Political party as organized criminal group

7/25/2019 Political party as organized criminal group

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Research paper: Why has no comprehensive action been taken against MQM?

Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) is a Karachi based political party that allegedly

represents interests of Muhajirs(Urdu-speaing) in !aistan since "#$% (&hmar' "##) *ver

the years' MQM has evolved from a political party in to an organi+ed criminal unit that conducts

crimes such as mobile-snatching' car theft' robberies' target-illing' stries' city-shutdo,ns and

etortions (.chelling' "#/0 .iddi1i' 23"3) 4espite their criminality and its deleterious effects

on Karachi' other than sporadically introducing short-term solutions' the state of !aistan has not

taen concrete steps to tacle the MQM problem 5his paper aims to sho, that there are t,o

reasons ,hy MQM has been allo,ed to persist in its criminal form in !aistan' one being that

MQM vote base is needed by subse1uent regimes to consolidate their po,er in Karachi' ,hile

the other reason is rooted in the potential violence that ,ill arise if any action is taen against

MQM 5his paper ,ill address these concerns raised by the government through studying past

cases in order to establish the validity' or lac thereof' of their concerns0 and through devising a

comprehensive action strategy that ,ill tae their reasoning into account 6or this purpose' the

paper ,ill be divided in to three sections 5he first section ,ill detail MQMs evolution from an

ethno-political group to a criminal enterprise 7n the second section the t,o causes for giving

MQM a free reign ,ill be eplored by using available empirical data and utili+ing eamples of

past cases in ,hich action ,as taen against MQM 5he third section ,ill attempt to address

states reasoning by formulating a strategy that ,ill incorporate and attempt to solve their

concerns 7n the end' a conclusion ,ill be presented

Literature review


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Karachi' the megacity of !aistan' has a population of approimately 23 million 7t is the

main sea port of !aistan and handles #89 of its foreign trade (:obota' 23";) Karachi is also

the commercial hub of !aistan0 it contributes 39 of the countrys overall taes' ;39 to

!aistans manufacturing sector' and houses almost #39 of the head offices of bans' financial

institutions and multinational companies in !aistan (:obota' 23";0


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facets that causes this destabili+ation' ethno-politics caused by MQM' becomes vital (Cusuf'

23"2)

5his paper advances the idea that the main party of Karachi' MQM' is actually an

organi+ed criminal unit 5he literature on organi+ed crime defines organi+ed criminals as groups

that mainly deal ,ith the provision of the commodity ?protection@ or security (Aambetta' "##;0

.chelling' "#/0 5illy' "#$80 .aperdas' 233") but that might epand their operations to control

the production and distribution of other commodities illegally (>arese' 23"3) 5his group ,ill

have ?its o,n history0 its tradition and customs0 its o,n method and techni1ues0 its highly

specialized machinery for attacs upon persons and property0 its o,n highlyspecialized modes

of defense@ that is' means to be able to enforce their rule so that they can effectively provide

protection (>arese' 23"3) 7n addition' it ,ill also have a structure' ?a system for issuing orders'

and someone ,ho benefits from such governance and some continuity over time@ (>arese' 23"3)

5he literature also applies several theories and eplores different scenarios- originally posited by

academics ,oring on drug cartels and prison gangs in different areas- that eplain levels of

violence perpetuated by organi+ed criminal groups ,hen state repression on them increases

(Eessing' 23"80 4ube' 23";0 Bru+' 23"")

5his paper ,ill attempt to etend the literature of organi+ed crime' ,hich loos at drug

cartels and prison gangs in Bolumbia' Meico and Fra+il0 and apply it to a political party' namely

MQM in !aistan 5he paper ,ill contest that MQM is an organi+ed criminal group that operates

under the guise of a political party Moreover' it ,ill attempt to sho, through past cases that in

situations of state cracdo,ns members of MQM are liely to respond similarly to members of

organi+ed criminal groups (Eessing' 23"8)


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Section 1:

Formation of MQM

Karachi is the most populous city of !aistan ,ith a population of over t,enty million

(Khalid' et al.' 23"8) 7t is a city that boasts a variety of people ,ho come from different

regional' linguistic and ethnic bacgrounds and for this reason it is often referred to as a Mini-

!aistan (Mali' "##$) *ne of the ethnicities that form a major chun of Karachis population

(%##9) is the Muhajirs (Khatta' 2332) Muhajir is a term ,hich means refugee in Urdu and

is used' along ,ith the term Urdu-speaing' to signify those people ,ho fled from 7ndia to

!aistan at the time of independence (&hmar' "##) &fter independence' majority of Muhajirs

settled in .indh' predominantly in its relatively urban regions namely Karachi' =yderabad and

.uer (&rif' 2333) 5he greatest number of Muhajirs' ho,ever' settled in Karachi ,hich led to

