POLITICAL LAW PART IVDECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES & STATE POLICIES

Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.

a. The basic principles underlying the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.

b.Manifestations of a republican state.

c.   Define “state”

COLLECTOR VS. CAMPOS RUEDA, 42 SCRA 23

d.   Elements of a state. Define each:

1. people

2. territory

3. sovereignty

4. government

e. Different meanings of the word “people” as used      in the constitution:

1. as inhabitants (Art. XIII, Sec. 1; Art. III, Sec. 2);

2. as citizens (Preamble; Art. II, Sec. 1 & 4; Art. III, Sec. 7);

3. as voters (Art. VII, Sec. 4)

f. Presidential & parliamentary forms of government

Read:

1.           FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION VS. OPLE, 108 SCRA 757

The government of the Philippines under the 1973 Constitution is “essentially presidential with parliamentary features.”

2. LEGASPI VS. SEC. OF FINANCE, 115 SCRA 418

The form of government is “essentially parliamentary with presidential features.”

g. Two-fold function of the government

Read:

        1)BACANI VS. NACOCO, 100 Phil. 468 (Ministrant [merely directory] and Constituent [Mandatory] Functions)       2)   ACCFA VS. CUGCO, 30 SCRA 649

Due to complexities of the changing society, the two-fold function of the government as classified by President Wilson is no longer relevant.

h. Parents Patriae

Read:

1)   GOVT. VS. MONTE DE PIEDAD, 35 Phil 738          2)   CABANAS VS. PILAPIO, 58 SCRA 94

i.   De jure govt.? De facto govt.?

Read:

1. AQUINO VS. COMELEC, 62 SCRA 275 (on the de jure aspect)  2. In Re: SATURNINO BERMUDEZ, 145 SCRA 160

A government formed as a result of a people’s revolution, is considered de jure if it is already accepted by the family of nations or other countries like the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Japan, and others.

3.           Estrada vs. Macapagal & Desierto, infra.

j. The three (3) kinds of de facto government?

Read: CO KIM CHAM VS. VALDEZ TAN KEH, 75 Phil. 113

There are several kinds of de facto governments.

a.           The first, or government de facto in a proper legal sense, is that government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal governments and maintains itself against the will of the latter, such as the government of England under the Commonwealth, first by Parliament and later by Cromwell as Protector.

b.           The second is that which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a government of paramount force, as the cases of Castine, in Maine,

which was reduced to British possession in the war of 1812, and Tampico, Mexico, occupied during the war with Mexico, by the troops of the United States.

c.           And the third is that established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state of such as the government of the Southern Confederacy in revolt not concerned in the present case with the first kind, but only with the second and third kinds of de facto governments.

“But there is another description of government, called also by publicists a government de facto, but which might, perhaps, be more aptly denominated a government of paramount force. Its distinguishing characteristics are

(1), that its existence is maintained by active military power with the territories, and against the rightful authority of an established and lawful government; and

(2), that while it exists it necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, or wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government.

On the other hand, laws of a political nature or affecting political relations, such as, among others, the right of assembly, the right to bear arms, the freedom of the press, and the right to travel freely in the territory occupied, are considered as suspended or in abeyance during the military occupation. Although the local and civil administration of justice is suspended as a matter of course as soon as a country is militarily occupied, it is not usual for the invader to take the whole administration into his own hands. In practice, the local ordinary tribunals are authorized to continue administering justice; and judges and other judicial officers are kept in their posts if they accept the authority of the belligerent occupant or are required to continue in their positions under the supervision of the military or civil authorities appointed, by the Commander in Chief of the occupant. These principles and practice have the sanction of all publicists who have considered the subject, and have been asserted by the Supreme Court and applied by the President of the United States.

The doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his work on International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): “The right of one belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of the enemy while in its military possession, is one of the incidents of war, and flows directly from the right to conquer. We, therefore, do not look to the Constitution or political institutions of the conqueror, for authority to establish a government for the territory of the enemy in his possession, during its military occupation, nor for the rules by which the powers of such government are regulated and limited. Such authority and such rules are derived directly from the laws war, as established by the usage of the of

the world, and confirmed by the writings of publicists and decisions of courts  in fine, from the law of nations. . . . The municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the laws which regulate private rights, continue in force during military occupation, excepts so far as they are suspended or changed by the acts of conqueror. . . . He, nevertheless, has all the powers of a de facto government, and can at his pleasure either change the existing laws or make new ones.”

The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of justice of those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid, and, by virtue of the well-knownprinciple of postliminy (postliminium) in international law, remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur. According to that well-known principle in international law, the fact that a territory which has been occupied by an enemy comes again into the power of its legitimate government of sovereignty, “does not, except in a very few cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by an invader, which for one reason or another it is within his competence to do. Thus judicial acts done under his control, when they are not of a political complexion, administrative acts so done, to the extent that they take effect during the continuance of his control, and the various acts done during the same time by private persons under the sanction of municipal law, remain good. Were it otherwise, the whole social life of a community would be paralyzed by an invasion; and as between the state and the individuals the evil would be scarcely less,  it would be hard for example that payment of taxes made under duress should be ignored, and it would be contrary to the general interest that the sentences passed upon criminals should be annulled by the disappearance of the intrusive government .” (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 518.) And when the occupation and the abandonment have been each an incident of the same war as in the present case, postliminy applies, even though the occupant has acted as conqueror and for the time substituted his own sovereignty as the Japanese intended to do apparently in granting independence to the Philippines and establishing the so-called Republic of the Philippines. (Taylor, International Law, p. 615.)

l.   Sovereignty:

1. legal

2. political

m.   The doctrine of sovereignty as auto-limitation?

Read:

1. REAGAN VS. COMMISIONER OF INTERNAL      REVENUE, 30 SCRA 968“By the Agreement, it should be noted, the Philippine Government merely consents that the United States exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. The consent was given purely as a matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of. The first proposition is implied from the fact of Philippine sovereignty over the bases; the second from the express provisions of the treaty.”    “Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of sovereignty.”  Then came this paragraph dealing with the principle of auto-limitation: “It is to be admitted any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in character. That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, “is the property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction.” A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence.”  The opinion was at pains to point out though that even then, there is at the most diminution of jurisdictional rights, not its disappearance.               2.  PEOPLE VS. GOZO, 53 SCRA 476               3.   COMMISSIONER VS. ROBERTSON, 143 SCRA 3972. Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national police, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity among all nations.

a. difference between aggressive & defensive war

b. Read:

1)           MEJOFF VS. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, 90 Phil. 70

The Philippines adopts the Universal Declaration of Human Rights since it is a generally accepted principle of international law. As such, it should be applied to illegal aliens like the petitioner so that it would be a violation of the said international law to detain him

for an unreasonable length of time since no vessel from his country is willing to take him.

“The meaning of “reasonable time” depends upon the circumstances, specially the difficulties of obtaining a passport, the availability of transportation, the diplomatic arrangements concerned and the efforts displayed to send the deportee away. Considering that this Government desires to expel the alien, and does not relish keeping him at the people’s expense, we must presume it is making efforts to carry out the decree of exclusion by the highest officer of the land. On top of this presumption assurances were made during the oral argument that the Government is really trying to expedite the expulsion of this petitioner. On the other hand, the record fails to show how long he has been under confinement since the last time he was apprehended. Neither does he indicate neglected opportunities to send him abroad. And unless it is shown that the deportee is being indefinitely imprisoned under the pretense of awaiting a chance for deportation 3 or unless the Government admits that it can not deport him  or unless the detainee is being held for too long a period our courts will not interfere.

2)            KURODA VS. JALANDONI, 83 Phil 171

Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no Jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international law. In facts these rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nation the United State and Japan who were signatories to the two Convention, Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of international law as continued inn treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.

Furthermore when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed the Philippines was under the sovereignty of United States and thus we were equally bound together with the United States and with Japan to the right and obligation contained in the treaties between the belligerent countries. These rights and obligation were not erased by our assumption of full sovereignty. If at all our emergency as a free state entitles us to enforce the right on our own of trying and punishing those who committed crimes against crimes against our people. In this connection it is well to remember what we have said in the case of Laurel vs. Misa (76 Phil., 372):

3)           SALONGA VS. HERMOSO, 97 SCRA 121

4)           AGUSTIN VS. EDU,  88 SCRA 195

The Geneva Convention on Road Signs and Signals, is also considered part of the law of the Philippines since the same is a generally accepted principle of international law in accordance with the Incorporation clause of the Constitution.

5)           REYES VS. BAGATSING,125 SCRA 553

Respondent Mayor posed the issue of the applicability of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or demonstrations within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes. It is to be admitted that it finds support In the previously quoted Article 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. There was no showing, however, that the distance between the chancery and the embassy gate is less than 500 feet. Even if it could be shown that such a condition is satisfied. it does not follow that respondent Mayor could legally act the way he did. The validity of his denial of the permit sought could still be challenged. It could be argued that a case of unconstitutional application of such ordinance to the exercise of the right of peaceable assembly presents itself. As in this case there was no proof that the distance is less than 500 feet, the need to pass on that issue was obviated, Should it come, then the qualification and observation of Justices Makasiar and Plana certainly cannot be summarily brushed aside. The high estate accorded the rights to free speech and peaceable assembly demands nothing less.

Without saying that the Ordinance is obnoxious per se to the constitution, it cannot be validly invoked whenever its application would collide with a constitutionally guaranteed right such as freedom of assembly and/or expression, as in the case at bar, regardless of whether the chancery of any foreign embassy is beyond or within 500 feet from the situs of the rally or demonstration.

3. Section 3. Civilian authority is, at all times supreme over the military. The armed forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.

See also:

Art. VII, Sec. 18

Art. XVI, Sec. 5 (2)

Art. XVI, Sec. 5 (4)

4. Section 4. The prime duty of the government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal and military service.

Read:

1.           PEOPLE VS. LAGMAN, 66 Phil. 13“The appellant’s argument that he does not want to join the armed forces because “he does not want to kill or be killed” and that “he has no military inclination” is not acceptable because it is his obligation to join the armed forces in connection with the “defense of the State” provision of the Constitution.2. PEOPLE VS. MANAYAO, 78 Phil. 7213. PD1706, August 8, 19804. Exec. Order No. 264  5.   Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.6.  Section 6. The separation of church and State shall be inviolable.

Read:

1)   PAMIL VS. TELERON, 86 SCRA 413     2)   GERMAN VS. BARANGAN, 135 SCRA 514

(NOTE: Read the dissenting opinions in    both cases)

3) Other provisions:

Other provisions on church & state:

1.           ART. III, Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. NO RELIGIOUS TEST SHALL BE REQUIRED FOR THE EXERCISE OF CIVIL OR POLITICAL RIGHTS.2.           ART. VI, Sec. 28 (3). Charitable institutions, churches, mosques, non-profit cemeteries…actually, directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.3.           ART. VI, Sec. 29 .(2). No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, for the benefit, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination or religion, except when such priest, minister.. is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.

