terms.

Jiang‟s core elite faction under him was known as the

Shanghai Clique, who were some of the chief power

players within Chinese politics in the 1990s. The

members of the Shanghai Clique were elites that

were advanced through Jiang Zemin. Jiang solidified

his position by launching a series of anti-corruption

probes to remove his political rivals, such as Beijing

Party Boss Chen Xitong in 1995. He promoted his pro-

tégés into high-ranking positions such as - Zheng

Qinghong to running the General Office of the Cen-

tral Committee, Yu Xigui to direct the Central Body-

guard Bureau, and Wu Bangguo, the current NPC

Chairman, who was previously the Party Secretary of

Shanghai to a full membership within the Politburo.

These promotions lead to a backlash within the elites

who began to block his appointments to various po-

sitions.

During the leadership transition between Jiang and

Hu in at the 16th Party Congress in 2002 many China

analysts wondering how much power Jiang and the

The Missing Leader | By Nicholas Miller

73


“ Jiang Zemin was one of the

key members of the Third

Generation of Chinese lead-

ers, and served as the Gen-

eral Secretary of the CCP from

1989-2002, President of the Peo-

ple‟s Republic of China (PRC) from

1993-2003, and Chairman of the

Central Military Commission

(CMC) from 1989-2002.

Shanghai Clique would have during the Hu Jintao‟s

tenure as General Secretary as Jiang left power with

two thirds of the nine-member Politburo Standing

Committee loyal to him and Jiang still retained

his position as Chairman of the CMC. It was not until

2008 that Hu was able to dismantle most of the

Shanghai Clique‟s influence throughout the CCP.

One area that will need to be watched in the future is

when Jiang does die whether it will have any bearing

on how the succession of the Chief Executive of Hong

Kong in 2012 will turn out. Henry Tang Ying Yen, has

strong ties to the Shanghai Clique and is considered

the frontrunner to win the election. However, the

Hong Kong race is still too uncertain to call it for Hen-

ry Tang Ying Yen but it is something China Watchers

will have to observe along with the General Secretary

elections at the 18th Party Congress in 2012.

Potential Impact:

Determining leadership succession accurately within

China and the possible impact that retired officials

could have on the selection and election of new lead-

ers is still an arcane process that relies upon Cold War

kremlinological techniques to understand what could

be going on within the Great Hall of the People. Chi-

na Watchers now have sift through message posts on

sites like Weibo, state media releases, and analyzing

the seating arrangements of elites during major

events in order to ascertain whether a particular elite

could be rising within the Party or have fallen from

grace.

The process of choosing the next leadership is han-

dled behind closed doors and the Party does not

want any event that could destabilize the transition

process or show to the outside world that there are

any signs of infighting within the elites. Guessing the

influence of retired political leaders is difficult but

within the current political system top leaders now

have to rely upon consensus building amongst a vari-

ety of elites and factions rather than a leader being

able to designate a successor and the Party going

along with this ruling like what happened during the

Mao era.

To outsiders it may look like the CCP is overreacting

by censoring the Internet searches for Jiang Zemin

but their reaction against these rumors stems from

the fear that a death of a major political figure could

lead to instability throughout the country. While

Jiang Zemin‟s legacy is considered a mix one within

China and in the Western world China analysts be-

lieve that when Jiang does die that it will be very un-

likely that widespread instability will occur. Jiang

Zemin‟s influence has been steadily decreasing after

the successful dismantling of the Shanghai Clique by

Hu Jintao. While it is far more likely that the rumors

are false and Jiang is very much alive when Jiang

does pass on he will leave behind the institutional

checks and balances that will ensure a smooth transi-

tion for the upcoming leadership succession between

Hu and Xi Jinping in 2012.

Notes:

* Nicholas J.S. Miller is a PhD candidate at the Uni-

versity of Sydney.

E-mail: [email protected]

1) “What will affect the bilateral relations of the pre-

vious president Jiang Zemin‟s death,” Sankei

Shimbun, 07/07/2011; Jamil Anderlini, “CCP birth-

day gala: where‟s Jiang Zemin,” Financial Times,

01/07/2011

2) “Jiang Zemin‟s death „pure rumor‟,” Xinhua,

07/07/2011; “China‟s Jiang „resting at home‟ dur-

ing death rumors,” Reuters, 13/07/2011.

3) J. Fewsmith, Elite Politics in Contemporary China,

M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, 2001, p. 33.

The Missing Leader | By Nicholas Miller

74


“ While it is far more likely that the

rumors are false and Jiang is very

much alive when Jiang does pass on

he will leave behind the institutional

checks and balances that will ensure

a smooth transition for the upcoming

leadership succession between Hu

and Xi Jinping in 2012.

M any Greeks believe that the dichotomy between a

Greek civil service, which is perceived as slow, well-

paid and overstretched and on the other hand of a

private sector, which carries the costs of the existence of a big

state is the reason for the current crisis. Who do you think is

to blame for the Greek crisis?

