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Theory and History of Ontology by Raul Corazzon | e-mail: [email protected]

Annotated Bibliography on Plato's Sophist. First Part: A - L

BIBLIOGRAPHY

N.B. For the critical editions and translations of the Dialogue see: Plato: BibliographicalResources on Selected Dialogues

Ackrill, John. 1955. " Symplokê Eidôn." Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studiesno. 2:31-35.

Reprinted in: R. E. Allen, Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, London, Routledge &Kegan Paul, 1965 pp. 199-206 and in: G. Vlastos (ed.) - Plato. A Collection ofCritical Essays Vol. I: Metaphysics and Epistemology, Garden City, N. Y.: AnchorBooks 1971.

1.

———. 1957. "Plato and the Copula: Sophist 251-9." Journal of Hellenic Studiesno. 77:1-6.

Reprinted in: R. E. Allen - Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, London: Routledge &Kegan Paul, 1965 pp. 207-218, in: G. Vlastos (ed.), Plato. A Collection of CriticalEssays. I: Metaphysics and Epistemology, Notre Dame, Indiana University Press,1971 and in: J. Ackrill - Essays on Plato and Aristotle, Oxford, Clarendon Press,1997.

2.

Aguirre, Jorge Francisco. 2001. "La Ontologìa De Los Géneros Supremos I."Analogía no. 15,1:127-171.

3.

———. 2001. "La Ontologìa De Los Géneros Supremos Ii." Analogía no.15,2:121-156.

4.

Alves dos Santos, Maria Carolina. 2001. "A Demarcação Platônica De NovasFronteiras Epistêmicas Para O Discurso Filosófico: Un Estudo Sobre O Sofista."Trans/Form/Acao.Revista de Filosofia no. 24:273-299.

"In the Sophist, through the circuits of the ontological-binary procedure of thedialectical divisions, Plato tries to arrive not only at the truth of the things inthemselves, but also rigorous methodictreatment, which minimizes its limitations and inadvertences, and locates it in atranscendent dimension, among the types of Being, secures to it the status ofphilosophical discourse, capable of saying that which is, as it is."

5.

Ambuel, David. 2005. "On What Is Not: Eleatic Paradox in the Parmenides and the6.

Plato's Sophist. Annotated bibliography (A - L) https://www.ontology.co/biblio/plato-sophist-biblio-one.htm

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Sophist." In Plato's Parmenides. Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium PlatonicumPragense, edited by Havlícek, Ales and Karfík, Filip, 200-215. Prague: Oikoimené.

———. 2007. Image and Paradigm in Plato's Sophist. La Vegas: ParmenidesPublishing Company.

7.

Aubenque, Pierre, ed. 1991. Études Sur Le Sophiste De Platon. Napoli: Bibliopolis.

Les textes de ce volume ont été recueillis par Michel Narcy.Table des MatièresPierre Aubenque: Avant-propos p. 11Première Partie: L'ORDRE DU TEXTE: SOPHISTIQUE, ONTOLOGIE,COSMOLOGIEFrancis Wolff: Le chasseur chassé. Les définitions du sophiste p. 17; Maria Villela-Petit: La question de l'image artistique dans le Sophiste p. 53; Nestor-Luis Cordero:L'invention de l'école éléatique: Platon, Sophiste, 242D p. 91; Jean Frère: Platon,lecteur de Parménide dans le Sophiste p. 125; Michel Fattal: Le Sophiste: logos dela synthèse ou logos de la division? p. 145; Monique Dixsaut: La négation, le non-être et l'autre dans le Sophiste p. 165; Antonia Soulez: Le travail de la négation:l'interprétation du Sophiste par Gilbert Ryle p. 215; Monique Lassègue: L'imitationdans le Sophiste de Platon p. 247; Rémi Brague: La cosmologie finale du Sophiste(265 B4 - E6) p. 267;Deuxième Partie: VUES PERSPECTIVESBarbara Cassin: Les Muses et la philosophie. Élements pour une histoire dupseudos p. 291; Denis O'Brien: Le non-être dans la philosophie grecque:Parménide, Platon, Plotin p. 317; Pierre Aubenque: Une occasion manquée: lagenèse avortée de la distinction entre l'"étant" et le "quelque chose" p. 365;Troisième Partie: LA TRADITION DU SOPHISTEPierre Pellegrin: Le Sophiste ou de la division. Aristote-Platon-Aristote p. 389;Michel Narcy: La lecture aristotélicienne du Sophiste et ses effets p. 417; LucBrisson: De quelle façon Plotin interprète-t-il le cinq genres di Sophiste? (Ennéades VI 2 [43] 8) p. 449; Annick Charles-Saget: Lire Proclus, lecteur duSophiste (ave un appendice par Christian Guérard: Les citations du Sophiste dansles œuvres de Proclus) p. 475; Françoise Caujolle-Zaslawsky: Note sur l' epagogédans le Sophiste. A propos de Diogène Laërce III 53-55 p. 509; Alain Boutot:L'interprétation heideggerienne du Sophiste de Platon p. 535;INDEXIndex de citations de Platon: I Index des citations du Sophiste p. 563; II Idex descitations d'autres dialogues p. 567; Index des citations d'auteurs anciens (Platonexcepté) p. 571; Index des noms d'auteurs modernes p. 582.

8.

———. 1991. "Une Occasion Manquée: La Genèse Avortée De La DistinctionEntre L' "Étant" Et Le "Quelque Chose"." In Études Sur Le Sophiste De Platon,edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 365-387. Napoli: Bibliopolis.

Repris dans: P. Aubenque - Problèmes aristotéliciens. I. Philosophie théorique -Paris, Vrin 2009 pp. 307-320

9.

Belardi, Walter. 1997. "Dal "Non Essere" Parmenideo All' "Alterità" Platonica: Un10.


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Caso Di Paralogismo Verbale." Atti della Accademia Nazionale deiLincei.Rendiconti Classe di Scienze Morali Storiche e Filologiche no. 8:633-647.

"Plato, in his dialogue The Sophist, tried to disprove the thesis of Parmenides,according to which the contrary of the einai would be the nonexistent me einai.Plato maintained instead that epsna is not the contrary of einai but its otherness ( toeteron). Plato's argument has seemed impeccable and constructive, and has hadnotable resonance and a sound approval through the history of the philosophy.Really, the deep structure of Parmenides' nominalized me einai was a predicate.Plato replaced the universal notion of "being" ( einai) with an epsnai assumed as adetermined "thing. Besides he transformed the negative meaning of me into thearithmetic meaning of less". So that me slum -- einai, and the wholeness of the"things", from which einai was subtracted, became the wholeness less to be, viz.the. Such an argument is actually a paralogism, according to Aristotle who saysexactly: "it is not the same thing to affirm not to be absolutely and to affirm not tobe in a determinated sense and about a determined thing ( Soph. elench. 167 a 4).Then, Plato simply committed the well known paralogism which consists inchanging a statement " a dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid"."

Benardete, Seth. 1960. "Plato Sophist 223b1-7." Phronesis.A Journal for AncientPhilosophy no. 5:129-139.

11.

———. 1963. "The Right, the True, and the Beautiful." Glotta no. 41:54-62.12.

———. 1986. Plato's Sophist: Part Ii of 'the Being of the Beautiful'. Chicago:University of Chicago Press.

13.

———. 1993. "On Plato's Sophist." Review of Metaphysics no. 46:747-780.

Reprinted in: S. Benardete - The Argument of the Action: Essays on Greek Poetryand Philosophy - Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2000, pp. 323-353."In the first part, it is argued that the Stranger has employed in his divisions botheikastic and phantastic speech, and that the issue of being arises because Theaetetusfails to recognize Socrates as the philosopher. In the second part, it is argued thatphantastic speech as the experience of eikastic speech is false opinion, and that thedouble account of logos, as the weaving together of species and of agent and action,corresponds respectively to that which makes speech possible, the other, and thatwhich determines truth and falsehood in terms of whether the agent is other than theaction."

14.

Berman, Scott. 1996. "Plato's Explanation of False Belief in the Sophist." Apeironno. 29:19-46.

"Plato's explanation of false belief is reconstructed from his Sophist and defendedagainst the principal contemporary account. Since Frege, the received view inanalytic philosophy of mind and language is that human cognition of the world isalways mediated through some sort of intensional object whose identity conditionsare such that the object is ontologically independent of the world. It is argued that

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Plato's theory of human cognition, which makes no reference to intensional objectsof that kind, is a better explanation insofar as it commits itself to a smaller ontologyand succeeds in explaining what we want explained."

