G

G.R. No. 93239 March 18, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDISON SUCRO,accused-appellant.WARRANTLESS ARREST: a. actually committing (i) coverageFACTS:Edison Sucro was charged with and convicted of violation of Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

On March 21, 1989, Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP, Kalibo, Aklan, was instructed by P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi, Jr. (Station Commander of the INP Kalibo, Aklan) to monitor the activities of appellant Edison Sucro, because of information gathered by Seraspi that Sucro was selling marijuana. As planned, at about 5:00 P.M. on said date, Pat. Fulgencio Positioned himself under the house of a certain Arlie Regalado at C. Quimpo Street. Adjacent to the house of Regalado, about 2 meters away, was a chapel. Thereafter, Pat. Fulgencio saw appellant enter the chapel, taking something which turned out later to be marijuana from the compartment of a cart found inside the chapel, and then return to the street where he handed the same to a buyer, Aldie Borromeo. After a while appellant went back to the chapel and again came out with marijuana which he gave to a group of persons .It was at this instance that Pat. Fulgencio radioed P/Lt. Seraspi and reported the activity going on. P/Lt. Seraspi instructed Pat. Fulgencio to continue monitoring developments. At about 6:30 P.M., Pat. Fulgencio again called up Seraspi to report that a third buyer later Identified as Ronnie Macabante, was transacting with appellant.

At that point, the team of P/Lt. Seraspi proceeded to the area and while the police officers were at the Youth Hostel at Maagma St., Pat. Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi to intercept Macabante and appellant. P/Lt. Seraspi and his team caught up with Macabante at the crossing of Mabini and Maagma Sts. in front of the Aklan Medical Center. Upon seeing the police, Macabante threw something to the ground which turned out to be a tea bag of marijuana. When confronted, Macabante readily admitted that he bought the same from appellant (Edison Sucro) in front of the chapel. The police team was able to overtake and arrest appellant at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans Sts. The police recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from the cart inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante,

ISSUE: 1. WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION EXHIBITS "E"-"E-4", TEA BAGS OF ALLEGED MARIJUANA, TO BE THECORPUS DELICTI;FURTHERMORE, THAT THE SAME WERE TAKEN WITHOUT THE REQUIRED WARRANT OF SEARCH AND ARREST SINCE THE ACCUSED WAS NOT IN THE ACT OF COMMITTING ANY OFFENSE AT THE TIME OF HIS ARREST.

2. Whether or not the arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful and consequently, whether or not the evidence resulting from such arrest is admissible.

RULING:

We rule in the affirmative.

The accused-appellant contends that his arrest was illegal, being a violation of his rights granted under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. He stresses that there was sufficient time for the police officers to apply for a search and arrest warrants considering that Fulgencio informed his Station Commander of the activities of the accused two days before March 21, 1989, the date of his arrest.

This contention is without merit.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the instances where arrest without warrant is considered lawful. The rule states:

Arrest without warrant, when lawful. A peace officer or private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledgeof facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; (Emphasis supplied)

An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof. (U.S. v. Fortaleza, 12 Phil. 472 [1909]; and U.S. v. Samonte, 16 Phil. 516 [1910])

The records show that Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado's house at C. Quimpo Street to monitor the activities of the accused who was earlier reported to be selling marijuana at a chapel two (2) meters away from Regalado's house.

Fulgencio, within a distance of two meters saw Sucro conduct his nefarious activity. He saw Sucro talk to some persons, go inside the chapel, and return to them and exchange some things. These, Sucro did three times during the time that he was being monitored. Fulgencio would then relay the on-going transaction to P/Lt. Seraspi.

Anent the second requirement, the fact that Macabante, when intercepted by the police, was caught throwing the marijuana stick and when confronted, readily admitted that he bought the same from accused-appellant clearly indicates that Sucro had just sold the marijuana stick to Macabante, and therefore, had just committed an illegal act of which the police officers had personal knowledge, being members of the team which monitored Sucro's nefarious activity.