Karachi becoming the largest Muhajir city early in the history of !aistani(Mali' "##$)

5he presence of different ethnicities' their desire to hold on to their distinct identities and

their competition among each other over limited resources0 coupled ,ith their mismanagement

and misrepresentation by the authorities can be said to be the reason for MQMs emergence

(Mali' "##$) More narro,ly' the alienation of Muhajirs and emergence of MQM can be lined

to three events in !aistans historyG the "#% presidential elections' the "#/2 language riots and

the "#$8 ethnic clashes bet,een Urdu-speaing and other ethnicities in Karachi (&hmar' "##)

4uring presidential elections of "#%' ethnic riots too place bet,een !athan and the

Muhajir community (&hmar' "##) 5he source of this tussle ,as the fact that each ethnicity

supported a different candidate in the elections0 ,hile Muhajirs sided ,ith 6atima &li Hinnah

(sister of the founder of !aistan' Mohammad &li Hinnah)0 !athans vote ,as declared for &yub


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Khan' the !athan military dictator ,ho had assumed office in "#8$ (&hmar' "##) Fecause the

Muhajir community did not etend their support to the military dictator' they ,ere at the

receiving end of !athan baclash led by &yub Khans son Iot only ,ere Muhajirs unhappy by

the allegedly fae election held by the authoritarian ruler' they ,ere also displeased &yub had

renamed :a,alpindi as the ne, federal capital of !aistan' taing the position a,ay from

Karachi (&hmar' "##) 5he riots that broe out bet,een !athans and Muhajirs in "#% and early

"#8 ,ere the very first ethnic riots of Karachi and in retrospect' they seemed to set the tone for

future ethnic encounters in urban .indh (&hmar' "##)

7n "#/2' Julfi1ar &li Fhutto' leader of the .indhi majority party' ,as the president of !aistan

=is regime ,orsened the relations bet,een Muhajirs and .indhis because of his policy of

nationali+ation of bans' insurance companies and industries that adversely affected the jobs

available to Muhajirs ,ho ,ere mostly employed in the non-governmental sector 7n addition'

Fhutto also introduced regional 1uota for federal bureaucracy that allotted /9 of seats to urban

.indh' ,hile ""%9 ,ere reserved for rural .indh .ince Muhajirs resided in urban .indh and

.indhis in rural areas' Muhajirs felt this eclusionary policy only benefitted .indhis ,hile

,orsening their o,n economic prospects ii(.iddi1i' 23"3) Fut the final stra, that resulted in a

split bet,een the t,o ethnicities ,as the introduction of .indhi as the other provincial language

of .indh0 previously Urdu had been the only official language of .indh (&hmar' "##) 5he

approval of this bill in the .indh assembly caused riots all around Muhajir dominated areas of

.indh &ll these issues combined placed an irrevocable dent on the relations bet,een Muhajirs

and .indhis (&hmar' "##)

7n "#$8' ethnic riots bet,een !athan and Muhajir once again plagued Karachi 5he cause this

time ,as the death of a female Muhajir student ,ho died by being run over by a bus that ,as


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driven by a !athan (transport in Karachi ,as mainly the domain of !athans) (&hmar' "##) 5his

issue served as the tipping point for tensions that had been bre,ing for some time0 tensions

rooted in unfavorable bureaucratic reforms' Karachis urbani+ation and underdevelopment and a

lac of leadership for the representation of Muhajirs in the government0 all of these issues led to

riots and an emergence of Muhajir nationalism (&hmar' "##0 Faig' 2338) 5his social'

economic and political sense of deprivation ,as furthered by the net ruler' Aeneral Jia-ul-=a1'

,hose policies increased !unjabi hegemony in bureaucracy and military0 and led to the creation

of MQM by university students in Karachi in "#$%0 ho,ever' the party officially emerged as a

political contender in "#$ (.iddi1i' 23"3)

rgani!e" #rimina$ %roup

MQM emerged in a climate of violence0 it ,as formed in an era during ,hich !aistan

eperienced internal ,ar that resulted in the loss of


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is reasonable to epect MQM' as a party taing off in such an atmosphere' to e1uip itself ,ith

means of conducting violence in order to effectively counter coercive threats of their opponents

(Iasr "##20 Aayer' 23"%) =o,ever' this eplanation does not account for the manner in ,hich

coercion' violence and criminality became core practices of MQM0 ho, these initial violent

leanings ,ere institutionali+ed in the party to mae it an organi+ed criminal group

Fased on the literature available on organi+ed crime' there are multiple similarities that

can be dra,n bet,een the political party MQM and organi+ed criminal groups 6or one' MQM

has a highly sophisticated' local organi+ational structure in Karachi that consists of three levels

&t the top level' there is Iine Jero that is the nation-,ide head1uarter of the party located in

&+i+abad' a middle-income neighborhood in Karachis 4istrict Bentral (Khan' Karimi' 23"8)