Bianchetti, Matteo, and Storace, Erasmo, eds. 2004. Platone E L'ontologia. IlParmenide E Il Sofista. Milano: Albo Versorio.

16.

Bluck, Richard Stanley. 1957. "False Statement in the "Sophist"." Journal ofHellenic Studies no. 77:181-186.

17.

———. 1975. Plato's Sophist. A Commentary. Manchester: Manchester UniversityPress.

Edited by Gordon Neal.

18.

Bolton, Robert. 1975. "Plato's Distinction between Being and Becoming." Reviewof Metaphysics no. 29:66-95.

Reprinted in: N. D. Smith (ed.) - Plato. Critical assessments - Vol. II: Plato'smiddle period: metaphysics and epistemology - Lond, Routledge, 1998 pp. 116-141."This paper argues that important changes in Plato's conceptions of being ( ousia)and becoming ( genesis) occur over the dialogues, but that the final version of thedistinction between the two remains strong enough to sustain the essentials of thetheory of degrees of reality which the distinction was originally devised to expound.This position is an alternative to the predominant prevailing positions -- that Plato'sviews underwent no significant change, or that there was a change so radical as toforce the abandonment of Plato's middle-period metaphysics. Relevant passages inthe "Phaedo", "Republic", "Theaetetus", "Sophist" and "Philebus" are fullydiscussed."

19.

Bondeson, William. 1972. "Plato's "Sophist": Falsehoods and Images." Apeiron no.6:1-6.

"The paper is an attempt to show how the problem of the nature and possibility offalsehood arises in the early parts of Plato's "Sophist". I argue that the participantsin the dialogue operate with two related analogies, one which considers spokenimages to be fundamentally like seen images, and another analogy which considersthe objects of stating or believing to be like the objects of perceiving. (The secondanalogy has parallels in "Theaetetus" 188c-189b). These analogies lead toconfusions which Plato attempts to dispel in the later portions of the "Sophist"."

20.

———. 1973. "Non-Being and the One: Some Connections between Plato's"Sophist" and "Parmenides"." Apeiron no. 7:13-21.

"The purpose of the paper is to analyze Plato's arguments in the "Sophist"concerning 'absolute' non-being and to show that these arguments, once the notionof 'absolute' non-being is interpreted, have implications for (a) Plato's notion ofbeing, (b) his views about the conditions for something to be a subject of discourse,

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and (c) the first and sixth hypothesis of the "Parmenides"."

———. 1974. "Plato's Sophist and the Significance and Truth-Value ofStatements." Apeiron:41-48.

22.

———. 1976. "Some Problems About Being and Predication in Plato's Sophist242-249." Journal of The History of Philosophy no. 14:1-10.

23.

Bordt, Michael. 1991. "Der Seinsbegriff in Platons Sophistes'." Theologie undPhilosophie no. 66:493-529.

"The article provides, first, a survey of the scholarly debate about the meaning of 'tobe' in Plato's Sophist, starting from Cornford, centering on Michael Frede andOwen, and leading up to the present day discussion. Then, Plato's criticism ofdualism, monism, idealism, materialism (Soph. 242b6-249d5) is given detailedanalysis. The scope of this analysis is to substantiate the hypothesis that Platodistinguishes two types of propositions in Sophist, i.e., those of predication and aparticular kind of identity. Each type uses 'is' differently. However, even whencriticizing traditional ontologies, Plato does not use 'is' to mean 'exists'."

24.

Bossi, Beatriz, and Robinson, Thomas M., eds. 2013. Plato's Sophist Revisited.Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

Proceedings of the International Spring Seminar on Plato's Sophist at the "Centro deCiencias de Benasque Pedro Pascual", Benasque (Spain), May 26 - May 31, 2009.

25.

Bostock, David. 1984. "Plato on 'Is Not' ( Sophist, 254-9)." Oxford Studies inAncient Philosophy no. 2:89-119.

"According to the received doctrine, which I do not question, the uses of the Greekverb 'to be' may first be distinguished into those that are complete and those that areincomplete. In its incomplete uses the verb requires a complement of some kind(which may be left unexpressed), while in its complete uses there is no complement,and it may be translated as 'to exist' or 'to be real' or 'to be true' or something of thekind. What role the complete uses of the verb have to play in the Sophist as a wholeis a vexed question, and one that I shall not discuss. For I think it will be generallyagreed, at least since Owen's important article of 1971, (1) that in our centralsection of the Sophist it is the incomplete uses that are the centre of Plato'sattention. Anyway, I shall confine my own attention to these uses, and accordinglymy project is to elucidate and evaluate Plato's account of 'is not' where the 'is' isincomplete. I might also add here that, for the purposes of the Sophist as a whole, Iam in agreement with Owen's view that what Plato himself took to be crucial wasthe account of 'not', and what he has to say about 'is' is, in his own eyes, merelyancillary to this. But I do not argue that point, partly because Owen has alreadydone so, and partly because it is not needed for my main contentions. As we shallsee, one cannot in fact understand what Plato does say about `not' without firstconsidering his views on the incomplete 'is'.Reverting to the received doctrine once more, the incomplete uses of 'is' may be

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divided into two. In one sense the verb functions as an identity sign, and means thesame as 'is the same as', while in the other it functions merely as a sign ofpredication, coupling subject to predicate, and cannot be thus paraphrased. The vastmajority of commentators on the Sophist seem agreed that Plato means todistinguish, and succeeds in distinguishing, these two different senses of the verb.This I shall deny. In fact I shall argue not only that Plato failed to see thedistinction, but also that his failure, together with another ambiguity that he fails tosee, wholly vitiates his account of the word 'not'. The central section of the Sophistis therefore one grand logical mistake."(1) Plato on Not-Being in Plato I, ed. G. Vlastos (New York, 1971), 223-267. (Anote omitted).

Brach, Markus Joachim. 1996. Heidegger--Platon. Vom Neukantilismus ZurExistentiellen Interpretation Des "Sophistes". Würzburg: Königshausen undNeumann.

27.

Brague, Rémi. 2005. "La Cosmologie Finale Du Sophiste (263b4-E6)." InIntroduction Au Monde Grec: Études D'histoire De La Philosophie, 195-218.Chatou: Les Éditions de la Transparence.

28.

Brisson, Luc. 1991. "Participation Et Prédication Chez Platon." RevuePhilosophique de la France et de l'Étranger no. 116:557-569.

29.

Brown, Lesley. 1986. "Being in the Sophist: A Syntactical Enquiry." Oxford Studiesin Ancient Philosophy no. 4:49-70.

"Plato's Sophist presents a tantalizing challenge to the modern student ofphilosophy. In its central section we find a Plato whose interests and methods seemat once close to and yet remote from our own. John Ackrill's seminal papers on theSophist, (1) published in the fifties, emphasized the closeness, and in optimisticvein credited Plato with several successes in conceptual analysis. These articlescombine boldness of 'argument with exceptional clarity and economy of expression,and though subsequent writers have cast doubt on some of Ackrill's claims for theSophist the articles remain essential reading for all students of the dialogue. I amhappy to contribute an essay on the Sophist to this volume dedicated to JohnAckrill.Among the most disputed questions in the interpretation of the Sophist is that ofwhether Plato therein marks off different uses of the verb einai, 'to be'. This paperaddresses one issue under that heading, that of the distinction between the'complete' and 'incomplete' uses of `to be', which has usually been associated withthe distinction between the 'is' that means 'exists' and the 'is' of predication, that is,the copula."(1) Symploke Eidon (1955) and Plato and the Copula: Sophist 251-59 (1957), bothreprinted in Plato I, ed G. Vlastos (New York, 1971), 201-9 and 210-22.

30.

———. 1994. "The Verb 'to Be' in Greek Philosophy: Some Remarks." InLanguage, edited by Everson, Stephen, 212-236. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.