G.R. No. L-22196 June 30, 1967ESTEBAN MORANO, CHAN SAU WAH and FU YAN FUN,petitioners-appellants,vs.HON. MARTINIANO VIVO in his capacity as Acting Commissioner of Immigration,respondent-appellant.

ADMINISTRATIVE ARRESTSChan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen born in Fukien, China on January 6, 1932, arrived in the Philippines on November 23, 1961 to visit her cousin, Samuel Lee Malaps. She left in mainland China two of her children by a first marriage: Fu Tse Haw and Fu Yan Kai With her was Fu Yan Fun, her minor son also by the first marriage, born in Hongkong on September 11, 1957. Chan Sau Wah and her minor son Fu Yan Fun were permitted only into the Philippines under a temporary visitor's visa for two (2) months and after they posted a cash bond of P4,000.00. On January 24, 1962, Chan Sau Wah married Esteban Morano, a native-born Filipino citizen. Born to this union on September 16, 1962 was Esteban Morano, Jr. To prolong their stay in the Philippines, Chan Sau Wah and Fu Yan Fun obtained several extensions. The last extension expired on September 10, 1962.1wph1.tIn a letter dated August 31, 1962, the Commissioner of Immigration ordered Chan Sau Wah and her son, Fu Yan Fun, to leave the country on or before September 10, 1962 with a warning that upon failure so to do, he will issue a warrant for their arrest and will cause the confiscation of their bond.

Instead of leaving the country, on September 10, 1962, Chan Sau Wah (with her husband Esteban Morano) and Fu Yan Fun petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila formandamusto compel the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel petitioners' Alien Certificates of Registration; prohibition to stop the Commissioner from issuing a warrant for their arrest, and preliminary injunction to restrain the Commissioner from confiscating their cash bond and from issuing warrants of arrest pending resolution of this case.1The trial court, on November 3, 1962, issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for, upon a P2,000-bond.

Petitioners and respondent Commissioner both appealed.

In the additional stipulation of facts of July 3, 1963, petitioners admit that Chan Sau Wah is not possessed of all the qualifications required by the Naturalization Law.

Because of all these we are left under no doubt that petitioner Chan Sau Wah did not become a Filipino citizen.

Petitioners argue that the legal precept just quoted trenches upon the constitutional mandate in Section 1 (3), Article III [Bill of Rights] of the Constitution, to wit:

(3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

They say that the Constitution limits to judges the authority to issue warrants of arrest and that the legislative delegation of such power to the Commissioner of Immigration is thus violative of the Bill of Rights.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION HAS AUTHORITY TO ISSUE WARRANTS OF ARREST?

RULING:

Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution, we perceive, does not require judicial intervention in the execution of a final order of deportation issued in accordance with law. The constitutional limitation contemplates an order of arrest in the exercise of judicial power4as a step preliminary or incidental to prosecution or proceedings for a given offense or administrative action, not as a measure indispensable to carry out a valid decision by a competent official, such as a legal order of deportation, issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, in pursuance of a valid legislation.

In consequence, the constitutional guarantee set forth in Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution aforesaid, requiring that the issue of probable cause be determined by a judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings.6Indeed, the power to deport or expel aliens is an attribute of sovereignty. Such power is planted on the "accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions."8So it is, that this Court once aptly remarked that there can be no controversy on the fact that where aliens are admitted as temporary visitors, "the law is to the effect that temporary visitors who do not depart upon the expiration of the period of stay granted them are subject to deportation by the Commissioner of Immigration, for having violated the limitation or condition under which they were admitted as non-immigrants (Immigration Law, Sec. 37 (a), subsection (7); C.A. 613, as amended)."9Recently we confirmed the rule that an alien wife of a Filipino may not stay permanently without first departing from the Philippines. Reason: Discourage entry under false pretenses.12G.R. No. 90878 January 29, 1990

PABLITO V. SANIDAD,petitioner,vs.THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,respondent.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION PRIOR RESTRAINT (CENSORSHIP)This is a petition forcertiorariassailing the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 on the ground that it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press.