First of all, I think it is essential to stress the multiple character of the current

crisis. We live in a globalized economy now more than ever, and it is a truism

that the effects of, for example, a credit crisis in the US could very much influ-

ence economic policies in the Eurozone and beyond. In contrast with other

countries around the world, Greece has been particularly hit by the so-called

Great Recession of the late-2000s, for a variety of reasons. Greece‟s current

predicament could be summed up in the herculean task of dealing with its

Interview with Dr. Alexandros Nafpliotis*

By K. Kaan Renda**

AFRICA REVIEW

INTERVIEW

75


sovereign debt crisis. This colossal public debt was mainly caused by

spendthrift state policies during the previous three decades. Successive

governments of Greece, whose economy is among the 30 largest in the

world, and was one of the fastest growing in the Eurozone during the 2000s,

based the country‟s entire social model on running large public deficits,

predominantly in order to finance public sector jobs (thus creating a

gigantic and unsustainable civil service), with an eye to gaining advantage

over their political rivals. The somewhat nefarious ways of the credit

rating agencies, in conjunction with the lack of a stentorian European answer

to Greece‟s financial woes, has added poisonous elements to the already toxic

mix. As far as the dichotomy mentioned in the question is concerned, I would

like to make two observations. It is true that a large part of the Greek civil

service is slow, well-paid and overstretched (I would also add inefficient

and corrupt), and that the private sector is encumbered with all the negative

consequences of a big state. However, I believe that it is the type and

the function of the Greek economy (with the public sector accounting

for about 40 percent of GDP), often characterized as „semi-soviet‟ due to

the state‟s role and the predominance of vested interests (see, for instance,

the existence of closed professions), that are the main culprits. One should

not neglect the fact that a very large part of private sector activity (like

construction, for example) is intertwined with the state, as it is mainly fi-

nanced by it.

For the last two months, a new social movement (Desperates)

continuously protests against the austerity measures. How does

the political system see this movement/phenomenon?

The movement of Aganaktismenoi (Indignants) of Greece was modelled

on that of the Indignados of Spain (its creation was actually sparked by

protesters in Madrid). It now seems to have lost its, arguably significant,

momentum. The originality of this social movement was owed to the fact that

it was distinctively non-violent, and that it attracted people from across the

political spectrum. Press and politicians alike initially discredited the

movement thinking or hoping it would go away quickly. The perseverance of

the demonsrators, however, forced the political system to pay increased

attention to the movement. Unfortunately, though, this multifarious and

far from monolithic phenomenon was once again exploited by politicians

who wished to create the false impression that they were in touch

with the people on the street. The protesters, on their part, did not

manage to agree on anything more than their opposition to the

austerity measures and the condemnation of MPs and the political system as

a whole.

What are the benefits of staying in the Eurozone and the bene-

fits of going back to the drachma?

Interview with Dr. Alexandros Nafpliotis | By Kaan Renda

76


“ It is true that a large part of the

Greek civil ser-vice is slow, well-

paid and over-stretched (I would also add inefficient and

corrupt), and that the private sector is en-cumbered with all the

negative consequenc-es of a big state.

I strongly believe that Greece cannot afford to leave the Eurozone. The bene-

fits of going back to national currency (the rise of exports, for instance) would

evaporate in a short amount of time and any real recovery would not be sus-

tainable. Greece has a long tradition of strong ties with the EEC/EU, which is

extremely important to it for historical, political and economic reasons.

Despite the fact that Athens has repeatedly failed to cultivate sincere rela-

tions with other Eurozone members, and despite some jingoistic talk about

dropping the Euro for nationalistic reasons, most Greeks realise that their

country could only flourish in close economic cooperation with its traditional

European partners. Of course, there are some disadvantages as far as Greece‟s

membership of the Eurozone is concerned; some analysts have long noted

the inefficiencies of the economic system of the EU, as well as the inequalities

it creates. These are issues, however, that need to be addressed on a Europe-

an level, and certainly solutions that take into account not only major export-

ing countries like Germany and France, but also the countries of the South

and the periphery, in general, should be reached. This is tied to the quintes-

sential issue of political integration in the EU lagging behind economic

integration.

In Greece, the labour unions have close connections with the politi-

cal parties and for many they are historically controlled by PASOK.

Do you think that this crisis can change this political relationship?

The way the socio-political system was created in Greece the last 30 years, has

influenced all strata of society and all interest groups. Labour unions gained

considerable power with the rise of PASOK, and the two seemed intercon-

nected to a large degree. The symbiotic relationship between the unions and

the socialist party has been on the wane since the death of Andreas

Papandreou, and, more importantly (and somewhat ironically), since the

premiership of his son, George. The terms described in the memoranda

signed between the PASOK government and the troika (IMF, ECB, EU) are

destined to frustrate and even infuriate labour unions and other pressure

groups. Papandreou is now faced with the task of having to balance between

the more liberal, progressive members of his party (and society, in general),

on the one side, and the more conservative, populist members who

belong to the old style PASOK of the profligate 1980s, on the other. It is

my personal opinion that the prime minister will not be able to walk this

tightrope without significant casualties on one of the two sides, and

possibly on both. George Papandreou‟s transformation of the party that his

father created, in conjunction with the painful decisions that he needs to take

for the country‟s sake, will not leave PASOK‟s relationship with the unions

unscathed.

Do you think that the programmatic statements of the

opposition (right-party, Nea Democratia), which states that

lower taxes are necessary for growth can be implemented?


77


“ The symbiotic re-lationship be-

tween the unions and the socialist

party has been on the wane since the death of Andreas Papandreou,

and, more importantly (and somewhat ironical-ly), since the premier-

ship of his son, George.

The question posed reveals a variety of different issues that all affect the cur-

rent Greek crisis. First of all, there is the stance of the opposition. Nea

Democratia, under its new leader Antonis Samaras, has chosen a quite precar-

ious path in its approach to the country‟s financial woes. Although, tradition-

ally, the party has struggled to promote liberal economic policies, placing

great emphasis on Greece‟s involvement in the European integration process,

Samaras has appeared adamant in his judgement of the memoranda signed

by the Greek government as inefficient and conducive to further recession

and troubles. However, and despite hopes from within and outside Greece,

he has not succeeded in providing a credible alternative to the austerity

measures taken by Papandreou in consultation with the troika. This has creat-

ed serious friction within the European People‟s Party, the organization

where Nea Democratia belongs; European conservative party leaders have

expressed their dissatisfaction with Samaras‟ intransigence as far as consen-

sus in Greek politics goes. Nevertheless, as time progresses, the measures do

not seem to pay off and figures do not seem to pick up, Samaras is increas-

ingly gaining support, both domestically and abroad. As far as taxes are con-

cerned, everyone that has studied the Greek economy since the creation of

the Greek state knows that there exists a huge problem, and that is collection.

