Polish Foreign Policy in the 21st Century:A Social-Constructivist Analysis

Jeremy Wysakowski-WaltersSupervised by Prof. Stanisław Obirek

Department of Transatlantic StudiesFaculty of Politics and International Studies

University of Łodź

Introduction

1. The apparent problem

This work is first and foremost the result of a foreigner’s attempt to understand Polish foreign

policy. Since moving to Poland from Britain in 2004 I have attempted to learn not only my new

countries language and culture, but also its politics and systems. This at times has been a somewhat

bewildering experience as it often involves leaving behind the deep-rooted mindset that is the

product of my British ethnicity. It is often said that to truly understand a people you must speak

their language; never is this more a truism than when analysing political culture.

Our modern word: politics comes from the Greek word polis meaning city. Cities are by their very

nature huge conglomerates of people; they are dynamic and living things. To understand what

politics is, we must understand this original meaning. Thus politics is dynamic and like language

changes with the ebb and flow of humanity. However, like language it has its normative rules and

can be categorised and analysed.

As I learnt more about Poland and its politics I became aware of an apparent dichotomy: Poland

seemed to be displaying both Euro-centric and Atlanticist tendencies. Further to this it appeared that

few of their decisions matched the traditional mainstream International Relations (IR) theories. I

gradually became aware that in fact an alternative theory must provide a more coherent explanation

for what I witnessed.

It became evident to me that Polish culture was in fact one of the main determinates of its foreign

policy. This notion however was a raw appraisal and needed to be grounded in both philosophical

and political theories. By stating both philosophical and political theories I am in fact outlining the

whole approach that I took to the problem. Although IR borrows heavily from other social

scientists, it has an often disparaging image of philosophy1. Whilst classical realism was based

heavily on philosophical notions2, structural realism was less inclined to use philosophy as a

benchmark.

This moving away from political philosophy has had the effect that much of the writing at the end

of the twentieth century was carried out with little reference to ontological or epistemological

concepts. This however did not mean that such concepts were not inherent in IR. In order to carry

1 See Waltz 1979:6 where he talks of theory as explanations as opposed to collecting “laws”2 Hobbes's 'State of Nature' was adapted to the State level

out any meaningful research you must have an idea of what constitutes facts and reality. The point

is merely that these concepts were not brought into question, but tacitly accepted. For the majority

of IR's existence as a science, positivism has been the unwritten rule. In fact as Alexander Wendt

(2000:38) states 'the field has polarized into two main camps: (1) a majority who think science is

an epistemologically privileged discourse through which we can gain a progressively truer

understanding of the world, an (2) a large minority who do not recognise a privileged epistemic

status for science in explaining the world out their.' Wendt's referral to science and epistemology is

in fact an unstated reference to empiricism as true science.

Therefore, the very way Wendt draws attention to the epistemological split within IR betrays the

force with which enlightenment principles have affected our (contemporary people) thinking. This

hard-wiring of what science is even affects the available degree titles within IR where some

universities offer Bachelor or Arts in IR3 while others offer Bachelor of Science4 in IR. Although

this may seem an irrelevant point to draw attention to, it illustrates the continued battle IR has

within the scientific community. This battle for acceptance as a science is obviously hampered

greatly by the discord that exists within the subject when some schools (reflectivist) are often

referred to by others (rationalist) as unscientific.

It is in view of the above that I therefore decided to go about this work with two principle goals in

mind: (1) to assess Polish foreign policy with cultural considerations in mind and (2) ensure that

philosophy retains its rightful place as a guide to scientific inquiry.

2. The philosophical considerations

As mentioned above, for many people the philosophical grounding of science is something tacitly

excepted but rarely considered. Most scientists go straight to questions of methodology without

enquiring as to what ontological or epistemological stance they are taking. However these three

factors are in fact inextricably linked. Ontology concerns questions of the fundamental kinds of

things which exist (Jary and Jary 2000:428) whilst epistemology concerns how we can know the

world (2000:186). These two concepts are the bedrock of scientific inquiry; without being certain of

these, then we cast doubt on any research done. The third aspect of science is methodology. The

methods chosen naturally follow from the ontology and epistemology assigned.