4.           ART. IX, C, 2(5). Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered…as political parties. (NOTE: Religious organizations are also prohibited ion connection with sectoral representatives under Art. VI)

5.            ART. XIV, Sec. 3(3). At the option in writing by parents, religion shall be allowed to be taught to their children in elementary and high schools within the regular class hours by instructors designated or approved by religious authorities to which said children belong, without additional cost to the government.

7.           Sections 7.   The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states the paramount consideration shall be   national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-determination,8.           Section 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear   weapons in its territory.

1.           meaning of “nuclear-free” Philippines;

2.            Art. XVIII, Secs. 4 & 25

9.           Sections 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all..10.          The state shall promote social justice in all phases of national development. 11.        The state values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.

a. Read together with entire provisions of Article XIII

12.         9.  Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civil efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support the support of the government.

NOTE: Father Bernas opines that this provision does not take a stand on divorce. As such, a Divorce Law to be passed by Congress may or may not be unconstitutional. But definitely, a law allowing  abortion ,  other than therapeutic, is unconstitutional.

1. Read together with the entire provisions of Article XV.

2.   Read:

a)           GINSBERG VS. NEW YORK, 390 US 629 (1969)

A law prohibiting the sale of “girlie magazines” [bold?) is constitutional and does not violate the above provision. This is so because parents could buy said magazines for their children if they believe the same is already suitable to the understanding of their child. This is in accordance with this provision which states that the parents have the “natural and primary right in rearing their child for civic efficiency…”

b)   MEYER VS. NEBRASKA, 260 US 260 (1922)

c)  PIERCE  VS. SOCIETY OF SISTERS, 268 US   510 (1925)

A law requiring small kids to be enrolled in public schools only is unconstitutional since it interferes with the right of parents in rearing their children. They have the right to choose which school is best suited for the development of their children without interference from the State.

d)   PACU VS. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, 97 Phil. 806

e)   CABANAS VS. PILAPIL, 58 SCRA 94

10.  Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.

Read:

1)  PD 684

2)  PD 935

3)  PD 1102

4)  PD 603; see the objectives of the law

11.        Sections 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of men and women.12.        Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.13.        Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

14.        Section 17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote human liberation and development.  

1)   Read together with Article XIV

Read :

VILLEGAS VS. SUBIDO, 109 SCRA 1

OPOSA VS. FACTORAN, July 30, 1993;

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."

The minors-petitioners have the personality to sue since the case deals with the timber licensing agreements entered into by the government which if not stopped would be prejudicial to their future. This is so because the DENR holds  in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations the natural resources of the country. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.

Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations.  Needless to say, every generation has a

responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right  the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 16.    The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:

Sec. 15.    The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation  aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners  the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come  generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and

judicially enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.

13.      Section 18.  The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.

1)   Read together with Section 3, Article XIII, 1987 Constitution.

2) Compare it with Section 9, Article II, 1973 Constitution.

3) Read:

a. VICTORIANO VS. ELIZALDE POPE WORKERS   UNION, 59 SCRA 54

The right to religion prevails over contractual or legal rights. As such, an Iglesia Ni Kristo member may refuse to join a Union and despite the fact that there is a closed shop agreement in the establishment where he was employed, his employment could not be validly terminated for his non-membership in the majority union therein.

13.  Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.

See Art. XII

14.      Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investments.

a.   Do we practice the free enterprise system in the Philippines or is it the welfare state concept? Distinguish the two.

b.   Read:     ACCFA VS. CUGCO, 30 SCRA 649 (Note: Read the separate opinion of former Chief Justice ENRIQUE FERNANDO only)

The Philippines never practiced the free enterprise system. It is the welfare-state concept which is being followed as shown by the constitutional provision on agrarian reform, housing, protection to labor… (NOTE, however, that the 1987 Constitution have provisions which provide for  “free enterprise)

PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS VS. PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY, 286 SCRA 109

Mendoza, J.

The Philippine Constitutions, starting from the 1935 document, HAVE REPUDIATED  laissez faire  (or the doctrine of free enterprise) as an economic principle, and although the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nevertheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare.

As such, free enterprise does not call for the removal of “protective regulations” for the benefit of the general public. This is so because under Art. XII, Sections 6 and 9, it is very clear that the  government reserves the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare and when the public interest so requires.

15.  Section 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform.

a. Read together with Secs. 4-10, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution

b. Read PD 27 - as to the extent of land reform under the MARCOS regime

c. Read RA 3844 & 6389, as amended - THE CODE OF AGRARIAN REFORMS OF THE PHILIPPINES (Read the policy of the state on this matter)

d .Read the COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM LAW, RA No. 6657 as signed into law by the President on June 7, 1988.

e. Read:

Association of Small Landowners vs. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, July 14, 1989

16.  Sections 22.  The State recognizes and promotes the right of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development.

To be discussed later with Art. X, Secs. 15-     21.

Other provisions on indigenous cultural communities:

1. Art. VI, Sec. 5(2)

2. Art. X, Secs. 15 - 21

3. Art. XII, Sec. 5

4. Art. XIII, Sec. 6

5. Art. XIV, Sec. 17

6. Art. XVI, Sec. 12

17. Section 23. The State shall encourage non-governmental, community based, or sectoral organizations that promote the welfare of the nation.17-a. Section 24. The State recognizes the vital role of communication and information in nation-building.18.  Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.a. Define "autonomy"

b. See Art. X

Read  the 1991  New Local Government Code and enumerate its provisions evidencing "autonomy" to local government units.

19.  Section 26. The State guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.20.   Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption.

To be discussed under Article XI.

a. Please see RA 3019, The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended by RA 3047, PD 77 and BP 195..b. PD 749, July 18, 1975, which grants immunity from prosecution to givers of bribes and other gifts and to their accomplices in bribery other than graft cases against public officers.c. RA 1379.  Forfeiture in favor of the State any property found to have been illegally acquired by a public officer or employee.21.        Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of public   disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

Power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation;  Public disclosure of government transactions

  CAMILO L. SABIO vs. GORDON, G.R. No. 174340,  October 17, 2006, 504 SCRA 704

Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.The Facts:On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res. No. 455),[1][4] “directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on

the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC),  Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors.”    The pertinent portions of the Resolution read:WHEREAS, in the last quarter of 2005, the representation and entertainment expense of the PHC skyrocketed to P4.3 million, as compared to the previous year’s mere P106 thousand;

WHEREAS, some board members established wholly owned PHC subsidiary called Telecommunications Center, Inc. (TCI), where PHC funds are allegedly siphoned; in 18 months, over P73 million had been allegedly advanced to TCI without any accountability report given to PHC and PHILCOMSAT;

WHEREAS, the Philippine Star, in its 12 February 2002 issue reported that the executive committee of Philcomsat has precipitately released P265 million and granted P125 million loan to a relative of an executive committee member; to date there have been no payments given, subjecting the company to an estimated interest income loss of P11.25 million in 2004;WHEREFORE, be it resolved that the proper Senate Committee shall conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation, on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and Philcomsat Holdings Corporations (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in the operations by their respective board of directors.On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff  Rio C. Inocencio, under the authority of Senator Richard J. Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG, one of the herein petitioners, inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by theCommittee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services.  The purpose of the public meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455.[2][6]

On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment.[3]

[7] At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of           E.O. No. 1 earlier quoted.On August 10, 2006, Senator Gordon issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum,[4][8] approved by Senate President Manuel Villar, requiring Chairman Sabio and PCGG Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, Nicasio Conti, Tereso Javier and Narciso Nario to appear in the public hearing scheduled on August 23, 2006 and testify on what they know relative to the matters specified in Senate Res. No. 455.   All were disregarded by the petitioners.

On September 12, 2006, at around 10:45 a.m., Major General Balajadia arrested Chairman Sabio in his office at IRC Building, No. 82 EDSA, Mandaluyong City and brought him to the Senate premises where he was detained.

Hence, Chairman Sabio filed with the Supreme Court a petition for habeas corpus against the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services, their Chairmen, Senators Richard Gordon and Joker P. Arroyo and Members.  The case was docketed as G.R. No. 174340.Chairman Sabio, Commissioners Abcede, Conti,  Nario, and Javier; and the PCGG’s nominees Andal and Jalandoni alleged: first, respondent Senate Committees disregarded Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 without any justifiable reason; second, the inquiries conducted by respondent Senate Committees are  not in aid of legislation; third, the inquiries were conducted in the absence of duly published Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation;and fourth, respondent Senate Committees are not vested with the power of contempt.In their Consolidated Comment, the above-named respondents countered: first, the issues raised in the petitions involve political questions over which this Court has no jurisdiction;second, Section 4(b) has been repealed by the Constitution; third, respondent Senate Committees are vested with contempt power; fourth,  Senate’s Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation have been duly published;  fifth, respondents have not violated any civil right of the individual petitioners, such as their (a) right to privacy; and (b) right against self-incrimination; and sixth, the inquiry does not constitute undue encroachment into justiciable controversies.I S S U E:Is  Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1  repealed by the 1987 Constitution? Is its implementation wherein the petitioners are exempt from appearing in investigations involving their transactions violates Section 28, Art. II of the Constitution?

Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1,  which limits the power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding provides:

No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.The Congress’ power of inquiry has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions long before it reached our shores through McGrain v. Daugherty,[5][15] cited in Arnault v. Nazareno.[6][16]  In those earlier days, American courts considered the power of inquiry as inherent in the power to legislate.

In Arnault, the Supreme Court adhered to a similar theory.  Citing McGrain, it recognized that the power of inquiry is “an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function,” thus:Although there is no provision in the “Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied.  In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.  A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislation body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who possess it.”

Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis.

Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI,     Section 1 of the Constitution stating that: “Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.”The provision presupposes that since an incumbent of a public office is invested with certain powers and charged with certain duties pertinent to sovereignty, the powers so delegated to the officer are held in trust for the people and are to be exercised in behalf of the government or of all citizens who may need the intervention of the officers. Such trust extends to all matters within the range of duties pertaining to the office. In other words, public officers are but the servants of the people, and not their rulers.[7][24] Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the principle of public accountability.   It places the PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of courts, Congress and other administrative bodies.  Instead of encouraging public accountability, the same provision only institutionalizes irresponsibility and non-accountability.  In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Peña,[8][25] Justice Florentino P. Feliciano characterized as “obiter” the portion of the majority opinion barring, on the basis of Sections 4(a) and (b) of E.O. No. 1, a civil case for damages filed against the PCGG and its Commissioners. He eloquently opined:The above underscored portions are, it is respectfully submitted, clearly obiter. It is important to make clear that the Court is not here interpreting, much less upholding as valid and constitutional, the literal terms of Section 4 (a), (b) of Executive Order No.1. If Section 4 (a) were given its literal import as immunizing the PCGG or any member thereof from civil liability “for anything done or omitted in the

discharge of the task contemplated by this Order,” the constitutionality of Section 4 (a) would, in my submission, be open to most serious doubt. For so viewed, Section 4 (a) would institutionalize the irresponsibility and non-accountability of members and staff of the PCGG, a notion that is clearly repugnant to both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution and a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic under the 1987 Constitution. x  x  x.

x    x   x

It would seem constitutionally offensive to suppose that a member or staff member of the PCGG could not be required to testify before the Sandiganbayan or that such members were exempted from complying with orders of this Court.    