On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into law. Pursuant to said law, the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras which consist of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao, all comprising the Cordillera Autonomous Region, shall take part in a plebiscite for the ratification of said Organic Act originally scheduled last December 27, 1989 which was, however, reset to January 30, 1990 by virtue of Comelec Resolution No. 2226 dated December 27, 1989.

The Commission on Elections, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), said R.A. 6766 and other pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution No. 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region.

In a petition dated November 20, 1989, herein petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims to be a newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which provides:

Section 19.Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers. During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on the plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.

It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void and unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press enshrined in the Constitution.

Unlike a regular news reporter or news correspondent who merely reports the news, petitioner maintains that as a columnist, his column obviously and necessarily contains and reflects his opinions, views and beliefs on any issue or subject about which he writes. Petitioner believes that said provision of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 constitutes a prior restraint on his constitutionally-guaranteed freedom of the press and further imposes subsequent punishment for those who may violate it because it contains a penal provision, as follows:

Article XIII, Section 122, Election Offenses and Banned Acts or Activities. Except to the extent that the same may not be applicable plebiscite. the banned acts/activities and offenses defined in and penalized by the Omnibus Election Code ('Sections 261, 262, 263 and Article' XXII, B.P. Blg. 881) and the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 6646 shall be aplicable to the plebiscite governed by this Resolution.

Petitioner likewise maintains that if media practitioners were to express their views, beliefs and opinions on the issue submitted to a plebiscite, it would in fact help in the government drive and desire to disseminate information, and hear, as well as ventilate, all sides of the issue.

Respondent Comelec maintains that the questioned provision of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is not violative of the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press. Rather it is a valid implementation of the power of the Comelec to supervise and regulate media during election or plebiscite periods as enunciated in Article IX-C, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. It is stated further by respondent that Resolution 2167 does not absolutely bar petitioner from expressing his views and/or from campaigning for or against the Organic Act. He may still express his views or campaign for or against the act through the Comelec space and airtime.However, it is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment offranchises, permits or other grantsissued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns andforums among candidatesare ensured. The evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give any undue advantageto a candidatein terms of advertising space or radio or television time. This is also the reason why a "columnist, commentator, announcer or personality,who is acandidate for any elective officeis required to take a leave of absence from his work during the campaign period (2nd par. Section 11(b) R.A. 6646). It cannot be gainsaid that a columnist or commentator who is also a candidate would be more exposed to the voters to the prejudice of other candidates unless required to take a leave of absence.

However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise bymedia practitioners themselvesof their right to expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis.

In the case of Badoy, Jr. v. Comelec, L-32546, Oct. 16, 1970, where the constitutionality of the prohibition of certain forms of election propaganda was assailed, We ruled therein that the prohibition is a valid exercise of the police power of the state "to prevent the perversion and prostitution of the electoral apparatus and of the denial of equal protection of the laws." The evil sought to be prevented in an election which led to Our ruling in that case does not obtain in a plebiscite. In a plebiscite, votes are taken in an area on some special political matter unlike in an election where votes are cast in favor of specific persons for some office. In other words, the electorate is asked to vote for or against issues, not candidates in a plebiscite.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE SAID provision violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press enshrined in the Constitution?RULING:

The instant petition is GRANTED. Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is declared null and void and unconstitutional. The restraining order herein issued is hereby made permanent.

Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The people's right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the issues, including the forum. The people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised. Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for expression but they do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the public concerned because they are limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or television times.G.R. No. 173034 October 9, 2007PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner,vs.HEALTH SECRETARY FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III; HEALTH UNDER SECRETARIES DR.ETHELYN P. NIETO, DR. MARGARITA M. GALON, ATTY. ALEXANDER A. PADILLA, & DR. JADE F. DEL MUNDO; and ASSISTANT SECRETARIES DR. MARIO C. VILLAVERDE, DR. DAVID J. LOZADA, AND DR. NEMESIO T. GAKO,respondents.

FOR COMMERCIAL SPEECH:Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III, 535 SCRA 265

(2007)

FACTS:

On October 28, 1986, Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. The Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. The Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. The DOH issued RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of The Milk Code, assailing that the RIRR was going beyond the provisions of the Milk Code, thereby amending and expanding the coverage of said law.

