Upload
others
View
2
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
Plug & PlayFacilitating grid connection of low emissions technologies
CONSULTATION SUMMARY PAPER FEBRUARY 2017
i
ClimateWorksAustralialSeedAdvisoryFebruary2017
PlugandPlay ExecutiveSummary
Harmonisedrequirementsforconnectionstoallelectricitydistributionnetworksareakeypartofensuringthattheinnovativetechnologiesandbusinessmodelsrequiredtomeetclimatetargetsanddriveenergyproductivitycancontributetotheirfullpotentialinprovidingourenergyneedsinthefuture.
Harmonisedrequirementsshouldleadtolesscostlyconnectionrequirements,moreresponsivetothedevelopmentofnewtechnologies.Eliminatingunnecessarycoststoconsumersandthewidereconomyshouldincreaseconsumeruptakeofnewtechnologies.Thisincludesnewtechnologiesthatcanreducegreenhousegasemissionssuchasdistributedelectricitygeneration,storage,demandmanagementequipmentandelectricvehiclecharginginfrastructure.Removingunnecessarycostsfromgridconnectionscancreateavirtuouscircle–supportingAustraliainmeetingourpolicyobjectivesinenergyproductivityandemissionsreduction.Removingunnecessarytechnicalrequirementsfromgridconnectionscanalsosupportproductdevelopmentandtheuptakeofinnovation,aswemovefromsmallerlocaltolargernationalmarketsforequipmentandtechnology.
ForAustraliatoplayitsfairshareintheglobaleffortagainstclimatechangewemustensurethattheinnovativetechnologiesandbusinessmodelsrequiredtomeetclimatetargetsanddriveenergyproductivitycanreadilyparticipateintheenergymarket.
TheobjectiveofthePlugandPlayprojectistoidentifyanddrivetheimplementationofinstitutionalandpolicysolutionstomakegridconnectionsforexistingandemergingtechnologiesasstraightforwardandcosteffectiveaspossibleforcustomersandproponents,whilesafeguardingelectricitysupply.
Thispaperoutlinesthefindingsfromthefirststageoftheprojectwherewehavelookedatthecurrentconnectionrequirementsandprocessesandthebarriersandunnecessarycoststheyimposeontheconnectionoflowemissiontechnologiestotheelectricitynetwork.Thepaperisinformedbydesktopresearchandinitialconsultationswithstakeholdersfromthepropertysector,energyserviceproviders,manufacturersandsuppliersofequipment,andfundersofrenewableenergyprojects.ItbuildsonpreviousworkbyClimateWorksAustraliaandSeedAdvisoryinthearea.Wewillbeseekingfurtherinputfromstakeholdersinthesecondstageoftheprojectproposedtofinishinmid-2017.
Duringthesecondstageoftheproject,wewillundertakefurtherconsultationtoidentifyandtesttheproposedsolutionswithkeystakeholdersandrefinetheseintoafinalreportinmid-2017,settingoutasolutionsroadmap.Itwillidentifythekeyactorsandtheirrolesinenactingthesolution,aswellasdocumentinternationalexamplesofsolutionstotheidentifiedbarriers.Subsequentphaseswillfocusonimplementationtheagreedsolutions.
ii
Aboutus
ClimateWorksAustraliaClimateWorksAustraliaisaleadingindependentorganisationactingasabridgebetweenresearchandactiontoidentify,modelandenableend-to-endsolutionstoclimatechange.
Sinceourlaunchin2009,ClimateWorkshasmadesignificantprogressandearnedareputationasagenuineandimpartialadvisertokeydecisionmakersfromallsidesofpoliticsandbusiness.Ourcollaborativeapproachtosolutionsthatwilldeliverthegreatestimpactencompassesathoroughunderstandingoftheconstraintsofgovernmentsandthepracticalneedsofbusiness.
Wedothisbylookingforinnovativeopportunitiestoreducegreenhousegasemissions,analysingtheirpotential,resolvingobstaclesandhelpingtofacilitateconditionsforourtransitiontoaprosperous,netzeroemissionsfutureby2050.
ClimateWorkswasco-foundedbyTheMyerFoundationandMonashUniversityandworkswithintheMonashSustainableDevelopmentInstitute.
SeedAdvisorySeedAdvisoryisacommercialadvisoryfirmspecialisingintheenergysector,withexpertiseinstrategy,riskmanagement,policydevelopmentandcommercialmanagement.
Sinceourlaunchin2008wehaveadvisedenergymarketparticipants–newandprospective–onthecommercialandregulatoryimplicationsoftheirpotentialinvestmentsinconventionalandrenewabletechnologies.Wehavealsoadvisednationalandstategovernmentsontheinteractionoftheirenergy-relatedpoliciesandotherareasofgovernmentpolicy,suchastherelationshipbetweensmartmeteringandAustralianPrivacylaw,ortheimpactonelectricvehicleuptakeoflocalregulationanddistributionbusinesspracticesaffectingresidentialandcommercialconnectionavailabilityandcost.
AcknowledgmentofSupport
ClimateWorksAustraliaandSeedAdvisorywouldliketothankthoseexpertswhohaveprovidedinputtotheconsultationsundertakenforthisproject.
WewouldalsoliketothanktheAustralianEnergyCouncil(AEC)foritsfinancialsupportofthisproject,anditsmembersfortheirparticipationintheconsultationsundertaken.ForafulllistofthoseconsultedpleaseseeAppendix2.
iii
Contents
1.Abouttheproject...........................................................................................1
2.Whyfocusonconnectionrequirements?......................................................2
2.1Otherbarriers...............................................................................................3
3.Theelectricitysystemischanging..................................................................4
3.1Customersarebecomingactiveparticipantsinthesystem.........................4
3.2Thedistributors’challenge...........................................................................5
3.3Meetingourenergyproductivityandemissionsreductionobjectives........5
4.Currentconnectionrequirements..................................................................7
4.1WhathappensduringaConnectionApplication?........................................8
5.Impactofthecurrentconnectionprocess...................................................11
5.1Coststobusinessandconsumers...............................................................11
5.2Impactonuptake.......................................................................................12
5.3Inefficiencieswheninstallinginmultiplelocations....................................12
5.4Variationsinrequirementsreducescompetitioninequipmentmarkets..13
5.5Impactoninnovationandtechnicalchange..............................................14
5.6Riskofunfairmarketadvantage................................................................14
6.Characteristicsofpreferredsolutions..........................................................15
6.1Consistentnationalstandard:rareexceptions..........................................15
6.2Minimumperformancestandards,setindependently..............................16
6.3Responsivenesstotechnologicalchange...................................................17
6.4Competitiveneutrality...............................................................................18
7.Whatnext?...................................................................................................19
8.References....................................................................................................20
Appendix1:Summaryofenergymarketreformprocesses.............................20
Appendix2:Stakeholderengagement.............................................................22
1
1. Abouttheproject ClimateWorksAustraliaandSeedAdvisorycommencedthePlugandPlayprojectinSeptember2016.Theoverallobjectiveoftheprojectistoidentifyinstitutionalandpolicysolutionswhichwouldmakeconnectiontothegridforexistingandemergingnewtechnologiesasstraightforwardandcosteffectiveaspossible,whilesafeguardingtheperformanceofthegrid.
Theprojectfocuseson:
• identifyingandaddressingthesourceofbarrierstoinstallationandunnecessarycosts
• describingthewiderimpactsofcurrentrequirementsandprocessesforconnectiontothegridonuptakeandenergyproductivity
• consideringhowstandardsandrequirementsintheelectricityindustryareset,interpretedandapplied
• proposingsolutionstocreategridconnectionprocessesthatwillensurethatnetworkedelectricityissecure,affordableandlowemission
Thisprojectwillundertakeabroadanalysisoftheimpactsonthemarketofthecurrentsituationforconnectionsofembeddedgenerationandstorage,onuptakeofthesetechnologiesandoncapacitytomeetourenergyproductivityandemissionsreductionobjectives.
Thisprojectwillnotlookatspecifictechnicalrequirementsoftheelectricitydistributionnetworkservicesproviders(distributors).Issuesaboutthesetechnicalrequirementsarewell-documented.DistributorshavebeenobligedtopublishtheirownrequirementssinceOctober2014,andourpreviouswork,andthatofothers,hasanalysedthedifferences.Ourpreviousworkfound'evenwithinjurisdictions,distributorstakemateriallydifferentapproachesto…connectingembeddedgenerationtotheirnetwork’.(ClimateWorksAustralia(CWA),PropertyCouncilofAustralia(PCA)andSeedAdvisory2015).Similarly,Energeia’sworkfortheCleanEnergyCouncil(CEC)foundthat‘Technicalrequirementsareinconsistentacrossnetworks’(CEC2016).
ThePlugandPlayprojectinsteadfocusesonthecoststhatcurrentdifferingrequirementsimposeonconnectionproponentsandthewidereconomy,andonalternativemodelsthatcouldreducethesecostswhilemaintainingthesafetyandperformanceofthenetworks.
Ourworktodatehasconfirmedourinitialthinkingthatvariationinrequirementsandprocessesbetweendifferentdistributorsisactingasabarriertotheadoptionofnewtechnologiesandimposingadditionalcosts.Thisdiscussionpaperexplainstheissuesarisingfromthecurrentconnectionrequirementsandprocessesandotherresultsarisingfromourinitialconsultations.
