P~litic11l Conrrol rinc~ J949

faligoc Roger llld Rcrni K1ufrer 111Cbi11rsSrrm m 1ire Tr-ins Chris1ine Donoughcr Kew York vlorruw 1989

Sek-er Commimc on LS 1nional Scauity ind MilitUJmiddot Com~rria Co11laquo111Suiith the Peoplri Rrpubi ofOin1WashingrunDC U-~middotCoVtlllmcntPrinting Office 1999 bcrpwwwfaorgsppl scuw11samgrcssllJJJ_rcnxl

Tanner MurrimiddotScor The lnstituriomt Lessons of Disimmiddotr RLOrgani1inmiddotg Inthe Peoples Armed Police1frerTian1J1mcn~ 77ePrnples Lilm1ti011 Army as OrgmriarfrmSunni Monica CA RAND 2002

POLITICAL CONTROL SINCE 1949 The Chinese Communist Partyexercisespolitical comrol as a means to maintain its authority and legicimalt-yDuring che Maoist era che party cxened this influence in virtually all ir~ of dtizcns lives including marriage childbearing rdishygiou~ practices employmenr and place of residence I nscrushymems used to monitor a-Jck or shape cicizcmmiddot behaviors and actions indudc d1e hou~ehold registration ncurd the danwei(work unit) the personal dossier rccducition cunps and the nommklaturasystem Sin~ the reform cr1 of the late 1970s with rhc imporcam exceptions of family planning and challcnbresto the party political conaol over peoples lives ha~ generally rclatCd becoming more institutionali1ed and rational in approach thus largclyreplacing the chaotic and draconian measures of the pasr

THE MAOIST ERA

Politicil control in the Maoist Lr1 (1949-1976) waspersonal roml unprcclicrablc and iolenr io L-ugc part hccau~eof Mao Zedong himself Acthe dice levd Mao -took cricici~mspershysonally and lashed back in wiysthat muted dissent setting a pattern that allowed his whims to dictate policic~ At the popular levd citicns experienced this ~tylc of political conshycrol through campaigns Lifebecame unpredictable because unes actions lauded by Mao in one cunpaign might be puni~hed io the ncxr as demon~trared by the inccllecrual~ who criticized the government in che Hundred Flowers Campaign ( 1956-1957) bur were Ihen pcrecuced in the anti-rightistcampaign (I 957) Mao also sancrioncd violence in these ltunpaigns In the Cultural Revolution (1966-1969) the Red Guard youth believed that they wen implementing his willby beating up bad teachers They demoycd places of worship because Mao regarded religious belief and pracric~ as superstitious and backv-Jrd

Mao employed several instruments of political conshytrol over the popularion Tn 1959 the government instishyrurcd rhc household registration record (hukou) which froze urban and rural dwellers in their respective regions thus limiting geogrJphicaJ mobility and truuring that the

countr-iide supported the cities In 1962 it in~citutcd the work unit (da111tbulle1)tu restrict urban workers job mobishylity In addition to crearing a sdf-comaincd community where one had a secure job affordable health care and inexpensive hou~ing the da11wtialso regulated minute aspects of io employees privattmiddot lives by concrolling their penonal dossiers (dangan) If an individual received a black mark in his or her da11ganthis rcsulr~d in farshyreaching consequences including denials of promotion permission co marry or have children or even m rravcl Other instruments of Maos political control to ensure order and proper ideological orienrttion included reedshyucation through labnr (laojino)rhc more punitive reform through labor (aogm1and sending down youths ro the countryside ro learn from the peaiallQi (xiafang) Uhishymatdy rhe tutalitarian conrrol that d1aracrcrized chis era failed to achieve or sustain any tangible long-term goals

THE REFORM ERA

In chc reform era (since 1978) political control rdmicroced in certain spheres During his leadership (1978-1992) Deng Xiaoping applied a pragmatic approach co economic develshyopment By partially lining control over agriculruril proshyductloo through the Household Re~ponsibility System of I 980 hr enabled farmers co keep surplu~ crops once rhey met government quotas He alm eased conrrol over develshyopment by crcacing speciaJ economic wne which wc1shycomcdforeigndirccr invcmncncand allowed enterprises to op~rate on market principles