Given the innate assumptions concerning both ontology and epistemology within science it is

3 See http://www.essex.ac.uk/coursefinder/CourseDetails.aspx?course=BA++L2584 See http://www.londondegree.org/BSc_IR_Introduction.htm

perhaps natural that I should not start from the top (ontology) but rather from somewhere between

epistemology and methodology. Using my first objective: to assess Polish foreign policy with

cultural considerations in mind, I worked my way backwards. The natural point I arrived at first

was constructivism which is defined by Alexander Wendt as: (1) the fact that structures of human

association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than by material forces, and (2) that

the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than

given by nature (1999:1). Wendt goes on to say that constructivism is therefore a kind of structural

idealism

The fact that structures are created by humans and that in turn these structures have a feedback

affect on the humans and help create their identities is from an ontology perspective closed to

existentialism. In the preface to Frantz Fanon's The Wretched Earth Jean-Paul Sartre (1965) wrote:

'We only become what we are by the radical and deep-seated refusal of that which others have

made of us'; this, on an individual level, becomes on a state level a conflict between structural

forces as conceived of in constructivism and actors' identities.

In point of summary then, I chose existentialism to be my guiding philosophical theory and

foundation on which to build my constructivist theories. This however means little unless I talk

about the ontological and epistemological theories to which I set myself in opposition.

As mentioned in section 1, traditional IR has rested on the epistemology of positivism. Positivism

involves the use of an empirical methodology (Jary and Jary 2000:471) where data is recorded

using physical science methods of measurement and the search for laws. A belief in a positive

epistemology is known in philosophical terms as empiricism (2000: 181) , yet it is essential to note

that within IR a somewhat confusing term is used. Schools of thought that rely essentially on

positivism are in fact grouped under the heading of rationalism (Wendt 1999:27). Rationalism

within philosophy refers to the use of reason to gain knowledge a priori. Rationalism, within

philosophy, is thus in opposition to empiricism. The term rationalism in IR in fact has more to do

with rational choice theory and in fact belief in the constancy of state attributes and qualities of the

international system (Wendt 1999:35-38).

Rationalism (or empiricism) in IR thus represents the dominant ontological approach, with

reflectivism being the group name for the ontological alternatives. I emphasised group name as

there are many diverse methodologies, and hence ontologies, within reflectivist IR. As mentioned

above I will concentrate on constructivism, yet keep in mind other approaches as I work.

3. The thesis outline

Retuning to the original quandary: that few Polish policy decisions matched the traditional

mainstream International Relations (IR) theories, and the fact that I wished to (1) to assess Polish

foreign policy with cultural considerations in mind and (2) ensure that philosophy retains its

rightful place as a guide to scientific inquiry; I will now give an outline of both my overall thesis

and chapter content.

As outlined above, the main conflict exists between reflectivist and rationalists IR theories. I have

therefore set about comparing these competing approaches with regards Polish foreign policy. For

this I set a time-frame of ten years in order to limit the amount of empirical evidence that could be

reviewed. The period under investigation is the first decade of the twenty-first century and

primarily deals with the 2003 Iraq War, the 2004 EU accession and the 2008 US/Polish Strategic

Declaration. These events marked defining moments in Poland's history.

The work consists five chapters and as such represents a whole; however, the constitutive chapters

can be read as separate and stand-alone pieces. To this end I have build in some degree of

redundancy within the dissertation. Certain key concepts are repeated as well as key motivations

and summaries.

4. A chapter breakdown

Chapter One has three principle tasks. As is perhaps traditional, the chapter sets out the main

theoretical concepts to be discussed within the work. All of the main IR theories are outline with

relevant literature quoted. The second part represents an analysis of the current literature regarding

Polish foreign policy. This was by no means an attempt to give an exhaustive overview of the

corpus, but rather a way of introducing the reader to the main issues concerned. Finally the chapter

deals with the scientific methodology that will be employed within the work.

Chapter Two represents the first part of the comparison. The three historical case studies are

reviewed using rationalist methodology. The chapter provides and important springboard for the

overall thesis as it shows that in fact rationalism can not explain Polish behaviour. This therefore

brings fourth the need for a reflectivist. As highlighted earlier, a constructivist approach is chosen.

Chapter Three contains the heart of the work. Constructivism by its very nature must be devised

and thus this chapter deals with analysing the empirical evidence necessary in order to construct a

new model of Polish behaviour. Here documentary and statistical evidence is used to demonstrate

Polish 'beliefs'; these beliefs are then used to form the model.

Chapter Four returns to the original case studies in order to test the new constructivist model.

Further to this, more recent events are analysed using the mode. Finally assessments are made based

on the analysis carried out. This in fact provides the most important part of the work in terms of its

contribution of the study of IR.

Finally Chapter Five provides a point of reflection. Action Research principles are used in order to

assess the work, as well as to provide fresh insights. This culminates in suggestions for future work.