It has been traditionally difficult to persuade Greek citizens to declare their

income, be sincere about it, and pay the appropriate tax. Corruption in the

sector is rife, thus making predictions of state profits irrelevant. Where

Samaras is right, though, is in his insistence on demanding measures that

would stimulate growth - see for example his recent fulmination against the

government for not taking full advantage of EU funds provided in the form of

the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF). The austerity measures

will certainly help ease the burden on the state‟s finances, but they have

already affected gravely a significant part of the population. Therefore, in

the longer term, Greek economy needs a boost in order to stand on its

feet but also in order to pay back its debt, and that can only be achieved

through growth. It is no wonder that OECD has urged Athens to „urgently‟

strengthen tax collection and boost privatization. In conclusion, I think that a

policy of lowering taxes could work, but it would need a proper working,

corruption-free tax collection mechanism (a major task in itself) as a

prerequisite.

On the other hand, the left parties are against the austerity

measures. What is their position about the future of the coun-

try and do they have a clear development proposal?

Greek left parties have traditionally been against austerity measures, and in

that sense they have been steady in their policies. However, they tend to ig-

nore the harsh reality of the financial woes of the state‟s finances, and the dire

need of reforms. They demand higher wages for everyone, discrediting any

rationalization of the economy and the public sector, and thus appear unreal-

istic in their suggestions to resolving the crisis. As the situation in Greece rap-


78


“ It has been tradi-tionally difficult to

persuade Greek citi-zens to declare

their income, be sincere about it, and pay the ap-propriate tax.

idly deteriorates, their plans appear more and more chimerical. Notwith-

standing that, it is only natural that a considerable part of those venting

their rage at Syntagma and elsewhere will have political recourse (if briefly)

to the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) and other parties of the left, as the-

se represent the most vocal and militant opposition to the government and

the troika.

What is the role of the media so far about the austerity

measures, the performance of the government and about the

rise of the new social movements?

The media‟s initial response to the austerity measures was numb; most

outlets insisted on their necessity, as a guarantor of Greece‟s avoiding

default. The majority of journalists followed the government‟s rhetoric

about reaching the end of the abyss and tried to make the people

understand that the measures were absolutely necessary for the country‟s

„salvation‟. Lately, however, opposition to the measures imposed by

the troika has become more vocal, since positive results are far from

forthcoming and the people have started to feel the squeeze in their

everyday life. This is greatly owed to the Aganaktismenoi of Syntagma

square and elsewhere. The media at first dealt with the movement as an-

other mass demonstration, like the hundreds that paralyse Athens every

year. It was only after the demonstrators proved their worth by insisting

and staying on for a considerable amount of time that the media decided

to take the whole matter seriously and try to explain this new social

movement.

Many commentators see new elections in September. Are the-

se a realistic option? And what is the cost/benefit of this de-

cision, given the fact that PASOK is only two years in power

and the prime minister just reshuffled the cabinet?

After the recent deal concerning Greece, the voices of members of the

government and PASOK that push in the direction of an early election in

September have risen in number and determination. That is because these

people believe that the best strategy to hold on to power is to go to the

polls hot on the heels of the deal on the Greek debt that provides Athens

with a significant breather, pushing away the specter of full and

uncontrolled bankruptcy. Prime Minister Papandreou is tempted to

succumb to this pressure in order to gain legitimacy for his choice to have

recourse to the IMF and sign the memoranda proposed by the troika.

However, the next tranche of the loan to Greece is set for mid-September,

and the last thing that Eurozone member countries want to see, after the

recent rise in the Italian and Spanish cost of borrowing, is instability and

troubles in the Greek capital. The prospect of fresh elections, less than two

years after the ones that brought PASOK to power, and almost three


79


“ The majority of journalists followed

the government‟s rhetoric about

reaching the end of the abyss and tried to make the people understand

that the measures were absolutely necessary for the country‟s „salvation‟.

months after a cabinet reshuffle, seems quite dismal, also given the current

fluidity of the Greek socio-political system, and the reaction, even violent,

(due to the mercurial nature of the Greek public) that an indecisive election

result could cause.

Do you think that the Greek programme can succeed or do we

need a global solution to tackle the debt crisis?

Most sober commentators have been clamoring, for years, for the reforms

included in the rescue package for Greece to be implemented. The rationali-

zation of public policy, the opening up of sectors of the economy to a wider

part of society, the end of the public sector as a depository of inefficient and

corrupt but well-connected employees, have been high up on the list of

things that needed to be done yesterday if the Greek economy were to stand

on its own feet and become sustainable. Nevertheless, as implied earlier, the

debt crisis is a global problem, and as such, it calls for a solution that is global

in scope. The actors that will struggle to procure such a solution cannot be

limited to a group of people, a government, a country, or even a regional or-

ganization alone; much more than that is needed. It is a combination of local,

regional and international policies that will manage to tackle the issue suc-

cessfully, but that does not mean that Greece (and the other countries that

are facing similar problems) should halt its new difficult course, navigating

through its dire financial straits. Greece has its work cut out for it, but it could

also function as an (extreme) case study of how things can go wrong and how

to fix them.

The EU urges the Greek parties to concede with the new

measures and be more realistic about the future of the country.

Do you think there is room for consensus in the near future,

and which parties are more likely to move in that direction?