Said provision of EO No. 1 violates Section 28, Art. II of the Constitution which mandates  that “Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.”

Read together with Section 7, Article III and Sec. 20, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

I.     Bill of Rights

Procedural Due Process

1.     Existence of Violation

Lameyra v. Pangilinan322 SCRA 117FACTS:  Petitioner received a letter from the mayor informing him that he is dropped from the roll of employees of the local government unit.  Petitioner claims that he was terminated without prior written notice of the charges and without investigation and hearing. 

HELD:  Although it is clear from the Civil Service Memorandum Circular that no prior notice is required to drop from the rolls an employee who has been continuously absent without leave for at least thirty days, petitioner contests the finding that he was absent at all.   He claims that he reported for work but was prevented form signing the log book.  In view of the circumstances prevailing in this case, the Civil Service Commission should have considered the new evidence annexed by petitioner to his motion for reconsideration.

Velayo v. Comelec327 SCRA 713FACTS:  The Comelec issued a resolution annulling the proclamation of Velayo as mayor.  Velayo claimed that he was denied due process because he was not furnished any notice of the pre-proclamation proceedings against him from beginning to end.  All that petitioner received from the Comelec was its en banc resolution annulling his proclamation.

HELD:  Velayo is a real party-in-interest since he was the proclaimed mayor.  His non-inclusion as respondent and his lack of notice of the proceedings in the Comelec which resulted to the cancellation of his proclamation constitute clear denial of due process.

Uy v. Commission on AuditG.R. No. 130685 (March 21, 2000)

FACTS:  Governor Paredes dismissed from service more than sixty employees, allegedly to scale down the operations of the office.  The Merit Systems Protection Board rendered a decision that the reduction in work force was not done in accordance with civil service rules and regulations, and ordered the reinstatement of the workers.  The Commission on Audit (COA) rendered a decision ruling that the back salaries of the workers have become the personal liability of the Governor because the illegal dismissal was done in bad faith.

HELD:  Governor Paredes was never made a party to nor served a notice of the proceedings before the COA.  Fundamental requirement of procedural due process cannot be violated before administrative agencies like COA.

Summary Dismissal Board v. TorcitaG.R. No. 130442 (April 6, 2000)

FACTS:  Respondent was charged with 12 administrative complaints which were consolidated into one major complaint, which is, conduct unbecoming of a police officer. The Summary Dismissal Board suspended respondent from service for 20 days, for “simple irregularity in the performance of service”.  The Board later found respondent to have committed a breach of internal discipline by taking alcoholic drinks while on duty.

HELD:  Respondent was entitled to know that he was being charged with being drunk while in the performance of duty.  Although he was given the opportunity to be heard on the multiple and broad charges filed against him, the absence of specification of the offense for which he was eventually found guilty is not a proper observance of due process.

Villanueva v. MalayaG.R. No. 94617 (April 12, 2000)

HELD:  The RTC’s granting of the writ of possession ex parte violates petitioner-lessees’ right to due process.  A writ of possession may issue against occupants of a property subject of execution who derive their right of possession from the judgment debtor upon motion in the execution proceedings and without need of a separate ejectment action, provided that the occupants are afforded an opportunity to explain the nature of their possession, on which basis the writ of possession will be denied or granted.

Gozun v. LlangcoA.M. No. MTJ-97-1136 (August 30, 2000)

FACTS:  The Sangguniang Bayan passed a resolution declaring the parcel of land occupied by complainant as the new site of the rural health center.  Respondent issued a resolution declaring that the Sangguniang Bayan resolution is valid and enforceable and that the mayor could order the police authorities to evict complainant.

HELD:  Complainant was not made a party to the petition nor notified thereof. Respondent violated the rights of the complainant to due process.

2.     Absence of violation

Immam v. Comelec322 SCRA 866FACTS:  Petitioner claims that the questioned Comelec order was issued without any motion for its issuance and without notice and hearing.  Thus, he claimed that his right to due process was violated.

HELD:  The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard.  The right to be heard does not only refer to the right to present verbal arguments in court.  A party can be heard through the pleadings he submits.  In this case, petitioner was heard through the memorandum he submitted.

Ocampo v. Office of the Ombudsman322 SCRA 17FACTS:  A criminal complaint was filed against petitioner for estafa and falsification.  The Ombudsman issued several orders to petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and controverting evidence.  Petitioner failed.  The Ombudsman issued the assailed resolution dismissing petitioner from service.  Petitioner claimed that he was denied due process because he was not given any notice of the order declaring him to have waived his right to file his counter-affidavit.

HELD:  The orders of the Ombudsman requiring petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit contained a warning that if no counter-affidavit is filed within the given period, a waiver would be

considered.  Also, petitioner was given the opportunity to be heard.  A party who chooses not to avail of the opportunity cannot complain of denial of due process

National Police Commission v. BernabeG.R. No. 129914 (May 12, 2000)

FACTS:  The Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the National Police Commission on the ground that respondent was denied due process in the conduct of the investigation of the charges filed against him.

HELD:  The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.  Due process does not always require a trial-type proceeding. In this case, the record shows that respondent was given notice of the complaints and an opportunity to answer.  He even submitted an affidavit answering point by point the charges against him.

3.     Administrative Due Process

Pefianco v. Moral322 SCRA 439FACTS:  Former DECS Secretary filed an administrative complaint against respondent for dishonesty.  She was dismissed.  Respondent filed a petition for mandamus to compel petitioner to furnish her a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee Report.  It was denied.

HELD:  A respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him.  He is entitled only to the administrative decision and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented during the hearings of the investigation committee.  Respondent had been accorded these rights.

4.     Impartiality of Judge

Soriano v. AngelesG.R. No. 109920 (August 31, 2000)

FACTS:  This is a petition for certiorari which seeks to annul the decision of respondent judge acquitting the accused in a direct assault case filed against him by the petitioner on the ground that respondent was biased.

HELD:  The fact that respondent judge believed the evidence of the defense more than that of the prosecution does not indicate that she was biased.

Almendra v. AsisA.M. RTJ-1590 (April 6, 2000)

HELD:  The mere fact that respondent judge ruled against complainant in the three cases filed before him did not amount to partiality against said complainant or warrant the conclusion that respondent rendered an unjust judgment.

People v. Zheng Bai HuiG.R. No. 127580 (August 22, 2000)

HELD:  The questioning of the witnesses by the judge is not a sufficient sign of bias.  (See also People v. Cabiles, G.R. No. 125008, October 23, 2000)

Equal Protection

De Guzman v. ComelecG.R. No. 129118 (July 19, 2000)

FACTS:  The Comelec reassigned petitioners to other stations pursuant to Section 44 of the Voter’s Registration Act.  The Act prohibits election officers from holding office in a particular city or municipality for more than four years.  Petitioners claim that the act violated the equal protection clause because not all election officials were covered by the prohibition.

HELD:  The law does not violate the equal protection clause.  It is intended to ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their place of assignment.  Large-scale anomalies in the registration of voters cannot be carried out without the complicity of election officers, who are the highest representatives of Comelec in a city or municipality.

            B.     Searches and Seizures 1.    Determination of Probable Cause by Judge

Dizon v. VeneracionA.M. No. RTJ-97-1376 (July 20, 2000)

FACTS:  Respondent issued a search warrant for the seizure of 100 cars imported by the operators of Metro Manila Inc. on the ground that the value of the cars had not been paid to the supplier.  Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge asked the witness for proof.  The witness answered that there was evidence from the shipper.

HELD:  The judge failed to comply with the constitutional requirement that before a search warrant may be issued, there must first be a complainant and his witness, and that the judge should determine probable cause through searching questions and answers.

Abdula v. Guiani

326 SCRA 1HELD:  If a judge relies solely on the certification of the prosecutor when the records are not before him, he has not personally determined the existence of probable cause.  The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied.  The judge does not have to personally examine the witnesses.  However, there should be a report and necessary documents supporting the certification of the prosecutor.  All these should be before the judge.  (See also Raro v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 108431, July 14, 2000 and Lim v. Felix, G.R. No. 940547)

Tolentino v. MalangaonA.M. No. RTJ-99-1444 (August 3, 2000)

FACTS:  Respondent judge dismissed the case of child abuse filed by petitioner on the ground that the prosecution failed to establish probable cause.  Previously, the court ordered petitioner to show cause why the court should order the arrest of the accused. However, petitioner refused to present additional affidavits on the ground that there was no need to prove the factual basis of the information.

HELD:  The judge must be satisfied with the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.  The judge may require the prosecutor to present further evidence to provide a factual basis for the finding of probable cause.

2.    Particularity of Description

Uy v. Bureau of Internal RevenueG.R. No. 129651 (October 20, 2000)

FACTS:  Petitioners claim that the search warrant issued lacks particularity.  The items described in the warrant are as follows: multiple sets of books of accounts, ledgers, journals, columnar books, cash register books, sales books or records, provisional and official receipts, production record books, inventory lists, stock cards, unregistered delivery receipts, unregistered purchase and sales invoices; sales records, job orders, corporate financial records, bank statements, cancelled checks. 

HELD:  Most of the items listed lacked particularity.  The judge could have formed a more specific description of the documents, since the former employee of the petitioners furnished photocopies of the documents sought to be seized.  With regard to the unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices, they are specific.  No more detailed description could have been given.  Items not particularly described may be cut off, without rendering the entire warrant void.

3.    Warrantless Searches and Seizurea.     Incident of Arrest

People v. ElamparoG.R. No. 121572 (March 31, 2000)

HELD:  Appellant’s subsequent arrest was lawful, coming as it is within the purview of “in flagrante delicto” arrest.  The warrantless search and seizure was also lawful since it was a search incidental to a lawful arrest.

People v. SevillaG.R. No. 124077 (September 5, 2000)

FACTS:  A team of police officers went to the house of the accused to enforce a warrant of arrest.  Some members of the Narcotics Command joined the team to look for marijuana.  Accused was subsequently charged with illegal possession of marijuana.

HELD:  The search is illegal.  It is not a search incidental to a valid arrest since the Narcotics Command joined the team of police officers for the specific purpose of conducting a search.

People v. FigueroaG.R. No. 134056 (July 6, 2000)

FACTS:  Accused, together with NBI agents, went to the house of his co-accused and pointed to a pail in the kitchen containing prohibited drugs.  NBI agents seized the item and arrested co-accused.  Is the warrantless seizure valid? HELD:  No.  The search is not incidental to a valid arrest.  The arrest of the co-accused did not precede the search. 