ClimateWorksAustraliaandSeedAdvisorywillbeseekingfurtherinputfromstakeholderstocollaborativelydevelopinstitutionalandpolicysolutions,beforeengagingwithdecisionmakerstoassistthosecollaboratingwithuscanadvocateforreform.
2
2. Whyfocusonconnectionrequirements? TheinitialfocusofthePlugandPlayprojectwillbeontheimpactsofconnectionrequirementsandprocesses;andtheirvariationacrossAustralia.Thefocusoftheprojectstemsfromanumberofissues:
•AmajortransformationinthestructureofAustralia’selectricitysectoristakingshape.Thistransformationisbasedoncustomers’interestinandabilitytogeneratetheirownrenewableenergyand,lookingforward,ontheabilityofcustomerstomanagetheirinteractionswiththegrid.Inthefuture,customersarelikelytocollectivelyprovidearangeofservicespreviouslyrestrictedtolargespecialisedgenerationunits.Newtechnologiesandservicesarebeingdevelopedatarapidratewithtrialsforinnovativetechnologiesunderway.
• Federalandstatepolicytoincreaserenewablegenerationanddecreaseemissionsacrosstheeconomyiscombiningwithrapidlydecreasingcostsoflowcarbontechnologies,andconsumers’desiretoachievegreaterenergyindependence,tofuelthistransformation.Suchpolicywillresultinfurthershiftsinthenumber(andtype)ofconnections.
• Australia’sfifteendistributorshavevariedconnectionrequirementsforrenewableenergygenerationandstoragetechnologies.Ourownwork(CWAetal2015),andworkfortheFutureProofinginAustralia’sElectricityDistributionIndustryProject(CEC2014)haveextensivelydocumentedtheextentofvariationintheseconnectionrequirementsandprocesses.
• Thevariationinrequirementscreatescomplexityandthusadditionalcostsforcustomers,projectproponentsanddistributors.Insomecasesitcanleadtotheabandonmentofotherwiseattractiveprojects.TherecentAll-EnergyConferenceidentifieddelaysinthecustomerdecisionmakingprocessandintheconnectionprocessassourcesofincreasedinstallationcosts.
• Thevariationinrequirementsmayhaveaparticularimpactonthecommercialsector.Thereisahighlevelofambitionwithinthesectortorefurbishexistinginstallationsand/orinstalldistributedrenewablegeneration,asthishasbecomemorefinanciallyattractive.Installationatscaleispotentiallymorecost-effectivethansmall-scaleinstallations.However,stakeholdershaveidentifieddifficultiesduetovaryingconnectionrequirementsandprocesses.DistributorsacrosstheNationalElectricityMarketacceptsmallinverterconnectedsystemsprovidedtheinvertercomplieswithAS4777;nosimilarharmonisedrequirementsexistformid-sizesystemsbelow30MW.
• Developmentsinbehindthemeterapplicationscompetewithservicescurrentlyorpotentiallyprovidedbydistributorsand/orgenerators.Realisingthefullpotentialofnewtechnologieswillrequireashiftfromsmall,localnetworkmarketstoanationalmarket:platformeconomiesarebestrealisedatscale.Newtechnologiesandservicescanshiftwhobenefitsfromthediversityofcustomerbehaviour–thecustomer,thedistributororthemarket.Currentconnectionprocesseswhichrequireindividualdistributorstomanagethesafetyandperformanceoftheirnetworksmaybeasourceofpotentialcompetitivedisadvantagetonewentrantsandcustomers–evenundertherecentlyintroducedring-fencingguideline1.
• Finally,stakeholderfeedbacksuggeststousthatourelectricitymarketscurrentlylacksupportforinnovationintechnologiesandservicesforbothnewmarketentrantsandexistingmarketparticipants.
1.TheAustralianElectricityRegulator(AER)hasintroducedthering-fencingguidelinetoensurefunctionalseparationoftheprovisionofdirectcontrolservicesbydistributorsfromtheirprovisionofotherservicesandtopromotecompetitionintheprovisionofelectricityservices.
3
Australia’svariableconnectionrequirementsraisepublicpolicyquestionsaboutthecostsimposedonallnetworkconnections;thecostsofreducingcompetitionintheequipmentmarketbylimitingavailablemarkets;and,therelationshipbetweenthedistributor’sdecisioninadoptingitsownrequirementsandthewiderimplicationsforcompetitionbetweendistributorsanddistributedenergyproviders.Asitcurrentlystandsthere’snooversightoftheappropriatenessofdistributors’requirements.Thereisnomechanismtocheckwhethertherequirementsstrikethecorrectbalancebetweenreducingrisksandthecoststheyimposeonconnectionsandthecommunityasawhole.
Harmonisingconnectionrequirementsandaddressingthewayinwhichthoserequirementsaredevelopedwillmakethetransformationofourenergysystemeasier,cheaperandmoreequitable.Itcouldallowconnectionrequirementstobemoreresponsivetotherateoftechnicalchange.
2.1OtherbarriersWerecognisetheexistenceofarangeofbarrierstotheuptakeofembeddedgenerationandthedevelopmentoffurthermarket-basedservicesenvisagedaspartofthewiderenergymarkettransformation.Ourstakeholdershavenominatedthefollowingkeyconcerns:
• Noexistingplatformormechanismtoeffectivelyrewardgridsecurity/demandmanagementservicesforservicesthatarenotreadilyincludedincurrentdemandmanagementprograms.
• Currentwholesaleelectricitypricespresentlittleincentivetosellintothegrid,evenforlarger,morecost-effectiveinstallations.
• Distributorscontinuetoimposesignificantbarrierstoexportsfromaconnection,totheextentthatconnectionproponentsnowroutinelysizetheirinstallationssoastoremainwithintheenvelopeoftheproperty’suse,regardlessofthepotentialscalebenefitsoflargerinstallations.Aggregationmechanismsinthewholesalemarketareunsuitableforportfolioscombiningloadandgeneration,andonlyasmallnumberofretailersarepreparedtoaggregateacustomers’supplyanddemandacrossthecustomer’sportfolio.
• Therearestillnoeffectivemechanismstoaddressthe“lastin,worstdressed”approachtothecostsofupgradingalocalnetworkimposedonaconnectionproponent.Standardcontracts,requiredbyChapter5oftheNationalElectricityRules,aresilentonmechanismstoaddressthisissue(CWAetal2015).
• Islanding–thatis,theabilityofapropertytocontinuetoself-generatewherethelocalnetworkhasfailed–representsasignificantpotentialbenefitforpropertieswherethepropertymightrequirepowerintheeventofalocalnetworkfailure.Exampleswherethismightbeofbenefitinclude:localemergencycentres;otherlocationswheresignificantnumbersofpeoplemightbepresentatthetimeofafailureormightcongregateafterfailure;etc.However,distributorscurrentlyareunwillingtoconsiderislandingapartfromsomesmall,localisedtrialschieflyinvolvingresidentialcustomers2.
However,theseissuesaresecondarytotheimportanceofestablishingacost-effectiveconnectionprocess.Intheabsenceofcost-effectiveconnections,someinstallationswillnotgoahead,whileotherswillbesmallerthanoptimal,givensitecharacteristics.
2.Forexample:http://www.ausnetservices.com.au/CA257D1D007678E1/All/41F5DC5437B4E7C2CA257F3A0020577041F5DC5437B4E7C2CA257F3A00205770/$file/160419%20Mooroolbark%20trial%20launch%20%20FINAL.pdf
4
3. Theelectricitysystemischanging
3.1CustomersarebecomingactiveparticipantsinthesystemMassadoptionofdistributedsolarPVgeneration,especiallyintheresidentialsector,hasdrivenatrendtowardsmoreactivecustomerparticipationintheelectricitysystem.TheEnergyNetworksAustralia(ENA)andCSIRO’sElectricityNetworkTransformationRoadmapprojectfocusesontheneedtoplaceconsumersbothresidentialandcommercialatthecentreofnetworkplanningtomanagethetransitionfrompassiveconsumersofelectricity,togeneratorsandtradersofelectricity(ENAandCSIRO2016).
Figure1:TotalinstalledcapacityofrooftopPVandIPSSintheNEM(AEMO,2016b)
Inresponse,theelectricityindustryisshiftingtowardsamorecustomercentricmodelwherecustomers’choicesandactionsareincreasinglyimportant.Regulatorsandpolicymakersareundertakingarangeofreformsinmeteringandinformationprovision.TheresearchandpolicyreformprocessesunderwayaddressingawiderangeofissuesaresummarisedinAppendix1.
BatterystoragetechnologiesnowenteringtheAustralianmarketarelikelytofollowasimilartrendwithahighlevelofinitialconsumerinterestandconsumerpricespredictedtodecreaserapidly(MorganStanleyResearch2016).AEMOcurrentlypredictsthatbatterystoragecapacitywillincreasefromalmostzeronowto6.6GWhoverthenexttwentyyears,whilerooftopsolarPVisprojectedtoincrease350percentfrom4.3GWto19GWoverthesameperiod(2016b)3.Theseprojections,whichmaybeconservativegivenpreviousexperiencewiththerateofsolarPVuptakerelativetoinitialprojections,implyahighnumberofrelativelysmallconnectionsintheshorttomediumterm.Bytheendof2016,therewerealready1.6millionsmallsolarPVsystemsinstalledinAustralia,mostofwhichwereconnectedintheNEM.(CleanEnergyRegulator2017).