Consensus is an example of a word in the political dictionary that (unlike

democracy) does not derive from ancient Greek (plebiscite is another fine

example)- and for very good reason; consensus in Greek politics is a rare sight.

The opposition leader has clearly stated that he will not provide the

government with any substantial form of agreement unless the terms dictat-

ed by the troika are re-negotiated. Samaras is a staunch critic of many of the

austerity measures included in the 110-billion-euro deal agreed last year and

he insists that Papandreou should admit that the memorandum has failed.

PASOK is more likely to get some (qualified) support from smaller parties like

Democratic Alliance- the one recently created by Dora Bakoyannis, who

served as foreign minister under the previous conservative government. Even

in that case, however, it seems that would not be enough for PASOK to

remain in power, as its performance in opinion polls has been extremely poor

lately.


80


“ Greece has its

work cut out for

it, but it could al-

so function as an

(extreme) case study of

how things can go wrong

and how to fix them.

Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan and the Minister of Foreign

Affairs Davutoglu have been using a harsher rhetoric in terms

of Cyprus issue. Do you think this tendency towards a more

hawkish foreign policy has anything to do with the deep

economic crisis in some European countries especially in

Greece?

It is quite certain that, in such an international climate and given the

importance of a country‟s financial clout today, Greece‟s bargaining position

vis-à-vis its neighbours and other foreign partners is in constant decline.

A number of commentators have noted that, apparently, Greece will not

have much room for maneuver in a number of unresolved geopolitically

crucial issues, such as energy sources in the Aegean, the Cyprus issue,

and, finally, Greek-Turkish relations, in general. To answer your question I

believe that Ankara‟s choice to use harsher rhetoric has less to do with the

sorry state of Greece‟s finances (granted, that has always been a strong incen-

tive), and more with Turkey‟s resilience and the confidence that the country is

enjoying at the moment. I think it would be a mistake to approach this

one-sidedly and ignore the current socio-political realities of Turkey, as well.

In that respect, I would say that tells us more about the role the Turkish

government wants to play in the region and beyond, than about the Greek

crisis per se.

Notes:

*Dr Alexandros Nafpliotis has a PhD and an MA from the LSE in

International History and a BA from the University of Athens. He has recently

presented his research at conferences and seminars at King's College

London, Oxford University, NYU, Yale University, and the Centre for

Contemporary British History, and he has won a dissertation prize from the

London Hellenic Society. His most recent publication is "The 1971

Reestablishment of Diplomatic Relations between Greece and Albania:

Cooperation and Strategic Partnership within Cold War Bipolarity?", in

Anastasakis, Bechev, Vrousalis, eds., Greece in the Balkans: Memory, Conflict

and Exchange, Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009. His research

interests lie in the field of international history of the Balkans and the

Mediterranean during the Cold War. His doctoral dissertation (to be

published by I.B. Tauris) focused on British policy towards the Greek military

dictatorship, 1967-1974, and analysed diplomatic, economic, cultural

and defence relations between the two traditional allies, by using archival

sources from both countries for the first time. He has taught on various

aspects of twentieth century international history at the LSE for a number

of years.

** Kaan Renda is a Doctoral Researcher at King‟s College London.

Kaan Renda would like to thank Christos Kourtelis for his help with preparing

interview questions.


81


“ It is quite certain that, in such an in-

ternational climate and given the im-

portance of a country‟s financial clout today, Greece‟s bargaining posi-

tion vis-à-vis its neigh-bours and other foreign partners is in constant

decline.

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Greece-Balkans-Memory-Conflict-Exchange/dp/144381315X/ref=sr_1_4?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1260192010&sr=1-4

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Greece-Balkans-Memory-Conflict-Exchange/dp/144381315X/ref=sr_1_4?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1260192010&sr=1-4

CESRAN Papers

CESRAN Papers | No: 5 | July 2011

COMPETITIVE REGULATION: Stepping Outside the Public /Private Policy Debate

By Dr. Jean-Paul Gagnon

CESRAN Papers | No: 4 | May 2011

Turkey: The Elephant in the Room of Europe | By Hüseyin Selçuk Dönmez

CESRAN Papers | No: 3 | April 2011

"Whither Neoliberalism? Latin American Politics in the Twenty-first Century"

By Jewellord (Jojo) Nem Singh

CESRAN Papers | No: 2 | March 2011

"Civil-Military Relations in Marcos' Philippines" | By Richard Lim

CESRAN Papers | No: 01 | March 2011

"The Paradox of Turkish Civil Military Relations" By Richard Lim

http://cesran.org/dergi.php?id=47









N airobi, the capital city of Kenya, who

hosts the world‘s biggest refugee

camps, has been examined in this volu-

me.

Kenya is the most developed and the most influential

country in East Africa; and, Nairobi is the most popu-

lous and one of the most prominent cities politically

and financially in this region. The Republic of Kenya

became an independent country in 1963. After this

date, the government of Kenya had followed a pro-

tectionist governmental and economic policy until

the 1990s. The government then embraced a semi-

liberal economic policy in 1993. As a consequence of

this decision, the social and economic connections of

the country with the other countries has started to

increase gradually. The year 2008 was a bad year for

the country. In early 2008, violence erupted in Kenya

following the presidential elections, leaving more

than 1,000 people killed and 300,000 people displa-

ced from their homes. Happily, the violence stopped

NAIROBI “needs to feel the positive effects of globalisation…”

By Fatih Eren*

AFRICA REVIEW

GLOBAL CITY ANALYSIS

83


National Coat of Arms of Kenya

quickly. Kenya enjoys a political and economical sta-

bility for the last 3 years.

