Plant Safety Safety Dose Management NRC …1400 Opus Place, Suite 904, Downers Grove, IL 60515 U.S.A. The printed version of the Journal is available cost-free to qualiﬁ ed readers

NuclearPlantJournalMay-June 2013 • Outage Management and Health Physics

Plant Safety NRC

page 18

Safety Challenges

Westinghousepage 32

Dose Management Challenges

Exelonpage 26

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Outage Management & Health Physics Issue

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Articles & ReportsStaying Focused on Plant Safety 18 By Bill Borchardt, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Fukushima, a Game Changer 22 By David Skeen, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Dose Management Challenges 26 By Pete Orphanos, Exelon Generation Current Issues in Radiological Protection 29 By Ted Lazo, OECD Nuclear Energy Agency. Meeting Safety Challenges 32 By Rita Bowser and Jim Brennan, Westinghouse Electric Company Post-Fukushima Innovations 34 By Thomas Franch, AREVA, Inc., North America

Fukushima Daiichi Status 37 A Nuclear Plant Journal Report Industry InnovationsOutage Performance Improvements 40 By Mark Hansen, NextEra Energy, Inc. Simulator Scenario Based Testing 42 By Gregg Ludlam, Exelon Nuclear

Fuel Reliability: Achieving Zero Failures 46 By Rob Schneider, Global Nuclear Fuel Plant Profi le A Long History of Safe and Reliable Operations 49 By Suzanne D’Ambrosio, Oyster Creek Generating Station Departments

Nuclear Plant JournalMay-June 2013, Volume 31 No. 3

Nuclear Plant Journal is published by EQES, Inc. six times a year in January-February, March-April, May-June, July-August, September-October, and November-December (the Annual Directory).

The subscription rate for non-qualifi ed readers in the United States is $150.00 for six issues per year. The additional air mail cost for non-U.S. readers is $30.00. Payment may be made by American Express®, Master Card®, VISA® or check and should accompany the order. Checks may be made payable to "EQES, Inc." Checks not drawn on a United States bank should include an additional $45.00 service fee. All inquiries should be ad-dressed to Nuclear Plant Journal, 1400 Opus Place, Suite 904, Downers Grove, IL 60515 U.S.A; Phone: (630) 858-6161, ext. 103; Fax: (630) 852-8787, email: [email protected]. 30 years of Journal issues are available online through the Journal website www.NuclearPlantJournal.com (search box on the right-top) for a nominal fee of $25 per issue. Contact: Anu Agnihotri, email: [email protected]

© Copyright 2013 by EQES, Inc.

ISSN: 2162-6413

Nuclear Plant Journal is a registered trademark of EQES, Inc.Printed in the USA.

Staff

Senior Publisher and EditorNewal K. Agnihotri, P.E.

Publisher and Sales ManagerAnu Agnihotri

Assistant Editor and Marketing ManagerMichelle Gaylord

Administrative Assistant QingQing Zhu

*Current Circulation: Total: 12,273 Utilities: 2,904*All circulation information is subject to BPA Worldwide, Business audit.

31st Year of Publication

Mailing Identifi cation StatementNuclear Plant Journal (ISSN 0892-2055) is published bimonthly; January-February, March-

April, May-June, July-August, September-October, and November-December by EQES, Inc., 1400 Opus Place, Suite 904, Downers Grove, IL 60515 U.S.A. The printed version of the Journal is available cost-free to qualifi ed readers in the United States and Canada. The digital version is available cost-free to qualifi ed readers worldwide. The subscription rate for non-qualifi ed readers is $150.00 per year. The cost for non-qualifi ed, non-U.S. readers is $180.00. Periodicals (permit number 000-739) postage paid at the Downers Grove, IL 60515 and additional mailing offi ces. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to Nuclear Plant Journal (EQES, Inc.), 1400 Opus Place, Suite 904, Downers Grove, IL 60515, U.S.A.

New Energy News 8

Utility, Industry & Corporation 9

New Products, Services & Contracts 13

New Documents 15

Meeting & Training Calendar 16

Research & Development 17

Journal ServicesList of Advertisers 6

Advertiser Web Directory 36

On The CoverOwned and operated by Exelon Generation, Oyster Creek is a single-unit General Electric Mark 1 Boiling Water Reactor, constructed by Burns & Roe, Inc. A horseshoe-shaped canal surrounds Oyster Creek and connects it to the Barnegat Bay. See page 49.