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"I examine key uses of 'to be' in Parmenides, Plato (especially Republic V andSophist) and Aristotle. I argue against imposing modern distinctions (intopredicative, existential or identity uses) on to the texts, showing that while Greekuses of einai may be partitioned into syntactically complete and incomplete (notedby Aristotle and perhaps at Sophist 255cd) the distinction was neither clear-cut norperceived as philosophically important. I examine how these authors treated theinference from 'X is F' to 'X is' (compare that from 'X teaches French' to 'X teaches')and, more problematically (as Plato Sophist saw, correcting Parmenides andRepublic V) from 'X is not F' to 'X is not'. "

———. 2001. "Innovation and Continuity. The Battle of Gods and Giants, Sophist245-249." In Method in Ancient Philosophy, edited by Gentzer, Jyl, 181-207. NewYork: Oxford University Press.

32.

———. 2008. "The Sophist on Statements, Predication, and Falsehood." In TheOxford Handbook of Plato, edited by Fine, Gail, 383-410. New York: OxfordUniversity Press.

"This essay focuses on two key problems discussed and solved in the Middle Part:the Late-learners problem (the denial of predication), and the problem of falsestatement. I look at how each is, in a way, a problem about correct speaking; howeach gave rise to serious philosophical difficulty, as well as being a source of eristictroublemaking; and how the ES offers a definitive solution to both. As I said above,the Sophist displays an unusually didactic approach: Plato makes it clear that he hasimportant matter to impart, and he does so with a firm hand, especially on the twoissues I've selected."

33.

———. 2010. "Definition and Division in Plato' Sophist." In Definition in GreekPhilosophy, edited by Charles, David, 151-171. New York: Oxford UniversityPress.

"In Plato's late dialogues Sophist and Politicus (Statesman), we find the chiefspeaker, the Eleatic Stranger, pursuing the task of definition with the help of the so-called method of division.(...)However, there are major and well-known problems in evaluating the method aspractised in the two dialogues, but especially so in the Sophist.(...)I investigate below some of the many scholarly responses to this bewilderingdisplay of the much-vaunted method of division. I divide scholars into a 'no-faction', those who hold that we should not try to discern, in any or all of thedialogue's definitions, a positive outcome to the investigation into what sophistry is(Ryle, Cherniss), and a 'yes-faction': those who think an outcome is to be found(Moravcsik, Cornford, and others).(2) I shall conclude that in spite of theappearance of many answers (Moravcsik) or one answer (Cornford, Notomi), thereader is not to think that any of the definitions give the (or a) correct account ofwhat sophistry is. But while I side with the no-faction, my reasons differ from thoseof Kyle and Cherniss, who, in their different ways, located the failure in the natureof the method of division. In my view the failure lies not, or not primarily, in the

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method of division itself; but in the object chosen for discussion and definition.Sophistry, the sophist: these are not appropriate terms to be given, a seriousdefinition, for the simple reason that a sophist is not a genuine kind that possessesan essence to be discerned.(3) If we try to carve nature at the joints, we cannot hopeto find that part of reality which is sophistry, for there is no such genuine kind assophistry-especially not under the genus of techne, art, skill, or expertise." pp.151-153).(2) The views of Moravcsik, Cornford, and Notomi are discussed in the text ofsection III; those of the 'no-faction' in note 17.(3) I use 'genuine kind' to indicate something with a wider extension than that of'natural kind' familiar from Locke, Putnam, etc. I use it to mean the kind of entitywhich Plato would allow to have an ousia (essence) or phusis (nature) of its own(cf. Tht. 172b). Virtues, senses like hearing and sight, and crafts like angling wouldbe recognized as genuine kinds in the intended sense."

Brumbaugh, Robert Sherrick. 1983. "Diction and Dialectic. The Language of Plato'sStranger from Elea." In Language and Thought in Early Greek Philosophy, editedby Cobb, Kevin, 266-276. La Salle: Hegeler Institute.

Reprinted with the title "Diction and dialectic: a note on the Sophist" and a newfinal pragraph as Chapter 7 in. R. S. Brumbaugh - Platonic studies of Greekphilosophy: Form, Arts, Gadgets, and Hemlock - Albany, State University of NewYork press, 1989, pp. 103-111.

35.

Brzoska, Andreas. 1992. Absolutes Sein. Parmenides' Lehrgedicht Und SeineSpiegelung Im Sophistes. Münster: Lit.

36.

Carchia, Gianni. 1997. La Favola Dell'essere. Commento Al Sofista. Macerata:Quodlibet.

Con il Sofista di Platone nella traduzione di Ermidio Martini

37.

Cherubin, Rose. 1993. "What Is Eleatic About the Eleatic Stranger?" In Plato'sDialogues: New Studies and Interpretations, edited by Press, Gerald A., 215-236.Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

"In Plato's Sophist the mathematician Theodorus introduces to Socrates a manTheodorus says is a philosopher from Elea and a companion of the followers ofParmenides and Zeno. This Eleaticstranger, whose name is neither given nor asked for in the dialogue, is asked bySocrates to tell whether his compatriots thought of sophist, statesman, andphilosopher as three classes or as fewer, and what names they used for such a classor classes.In this paper I would like to pose and to explore the following questions: Why isthere an Eleatic Stranger in Plato's Sophist? What if anything does this charactersay or imply or do that only a"companion of those around Parmenides and Zeno" (216a) would? I would also liketo propose that central to these concerns is the question of how Plato readParmenides' poem. Did Plato take the daimon's speech as a direct and literal

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statement of Parmenides' views? What we can discover about this issue could beinstructive in our considerations of how we might best read Parmenides." p. 215

Chu, Antonio. 2004. "Plato, Frege and the Possibility of False Judgment." InDesire, Identity, and Existence. Essays in Honor of T. M. Penner, edited byReshokto, Naomi, 225-249. Kelowna (Canada): Academic printing and publishing.

39.

Cordero, Nestor-Luis. 1991. "L'invention De L'école Éléatique: Platon, Sophiste,242d." In Études Sur Le Sophiste De Platon, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 91-124.Napoli: Bibliopolis.

40.

———. 2000. "La Participation Comme Être De La Forme Dans Le Sophiste DePlaton." In Ontologie Et Dialogue. Mélanges En Hommage À Pierre AubenqueAvec Sa Collaboration À L'occasion De Son 70e Anniversaire, edited by Cordero,Nestor-Luis, 33-46. Paris: Vrin.

41.

———. 2002. "Aristotele Critico Spietato Ma Erede Furtivo Del Sofista Platone."In Gigantomachia. Vonvergenze E Divergenze Tra Platone E Aristotele, edited byMigliori, Maurizio, 205-219. Brescia: Morcelliana.

42.

———. 2005. "Du Non-Être À L'autre: La Découverte De L'altérité Dans LeSophiste De Platon." Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger no.195:175-189.

"When Plato, in the Sophist, tries to turn down Parmenides' argumentation about theexistence of non-being, he reaches a most unexpected conclusion: i.e., the Greeklanguage, identifying "what is" to "the beings", makes it impossible to express whatis not. Now, since the false discourse, proper to Sophists, supposes that "that whichis not" exists, Plato examines the theories of the philosophers who came before himand discovers that, apart from the absolute nothingness on which he sharesParmenides's judgment, some kind of a non-being is possible, i.e., that ofpredication. True to his philosophy. Plato suggests a Form as warrant of such a"relative" non-being: the different (alterity, otherness). This Form, with itscomplementary Form, the identity, guarantees the definition of every reality."

43.

———. 2007. "Il Faut Rétablir La Version Originale De Sophiste 240 B 7-9."Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico no. 28 (403):413.

44.

Cornford, Francis Macdonald. 1935. Plato's Theory of Knowledge. The Theaetetusand the Sophist of Plato Translated with a Running Commentary. New York:Harcourt, Brace and Co.

45.

Crivelli, Paolo. 1990. "Il 'Sofista' Di Platone. Non Essere, Negazione E Falsità." InAtti E Memorie Dell'accademia Toscana Di Scienze E Lettere "La Colombaria" -Vol. 55, 11-104. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki.