ISSUE:

whether the absolute prohibition on advertising and other forms of promotion of breastmilk substitutes violative of freedom of speech?

RULING:

The Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition by declaring NULL AND VOID Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of Administrative Order No. 2006-0012, dated May 12, 2006, for being ultra vires and prohibited the Department of Health from implementing the said provisions.

It does not violate freedom of speech because there is no absolute ban.

The Inter-Agency Committee (IAC) will evaluate some advertising and promotional materials subject to the standards provided for by the Milk Code. The IAC can allow if the advertising and promotions will not undermine breast milk and breastfeeding. It is recognized that the IAC has that power to evaluate promotional materials.

Of breastfeeding, breastmilk substitutes and advertisements. To what extent may the Department of

Health, in promoting the health and nutritious needs of children, regulate the businesses which promote

breastmilk substitutes as acceptable alternative to mothers milk?

Health is a legitimate subject matter for regulation by the DOH (and certain other administrative

agencies) in exercise of police powers delegated to it. The sheer span of jurisprudence on that matter

precludes the need to further discuss it. However, health information, particularly advertising materials

on apparently non-toxic products like breastmilk substitutes and supplements, is a relatively new area

for regulation by the DOH. Accordingly, the DOH's power under the Milk Code to control

information regarding breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes is not absolute as the powerto control

does not encompass the power to absolutely prohibit the advertising, marketing, and promotion of

breastmilk substitutes. Implementing rules and regulations imposing labeling requirements and

limitations such as that there be a statement that there is no substitute to breastmilk, and that there be

a statement that powdered infant formula may contain pathogenic microorganisms and must be preparedand used appropriately, as well as a prohibition against health and nutrition claims of increased

emotional and intellectual abilities of the infant and young child are consistent with the Milk Code.

These provisions of the Milk Code expressly forbid information that would imply or create a belief that

there is any milk product equivalent to breastmilk or which is humanized or maternalized, as such

information would be inconsistent with the superiorityof breastfeeding. Correct information as to infantfeeding and nutrition is infused with public interest and welfare.

Nonetheless, in this case while the Court held the authority of DOH to control information regarding

breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes and supplements and related products cannot be questioned,

it declared that the DOH, in imposing an absolute prohibition on advertising, promotion, and marketing,

the same went beyond its authority since the same was not within the provisions of the Milk Code itself.

Respondents submit that the national policy on infant and young child feeding is embodied in A.O. No. 2005-0014, dated May 23, 2005. Basically, the Administrative Order declared the following policy guidelines: (1) ideal breastfeeding practices, such as early initiation of breastfeeding, exclusive breastfeeding for the first six months, extended breastfeeding up to two years and beyond; (2) appropriate complementary feeding, which is to start at age six months; (3) micronutrient supplementation; (4) universal salt iodization; (5) the exercise of other feeding options; and (6) feeding in exceptionally difficult circumstances. Indeed, the primacy of breastfeeding for children is emphasized as a national health policy. However, nowhere in A.O. No. 2005-0014 is it declared that as part of such health policy, the advertisement or promotion of breastmilk substitutes should be absolutely prohibited. Hence, the Court held that the national policy of protection, promotion and support of breastfeeding cannot automatically be equated with a total ban on advertising for breastmilk substitutes. The Milk Code does not contain a total ban on the advertising and promotion of breastmilk substitutes but instead specifically creates an IAC which will regulate said advertising and promotion. A total ban policy could be implemented only pursuant to a law amending the Milk Code passed by the constitutionally authorized branch of government, the legislature. The Court emphasized that only the provisions of the Milk Code, but not those of subsequent WHA Resolutions, can be validly implemented by the DOH through the subject RIRR.

The Court held that the Sec. 3 of the Milk Code's coverage is not limited only to children 0-12 months old. Section 3 of the Milk Code. The coverage of the Milk Code is not dependent on the age of the child but on the kind of product being marketed to the public. The law treats infant formula, bottle-fed complementary food, and breastmilk substitute as separate and distinct product categories.