Iine Jero is a place ,here partys ?chairman' secretaries' MI&s (members of the national

assembly)' M!&s (members of the provincial assembly)' and other functionaries@ often meet

(Aayer' 23"%) Iet in the hierarchy are sectors headed by a sector-in-charge (Khan' Karimi'

23"80 Faig' 2338) 5here are 2 city-,ide sector offices that in turn ensure the effective running

of the $-"3 unit offices' each run by a unit-in-charge' that are embedded in different

neighborhoods (Khan' Karimi' 23"8) 5hus' in this manner MQM has offices at the district'

+onal-to,n and neighborhood level in Karachi (Faig' 2338) 7n such a system' all the decisions

are made at the top and then relegated do,n in the hierarchy (Aayer' 23"%0 Eevitt' >enatesh'

2333) 5he sector-in-charge and unit-in-charge reside ,ithin the mohallah (neighborhood) that

they are responsible for (Aayer' 23"%) 5hese neighborhood heads are epected to resolve

problems of the area such as ensuring access to utilities (,ater and electricity) and solving

neighborhood disputes (Khan' Karimi' 23"8) 5heir main purpose is to mae sure that they

effectively carry out orders from above (Aayer' 23"%) 7n this manner' through their dedicated


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foot-soldiers MQM is able to establish a comprehensive net,or that gives them complete

no,ledge of each neighborhood in Karachi (Faig' 2338) 6urthermore' it also leads to their

complete control of each area ,hich in turn maes other activities' such as stries and etortion'

easier

&n important piece of this organi+ational structure is the leader of MQM' &ltaf =ussain &ltaf

,as born in Karachi to an Urdu-speaing family in "#8; (Faig' 2338) =e had a modest

upbringing as he belonged to a middle-class family ,ho had a house in a lo,er-middle class

neighborhood of Karachi (Iine Jero' &ltafs house' as noted above serves as the party

head1uarters in Karachi) (Faig' 2338) &fter finishing high school in "##' he decided to join the

army (Faig' 2338) &ltaf faced discrimination based on his ethnicity during his brief stint in the

army and during his time as a pharmacy student at the University of Karachi' ,hich he had

enrolled in after leaving the forces (=a1' "##80 Faig' 2338) Fecause of this discrimination' &ltaf

founded the &ll !aistan Muhajir .tudent *rgani+ation (&!M.*) ,hile at university 4uring its

formative years' &!M.* ,as unable to appeal to the Muhajir students as &ltaf had hoped (Faig'

2338) &fter he completed his degree' &ltaf ,ent to the United .tates and started ,oring as a

tai-driver in Bhicago (Faig' 2338) *nce the &!M.* started performing ,ell in student

elections' &ltaf decided to try his hand at politics once again and ,ith his return' he devoted all

his efforts to &!M.* ,hich culminated in the creation of MQM in "#$%

&ltaf =ussain plays a pivotal role in the organi+ational structure of MQM as the

decisional hierarchy starts ,ith him =e continues to dictate all the actions of the party despite

being in a voluntary eile in Eondon since "##2 (=a1' "##8) &ltafs hold over MQM is

absolute0 his follo,ers consider his life to be the epitome of the Muhajir struggle that each of

them has to face0 to them &ltaf =ussain isthe Muhajir community (=a1' "##80 Faig' 2338) 7n


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early years of MQM' &ltaf ,ielded significant po,er over the Muhajir youth through his oratory

sills =is speeches led to devotional responses such asG

?=es &ltafsL a great leader and if you listen to him once he ,ill change your life

forever =e ,as perfect his ,ords ,ere lie magic 5hey ,ent straight into my heart@

(Khan' 23"3)

Moreover' he demanded absolute loyalty from his follo,ers' by maing them tae oathsvat their

initiation into the party =is party ,orers in turn' perceived his ,ords as divine and hailed him

as apir(saint) and quaid(leader)0 chanting slogans such as' ?joquaid ka ghaddar hai wo maut

ka haq daar hai" (he ,ho betrays their leader deserves only death) (Faig' 2338) 5hus' it can be

said that MQM is more lie a personality cult' ,ith &ltaf capturing the central position in the

party hierarchy (Mali' "##$0 Faig' 23380 &hmar' "##)

&nother crucial similarity bet,een organi+ed criminals and MQM is etortion MQM ,anted to

provide resources for the disenfranchised Muhajirs ,ho joined its rans 5he most convenient

method of ac1uiring those resources ,as by acting lie a protection racet (5illy' "#$8) 7n order

to become a racet' MQM first gained the means through ,hich they ,ould coerce people to pay

themG they gained arms and recruits 5hey then built a reputation for using means of violence as

credibility to carry out threats is etremely important for a raceteer (5illy' "#$80 .chelling'

"#/) 5hey built a reputation by carrying out threats against those ,ho refused to comply0