His successor Jiang Zemin (199 2-2002) continued loosshyening control bycutting the staff of the cconomic apparatus in theccmraland provincial adminbuation byone-half and at the township level byonc-fifih between 1998 and 2002 Jiang also introducedhi~ThreeRcpresencto rhe SixteenthPartyConshygressin 2002 this policysignaled chat the ptrtywould welshycome members from the bourgeoisie rhcrebydirninating politicalcontrolsbased on ~mcs classbackground

The economic reforms in effict weakened rhc h11ku11and rhcdanwdAs rruukerforccsbegan replacing the nced fur rural suhsidizarion of urban areasthe rationale hchind the hukou systembegantu break down In addition the need for labor to fuel economic Jevclopmcnt in Chinas sourhcasccrn coastal region cnco~gted millions of peisamsto seek work in the cities Instead of damping down on this mobility the parry adjumdby incroducingthetemporary urban re~idcnt pcnnir in 1985 and the bluNeal lmAV1fin 1993 (revised in 1998) the larrer allowing educated or wealthy cimens to move pcnnashynenclyto an urban arca The danuoeialso weakened because statc-owmd enterprises had to compltte with market emershypriscs which often had no nccd coinspectones dtmgmfur a job By the mid-l 990s workrrs could finally choose their employment in many regions and by 2003 one no longer needed pcnnis~ion comany

f-CYC LO PHDIA CH MODER CH l A

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Politfra Ca11trol sfou 1949

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r Political Culhl1middot~ 1800-1900

In addition to rhc ecoJJomy theparty also rclaxcd conrrol ovcr religion In 1982 the party iliiucd a directive (Dncumcnr 19) gtJnting procecrion of freedom of relishygious belie The reasoning bchind rhe directive held that rhough belief in rdigion would cvcnrutlly disappearwhen l genuine sodalL~tscate was achieved stamping it out before rhar was achieved as auempred during the Culshytural Rcvulutionwas unfeasible

Despite these rdaxationli in control both Deng and Jiang rcmaimd unyidding in exercising political cnntml to preserve party authority and legitimacy Based on Dengs Four Ba~ic Principles (sbda11gjibm yuanu which upheld che partys ahsolure political dominance the protection of a ciriens right to practice religion fur instance was condi~ tioned on his or her submission 10 the directives of theparry ln addirion the dnngan and the classified designation of targeted persoru(zhnngdia11rmkou) on a partia11ir lmkou still allowed the government to track and monitor citizema~ well as denyth~ cravdpermissionFinallyJiang reiscrted and further srrcngrhencd the partys 11omenklamraprerogashytiveThe Soviec-scylcnnme11klaturais a liscof peopledeemed eligible ro hold elite posicions of power in all spheres over which rhc pany cxCiciscsabsolute power of appointment and dismissalAmbitious Chincewho aspire to lcadcrsbip posishytions must conform to chc norms and standuds of the Communist Party in hope of gcrring their nam~ on the Ii~

Orhcr example~ of actions taken to maintain party authority and legitimacy are Jiangs suppression of the China Dcmocracy Party (Zhongguo Minzhu Dang) and the spirirual practice group Falun Gong in 1999 Jiangs adminisrration scnc members of both groups rhc latter numbering in the chousands tu labor rceducacion camps

The patty leadcllihip has also exercised right control in the sphcrl of childbearing Based on a mi~silescienciscs dire ovcrpopuaricgtnprojections the parryimplemented che oneshychild policy (allowing most couples ro have only one child) in 1980 and made a big push in 1983 ro achieve its goaL middot11tc m~anirude of the rculcing social suffcring-cwencyshyone million sterilization~ and fourrcen million abortion~ chat yc-u-made the leadership seep back from ~uch a scricL polky though still advocating fur che one-child rule the patty instiruccd more conditions that would permit having second children Although tk policy has produced an aging populacion and a skewed so ratio (120 boys per 100 girls born in 1999) under Hu Jinrao who cune m power in 2003 1hc parry has decided co extend the one-child policy until 2018

THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Compared co the Maoist era in rhc 2000s the partys application of political conrrol is less opprcs~ive in peoples everydaylives Aside from familyplanning citi7cnsocrcisc greater economic social religiousand some limited polirshy

ical freedoms Thdr ability rn dili~enr is m imponam indishycation of thcoc new frccdoms Between 1978 and 1999 lawuits incre1sed by 1 2000 percent From 1994 to 2003 thenumber of formerand worker prorcir~increased from I 0000 to 60000 One must note howeverthir alrhough chc pany has allowed farmers and work-ers ro protestshyvicwingchisas a safety valve fur rdcisingfrustration-these protcsrs UlUallyoccur ar the local and sometimes at the regional levd but n~cr risero a national k-vd when they could thrcaren parrylegitimacy

