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Political law 1 digested case DOUGLAS R. CAGAS v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CLAUDE P. BAUTISTA A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a COMELEC Division in an election protest may not directly assail the order before the Supreme Court through a special civil action for certiorari. The remedy is to to seek the review of said interlocutory order during the appeal of the decision of the Division. FACTS: Petitioner Douglas R. Cagas was proclaimed the winner for the gubernatorial race for the province of Davao del Sur. Respondent Claude P. Bautista, his rival, filed an electoral protest alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying and violations of election laws, rules and resolutions. The protest was raffled to the COMELEC First Division. In his affirmative defense, Cagas argued that Bautista did not make the requisite cash deposit on time and that Bautista did not render a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of. The COMELEC First Division denied the special affirmative defences. Thus, Cagas prayed that the matter be certified to the COMELEC En Banc. Bautista countered that the assailed orders, being merely interlocutory, could not be elevated to the COMELEC En Banc. The COMELEC First Division issued an order denying Cagas’ motion for reconsideration, prompting him to file a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC HELD: Petition DENIED. Although Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution confers on the Court the power to review any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC, it limits such power to a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and does not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court

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Page 1: Political Law 1 Digest

Political law 1 digested case

DOUGLAS R. CAGAS v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CLAUDE P. BAUTISTA

A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a COMELEC Division in an election protest may not directly assail the order before the Supreme Court through a special civil action for certiorari. The remedy is to to seek the review of said interlocutory order during the appeal of the decision of the Division.

FACTS:

Petitioner Douglas R. Cagas was proclaimed the winner for the gubernatorial race for the province of Davao del Sur.

Respondent Claude P. Bautista, his rival, filed an electoral protest alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying

and violations of election laws, rules and resolutions. The protest was raffled to the COMELEC First Division.

In his affirmative defense, Cagas argued that Bautista did not make the requisite cash deposit on time and that Bautista

did not render a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of. The COMELEC First Division denied the

special affirmative defences. Thus, Cagas prayed that the matter be certified to the COMELEC En Banc. Bautista countered

that the assailed orders, being merely interlocutory, could not be elevated to the COMELEC En Banc. The COMELEC First

Division issued an order denying Cagas’ motion for reconsideration, prompting him to file a petition for certiorari before

the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order issued by a Division of

the COMELEC

HELD:

Petition DENIED.

Although Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution confers on the Court the power to review any decision, order or

ruling of the COMELEC, it limits such power to a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and does not extend

to an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on

certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC.

There is no question, therefore, that the Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for certiorari assailing

the denial by the COMELEC First Division of the special affirmative defenses of the petitioner. The proper remedy is for

the petitioner to wait for the COMELEC First Division to first decide the protest on its merits, and if the result should

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aggrieve him, to appeal the denial of his special affirmative defenses to the COMELEC En Banc along with the other errors

committed by the Division upon the merits.

It is true that there may be an exception to the general rule, which is when an interlocutory order of a Division of the

COMELEC was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, as the Court conceded in Kho

v. Commission on Elections. However, the said case has no application herein because the COMELEC First Division had the

competence to determine the lack of detailed specifications of the acts or omissions complained of as required by Rule 6,

Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, and whether such lack called for the outright dismissal of the protest.

Requisites of Judicial Due ProcessCase 1b & 1c

Chapter II

MALIKSI VS. COMELECMarch 12, 2013

During the 2010 Elections, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Saquilayan the winner for the position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes, brought an election protest in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite alleging that there were irregularities in the counting of votes in 209 clustered precincts. Subsequently, the RTC held a revision of the votes, and, based on the results of the revision, declared Maliksi as the duly elected Mayor of Imus commanding Saquilayan to cease and desist from performing the functions of said office. Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC. In the meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksi’s motion for execution pending appeal, and Maliksi was then installed as Mayor.

In resolving the appeal, the COMELEC First Division, without giving notice to the parties, decided to recount the ballots through the use of the printouts of the ballot images from the CF cards. Thus, it issued an order dated March 28, 2012 requiring Saquilayan to deposit the amount necessary to defray the expenses for the decryption and printing of the ballot images.Later, it issued another order dated April 17, 2012 for Saquilayan to augment his cash deposit.

On August 15, 2012, the First Division issued a resolution nullifying the RTC’s decision and declaring Saquilayan as the duly elected Mayor.

Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that he had been denied his right to due process because he had not been notified of the decryption proceedings. He argued that the resort to the printouts of the ballot images, which were secondary evidence, had been unwarranted because there was no proof that the integrity of the paper ballots had not been preserved.

On September 14, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc resolved to deny Maliksi’s motion for reconsideration.

Maliksi then came to the Court via petition for certiorari, reiterating his objections to the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images without prior notice to him, and to the use of the printouts of the ballot images in the recount proceedings conducted by the First Division.