3.Thistotal19GWofsolarPVincludes3.8GWexpectedtobeintegratedwithbatteries.
5
3.2Thedistributors’challengeAsthetraditionalstaticnetworkoflarge-scalecentralisedgenerationevolvestorespondtoactiveconsumerswhogeneratetheirownelectricity,distributorsfacesignificantchallengestotheircurrentoperatingmodelandtothemanagementofthesafetyandperformanceoftheirnetworks.Thedistributors’requirementstomanagethisarediscussedinSection04.Thesechallengesincludeasignificantmismatchbetweenconsumptionandtheproductionprofiles,requiringtwo-wayflowstobefacilitatedinlocalnetworkareasandacrossnetworks.
Rapidchangesinnetdemandduetotransitoryweatherconditionsaremorecommon,changingwholesalemarketdynamics.InsomesituationsandweatherconditionssolarPVcanreducenetworkpeaks.However,theflowsfromembeddedgenerationcanbeunpredictable,overalladdingtothecomplexityofmanagingthenetwork.CombiningsolarPVwithbatteriescanmitigatethetechnicalchallengespresentedbyincreasedlevelsofdistributedenergygeneration,forexample,byallowingcustomerstoreducetheirexportsintothenetworkbystoringtheirenergyproductionforuseatpeakconsumptionperiods.4However,networkchallengesarelikelytoremain.
IfcustomersincludemanagementsystemswiththeirsolarPVandbatterysystem(integratedinthebattery,orasathirdpartyproviderservice),thencustomerscanco-ordinatetheirdemandandgenerationwiththemarket.Thesemanagementservicesseektooptimisewhenthecustomerexportselectricityandwhentheyimportit–eitherforuseorstorage.Thisfurtherincreasesthepotentialfortheirnetdemandtochangefrommomenttomoment.
Allthesedynamicscanalternetworkinvestmentrequirementsandwholesaleenergydemand.Thecombinationofembeddedgeneration,storageandmanagementsystemscancompetewithservicescurrentlyorpotentiallyprovidedbydistributorsand/orgenerators,whichcanchangewhobenefitsfromthediversityofcustomerbehaviour–thecustomer,thedistributororthemarket.
3.3MeetingourenergyproductivityandemissionsreductionobjectivesChangestoourelectricitysystemwillbeintegraltomakingouruseofenergymoreproductiveandreducingouremissions.TheCouncilofAustralianGovernments(COAG)hascommittedtoagoalofimprovingAustralia’senergyproductivityby40percentby2030.TheNationalEnergyProductivityPlanoutlinesaseriesofinitiativestoreachthisgoalinordertoreducecoststoconsumers,maintainingAustralianbusiness’competitivenessandreducinggreenhousegasemissions.5
Australia’sratificationoftheParisAgreementon9November2016commitsAustraliatoanemissionsreductionpathwayinlinewithconstrainingglobalwarmingtowellunder2degrees.Australiahasalsocommittedtobepartofcollectiveglobalactiontoreachnetzeroemissions.AnalysisindicatesthatdoingAustralia’sfairsharerequiresachievingnetzeroemissionsacrosstheAustralianeconomyby2050.6
ClimateWorksDeepDecarbonisationPathwaysreportdemonstrateshowthisgoalcanbeachievedwhilemaintainingeconomicgrowththroughfourpillarsofdecarbonisation.
4.TherecentEnergyTransformationRoadmappresentation(ENAandCSIRO2016),forexample,raisedthepossibilitythat,dependingonthewayinwhichtariffsarestructured,andthemanagementofcustomerdiversity,peaknetworkrequirementscouldbeshiftedtotimeperiodsimmediatelybeforepeakpowerratescutin,orimmediatelyafteroff-peakpowerratescommence.5.COAGEnergyCouncil,20156.Forexamplethelong-termcarbonbudgetproposedbytheClimateChangeAuthority(CCA2014,Chapter8)willrequirenetzeroby2050givencurrentemissionrates.
6
Figure2:The4pillarsofDecarbonisation
Gridconnectedlowcarbontechnologiesplayacentralroleinachievinganetzeroeconomy.Distributedrenewablegenerationcontributestowardsdecarbonisationofthegrid,whiledemandmanagementequipmentcontributestoambitiousenergyefficiency,andstoragetechnologiessupportnetworkstabilitywithhigherpenetrationofrenewablegeneration.Electricvehiclecharginginfrastructuresupportsfuelswitchingfrompetroleumtolowcarbonelectricity.
ASBECandClimateWorksAustralia’srecentreportLowCarbon:HighPerformance,onemissionsreductionpotentialintheAustralianbuiltenvironmentsectorfoundthatinstallationofcommercialandresidentialdistributedsolargenerationcouldcontributeareductionof50MtCO2eby2030.Thiswoulddeliver18percentofAustralia’scurrent2030emissionsreductiontarget.7
7.ASBEC2016,LowCarbonHighPerformance.
7
4.Currentconnectionrequirements
Statelegislationconfersondistributorstheresponsibilityformanagingthesafetyandperformanceofthenetworkwithinlocaljurisdictionalguidelines,andthepowerstocontrolcustomerconnectionsinlinewiththeseresponsibilities.Somestatesimposesymmetricrightsandobligationsoncustomerswhouseanetwork;inothers,customers’responsibilitiesoutweightheirrightswhenconnectingtothenetwork.
Distributorssettechnicalconnectionrequirementstoallowthemtomeettheirresponsibilitiestomanagetheirnetwork.TherequirementsfitwithintheNationalElectricityRuleswhichhasthreedifferentconnectionprocessesforproposedinstallationsthatarethefocusofthisproject.Installationsunder30kW,whicharecoveredbytheAustralianStandardAS4777(seebreakoutbelow),followtheprocessforabasicconnection.Largerinstallationsunder5MWmayfollowastandardornegotiatedconnectionprocess.WithinthebroadguidelinesintheNER,eachdistributoremploystheirownprocessesfornegotiatingtheconnectionofnon-standardinstallations.Mostinstallationsabove30MWsarecoveredbyChapter5oftheNER.
Eachdistributor’srequirementsgovernthetypeandperformanceoftheequipmentthatcanbeconnected,andthelevelofprotectionrequiredforaninstallationtobeapprovedinthatdistributor’sfranchisearea.TherequirementsmayberelevantAustralianStandards,internationalstandards,requirementsspecifictothedistributor,orsomecombinationofthese.Connectedequipmentmustbecertifiedascompliantwiththerelevantrequirement(s).Requirementsvaryfromnetworktonetwork.Thedifferencesbetweendistributors’requirementsandtheissuestheycreatearewelldocumented8.
AustralianStandardsaimtoacceptrelevantinternationalStandards,oracceptwithmodificationswhererequiredforAustralianconditions.WheretheAustralianmarketisaheadofdevelopmentofinternationalstandards,astandardisdevelopedindependently.Forexample,StandardsAustraliaisdevelopingastandardforresidentialbatterystorageinstallationsintheabsenceofarelevantinternationalstandardapplicabletotheAustralianmarket.Oncethatstandardisavailable,however,there’snoguaranteethatnetworkswillallowinstallationsconsistentwiththestandardtoproceedwithoutotherlocalrequirements.
Asitcurrentlystands,there’snooversightof,ormechanismtoreview,theappropriatenessofdistributors’requirementsandthecoststheymayimposeonconnections,orthecommunityasawhole.Proponentshavetheabilitytocontestthedistributor’sdecisionsoncemade,butthisreviewisonlypossibleinstallationbyinstallation.
Insettingrequirementsforequipmentthatdifferfromthoseadoptedbyotherdistributors,orrelevantAustralianorinternationalstandards,thelocaldistributorisassertingitsjudgementthatuniquerequirementsareneededtoaddressconditionswithinitsnetwork.Thedistributormayhavespecificrequirementsinparticularareascharacterisedbypoorlyperforming,vulnerableoroldinfrastructure.However,stakeholdershaveraisedconcernswithinourconsultationsthatthesejudgementsarenotalwaysappropriate9.
8.ClimateWorksAustralia,PropertyCouncilofAustraliaandSeedAdvisory,ImplementingtheConnectingEmbeddedGenerationRule:ProjectOutcomesReport,May2015Energeia,EmbeddedGenerationGridConnectionStandardsScopingStudy:Task3B.1,May20169.Insomeinstances,stakeholdershaveexperiencedresponsesfromdistributorswhereolderversionsofcurrenttechnologiesweremandatedinpreferencetobetterperforming,morerecentversions.
8
4.1Whathappensduringaconnectionapplication?Thediagramonthefollowingpage(Figure3)isastylisedrepresentationoftheconnectionprocess(otherthanforverysmallapplicationscoveredbyAS4777)foraconnectionapplicationinadistributionnetwork.Atypicaldescriptionoftheconnectionprocesswilloutlinethevarioussteps.Thisdiagram,incontrast,focussesonthedecisionpointsinaconnectionapplicationarisingfromthedistributor’stechnicalrequirements:
• Self-assessment:Theproponent’sself-assessmentthattheapplicationcomplieswiththedistributor’sspecificrequirements.
• Thedistributor’sassessmentoftheapplicationagainstitsownmandatedrequirements.