In areas of porcnrial challenge rn party authority and lcgilimacy political control continues ro be arbitrary utd nontrnnsparenrto the Chinese peopleespecially in the partys censoring of the media and lntemec and sending people co labor rccducirion campsA~ lung as theparrysustains China middots imprcisivc arbitraryeconomic growth and dtVdopmenr~Uch politicalcontrol will quite likelycon~nue

SfI ALSO Cnuorship Dissidents Educnrion through Libor Reform through Labor Human Rights since I 949 Police Secret Sent-euun EdzmztedYouth Unit (da11uid)Xiafang

81BLlOGRAlHY lJitrmcr Lowell 1eadenhip Chanllc and Chimmiddotsc Policic11

Dt-vdopmcnt China Quarttrly [7( (2003) 903-92 Goldman Merle Prom Commdr tr Cirizz11 far PolitimlTix Szmgglr Righrsill ChindBoston Huvird Lnive~iry Pres~ 21105

Crecnhalgh Su~-an Mi~silc Sciltno Population Scicnu The Originsof Chin15 One-Child Policy Chi1111 11121Q1umrr(J(2005) 253-276

Lam Willy Wu-Lap Chi11rstlolitirs i11 1hr H11jinran lrr Nrubull LetidirsNt11J 0111lrngtr ME harpc 2006Armonk IY

Lleberthal Kenneth Go1bullrmii1gChi111Frnm Rruolution thrv11gh Rrfarn12nd ed )kw York WW orion 2004

lu Xiiobo and ElizabcchJ PerryDa11wtiTht Changing Chineltr Workplace in llistoriml ind Comparalirf lmpt1tfotNcw York MF Shupc 1997

Wang Fei-Ung Orgt111izing Divirinn and Fd11sio11 ithrnugh 01i111t lulro11S)tC111 CA Smnfnrd Univcniry Pnss 2005bullSt1J1ford

Grau C H1ut11g

POLITICAL CULTURE 1800-1900 Political culture not only serves asa motivational tool for cenrral control anltl lcxil mobili1arionit provides a system of mcmicroingro make sense of speciflc political events and individual artitudcs or behaviorscoward chcm In the case of Qing China (1644-1912) its politicilculrure envisioned an ideal sr-are rulcdby an exemplary emperor loyally assisccd byvirruou~and competent scholar-officialsThis cenrrali1ed bureaucraric monarchy sanctioned by the mandate of

EN CYC LOPlDIA DF MODER - C lll XA 146

r Political Culhl1middot~ 1800-1900

In addition to rhc ecoJJomy theparty also rclaxcd conrrol ovcr religion In 1982 the party iliiucd a directive (Dncumcnr 19) gtJnting procecrion of freedom of relishygious belie The reasoning bchind rhe directive held that rhough belief in rdigion would cvcnrutlly disappearwhen l genuine sodalL~tscate was achieved stamping it out before rhar was achieved as auempred during the Culshytural Rcvulutionwas unfeasible

Despite these rdaxationli in control both Deng and Jiang rcmaimd unyidding in exercising political cnntml to preserve party authority and legitimacy Based on Dengs Four Ba~ic Principles (sbda11gjibm yuanu which upheld che partys ahsolure political dominance the protection of a ciriens right to practice religion fur instance was condi~ tioned on his or her submission 10 the directives of theparry ln addirion the dnngan and the classified designation of targeted persoru(zhnngdia11rmkou) on a partia11ir lmkou still allowed the government to track and monitor citizema~ well as denyth~ cravdpermissionFinallyJiang reiscrted and further srrcngrhencd the partys 11omenklamraprerogashytiveThe Soviec-scylcnnme11klaturais a liscof peopledeemed eligible ro hold elite posicions of power in all spheres over which rhc pany cxCiciscsabsolute power of appointment and dismissalAmbitious Chincewho aspire to lcadcrsbip posishytions must conform to chc norms and standuds of the Communist Party in hope of gcrring their nam~ on the Ii~