People v. Che Chun TingG.R. No. 130568 (March 21, 2000)

FACTS:  Standing outside Unit 122, accused handled two transparent bags of drugs to Mabel Po, in full view of NARCOM agents.  Police officers arrested the surprised man and conducted a search of Unit 122 where they found more bags of shabu.

HELD:  The search of Unit 122 and the seizure of drugs found therein are illegal.  A warrantless search should be limited to the premises and surroundings that are under the immediate control of the accused.  Unit 122 is not even the house of the accused but that of his girlfriend.

            b.     Moving Vehicle

People v. Escaño323 SCRA 754FACTS:  During a checkpoint, a police saw a firearm on the lap of the accused.  As a result, other passengers were searched and all firearms were seized.  Are checkpoints illegal?

HELD:  As long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection is limited to a visual search, such routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of the right against unreasonable search.

c.    Prohibited Article in Plain View / Custodial Investigation

People v. ValdezG.R. No. 129296 (September 25, 2000)

FACTS:  Based on a tip from an informer, police officers went to the place of the accused where they found marijuana plants being cultivated approximately twenty-five meters from the house of the accused.  They uprooted the plants and arrested the accused.  They asked the accused who owned the plants and the accused admitted that they belonged to him.  The prosecution offered the plants and the admission of the accused as evidence. The accused claimed that the warrantless search was illegal while the police officers claimed that the plants were found in plain view. 

HELD:  The marijuana plants were not in plain view.  For the plain view doctrine to apply, the following must be present:  (a)  there was a valid prior intrusion based on a valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b)  the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they were; (c)  the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d)  plain view justified seizure of the evidence without further search.  In this case, the police officers located the plants before they arrested the accused without a warrant.  Also, they were dispatched precisely to look for the marijuana plants.  The discovery was not inadvertent. The confession is also inadmissible.  In trying to elicit information from the accused, the police was investigating him as a suspect.  At this point, he was already under custodial investigation and had a right to counsel.

People v. DeangG.R. No. 128045 (August 24, 2000)

FACTS:  The accused was arrested for kidnapping for ransom with homicide.  He accompanied the police to his house to surrender his share of the ransom. Subsequently, the accused got convicted.  He claimed that the warrantless seizure of the money was illegal.

HELD:  The warrantless seizure of the money was legal because it was made with the consent of the accused.

4.    Warrantless Arrestsa.    Invalid Arrests

People v. Dela Cruz

G. R. No. 138516 (October 17, 2000)HELD:  A warrantless arrest after the commission of a crime is illegal.  The seizure of the items he stole is also illegal.

Posadas v. OmbudsmanG.R. No. 131492 (September 29, 2000)

FACTS:  Upon the request of the University Chancellor, the NBI sent agents to the university and tried to arrest two members of a fraternity who were identified by two witnesses as responsible for the killing of a member of another fraternity.

HELD:  The NBI agents had no personal knowledge of any fact which might indicate that the two students were probably guilty of the crime.  Their attempt to arrest them without a warrant was illegal.

5.    Effect of Plea on Illegal Arrest

People v. Gomez325 SCRA 61HELD:  Any objection to the warrant of arrest or the procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.  Thus, if he fails to move for the quashing of the information against him before his arraignment, he may be estopped from assailing the illegality of his arrest.  (See also People v. Buluran, 325 SCRA 476)

            D.     Freedom of Speech and of the Press 1.    Libel

Jalandoni v. Drilon327 SCRA 107

FACTS:  Private respondents published a full-page advertisement in five major daily newspapers.  These ads contained allegations naming petitioner who was then a PCGG Commissioner of having committed illegal and unauthorized acts.  Petitioner filed a complaint for the crime of libel.

HELD:  In libel cases against public officials, for liability to arise, the alleged defamatory statement must relate to official conduct, even if the defamatory statement is false, unless the public official concerned proves that the statement was made with actual malice, that is, with knowledge that it was false or not.  Here, petitioner failed to prove actual malice on the part of the private respondents.  The statements embodied in the advertisement are covered by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.  This carries the right to criticize the action and conduct of a public official.

2.    Freedom of expression

ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Comelec323 SCRA 811

FACTS:  Comelec came up with a resolution prohibiting the conduct of exit polls during elections for the reason that exit polls have the tendency to cause confusion.

HELD:  Conducting exit polls and reporting their results are valid exercises of freedom of speech and of the press.  A limitation on them may be justified only by a danger of such substantive character that the state has a right to prevent.  The concern of the Comelec cannot be justified since there is no showing that exit polls cause chaos in voting centers.

E.    Right to Information

Gonzales v. NarvasaG.R. No. 140835 (August 14, 2000)

FACTS:  Petitioner wrote a letter to the Executive Secretary requesting for information with respect to the names of executive officials holding multiple positions, copies of their appointments, and a list of recipients of luxury vehicles previously seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to the Office of the President.  Petitioner filed this petition to compel the Executive Secretary to answer his letter.

HELD:  It is the duty of the Executive Secretary to answer the letter of the petitioner.  The letter deals with matters of public concern, appointments to public offices and utilization of public property.  The Executive Secretary is obliged to allow the inspection and copying of appointment papers.

F.    Eminent Domain

Santos v. Land Bank of the PhilippinesG.R. No. 137431 (September 7, 2000)

HELD:  Compensation for land expropriation for agrarian reform is valid, even if made not completely in cash.

G.   Prohibition Against Impairment of Contracts

Harrison Motors Corporation v. NavarroG.R. No. 132269 (April 27, 2000)

FACTS:  Harrison Motors sold two trucks to Navarro.  Subsequently, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), the Land Transportation Office and the Bureau of Customers (BOC) entered in

a Memorandum of Agreement which provided that for purposes of registering vehicles, a Certificate of Payment should first be obtained from the BIR. Government agents seized and detained the two trucks of Navarro after discovering that there were still unpaid taxes.

HELD:  The Memorandum of Agreement does not impose any additional taxes which would unduly impair the contract of sale between petitioner and private respondent. Instead, these administrative orders were passed to enforce payment of existing BIR taxes and customs duties at the time of importation.  What Sec. 10 Art. III of the Constitution prohibits is the passage of a law which enlarges, abridges or in any manner changes the intention of the contracting parties.

H.   Rights During Investigation1.     Inapplicability

a.    Administrative Investigation

Sebastian v. GarchitorenaG.R. No. 114028 (October 18, 2000)

FACTS:  Some employees of the post office were investigated by the chief postal service officer in connection with missing postage stamps.  During interrogation, they submitted sworn statements.  The prosecution presented the sworn statements as evidence. Accused claimed that their sworn statements were not admissible in evidence since they were not assisted by counsel.

HELD:  The right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigation because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers.

b.    Police Line-Up

People v. PartiareG.R. No. 129970 (April 5, 2000)

HELD:  The accused-appellant’s defense that the identification made by the private complainant in the police line-up is inadmissible because the appellant stood at the line-up without the assistance of counsel is inadmissible.  The stage of an investigation wherein a person is asked to stand in a police line-up is outside the mantle of protection of the right to counsel.  (See also People v. Sirad, G.R. No. 130594, July 5, 2000)

c.    Photograph

People v. Gallarde325 SCRA 835

FACTS:  Accused was charged with the crime of rape with homicide.  The trial court convicted him of murder only.  The trial court rejected the photographs taken of the accused immediately after the incident on the ground that the same were taken when the accused was already under the mercy of the police.

HELD:  The taking of pictures of an accused, even without the assistance of counsel, being purely a mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional rights against self-incrimination.

G.               Applicability Gutang v. People

G.R. No. 135406 (July 11, 2000)HELD:  Receipt by the accused of prohibited drugs is inadmissible in evidence.

3.    Custodial Investigation

People v. BariquitG.R. No. 122733 (October 2, 2000)

HELD:  Confession given by the accused without the assistance of counsel, while on the way to the police station, is inadmissible in evidence.

People v. ValdezG.R. No. 129296 (September 25, 2000)

FACTS:  The accused was arrested for bank robbery.  After four days, the police investigator took down his extrajudicial confession and called a lawyer who conferred with the accused for ten minutes and executed his confession.

HELD:  The confession is inadmissible.  The moment the accused was arrested and detained, he was already under custodial investigation.  The lawyer was called only on the 4th day of detention when the accused was about to put down his confession in writing.

People v. LegaspiG.R. No. 117802 (April 27, 2000)

FACTS:  Legaspi and Franco were charged and convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.  They were identified as perpetrators of the crime by someone from a group of eleven residents who were invited for questioning by the police.  The accused now claims that their rights during custodial investigation were violated.

HELD:  No rights were transgressed inasmuch as Legaspi and Franco were not yet singled out as perpetrators of the crime on November 29, 1992.  Inviting certain individuals for questioning

and asking them a single question as to their whereabouts on the day of the crime do not amount to custodial investigation.    When certain persons are already singled out and pinpointed as authors of the crime, they are entitled to the rights of persons under custodial investigation.

4.    Sufficiency of Warning

People v. SamoldeG.R. No. 128551 (July 31, 2000)

FACTS:  The accused was arrested for murder.  Before he was interrogated, he was informed of his right to remain silent, that any statement he might give could be used as evidence against him, and that he had the right to be assisted by counsel of his own choice.  During trial, the prosecution offered his confession in evidence.

HELD:  The confession is inadmissible.  The accused was given only a perfunctory recitation of his rights.  This is inadequate to transmit meaningful information to the suspect.

People v. ManriquezG.R. No. 122510 (March 17, 2000)

FACTS:  Accused were found guilty of two counts of murder.  They executed an extra-judicial confession wherein they narrated their participation in the commission of the crime.  They also signed a waiver in the presence of a counsel which contained that they did not want the assistance of counsel.

HELD:  Rights to remain silent and to counsel were violated.  The lawyer’s explanation on the effects of the waiver is unsatisfactory.  Also, the extra-judicial confession is inadmissible evidence.  It is intrinsically flawed.  It was merely attached as page 2 of the waiver.  It was not prepared at the time the waiver was being prepared since another typewriter was used in preparing the extra-judicial confession.

People v. ObreroG.R. No. 122142 (May 17, 2000)

FACTS:  Appellant was charged with robbery with homicide.  His extra-judicial confession was presented as evidence.

HELD:  Extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence because counsel for accused was not independent.  At the time he assisted accused-appellant, he was the station commander of the WPD and a PC captain.  As part of the police force, he could not be expected to have effectively assisted the accused during the investigation.