6 NuclearPlantJournal.com Nuclear Plant Journal, May-June 2013

Nuclear Plant Journal Rapid Response Fax Form

To: _________________________ Company: __________________ Fax: ___________________

From: _______________________ Company: __________________ Fax: ___________________

Address:_____________________ City: _______________________ State: _____ Zip: _________

Phone: ______________________ E-mail: _____________________

I am interested in obtaining information on: __________________________________________________

Comments: _____________________________________________________________________________

List of Advertisers & NPJ Rapid Response

May-June 2013

Advertisers’ fax numbers may be used with the form shown below. Advertisers’ web sites are listed in the Web Directory Listings on page 36.

Page Advertiser Contact Fax/Email

2 AREVA NP, Inc. Donna Gaddy-Bowen (434) 832-3840

11 Bechtel Power Ashley Merriman (240) 379-2123

13 Birns Eric Birns (805) 487-0427

35 Cameco Fuel Manufacturing Doug Burton (905) 372-3748

52 CB&I Keith Mackert [email protected]

4 Diakont Keith Reeser [email protected]

41 E. H. Wachs Co. Sherry Gilmore (847) 520-1147

19 GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy Julia Longfellow [email protected]

7 Global Nuclear Fuel Nicole Holmes [email protected]

27 Herguth Laboratories, Inc. J. Michael Herguth (707) 554-0109

3 HF Controls Robert Contratto (469) 568-6589

21 HukariAscendent Robert Plappert (303) 277-1458

31 Quest Integrity Group Rich Roberts [email protected]

45 Remote Ocean Systems Rick Conroy [email protected]

39 Seal Master Thomas Hillery (330) 673-8410

43 Siempelkamp Nukleartechnik GmbH John Mageski (925) 932-4000

23 Tri Tool Inc. William Atkinson (916) 351-9125

25 TW Metals- Nuclear Materials Solutions Randolph Gounder (724) 251-4701

51 Westinghouse Electric Company LLC Michelle Rossman (412) 374-3244

47 World Nuclear Association Julia Deere [email protected]

1.4 MILLION VICTORIES AND COUNTINGGNF congratulates all of our North American BWR customers on being leaker free.

In March of 2013, we met the INPO challenge and with it achieved

a significant milestone—all our North American BWR customers

were operating over 1.4 million fuel rods with zero leakers. This

achievement was the result of commitment and collaboration with

some of the best operators using the world’s best fuel from GNF.

Through development and implementation of our Defense-in-Depth

program, we’ve helped improve reliability for utilities around the

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New Energy

Ningde and FangjiashanSteam generators have been installed

at new nuclear power reactors in Ningde and Fangjiashan in Fujian and Zhejiang provinces respectively.

Four CPR-1000 pressurized water reactors are planned for Ningde. The fi rst began operation last month, while on May 3, 2013 the third unit fi nished installing its 345 tonne steam generators on schedule for startup at the end of this year. By 2015 all four reactors should be in operation at Ningde, with authorities considering adding two more advanced ACPR-1000 units.

A similar operation to install steam generators was completed at Fangjiashan 2 on May 7, 2013. That site, which is adjacent to the Qinshan and Qinshan Phase II nuclear power plants, is only currently slated for two CPR-1000s. These are expected to start operation in December 2013 and October 2014.

Contact: Source: World Nuclear Association.

BelarusianOJSC “Atomenergomash” (AEM),

Rosatom power machine building company, won the tender for the supply of two reactors and molten core catcher intended for units No. 1 and No. 2 of the Belarusian NPP.

The reactors will be manufactured by AEM-technologies (part of AEM) in Volgodonsk (Atommash plant), including reactor vessels, upper blocks, reactor shafts, refl ection shields, block of protective pipes, and other equipment. In total, between 2013 and 2017, “AEM-Technologies” is to supply approximately 4000 tons of equipment to the Belarusian NPP, Russia.

Currently, “AEM-Technologies” gets under way the comprehensive production of the reactor for the Baltic NPP, Russia. The supply is expected in 2014. In addition, the branch has great experience in production of molten core

catchers. The plant produced two of these for the Novovoronezh NPP-2, Russia and one for the Baltic NPP. Currently, the second catcher for the Baltic NPP is under production and it is expected to be shipped for the station this year.

Contact: 7 495 668-20-93, email: [email protected].