Kenya is the gate of the East Africa region. This

unique position makes Nairobi, that is the leading

city of the country, a natural attraction centre for all

global players who are closely interested in this re-

gion. More globalisation studies should be conduc-

ted on Nairobi because the city, as different from

many other global cities in the same cathegory,

connects to the world via specific and interesting

channels. Nairobi became the top-ranked city

among 25 global cities in the list which was

developed by the Globalization and World Cities Re-

search Network (GaWC) using NGO (Non-

Governmental Organization) network connectivity

indicators in 2004. In other words, Nairobi is the

most connected city to the world with respect to

NGO activities; it connects to the world through in-

ternational NGOs.

The financial and commercial ties of the city with

other countries speeded up after 2005. Main reasons

for this acceleration were the realisation of successful

structural and economic reforms which were perfor-

med by the Kenyan Parliement and the increasing

memberships of Kenya to international unions and

trade organizations (e.g. Africa Union (AU), East Afri-

can Community (EAC), Common Market for Eastern

and Southern Africa (COMESA), The Indian Ocean

Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC)

and so on).

Today, Nairobi is fighting against severe drought

which has started in 2008 and affected all Sub-

saharan Africa. Due to drought,

migrations from the city‘s rural

areas, other cities and other

countries to Nairobi increased

significantly in the last 3 years.

Many people are now trying to

survive in the refugee camps

and in the slums of the city.

Therefore, the city is subject to

an interest of international

NGOs for help rather than in-

ternational investors. The he-

adquarters of more than 75

international NGOs are located

in Nairobi right now and these

NGOs conduct their aid activi-

ties (main aids are on food, he-

alth, environment and educa-

tion) towards the East Africa

from here.

The impact of global concern for Nairobi: Analysis

There are about 473,000 registered refugees in Ken-

ya according to UNHRC April 2011 data. A 100,000 of

these refugees are accomodated in Nairobi

(Humanitarian Policy Group Working Paper 2010).

These refugees are living in refugee camps which are

spreaded all over the country (e.g. Dagahaley, Kaku-

ma and so on) or in Kenyan cities as urban refugees.

The current situation of the refugee camps is very

problematic; they are all over-crowded and their re-

sources (i.e. doctors, nurses, food, water, medicine,

volunteer staff and so on) are inefficient and poor.

The Government of Kenya is reluctant to open new

refugee camps in the country not to encourage new

migrations. Despite this, migrations are still going on

from neighbour countries to Kenya. For example,

Egypt map

Nairobi | By Fatih Eren

84


15,000 people migrate every month from Somalia to

Kenya according to United Nations data. It is a big

possibility that immigrants who are spreaded all over

the country will move to Nairobi to survive in the

next years because all Kenyan youngs moved to Nai-

robi in the last 10 years to survive and to make their

livings. The urban population rose about 1 million

due to internal migrations between 1999 and 2008;

the present spreaded immigrants may follow the

same route. If it goes like that, the city‘s urban popu-

lation may rise to 10 million; 30 new slum districts

may be added to the city‘s fringes and so the 90% of

the city population may be accomodated in the city‘s

slums in the next 5-10 years (there are already 66

slums in Nairobi (e.g. Kibera, Mathare Valley, Mukuru

Kwa Njenga and so on) and 60% of the city‘s popula-

tion is living in slums, today).

The country is dependent on foreign financial credits

and aids in terms of infrastructural investments

(United Nations(UN) provided $284 million and Euro-

pean Union(EU) provided $145 million financial aid

to Kenya for infrastructural investments in 2011). The

severe problems of East Africa ( i.e. drought, starva-

tion, waterlessness, sheltering and diseases) are in

the agenda of the world for a while so international

financial aids are now flowing into Nairobi, which is

the financial centre of the region. A significant share

of these aids are spent for infrastructural investments

in the region (The World Bank provided $1.3 billion

financial aid to the East Africa region to strengthen

its highway, railway and harbour infrastructures.

Again, China and India are providing long-term cre-

dits for their international companies to promote

them to invest in infrastructural projects in the re-

gion). Nairobi has benefited from these international

aids a certain extent, of course. However, the city still

needs all type of infrastructural projects (i.e. buil-

dings, transport, water and power supplies). Re-

cently, some international property development

and investment companies (e.g. Renaissance, Garun

Real Estate Investment, Translakes Limited and so

on) have started some residential and commercial

property development projects in the city benefiting

from the long-term credit advantages of internatio-

nal banks and funds (e.g. Tatu City). Therefore, fore-

ign capital inflows have speeded up property const-

ruction and development activities in Nairobi. It is

possible to see many construction sites in Central

Nairobi at the moment. However, the land prices

increased dramatically in Central Nairobi. 1 acre land

whose price was less than $2,000 before 2008 rose to

$50,000 now due to new infrastructural investments

in Central Nairobi. For this reason, international

property development and investment companies

moved their new residential and commercial

projects to small towns near Central Nairobi

and started to develop new gated communities

(safe and luxury neighbourhoods) for middle and

higher income class in these towns (e.g. Nakuru,


Drought in Nairobi

Naivasha). This trend will continue increasingly in the

next years.

World Bank has just declared that 150,000 new social

housing units have to be developed and delivered

every year in the country to meet the demand.

However, World Bank 2011 report also states that

only 8% of Kenyans can afford a housing loan. It is

clear that all prospective housing projects have to be

designed and developed as affordable housing units

in Nairobi because 90% of Nairobians, living and

working in the city, belong to low-income class. I

should say that the city needs long-termest internati-

onal property developers and investors who expect

to get the returns of their investments between 20

and 40 years. Keeping in mind that Nairobi is an im-

portant international centre in East Africa and its pro-

perty market has a potential to grow significantly in

the future. Therefore, it is not so hard for local pro-

perty professionals to find this type of international

investors who can invest in the development of af-

fordable houses in Nairobi.