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"Introduzione. Dopo sei tentativi insoddisfacenti di definire il sofista con il metododiairetico, nella settima classificazione dicotomica Platone lo descrive come`produttore di immagini'. Tale caratterizzazione si scontra con le difficoltà sollevatedal `paradosso del falso', l'argomentazione che cerca di provare l'inesistenza delfalso. L'ampio excursus centrale del Sofista (236d5-264d9) affronta e risolve unadelle versioni del paradosso del falso. Platone riconduce la fallaciadell'argomentazione a un'errata valutazione dei rapporti tra negazione ed esistenza,e corregge lo sbaglio mediante una minuziosa analisi del significato della particella'non'.La versione del paradosso del falso studiata nel Sofista può essere presentata, ameno di qualche inessenziale semplificazione, come un'argomentazione che escludela falsità degli enunciati singolari affermativi: perché un enunciato singolareaffermativo sia falso, bisogna che ciò che non è P sia detto essere P (`P' terminegenerale arbitrario), e quindi bisogna parlare di ciò che non esiste; ma è impossibileparlare di ciò che non esiste; di conseguenza, un enunciato singolare affermativonon può essere falso. Il passaggio critico di questa argomentazione si fondasull'assunzione che la negazione predicativa implichi l'inesistenza: se x non è P,allora x non esiste.Platone ritiene (giustamente) che tale assunzione sia errata, e adotta la strategia disvelare, e quindi confutare, il ragionamento sofistico che sta a fondamento di essa.A suo avviso, tale ragionamento muove dal presupposto che la particella `non'indichi contrarietà: dato che la copula ha portata esistenziale, la verità di unpredicato nominale `è P' rispetto a un oggetto x richiede (tra l'altro) l'esistenza di x;se il `non' indica contrarietà, la verità rispetto a x del predicato nominale negativo`non è P' richiede la soddisfazione di condizioni contrarie (ossia antitetiche, il piùpossibile lontane) rispetto a quelle che garantiscono la verità di `è P', e quindirichiede (tra l'altro) l'inesistenza di x. Pertanto `non è P' è vero solo di ciò che nonesiste, e la negazione predicativa implica l'inesistenza.Platone demolisce tale ragionamento attaccandone il presupposto: il `non' nonindica contrarietà, ma solo diversità. Più precisamente: la verità del predicatonominale negativo `non è P' rispetto a un oggetto x richiede `solo' che x sia diversoda ciascuno degli oggetti dei quali è vero il predicato nominale `è P', ossia (poichéla predicazione ha portata esistenziale) che x sia diverso da ciascuno degli oggettiche esistono e partecipano della proprietà significata dal termine generale `P'.Ora, però, niente vieta che tra gli oggetti diversi da tutti quelli che esistono epartecipano della proprietà significata da `P' ve ne siano di esistenti. Pertanto `non èP' può essere vero anche di ciò che esiste, e la negazione predicativa non implical'inesistenza. L'assunzione sulla quale si fonda il paradosso del falso è confutata.Platone non si limita a demolire il paradosso del falso, ma propone anche un'analisidella falsità degli enunciati singolari nella quale mette a frutto i risultati dello studiodella negazione: `s è P' è falso quando s (l'oggetto del quale `s è P' parla) non è P,ossia quando s è diverso da ciascuno degli oggetti che esistono e partecipano dellaproprietà significata dal termine generale P.La versione del paradosso del falso studiata nel Sofista non dipende da uno scambiotra gli usi èsistenziale' e `predicativo' del verbo 'einai' ('essere'), ma da un errore nelmodo d'intendere il 'non'. Ciò spiega perché la soluzione suggerita da Platone non siconcentri sulla distinzione tra gli usi èsistenziale' e 'predicativo' di èinai' (un fatto,questo, che mette in crisi varie accreditate interpretazioni del dialogo): ladistinzione tra gli usi di 'einai' non avrebbe colpito l'errore che sta alla radice delparadosso esaminato da Platone. Il problema logico più profondo studiato dalSofista non riguarda i sensi o usi di 'einai', ma i rapporti fra negazione ed esistenza."


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pp. 11-12.

———. 1993. "Plato's Sophist and Semantic Fragmentation." Archiv für Geschichteder Philosophie no. 75:71-74.

"In this journal, Band 71, Heft 3, pp. 257-282, Michael T. Ferejohn proposed toapply to the interpretation of certain parts of Plato's Sophist a methodologicalprinciple which I shall call 'principle of joint explanation': given the closerelationship between Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy, in particularcircumstances it's possible to use Aristotelian texts to interpret obscure or vaguePlatonic passages. In this paper I shall criticize Ferejohn's application of the'principle of joint explanation' to the Sophist and his interpretation of Plato'sanalysis of negation and of its philosophical aims."

47.

———. 2012. Plato's Account of Falsehood. A Study of the Sophist. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.

Contents: Acknowledgements IX; Abbreviations of titles of Plato's works X; Noteon the text XI; Introduction 1; 1. The sophist defined 13; 2. Puzzles about non-being 28; 3. Puzzles about being 71; 4. The communion of kinds 102; 5. Negationand not-being 177; 6. Sentences, false sentences, and false belief 221; Appendix:The Sophist on true and false sentences: formal presentation 261; References 275;Index of names 290; Index of subjects 294; index of passages cited 296-309.

48.

Crombie, Ian MacHattie. 1963. An Examination of Plato's Doctrines. London:Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Vol. I: Plato on man and society; vol. II: An examination of Plato's doctrines

49.

Dancy, Russell M. 1999. "The Categories of Being in Plato's Sophist 255c-E."Ancient Philosophy no. 19:45-72.

" Sophist 255c-e contains a division of beings into two categories rather than adistinction between the "is" of identity, existence, and/or predication; this emergesfrom an analysis of the argument that employs the division. The resulting division isthe same as that ascribed to Plato in the indirect tradition among the so-called"unwritten doctrines"; there the two categories are attached to the One and theIndefinite Dyad."" Conclusion. Perhaps it is not so bad if the later Plato sounds more like Aristotle.But there remains an enormous difference of ontology between Plato and Aristotle,if any of the reports of Plato's 'unwritten doctrines' can be believed.We have already noticed that Plato thinks the distinction between beings and otherscan be put by saying that while beings partake of both the Forms Standalone andRelative, others partake only of the Form Relative. The partition of beings intoStandalone ones and Relative ones, as I have construed it, is a categorial scheme:the scheme of Old Academic Categories adverted to in the introductory section ofthis article. Hermodorus (or whoever) was there quoted as saying that Plato says 'ofthe beings, some are by virtue of themselves, and some are relative to something';that much we have the Eleatic Stranger saying in 255c13-14. But Hermodorus gives

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us examples, where the Stranger does not: a man and a horse are by virtue ofthemselves; large and small [things] are relative to things. If we unpack theseexamples, we presumably find ourselves saying: Bucephalus is a horse by virtue ofhimself; it is because he is Bucephalus that he is a horse, or, perhaps better, it is notbecause of some other thing that Bucephalus counts as a horse, whereas the fact thatBucephalus is large is something whose explanation requires us to introduce other,relatively smaller, horses which are the norm for horses as far as size goes. Thisthen leads to categorizations of the terms man and horse under the headingStandalone and large, small, good, and bad under the heading Relative. And itseems a sound conjecture that where I am speaking of 'terms', Plato would speak of'forms': the division is a division of forms, if that is right.But that is not the end of the story. The Hermodorus text, along with other texts, (1)would have us believe that Plato rooted the two categories Standalone and Relativein two super-Forms that stood above all the others: the mysterious entities known asthe One and the Indefinite Dyad, from which the more ordinary Forms derived asnumbers. I think this, too, should be taken seriously. But that is a large undertaking,not to be entered on here." pp. 69-70(1) Including, besides the others quoted in I, many in Aristotle, and also the ratherstrange and somewhat garbled stretch of text in Sextus Empiricus, AdversusMathematicos x 257-276 purporting to report on the views of 'Pythagoras and hiscircle'.

De Petris, Alfonso. 2005. Del Vero E Del Falso Nel Sofista Di Platone. Con UnSaggio Sul Cratilo. Firenze: Olschki.

51.

Denyer, Nicholas. 1991. Language, Thought and Falsehood in Ancient GreekPhilosophy. London: Routledge.

52.

Diés, Auguste. 1963. La Définition De L'être Et La Nature Des Idées Dans LeSophiste De Platon. Vrin: Paris.

Reprint of the oririginal edition published in 1903

53.

Dixsaut, Monique. 1991. "La Négation, Le Non-Être Et L'autre Dans Le Sophiste."In Études Sur Le Sophiste De Platon, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 165-213. Napoli:Bibliopolis.

54.

Dorter, Kenneth. 1990. "Diairesis and the Tripartite Soul in the Sophist." AncientPhilosophy no. 10:41-61.