Section 4(h) of the Milk Code defines infant formula as a breastmilk substitute x x x to satisfy the normal nutritional requirements of infants up to between four to six months of age, and adapted to their physiological characteristics; while under Section 4(b), bottle-fed complementary food refers to any food, whether manufactured or locally prepared, suitable as a complement to breastmilk or infant formula, when either becomes insufficient to satisfy the nutritional requirements of the infant. An infant under Section 4(e) is a person falling within the age bracket 0-12 months. It is the nourishment of this group of infants or children aged 0-12 months that is sought to be promoted and protected by the Milk Code.

But there is another target group. Breastmilk substitute is defined under Section 4(a) as any food being marketed or otherwise presented as a partial or total replacement for breastmilk, whether or not suitable for that purpose. This section conspicuously lacks reference to any particular age-group of children. Hence, the provision of the Milk Code cannot be considered exclusive for children aged 0-12 months. In other words, breastmilk substitutes may also be intended for young children more than 12 months of age. Therefore, by regulating breastmilk substitutes, the Milk Code also intends to protect and promote the nourishment of children more than 12 months old. Evidently, as long as what is being marketed falls within the scope of the Milk Code as provided in Section 3, then it can be subject to regulation pursuant to said law, even if the product is to be used by children aged over 12 months.

To resolve the question of whether the labeling requirements and advertising regulations under the RIRR are valid, the Court had to discuss the nature, purpose, and depth of the regulatory powers of the DOH, as defined in general under the 1987 Administrative Code, and as delegated in particular under the Milk Code. Health is a legitimate subject matter for regulation by the DOH (and certain other administrative agencies) in exercise of police powers delegated to it. The sheer span of jurisprudence on that matter precludes the need to further discuss it.. However, health information, particularly advertising materials on apparently non-toxic products like breastmilk substitutes and supplements, is a relatively new area for regulation by the DOH. The 1987 Administrative Code tasked respondent DOH to carry out the state policy pronounced under Section 15, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which is to protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them. To that end, it was granted under Section 3 of the Administrative Code the power to (6) propagate health information and educate the population on important health, medical and environmental matters which have health implications. When it comes to information regarding nutrition of infants and young children, however, the Milk Code specifically delegated to the Ministry of Health (hereinafter referred to as DOH) the power to ensure that there is adequate, consistent and objective information on breastfeeding and use of breastmilk substitutes, supplements and related products; and the power to control such information. Further, DOH is authorized by the Milk Code to control the content of any information on breastmilk vis--vis breastmilk substitutes, supplement and related products. The DOH is also authorized to control the purpose of the information and to whom such information may be disseminated under Sections 6 through 9 of the Milk Code to ensure that the information that would reach pregnant women, mothers of infants, and health professionals and workers in the health care system is restricted to scientific and factual matters and shall not imply or create a belief that bottlefeeding is equivalent or superior to breastfeeding. It bears emphasis, however, that the DOH's power under the Milk Code to control information regarding breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes is not absolute as the power to control does not encompass the power to absolutely prohibit the advertising, marketing, and promotion of breastmilk substitutes.

Nonetheless, the Court held that the framers of the constitution were well aware that trade must be subjected to some form of regulation for the public good. Despite the fact that our present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare. Free enterprise does not call for removal of protective regulations. It must be clearly explained and proven by competent evidence just exactly how such protective regulation would result in the restraint of trade. In this case, petitioner failed to show that the proscription of milk manufacturers participation in any policymaking body (Section 4(i)), classes and seminars for women and children (Section 22); the giving of assistance, support and logistics or training (Section 32); and the giving of donations (Section 52) would unreasonably hamper the trade of breastmilk substitutes. Petitioner has not established that the proscribed activities are indispensable to the trade of breastmilk substitutes. Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the aforementioned provisions of the RIRR are unreasonable and oppressive for being in restraint of trade.

In fine, the Court held that except Sections 4(f), 11 and 46, the rest of the provisions of the RIRR are in consonance with the objective, purpose and intent of the Milk Code, constituting reasonable regulation of an industry which affects public health and welfare and, as such, the rest of the RIRR do not constitute illegal restraint of trade nor are they violative of the due process clause of the Constitution.