?refusal to pay by shopeepers' businessmen and industrialistsL' or a sign of dissent in the MQM

strongholds' could result in torture' loss of property and even loss of life@ (.iddi1i' 23"3) MQM

gained charity from businessmen and citi+ens all over Karachi0 their unit and sector-in-charge

greatly facilitating this process (=a1' "##8) 7n return for paying this tribute' these people ,ere


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considered to be under MQMs protection ,hich basically meant that until the net payment

,as due' MQM ,ill not cause them any harm &ccording to columnist 7rfan =ussain' ?boys as

young as thirteen and fourteen roam the streets ,ith automatic ,eapons Coung recruits of

MQML cant get a job but in the profession of illing they are ade1uately compensated out of

bhattaetortion moneyL@ (Khan' 23"3) 5he money generated ,as also used to help Muhajirs

get jobs' admissions in to schools and universities and it ,as also used to perpetuate the system

of corruption in ,hich local citi+ens ,ere helpless bystanders ,ho had to pay their protectors in

order to ensure their safety from them

5his section briefly eplained the ey events in !aistans history that fueled Muhajirs

grievances and culminated in the creation of MQM 7t then traced the causes of MQMs early

criminal leanings and eplained ho, over the years those criminal tendencies became

institutionali+ed in the party turning MQM into an organi+ed criminal group 7t did so through

corroborating the practices of MQM ,ith available literature on organi+ed criminal groups0 by

sho,ing that MQM has its o,n traditions (oath taing)' an organi+ational structure (Iine Jero-

sectors-units)' someone ,ho benefits from that structure (&ltaf =ussain) and by sho,ing that

MQM operates lie a protection racet 5he net section ,ill eplore the t,o reasons that

eplain ,hy state of !aistan hesitates in taing action against this criminal organi+ation

Section &:

'ote base

&fter MQM ,as launched' it soon established itself as the sole political representative of

the Urdu-speaing community in !aistan (Faig' 2338) 5his popularity of MQM has manifested

itself repeatedly in electoral support since MQM too part in national and provincial elections for

the first time in "#$$ (.iddi1i' 23"3) 7n "#$/' MQMs agenda gained it votes in the municipal


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elections in Karachi and =yderabad (Khalid' et al.' 23"8) 5hen in the "#$$ general elections'

MQM achieved success in urban areas of .indh and emerged as the third largest political party of

the country (.hah+ad' 23";) 5he rural areas of .indh ,ere dominated by the !aistan !eoples

!arty (!!!)vi' ,hich also came first at the national level' ho,ever' ,ithout an absolute majority

(Khalid' et al.' 23"8) Fena+ir Fhutto' !!!s chairperson' decided to form an alliance ,ith MQM

as by combining MQMs seats ,ith their o,n' !!! could form an absolute majority in the

national assembly and come to po,er (Khalid' et al.' 23"8)

.ince then' MQM has formed political alliances ,ith each government that has come in

to po,er0 after !!! in "#$$' it formed a coalition ,ith 7slami Hamhoori 7ttehad (7H7) in "##3 and

then again ,ith !!! in "##; and in "##' it joined hands ,ith !aistan Muslim Eeague- Ia,a+

(!ME-I) and then ,ith the !aistan Muslim Eeague- Quaid (!ME-Q) in "### (!attanai' "###)

.ome of these alliances ,ere formed because MQMs seats ,ere needed by different political

parties in order to form a majority in the national assembly (as in "#$$' and in "###)

7nterestingly' even ,hen MQM ,as a part of the ruling coalition' dataviisho,s that it did not stop

its criminal activities0 but a reduction ,as noticeable (!attanai' "###) =o,ever' in "#$$ and

"### due to the ruling partys reliance on MQMs vote ban it became harder for them to tae

any formal measure against the criminality and violence that MQM continued to generate' albeit

at a marginally lo,er level 6or eample' in "#$$ ?there ,as tremendous pressure on the !!!

from the po,erful army and e1ually po,erful president to tae action against those engaged in

violence in Karachi@ ho,ever' since Fhutto depended on the "; MQM seats in the national

assembly to maintain her parliamentary majority' she had to balance several' and at times

contrasting' interests in order to ensure the continuity of her rule (=a1' "##8) *n the one hand'

this led her to not initiali+e a cracdo,n against MQM ,hile on the other hand' in order to


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appease her .indhi voters' she continued to delay the implementation of certain policies that she

had agreed ,ith MQM at the time the coalition ,as formed (Khalid' et al.' 23"8) Fecause she

continued to ignore MQMs demands' MQM escalated the level of violence in Karachi (.hah+ad'