"The Republic and its predecessors interpret sophistry as the employment of reasonin the service of the appetites (or spiritedness). But although the Sophist definessophistry in several ways, none of which is entirely satisfactory, it never discussesthis earlier approach. It proceeds entirely in terms of material products rather thanvalue-laden goals. The tripartite soul is not mentioned, and attentiveness todifference of value is actively discouraged. At the same time, however, the dialogueabounds with allusions to the tripartite soul and value. My essay explores thistension and suggests a resolution that also explains the six preliminary definitions

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and the purpose of the trilogy as a whole."

Duerlinger, James. 1988. "The Ontology of Plato Sophist: The Problems ofFalsehood, Non-Being and Being." Modern Schoolman no. 65:151-169.

"A new, unifying account of Plato's discussion of the problems is introduced thatplaces it squarely within the framework of his theory of Forms as it was understoodby Aristotle and the ancient Platonists, instead of the linguistic frameworks inwhich it has been placed by modern scholars. The account takes the form of acontinuous analytical summary of, and commentary on, the "Sophist",236d9-259d8."

56.

———. 1988. "The Ontology of Plato Sophist: The Solutions to the Problems ofFalsehood, Non-Being and Being." Modern Schoolman no. 65:170-184.

57.

Duncombe, Matthew. 2012. "Plato's Absolute and Relative Categories at Sophist255c14." Ancient Philosophy no. 32:77-86.

58.

Dürr, Karl. 1945. "Moderne Darstellung Der Platonischen Logik. Ein Beitrag ZurErklärung Des Dialoges Sophistes." Museum Helveticum no. 2:166-194.

59.

Ebert, Theodor. 1998. "Wer Sind Die Ideenfreunde in Platons Sophistes?" In AmicusPlato Magis Amica Veritas. Festschrift Wolfgang Wieland Zum 65. Geburtstag,edited by Enskat, Reiner, 82-100. Berlin: de Gruyter.

"In this paper I try to support the position (held by Proklos, Mallet, Burnet, and A.Taylor) that the "friends of the Forms" in Plato's Sophist (248a ff.) are Pythagoreanphilosophers. My main argument for this claim is the term ' synetheia' as used bythe Eleatic Stranger at Sophist 248b8: as the passage Meno 76c-d (not taken intoconsideration by Ross in Plato's Theory of Forms p. 105) shows, this term may welldenote acquaintance with persons, not only habituation. Hence, Plato has the EleaticStranger refer to philosophers with whom he, because of his Italian background, iswell acquainted. For these philosophers, there are no other likely candidates thanthe Pythagoreans."

60.

Eck, Job van. 1995. "Falsity without Negative Predication: On Sophistes255e-263d." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 40:20-47.

61.

———. 2000. "Plato's Logical Insights: On Sophist 254d-257a." AncientPhilosophy no. 20:53-79.

"The theory of falsity and negation in Sophist 254 D-263 D contains the idea that(a) rest does not participate in movement, nor movement in rest (254 D-255 A ; 255A-E ; 255 E-257 A), because (b) this would turn their opposite natures into eachother. Only the first part of (a) is true and the reason given for it is not sound. Theinvalidation of the argument may be repaired by dropping the false part of (a), thatmovement does not partake of rest. Further, (b) stands on its own and could be

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dropped without consequences for the construction of the theory. So, although (a) +(b) plays a part in the foundations of the theory, it is not fundamental in the sensethat its unsoundness would shake these foundations : what is argued for with thehelp of it remains valid."

———. 2002. "Non-Being and Difference: On Plato's Sophist 256d5-258e3."Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 23:63-84.

"The passage appears to predicate not-being of a Form. Because "being" admits ofboth complete and incomplete uses we can find, in the present passage, the verbbeing used in both senses to show that to me on is indefinite in quantity with regardto each form."

63.

———. 2008. "Self-Predication and Being the Aitia of Things." Ancient Philosophyno. 28:105-124.

"Plato's claim that a form, F, can be predicated of itself is not a claim about causalexplanation. To say that F-ness is F is to say something about the being F-ness is,which is being F, something F indeed. That is why it can be called F and that iswhat we do in saying that F-ness is F. (Evidence is drawn from Sophist andPhaedo.).

64.

Ellis, John. 1995. ""Dunamis" and Being: Heidegger on Plato's Sophist 247d8-E4."Epoché.A Journal for the History of Philosophy no. 3:43-78.

65.

Esposti Ongaro, Michele. 2008. "Analisi Nominale E Analisi Verbale Nel Sofista DiPlatone." Giornale Critico di Filosofia Italiana no. 87:240-254.

66.

———. 2009. "The Ontological Ground of Syntax: An Analysis of Plato's Sophist,262c2-5. A Reply to Bruno Centrone." Études Platoniciennes no. 6.

67.

Fattal, Michel. 1991. "Le Sophiste: Logos DeLa Synthèse Ou Logos DeLaDivision?" In Études Sur Le Sophiste De Platon, edited by Aubenque, Pierre,145-163. Napoli: Bibliopolis.

Repris dans: M. Fattal - Logos. Pensée et vérité dans la philosophie grecque - Paris:l'Harmattan 2001, 161-80

68.

Ferejohn, Michael T. 1989. "Plato and Aristotle on Negative Predication andSemantic Fragmentation." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 71:257-282.

69.

Ferg, Stephen. 1976. "Plato on False Statement: Relative Being, a Part of Being,and Not-Being in the Sophist." Journal of The History of Philosophy no.14:336-342.

"The Stranger in the Sophist is careful to distinguish false statements from ellipticalrelational assertions which sometimes appear to resemble them."

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Ferro, Antonio. 2011. Il Problema Della Predicazione Tra Antichi E Moderni.Bologna: CLUEB.

Il Sofista platonico e la sua fortuna nella filosofia contemporanea.

71.

Figal, Gunter. 2000. "Refraining from Dialectic: Heidegger's Interpretation of Platoin the Sophist Lectures (1924/25)." In Interrogating the Tradition. Hermeneuticsand the History of Philosophy, edited by Scott, Charles E. and Sallis, John, 95-109.Albany: State University of New York Press.

72.

Flower, Robert. 1980. "G. E. L. Owen, Plato and the Verb to Be." Apeiron no.14:87-95.

"In defining what Being is in the Sophist, Plato uses the verb to be in one senseonly, that of participation. There is neither an "is" of existence nor one of identity."

73.

Fraasen, Bas C.van. 1969. "Logical Structure in Plato's Sophist." Review ofMetaphysics no. 22:482-498.

"In view of much recent discussion of the passage in the Sophist in which Platodiscusses the relations among the forms, (*) it may not be inappropriate to examinethis passage from the point of view of modern logical theory. There is indeedalready one such study by Karl Dürr, (**) who attempts to represent the relationsamong the forms within the framework of classes in Principia Mathematica. Sincewe consider some of these relations to be modal in character, we cannot accept theadequacy of this framework for this purpose.In what follows we shall examine the connection between relations among theforms and the relation of participation between forms and individuals (section 2),the peculiar character of forms corresponding to relative terms (section 3), andfinally the formal representation of the described logical structures (section 4). Themain point which emerges is that the problems discussed by Plato are closelyrelated to difficult problems in current logical theory." p. 482(*) 251A-259D. See for example J. B. Trevaskis, "The megista genê and the vowelanalogy of Plato, Sophist 253," Phronesis 11 (1966), pp. 99-116, and the referencestherein.(**) "Moderne Darstellung der platonischen Logik. Ein Beitrag zur Erklärung desDialoges Sophistes," Museum Helveticum 2 (1945), pp. 166-194.

74.

Frede, Michael. 1967. Prädikation Und Existenzaussage. Platons Gebrauch Von'...Ist' Und '...Ist Nicht...' In Sophistes. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

75.

———. 1992. "Plato's Sophist on False Statements." In The Cambridge Companionto Plato, edited by Kraut, Richard, 397-424. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.

76.

———. 1996. "The Literary Form of the Sophist." In Form and Argument in LatePlato, edited by Gill, Christopher and McCabe, Mary Margaret, 135-152. Oxford:

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Oxford University Press.

Fronterotta, Francesco. 1995. "L'être Et La Participation De L'autre, Une NouvelleOntologie Dans Le Sophiste." Études Philosophiques:311-353.

78.

Gardeya, Peter. 1988. Platons Sophistes. Interpretation Und Bibliographie.Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.