5.    Independence of Counsel

People v. BaseG.R. No. 109773 (March 30, 2000)

HELD:  While the initial choice in cases where a person under custodial investigation cannot afford the services of a lawyer is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one.  A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any objection against the former’s appointment during the course of the investigation.  (See also People v. Gallardo, 323 SCRA 318)

6.    Admissibility of Evidencea.    Admissible Evidence

People v. Lumandong327 SCRA 650

HELD:  The four fundamental requirements on the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession are:  1)  the confession must be voluntary; 2 ) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; 3) the confession must be express; and 4) the confession must be in writing.  (See also People v. Daeng, G.R. No. 128045, August 24, 2000; People v. Llanes, G.R. No. 140268, September 18, 2000; and People v. Mameng, G.R. No. 123147, October 13, 2000)

People v. ContinenteG.R. No. 1000801 (August 25, 2000)

FACTS:  The trial court convicted the accused of murder.  Among the evidence the trial court relied upon were the confession of the accused.  The accused argued that their confession were inadmissible in evidence, since they were not informed of their constitutional right.

HELD:  The written warning contained an explanation that the investigation dealt with the participation of the accused who chose not to give any statement to the investigator and a warning that any statement obtained from the accused might be used against them in court.  They contained an advice that the accused might engage the service of a lawyer of their own choice and that if they could not afford the service of a lawyer, they would be provided with one for free.  Despite the manifestation of the accused that they intended to give their statements, the investigator requested two lawyers to act as counsel for the accused.  The lawyers conferred with the accused before their investigation.  The accused were informed of their constitutional rights in the presence of their counsel.  The confession are admissible in evidence.

b.    Inadmissible EvidencePeople v. Naag322 SCRA 710

HELD:  Circumstances show that the extrajudicial confession was signed without the assistance of counsel.  As such, it is inadmissible.  The text of the confession is darker suggesting that a different typewriter was used from that used to type the name of the accused.  (See also People v. Paglinawan, 324 SCRA 97)

c.    WaiverPeople v. Hermoso

G.R. No. 130590 (October 18, 2000)HELD:  When the confession of the accused was given without the assistance of counsel and the accused did not object, he waives his right to object.

H.   Right to BailLardes v. CA

324 SCRA 321FACTS:  Petitioner filed a petition for bail.  The trial court granted it but imposed a condition that the approval of the bail bond would only be made after arraignment to make sure that the accused could not delay his trial by absenting himself.

HELD:   Bails should be granted before arraignment. Otherwise, the accused might be precluded from filing a motion to quash. 

I.     Right to Counsel 1.     Absence of Violation

People v. AquinoG.R. No. 129288 (March 30, 2000)

FACTS:  Accused were charged with robbery with homicide.  Accused claimed that he was denied of his constitutional right to counsel.

HELD:  Accused should have informed the trial court if he had difficulties with his counsel.  He had the opportunity to present his own version of the events but he just kept quiet.  Besides, accused was convicted based on the strength of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense.

Villanueva v. PeopleG.R. No. 135098 (April 12, 2000)

FACTS:  Petitioner was found guilty of the Bouncing Check Law.  He appealed to the Court of Appeals.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.  Petitioner filed a motion for

reconsideration but the same was denied because it was filed out of time.  Petitioner claimed that he had a difficulty in finding a new lawyer and that when the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, he was denied of his right to counsel.

HELD:  Petitioner was represented by counsel of his choice in the trial court, and also by a counsel de parte before the CA.  There was no violation of his right to counsel when his new lawyer committed a procedural blunder.

2.    Presence of Violation

People v. Nadera324 SCRA 490

FACTS:  The accused was charged for raping his two daughters.  He pleaded guilty.  The lawyer of the accused did not cross-examine the first daughter because he was convinced that she was telling the truth.  The cross examination of the second daughter centered on what she did when she saw her sister being raped.  The lawyer did not present any evidence, and expressed his conformity for the admission of the evidence of the prosecution.

HELD:  The case should be remanded because of the neglect of the lawyer of the accused in representing his cause.

I.      Right to be Informed1.     Different Offense

People v. Paglinawan324 SCRA 97

FACTS:  The accused was charged with murder.  During trial, it was shown that the victims also suffered injuries.

HELD:  A person cannot be convicted of a crime for which he has not been charged. Accused cannot be held liable for the injuries.

2.    Absence of Qualifying Circumstance

People v. Villar322 SCRA 390

HELD:  If no qualifiying circumstances were alleged in the information, accused cannot be sentenced to death.  (See also People v. Bernaldez, 322 SCRA 762).

4.     Number of Offense

People v.  Pambid,G.R. No. 129164 (March 15, 2000)

HELD:  If a person is charged only with one count of rape, even though the victim was raped more than once, the accused can only be convicted of one count of rape.  (See also People v. Alnero, G.R. No. 134536, April 5, 2000)

5.     Date of Commission of Crime

Sumbang v. General Court Martial PRO-Region 6G.R. No. 140188 (August 3, 2000)

FACTS:  Petitioner, who is a member of the Philippine Constabulary, was charged with double murder before a general court martial.  The composition of the court martial was changed four times.  The accused argued that his right to a speedy trial has been violated since the case has been going on for years.

HELD:  The prosecution had no fault in the delay since the membership of the general court martial underwent changes four times and none of the original members who heard the prosecution witnesses were reappointed in the succeeding court martial.  Besides, the petitioner failed to assert his right to a speedy trial.  It was only  after the general court martial resumed hearing of the case in 1999 that petitioner invoked his right to a speedy trial.  His silence should be interpreted as a waiver of such right.

Arambulo v. LaquiG.R. No. 138596 (October 12, 2000)

FACTS:  A libel case was filed against the petitioner-accused.  He filed a motion to quash on the ground of prescription which was denied.  He filed motion for reconsideration which was also denied.  Petitioner-accused filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals which was dismissed.  His motion for reconsideration was also denied. Petitioner-accused later on claimed that his right to a speedy trial was violated.

HELD:  The right to a speedy trial is violated only when there is an unreasonable delay without the fault of the accused.  Petitioner-accused is not without fault in the delay of the prosecution against her.

M.     Right to Confrontation

People v. Crispin327 SCRA 167

HELD:  Affidavit of a witness who was not presented as such is not admissible in evidence.

N.     Right to Compulsory Process

People v. YambotG.R. No. 120350 (Oct. 13, 2000)

FACTS:  The accused were charged with kidnapping for ransom.  When it was their turn to present evidence, the subpoena for the first witness was not served because she was unknown at her given address, while the subpoena for the other witness was received only three days before the hearing.  At the next hearing, the two witnesses did not appear.  The subpoena for the first witness remained unserved while the subpoena for the second was received four days before date of hearing.  The trial court denied the request of the counsel of the accused for postponement and considered the case submitted for decision even though it issued a warrant for the arrest of the second witness.

HELD:  The delay is not entirely attributable to the accused.  The trial court should have granted postponement.

O.     Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases

Dansal v. Fernandez327 SCRA 145

FACTS:  Petitioners, who were officers of the National Food Authority, were charged with estafa thru falsification of a public document in the office of the Ombudsman.  An additional charge for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was filed against the petitioners.  More than one year and four months after the cases were submitted for resolution, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a resolution recommending the filing of a case for estafa thru falsification and a case for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against the petitioners.  Petitioners argued that the delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation violated their right to a speedy disposition  of their cases.

HELD:  The concept of speedy disposition of cases is a relative and flexible concept.  It is consistent with reasonable delay.  The protection under the speedy disposition of cases should not operate as to deprive the government of the inherent prerogative to prosecute criminal cases or in seeing to it that all who approach the bar of justice be afforded a fair opportunity to present their side.  It cannot be said that petitioners found themselves in a situation oppressive to their rights simply by reason of delay. 

Domingo v. Sandiganbayan322 SCRA 655

FACTS:  On May 26, 1987, a complaint was filed with the Tanodbayan against petitioner for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.  On July 30, 1992, a case was filed against

petitioner with the Sandiganbayan.  Petitioner argued that the inordinate delay in the preliminary investigation violated right to speedy disposition of his case.

HELD:  The delay was not undue since it was brought about by peculiar unforeseen circumstances.  The SC nullified the authority of the Office of the Special Prosecutor which necessitated the issuance of AO #1 by the Ombudsman authorizing the Special Prosecutor to continue with the preliminary investigation.  The assigned prosecutor retired in 1989.   After the reorganization by the Ombudsman of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, the case was assigned to a new prosecutor.  The subpoena sent to petitioner was return unserved because he was no longer connected with his previous office.    The prosecutor issued another subpoena to give petitioner chance to file counteraffidavits which he filed only on March 1992. 

Castillo v. SandiganbayanG.R. No. 109271 (March 14, 2000)

FACTS:  On August 25, 1986, a complaint was filed against petitioners with the Tanodbayan.  On Oct. 30, 1987, the Tanodbayan recommended filing a case for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.  Petitioners filed motion for reinvestigation. The Ombudsman filed an information against petitioners on November 5, 1990 without first resolving the motion for reinvestigation.  Petitioners argued that the case should be dismissed for unjustified delay in the filing of the information.

HELD:  There was no violation of right to speedy trial.  The delay was not capricious nor oppressive but was brought about by frequent amendments of procedural laws in the initial stages of the case.

Raro v.  SandiganbayanG.R. No. 108431 (July 14, 2000)

FACTS:  The complaint against petitioner for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was referred by the Deputy Ombudsman to the NBI for investigation.  The NBI recommended the prosecution of the petitioners.  However, the petitioners argue that the four-year delay in the completion of the preliminary investigation violated right to speedy disposition of cases.

HELD:  It took the NBI 2 years to complete its report.  The resolution recommending the filing of the case against petitioner has to be reviewed.  The length of time it took before the conclusion of the preliminary investigation may only be attributed to the adherence of the Ombudsman and NBI to the rudiments of fair play.

P.     Prohibition Against Cruel Punishment

People v. Alicante

 G.R. No. 127026 (May 31, 2000)HELD:  Death penalty is not cruel. 

Q.     Double Jeopardy

1.     Termination

People v. VelascoG.R. No. 127444 (September 13, 2000)

FACTS:  Trial court acquitted respondent from a case of murder; two cases of frustrated murder and a case for illegal possession of firearms outside of his residence.  The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari on the ground that the trial court deliberately and wrongfully interpreted certain facts and evidence.

HELD:  On the ground of double jeopardy, an acquittal is final and unappealable. Prosecution cannot accomplish through a writ of certiorari what it could not do so by appeal. 

2.     Different Offenses

People v. Ong322 SCRA 38

HELD:  An illegal recruiter can be charged with estafa and illegal recruitment (See alsoPeople v. Meris, G.R. No. 117145, March 28, 2000)

II.     Citizenship

Valles v. ComelecG.R. No. 137000 (August 9, 2000)

FACTS:  Respondent was born in Australia on May 16, 1934 to a Filipino father and an Australian mother.  She ran for governor.  Petitioner, her opponent, filed a case for disqualification on the ground that she is not a Filipino citizen since she was issued an alien certificate of registration; there was an application for an immigrant certificate of residence and she was a holder of an Australian passport.

HELD: The respondent is a Filipino citizen since her father is a Filipino.  Holding of an Australian passport and an alien certificate of registration does not constitute an effective renunciation of citizenship and does not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. At most, she has dual citizenship. 