Orhcr example~ of actions taken to maintain party authority and legitimacy are Jiangs suppression of the China Dcmocracy Party (Zhongguo Minzhu Dang) and the spirirual practice group Falun Gong in 1999 Jiangs adminisrration scnc members of both groups rhc latter numbering in the chousands tu labor rceducacion camps

The patty leadcllihip has also exercised right control in the sphcrl of childbearing Based on a mi~silescienciscs dire ovcrpopuaricgtnprojections the parryimplemented che oneshychild policy (allowing most couples ro have only one child) in 1980 and made a big push in 1983 ro achieve its goaL middot11tc m~anirude of the rculcing social suffcring-cwencyshyone million sterilization~ and fourrcen million abortion~ chat yc-u-made the leadership seep back from ~uch a scricL polky though still advocating fur che one-child rule the patty instiruccd more conditions that would permit having second children Although tk policy has produced an aging populacion and a skewed so ratio (120 boys per 100 girls born in 1999) under Hu Jinrao who cune m power in 2003 1hc parry has decided co extend the one-child policy until 2018

THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Compared co the Maoist era in rhc 2000s the partys application of political conrrol is less opprcs~ive in peoples everydaylives Aside from familyplanning citi7cnsocrcisc greater economic social religiousand some limited polirshy

ical freedoms Thdr ability rn dili~enr is m imponam indishycation of thcoc new frccdoms Between 1978 and 1999 lawuits incre1sed by 1 2000 percent From 1994 to 2003 thenumber of formerand worker prorcir~increased from I 0000 to 60000 One must note howeverthir alrhough chc pany has allowed farmers and work-ers ro protestshyvicwingchisas a safety valve fur rdcisingfrustration-these protcsrs UlUallyoccur ar the local and sometimes at the regional levd but n~cr risero a national k-vd when they could thrcaren parrylegitimacy

In areas of porcnrial challenge rn party authority and lcgilimacy political control continues ro be arbitrary utd nontrnnsparenrto the Chinese peopleespecially in the partys censoring of the media and lntemec and sending people co labor rccducirion campsA~ lung as theparrysustains China middots imprcisivc arbitraryeconomic growth and dtVdopmenr~Uch politicalcontrol will quite likelycon~nue

SfI ALSO Cnuorship Dissidents Educnrion through Libor Reform through Labor Human Rights since I 949 Police Secret Sent-euun EdzmztedYouth Unit (da11uid)Xiafang

81BLlOGRAlHY lJitrmcr Lowell 1eadenhip Chanllc and Chimmiddotsc Policic11

Dt-vdopmcnt China Quarttrly [7( (2003) 903-92 Goldman Merle Prom Commdr tr Cirizz11 far PolitimlTix Szmgglr Righrsill ChindBoston Huvird Lnive~iry Pres~ 21105

Crecnhalgh Su~-an Mi~silc Sciltno Population Scicnu The Originsof Chin15 One-Child Policy Chi1111 11121Q1umrr(J(2005) 253-276

Lam Willy Wu-Lap Chi11rstlolitirs i11 1hr H11jinran lrr Nrubull LetidirsNt11J 0111lrngtr ME harpc 2006Armonk IY

Lleberthal Kenneth Go1bullrmii1gChi111Frnm Rruolution thrv11gh Rrfarn12nd ed )kw York WW orion 2004

lu Xiiobo and ElizabcchJ PerryDa11wtiTht Changing Chineltr Workplace in llistoriml ind Comparalirf lmpt1tfotNcw York MF Shupc 1997

Wang Fei-Ung Orgt111izing Divirinn and Fd11sio11 ithrnugh 01i111t lulro11S)tC111 CA Smnfnrd Univcniry Pnss 2005bullSt1J1ford

Grau C H1ut11g

POLITICAL CULTURE 1800-1900 Political culture not only serves asa motivational tool for cenrral control anltl lcxil mobili1arionit provides a system of mcmicroingro make sense of speciflc political events and individual artitudcs or behaviorscoward chcm In the case of Qing China (1644-1912) its politicilculrure envisioned an ideal sr-are rulcdby an exemplary emperor loyally assisccd byvirruou~and competent scholar-officialsThis cenrrali1ed bureaucraric monarchy sanctioned by the mandate of

EN CYC LOPlDIA DF MODER - C lll XA 146