79.

Gavray, Marc-Antoine. 2006. "La Dunamis Dans Le Sophiste." PhilosophieAntique.Problèmes, Renaissance, Usagess no. 6:29-57.

"In Sophist 247d8-e4, the Eleatic Stranger presents an bows of Being as dunamistou poiein kai tou pathein. This paper aims to investigate the meaning of this horosand to establish the value set on dunamis. A comparison with other Platonicpassages where the formula occurs ( Phaedrus and Theaetetus) reveals that theSophist provides a double change: on the one hand, the dunamis moves to the fieldof Being in an unprecedented way, on the other hand the formula is not ascribed toHippocrates or Protagoras anymore, but it is introduced by a protagonist whointends to defend it. A reading of the previous and following arguments shows thatthe horos can thoroughly help to understand the dialogue's structure andargumentation. Not only useful for defining Being, it also permits to explain thekoinonia of the Kinds and to lay the foundation for the theory of non-being. Finally,it proves an efficient mean of definitely going beyond sophistry by replacing it witha real and philosophical ontology."

80.

———. 2007. Simplicius Lecteur Du Sophiste. Contribution À L'étude DeL'exégèse Néoplatonicienne Tardive. Paris: Klincksieck.

81.

Gerson, Lloyd. 1986. "A Distinction in Plato's Sophist." Classical Quarterly no.63:251-266.

Reprinted in: Nicholas D. Smith (ed.) - Plato. Critical Assessments - Plato's laterworks - vol. IV - London, Routledge, 1998 - pp. 125-141."The fundamental objection to the theory of Forms, as recognized both by Aristotleand Plato himself in the "Parmenides", is that Forms need to be separate from thesensible world and yet in some way present in it. This appears to be impossible. Inthe "Sophist" Plato begins to formulate an answer to this objection which consists ina distinction of a Form and its nature, the latter bearing a strong resemblance towhat later came to be called a 'common nature'."

82.

———. 2006. "The 'Holy Solemnity' of Forms and the Platonic Interpretation ofSophist." Ancient Philosophy no. 26:291-304.

"In the famous passage Sophist 248E6-249A2, the Eleatic Stranger suggests that"real being" is somehow inseparable from intellect or "intellectual motion." Moderninterpretations of this passage either hold that Plato wants to redefine real reality toinclude all things that are in motion or that he wants to include one type of motion

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within the really real. Both of these interpretations have serious difficulties.According to the older Platonic interpretation of the passage which I shall defend,Plato wants to claim that the inseparability of intellect and real reality means thateternal objects of thinking could not exist without their being eternally thought."

Giannopoulou, Zina. 2001. ""The Sophistry of Noble Lineage" Revisited: Plato'sSophist 226 B 1-231 B 8." Illinois Classical Studies no. 26:101-124.

"Plato's Sophist consists of seven definitions of the sophistic art that, with theexception of the last, reveal mostly fragmentary aspects of the essence of sophistry.The sixth logos (226 B 1-231 B 8) depicts the art as noble. Here the sophist emergesas someone who is able to identify contradictory arguments and thereby to removehindrances to truth. But his activity can be seen as an intellectual game devoid ofseriousness because vague as to its intentions. This logos thus facilitates thetransition to the final definition, which portrays the sophist as unable to teachbecause he lacks true knowledge."

84.

Gill, Mary Louise. 2010. "Division and Definition in Plato's Sophist andStatesman." In Definition in Greek Philosophy, edited by Charles, David, 172-199.New York: Oxford University Press.

"In this paper I will argue that dichotomous division yields a good definition of atarget kind only in the simplest and most uncontroversial cases. Plato also usesdivision in defining more complex kinds, but then it serves as a preliminarystrategy, which undertakes to expose some puzzle about the kind underinvestigation, which the enquirers must resolve in some other way, or at least inconjunction with some other method.We have trouble catching the sophist, because we find him, not at the end of asingle branch, but at many different termini, allowing multiple definitions. We findthe statesman at a single terminus, but he has many rivals there, who claim to sharehis expertise; the definition of the statesman reached by dichotomous division,though very detailed, turns out to be much too general. These disappointing resultsserve a purpose. Plato wants us to see that something about the sophist explainswhy he turns up all over the map, and that something about the statesman explainswhy he has company at the terminus. In each dialogue, reflection on the peculiaroutcome of division enables the enquirers to recognize something about the kind inquestion which helps to explain the peculiarity. The enquirers aim to discover a realdefinition that applies to all and only instances that fall under a kind, and whichspecifies its essence -- the feature or complex of features that explains why in thecase of the sophist he turns up in too many places, and why in the case of thestatesman he is not alone at the terminus." (p. 173)

85.

Glasmeyer, Christian. 2003. Platons Sophistes: Zur Überwindung Der Sophistik.Heidelberg: Winter.

86.

Gomez-Lobo, Alfonso. 1977. "Plato Description of Dialectic in the Sophist 253d1-E2." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 22:29-47.

87.

Gonzalez, Francisco J. 2003. "Confronting Heidegger on Logos and Being in88.


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Plato's Sophist." In Platon Und Aristoteles - Sub Ratione Veritatis. Festschrift FürWolfgang Wieland Zum 70. Geburstag, edited by Damschen, Gregor, Enskat, Reinerand Vigo, Alejandro, 102-133. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & ruprecht.

Griswold, Charles. 1977. "Logic and Metaphysics in Plato's Sophist." Giornale diMetafisica no. 6:555-570.

"In part one of this essay I defend the thesis that the "greatest genera" of the"Sophist" are not the metaphysical ideas of the earlier dialogues, and that the"participation" of these genera in each other is to be understood from a linguistic orlogical, rather than metaphysical, perspective. The genera are like concepts, notessences. In part two I argue that the Stranger's doctrine of the genera means thatthey cannot be unified, self-predicative, separable, and stable; the doctrinedeteriorates for reasons internal to itself. I suggest throughout that the Stranger'sphilosophical orientation is more "subjectivistic" than that of (Plato's) Socrates;unlike the ideas, the genera are subject to the soul's intellectual motion andproductive capacity. finally, I suggest that there is no convincing reason for holdingthat the Stranger's views are superior to those of Socrates."

89.

Hackforth, Reginald. 1945. "False Statement in Plato's Sophist." ClassicalQuarterly no. 39:56-58.

90.

Heidegger, Martin. 1997. Plato's Sophist. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Heidegger's lecture course at the University of Marburg in the Winter Semester of1924-25.Translated by Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer.Original German edition: Platon, Sophistes - Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann,1992, edited by Ingeborg Schüssler ( Gesamtausgabe, II, 19)

91.

Heinaman, Robert E. 1981. "Being in the Sophist." Archiv für Geschichte derPhilosophie no. 65:1-17.

"There is an influential view, developed during the last fifteen years, concerning therelationship between the concept of existence and thenotion of Being in Plato's Sophist. (a)Three distinguishable claims are involved in this account:(1) Plato does not wish to isolate the existential use of `to be' from its other uses.(2) Plato's discussion of being concerns syntactically incomplete uses of `to be,' notsyntactically complete uses of the verb. (b)(3) The concept of existence plays no role in the philosophical problems discussedor their solutions. Plato operates with a "scheme of concepts which lacks or ignoresan expression for èxist.' (c)I have no quarrel with (1). But (1) must be clearly distinguished from (3) sincePlato may have failed to mark out the existential use of `to be' while neverthelessusing the word to mean existence with this latter concept playing an important rolein the argument. In this paper I will try to show that there are no good reasons toaccept (2) or (3). Although I shall deal with points raised by John Malcolm andMichael Frede, the focus will be on Professor Owen's paper. The first section will

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argue that Owen's interpretation of the Sophist is untenable and the second sectionwill show that his arguments for (2) and (3) are unsuccessful. Finally, the thirdsection explains how the position I defend is compatible with Plato's employment ofnegative existentials.The position I defend is that the concept of existence does not monopolize but ispart of the notion of Being in the Sophist." pp. 1-2(a) G. E. L. Owen, "Plato on Not-Being," in G. Vlastos (ed.) Plato I (New York,1971), pp. 223-67; Michael Frede, Prädikation und Existenzaussage (Göttingen,1967); J. Malcolm, "Plato's Analysis of tò ón and tò me ón in the Sophist,"Phronesis (1967), pp. 130-46. Also cf. W. Bondeson, "Some Problems about Beingand Predication in the Sophist," Journal of the History of Philosophy (1976), p.7, n.15; A. P. D. Mourelatos, "`Nothing' as 'Not-Being'," in G. Bowersock, W. Burkert,M. Putnam (eds.) Arktouros (New York, 1979), pp. 319-29.(b) Owen, pp. 225, 236, 240-41. Frede makes the still stronger claim that every useof 'to be' in the Sophist is incomplete (Frede, pp. 37, 40, 51). Idiscuss Frede'sinterpretation in an appendix.(c) Owen, p. 263.