Valles v. ComelecG.R. No. 137000 (August  9, 2000)

FACTS:  Respondent was born in Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian mother. Australia follows jus soli.  She ran for governor.  Opponent filed petition to disqualify her on the ground of dual citizenship.

HELD:  Dual citizenship as a disqualification refers to citizens with dual allegiance.  The fact that she has dual citizenship does not automatically disqualify her from running for public office.  Filing a certificate of candidacy suffices to renounce foreign citizenship because in the certificate, the candidate declares himself to be a Filipino citizen and that he will support the Philippine Constitution.  Such declaration operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. 

III.     LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

A.     Party-List

Veteran Federation Party v. ComelecG.R. No. 136781 (October 6, 2000)

FACTS:  The Comelec proclaimed 14 party list representatives from 13 parties which obtained at least 2% of the total number of votes cast as member of the House of Rep. Upon petition by other party-list organization, it proclaimed another 38 additional party representatives althout they received less than 2% of the votes on the ground that under the Constitution it is mandatory that at least 20% of the members of House of Rep. must come from the party list system.

HELD:  Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory.  It merely provides a ceiling for party list seats in the House of Representatives.  The Congress is vested with power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representation. In the exercise of their Constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it necessary that parties participating in the system to obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast to be entitled to a party-list seat.  This is to ensure that only parties with sufficient number of constituents are actually represented in Congress. 

B.     Attendance of Session

People v. Jalosjos324 SCRA 689

FACTS:  While his appeal from a conviction of rape is pending, the accused, a Congressman was confined at the national penitentiary.  Since he was reelected to his position, he argued that he should be allowed to attend the legislative sessions and committee hearings, because his confinement was depriving his constituents of their voice in Congress.

HELD:  Election to high government office does free accused from the common restraints of general law.  Under Section II, Article VI of the Constitution, a member of the House of Rep is privileged from arrest only if offense is punishable by not more than 6 years imprisonment.  Confinement of a congressman charged with a crime punishable by more than 6 years has constitutional foundations.  If allowed to attend the congressional sessions, the accused would be virtually made a free man.  When he was elected into office, the voters were aware of his limitations on his freedom of action. Congress can continue to function even without all its members being present.  Election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. 

            C.     Electoral Tribunal

Guerrero v. ComelecG.R. No. 137004 (July 26, 2000)

FACTS:  A petition to disqualify respondent as a candidate for Congressman was filed with the Comelec on the ground that he was campaigning although he had not filed a certificate for candidacy.  Three days before the election, respondent filed his certificate of candidacy as substitute for another candidate who withdrew.  The petitioner argued that the substitution was fatally defective since the replaced candidate was an independent and the respondent ran as candidate for a political party.  Respondent was proclaimed winner and assumed office.  Comelec dismissed petition on the ground that the matter is now within the exclusive jurisdiction of the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal.

HELD:  Once a winning candidate has assumed office as a member of the House of Rep, the jurisdiction of Comelec over his qualification ends and jurisdiction of Electoral Tribunal begins.  The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is not limited to constitutional qualifications only.  The filing of a certificate of candidacy is a statutory qualification.

D.     Title of the Law

De Guzman v. ComelecG.R.No. 129118 (July 19, 2000)

FACTS:          Section 44 of the Voter’s Registration Act provided that no election officer shall hold office in a particular municipality or city for more than 4 years.  In accordance with it, the Comelec reassigned petitioners, who were election officers to other stations. Petitioners argued that the provision was not expressed in the title of the law, which is “An Act Providing for a General Registration of Voters, Adopting a System of Continuing Registration, Prescribing the Procedures Thereof and Authorizing the Appropriation of Fund Thereof”.

HELD:  The contention is untenable.  Section 44 is relevant to the subject matter of registration as it seeks to ensure the integrity of the registration process by providing a guideline for the Comelec to follow in the reassignment of election officers. 

E.      Appellate Jurisdiction of Supreme Court

Villanert v.  Desierto326 SCRA 355

HELD: The law making the decision of the Ombudsman appealable to the SC is invalid because the concurrence of the SC was not obtained. (See also Tirol v.  Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 133594, August 3, 2000)

IV.     Executive Department

A.     Immunity from Suit

Gloria v.  CA G.R. No. 119903 (August 15, 2000)

FACTS: Upon recommendation by the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, respondent was reassigned as superintendent in another school.  Respondent filed a petition for prohibition against the Secretary on the ground that his indefinite reassignment violated his security of tenure.  The Secretary argued that the filing of the case violated the immunity of the President from suit.

HELD:  The contention is untenable.  The petition is not directed against the President. Presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts.

B.     Power of Control

Hutchison Ports Philippines, Ltd. V. Subic Bay Metropolitan AuthorityG.R. No. 131367 (August 31, 2000)

FACTS: The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority conducted a bidding for the development and operation of a modern marine container terminal.  It awarded the contract to petitioner.  The Office of the President set aside the award and ordered a new bidding. Petitioner filed action for specific performance.

HELD:  The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority is under the control of the Office of the President.  Therefore the President may overturn any of awards granted by it for justifiable reasons.

C.     Power to Call Out Armed Forces

IBP v. ZamoraG.R. No. 941284 (August 15, 2000)

FACTS:  In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metropolitan Manila, the President ordered the PNP and the Phil.  Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for crime prevention and suppression. IBP questioned validity of the order on the ground that there is no factual basis for President to exercise his power to call out the Armed Forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence.

HELD:  The IBP failed to support its assertion that the President acted without factual basis.  The President has determined the necessity and factual basis for calling the armed forces.  He asserted that violent crimes like bank and store robberies, holdups, kidnappings and carnappings continue to occur.  The court can take judicial notice of the recent bombing perpetrated by lawless elements in public places. 

D. State of Rebellion

Lacson v. Perez G.R. No. 147780 (May 10, 2001)

FACTS:            On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an angry mob assaulting and attempting to break into Malacañang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region. She likewise issued General Order No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress the rebellion in the National Capital Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the “rebellion” were thereafter effected.

            Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a “state of rebellion,” which allegedly gave a semblance of legality to the arrests, four related petitions were filed before the Court assailing the declaration of a state of rebellion by the President and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in fact and in law.

1.    On May 6, 2001, the President ordered the lifting of the declaration of a “state of rebellion” in Metro Manila. Accordingly, the instant petitions have been rendered moot and academic. 

2.    As to petitioners’ claim that the proclamation of a “state of rebellion” is being used by the authorities to justify warrantless arrests, there are actually general instructions to law enforcement officers and military agencies to implement Proclamation No. 38 and obtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts. This means that preliminary investigations will be conducted.

3.    Moreover, petitioners’ contention that they are under imminent danger of being arrested without warrant do not justify their resort to the extraordinary remedies of mandamus and prohibition, since an individual subjected to warrantless arrest is not without adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law.

4.    Petitioners cannot ask the Court to direct the courts before whom the informations against the petitioners are filed to desist from arraigning and proceeding with the trial of the case. Such relief is clearly premature considering that as of this date, no complaints or charges have been filed against any of the petitioners for any crime.

5.    Hold departure orders issued against petitioners cannot be declared null and void since petitioners are not directly assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders in their petition.

6.    Petitioner Defensor-Santiago has not shown that she is in imminent danger of being arrested without a warrant. Hence, her petition of mandamus cannot be issued since such right to relief must be clear at the time of the award.

7.    Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the People’s Movement against Poverty (PMAP), argues that the declaration of a “state of rebellion” is violative of the doctrine of separation of powers, being an encroachment on the domain of the judiciary to interpret what took place on May 1. The Court disagreed since the President as the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence.

8.    As for petitioner Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), it is not a real party-in-interest. LDP has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify resort to the Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members and supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime of rebellion.   

Even if instant petition may be considered as an action for declaratory relief, the Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction in the first instance over such a petition.

PETITIONS DISMISSED (However, petitioners cannot be arrested without the required judicial warrant for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege)

E. Legitimacy of the Arroyo Presidency

Estrada v. DesiertoG. R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001

Estrada V. ArroyoG.R. No. 146738

FACTS:  Petitioner sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in any criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted. Erap also filed a Quo Warranto case, praying for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.”

HELD:FIRST:  The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions.

The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II, and section 8 of Article VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under section II of Article VII.  The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit.  They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.  As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison, the doctrine has been laid down that “it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is . . .”

            The Court also distinguished between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II.  EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government.  EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President.  EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented political question; EDSA II involves legal questions.

SECOND: Using the totality test, the SC held that petitioner resigned as President.

a.    The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time.

b.    The Angara diary shows that the President wanted only five-day period promised by Reyes, as well as to open the second envelop to clear his name.

"If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday."The President says. “Pagod na pagod na ako.  Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I don’t want any more of this – it’s too painful.  I’m tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.)

"I just want to clear my name, then I will go.”The SC held that this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned.  The intent to resign is clear when he said “x x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit.” “ Ayoko na” are words of resignation.

c.    During the negotiations, the resignation of the petitioner was treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after transition period. 

d.    His resignation was also confirmed by his leaving Malacañang.  In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation.  He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them.  Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country.  Petitioner’s reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of’ the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency.  The press release was petitioner’s valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense.

THIRD:  The petitioner is permanently unable to act as President.

Section 11 of Article VII provides that “Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions.” Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. 

The House of Representative passed on January 24, 2001 House Resolution No. l75  which states:  “RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OFTHE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE NATION’S GOALS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.”  The Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82 which states:  “RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO’S NOMINATION OF SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES” 

Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner’s claim of inability.  Even if petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court.

FOURTH:  The petitioner does not enjoy immunity from suit.

            The Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings.  The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency.  On February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 “Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio.”  Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted.  The plea, if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution.  The debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him.

The SC also ruled in In re: Saturnino Bermudez that “incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure” but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings.

Also, petitioner cannot cite any decision of the SC licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability.  The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.

FIFTH:  Petitioner was not denied the right to impartial trial.

            Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case.  The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the

trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable if change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.

V.     Judicial Department

        A.     Judicial Review

Gonzales v.  NarvasaG.R. No. 140835 (August 14, 2000)

FACTS: The president issued EO 43 creating the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform to recommend amendments to the Constitution.  Petitioner, in his capacity as taxpayer, filed a petition assailing constitutionality of the Commission.

HELD:  The Preparatory Commission was created by the President by virtue of EO 43. An amount was set aside for its operation from the funds of the Office of the President.  There was no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers.  Petitioner cannot question the constitutionality of the Commission in his capacity as taxpayer.

Gonzales v.  NarvasaG.R. No. 140835 (August 14, 2000)

FACTS:  Petitioner filed a petition in his capacity as taxpayer questioning the constitutionality of the creation by the President of seventy positions for presidential advisers on the ground that the President did not have the power to create these positions.

HELD:  Petitioner has not proven that he has sustained any injury as a result of the appointment of presidential advisers. 