TaishanHE Yu, Chairman of China

Guangdong Nuclear Power Holding Co. (CGNPC), Henri Proglio, Chief Executive Offi cer of Electricité de France (EDF), and Luc Oursel, Chief Executive Offi cer of AREVA have signed a tripartite agreement fostering deeper industrial and commercial cooperation among the three groups.

According to the terms of this agreement, CGNPC, AREVA and EDF reaffi rm their willingness to successfully complete the construction of the fi rst two reactors in Taishan, and to carry out a successful start of their commercial operation. This will also set the stage for an effective development of future reactors. In this perspective, AREVA and CGNPC will shortly analyze the return on experience gained from the construction of Taishan 1 & 2 units.

This cooperation also foresees EDF and AREVA contribution, in their respective fi eld of expertise, to the improvement of safety, maintenance and performance of CGNPC’s reactors in operation, and to the evolution of its fl eet. Within this framework, the three partners will benefi t together from their respective nuclear industrial experiences and will consider cooperation in future international projects.

Contact: Carole Trivi, telephone: 33 40 42 44 19.

United KingdomOffi ce for Nuclear Regulation

(ONR), United Kingdom, and the Environment Agency have signed various agreements to enable the start of their assessment of a new nuclear reactor for the UK – the UK Advanced Boiling Water reactor (ABWR) of Hitachi-GE Nuclear Energy, Limited.

In January 2013, the Minister of State for Energy asked the regulators to undertake a generic design assessment

(GDA) of Hitachi-GE’s Advanced Boiling Water Reactor.

All parties have now signed a formal charging agreement and regulatory nuclear interface protocol. These documents make clear that all costs for assessing the design will be charged to Hitachi-GE and will ensure formal arrangements for engagement. The next step is for Hitachi-GE to submit documentation for assessment, which we are expecting to receive in autumn 2013.

ONR and the Environment Agency will now begin formal preparatory work with Hitachi-GE about the timescales and resources involved in assessing this new design.

In December 2013, the regulators concluded a generic design assessment for the (EDF and Areva) UK EPR nuclear reactor, a process which secured safety enhancements to the original design.

Contact: email: [email protected].

HaiyangWestinghouse Electric Company,

its consortium team member CB&I, China’s State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation Ltd. and Shandong Nuclear Power Company Ltd. of China Power Investment Corporation announced the successful setting of the AP1000 containment vessel top head (CVTH) for the nuclear island of Unit 1 at the Haiyang site in China.

Placement of the CVTH, which weighs approximately 659 tons, was completed at 9:36 a.m. China Time on March 29, 2013. It was manufactured by Shandong Nuclear Power Equipment Manufacturing Company Ltd. in China’s Shandong province.

The setting of the CVTH for Haiyang Unit 1 is another signifi cant step this year in Westinghouse’s delivery of China’s four AP1000 nuclear power plant units, following the successful placement of the CVTH at Sanmen Unit 1 on January. 29, 2013. The achievement further demonstrates the company’s commitment to the safe, high-quality and effi cient delivery of its AP1000 plants worldwide.

Contact: Scott Shaw, telephone; (412) 374-6737, email: [email protected]. �

mailto: [email protected]



(Continued on page 10)

Utility, Industry and Corporation

UtilityFessenhe

The French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) allows EDF to continue operating reactor Unit 2 at the Fessenheim, France nuclear power station beyond its third ten-year inspection.

EDF will carry out the work imposed by the ASN within the stipulated deadlines.

This positive operating notifi cation follows the ten-year inspection conducted between April 2011 and March 2012. The regulatory ten-year inspection consists of an exhaustive “check-up” of the installations, after every ten years of operation, carried out under the supervision of the ASN, and resulting into a strengthened safety level for the installations in accordance with the most recent standards. This shut down, exceptional in terms of the extent of the monitoring (regarding compliance as well as safety) and the work carried out, provides a means of checking components that are essential to the safety of the installations: the reactor vessel, the reactor building and the primary circuit.

All work required will be completed within the deadlines fi xed by the ASN. Some work will be completed on the occasion of the planned outage of reactor Unit 2, scheduled for July 2013.

Contact: Carole Trivi, EDF, telephone: 33 40 423 44 19.

IndustryInitial Review

An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) expert team completed an initial review of Japan’s efforts to plan and implement the decommissioning of TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. The International Peer Review of Japan’s Mid-and-Long-Term Roadmap towards the Decommissioning of TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear

Power Station Units 1-4 was conducted during its visit from April 15 to 22, 2013.