———. 1981. "Self-Predication in the Sophist." Phronesis.A Journal for AncientPhilosophy no. 26:55-66.

93.

———. 1983. "Communion of Forms." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society no.83:175-190.

"I argue that the notion of 'communion of Forms' in Plato's "Sophist" is intended toaccount for the truth and not for the meaningfulness of statements; and that therelation of communion which holds between Forms is identical with the relation ofparticipation which connects individuals to Forms, and that no other relationsconstitute communion."

94.

———. 1986. "Once More: Being in the Sophist." Archiv für Geschichte derPhilosophie no. 68:121-125.

"According to what I will call the 'new' interpretation, the meaning of `being' whichplays an important role in the philosophical argument of the Sophist is notèxistence' but `being such and such,' what is expressed by syntactically incompleteuses of 'to be. (a) In an earlier paper I claimed, to the contrary, that `being' is used tomean existence in the Sophist's argument, although its meaning corresponds to theother uses of the verb as well. (b) Against the new interpretation I argued asfollows:(1) The aporiai of 237-41 are solved in 251-59 by rejecting 237-41's assumptionthat 'not-being' means `contrary to being' and claiming that 'not-being' insteadmeans `different from being.'(2) On the new interpretation, `the contrary of being' means `what is (predicatively)nothing.'(3) The aporia of 240c-241b cannot be given a coherent interpretation if 'not-being',as there used, is understood to mean `what is (predicatively) nothing.'(4) Hence the meaning of 'not-being' required by the new interpretation isunacceptable, and the new interpretation should be rejected.

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In a recent note John Malcolm has replied to this argument and raised some otherobjections to my paper. (c) Here, I will limit myself to explaining why Malcolm'sobjections have no force, and why his reply to my argument. simply exchanges oneabsurdity for others." p. 121(a) Its main proponents are G. E. L. Owen, "Plato on Not-Being," in G. Vlastos(ed.) Plato I (New York, 1971), pp. 223-67); Michael Frede, Prädikation undExistenzaussage (Göttingen, 1967); J. Malcolm, "Plato's Analysis of tò on and tòmé on in the Sophist," Phronesis (1967), pp. 130-46.(b) "Being in the Sophist," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie (1983), pp. 1-17.(c) "Remarks on an Incomplete Rendering of Being in the Sophist," Archiv fürGeschichte der Philosophie (1985), pp. 162-65. Ensuing references to Malcolm willbe to this paper.

Hestir, Blake E. 2003. "A Conception of Truth in Plato's Sophist." Journal of TheHistory of Philosophy no. 41:1-24.

" Plato's solution to the problem of falsehood carries a notorious reputation whichsometimes overshadows a variety of interesting developments in Plato's philosophy.One of the less-noted developments in the Sophist is a nascent conception of truthwhich casts truth as a particular relation between language and the world. Cornfordand others take Plato's account of truth to involve something like correspondence;some find the origin of Aristotle's "correspondence" account of truth in Plato'sSophist. But all this assumes a lot about Plato, much less Aristotle. For one, itassumes that to claim that the statement 'Theaetetus is sitting' is true is to claim thatit is true because it corresponds with the fact that Theaetetus is sitting. Otherscholars have been reluctant to accept Cornford's view, but few offer anyexplanation of what sort of account of truth we might ascribe to Plato by the end ofthe Sophist. Tarski has argued that truth is a simpler notion than that ofcorrespondence. In fact, he claims his own "conception" of truth is similar to theclassical conception we find in Aristotle's Metaphysics -- a conception of truthformulated in Greek in much the same way Plato formulates it in the Sophist.Unfortunately, Tarski never sufficiently explains what it is about the classicalconception that makes it closer to his own. I argue that Tarski is generally rightabout the ancient conception of truth, but this is not to claim that Tarski's ownconception is in Plato. By interpreting Plato's solution to the paradox of not-beingand his solution to the problem of falsehood, I argue that Plato's account of truthimplies a simpler notion of truth than correspondence. I outline various types ofcorrespondence theory and show that none of these fits what Plato says about truth,syntax, and meaning in the Sophist."

96.

Johnson, Patricia Ann. 1978. "Keyt on "Eteron" in the Sophist." Phronesis.AJournal for Ancient Philosophy no. 23:151-157.

97.

Jordan, Robert William. 1984. "Plato's Task in the Sophist." Classical Quarterly no.34:113-129.

98.

Kahn, Charles. 1981. "Some Philosophical Uses of 'to Be' in Plato." Phronesis.AJournal for Ancient Philosophy no. 26:105-134.

99.


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———. 1988. "Being in Parmenides and Plato." Parola del Passato no.43:237-261.

100.

———. 2007. "Why Is the Sophist a Sequel to the Theaetetus?" Phronesis.AJournal for Ancient Philosophy no. 52:33-57.

"Interprets the Theaetetus and the Sophist as Plato's first move in the project ofreshaping his metaphysics, with the double aim of avoiding problems raised in theParmenides and applying his general theory to the philosophy of nature. Theclassical doctrine of Forms is subject to revision, but Plato's fundamentalmetaphysics is preserved in the Philebus as well as in the Timaeus. The mostimportant change is the explicit enlargement of the notion of Being to include thenature of things that change. This reshaping of the metaphysics is prepared in theTheaetetus and Sophist by an analysis of sensory phenomena in the former and, inthe latter, a new account of Forms as a network of mutual connections andexclusions. The Theaetetus deals with becoming and flux but not with being; thattopic is reserved for Eleatic treatment in the Sophist. But the problems of falsity andNot-Being, formulated in the first dialogue, cannot be resolved without theconsiderations of truth and Being, reserved for the later dialogue. That is why theremust be a sequel to the Theaetetus."

101.

Kamlah, Wilhelm. 1963. Platons Selbstkritik Im Sophistes. München: C. H. Beck.102.

Kerferd, George. 1954. "Plato's Noble Art of Sophistry ( Sophist 226a-231b)."Classical Quarterly no. 4:84-90.

103.

Ketchum, Richard. 1971. Truth and Being in Plato's Sophist. Philadelphia:University of Pennsylvania Press.

104.

———. 1978. "Participation and Predication in the Sophist 251-260." Phronesis.AJournal for Ancient Philosophy no. 23:42-62.

105.

Keyt, David. 1969. "Plato's Paradox That the Immutable Is Unknowable."Philosophical Quarterly no. 19:1-14.

"One of the great questions that Plato considers in the Sophist is that of the numberand nature of real things (242C5-6). The protagonist of the dialogue, an Eleaticstranger, raises problems for both the pluralist (243D6-244B5) and the monist(244B6-246E5) without resolving them and then turns to the battle of gods andgiants, the battle between those who hold that "body and being are the same"(246B1) and those who hold that "true being is certain intelligible and bodilessForms" (246B7-8). What the one holds is the logical contrary, not the contradictory,of what the other holds; so it is possible that they are both wrong. This seems in factto be the Eleatic's conclusion (249C10-D4), although by the time he gets to thefriends of the Forms the property under examination has shifted from corporealityto mutability. The Eleatic stranger presents the friends of the Forms with aninteresting paradox (248D1-E5). This is my subject. The friends of the Forms hold

106.


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that real being " is always invariable and constant " (248A11-12). But being isknown (248D2). And on the hypothesis that to know is to act on something, thatwhich is known is acted upon (248D10-E1). Further, to be acted upon is to bechanged (248E3-4). Therefore, since being is known, it is changed (248E3-4). Butthis conclusion contradicts their original contention." p. 1

———. 1973. "Plato on Falsity: Sophist 263b." Phronesis.A Journal for AncientPhilosophy:285-305.