Bayan v. ZamoraG.R. No. 138570 (Oct. 10, 2000)

FACTS:  Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) was entered into by the Philippines and United States to regulate conditions of presence of US military personnels in the Philippines. The Senate concurred with the VFA.  Petitioners who are taxpayers and members of Congress questioned its validity.

HELD:  Petitioners failed to show that they have sustained or are in danger of sustaining any direct injury as a result of the enforcement of VFA.  As taxpayers, they failed to show how the VFA will involve the exercise of Congress of its taxing or spending powers. Members of Congress’ standing cannot be upheld absent a clear showing of any direct injury to their person or to the institution to which they belong. Further, IBP has no standing. 

IBP v. ZamoraG.R. No. 141284 (August 15, 2000)

FACTS:  In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metropolitan Manila, the President ordered the PNP and the Phil.  Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for crime prevention and suppression.  The IBP questioned validity of the order invoking its responsibility to uphold the rule of law.

HELD:  The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case.  This is too general an interest which is shared by the whole citizenry.  The IBP has failed to show any specific injury it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned order.  The presumed possible injury is highly speculative.  

Militante v. CAGR. No. 107040 (April 12, 2000)

FACTS:  Pres. Marcos issued PD 1315 in 1975 expropriating 40 hectares in Caloocan for distribution to their occupants.  The lots of petitioners were included in the coverage of the decree.  However, these lots were not among those acquired by government in 1978 and 1979.  On May 14, 1980, Proclamation No. 1967 indentified 244 sites in Metropolitan Manila as areas for priority development and urban land reform zones.  In 1981, the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) declared the lots of petitioner to be outside the reform area.  Because the National Housing Authority (NHA) failed to evict the squatters on his lots, petitioner questioned the constitutionality of PD 1315.

HELD:  The lots of petitioners are not in danger of expropriation.  PD. 1315 was issued in 1975.  It is doubtful that the government will still desire to expropriate the lots of petitioner. Moreover, the HSRC certified that the lots were outside the Urban Land Reform Zone.  In 1987, petitioner negotiated with the NHA for the price of his lots therefore, he is estopped from asserting that PD 1315 to be unconstitutional.

        B.     Form of Decision

1.     Void Decision People v. Nadera

324 SCRA 490FACTS:  The accused was charged with rape.  The trial court convicted him.  The decision merely narrated the evidence of the prosecution and a republic act.

HELD:  The trial court failed to state the factual and legal reasons on which it based the conviction of the accused.  There is nothing to indicate the reason for the decision.  No reason is given why the trial court found the testimonies of the witnesses credible. 

Madrid v. CAGR No. 130683 (May 31, 2000)

FACTS:  The accused was convicted of homicide by the trial court.  The decision summarized the testimonies of witnesses from both sides.  It then stated that the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution convinced the court. On the other hand, the demeanor of the defense witnesses were not credible.  The decision added that the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength were present.

HELD:  The decision does not indicate what the trial court found in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses to consider them straightforward when they are in fact contradictory and confused.  Neither does the decision contain any justification for the appreciation of aggravating circumstances against the accused.  The decision failed to comply with the constitutional requirement that a decision must expressly state the facts and the law on which it is based

Yao v. CAGR. No. 132428 (October 24, 2000)

FACTS:  The MTC convicted petitioner of unfair competition.  Petitioner appealed to RTC.  The RTC confirmed his conviction.  In its decision, it stated that it found no cogent reason to disturb the finding of fact of the MTC.

HELD:  The decision of the RTC fell short of the constitutional requirement. Parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusion of the court.  The decision in question should be struck close as a nullity.

People v. DumaguingG.R. No. 135516 (September 20, 2000)

FACTS:  The trial court convicted the accused of rape.  The decision simply stated that the accused was guilty of raping his own daughter and that the evidence of the prosecution was not controverted by the accused. 

HELD:  The trial court failed to comply with the requirement that it should state clearly and distinctly the facts on which it is based.

2.      Valid DecisionPeople v. Ordonez

G.R. No. 129593 (July 10, 2000)FACTS:  The trial court convicted the accused of illegal recruitment and estafa.  The accused argued that the decision did not comply with Section 14, Article VIII of the constitution, because it merely paraphrased the testimonies of the witnesses. 

HELD:  The trial court went over the testimonies of every witness of both parties.  After summarizing the testimonies, the trial court stated in its decision that it found that the accused informed the complainants that they would be going to Korea to work when in fact they landed in Kuala Lumpur instead; that one of the complainants had no job waiting, and the other complainant landed in jail at the time he arrived in Kuala Lumpur and had to be returned to the Philippines.  The decision complied with the requirement. 

VI.     Constitutional Commissions

        A.     Term of Commissioners

Gaminde v. Commission on AuditG.R. No. 140335 (December 13, 2000)

FACTS:  On June 11, 1993, the President appointed petitioner as Commissioner of the CSC for a term expiring on February 2, 1999.  She took her oath of office on June 22, 1993 and was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on September 7, 1993. The Commission on Audit issued a decision that her term expired on Feb. 2, 1999.

HELD:  The constitution adopted a rotational system for the appointment of the Chairman and Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions.  The operation of the rotational plan requires that the terms of the first Commissioners should start on a common date and any vacancy before the expiration of the term should be filled only for the unexpired balance of the term.  Consequently, the term of the first Chairman and Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions must start on a common date, irrespective of variations in the dates of appointments and qualifications of the appointees in order that the expiration of the first terms should lead to the regular recurrence of the two-year interval between the expiration of the terms.  February 2, 1987 is the proper starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional Commission, as the beginning of the term of office is understood to coincide with the effectivity of the Constitution upon its ratification. 

        B.     Civil Service Commission

1.     Reassignment

Chato v. ZenarosaGR No. 120539 (October 20, 2000)

HELD:  A government employee may be transferred.

De Guzman v. ComelecG.R. No. 129118 (July 19, 2000)

FACTS:  Section 44 of the Voter’s Registration Act provided that no election officer shall hold office in a particular municipality or city for more than 4 years.  In accordance with it, the Comelec reassigned petitioners, who were election officers to other stations. Petitioners argued that the law violated their security of tenure.

HELD:  What the guarantee of security of tenure seeks to prevent is the capricious exercise of the power to dismiss.  Where it is the legislature which furnishes the ground for the transfer of  a class of employees, no such capriciousness can be raised for so long as the remedy proposed to cure a perceived evil is germane to the purpose of the law.

Gloria v. CAG.R. No. 119903 (August 15, 2000)

FACTS:  Respondent was appointed School Division Superintendent, Division of City Schools, Quezon City.  Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the President reassigned him as Superintendent of the Marikina Institute of Science and Technology on the ground that he is an expert in vocational and technical education.  Respondent questioned the validity of his reassignment on the ground that it is indefinite and it violated his security of tenure. 

HELD:  There is nothing to show that the reassignment of respondent is temporary.  The evidence or intention to reassign respondent had no definite period.  It is violative of his security of tenure. 

Padolino v. FernandezG.R. No. 133511 (October 10, 2000)

FACTS:  Respondent was Finance and Management Division Chief.  The petitioner, the Secretary of Science and Technology issued an order providing for the reassignment  of branch, division and section chiefs.  The order provided that their return would be the subject of a separate order.  Pursuant to the order, respondent was reassigned to the Office of the Director of Finance and Management Service in Taguig.  Respondent argued that this violated her security of tenure.

HELD:  The order violated the security of tenure of respondent and hence invalid.  The order contains no definite duration of the reassignment.  The reassignment of respondent reduced her to a mere subordinate without authority to supervise anyone. 

2.      ReorganizationCanonizado v. Aguirre

323 SCRA 312FACTS:  Petitioners were incumbent commissioners of the National Police Commission when Republic Act. No. 8851, otherwise known as the PNP Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998,

took effect.  Section 8 of Republic Act. No. 8851 provided that the terms of office of the incumbent commissioners were deemed expired.  Petitioners claimed that this violated their security of tenure.

HELD:  Petitioners are members of the civil service.  Republic Act No. 8551 did not expressly abolish the positions of petitioners.  Under RA No. 6975, the National Police Commission was under the Department of Interior and Local Government, while  under Republic Act. No. 8551 it is made an agency attached to the Department of Interior and Local Government.  The organizational structure and the composition of the National Police Commission remain essentially the same except for the addition of the Chief of PNP as ex-officio member.  The powers and duties of the National Police Commission remain basically unchanged.  No bona fide reorganization of the NPC having been mandated by Congress and insofar as RA 8851 declares the office of the petitioner as expired resulting in their separation from office, it is tantamount to removing civil service employees from office without legal cause therefore, it must be struck down for being constitutionally infirm. 

3.      Lack of EligibilityCuevas v. Bacal

G.R. No. 139382 (December 6, 2000)FACTS:  Respondent passed the Career Executive Service Examination.  She was appointed Regional Director of the Public Attorney’s Office.  Later, she was designated as acting chief Public Attorney.  Upon change of administration, respondent was appointed Regional Director.  Respondent argued she was removed without cause.

HELD:  The rank level of respondent is Rank level III.  The position of Chief Public Attorney required rank level I.  As respondent does not have the required Rank, her appointment to that position cannot be considered permanent and she cannot claim the right to a security of tenure. 

        C. Commission on Elections

1.     Power to Appoint Employees

De Guzman v. ComelecG.R. No. 129118 (July 19, 2000)

FACTS:  Section 44 of the Voter’s Registration Act provided that no election officer shall hold office in a particular municipality or city for more than 4 years.  In accordance with it, the Comelec reassigned petitioners, who were election officers to other stations. Petitioner argue that the law undermined the constitutional authority of the Comelec to appoint its own officials.

HELD:  The law merely provides the basis for the transfer of an election officers and does not deprive the Comelec of its power to appoint its officials.

2.     Judicial Review Ambil v. Comelec

G.R. No. 143398 (October 25, 2000)FACTS:  Petitioner and respondent were opposing candidates for governor.  Petitioner won.  Respondent filed election protest with the Commission on Elections.  A member of its first division prepared the resolution but he retired before it could be promulgated.  A new member was appointed to replace the retired commissioner.  The first division issued a resolution declaring the previously prepared resolution void, because it had not been promulgated.

HELD:  Petition should be denied because the SC had no power to review interlocutory orders or final resolutions of a division of Comelec.  It must first be reviewed by the Comelec en banc before it can be brought to the SC. 

ABS-CBN v. Comelec323 SCRA 811

FACTS:  Comelec approved Resolution 98-1419 on April 21, 1998 which prohibited the conduct of exit polls.  Petitioners questioned the validity of the resolution by filing a petition for certiorari in the SC.  Solicitor General argued that case should be dismissed for failure to exhaust all available remedies by failure to file a motion for reconsideration before the Comelec.

HELD:  Considering that the resolution was issued only 20 days before the election and that the petitioners got a copy of it only on May 4, 1998, there was hardly any opportunity to move for reconsideration and to obtain and swift resolution in time for the May 11 elections.  The petition also involves transcendental constitutional issues therefore, direct resort to SC is justified.  