• Safeinthislocation?Thedistributor’sassessmentoftheapplicationinrelationtothenetworkcharacteristicsofthelocationforwhichtheinstallationisproposed
• Meetingadditionalrequirementsofthelocation:Ifnecessary,thedistributor’srequirementsforremediationoforaugmentationtothelocalnetworktoenabletheinstallationtoproceed.
Thediagramalsodescribes,ataveryhighlevel,theproponent’savenuesforclarifyingordisputingadistributor’sdecision,wheretheseexist.Thisdiagramhasbeenusedinourinitialconsultationswithstakeholderstoassistusinidentifyingandclassifyingproponents’experiences.
Standardisedrequirementsforsmall-scalePVCOAGadoptedtheAustralianStandardAS4777(anditssuccessors)astheprimarytechnicalrequirementforabasicconnectionforsmallscalePV.AS4777mandatesinverterconnectionforallcomplyingsolarPVinstallations.Initsmorerecentversionsithasaddedadditionalfunctionalityrelatingtothemanagementofthenetwork.ThisuseofaharmonisedstandardhasfacilitatedthewidespreadinstallationofsmallscalesolarPVpenetrationinEasternAustralia.
However,somedistributorsaddadditionalrequirementsforconnectionscoveredbyAS4777,forinstanceiftheirnetworkhasahighpenetrationofsolargeneration.Distributorswhowishtoreduceexportsintothenetworkfromahighpresencesolargenerationhaverespondedinanumberofways.Thedistributormaylimitthesizeofthesystemtoasetsizeorasizelessthanthatcustomer’sconsumptionenvelope;theymayrequirethatbatteriesareinstalledaspartofthesystemortheymaynotpermitfurthersolarPVinstallationsinspecificareasintheirnetwork.Othersincludeanadditionalassessmentstepbeforeasmall-scaleapplicationisformallyprocessed;orlongerwaitingperiodsthanforabasicconnectionapplicationaspartoftheassessmentperiod.
9
Figure3Stylisedrepresentationoftheconnectionprocessforaconnectionapplicationinadistributionnetwork
Self-assessmentFirst,aproponentassesseswhethertheproposedconnectionissafeandcompliantwiththedistributors’requirements,basedonthedistributor’spublishedmaterials,beforemakinganapplication.
Theproponentmayhavedifficultydecidingiftheproposedinstallationiscompliantduetolackofclarityinthedistributor’sinformationabouttheirrequirements.Forexample,ifadistributor’srequirementsrefertoawidegroupofstandardswithadditionalrequirementstheproponentmayhavetomakeajudgementbetweenapparentlydifferingrequirements,andmaynotbeconfidentthattheirjudgementonwhichapplieswillbeacceptabletothedistributor.Thisisdiscussedinourearlierwork(CWAetal2015)andtheEnergeiastudyfortheCEC(2016).
Theequipmentconfigurationproposedmayhavebeenacceptableandsuccessfullyinstalledelsewhere,butthelocaldistributormayhavedifferentrequirements.There’snorecoursetoanotherauthorityintheeventthatadistributor’srequirementsruleoutequipmentconsistentwithotherdistributors’requirements,Australianstandardsorcomparableinternationalstandards.
Thedistributor’sassessmentSecond,inmakinganapplication,theproponentisaskingthedistributorwhetheritagreesthattheconnectionapplicationmeetsitsrequirements.Ifthedistributorrefusesanapplicationonthesegrounds,aconnectionproponenthasrecoursetotheNER’sdisputeresolutionprocedures,shouldtheproponentchoosetopursueadispute.Thedistributortowhichtheconnectionapplicationisbeingmadeistheonlyauthorityonrequirementsforitsnetwork.
Someofthestakeholderswehaveinterviewedhavearguedthatambiguitiesindistributor’spublishedmaterialsmakethisstepasdifficultforthedistributorasitisforproponents.Intheabsenceofclearrequirements,thedefaultpositioncanbearejectionofacompliantapplication,ratherthantheexerciseofjudgementintheinterpretationofvagueorambiguousrequirements.
10
Typically,thisstepintheprocessisnotdifferentiatedfromadecisiononwhethertheproposedinstallationissafeatagivenlocation.Wehavedistinguishedbetweenthetwobecausetheoutcomesoffailingeachofthesearedifferent.Ifadistributordecidestheconnectiondoesnotmeetitsrequirementsitmayrejecttheconnectionapplication,requireanamendmenttotheproposedconfigurationorequipmentorrequirefurtherstudies.
Ifnetworkcharacteristicsrequiresignificantadditionalprotectionequipment,oraninvestmentinnetworkaugmentation,thedistributormustspecifytherequirements,and,inthecaseofnetworkaugmentationworks,provideanestimateofthecostsoftheworksrequired.
Safeinthislocation?Alllocationsinanynetworkcannotsupportallconnectionapplications:networkcharacteristicsdifferbylocationandovertime.Adistributor’sintimateknowledgeofprevailingconditionsinthelocalnetwork,andmoreadvancedconnectionapplicationsrelatingtothesamelocationmeanthedistributoristheobviousarbiterofthesafetyofanapplicationinrelationtoanygivenlocation.
AsweunderstandtherequirementsoftheNER,ifaninstallationwouldnotbesafebecauseofthelocalconditions,adistributorshouldimposespecificrequirementsontheconnectionapplicationorrequiretheconnectionproponenttofunddownstreamworksinthedistributionnetwork.Inthefirstcase,thoserequirementsareintendedtobringintocompliancetheproposedconnectionandthedistributor’ssitespecificrequirements.Inpractice,connectionproponentscontinuetopointtooccasionswhereabanonallexportsintothenetworkhasbeenimposed,ratherthantherequirementsforexportstobeacceptableintherelevantsectionofthenetworkbeingspecified.AconnectionproponentcanusetheNER’sdisputeresolutionprocedurestodisputetheadditionalrequirements,ortocontestadistributor’srefusaltocontemplatetheapplicationattheproposedlocation.
MeetingadditionalrequirementsofthelocationWherethenetworkrequiresadditionalinvestmenttomaketheinstallationsafeinthatlocation,insomestatestheconnectionproponentmaychooseitsowncontractortoundertaketheworks,orrequirethedistributortoseekcompetitivequotesfortheworksrequired.Theproponentcanchoosenottoproceedwiththeapplicationifthecostsaretoohigh,ormaychoosetodisputethedistributor’srequirementsundertheNERdisputeresolutionprocedures.Iftheproponentgoesaheadwiththeworktheyhavearighttocollectfromfutureconnectionscontributionstosharedinfrastructureinvestments,but,intheabsenceofco-operationfromthedistributor,thatrightisunenforceable(CWAetal2015)10.
Aconnectionproponenthasonlyalimitedabilitytopredictthedistributor’sspecificationofitsdownstreamrequirements,excepttotheextentthatthedistributor’sDistributionAnnualPlanningReportprovidessomecurrentinsightintolocalconditions.Distributorshavearguedthatlocalconditionscanchangesorapidlythatthetaskofkeepingpubliclyavailablematerialsonlocalstatusup-to-dateisanoneroustask.
10.Noneofthemodelcontractsrequiredtobepublishedbythedistributorsandreviewedinthereportmadeanyreferencetothepotentialfortherecoveryofexpendituresonnetworkaugmentationfromfutureconnections.
11
5.Impactofthecurrentconnectionprocess
Customersconnectingnewtechnologiesundercurrentprocessesbearunnecessarycosts–whethermeasuredinthetimetoconnect,ordirectcostsofconnection,orboth.
VaryingrequirementsfromdistributorsfragmenttheAustralianmarketintostateandlocalnetworkareas.Thisfragmentedmarketdirectlyincreasesthecostsofequipment.Thefurthercostsitimposesonstandardisationandlearningbydoingareadragonenergyandnationalproductivityandinnovation.
Further,thesecostsrepresentareductionincustomerwelfare.Thestatusquoalsohindersbusinesses–thedistributorsandallthoseinvolvedwithofferingtechnologiesandservices.Thesecostsreducetheuptakeofnewtechnologiesand,byextension,limittheachievementofAustralia’semissionsreductionandenergyproductivitygoals.Inthefollowingsections,we’vesummarisedobservationsaroundthecurrentconnectionprocessfromouranalysisandconsultationstodate.
5.1CoststobusinessandconsumersInconsistentandnon-transparentrequirementsfortheconnectionoftechnologiestothegridimposecostsandreducethebenefitsavailablefromharmonisation.Ambiguityortheabsenceofawrittendescriptionofdistributor’srequirementsincreasesthedifficultyofaninstallation.Restrictingtheequipmentapprovedforusedecreasescompetitionintheequipmentmarketandhence,mayincreasecoststocustomers.
Givenprojectedcustomeruptakeofrenewableenergyovertheshorttomediumterm,anyreductionintransactioncostsassociatedwithmoreconsistent,transparentandbalancedconnectionrequirementsislikelytodeliversignificantaggregatedcostsavings.Forexample,AEMO’sprojectionsfortheNEFRsuggestcommercialandindustrialcustomerswillinstallaround25,000solarPVsystemsoverthenext10years,addingaround1GWtototalsolarPVinstalledintheNEM.