Supplementary vol. I: Exegesis and argument. Studies in Greek philosophypresented to Gregory Vlastos - Edited by E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos, R. M.Rorty - Assen, Van Gorcum

107.

Kolb, Peter. 1997. Platons Sophistes. Theorie Des Logos Und Dialektik. Würzburg:Königshausen & Neumann.

108.

Kostman, James. 1973. "False Logos and Not-Being in Plato's Sophist." In Patternsin Plato's Thought. Papers Arising out of the 1971 West Coast Greek PhilosophyConference, edited by Moravcsik, Julius, 192-212. Dordrecht: Reidel.

109.

———. 1989. "The Ambiguity of 'Partaking' in Plato's Sophist." Journal of TheHistory of Philosophy no. 27:343-363.

"In his An ambiguity in the "Sophist," Gregory Vlastos showed that statementsabout Forms in the central section of the "Sophist" may be either 'ordinary' or'Pauline' predications. This paper refutes Vlastos's claim that Plato was "utterlyunaware" of this ambiguity. 255c-e is taken to be the crucial passage here. Thispaper adapts the interpretation given by Michael Frede of this passage and showsthat the sense of Plato's partaking-terms (which are used to analyze statementsabout Forms) switches from a 'Pauline' to an 'ordinary' usage at a definite point inthe text which falls at the end of the crucial passage. The context and content of thepassage determine that the switch is deliberate on Plato's part. An analysis of anearlier passage, 250a-e, confirms this point."

110.

Krohs, Ulrich. 1998. "Platons Dialektik Im Sophistes Vor Dem Hintergrund DesParmenides." Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung no. 52:237-256.

"In the Sophist, Plato demonstrates the application of two different types ofdialectics: diairesis and the method to investigate the megista gene. The aim of thispaper is to reveal the methodological unity behind this pronounced duality. Thecommon origin of both methods can be found in the aporetic part of theParmenides. The application of that type of dialectics is restricted in the Sophist toits adequate field and -- in the middle part of the dialogue-- a variation introduced tosolve the paradoxes of the Paramides. Meinwald's non-aporetic interpretation of theParmenides is discussed but rejected."

111.

Lacey, Alan Robert. 1959. "Plato's Sophist and the Forms." Classical Quarterly no.9:43-52.

112.


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Lafrance, Yvon. 1984. "Sur Une Lecture Analytique Des Arguments Concernant LeNon-Être ( Sophiste 237b10 - 239a12)." Revue de Philosophie Ancienne no.2:41-76.

113.

Lanigan, Richard L. 1982. "Semiotic Phenomenology in Plato's Sophist." Semioticano. 41:221-246.

Reprinted in: John Deely (ed.), Frontiers in Semiotics, Bloomington: IndianaUniversity Press, 1986, pp. 199-216

114.

Lee, Edward N. 1966. "Plato on Negation and Non-Being in the Sophist."Philosophical Review no. 81:267-304.

"(I) A close analysis of "Sophist" 257-259 yields a new interpretation for Plato'sdoctrine of the "parts of otherness" there. I show how it defines a sense of non-being different from, and stronger than, that earlier defined by otherness itself (in"Sophist" 251-257), and I claim that this explains why Plato twice specifies thisdoctrine, rather than that, as the explanation of non-being he needs to refuteParmenides (258b and 258e). Next I explore the philosophical force of this doctrineof "parts of otherness". First (II) I show its logical role in analyzing the sense ofnegative predication statements, using comparisons with Wittgenstein's earlyanalysis of negation. Then (III) I treat its metaphysical role, defining that element ofnegativity in becoming that corresponds to Aristotle's principle of "privation"("Physics" I). A brief addendum argues that Plotinus read Plato's doctrine of the"parts" in the same way as developed here."

115.

Leigh, Fiona. 2008. "The Copula and Semantic Continuity in Plato's Sophist."Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 34:105-121.

"Reply to J. Malcolm's critical response (Some cautionary remarks on the " is"/"teaches" analogy, 2006) to L. Brown's reading of the verb "to be" in Greek ( Beingin the Sophist. A syntactical inquiry, 1986 and The verb "to be" in Greekphilosophy: some remarks, 1994) generally and Plato's Sophist in particular.Malcolm fails to show that Brown was wrong, but Brown was indeed wrong: hercentral thesis -- that there is a semantic continuity between complete andincomplete uses of einai-- lacks the textual support it requires from the Sophist, anda central argument of that dialogue tells against it."

116.

———. 2010. "Being and Power in Plato's Sophist." Apeiron no. 43:63-85.

"An examination of Sophist 247 D-E suggests that Plato has the Stranger articulatea definition of being according to which whatever has the power to act or beaffected is a being. He does this by distinguishing relations of causation fromrelations of change. On this view, Plato himself endorses the position put forward at247 D-E."

117.

Lema Hincapié, Andrés. 1999. "¿Qué Es El No-Ser? La Respuesta De Platón Y DeParménides." Praxis Filosófica no. 8-9:247-279.

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"Firstly, this article presents through a minute analysis Parmenides' ontologicaldoctrine on not-being taken from his Poem. Moreover, it handles with a period inPlato's thought that could be adequately qualified as a Parmenidean period of hisnot-being ontology.Nevertheless, Plato, in his search for a precise and true definition of the sophist, isforced to abandon his former way of thinking about not-being. That is the maincontent of his dialogue entitled The Sophist. This dialogue defends another meaningof not-being. For Parmenides not-being just meant nothing. Besides not-being asnothing, now for Plato there is a positive sense of not-being, which is the differentor the other."

Lentz, William. 1997. "The Problem of Motion in the Sophist." Apeiron no.30:89-108.

119.

Lewis, Frank A. 1976. "Did Plato Discover the Estin of Identity?" CaliforniaStudies in Classical Antiquity no. 8:113-143.

Summary. "(I) The notion of an is of identity in English. Some passages from Platosuggesting the existence of the comparable notion of a special estin of identity inGreek. (II) What in particular would lead Plato to recognize such a special sense ofestin? Forms, participation, and predication. In the account of ordinary singularpredications, a predicate 'Y' is true of a subject X just in case X participates in theform the Y associated with. (III) Self-participation. If nothing can participate initself, then for any forms X and Y, X participates in Y and so is Y only if X is not Y.Even if self-participation is allowed, still in the majority of cases a subject is notwhat it participates in. The difficulty for all theories of predication which wish toexplain how a thing can be something which it also is not. (IV) The is of identity re-examined. Some fallacies which might support the notion, and some argumentsagainst it. (V) Sophist 255e11-256d10. Plato does not explicitly recognize an estinof identity. Four competing, "equally best" accounts of the grammatical theory hemay implicitly be invoking: (i) the estin of identity; (ii) relational terms; (iii) thedefinite article; (iv) the not of nonidentity. (VI) Conclusion. The notion of a specialestin of identity has little basis in Plato's text."

120.

———. 1976. "Plato on "Not"." California Studies in Classical Antiquity no.9:89-115.

"The general analysis of negation in the Sophist and a detailed examination ofSophist 257b3-c3 show that Plato distinguished sentences that assert non-identity,e.g. "Motion is not identical" with assorted other Forms, from sentences of negativepredication proper, e.g. "Helen is not wise". Plato is not concerned either with truth-conditions of negative sentences or with supplying the details that would give amaterially adequate account of such sentences. Instead, he is concerned almostexclusively with stating what is required if we are to understand a negativepredicate and if the negative predicate is to have a determinate meaning."

121.

Li Volsi, Rocco. 2002. "Il Sofista Di Platone." Giornale di Metafisica no.24:177-234.

122.


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RELATED PAGES

On the website "Theory and History of Ontology" (www.ontology.co)

Annotated Bibliography on Plato's Sophist. Second Part: M- Z

Plato: Bibliographical Resources on Selected Dialogues

Plato's Parmenides and the Dilemma of Participation

Semantics, Predication, Truth and Falsehood in Plato's Sophist

Plato's Cratylus and the Problem of the "Correctness of Names" (under construction)

Index of the Section: Ancient Philosophy from the Presocratics to the Hellenistic Period


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Documents

Plato's Sophist. Annotated bibliography (A - L) · 3odwr v wkhru\ ri kxpdq frjqlwlrq zklfk pdnhv qr uhihuhqfh wr lqwhqvlrqdo remhfwv ri wkdw nlqg lv d ehwwhu h[sodqdwlrq lqvridu dv