Salva v. MakalintalG.R. No. 132603 (September 8, 2000)

FACTS:  The Sangguniang Pambayan of Calaca Batangas approved an ordinance merging Barangay San Rafael with another Barangay.  The Sanggunian Panlalawigan passed a resolution instructing the Comelec to hold a plebiscite.  The Comelec passed a resolution calling for a plebiscite.  The officials and residents of San Rafael filed a case in RTC to prohibit the plebiscite on the ground that the ordinance and the resolutions were invalid.  The RTC ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the case because only the Supreme Court can review the resolution of the Commission on Elections.

HELD:  The issuance of the Resolution of the Comelec was a ministerial duty which may be enjoined by law and is part of its administrative functions.  Any question pertaining to its validity may be taken in an ordinary civil action before the RTC.

3.     Decision Soller v. Comelec

G.R. No. 139853 (Sept.5, 2000)FACTS:  Petitioner and respondent were opposing candidates for mayor.  Petitioner was proclaimed elected.  Respondent filed with Comelec a petition for annulment of proclamation.  A week later, he filed an election protest in the RTC.  Petitioner moved to dismiss the protest on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, forum shopping, and failure to state a cause of action.  The RTC denied motion.  Respondent also filed certiorari with Comelec en banc which was later denied.

HELD:  The authority to resolve petitions for certiorari involving incidental issues of election protests falls within the jurisdiction of the Division of the Comelec and not with the Comelec en banc.  If the principal case is cognizable on appeal by a Division, there is no reason why petitions for certiorari relating to incidents of election protest should not be referred first to a Division of the Comelec for resolution. 

D.   Commission on Audit

Laysa v. Commission on AuditG.R. No. 12813 (October 18, 2000)

FACTS:  As a result of an audit of the Fishery Sector Program Fund of the Department of Agriculture, Regional Office No. V was found to not have complied with the rules on bidding, submission of documents to support claim of disbursement.  Petitioner, Director of the office, argued that since the Fishery Sector Program is a special program for research and development, bureaucratic adherence to prescribed rules and procedures stifles research and development.

HELD:  Verification of whether officials of an agency properly discharged their fiscal responsibilities and whether an agency complied with internal audit controls in the collection and disbursement of government funds are part of the functions of the Commission on Audit. 

1. Prevention of Unnecessary Expenses

Polloso v. GanganG.R. No. 140563 (July 14, 2000)

FACTS:  The National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR)  hired the legal service of petitioner, a private lawyer.  The Commission on Audit disallowed the payment of his compensation, since he was hired without complying with Circular No. 86-255 which requires prior written approval by the Solicitor General as well as the Commission on Audit.  Petitioner argued that circular is unconstitutional because it restricted the practice of law.

HELD:  The claim is bereft of merit.  The circular simply sets forth the prerequisite for the government agency in hiring a private lawyer which are reasonable safeguards to prevent irregular, unnecessary, excessive and extravagant expenditures of government funds. 

Uy v.  Commission on AuditG.R. No. 130685 (March 21, 2000)

FACTS:  Petitioners were permanent employees of the Provincial Engineering Office who were dismissed by the governor allegedly to scale down the operations of that office. Petitioners filed a petition for reinstatement with the Merit Protection System Board.  The board held that the reduction in work force was not done in accordance with the civil service rules since it was made without comparing the relative fitness, efficiency and length of service of the employees.  It ordered the reinstatement of petitioners and payment of their back salaries.  The decision became final.  The Commission on Audit disallowed the payment of back salaries on the ground that it should be the personal liability of the governor since illegal dismissal was done in bad faith.

HELD:  The decision of the Merit System Protection Board has become final and executory.  The Commission on Audit cannot be allowed to set it aside since payment cannot be described as irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable.

VII.     Local Government

Pimentel v. Aguirre G.R. No. 132988 July 19, 2000)

A.     Ombudsman1. Form of Complaint

Raro v. SandiganbayanG.R. No. 108431 (July 14, 2000)

FACTS:  Upon complaint of an employee of a corporation which was authorized by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office to operate a small town lottery, the Ombudsman filed a criminal case against petitioner for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.  Petitioner argued that the complaint was sworn to before a notary public and the affidavits of witnesses against him were sworn to before a provincial fiscal not deputized by the Ombudsman.

HELD:  Under Section 12, Article XI of the Constitution, the Ombudsman is required to act on complaints filed in any form or manner.  The charges are valid. 

2. Investigation

Raro v.  SandiganbayanG.R. No. 108431 (July 14, 2000)

FACTS:  The Deputy Ombudsman referred the complaint against petitioner for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act to the NBI for investigation.  The NBI recommended the prosecution of the case.  Petitioner argued that by referring the complaint to the NBI, the office of the Ombudsman abdicated its duty to conduct preliminary investigation.

HELD:  The Office of the Ombudsman did not delegate the conduct of the preliminary investigation to the NBI.  What was delegated was only the fact-finding function, preparatory to the preliminary investigation still to be conducted by the Ombudsman. 

3. State immunity from SuitA.   Applicability

Calub v. CAG.R. No. 115634 (April 27, 2000)

FACTS:  Petitioners, who were officers of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources seized two motor vehicles for transporting illegally cut lumber.  The owner and the driver filed a case against them for the recovery of the possession of the motor vehicle.

HELD:  The acts for which petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties.  A suit against them is a suit against the state.  It cannot prosper without the consent of the state. 

 B. Law Enforcement

Armed Forces

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ZAMORA

G.R. NO. 141284 (August 15, 2000)FACTS:  The petitioner argues that the order of the President for the Philippine National Police and the Philippine Marines to carry out joint visibility patrols to prevent and restrain crime, violated the prohibition on the appointment of the members of the Armed Forces who are in active service to civilian positions.

HELD:  The SC held that there was actually no appointment of the members of the Armed Forces to civilian positions.  The members of the Philippine Marines were not integrated as members of the PNP.  The participation of the Chief of Staff in civilian law enforcement

does not mean that he was appointed to a civilian post, since the head of the PNP is the one actually vested with authority in these operations.

Philippine National Police

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ZAMORA

G.R. NO. 141284 (August 15, 2000)FACTS:  The petitioner argues that the order of the President for the Philippine National Police and the Philippine Marines to carry out joint visibility patrols to prevent and restrain crime, violated the principle of supremacy of civilian authority over the military and the civilian character of the police force.

HELD:  The participation of the Philippine Marines constitutes a permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The civilian character of the police force is also not affected by this participation. The members of the PNP are the ones in charge of the operations. They are the ones who will direct and supervise the deployment of the Philippine Marines.

Visiting Forces Agreement

Bayan v. ZamoraG.R. NO. 138570 (October 10. 2000)

The Visiting Forces Agreement, for which Senate concurrence was sought and received on May 27, 1999, is the subject of a number of Constitutional challenges.

Issue 1:  Do the Petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to question the constitutionality of the VFA?

Petitioners Bayan Muna, etc. have no standing.  A party bringing a suit challenging the Constitutionality of a law must show not only that the law is invalid, but that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way.  Petitioners have failed to show that they are in any danger of direct injury as a result of the VFA.

As taxpayers, they have failed to establish that the VFA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. A taxpayer's suit refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.  Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract.

It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.  Clearly, inasmuch as no public funds raised by taxation are involved in this case, and in the absence of any allegation by petitioners that public funds are being misspent or illegally expended, petitioners, as taxpayers, have no legal standing to assail the legality of the VFA.

Similarly, the petitioner-legislators (Tanada, Arroyo, etc.) do not possess the requisite locus standi to sue. In the absence of a clear showing of any direct injury to their person or to the institution to which they belong, they cannot sue.  The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is also stripped of standing in these cases. The IBP lacks the legal capacity to bring this suit in the absence of a board resolution from its Board of Governors authorizing its National President to commence the present action.

Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance and the constitutional significance of the issues raised, the Court may brush aside the procedural barrier and takes cognizance of the petitions.

Issue 2:  Is the VFA governed by section 21, Art. VII, or section 25, Art. XVIII of the Constitution? 

Section 25, Art XVIII, not section 21, Art. VII, applies, as the VFA involves the presence of foreign military troops in the Philippines.

The Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate on treaties or international agreements. Section 21, Article VII reads: “[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate." Section 25, Article XVIII, provides:"[a]fter the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State."

Section 21, Article VII deals with treaties or international agreements in general, in which case, the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Senate is required to make the treaty valid and binding to the Philippines. This provision lays down the general rule on treaties. All treaties, regardless of subject matter, coverage, or particular designation or appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective.

In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties which involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. Under this provision, the concurrence of the Senate is only one of the requisites to render compliance with the constitutional requirements and to consider the agreement binding on the Philippines. Sec 25 further requires that "foreign military bases, troops, or facilities" may be allowed in the Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by Congress, and recognized as such by the other contracting state.

On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of US troops visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of the US and RP government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, import and export of equipment, materials and supplies.

Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent, however, the provisions of Section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the Senate.

It is specious to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is inapplicable to mere transient agreements for the reason that there is no permanent placing of structure for the establishment of a military base. The Constitution makes no distinction between "transient" and "permanent". We find nothing in Section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines.  When no distinction is made by law; the Court should not distinguish. We do not subscribe to the argument that Section 25, Article XVIII is not controlling since no foreign military bases, but merely foreign troops and facilities, are involved in the VFA. The proscription covers "foreign military bases, troops, or facilities." Stated differently, this prohibition is not limited to the entry of troops and facilities without any foreign bases being established. The clause does not refer to "foreign military bases, troops, or facilities" collectively but treats them as separate and independent subjects, such that three different situations are contemplated — a military treaty the subject of which could be either (a) foreign bases, (b) foreign troops, or (c) foreign facilities — any of the three standing alone places it under the coverage of Section 25, Article XVIII.  

Issue 3: Was Sec 25 Art XVIII’s requisites satisfied to make the VFA effective?

Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by Congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.  There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the Constitution, as there were at least 16 Senators that concurred. 

As to condition (c), the Court held that the phrase "recognized as a treaty" means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the US to submit the VFA to the US Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase. Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in common use.

The records reveal that the US Government, through Ambassador Hubbard, has stated that the US has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the US

accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its treaty obligations, there is indeed compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.

Worth stressing too, is that the ratification by the President of the VFA, and the concurrence of the Senate, should be taken as a clear and unequivocal expression of our nation's consent to be bound by said treaty, with the concomitant duty to uphold the obligations and responsibilities embodied thereunder.  Ratification is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state, through which the formal acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed. A State may provide in its domestic legislation the process of ratification of a treaty. In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as commonly believed, in the legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.

With the ratification of the VFA it now becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part, under principles of international law (pacta sunt servanda), to be bound by the terms of the agreement. Thus, no less than Section 2, Article II declares that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations.