Poetics Volume 13 Issue 6 1984 [Doi 10.1016%2F0304-422x%2884%2990018-4] Koenraad Kuiper -- The Nature of Satire

8/11/2019 Poetics Volume 13 Issue 6 1984 [Doi 10.1016%2F0304-422x%2884%2990018-4] Koenraad Kuiper -- The Nature of

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Poetics 13 (1984) 459-473

North-Holland

459

THE NATURE OF SATIRE

KOENRAAD KUIPER *

This paper argues for a perceptual theory of satire. It shows that satire is neither a matter of form

nor of function but a matter of the way both these are perceived in particular contexts by

particular people. Three independent factors appear to be responsible for the perception of satire:

A perceived intent to alter the perceivers view of some state of affairs, a similarity of form of the

satire with some other artifact, and the perceiver finding the satire humorous. This theory predicts

that a strong intentionalist theory of satire will be inadequate as will a reader response theory.

1 Prima facie evidence for a perceptual theory of satire

What is the nature of satire? Does it lie in the form of the object, in, say, the

language of a literary satire, or does it lie instead in the function of the object,

in its effect on, say, readers? I shall propose that the real essence of satire lies

in neither its form nor its function but rather in the way both these are

perceived.

I shall start on this central thesis by looking at two examples to see if a

primafacie case can be made for supposing that the real essence of satire is to

be found in neither its form nor its function.

I perceive the presentation in fig. 1 to be a satire. Why is this? I have seen a

number of advertisements for Marlboro cigarettes. Such advertisements depict

a rugged scene with a rider or riders on horseback. Such advertisements are

usually colour pictures.

I note that there are a number of similarities between fig. 1 and conven-

tional Marlboro advertisements: The outdoor scene, the horse, the slogan and

the Surgeon Generals warning. There are also differences: The unruggedness

of the scene, the presence of the grave, the absence of a rider, and the fact that

the picture is in black and white. These particular differences suggest to me a

possible explanation. The riderless horse in the context of a graveyard and the

Surgeon Generals warning indicate to me that smoking can kill the riders of

I am grateful to the following for helpful and constructive criticisms of an earlier version of this

paper: Robin Bond, Douglas Haggo, Philip Manger, David Novitz and Margaret Rose.

Authors address: K. Kuiper, Department of English Language and Literature, University of

Canterbury, Chistchurch, New Zealand.

0304422X/84/ 3.00 0 1984, Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. (North-Holland)


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K. Kui per / The natur e of satir e

horses in Marlboro advertisements thus attempting to discourage me from

smoking. Another example: A passage in the third movement of Bartoks

Concerto for Orchestra can be perceived as satirical because of the similarities it

has to early Shostakovich. The similarity is in the early theme. There are also

differences in the glissando passage on the brass and the subsequent high

pitched twittering, and dissonant repetition of the theme.

It is clear from this at present very superficial analysis of an example that

there is a prima facie case for regarding satire as perceptual. I now go in search

of a theory to accommodate that suggestion.

2.

A theory of satire

What kind of a theory are we in search of in seeking a theory of satire? It

should for preference be a scientific theory, that is, one which can be

disconfirmed by theory comparison and testing. Literary theories are normally

not formulated so that this is possible. This one is. That is not to say that it is

fully precise. There are terms which have been kept vague but not without

reason. The term simi l ar i ty of form is vague in that such a similarity may take

many different forms. Similarity of form in the case of literary artifacts is

different from musical similarity. What is humorous is in need of clarification.


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K. Kui per / The natur e ofsatire

461

However, terms such as form similari ty hutnour although primitive terms in

this theory can themselves be subject to empirical investigation in theories

dealing with their particular domains. They are thus not out of place in a

scientific theory.

A further point should be noted. The theory of satire to be presented here is

culture-specific. Thus the universe within which the theory makes predictions is

that of modem Western societies. It can, therefore, only be corroborated or

falsified by artifacts from such societies.

Lastly the theory is not an investigation into the meaning of the word satire

or the conditions under which the word can be correctly used. The theory

makes predictions about classes of objects and acts. Most of these may be

called satires. But that is not what makes them satires, nor is it the case that

some acts or objects which are not called satires, may not in fact be satires.

What is being examined is a natural class within a culture, i.e. it is being

presupposed that such natural classes exist.

How should an attempt at a perceptual theory of satire proceed? Clearly it

should delimit the set of all and only those objects or acts which are satires and

it should also lay the groundwork for a psychological theory of satire which

would be empirically falsifiable. Let us invent as part of the theory therefore a

hypothetical perceiver P who exists in a culture where there are satires. Let us

suppose for the sake of illustration that this is a modem ivestern European

culture since we know that there are satires in such a culture.

P

has many

kinds of perceptions. Some of these are cross-cultural such as the perception of

colour and three dimensionality in the visual field and the perception of voiced

and voiceless sounds in the auditory field. Other perceptions are culture-specific

such as the perception of kinship. For the moment I wish to claim only that the

perception of satire is acculturated perception though it would not be surpris-

ing to find that there were cross-cultural factors involved [l]. The reason for

restricting the present theory to satire in modern Western cultures is that there

are clear cases here on which to test the theory. Since perceptions may be

either acculturated or universal, claiming that particular perceptions are accu-

lturated is a weaker claim than that they are universal but it is nevertheless not

an uninteresting claim.

What must

P

perceive to have a perception of satire? Clearly

P

must

perceive a cultural act or artifact, that is an artifact or act which has been

produced by humans. Let us call this artifact a and let us call its author or

treater C. But not every artifact qualifies as a satire. A dumpling or the Mona

Lisa

are not usually satires. What is needed are just those characteristics which

[l] This does not mean that a universal account is ruled out. It is possible that some aspects of

satire may generalise across cultures. For example, many cultures use exaggerated imitation for

ridicule. If this is perceived to be a possible act in all cultures then the theory here proposed will

have cross-cultural universal character.


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K. Kui per / The

narure of

salire

enable P to distinguish that particular a which is a satire from all other acts or

artifacts. What are these characteristics?

First a must be perceived to have an object, i.e. the object of the satire.

Such an object is a state of affairs. Let us call this state of affairs S [2]. Thus

some satires are directed at politicians, some at writers. Absolom and Achit ophel

is an example of the former and the Dunciad of the latter. But the relationship

of a satire to its object is a particular one. It is that P must think on perceiving

u that its inferred treater C is attempting to change

Ps

view of S to a

negative one. This requires some further explanation. C is a perceptual reality

described in some detail in Kuiper and Small (to appear). Here is how (s)he

may be viewed. The existence of C is inferred from a by P. P is justified in

such an inference as soon as P recognises that a is an artifact. Clearly P can

deduce a number of attributes of C. C created a. C intended a to change

Ps view of S. In particular cases P might infer that C hates royalty, Grubb

Street hacks, and any other objects of satire. C may share these inferred

attributes with C or (s)he may not. What is necessary for the theory of satire is

merely that P can infer C and various attributes of C. Thus a is the means

whereby C appears to P to be attempting to change Ps views of S.

The subset of a thus circumscribed is still too large. It includes acts which

definitely are not satires. It includes, for example, sermons. What is needed are

further characteristics of satire which are also definitive. Let us say that satires

always have a relationship with some other act or artifact a with which (I has

similarities and let us call a the antecedent of a. Thus P must perceive a

similarity of form between the satire and some other act or artifact to perceive

that it is satire. This claim predicts that all satires have formal antecedents,

thus that the Dunciad could not be a satire without classical epic. But this

additional characteristic of satires still leaves too large a set since this set still

includes sermons. So one more characteristic will be suggested and that is that

P

perceives that u is humorous. This excludes sermons and provides the three

major characteristics of satire.

To place this rather discursive treatment on a more rigorous footing, let us

suppose that the three major characteristics of satire so far proposed are

actually the necessary and sufficient conditions for an act or artifact to be a

satire. This can be formalised using a logical formulation as follows. For an act

a to have the character of satire it must meet the following necessary and

sufficient conditions for some perceiver P:

[2] No

account is taken here of constraints on the set of states of affairs which will be regarded as

fit objects of satire. In particular cultures certain states of affairs are routinely regarded as fit

objects for satire while others are not. In our culture those who are dying are not regarded as fit

objects for satire. Note that this is in the first instance a pragmatic factor having to do with the

beliefs of the community in which the satire takes place. It may also, in some instances. be more

than that. It may be that the dying are unfit objects for satire in any culture.


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K. Kuiper / The natur e ofsatire 463

(1) a is satirical if P thinks on perceiving a that the author (s)he infers to

have created a (C) intends Ps perception of a to change Ps vi ew of

some state of affairs S to a negative one;

(2)

P

thinks on perceiving a that C intended

P

to see a similarity of form

between (I and some other set of acts or artifacts Q, the antecedent(s) of a,

and

(3) P thinks on perceiving a that C intended the similarity of form between a

and a to be humorous.

The theory so far can be termed the weak theory because an important

distinction has been made tacitly between the intentions of C and those of C.

We have said nothing about the intentions of C and will postpone doing so

until we have more fully explored the intentions of C. Condition 1, to

recapitulate, is weakly intentionalist in that P must perceive an intent to

change

Ps view

of some state of affairs. Now the existence of C and the

perception of the intentions of C are not a necessary consequence of the

perception by P that a can change Ps view of S. The P who speaks in Rilkes

Ar cii ischer Torso Apol los

finds that the torso of the sculpture is itself enough to

suggest not only an altered view of life but one which demands a change in the

perceivers own life. Thus the weak intentionalist view of condition 1 suggests

that intentionalist conditions are independent.

Condition 2 is also weakly intentionalist; nor is the intention of C here a

necessary consequence of the perception of similarity of form. For example,

one can perceive that a person walks with a similar limp to someone else

without it necessarily being the case that the similarity is intentional.

Condition 3 is similarly weakly intentionalist and the intent of C is not a

necessary consequence of P finding a humorous. Returning momentarily

again to sermons, some people may find a sermon very funny without the

preacher intending it to be funny. Thus we can factor out the weak intentiona-

list condition as an independent factor.

An act of artifact a is a satire if a perceiver P thinks on perceiving a that

the creator C whom P infers to have created a intended:

(1) that Ps perception of a should change Ps vi ew of some state of affairs

S; and

(2) that there should be a similarity of form between u and some antece-

dent set of acts or artifacts a, and

(3) that the similarity between a and a should be humorous.

The prediction of this theory is, then, that no act or artifact is a satire unless

these three conditions are all met in at least a weakly intentionalist form.


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K. Kui per / The natur e o

satire

3 Strong intentionalist conditions

Having shown that the weak theory at least delimits a set of acts and artifacts

which includes satires, it is now necessary to show that it includes nothing

other than satires. To demonstrate this the theory will be strengthened by

further conditions which might be proposed for satires, strong intentionalist

conditions.

The first intentionalist condition to be examined can be phrased as follows:

Condition 1A

and

The actual creator of a, C, did actually intend a to change s view of S.

What are the empirical consequences of introducing condition lA? The major

consequence is that no could correctly perceive u to be a satire unless was

correct in his intuitions about .the real intentions of C. Such a consequence is a

very substantial one. It predicts that an object with the following characteris-

tics cannot be a satire: A deceased author C of whom nothing whatever is

known has produced a. sees a parallel between a and some a, finds a

funny and thinks that the inferred author of u is trying to change s views

about S. Let us take an example. A manuscript by an unknown author is

discovered. Critics believe from linguistic evidence that the piece was written in

the early nineteenth century. The piece appears to be similar to early Romantic

poetry and has similar themes. However certain stylistic infelicities suggest that

it may be a satire of Romantic poets. The perception of the satirical nature of

the poem is entirely in the absence of knowledge of the actual authors

intentions. In the absence of further knowledge, there is nothing at all defective

in such perceptions and in considering the poem to be a satire [3].

Since a strong intentionalist version of condition 1 appears unwarranted it is

worth looking at condition 2. A strong intentionalist version of condition 2

might read as follows.

Condition 2A

and

C did actually intend there to be a similarity of form between u and a.

It seems that here too, does not need to know the actual intentions of C

since we have clear cases where critics note weakly intentionalist formal

[3] Of course it may be objected that in such a situation P cannot be certain that a is a satire. The

rebuttal is that P cannot be certain that a is a satire even if P were certain that C intended it to

be a satire since a may be a complete failure as a satire. Thus strong intentionalist conditions do

not increase the certainty that a will be a satire.


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K. Kui per / The natur e of satire

465

parallels with no chance of corroborative evidence. Chaucer criticism, for

example, often attributes similarities of form to various of the Canterbury

Tales

and assorted antecedents such as the

Decameron.

Now for condition 3. It too has a strongly intentionalist version.

Condition 3A

and

C did actually intend that the similarity of form between a and a should

have a humorous effect.

This condition is again too strong. Take the examples of Shakespeare and

Chaucer. Readers and audiences seem perfectly content to find humour in

their work without recource to the writers actual intentions and in the poem

Chard Whi t fow quoted later, attributing intent to C is quite sufficient for the

poem to qualify as a satiric parody.

If the strong intentionalist versions of each condition appear unwarranted

then we are left with the weak theory in the form presented earlier. But this is

not without a few problems. First it must be said that none of what has been

said so far in opposition to strong intentionalist conditions implies that these

conditions are not met in many cases.

For example, stand-up comedians

frequently do intend to do the things which their audiences think they intend.

What the argument so far shows is that these conditions are not necessary ones

since there are situations where a satire need not require strong intentionalist

conditions. Furthermore it may be that the strong conditions are strictly

speaking irrelevant. So long as

P

perceives that C had an intent to change

Ps

view of S the actual intentions of C appear to be irrelevant. However, the

actual intentions of C do have a part to play as will be seen in the discussion of

the pragmatics of satire.

Second there is a problematic consequence of abandoning strong in-

tentionalism. It is, that where we take actual authors into account we can be

sure of .one important fact and that is, that the antecedent is chronologically

prior to the production of a. And it seems, on the face of it, that that should be

the case. This follows from a strong intentionalist theory since C can only

intend to create similarities of form between a and a if (s)he knows of the

existence of u before commencing ~1. f it were not so then it might be possible

for some

P

to suppose that a particular play by Shakespeare was a satiric

parody of a play by Tennyson. Such a perception is certainly odd but not

impossible and not bizarre. Let us take a Victorian P who is very familiar with

the writing of Tennyson but otherwise uneducated. This P comes upon a play

by Shakespeare but finds its sentiments too direct and offensively so, notes the

parallels in form between the beloved plays of Tennyson and this new play and

finds some of the aspects of the new play too preposterous, ludicrously so in

fact. This hypothetical reader could regard the Shakespeare play as a satiric


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K. Kurper / The nmure of same

parody of Tennyson. To prevent such a possibility would require a further

condition.

Condition 4

and

The actual creation of u antedates the actual creation of u.

It seems, this additional condition should be rejected because if seems that the

Victorian person mentioned above has perceived a to be a satire in a manner

no different from that of any other perception of satire and that, as we shall

argue later, is sufficient to make a a satire. What can be said about condition 4

is that it has a pragmatic effect. namely that if knows that a does not

antedate a then will not regard a as a satire, but this follows from the weak

theory as well as the strong, for C could not have intended a to be a similar to

a if (s)he could not have known a existed before a was completed. That is an

argument often used about antecedents in cases where knowledge of actual

authors is meagre.

4. Is

s tire m tter of form

It is now necessary to defend the infant theory from a number of possible

attacks. The first possible line of attack is that although perception plays a

part, it is not a crucial part in understanding the real nature of satire. This is

because satire, like other artifacts which are perceived, has certain physical

characteristics which trigger the crucial perceptions and it is actually these

physical features, features of form, which constitute the essential nature of

satire.

What evidence is there that the perception of satire is not like the perception

of other physical objects such as say cats or cups? Ko one would seek to define

a cat by saying that the necessary and sufficient conditions needed for an

object to be a cat are just that someone perceives it to be a cat. The reason for

this is that cats do have physical attributes which make them cats. They have a

nominal essence to use the terminology of Harri and Madden (1975) [4].

Underlying their nominal essence is the real essence. in the case of cats, their

genetic makeup which we believe to be responsible for their unique physical

characteristics. It is true that these physical characteristics trigger the percep-

tion that cats are cats. But the essence of being a cat is not just being perceived

to be one. The case of cups is slightly more complex since cups must be

[4] HarrC and Madden have adapted this terminology from Locke who definss these terms slightly

differently. I, however. follow Harre and Madden.


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K. Ku iper / The nat ure of sati re 467

perceived to be so in the presence of mugs, plates, saucers and other items of

crockery. It is not clear that mugs have a nominal which essence is distinct

from that of cups and their topology shows that a cup and a mug are both just

plates with their edges and sides changed in particular ways. Labov (1978) has

shown that in spite of the basic similarities of cups and mugs as physical

objects, it is certain particular changes in the shape of the object which will

trigger perceptual shifts. Such shifts are stochastic in that different people will

stop calling something a cup and call it a mug instead over slightly different

perceptual thresholds but over a big enough threshold there will be near

unanimity on whether a particular item is a cup or a mug.

The claim that I have so far made is that satire is not cat-like. I have said

that there is nothing universal in the nature of the physical object itself that

makes it satire. Is it then cup-like?

It is cup-like in that perception of satire must be local. i.e. dependent on

context, just as the perception of cups as different from mugs depends on the

presence of mugs. But what is perceived as satire is only so perceived in

particular contexts and by particular people predisposed by experiences other

than their experience of the particular satire, to see it as satire. Thus the real

nature of satire lies in the perceiver. In this way satire is un-cuplike. Labov

shows that it is in the actual physical shape of the cup that its real nature lies.

Thus cups are seen as like one another in being cups on account of their

physical similarity. It foilows that satires cannot be seen as like one another in

being satires on account of their physical similarity. We have already shown

this by comparing the advertisement and the extract from Bartoks Concerro for

Orchestra. We have said that these are both alike in being satires. Yet clearly

they share no physical characteristics at all. What they share is the ability to

trigger certain uniform perceptions. It is thus not in their natures that they

should do so, but in the nature of the perceiver that they should do so. Let us

look briefly at a further consequence of regarding satire as purely perceptual.

If it is; then we would expect it to have different perceptual characteristics

from the perception of cats and cups. Whereas cats and cups are perceived as

category shifts with small perceptual thresholds, the perception of satire is

radically non-uniform for populations of perceivers, often only small propor-

tions of perceivers find a particular object a satire (Carl 1968. Gruner & Lamp-

ton 1972). Their perception is also affected by all sorts of external factors such

as their previous experience and their socio-economic backgrounds (Wilson

1979 : 201). This is not the case with cats and cups.

5. Is satire a matter of function?

A second line of attack on the weak perceptual theory comes from the

possibility that we should look beyond the perception to the effect of the


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K. Kui per / The narure of satir e

perception on the perceiver. This would be to suppose that the real nature of

satire lay in its function.

To explore the possibility that satire is a matter of function a further

element would be required in the theory. This would be an additional condi-

tion, say condition 5.

Condition 5

and

P actually changes his view of S on perceiving a.

Condition 5 states that a satire can only properly be a satire if it is effective,

and by effective I mean, that it makes a change in someones views. It is clear

that condition 5 is too strong since it would exclude as satires many things

which people feel to be satires. I, for example, would not change my view of

smoking on seeing fig. 1, since I already hold the view that smoking can kill

people who ride horses in Marlboro advertisements and elsewhere. Notwiths-

tanding that, I perceive fig. 1 to be satirical. In fact, people seem more prone to

perceive something to be a satire if they already hold views which they feel the

inferred author of the satire is trying to get them to adopt.

The theory thus predicts that satire cannot be defined by its function since

condition 5 is too strong.

If therefore satire is neither a matter of form nor of function then the

perceptual theory is strengthened by having resisted arguments from at least

two possible areas of counter-evidence.

6. Some predictions of a weak perceptual theory of satire

6.1. Binarity

The way the conditions of the theory are phrased they are clearly of a binary

nature. Thus P either does or does not perceive condition 1, 2 or 3. It is

necessary to support the theory that the perception of satire is not an analogue

phenomenon, i.e. that something is a satire to a particular degree. It should

first be said that much perception is of a binary nature. Take for example the

perception of phonological distinctions in natural languages. Native speakers

of English perceive a particular sound to be either voiced or voiceless although

the actual phonetic facts show that voicing can be matter of degree. The

situation is more serious with satire since it is clear that people do perceive

both that something is humorous and if it is, that it is variously humorous by

degrees. What the weak theory proposes is that for a satire to be such, only the

perception that a is humorous is required, not the perception that a is very

funny rather than just mildly funny. It is even the case that the weak theory


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K. Kui per / The natur e of

sarire

469

does not propose that P finds a humorous himself, but only perceives that it

is. Thus some perceivers may realise that a particular a is funny for others but

not for themselves. That would be sufficient to meet condition 3. The theory,

therefore, claims that satire is a categorical perception; something either is or is

not a satire. Thus binary conditions are necessary. If any one condition were

not binary, categorical perception could not be predicted.

If satire does have the characteristic of binary perceptual features it is

possible that these features are either completely independent, that is that they

fully cross-classify, or else that they contain some redundancy and do not fully

cross-classify. It has already been seen earlier that the weak intentionalist

condition is common to all three of the major conditions and is not a necessary

constituent of any of them. Let us now look at the three other conditions. Let

us suppose that each condition is a binary feature of satire, that is that

P

either

does or does not perceive that that condition holds.

Three binary features generate eight possible classes. If the features are

correct and non-redundant then there should be eight distinct classes of

entities defined by these three features. I now show that there are eight classes

by listing each feature matrix with an example:

[+1,+2,+ 31

[-1,+2,+ 31

[-1,+ 2,- 31

[+1,+2,-3)

[+l,- 2,+ 31

[-l,- 2,+ 31

[+l,-- 2,- 31

[-l,-2,-31

The class of satires as already defined.

The class of parodies which are not also satires.

The class of imitations of form (which are not parodies), e.g.

an exercise for young composers producing a fugue in the

style of Bach.

The class of unhumorous didactic imitations, e.g. sermons.

The class of non-imitative humorous and didactic acts, e.g.

some teachers admonitions to students.

The class of non-imitative jokes.

The class of unfunny and unimitative instructions, e.g. the

Road Code read for the first time.

The universe of all other acts.

These cases predicted by the theory support the theory and each element of it.

It is clear that the conditions of the theory are non-redundant and the

classification of acts which they predict in fact occurs.

Now note further that a particular case of u can be perceived as any one of

these eight classes of acts if P does not find that all three conditions are met.

So what is one perceivers satire may be another perceivers joke or a further

perceivers parody. A perceptual theory predicts this. And it would appear to

be borne out. The mystification of some students when initially confronted

with Swifts Tal e of a Tub shows that one mans satire can even belong for

another to the last class we have just looked at.


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K. Kuiper / The nature ofsatire

6.2. Parody

The theory of satire so far proposed also predicts that there exist two different

kinds of parody. The most general definition one might give of parody is one

where parody meets conditions two and three, i.e. there is a formal resemb-

lance between the parody and some antecedent and it is funny. This kind of

parody can be seen when children imitate and exaggerate the walk of an adult

and other children laugh. Here no attempt is perceived to meet condition 1.

Then there is the same kind of parody as above but with the additional

condition that condition 1 is met in a particular way. That is that Ps view of

the antecedent is the object of the parody. Such a parody is, therefore, a

particular kind of satire, a satire which has as its object the character of a

which is selected by

a.

For such parodies the following condition is met.

Condition 6

and

S is a.

An example of such a satire would be the following poem.

Chard Whit low

Mr. Eliots Sunday evening postscript)

As we get older we do not get any younger.

Seasons return, and today I am fifty-five,

And this time last year I was fifty-four,

And this time next year I shall be sixty-two.

And I cannot say I should like (to speak for myself)

To see my time over again - if you can call it time:

Fidgeting uneasily under a draughty stair,

Or counting sleepless nights in the crowded tube.

There are certain precautions - though none of them very reliable -

Against the blast from bombs and the flying splinter,

But not against the blast from heaven, venfo dei venti,

The wind within a wind unable to speak for wind;

And the frigid burnings of purgatory will not be touched

By any emollient.

I think you will find this put,

Better than I could ever hope to express it,

In the words of Kharma: It is, we believe,

Idle to hope that the simple stirrup-pump

Will extinguish hell.


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K. Kui per / The natur e of satir e 47

Oh, listeners,

And you especially who have turned off the wireless,

And sit in Stoke or Basingstoke listening appreciatively to the silence,

(Which is also the silence of hell) pray, not for your skins, but your souls.

And pray for me also under the draughty stair.

As we get older we do not get any younger.

And pray for Kharma under the holy mountain.

HENRY REED

For those readers familiar with the poetry of T.S. Eliot the parallels of form

will be obvious. Some of them are humorous, at least for this P and as a

consequence I think Reed, the poet I perceive in the poem, seems to me to be

suggesting that Eliots work is pretentious, and given how easy it seems to be to

caricature it, also not technically very good. Thus condition 1 is met and its

object is the antecedent of Reeds poem, namely the poems of T.S. Eliot. Note

again that I do not need to agree with what I take C to be suggesting for the

poem to be a satire.

6.3.

Uncertainty

A further prediction of the theory of satire is that it should be possible to be

uncertain whether a particular instance of

a

is a satire or not. This follows

from the fact that P may not be certain whether any of the three conditions

hold or not. And it is the case that people can be uncertain as to whether C is

trying to change their view of S, whether there are similarities of form between

a and a or whether a is humorous or not. This possibility for uncertainty

does not undermine the assertion that perception of satire is categorical. In fact

it supports such an assertion since we are likely to be uncertain in areas where

categorical perception obtains and pragmatic knowledge in necessary.

7. The pragmatics of the perception of satire

The theory of satire I have developed predicts that context will play a vital role

in triggering the perception that an object or act is a satire. This is because all

three conditions are affected by pragmatic factors.

Condition 2 requires that P be familiar with a and recognise a resemblance

of form between a and a. For example the Dunciad is not a recognisable epic

unless one is familiar with epics. The Beatles Back i n t he USSR is not a

recognisable imitation of the music of the Beach Boys unless one is familiar

with Beach Boys music. Much of this pragmatic context must be culture-specific

as are the last two examples. Even given this pragmatic context, however, the


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472 K. Ku i per / The naure of sari re

theory predicts that it is possible for certain people not to perceive similarity.

This prediction is frequently borne out in university classes on literary topics.

Many students cannot see sonnet form when, as it seems to their tutor, it is

staring them in the face. Condition 3 requires that P finds a funny. This too is

dependent on pragmatic factors. Some speakers do not find jokes about

women, homosexuals or the Queen funny. Others do. It depends on their

experience and how sensitised they are to finding such topics fit for humour

(Cooper and Jahoda 1947). Thus satire may fail to be perceived because

P

cannot see the humour. Again this tends to be culture-specific as the mystifica-

tion of foreigners by the humour of the people for whom they are foreigners

often testifies. Condition 1 is also affected by pragmatic factors. Some people

are prone to see particular states of affairs as fit objects for a change of mind.

Socialists see the life of the rich as a good topic for satire. The rich may not.

Bigots often fail to see the object of a satire addressed at bigotry. It follows

from what we have said that there must be an optimal pragmatics for any

particular a to be perceived as satire, i.e. P is more prone to perceive a as

satire under pragmatic conditions which are optimal for it than under other

conditions. Optimal conditions will vary from one P to another. Such condi-

tions will always be local to a greater or lesser extent. i.e. they will be particular

to some a and will not necessarily carry over to another. Optimal local

conditions may involve conditions such as the following:

Co text conditions: to perceive a as a satire particular cases of a must be

known to P.

Literary historical context: to perceive a as a satire P may need to know that it

was common at a particular point in time for a to be satirised. He can be

told this without necessarily having to know any of the actual satires.

Socio cultural conditions:

to perceive the intent to satirise politician X,

P

may

need to be aware of Xs existence and some of As properties.

We can now look again at the strong conditions lA-3A and 4. Condition 1A

can be regarded as part of an optimal context in that P is more likely to

suppose that a is a satire if he knows its actual author intended it as one than

if he did not know that (Gruner 1966). Condition 4 is also of this kind. P is

more likely to regard a as a satire if he knows it antedates a and also, if he

knows that C intended a to be a parallel of u. Thus strong intentionalism can

be seen as part of the theory of pragmatics which follows from the central

theory of the perception of satire but which is not part of that theory. So it

might be unusual for P to suppose that a is a satire in the mistaken belief that

a antedates a. But it is not impossible that he should do so and the theoq

predicts that it is in the nature of satire that it should be possible (but

unlikely.)

Note that we have said nothing about how perceptions of satire are


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K. Kui per / The natur e of satir e

473

triggered. There is a considerable literature on this subject, none of which has a

bearing on the theory except that I affirm that triggers only operate in context

and thus are not sufficient to make an object a satire nor is the context

sufficient in itself. It is only in the perception of triggers in particular local

contexts that some but not all perceivers will perceive an object to be a satire,

i.e. that it will be a satire.

8 Conclusion

I have presented a deductive theory of satire which states that for an object or

act to be a satire it must be perceived in a particular way. This particular way

is a function of three independent binary conditions all of which must be met.

From this central thesis a number of empirical predictions have been derived

all of which appear to be supported.

In the process, and without mention, it has been shown that a structuralist

account of satire is bound to fail as is a reader response theory narrowly

conceived. It has also been shown that a strong view of intentionalism cannot

be sustained in the case of satire. Instead I have opened up the possibility of a

psychology of literary perception for which there seems to be a need since the

explanation of a major literary genre appears to depend on it.

References

Carl. L.M. 1968. Editorial cartoons fail to reach many readers. Journalism Quarterly 45: 533-535.

Cooper, E. and M. Jahoda. 1947. The evasion of propaganda: How prejudiced people respond to

anti-prejudice propaganda. Journal of Psychology 23: 15-25.

Gruner, C.R. 1966. A further experimental study of satire as persuasion. Speech Monographs 33:

184-185.

Gruner, C.R. and W.E. Lampton. 1972. Effects of including humorous material in a persuasive

sermon. South Speech Communication Journal 38: 188-196.

Harre. R. and E.H. Madden. 1975. Causal powers. Oxford: Blackwell.

Kuiper, K. and V.A. Small. Forthcoming. Constraints on fictions. Poetics Today.

Labov, W. 1978. Denotational structure. In: D. Farkas et al., eds., Papers from the parasession

on the lexicon. Chicago, IL: Chicago Linguistic Society.

Wilson. C.P. 1979. Jokes. London: Academic Press.

Documents

Poetics Volume 13 Issue 6 1984 [Doi 10.1016%2F0304-422x%2884%2990018-4] Koenraad Kuiper -- The Nature of Satire