23";) that eventually forced Fhutto to agree to a cracdo,n against the perpetrators of violence'

a move that officially ended the MQM-!!! alliance (!attanai' "###) 5herefore' this eample

sho,s ho, forming a coalition at the national level ,ith MQM put the !!! administration

bet,een a roc and a hard placeG on the one hand' in order to continue the alliance no action

could be taen against MQM' on the other' MQMs violent orientation seemed to intensify every

time one its demands ,as not met- a scenario that is inevitable ,hen a ruling party is trying to

eep all its voters happy- causing a greater need for a cracdo,n against MQM 7n this instance'

since Fena+ir did not react s,iftly to MQMs increasing levels of violence' she ,as dismissed by

her o,n president on the pretet of not being able to handle the deteriorating la, and order

situation in Karachi (.hah+ad' 23";)

=o,ever' it is not only those parties ,ho lac a majority in the national assembly that

need MQMs votes .ince MQM persistently ,ins in the most vital and largest city in !aistan'

no peaceful rule can be implemented in !aistan ,ithout MQM on board (Mali' "##8)

5herefore' all governments ,ho come in po,er try to eep good relations ,ith MQM' at least

initially until MQMs antics might force them to change tactics


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'io$ence

*ne of the other reasons ,hy 7 thin subse1uent governments have not taen action

against MQM is because of MQMs ability to conduct violence and destabili+e Karachi >iolence

,ould occur in Karachi if MQM feels that a cracdo,n is being launched against them 5his

claim is made because history of MQMs eploits sho,s that strong-arming is the predominant

strategy used by MQM to achieve its aims =ence' if such a group finds its bac against the ,all

in a cracdo,n instituted by the state then it ,ill have a limited number of options 5he group

,ill either bribe or hide or it may choose to fight (Eessing' 23"8) 7n a situation ,here bribery is

not effective' criminals may choose to hide' depending on the time hori+on that is' if they epect

the enforcement from above to not last long' they are liely to hide it out only to emerge once

again ,hen the cracdo,n ends (Eessing' 23"8) 7n such cases' violence ,ill increase once the

cracdo,n ends & scenario that substantiates my claims can be found in MQMs history

7n the period of "##3-"##2' MQMs street po,er seemed undisputed 4uring these t,o years'

MQM ,as accused of destroying 23 bans' #8 shops' "32 houses' and conducting ;8 stries and

etortion (in ,hich they ?collected monthly ta from each and every shop' house and industry@)

(.hah+ad' 23";) Hournalists and press became a special target of MQM as its ,orers ?burnt

hundreds of thousand copies of different dailies - Jang' Dawn, The News, monthlyHerald and

,ealy Takbeer bet,een "3 N 23 March "##"@ (.hah+ad' 23";) Moreover' MQM illed

journalists ,ho ,rote against them' tortured professionals ,ho refused to pay them and also too

on the military ,hen they abducted and tortured a serving army officer (Daseem' "##) 4ue to

these gro,ing disturbances' the army stepped in and launched *peration Blean Up in Hune

"##2 in order to reestablish order in Karachi by eliminating dacoits and terrorists (&rif' 2333)


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5he federal minister at the time eplicitly assured MQM that the operation ,as not conducted

against them0 ho,ever' it soon became apparent that MQM ,as the intended target (Mali' "##80

.hah+ad' 23";) &s soon as it became evident ,ho the intended target of the operation ,as'

MQM leaders ran a,ay from !aistan or ,ent in to hiding ,hile foot soldiers of MQM ,ere left

floundering (Haffrelot' :ais "##$) 5he army ,ithdre, in Iovember "##% and the operation that

had begun in order to restore peace to .indh actually led to a ,orsening of an already volatile

situation 6or eample' ,hile ;3% people ,ere murdered in .indh in "##"' in "##% 88viiipeople

,ere illed in Karachi alone (!attanai' "###) 7n "##8' the situation deteriorated further ,ith the

illings of 2'3#8 people out of ,hich 2%; belong to MQM and 22 to la, enforcement

personnel OIever before in the history of this country have so many people been mo,ed do,n

in one city in a single year'O ,rote a columnist in "## (Faig' 2338)

&s grim as these statistics are they lend support to the claim made earlier Aovernments are

hesitant to tae action against MQM due to the levels of violence such action entails >iolence is

generated because out of the three options available to MQM ,orers' the one option' bribe'

,hich could lead to a reduction in violence' is not applicable because the army has lo, levels of

corruption in !aistan *f the t,o options' the foot soldiers of MQM- people ,ho ,ere in charge

of units and other countless party ,orers- ,ere unable to go underground or escape as

efficiently as the higher-ups in the party had and thus' their option ,as to fight 5hose party

members ,ho ,ere able to hide during the cracdo,n reemerged once the operation ended and

to sho,case their strength conducted even higher levels of violence

5his section eplained the t,o reasons because of ,hich 7 claim that the state of !aistan

has been unable to commit long-term action against MQM 5hese include the dependency that

each party in office has on the MQM vote base and the penchant for violence that is