Directcostreductionsfromharmonisingconnectionrequirementsareexpectedtobesubstantial.Thereductioninconsumers’installationscosts–fromthefirst10yearsofanationallyconsistentsetoftechnicalrequirementsforgridconnectionsforsmalltomedium(30kWto5MW)embeddedgenerators-couldbeworthatleast$140m($2016),accordingtoestimatespreparedbyEnergeiafortheFuture-ProofinginAustralia’sElectricityDistributionIndustryProject(FPDI)(CEC2016).AEMO’sprojecteduptakeofsolarPVbycommercialandindustrialcustomersinthe2016NationalElectricityForecastingReportisaround20percenthigherthantheestimateEnergeia’susesinitsbenefitcalculation:onalike-for-likebasis,savingswouldbe20percenthigher(SeedAdvisorycalculationbasedonAEMO2016b).11
Whicheveroftheseestimatesareused,thebenefitsfromchangestotherequirementsforgridconnectionsareunderstated,becausetheyonlyconsidercurrentlevelsofinstallation.Broadeningnationallyconsistentrequirementstolargerandsmallerconnectionswouldincreasedirectbenefits,andlowercostswouldbelikelytoincreasethenumberofinstallationsofembeddedgeneratorsofallsizes.Reducingthecostofinstallationscanhaveequityimplications–somecustomerscurrentlyexcludedfrominstallingtheirownrenewableenergycouldaffordtodosoandsavemoneyacrossthelifeofthesystem.
11.TheestimatehasbeencalculatedbasedonAEMO’sprojectionsforadditionstosolarPVinstalledbyCommercialandIndustrialcustomers,assumingthesameaveragesizeinstallationandsimilarcostsperinstallationasusedbyEnergeia.AEMO’sandEnergeia’sprojectionshavedifferentinitialtrajectories,butovera10yearperiod,thenumberofinstallationsassumedtounderlieAEMO’scalculationsisaround20percenthigherthanEnergeia’sprojectionforthesameperiod.
12
5.2ImpactonuptakeIncreasingthenumberofinstallationsandreducingthecostscouldcreatearangeoffurthereconomy-widebenefits,improvingenergyproductivity,increasingtheuptakeofrenewableenergyandcontributingtonationalobjectivesforreducedemissions.Lowercoststocustomersincreasedemand:theprogressofresidentialsolarPVinstallationsshowsusjusthowpotentthiseffectcanbe.If,forexample,wetakeAEMO’sassumptionsthatcustomers’responsivenesstopricechangesis0.1percentforeverypercentagechange,thenforevery10percentreductionininstallationcostsachieved,thenumberofinstallationsincreasesby1percent(calculationsbasedonAEMO2016b).Overa10yearperiodcustomerswillinstallaroundanextra2,100systems,oraround86MWoffurthersolarPV,ifusingEnergeia’sestimateforannualinstallations(CEC2016).TheincreaseislargerusingAEMO’sprojections,byaround10MW12.
Conversely,delaysandcostsinachievinginstallationsreducedemand.Forlargerpotentialinstallations,thistakesanumberofforms.Theconnectionproponentcouldreducetheirambition,reducingthescaleoftheprojectproposedeithertoaddresspotentialnetworkissues,orinresponsetodirectdistributorfeedbackonanapplication.Or,theprojectmaybeabandoned;inthecommercialpropertysector,projecttimelinesandconnectionapplicationtimelinesarestillinconsistent,despiterecentreformstoconnectionapplicationprocesses.Thecostsofdelayingaprojecttypicallyfaroutweighthebenefitsofembeddedgeneration:timeconsumingconnectionprocessesdirectlyreduceproponents’interest.
Stakeholdershavealsomentioneddistributorrequirementsthatdirectlylimitembeddeddistribution,withouttakingintoaccounttheindividualinstallation.Anexampleisdistributors’useofanabsolute,undiversifiedcapacitylimit,wherethetotalcombinedinstalledcapacityofsolarPV,batteryandinverterinstallationsisrestrictedtobelowadefinedlimit,regardlessofthelikelypatternofconsumptionandproductiononthecustomer’spremise.
Informedbytheirexperiencesinothermarkets,customersexpectbehind-the-meterinstallationstofollowrapidlyafterthepurchasedecision.Stakeholdershavereportedtousthedifficultiesconfrontingretailerssimultaneouslymanagingcustomerexpectationsforclose-to-immediateinstallationanddistributorprocesses,insomecasesrequiring60businessdaysprocessingtime.Managingtheseprocessesimposesadditionalcostsonretailersand,ultimately,allcustomers;andthedelaysmayreducethepotentialsizeandgrowthofacurrentlyimmaturemarket,ifcustomers’experiencesarenegativeintheearlystagesofthemarket.
5.3InefficiencieswheninstallinginmultiplelocationsThecurrentsituationhasobviousimplicationsforproponentsaimingatstate-wideornationalroll-out.Thedifferencesfromonedistributortothenextmeanthateachprojectwillbetoagreaterorlesserextentunique.Designs,procurementandinstallationcostswillallbemoreexpensivethanwouldotherwisebethecase.LargersolarPVinstallationsaresubjecttosignificantlylongerdelaysthansmallresidentialinstallations.Thedelaysintroducesignificantlagsintoinstallers’businessesrelativetothepipelineforsmallresidentialsolarPVinstallations.
Alternatively,aproponentcouldinvesttimeandcostup-fronttoseekdistributors’agreementtoacommondesign.Thereis,however,ariskthatthemostonerousdistributorrequirements(orthedistributortheleastwillingtonegotiate)setthebarforallinstallations.Thiswouldimposeunnecessaryexpenseonthetotalproject,and,forsomeprojects,reducethelikelihoodoftheprojectproceeding.
12.Incalculatingtheimpacts,we’veassumedAEMO’sprojectionsarebasedoncurrentconnectionprocessesandtimelines.
13
Inthecommercialpropertysector,hightransactioncostsresultingfrominconsistentrequirementsfromdistributortodistributor,non-transparentandcomplexconnectionrequirementsandprocessesallremainsignificantbarriers.Thisisparticularlytrueforbusinesseswithsitesspreadacrossdifferentdistributors.Consequently,despitehighlevelsofambitioninthesector,commercialsolarPVinstallationsinAustraliaareprogressingataslowerthandesiredrate.Projectsareapproachedonanindividualbasis,evenwhenthepropertyownerormanagerrecognisesthepotentialbenefitsofapproachingprojectsaspartofawiderprogramofwork.Installationratesaresloweventhoughrooftopsolarshouldbeacost-effectiveinvestmentformanybuildingowners,especiallythosewithlargeunutilisedroofspacessuchaslargeretailandindustrialassets.
Theinabilitytoachieveeconomiesofscaleisnotlimitedtotheconnectionproponent.Banksandfundmanagerswiththegoalofincreasingtheirlendingtorenewableenergyprojectsseeharmonisationaspartofaprocessthatshiftsprojectfinancingfromthecurrent,highcost,bespokemodeltoasimplereplicablemodelwithaprojectpipelinetosupportefficientfundingapproaches.Incontrastwiththecurrentmodel,areplicablemodelforprojectdevelopmentwouldsimplifyprojectdocumentation,duediligenceandsecuritisation,decreasefinancingcostsandincreasefinanceavailability.
5.4VariationsinrequirementsreducescompetitioninequipmentmarketsTheAustralianmarketforconnectionequipmentisnotlarge;iflocaldistributorsadoptdifferentrequirements,themarketfortheaffectedequipmentisreducedtofragmentedlocalmarkets.WehaveheardfromequipmentmanufacturerswhochoosenottocompeteintheAustralianmarket,becauseofthecostsofparticipation13.ThestatusquoaffectsnotonlytheavailabilityofproductsintheAustralianmarketbutalsothedepthofproductandserviceoffering,particularlywheredistributorshaveuniquerequirements.Lowerproductavailabilityresultsinlesscompetition,andinturn,highercosts.WehavealsoheardfromastakeholderwhereAustralianinstallationsinaninternationalroll-outofidenticalfacilitieshavetheunenviablepositionofdominatingthelistof“10mostexpensiveinstalls”internationally.Thestakeholderstatedthiswaslargelyowingtodifferencesincostofequipment,drivenbyalackofcompetitioninthemarketplaceinAustraliaforcertifiedequipment,andreinforcedbythehighcostofcertification14.
LimitedcompetitionintheAustralianmarket,combinedwiththehighcostofcertifyingequipmentforAustralianrequirements,resultedinasingleavailablecertifiedmodelintheAustralianmarketofaspecifictransformer.ThattransformercostmorethanfourtimesthecostofthesameequipmentintheJapanesemarket.GivenalimitednumberofexpectedinstallationsthecostsofcertificationspecificallyfortheAustralianmarketmeanstherewouldbenopaybackforthecustomerinimportingandcertifyinganalternativetransformerforherownuse.AndthefragmentationoftheAustralianmarketreducestheincentiveforothermanufacturerstocompetewiththeexistingcertifiedmodel.
Insummary,installationtechnologiesinAustraliacanbesignificantlymoreexpensivethaninothersimilarcountries,becausethechoiceofequipmentcertifiedtoAustralianStandardsislimited,asaresultofacombinationofthesmallsizeoftheAustralianmarket,theextensivedifferencesinnetworks’requirementsandthecostsofcertification.
13.Thesamecouldbesaidwhere,forexample,StandardsAustraliaadoptsmateriallydifferentstandardsfromtheprevailinginternationalstandards:customersbearcostsfromareductioninsupplierstotheAustralianmarketplace,whiledifferentstandardsmayprovidenocommensuratebenefittocustomersorthecommunitymorebroadly.14.Thisinformationwasprovidedduringstakeholderconsultations.