As requested by the Government of Japan, the IAEA team held extensive discussions with offi cials from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO). The team also met with offi cials of the Nuclear Regulation Authority. The team visited the nuclear accident site to gain fi rst-hand information about conditions at the power plant and progress toward decommissioning the facility.

The 13-member IAEA team examined a wide variety of issues related to decommissioning the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, such as the Roadmap’s overall strategic approach, the current condition of the reactors and spent fuel pools, the management of the huge amount of accumulated water at the site, as well as the radioactive releases.

In a draft report delivered to Japanese authorities, the team acknowledged a number of accomplishments that have been made to prepare Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station for decommissioning. For example:

Japan has addressed the plant’s • decommissioning in a timely manner, as demonstrated by its early preparation of the Roadmap and its acceleration of plans to remove fuel from the spent fuel pools at Units 1-4. In addition, Japan has logical and rational plans for the most complex task: removing damaged fuel from the reactors;TEPCO has successfully deployed • advanced and large-scale treatment technologies for decontaminating and desalinating highly radioactive water that has accumulated at the site; andThe Government of Japan and TEPCO • have recognized the importance of effective stakeholder involvement and public communication in dealing with decommissioning programmes.In addition, the IAEA team provided

advice in areas where current practices could be improved. For example:

Launching efforts to defi ne an end-• state of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station site would

help focus decommissioning efforts. This effort should be pursued with effective stakeholder involvement;An assessment of TEPCO’s incident • reporting and communication practices - with the government, the regulator, and the public - could help to enhance stakeholder trust and respect;TEPCO should continue its efforts • to improve the reliability of essential systems, to assess the structural integrity of site facilities, and to enhance protection against external hazards; andMeasures should continue to • improve management issues regarding radioactive releases and radiation exposures from the site, particularly issues created by the storage of accumulated water. The team encourages Japan to assess the overall benefi t of the site-boundary dose limit, particularly in relation to the radiation levels at the site boundary due to solids and liquids stored at the site.Contact: Greg Webb, IAEA,

telephone: 43 699 165 22047.

CorporationFuel Manufacturing Facility

AREVA announced the successful completion of the annual Licensee Performance Review of AREVA’s manufacturing facility in Richland, Washington. The facility achieved the highest distinction the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) can extend to any fuel manufacturing facility.

AREVA’s performance was evaluated in four major areas: Safety Operations, Radiological Controls, Facility Support, and Special Topics. The NRC determined that, between January 1 and December 31, 2012, AREVA’s Richland facility operated smoothly and without incident. The review did not identify any specifi c areas needing improvement. This is the sixth year in a row the Richland facility has earned a review, with no areas for improvement.

Contact: Kelly Cousineau, AREVA, telephone: (202) 680-2469, email: [email protected].

[email protected]


Corporation...Continued from page 9

Strategic AgreementsChinese President Xi Jinping and

French President François Hollande, Luc Oursel, President and CEO of AREVA, signed an agreement with China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) in Beijing.

Sun Qin, Chairman of CNNC and Luc Oursel, signed a letter of intent to build a used fuel treatment and recycling facility in China.

This agreement is a decisive milestone in the negotiations as part of a future contract for the sale of the facility. The agreement covers the technical specifi cations and the project organization as well as the responsibilities and scope of work for each partner.

The future facility would process used nuclear fuel from Chinese power plants in order to recover the reusable materials and recycle them as fuel. The facility would have a capacity to treat 800 metric tons of used fuel per year.

This facility would integrate the most advanced recycling technologies and present the best guarantees in terms of safety, security, and for the environment. This letter of intent marks China’s recognition of AREVA’s technological advancements in the back end of the fuel cycle. On the global nuclear market, China confi rms the economic and environmental viability of the strategy to process and recycle used nuclear fuel.

Contact: Julien Duperray, telephone: 33 1 34 96 12 15, email: [email protected].

Steam GeneratorsAREVA is pleased to announce

the safe and successful delivery of two steam generators to the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant in Red Wing, Minnesota. Delivery of the generators is the culmination of a 10-week journey beginning at the AREVA Chalon/St. Marcel facility in France.

After being manufactured by AREVA at the company’s Chalon/St. Marcel facility, the steam generators,

each 70 feet tall and weighing 330 tons, traveled via barge to the Mediterranean Sea. From there, they were shipped across the Atlantic Ocean and then up the Mississippi River, arriving at the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Facility near Red Wing, Minnesota, on April 11, 2013. These new steam generators will be stored securely on-site until installation during this fall’s planned refueling outage.