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characteristic of MQM 5his violence not only destabili+es the city but also generates huge costs

in terms of lives that are lost and money spent to sustain the operation and money lost due to the

operationi 5he net section ,ill present a strategy to counteract MQM that ,ill also address

states concerns

Section (:

#omprehensive action

7n the past ;3 years since its inception' MQM has morphed in to an organi+ed criminal group

,ith an ironclad grip over Karachi 5hough its had its ups-and-do,ns' MQM has sho,n

resilience by remaining the top contender in Karachi 5he 1uestion then is ,hat can be done to

effectively counter MQM considering that each party relies on MQM to consolidate its o,n

position in government and the violence that threatens to implode the moment any action is taen

against MQMP

Dhile formulating a solution to the MQM problem one aspect that needs to be

understood is that any antidote to Karachis conundrum ,ill have to be long-term 5he problem

that MQM poses does not have an easy fi0 ,hich is the very outloo that seems to characteri+e

all strategies implemented against MQM thus far 6or eample' in the "##2 operation against

MQM' the military had s,ept in to rid Karachi of all violent elements' alleging that they could

do the job in si months0 something ,hich they soon understood ,as not possible resulting in its-

e1ually insufficient though etended- 2 year stay .uch myopic and one-dimensional solutions

have plagued Karachi on several occasions (in "##2' "##%' 23";) 7nstead of such measures' a

comprehensive solution ,ill be one that is multi-pronged ,ith a longer time hori+on but has

certain short-terms goals as ,ell (Bru+' 23"")


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6or the purposes of this paper' 7 ,ill analy+e some aspects of the most recent policy the

government has implemented to counter violence in Karachi and ,ill propose amendments in

their design *n .eptember %' 23"; the government decided to launch an operation led by the

paramilitary :angers to curb violence in Karachi (7nternational Brises Aroup' 23"%) 5he state

identified ?%83 terrorists' target illers' idnappers and etortionists@ as the primary targets of the

operation (7nternational Brises Aroup' 23"%) 5he government stated that four committees ,ould

supervise the operationG ?a ,eely federal committee comprising the interior minister and

representatives of the .indh government' :angers' the Iational 4atabase and :egistration

&uthority (I&4:&)' the Iational &lien :egistration &uthority (Iara) and the federal

intelligence agencies0 a daily operational committee headed by the :angers director general and

including civilian and military intelligence officials0 a legislative committee to devise a legal

frame,or for epanding the :angers po,ers in the operations0 and a citi+ens committee

comprising respected civil society activists to oversee :angers conduct@ (7nternational Brises

Aroup' 23"%)

5hese steps taen by the government in the latter part of 23"; seemed to be going in the

right direction as the government called the paramilitary to help ,ith the situation in Karachi but

at the same time' it did not allo, it complete reign and made sure the actions of :angers ,ere

ept under chec by committees comprising of political members' intelligence personnel'

civilian officers and members of civil society =o,ever' there ,as one instance in the early

stages of the operation ,here the government erred grievouslyG it gave :angers shoot-to-ill

po,ers (7nternational Brises Aroup' 23"%) .uch unbridled po,er can' and has in the past' led to

po,er abuses by the paramilitaries .ubse1uently' abuse of po,er by those ,ho are supposed to

enforce la, can' as ,itnessed in the past' be counterproductive to the aim of restoring la, to


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17

Karachi 6or eample' in "##2 and "##' a number of MQM members ,ere illed in etra

judicial illings and as the stories of their torturous deaths ,ere uncovered organi+ations such as

the =uman :ights Bommission of !aistan began accusing the authorities of illing people

,ithout due process of la, (.hah+ad' 23";) &s ne,s of these unla,ful illings began to emerge'

MQMs popularity became further amplified as they ,ere able to play the role of the victim since

the state had proved to be more violent than them (Faig' 2338) 5he government stands to go

do,n the same path if it does not effectively limit the po,er of the paramilitaries by placing

controls on them and not giving them authori+ation to ill suspects

Moreover' it must be ept in mind that reliance on paramilitaries should not be the status

1uo rather it should be a short term measure as a states local la, enforcement should be

competent enough to deal ,ith local criminals 5hus the government' eeping in mind the longer

time frame' should mae an effort to strengthen the local police by increasing their pay' their

access to health facilities and improving their ,or conditions0 all of ,hich ,ill help reduce their

susceptibility to corruption (7nternational Brises Aroup' 23"%) *ne important element that

compromises the police is its high level of politici+ation as around %39 of the police in Karachi

are recruited on political grounds (Cusuf' 23"2) 5his results in police officers that have political

ties offering protection for the illegal activities of their political patrons (Cusuf' 23"2) =o,ever'

it is not only political affiliations that cripple effective police operations but also the fact that

police officers ,ho resist political pressures are often gunned do,n ,hich goes to sho, the

inability of police to protect even itself (Cusuf' 23"2) 5his dismal state of local police not only

provides further justification for relying on paramilitary' but also reveals the etent to ,hich the

local la, enforcement needs to be revamped and depolitici+ed so that in the long run it can step

up to protect the city (Cusuf' 23"2)


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18

!oor la, enforcement situation in Karachi is made ,orse by the e1ually ineffectual criminal

justice system (Cusuf' 23"2) 6or instance' in 23"" :angers arrested more than t,o hundred

suspected target illers and since then' not one of those has been successfully prosecuted (Cusuf'

23"2) Majority of the criminals accused in anti-terrorism courts iare let go because ,itnesses

are too scared to testify against them out of fear of retaliation by the accuseds fello, friends

(Cusuf' 23"2) 5his fear on part of the ,itness stems from the lac of proper ,itness protection

programs in !aistan (Cusuf' 23"2) Moreover' there is also a baclog of unresolved cases0 cases

that have been a,aiting hearings for over eight years (Cusuf' 23"2) 6or the state to launch any

effective policy against criminals in Karachi it needs to not only enhance the capacity of the

justice system but also to ensure ?transparency' impartiality' and prompt disposal of cases@

(Cusuf' 23"2)

5o reiterate' the current government has given po,ers to the paramilitary in !aistan and

additionally' it has lifted its seven-year ban on eecutions (Frennan' 23"8) =o,ever' of the $333

convicts on death ro,' only 2## have been put to death' as reported by FFB 5hough the death

penalty has not been effectual since majority of the offenders remain untouched' its

reimplementation has led to interesting outcomeG hours before his eecution' .aulat Mir+a' an

MQM hit-man ,ho had been on death ro, for "/ years' revealed that all his orders to ill had

come from &ltaf =ussain (.hah' &hmed' 23"8) .uch confessions cause a chin in the armor of

MQM Moving for,ard' the government needs to enhance the process that they have started by

building up local police force and speeding up the judicial process so that the baclog of decades

old cases reduces

.uch steps ,ill help the state counter the threat of violence posed by MQM and others in

Karachi Fy improving their la, enforcement (increasing their resources and depolitici+ing


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19

them) and their judicial system (promptly disposing cases ,ith transparency)' the government

increases its potential of not only catching militants' those affiliated ,ith MQM and others0 but

also bringing them to justice 7n order to increase their credibility as impartial suppliers of

justice' the state should not be discriminating in ,ho they apprehend that is they should not be

charging only those criminals ,ho are affiliated ,ith MQM rather' for anyone studying the

pattern of arrests made by the :angers it should be obvious that enforcement agencies are going

after all criminals' regardless of their ethnicity or political affiliations 7f the state is able to

apprehend and convict criminals in a transparent process' by using the press and the media to

sho, that the individuals charged have indeed committed crimes' MQMs claims of being

unfairly treated ,ill be less liely to gain support :ather' it is possible that MQM might

disassociate itself ,ith the arrested persons in order to distance itself from their crimes0 a

situation that can cause the individuals to confess lie in the case of .aulat Mir+a

Dhile carrying out this process' the state should anticipate a possible baclash from

MQM in the form of resignation of MQM members from the national and provincial assemblies

and dissolution of previously formed coalitions 7n such a situation' the government has several

options the first one being that it accepts MQM resignations and then' as per the constitution'

holds by-elections in former MQM constituencies 5his ,ill allo, ne, members to get elected

thus ensuring the presence of representatives from Karachi in assemblies 7n this scenario' since

MQMs usual fallbac option- their ability to cause mayhem in the city- should have been

significantly reduced by paramilitaries and their action against criminals' resignation by the

members of MQM should not affect Karachi adversely &nother option that the government can

avail is not to accept MQM members resignations 5his move stems from the tacit

understanding that MQM actually does not ,ant to resign0 it uses the threat of resignation as a


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20

bargaining chip to pressuri+e the government to agree to its demands 5his is based on the fact

that in ?real politik,despite all the seats from urban constituencies' the MQM cannot form any

provincial government on its o,n and it can operate only in coalition@ (Mali' "##8) 5he

aforementioned fact means that as much as certain parties might rely on MQM to form majorities

in national assemblies' MQMs reliance on all the parties is greater since it mustform coalitions

in order to sustain its position of po,er

&side from the aforementioned steps' other measures that should be taen by the

government are concrete steps taen to address the grievances of Muhajirs 5his is necessary

because MQM receives all its electoral support from the Muhajirs of Karachi (Daseem' "##0

Mali' "##$0 =a1' "##80 Faig' 2338) as it alleges to represent its interests 5he governments

tas is to brea the hold of po,er that MQM has over the Muhajir voter by addressing the

problems of Muhajirs (and not by creating factions ,ithin MQM' a failed strategy of the state in

the "##2 operation) and the first step in this direction ,ould be to alter the 1uota system :ather

than feed the illusion of Muhajir being a helpless citi+en of Karachi0 someone ,hose interests are

not accounted for in the mandates of any party' the government ,ould be ,ise to shatter it by

investing their energies in solving the social and economic factors that give rise to Muhajir

grievances 5here are already factions of Muhajirs present ,ho believe that rather than further

their cause' MQM is actually bad for them (&hmar' "##) 6or eample' former party ,orers

epress their dissatisfaction ,ith MQM in statements such asG

?&ltaf =ussein spoe po,erfully but ,as not committed to solving our problems =is

demands escalated 7f the army refused he announced a strie Iot one vehicle moved on

the roads Dho ,as affectedP Muhajir shopeepers' tai drivers and ricsha, drivers

5he violence ,as relentless' ,e ,ere no nearer to our goals De idnapped rich people'


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21

robbed bans De gave everything ,e robbed to the party' something ,as ,rong@ (Khan'

23"3)

5he state should eploit these dissatisfactions among Muhajirs' something ,hich it cannot do

,ithout addressing the social and economic problems faced by Muhajirs0 problems that currently

only &ltaf =ussain vo,s to address

5his section attempted to form a strategy through ,hich MQMs hold on po,er in

Karachi could be challenged Freaing MQMs monopoly on violence is the ey through ,hich

governments reliance on MQM goes do,n 7n the short run' this monopoly ,ill be broen by

initiating stricter la, enforcement' such as the paramilitary action initiated by the current

government- one that did not need MQMs votes to form a majority in the national assembly-

and in the longer run' MQMs monopoly over Karachi ,ill ,eaen further through the

revamping of la, enforcement and judiciary' and through the introduction of social and

economic policies that address Muhajir grievances

#onc$usion

Bonventional ,isdom states that organi+ed criminal groups are those that do not see

political po,er' their main aim is to continue their operations to generate profits MQM is no

differentG it is a group that sees to further the interests of its higher ups only =o,ever' the

advantage that MQM has over other criminal groups is the legitimacy it gains because of its

popular support Fecause all the other parties do not focus on the grievances of the Muhajir

community' MQM is able to come in and fill this niche by proclaiming that it does ,hat others

,ill notG represent Muhajirs =o,ever' their actions on ground defy their claim0 a deception not

recogni+able to many of its supporters


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22

5he purpose of this paper ,as to establish the criminal nature of MQM' present reasons

for ,hy the party has not been targeted lie a criminal group and provide steps through ,hich the

government can begin to counter the MQM problem 7 do not claim that this paper is a

comprehensive overvie, of the etent of the criminal nature of MQM' of the reasons ,hy

government hesitates in taing action against it and the steps through ,hich it can counter MQM

Ior do 7 thin that the steps proposed by the government thus far to counter MQM are incorrect

=o,ever' 7 do believe that this paper presents a more comprehensive strategy to deal ,ith

MQM0 a strategy that eeps in mind several conditions that impact MQMs popularity ,hich is

something that previous measures have not done =aving said that' ,ith more research this paper

can be further refined


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23


24/27

i*ver the years' in addition to housing the largest Muhajir population in !aistan' Karachi has become the

largest !athan' .indhi' Faloch and Kashmiri city and the sith largest !unjabi city

ii&fter the introduction of this policy' the Muhajirs of urban .indh eperienced a fall in their civil service

recruitment percentages that fell from ;3"9 in "#/; to 2329 in "#$; ,hile the .indhi share in the federal

bureaucracy increased from ;"9 in "#/; to 8"9 in "#$; (&hmar' "##)

iiiFihari are also Muhajirs (refugees) ,ho migrated to


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responsibility for the situation in Karachi 5he military in !aistan is one institution that not only has the means

to sufficiently challenge MQM but it also has the influence to ensure that long term policies to counter MQM are

properly implemented by each successive government

xi&ntiterrorism courts in !aistan are responsible for terrorist attacs' murder' etortion' arms trafficing' idnapping'

hijacing' sectarian violence' and target political illings (Cusuf' 23"2)

Dor BitedG

&hmar' Moonis O


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Karimi' Kayvan' and .adaf .ultan Khan ?"3/ KarachiG 5he transformation and spatial politics

of a !ost-Bolonial migrant city@ +roceedings o/ the 45th6nternational !pace !#nta7 !#mposium,

(23"8)G "-"

Khalid' Muhammad Munib' Ia+ima Kulsoom' and Ahulam Qasim O5he :ole of ali :e+a O.tudents' 7slam' and !oliticsG 7slami Hamiat-7 5ulaba in !aistanO The

(iddle -ast Journal("##2)G 8#-/

!attanai' .mruti . O


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5illy' Bharles' !eter F

Documents

Political party as organized criminal group