14
5.5ImpactoninnovationandtechnicalchangeLocaltechnicalstandardsettingforconnectionofequipmentlimitstheabilityofnewmodelsornewtechnologies-includingthosedemonstratingsuperiorperformanceandsafety-toenterthemarket.Issuesidentifiedduringourconsultationsinclude:
• ExistingAustralianStandardsareslowtoadapttotechnicalchange.Forexample,asinverterdesignschange,therequirementthatallsmallsolarPVinstallationscomplywithAS4777shutsnewerdesignsoutofthemarketuntilthatstandardisupdatedtorecognisethechangestodesigns.
• Weareawareofbusinesseswithmoreadvancedmodelinverterswhohavebeenadvisedthatthebestandmostproductiveroutetomarketisthroughinternationalcertification,followedbyAustralianmarketentry,ratherthanenteringtheAustralianmarketdirectly.
• Internationalequipmentmanufacturers’decisionstoparticipateintheAustralianmarketareinformedbythescaleoftheavailablemarketandthecostofcompliancetospecificAustralianrequirements.StakeholdersrepresentingAustraliantechnologydevelopershavestatedthatthestatusquorestrictsmarketentry.
• ThecostofcertificationinAustraliaishigh(particularlywhenconsideringthesizeofthemarket),andstakeholdersmentionedinstancesofsomedistributorsacceptingAustralianStandardsastheonlyacceptablecertificationregardlessofcertificationinothermarkets.
• Newbusinessmodelsfacedifficultiesingettingestablished,especiallyforstatewideornationalbusinessofferingscrossingmultipledistributionbusinesses.
5.6RiskofunfairmarketadvantageStakeholdershavealsoexpressedconcernsthatasaresultoftherequirementsadoptedbyindividualdistributors,innovationinproductsandservicesmaybelimitedtothedistributionbusinessesthemselves-providinganunfairmarketadvantage.We’vealsobeentoldofdistributorsrequiringextensiveandcompetitivelysensitiveinformationaboutthesoftwarebeinginstalledwithsolarPV/batterybundles,aswellasdistributorrequirementsthatseektorestrictsmallresidentialcustomersfromexportingfromtheequipmentinstalled.Similarly,we’veheardconcernsfrombusinessesthattheremaybetheselectiveapplicationofdistributorrequirements–oneruleforthedistributor’sownbusinesses,andoneforconnectionapplicationsbyunrelatedbusinesses.
Akeyquestionrelatestowhetherthestatusquoisconsistentwithcompetitioninnetworkservicesprovidedbehindthemeter.Intheabsenceofanyoversightofdistributors’individualrequirements,itisnotclearwhetheritis.Currentstatelegislationprovidesnooversightmechanismfordistributors’requirements,orthebalanceofsafety,performanceandcompetitiveaccessachievedintheapplicationofthoserequirements.AsidefromfuturerulechangesextendingthecoverageoftheNERtonetworks’requirements,theonlymechanismcurrentlyavailableundertheNERisadisputebetweenaconnectionproponentandthenetworkonaspecificapplication.
Clarityontherelationshipbetweendistributors’requirementsandthecompetitivelandscapeisunlikelytoresultfromconnectiondisputes,becausecustomers’abilitytodisputetherequirementsislimited;thedisputeresolutionprocessesundertheNERareavailableonlyonacase-by-casebasisandinrelationtospecificconnectionapplications;anddisputeresolutionprocessesareonlyavailableonceaconnectionapplicationhasbeenmade.Projectsthatdon’tproceedtotheapplicationstagebecausetheproponent’sassessmentofthenetwork’srequirementsisunfavourabletotheprojectproceeding,havenorecoursetoadjudicationofanysort.
15.Someoftheseeffortsappearpoorlydesigned:customerundertakingsnottoexportaredifficulttoenforceifthecustomeratthepremisechanges,whilerequirementsonretailerstoenterintoundertakingsacustomerdoesnotexportareunlikelytosurviveacustomer’schangeofretailer.But,morerelevantly,limitationsofthissortappeartobeinconsistentwiththetreatmentofsmallcustomersundertheNER,andraisematerialquestionsaboutcompetitiveneutrality.Inprohibitingacustomerexportingthroughtheirretailerorathirdparty,isthenetworkeffectivelypositioningitselfastheonlypossibleproviderofthisvaluestreamtothecustomer?
15
6.CharacteristicsofpreferredsolutionsInordertominimisecostsandmaximiseuptakeoflowcarbongridconnectedtechnologies,webelievethatnewinstitutionalsolutionsarerequiredtoreplacethecurrentnetwork-by-networkprocess.Thesesolutionsshouldideallyminimisedelayandreduceupfrontandtransactioncostsofinstallationasfarasispractical,whilemaintainingsafetyandsecurityofthenetwork.Thiswouldbeasubstantialpublicbenefit–installingembeddedgenerationandstoragecanhelpAustraliatransformourenergysystemandreduceemissions.Harmonisedrequirementswillmakethiseasier,cheaperandmoreequitable.
Wehaveidentifiedsomecharacteristicsofanapproachwhichcandeliverontheseobjectivesmoresothanthestatusquo,andwe’vehadanearlylookatalternativeinstitutionalmodelsasaguidetowhatthismightbe.Inthenextstageofthisproject,ourobjectiveistodevelopalternativeinstitutionalmodelsinlinewithourpreferredcharacteristics,todevelopapreferredalternativetothestatusquowithstakeholders.
Consideringstandardsasprovidingaminimumacceptablesolutionoraperformancebasedspecification,ratherthandefiningtheonlyacceptablesolution,couldbeasolutionintimesofrapidtechnologicalchange.
6.1Consistentnationalstandard:rareexceptionsAconsistent,clearandtransparentnationalconnectionstandardwouldreducethecostandmarketimpactsofthecurrentarrangements,providebenefitstocustomersandtheeconomy,andunblockuptakeofnewtechnologies.State-basedsolutions,liketheproposalbyErgonEnergy,EnergexandtheQueenslandgovernment(2016)potentiallyoffereasierstepsforward,butthisproposalandothergovernmentproposalsofwhichweareaware,donotfullyaddresstheissue-especiallyforbusinesseswithanationalfootprint,andinrelationtocompetitionintheequipmentmarket.
Nationalstandardsmustexplicitlybalanceriskstosafetyandnetworkperformance,costsandwiderpolicyobjectives:Thereisacosttobothinappropriatelyhighandinappropriatelylowstandards,andtheprocessusedtodevelopnetworkstandardsneedstorecognisethesecosts16.Theperformanceoftheelectricitysystemasawholeneedstobeconsidered,inadditiontolocaldistributorrequirements,accordingtoAEMO’srecentworkoninvertersettings(2016a)anditsFuturePowerSystemSecurityProgram(2016c).AEMO’sinitialworksuggestedthatundercertainspecificcircumstancescurrentlocaldistributorrequirementsmaybeinconsistentwithsystem-widerequirements:forexample,distributors’requirementsforinverterstorespondtounder-frequencyeventsbydisconnectingcouldcontributetotheworseningofsystem-wideperformance.
Thedistributormayhavespecificrequirementsinparticularareascharacterisedbypoorlyperforming,vulnerableoroldinfrastructure:inourview,thesecharacteristicsshouldbeaddressedatalocallevel,notthroughadistributor-widestandard.
It’salsoimportantthatnetworkstandardsreflectconditionsinthenetworkswheretherearealargenumberofconnectionsandwherethemajoreconomicactivityis,thatis,inhighlymeshedurbannetworks,highperformingbyinternationalstandards.Settingnetworkstandardsbasedontheperformanceoftheleastwellperformingareasofthenetworkwouldresultinnetworkrequirements‘levellingup’tomeetthemostonerouscurrentrequirements.Ourviewisthattheoppositeshouldbethecase:nationalnetworkstandardsshouldbesetattheminimumconsistentwiththesafetyandperformanceofnetworks,andareaswhereexceptionstothosestandardsareappropriateshouldeitherbeexplicitlyexcised(foraperiod)fromthecoverageofthestandards,ordealtwithonanexceptionsbasis.Thisistheappropriateuseofthetestastowhetheranapplicationissafeattheproposedlocation,thethirdofthetestsinourdiagraminSection4.16.InthecourseofthedebatesurroundingthechangestoconnectionprocessesinChapter5oftheNER,astakeholderrepresentativeclaimeditwasamatterofsomepridethattheautomaticconnectionthresholdintheNERScheduleswasasonerousasitis.Toaneconomist,ofcourse,astandardsetsohighitcanneverprofitablybeimplementedisineffectiveandexpensiveregulation,notadesirableoutcome.
16
6.2Minimumperformancestandards,setindependentlyConsistenttechnicalstandardsforequipmentwouldbebestsupported,asinotherindustries,bycommonstandardssupportedbyindependentandcosteffectivetestingandcertificationacceptedacrossAustralia.StandardsAustraliaacknowledgesthatinrelationtotherepresentationonitsCommitteesdevelopingstandardsfortheelectricityindustry,therepresentationoforganisationsdirectlyrepresentingcustomers’interestshasdwindledovertime,leavingtheCommittees’membershipdominatedbydistributorrepresentatives.