In the decision promulgated on March 12, 2013, the Court, by a vote of 8-7, dismissed Maliksi’s petition for certiorari. The Court concluded that Maliksi had not been denied due process because: (a) he had received notices of the decryption,

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printing, and examination of the ballot images by the First Division — referring to the orders of the First Division directing Saquilayan to post and augment the cash deposits for the decryption and printing of the ballot images; and (b) he had been able to raise his objections to the decryption in his motion for reconsideration. The Court then pronounced that the First Division did not abuse its discretion in deciding to use the ballot images instead of the paper ballots, explaining that the printouts of the ballot images were not secondary images, but considered original documents with the same evidentiary value as the official ballots under the Rule on Electronic Evidence; and that the First Division’s finding that the ballots and the ballot boxes had been tampered had been fully established by the large number of cases of double-shading discovered during the revision.

Hence, Maliksi filed the petition before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: W/O Maliksi was deprived of due process when the COMELEC First Division ordered on appeal the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images in the CF cards.

HELD: The petition was dismissed. Maliksi alleged that he was denied due process when the COMELEC First Division directed the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images in the CF cards for the first time on appeal without notice to him, thus depriving him of his right to be present and observe the decryption proceedings.

The records also showed that Maliksi was aware of the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images by the COMELEC First Division. The COMELEC First Division issued an Order dated 28 March 2012 directing Saquilayan to deposit the required amount for expenses for the supplies, honoraria, and fee for the decryption of the CF cards, and a copy of the Order was personally delivered to Maliksi’s counsel. Maliksi’s counsel was likewise given a copy of Saquilayan’s Manifestation of Compliance with the 28 March 2012 Order. In an Order dated 17 April 2012, the COMELEC First Division directed Saquilayan to deposit an additional amount for expenses for the printing of additional ballot images from four clustered precincts, and a copy of the Order was again personally delivered to Maliksi’s counsel. The decryption took weeks to finish.

Clearly, Maliksi was not denied due process. He received notices of the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images by the COMELEC First Division. In addition, Maliksi raised his objections to the decryption in his motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc. The Court has ruled:

x x x. The essence of due process, we have consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. x x x.

There is no denial of due process where there is opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings. It is settled that “opportunity to be heard” does not only mean oral arguments in court but also written arguments through pleadings. Thus, the fact that a party was heard on his motion for reconsideration negates any violation of the right to due process. The Court has ruled that denial of due process cannot be invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.

MALIKSI VS. COMELECApril 11, 2013

In Maliksi’s Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration he argued that the Supreme Court en banc gravely erred in dismissing the instant petition despite a clear violation of petitioner’s constitutional right to due process of law considering that decryption, printing and examination of the digital images of the ballots, which is the basis for the assailed 14 September 2012 resolution of the public respondent, which in turn affirmed the 15 August 2012 resolution of the COMELEC First Division, were done inconspicuously upon a motu proprio directive of the COMELEC First Division sans any notice to the petitioner, and for the first time on appeal.

HELD: The Court grants Maliksi’s Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, and reverses the decision promulgated on March 12, 2013 on the ground that the First Division of the COMELEC denied to him the right to due process by failing to give due notice on the decryption and printing of the ballot images. Consequently, the Court annuls the recount proceedings conducted by the First Division with the use of the printouts of the ballot images.

It bears stressing at the outset that the First Division should not have conducted the assailed recount proceedings because it was then exercising appellate jurisdiction as to which no existing rule of procedure allowed it to conduct a recount in the first instance. The recount proceedings authorized under Section 6, Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, as

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amended, are to be conducted by the COMELEC Divisions only in the exercise of their exclusive original jurisdiction over all election protests involving elective regional (the autonomous regions), provincial and city officials.

As we see it, the First Division arbitrarily arrogated unto itself the conduct of the recount proceedings, contrary to the regular procedure of remanding the protest to the RTC and directing the reconstitution of the Revision Committee for the decryption and printing of the picture images and the revision of the ballots on the basis thereof. Quite unexpectedly, the COMELEC En Banc upheld the First Division’s unwarranted deviation from the standard procedures by invoking the COMELEC’s power to “take such measures as [the Presiding Commissioner] may deem proper,” and even citing the Court’s minute resolution in Alliance of Barangay Concerns (ABC) Party-List v. Commission on Elections5 to the effect that the “COMELEC has the power to adopt procedures that will ensure the speedy resolution of its cases. The Court will not interfere with its exercise of this prerogative so long as the parties are amply heard on their opposing claims.”

Based on the pronouncement in Alliance of Barangay Concerns (ABC) v. Commission on Elections, the power of the COMELEC to adopt procedures that will ensure the speedy resolution of its cases should still be exercised only after giving to all the parties the opportunity to be heard on their opposing claims. The parties’ right to be heard upon adversarial issues and matters is never to be waived or sacrificed, or to be treated so lightly because of the possibility of the substantial prejudice to be thereby caused to the parties, or to any of them. Thus, the COMELEC En Banc should nothave upheld the First Division’s deviation from the regular procedure in the guise of speedily resolving the election protest, in view of its failure to provide the parties with notice of its proceedings and an opportunity to be heard, the most basic requirements of due process.