The Ministry of Lands wants to achieve a key objecti-

ve in the country: ‗equitable and efficient access to

land for Kenyans‘; so the government, who aims to

solve the chronic housing problem of the city, may

provide free or cheap lands to local/international

institutional/individual investors who wish to deve-

lop affordable housing units in Nairobi in the near

future. The city has enough suitable land for new

residential developments. International property

investors are now interested in the development of

affordable single family homes in the city. It would

be a good idea to support and sustain this initiative

considering the social and demographic structure of

the city.

The government has set up a future vision for the

country, that is ‗to create a globally competitive and

prosperous Kenya in 2030‘. In parallel to the state‘s

2030 vision, Nairobi City Council has also set up a

new vision for the city, that is ‗to be recognized as

one of the most attractive cities in the world‘. The

governors of the city believes this basic principle:

‗Where there is activity, there is plentifulness and

prosperity‘. When we look at the vision of all cities in

the world, we see that almost all cities are trying to

attract international human, capital and commodity

flows into themselves in order to be a global city and

an international hub. This vision looks fine for a city if

we consider that city individually as separate from

other cities. However, when we consider all cities

collectively as an integrated system or network, this

vision seems quite problematic. In the logic of

‗competition‘, the rise of some cities means the fall of

some other cities. In other words, in a race, if there

are some winners, there have to be some losers. In

this context, it is very very difficult for a city, for

example Nairobi, which starts this race as a loser

from the beginning, to win the race; it doesn‘t matter

how long does this race take, the result does not

change. Starting from this argument, perhaps, we

can talk about a competition between ‗states‘ but we


City of the Dead, Cairo

Slums of Nairobi

should not talk about a competition between

‗cities‘. In stead of using the term ‗urban com-

petition‘, it is better to discuss the terms

‗urban cooperation‘ or ‗urban solidarity‘ on

global scale. In this way, we can distribute a

city‘s accumulated value fairly to different

localities via special channels (e.g. twin cities,

sister cities, city-to-city cooperation, urban

partnership programs and so on). Nairobi can

survive only with the help and support of

other strong global cities. In short, Nairobi

needs a new future vision and strategy which

strongly focus on the basic needs of the

citypeople such as sheltering, food, water

and security.

Everybody knows that the main reason for

the experiencing problems in Nairobi is not

only ‗drought‘ but also some developed co-

untries‘ imperialist attempts which were ma-

de towards the city‘s (and the country‘s) reso-

urces over the past 150 years. Therefore, Nai-

robi no more wants to see short-termest in-

vestors who expect to take something from

the city but the city wants to see long-

termest investors and charitable donors who

want to give something to Nairobians and

who try to develop this city a self-sufficient

independant locality in the world. In the last

3 years, deaths, which emerged as a result of

drought, starvation, waterlessness and violance, mo-

ved short-termest investors away from the city but

brought charitable donors close to the city.

In the last 3 years, many wells were opened by chari-

table donors especially in the rural areas of the city to

meet the Nairobians‘ clean water need. Again, many

NGOs provided food aids to the city people who are

living in both urban and rural areas. It is very difficult

to establish a permanent clean water system in the

urban area in the short term due to unplanned

growth, uncontrolled slum developments and high

investment costs. Therefore, many new wells may be

opened in the slum areas of the city in the next

months (Nairobi was a famous city with its cool

waters in the history. Clean water can easily be found

from 45m. depth under the ground today. The cost

of opening a new well is about €2000). On one hand,

some social buildings such as ‗imarethane‘, which

provide and deliver free daily foods regularly and

fairly to poor people, may rise in the urban area be-

cause all charities are now aware that future food

aids have to be done regularly and in a systematic

way in the city. On the other hand, many children

were left orphan dependent on AIDS and HIV related

diseases, fatal migrations and violance in the co-

untry. It is estimated that there are more than 1 mil-

lion orphans in the whole country. In this context, in

the next years, as different from other metropolitan

cities, Nairobi may develop into a city with many so-

cial nodes (small sub-centres) which include simple

commercial units, temples, schools as well as wells,

Cairo’s rich architectural heritage

87



International NGO’s Food Aids and Wells

imarethanes, orphanages and security units that are

responsible for the organization, hygiene and security

of food and water deliveries. Increasing food prices,

increasing hunger and waterlessness and the initiati-

ves of international NGOs are strenghtening the pos-

sibility of the emergence of social nodes in the city.

One of the main problems of Nairobians is the incre-

asing food prices. Some people may claim that the

farmlands of the city is unproductive. However, it is

possible to see some coffee, tea, banana and sugar

cane farmlands which belong to some international

companies and which use modern irrigation and

greenhouse systems in some parts of the city

(Nakuru, the Abardare Ranges, Limuru, etc.). This

situation is clear evidence that if Nairobians want

and if they have some resources, they can develop

the urban and rural land into productive farmlands.

The EU imports many agricultural products which

were grown in Kenya without any custom in the con-

text of Cotonou Agreement, today. The level of agri-

cultural productions is low and even products do not

meet the demand for the home market. If European

Development Programme (EDP) uses its money

(which was seperated for Kenya) to teach modern

farming techniques to Kenyans and to help Nairobi-

ans to own essential agricultural technological tools

and vehicles, many new greenhouses may rise in the

urban and rural areas of the city in the

next years. In this way, in maximum 10

years, Nairobians may develop into far-

mers who meet their own food require-

ments and who also export their agricul-

tural products to European Countries.

Indeed, Nairobians have to grow their own foods

independently because of the overcrowded popula-

tion of the city who are living on the hunger thres-

hold and of the weakly established food transporta-

tion and delivery channels in the country. The city

governors should benefit from public-private part-

nerships to encourage agricultural productions in

the locality and to distribute agricultural products to

internal and external markets in a fair and balanced

way.

In conclusion, it is now time to see the positive ef-

fects of globalisation in Nairobi. International com-

panies which give a helping hand to Nairobians,

thinking long-termest and using on free loan, will be

called as ‗real global companies‘, countries which

give a helping hand to East Africa will be remembe-

red as ‗great states‘ in the future. After all, we would

be a child who was born in Nairobi; we would be

struggling against hunger and waterlessness and we

would be expecting a help from other world people

right now.

Note:

* Fatih Eren is Doctoral Researcher in

Department of Town and Regional Planning, Univer-

sity of Sheffield.

E-mail: [email protected]

Tea (left), Banana (middle) and Sugar Cane (right) Production in Nairobi

Nairobi‟s Greenshouses

T his review looks at what is quality television and what makes The

Sopranos so successful. ―Quality Television‖ term has started to

be used by critics and scholars after 1990s to describe a genre

which contains the style, content and its subject. They use this

term to qualify the television show to higher than others. But what are those

reasons making those shows better than others? Kristin Thompson's criteria

for "quality television" programs are "...a quality pedigree, a large ensemble

cast, a series memory, creation of a new genre through recombination of ol-

der ones, self-consciousness, and pronounced tendencies toward the contro-

versial and the realistic". Also, US group Viewers For Quality Television descri-

bes Quality Television as "A quality show is something we anticipate, focuses

more on relationships, explores character, it enlightens, chal-

lenges, involves and confronts the viewer; it provokes tho-

ught..."

Cinematic Television

The elements that make the TV series more cinematic are

What is so Good About

The Sopranos?

By Enes Erbay*

The boundaries between television drama and cine-

ma have blurred in recent years. Tim Van Patten, the

director of The Sopranos, once said “This show [The

Sopranos] is like making a feature in nine to twelve

days”.

AFRICA REVIEW FILM REVIEW

89

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

good acting, good script and a big budget. In The Sopranos, each episode is

polished like a feature film. They shoot it on 35mm film and 16:9 aspect ratio.

They keep the scenes a bit longer than usual. They focus on the characters

more than the action. Each character has its own arc and personal inside

problems. For example, in the season three, the episode seven, the audience

watches Carmela Soprano is dealing with herself being a wife to a sinner and

criminal husband. Or Vito‘s own story within few episodes in season 6, he is

dealing with his mafia fellows finding out that he is a homosexual. As David

Chase says, it is more visual than talking. Also during the shooting process

having higher budgets gives them to work on the episode like it is a feature

film.

What is so good about The Sopranos?

The creator of The Sopranos David Chase (David DeCesare), is a member of an

Italian-American family in New Jersey. He says that it is impossible to grow up

in New Jersey and not to envy mafia life style. His first intend was making a

film called The Sopranos which is a story of his old neighbourhood in New Jer-

sey. He wanted to add his family‘s stories and combining them with some

mafia flavour. However, after some time, he realised that making this a TV

show would be better. He set the main roof of the show within the idea of

Tony Soprano seeing a psychiatrist and dealing with his mother‘s issues from

his childhood.

The Sopranos has all the elements that make a TV series a Quality TV. Like big

group of good actors, excellent script, shooting it on 35mm film, stories more

about the characters, more visual style, 16:9 aspect ratio etc. All those ele-

ments make The Sopranos more cinematic and better series than the other

ones.

In the show, most of the characters are Italian-American. Some of the actors

had been in some projects together earlier from The Sopranos. David Chase

had interviews with all the actors personally. One of the main criteria of choo-

sing the right actors is the accent.

To be more specific, we should focus on to the characters inside the show.

First of all, we should focus on the head of the family, Tony Soprano (James

Gandolfini). Tony is the 3rd generation member of an Italian-American family.

His grand fathers came to America from Naples, Italy, as stone workers. They

settled down in New Jersey. Later on, as a second generation, Tony‘s father

got into illegal business and so Tony. So, as a mafia mem-

ber, we can say that Tony is an anti-hero. These charac-

ters acts and do their duties as other protagonists suc-

cessfully but their methods to do these tasks are different

than typical protagonists. It is the same case with Tony

Soprano who can be evaluated as a typical anti-hero. Anti

-hero characters are mean, brutal, selfish, sarcastic, pessi-

Film Review | By Enes Erbay

90

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection Political Reflection | June-July-August 2011

mistic, and they contempt the social values. So, anti-heroes act within a clas-

sical hero impulses but he also carries those weak characteristics with him-

self. Because of that, the audience cannot identify those characters with their-

selves but they can‘t ignore them as well. We can see all these characteristics

in Tony Soprano.

After the scripts of the last episodes, the audience have started to realise that

he is not a typical mafia boss figure. The audience noticed his sick and repul-

sive actions and they accepted that he was a defected character as such. He

has a lot of atypical characteristics than earlier mafia figures in cinema or lite-

rature. Such as his sense of humour, his psychological issues about his mot-

her and talking about these issues to a psychiatrist, and usually being on me-

dication (antidepressant). Thanks to the great acting of James Gandolfini,

Tony Soprano became the most phenomenal character of television history.

He won over ten awards for his performance in The Sopranos. At the end of

eight year, James Gandolfini says ―The character has been with me for so

long, it‘s a relief to let him go.‖

All actors add a lot of quality to the show with their great performance.

One of them is a recognizable actor, Steve Buscemi. He joined The Sopranos

in the fifth season. When David Chase confessed that he wanted him in

the show from the minute he created it, the same confession came from Ste-

ve Buscemi who said that he wanted to be in the show from the minute he

saw the show. However, until the season five, they had never mentioned it

to each other. David Chase says ―We never talked about it because I was

embarrassed to ask him to come on the show. He‘s Steve Buscemi, he's got

a thriving feature career, and the TV life is very difficult for an actor‖.

Also, Steve Buscemi says ―It's something that I thought about sometimes but

I was too shy to mention it‖. At the end, it happened and Steve Buscemi beca-

me a part of the Sopranos family. Apart from acting, he also directed one epi-

sode in the fifth season. After his great performance in that, he was nomina-

ted for the Best Supporting Actor and for the Best Directing for a Drama

Series.

The end of The Sopranos caused a big conflict among its fans. Some fans were

really happy about the ending but some of them did not like the ending. Ste-

ve Buscemi was one of the happy ones ―I loved it. I thought it was brilliant...

When it cut to black, I was shocked but I was relieved because I don‘t think I

could have taken it if I had to witness anything happen to his family or to

him.‖

Notes:

* Enes Erbay is an M.A. Student in Directing: Film and Television at the Uni-

versity of Westminster. http://www.eneserbay.com/

91

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection

Film Review | By Enes Erbay

James Gandolfini

http://www.eneserbay.com/

Modern Turkey:

People, State and Foreign Policy in a Globalised World

By Bill Park

This exciting new textbook provides a broad and comprehensive overview

of contemporary Turkey. Placing the country and its people within the con-

text of a rapidly globalizing world, the book covers a diverse range of the-

mes such as politics, economics, international relations, the Turkic world,

religion and recent historical background.

Tracing the evolution of Turkey‘s domestic political and economic systems,

and its foreign policy, from the inception of the republic to the present day,

the themes covered include:

The impact of globalization on Turkey‘s society, politics, economy and

foreign policy

The role of the EU and the Turkish diaspora in the evolution of Turkish policies

The main features and prominent role of Kemalism

Turkish foreign policy, and the new challenges and opportunities brought by the end of the cold war

The position of Turkey as a ‗bridge‘ between East and West, and the particular and unique dilemmas confron-

ting a Muslim but economically developed, democratized state allied to the West

Kurdish identity

The Fethullah Gulen movement and the Armenian ‗genocide‘

Situating the country as a ‗model‘ for the wider Muslim world, this sophisticated analysis of one of the largest

and most important states in the Middle East will be an invaluable resource for scholars and officials interested

in Turkish politics and US foreign and security policies, and for students of the Balkan, Middle Eastern, Cauca-

sus and Central Asian regions.

RECENT BOOKS

92


Globalization, Labor Export and Resistance

A Study of Filipino Migrant Domestic Workers in Global Cities

By Ligaya Lindio-McGovern

Moving beyond polemical debates on globalization, this study considers comp-

lex intersections of gender, race, ethnicity, nationality and class within the field

of globalized labor.

As a significant contribution to the on-going debate on the role of neoliberal

states in reproducing gender-race-class inequality in the global political eco-

nomy, the volume examines the aggressive implementation of neoliberal poli-

cies of globalization in the Philippines, and how labor export has become a

contradictory feature of the country's international political economy while be-

ing contested from below. Lindio-McGovern presents theoretical and ethnographic insights from observatio-

nal and interview data gathered during fieldwork in various global cities—Hong Kong, Taipei, Rome, Vancou-

ver, Chicago and Metro-Manila. The result is a compelling weave of theory and experience of exploitation and

resistance, an important development in discourses and literature on globalization and social movements see-

king to influence regimes that exploit migrant women as cheap labor to sustain gendered global capitalism.

RECENT BOOKS

93


Small Arms, Crime and Conflict

Global Governance and the Threat of Armed Violence

Edited by Owen Greene, Nic Marsh

This book focuses on the use of small arms in violence and attempts by the

state to govern the use and acquisition of these weapons.

It is likely that hundreds of thousands of people are killed every year as a re-

sult of armed violence – in contexts ranging from war zones to domestic vio-

lence. This edited volume examines why these deaths occur, the role of guns

and other weapons, and how governance can be used to reduce and prevent

those deaths. Drawing on a variety of disciplines, ranging from anthropology

through economics to peace and security studies, the book‘s main concern

throughout is that of human security – the causes and means of prevention

of armed violence.

The first part of the book concerns warfare, the second armed violence and crime, and the last governance of

arms and their (mis)-use. The concluding chapter builds on the contributors‘ key findings and suggests priori-

ties for future research, with the aim of forming a coherent narrative which examines what we know, why ar-

med violence occurs, and what can be done to reduce it.

This book will be of much interest to students of small arms, security studies, global governance, peace and

conflict studies, and IR.

Russia and Islam

State, Society and Radicalism

Edited by Roland Dannreuther, Luke March

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, both the Russian state and Rus-

sia's Muslim communities have struggled to find a new modus vivendi

in a rapidly changing domestic and international socio-political con-

text. At the same time as Islamic religious belief and practice have

flourished, the state has become increasingly concerned about the

security implications of this religious revival, reflecting and respon-

ding to a more general international concern over radicalised political

Islam. This book examines contemporary developments in Russian

politics, how they impact on Russia's Muslim communities, how these

communities are helping to shape the Russian state, and what in-

sights this provides to the nature and identity of the Russian state

both in its inward and outward projection. The book provides an up-

to-date and broad-ranging analysis of the opportunities and challen-

ges confronting contemporary Muslim communities in Russia that is not confined in scope to Chechnya or the

North Caucasus, and which goes beyond simplistic characterisations of Muslims as a 'threat'. Instead, it enga-

ges with the role of political Islam in Russia in a nuanced way, sensitive to regional and confessional differen-

ces, highlighting Islam's impact on domestic and foreign policy and investigating sources of both radicalisa-

tion and de-radicalisation.

Documents

Political Reflection Vol. 2 | No. 3