Wehaveidentifiedmodelsforsettingharmonisedrequirementssupportedbyappropriatetestingandcertification.ThesecovertheregulatedsolutionrepresentedbytheAustralianCommunicationsandMediaAuthority(ACMA);thecoordinatedapproachadoptedbyAustraliangasnetworkswhichrelyonStandardsAustralia’sstandardsasthebasisforindustrystandards18;andtheaviationsectorapproachwhichreliesoninternationalstandardsandmodifiesthemonlywherestrictlynecessaryforAustralianconditions.
Telecommunicationsandtransportareregulatedbythefederalgovernment,butthegasindustry’sapproachsuggeststhatstateregulatedindustriescanarriveatanationalapproach,ifindustry(andthelocalregulators)havethewilltodoso.
17.Earlyintheprocessofopeningtelecommunicationstocompetition,theincumbentoperatorinsistedonrestrictingconnectedequipmenttoequipmentitmanufactured.18.Inothermarkets,competitionextendstothedevelopmentofstandardsthemselves,withcompetentorganisationscompetingfortherighttodevelopstandardsonbehalfofindustryorganisationsandregulators.
TechnicalstandardsinthetelecommunicationsindustryTherearealternativemodelsavailablethatbetteraddressquestionsofcompetitiveadvantage.Forexample,atthebeginningofthetelecommunicationindustry’stransformation,theincumbentAustraliannetworkoperatorwasthearbiterofallequipmentthatcouldbeconnectedtoitsnetwork17.Inthetelecommunicationssector,theincumbentwasnational,whichmeantthateconomiccostsimposedbyitsrestrictionswerelowerrelativetothosecurrentlyresultingfromthedifferingrequirementsamongelectricitydistributionnetworks.Thecompanieslockedoutofthemarket–equipmentmanufacturersinparticular–werelarge,internationalbusinessesandthecustomerswererepresentedinitiallybylargeinternationalbusinesses,likeOptusandVodafone.Thequestion–whenwastheincumbentappropriatelysafeguardingitsnetwork’sperformanceandsafety,andwhenwerethereanti-competitiveimplicationsfromtheincumbent’sdecisions–wasresolvedbymovingthedevelopmentoftechnicalstandardstoanindependentregulatoryauthority.
TheAustralianCommunicationsandMediaAuthority(ACMA)haslegislativeresponsibilityfor,amongotherthings,licensingandregulatingtelecommunicationscarriers,certainstandardsfortelecommunicationsequipmentandcabling,andelementsofnetworkperformance(interference,forexample).ACMA’srequiredapproachtothetechnicalstandardsisthatthestandardsarethelowestlevelconsistentwiththesafeperformanceofthenetwork,anditsenforcementprogramadoptsarisk-basedapproachtoitspriorities.
ACMAhasanaccreditedradiocommunicationscompliancelaboratorythatcarriesoutcompliancetestingofradiocommunicationsdevices.Itsmainpurposeistosupportindustrycompliancewithregulatoryarrangementssuchastheradiocommunicationsstandardscomplianceandlabellingarrangements.ThelaboratoryisaccreditedbytheNationalAssociationofTestingAuthorities(NATA)forassessingcompliancewithcompliancelevelstwoandthreeforthefullrangeofACMAstandardsandequivalentinternationalstandards.
17
Insomecases,theregulatoryauthorityhasitsowntestingfacilities,althoughtestingisnotrestrictedtothosefacilities.Inothercases,theindustrybodyownsatestingfacility,operatedasafor-profitbusinessincompetitionwithothertestfacilities.
6.3ResponsivenesstotechnologicalchangeThedevelopment,adoptionandrevisionofstandardsintheelectricitysectorwouldbenefitfrombeingrevisedtoallowformorerapidturnaroundtimes.Alternatively,theprocesscouldfocusonestablishingminimumrequirementsorperformance-basedrequirements,ratherthanmandatoryrequirements.Thiswouldallowcustomerstobenefitfrominnovativetechnologicaldevelopments.
DiscussionsaboutworkonaninstallationstandardforsmallscalebatteryinstallationsataStandardsAustraliaworkshopinAugust2016highlightedthechallengesofthecurrentstandardsprocess,thepaceoftechnologicaldevelopmentandthepotentialcoststoconsumers(andmanufacturers).OneoftheCommitteemembersdiscussedtheclaimsbysomebatterymodelstohavetechnicalsafeguardsagainstcommonriskstoahouseholdfromabatterymalfunctionorotherincidents.Intheabsenceofaperformancestandard,however,themodelsmakingtheseclaimscouldnotbetested;and,asaresult,theinstallationrequirementsforsmallbatteriescouldnotdifferentiatebetweenequipmentwithorwithouttheclaimedsafeguards.Asaresult,installationrequirementsarelikelytobebasedontheleastsafemodels.Thiswouldmeanthedistributormayrequireadditionalmeasuresforallinstallations;forthoseofferingsuperiorperformance,thoserequirementsarelikelytobeoverlyonerous.
Some,butnotall,batteriesofferadditionalsafetyfeaturesthatreducetheriskoffiretoacceptablelevels,forexample.Ifthestandardoradistributordoesnotdifferentiatebetweenthosewithandthosewithoutthesefeatures,allbatteriesmayberequiredtobeinstalledexternallyinametalfireproofcabinet.Thisrequirementcreatesextracostsforallbatteriesinstalled,andstopsbatterieswiththeadditionalfeaturesbenefittingfromthosefeatures.Stakeholders’experienceofamendingAustralianstandardsinresponsetotechnicaldevelopmentssuggeststhatamendmenttocaptureindustrydevelopmentswillbedifficultandtimeconsuming.
EquipmentstandardsintheAustraliangasindustryAustraliangasnetworksshareequipmentstandardsacrossAustralia.ThecurrentprocessforqualifyingequipmentforconnectiontoanAustraliangasnetworkisbasedonStandardsAustralia’sdevelopmentofrelevantstandards(althoughthereareconcernsaboutthespeedofStandardsAustralia’scurrentprocesses,andtherepresentativenessofStandardsAustralia’scommitteememberships).Equipmentsubjecttoaspecificstandardistestedandcertifiedbyoneofanumberofcompetingaccreditedfacilities.TheAustralianGasAssociationoperatesanaccreditedfacility.Accreditedfacilitiesareauditedregularly,typicallybythestate-basedtechnicalregulator,toensuretestproceduresareappropriate.CertifiedequipmentcanbeconnectedtoanygasnetworkinAustralia.
Gasnetworks’safetyandperformance,likeelectricitydistributionnetworks,isastateresponsibility.However,co-ordinationeffortsbythetechnicalregulatorshaveresultedintechnicalregulationconvergingtoanationalmodel,eventhoughstatelegislationdiffersinthepowersandprocessesappliedfromstatetostatebythedesignatedtechnicalregulator.
Insomestates,additionalcertificationprocesseshavebeenintroducedwheretheequipmentforwhichcertificationisbeingsoughtisnotexpectedtobeinstalledinsignificantvolumes.Thisadditionalcertificationcategoryisapossiblemodelfornewtechnologiesintheearlystagesofdevelopment,orwherethereareonlyasmallnumberofcertifiedproductsavailableintheAustralianmarket.
18
Thereisalsoaneedtoconsiderthecurrentprocessesforsettingindividualnetworks’requirements,whichrelyonindividualdistributorsandtheircapacitytoassesstechnologiesandtheimplicationsfortheirnetworks.Thenextstageoftheprojectwillconsiderfurtherwhetherthestatusquoisappropriateandcostefficientduringaperiodofrapidtechnologicalchange.Thiswillincludewhetherindividualdistributorshavethecapacitytokeepupwiththedevelopmentsinthemarketplace,andifitiscosteffectiveforindividualdistributorstoduplicatesuchactivity.
6.4CompetitiveneutralityDistributorsareincreasinglyseekingtodeliverbehind-the-meterservicestomanagedemandandinvestmentintheirnetworkaswellasforcommercialbenefit.Therisktocompetitiveneutralityfromdistributors’controloftheirownconnectionrequirementsandtheabsenceofanyeffectiveoversightofthoserequirements,ortheirapplication,hasthepotentialtobecomeasignificantissue.
Currently,adistributordecideswhetheraparticularinstallationortypeofinstallationissafe,subjecttothelocaljurisdictionalframework.Thedistributoralsodeterminestheconditionsunderwhichtheproposedconnectioncanbemade,andconsequentlythedirectcostoftheconnection.Thisallocationofresponsibilitymaycreateconflictsforcompetitiveneutralitybetweenthedistributor’sregulatedbusiness,itsunregulatedbusinessanditspotentialcompetitors.Giventhereislittleoversightofdistributors’technicalrequirementsortheirdecisionmaking,thecurrentprocessoffersfewavenuestoeffectivelycontestdistributordecisions.Thiswilltendtodecreasetheprovider’sconfidencethattherewillbecompetitiveneutralityforpotentialproductsandservicesbehindthemeter.
TheEnergeiareport(CEC2016)includesacommentfromonerespondenttotheirstakeholdersurveythattheRing-FencingGuidelinewillensurecompetitiveneutralityindistributors’requirements.However,theGuidelinedoesnotdiscussthepotentialconflictofinterestfromthedistributorsactingasgatekeeperstotheirnetworksforserviceswiththepotentialtocompetewiththeirownservices.
19
7.Whatnext?
GatheringfurtherevidenceofimpactWewillworkwithacoalitionofstakeholderstobuildfurtherevidenceabouttheimpactofidentifiedbarriers.Thiswillparticularlyfocusonthecostanduptakeimpacts,ofthestatusquoonconnectionrequirements.Wewilldevelopworkablesolutionsthatcanberapidlyimplementedtounblockbarriers.
ArticulatingthesolutionWewilldevelopinstitutionalandpolicysolutionstotheissuesidentifiedthroughacollaborativeprocesswithstakeholdersacrossarangeofsectors.
Weaimtoundertakefurtherconsultationwhichwillallowtheproposedsolutionstobetestedwithkeystakeholdersandrefined.
Wewillfinaliseareportincludingasolutionsroadmapinmid-2017.Itwillidentifythekeyactorsandtheirrolesinenactingthesolution,aswellasdocumentinternationalexamplesofsolutionstotheidentifiedbarriers.
BuildingsupportforactionWewillengagewithstakeholderstopresenttheproposedsolutionsandgarnersupportforaction.Thiswillalsoincludebroaderengagementwithkeypolicymakers,regulatorsandindustryplayers,plusafocusedmediacampaign.Wewillidentifystakeholderswhowishtoformacoalitionactiveroleinimplementingthesolutions.Wewillrunaseriesofforumssothatcoalitionmemberscanengagedirectlywithkeydecisionmakersandclearlyvoicetheirsupportforreform.
ImplementationandmonitoringofreformWehavelearntfromourpreviouseffortsindrivingchangeintheenergymarketthatittakestimeandefforttoseethingsthrough.Oncesupportisbuilt,wewillcontinuetoengagewithdecisionmakerstoobserveimplementationofthedesiredoutcomesandmonitoractiononthegroundtoensurethatchangeisembeddedintopractice.
ProjectfundingClimateWorksandSeedAdvisorycurrentlyseekfundingforthisproject,fromavarietyofsourcesandarekeentodiscussthiswithinterestedparties.
20
8.ReferencesAustralianEnergyMarketOperator(AEMO)2016a,ResponseofExistingPVInverterstoFrequencyDisturbances,April2016https://www.aemo.com.au/-/media/Files/PDF/Response-of-Existing-PV-Inverters-to-Frequency-Disturbances-V20.pdfAEMO2016b,NationalElectricityForecastingReport,NationalEnergyMarket.https://www.aemo.com.au/-/media/Files/Electricity/NEM/Planning_and_Forecasting/NEFR/2016/2016-National-Electricity-Forecasting-Report-NEFR.pdfAEMO2016c,FuturePowerSystemSecurityRoadshowpresentations,2016https://aemo.com.au/-/media/Files/Electricity/NEM/Security_and_Reliability/Reports/2016-FPSS-Roadshow-presentation-1.pdfAustralianSustainableBuiltEnvironmentCouncilandClimateWorksAustralia,2016,LowCarbon,HighPerformance,Sydney.http://www.asbec.asn.au/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/160509-ASBEC-Low-Carbon-High-Performance-Full-Report.pdfCleanEnergyCouncil(CEC),2014,2013-14GridConnectionExperiencesSurveyResults,Melbourne.Task4C.1byCEC,2014http://fpdi.cleanenergycouncil.org.au/dam/cec/policy-and-advocacy/ARENA/FPDI/Grid-Connection-Experiences-Survey-Results-Report.pdfCEC,2016,EmbeddedGenerationGridConnectedStandardsScopingStudy,Melbourne.Task3B.1byEnergeia,May2016http://fpdi.cleanenergycouncil.org.au/dam/fpdi/reports/embedded-generation-study-report.pdfCleanEnergyRegulator,2017,Postcodedataforsmall-scaleinstallations.Viewed17January2017http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/RET/Forms-and-resources/Postcode-data-for-small-scale-installations#Summary-of-postcode-data
ClimateChangeAuthority,2014ReducingAustralia’sGreenhouseGasemissions–TargetsandProgressReviewFinalReport,Melbourne
ClimateWorksAustralia,PropertyCouncilofAustraliaandSeedAdvisory,May2015,ImplementingtheConnectingGenerationRule:ProjectOutcomesReport,Melbourne.http://climateworks.com.au/sites/default/files/documents/publications/implementing_the_connectin_embedded_generation_rule_report_20150507.pdfCOAGEnergyCouncil2015,NationalEnergyProductivityPlan2015-2030:BoostingCompetitiveness,ManagingCostsandReducingEmissions,Canberra.https://scer.govspace.gov.au/files/2015/12/National-Energy-Productivity-Plan-release-version-FINAL.pdfEnergyNetworksAssociation(ENA)andCommonwealthScientificandIndustrialResearchOrganisation,2015,ElectricityNetworkTransportRoadmap:InterimProgramReport,Sydney.ViewedOctober2016.http://www.energynetworks.com.au/electricity-network-transformation-roadmapErgonEnergy,EnergyQueenslandandEnergex(2016)Above30kWto5MWEmbeddedGeneratingSystemConnectionStandardforQueensland–ConsultationPaperhttps://www.ergon.com.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/383144/Above-30kW-and-up-to-5MW-EG-Connection-Standard-Consultation-Paper.pdfMorganStanleyResearch,2016,AustraliaUtilitiesAsiaInsight:Solar&Batteries.
21
Appendix1:Summaryofenergymarketreformprocesses
Who Process Timeline
AER
Ring-fencingGuidelines
FinalguidelinespublishedendNovember2016:
http://www.aer.gov.au/system/files/AER%20Ring-fencing%20Guideline%20-
%2030%20November%202016.pdf.
COAG
EnergyStorageRegistrationConsultation
Consultationpaperreleasedin2016:
http://coagenergycouncil.gov.au/sites/prod.energycouncil/files/publications/documents/EMTPT%20-
%202016%20Forward%20Work%20Program_2.pdf
COAG
StandAlone
EnergySystemsintheElectricity
MarketConsultation
Consultationpaperreleasedin2016:
http://coagenergycouncil.gov.au/sites/prod.energycouncil/files/publications/documents/EMTPT%20-
%202016%20Forward%20Work%20Program_2.pdf
COAG
FinkelReview
ReporttoCOAGDecember2016withfinalreport
early2017:http://coagenergycouncil.gov.au/independent-
review-reliability-and-stability-national-electricity-market.
StandardsAustralia
Energystorageinstallationstandards
DiscussionpaperreleasedforcommentJuly2016:
http://www.standards.org.au/OurOrganisation/News/Documents/Second%20Standards%20Australia%20Energy%20Storage%20Standards%20Discussion%20Pa
per%202016.pdf
StandardsAustralia
DistributedGenerationRoadmap
DiscussionpaperreleasedforcommentJuly2016:
http://www.standards.org.au/OurOrganisation/News/Documents/Standards%20Australia%20and%20the%20Future%20of%20Distributed%20Electricity%20Di
scussion%20Paper%2011%20July.pdf
Inadditiontothislist,theCompetitioninMeteringreformsareexpectedtocommencein2017andtheAEMCisconsideringawiderangeofRuleChangeproposals.
22
Appendix2:Stakeholderengagement
SeedAdvisoryandClimateWorksconsultedthefollowingorganisationsduringthisproject:
ABB
AGL
AECOM
AECmembersandassociatemembers
AMPCapital
ANZ
Brookfield
CharterHall
CleanEnergyCouncil
Dexus
FrasersProperty
Goodman
TheGPTGroup
ISPT
Investa
JetCharge
Lendlease
Mirvac
OakleyGreenwood
PropertyCouncilofAustralia
Pro-utility
RedEnergy
ScentreGroup
SimplyEnergy
Stockland
Tesla
VicinityCentres
Duringtheconsultations,SeedAdvisoryandClimateWorksraisedthefollowingissuesrelatingtothelackofharmonisedrequirementsthathadbeenbroughtupinpreviousconsultations:
• Increasedcoststobusinessesandconsumers
• Downscalingofambition
• Abandonmentofprojects
• Difficultiesaccessingprojectfinance
• Reducedmarketavailabilityofproducts
• Difficultiesinrollingoutnewbusinessmodelsandtechnologies
• Limitinginnovationandpoorresponsivenesstonewtechnology
Organisationscouldeitherraisetheirownissuesorwerepromptedwiththefollowingquestions:
• Hasyourbusinessexperiencedanyoftheseimpacts?
• Whatisthecostimpactofcurrentstandardsandprocessesonyourbusiness?
• Whataretheimpactsintermsofupdateofdistributedgenerationandnewtechnologies?
• Arethereadditionalimpactswehavenotdiscussed?
For further information about this project, contact ClimateWorks Australia:
ClimateWorks Australia 16/41 Exhibition St Melbourne Victoria 3000 PHONE +61 3 9902 0741 EMAIL: [email protected]
Published by ClimateWorks Australia Melbourne, Victoria, February 2017 © ClimateWorks Australia 2017
This work is subject to copyright. Apart from any use permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part may be reproduced by any process without written permission from the publisher.
This report may be downloaded at www.climateworksaustralia.org
Contact us
ClimateWorks Australia is a leading, independent research and advisory organisation helping Australia transition to net zero emissions by 2050. Founded through a partnership between Monash University and the Myer Foundation and hosted by the Monash Sustainable Development Institute.