Contact: Kelly Cousineau, telephone: (202) 680-2469, email: [email protected].

New PresidentThe Babcock & Wilcox Company

(B&W) announced that John MacQuarrie has been named President of its subsidiary, Babcock & Wilcox Canada Ltd. (B&W Canada).

MacQuarrie’s new role will focus on the optimization of B&W’s Canadian operations, including the growth of B&W Canada’s Nuclear Services and Nuclear Equipment organizations, and supporting B&W Canada’s Thermal Power organization.

Contact: Natalie Cutler, telephone: (519) 621-2120, email: [email protected].

Small Modular ReactorThe Babcock & Wilcox Company

(B&W) announced that its subsidiary, Babcock & Wilcox mPower, Inc. (B&W mPower), and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) have signed a Cooperative Agreement for funding made available through DOE’s Small Modular Reactor (SMR) Licensing Technical Support Program for the development and licensing of B&W’s mPower™ technology.

The $79 million allocated for the fi rst year of the program will be immediately available to the B&W mPower program. While the DOE has projected that approximately $150 million will be made available during the fi ve-year period of the DOE award, subject to incremental appropriations from Congress and B&W

mPower’s compliance with the terms of the Cooperative Agreement. The Cooperative Agreement allows for $226 million or more in federal funding. B&W mPower intends to use any additional funding made available on a cost-shared basis for licensing and engineering activities that qualify under this award.

The signing of the Cooperative Agreement formalizes B&W’s cost-share agreement with DOE, following the selection of the mPower America team – comprised of B&W, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and Generation mPower – as the winner of DOE’s competitively bid funding opportunity, in support of commercial demonstration of the B&W mPower SMR by 2022. B&W mPower and Bechtel (who together formed Generation mPower LLC) will provide licensing and engineering support for the mPower America Project.

Contact: Ryan Cornell, telephone: (330) 860-1345, email: [email protected].

Technology PartnerGE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH)

announced its selection by Dominion Virginia Power as its new technology partner for the North Anna Unit Three (NA-3) Nuclear Power Plant Project.

The project development agreement includes engineering work to support the development of the specifi c Economic Simplifi ed Boiling Water Reactor (ESBWR) design for NA-3 and licensing support work for the utility’s Combined Operating License (COL) application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

GEH also announced an agreement with Fluor Corporation on the project. GEH will focus on reactor design and equipment while Fluor will bring its experience to the balance of plant, including planning for construction and the installation of a GE steam turbine in the turbine island.






Bechtel is among the most respected engineering, project management, and construction companies in the world. Bechtel operates through five global business units that specialize in power generation; civil infrastructure; mining and metals; oil, gas and chemicals; and government services.

Since its founding in 1898, Bechtel has worked on more than 22,000 projects in 140 countries on all seven continents. Today, our 53,000 employees team with customers, partners and suppliers on diverse projects in nearly 50 countries. Bechtel has contributed over 74,000 MW of completed nuclear design and construction projects and performed services on more than 80% of the US nuclear fleet.

Building the World’s Energy Future

CIVILGOVERNMENT SERVICESMINING & METALSOIL, GAS & CHEMICALSPOWER


The ESBWR employs passive safety systems and a simplifi ed design utilizing natural circulation. These attributes result in an ability of the reactor to cool itself for more than seven days without operator intervention or AC power on or off site.

Contact: Christopher White, telephone: (910) 819-6121, email: [email protected].

Nuclear Qualifi cation Testing

General Cable, a wire and cable manufacturer has successfully completed third-party environmental qualifi cation testing on its low-voltage line of ULTROL® 60+ nuclear qualifi ed cable. For nearly four decades, ULTROL®

cables, developed by Brand-Rex Company, have answered the needs of the nuclear power market. Backed by a continued commitment to the nuclear industry and a dedicated nuclear team, General Cable’s ULTROL® 60+ cables are intended to support the existing nuclear fl eet, including Gen III reactors.

General Cable began a fi ve-year testing and certifi cation program in 2008 to develop a second generation 60-year-life product line. Recognized for its advanced material innovations, General Cable’s system approach to cable construction reaches new levels of performance with ULTROL® 60+.

Adhering to design control requirements from ASME NQA-1 and US NRC 10CFR50 Appendix B, under the regulatory guidelines of the utilities and reactor manufacturers, and extensive third-party testing ensures conformance of ULTROL® 60+ to all nuclear requirements.

Contact: Karen Ouellette, telephone; (860) 465-8777, email: [email protected].

NQA-1 ComplianceKlein Steel Service Inc., a metal

service center with a focus on innovation and continuous process improvement, announced today that it has attained Nuclear Quality Assurance (NQA-1)

compliance as verifi ed by an independent audit.

Due to the critical importance of safety, quality and control, suppliers are required to comply with the strictest requirements in the nuclear industry. NQA-1 specifi cations are issued by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) and recognized globally as a world-class quality standard for nuclear applications. As such, compliance in accord with NQA-1 standards indicates that Klein Steel is authorized to supply raw and processed materials, manufactured parts and direct-to-assemble components to companies, such as equipment manufacturers, that are serving the nuclear industry in the U.S. and abroad.

Contact: Deborah Kurvach, telephone: (585) 328-4000, email: [email protected].

Full Scope SimulatorL-3 MAPPS announced that the

Embalse full scope simulator it developed for Nucleoeléctrica Argentina S.A. (NA-SA) was put into service on March 22, 2013 at the Embalse nuclear power station on the southern shore of a reservoir on the Rio Tercero, near the city of Embalse in Córdoba Province, Argentina. L-3 MAPPS and NA-SA gathered in Córdoba today to celebrate this signifi cant success, a project milestone known as “Ready for Training.”

The simulator will support enhanced operator training for the single unit at the Embalse site – a CANDU 6 pressurized heavy water reactor with a net output of 600 MWe, which went into commercial operation on January 20, 1984. The last full scope CANDU plant simulator L-3 MAPPS developed was for the Qinshan Phase III plant in Zhejiang, China, which entered service in the fi rst quarter of 2003. Since then, L-3 MAPPS has introduced signifi cant technology inroads that the industry has adopted, including plant models developed in L-3’s Orchid® simulation environment, emulation of redundant plant computer systems and highly advanced compact input/output systems, all of which have been applied to making the Embalse simulator completely state-of-the-art.

Contact: Sean Bradley, telephone: (514) 787-4953.

Perma-Con®

Radiation Protection Systems, Inc. supplied the largest Perma-Con® ever built to Los Alamos National Laboratory, measuring 18 feet tall by 110 feet long with a clear span 48 feet wide, providing for unrestricted large TRU waste box handling.

The structure will be used for the repackaging of legacy transuranic (TRU) waste for permanent disposal. The massive size of the “375 box line facility” is able to accommodate the largest waste storage boxes up to 40 feet in length, giving Los Alamos the capability to safely dispose of large volumes of highly contaminated waste.

RPS provided an electrical lighting design with associated hardware, and an integrated interface for ventilation, fi re protection, and other utilities. The modular panel containment system was fabricated and delivered on schedule in 17 weeks. RPS also provided onsite engineering support during the construction phase of this project. Mechanical assembly took approximately 5 weeks.

Contact: William Rambow, telephone; (860_ 445-0334, email: [email protected].

Joint VentureWestinghouse Electric Company

and State Nuclear Power Technology Corp. (SNPTC), China announced a joint venture, SNPTC-WEC Nuclear Power Technical Services (Beijing) Co., Ltd, to provide supplier qualifi cation services to the global AP1000® nuclear power plant market.

The joint venture will work to accomplish the goal of qualifying suppliers and further developing the supply chain within China for AP1000 nuclear power plant equipment and components to be used there. The Joint Venture will also work toward a goal of exporting equipment and components made by qualifi ed Chinese suppliers to other global markets, and importing components and equipment made by qualifi ed suppliers elsewhere in the world for use in China.

Contact: Scott Shaw, telephone: (412) 374-6737, email: [email protected]. �

Corporation...Continued from page 10





New Products, Services & ContractsNew ProductsBridge-Free Tooling

GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy’s Stinger tool provides BWR power plants the ability to clean and perform in-vessel visual inspections during critical path activities. Using the RPV fl ange or shroud fl ange as a guide, the Stinger performs inspections without the installation of a track or rail system.

Developed with input from our customers, this remotely operated system reduces critical path impact and radiation exposure for workers. Through advanced camera and remote positioning technology, it allows examiners to clean and examine In-Vessel Visual Inspection (IVVI) components from the annulus fl oor to the RPV fl ange without tool removal or reconfi guration.

Remote operation of the Stinger also allows for non-interrupted fuel movement. Inspections may be performed in parallel with fuel movement and other critical path activities. Stinger can also inspect the open slot area below steam dam when a 360 degree platform is used, thereby minimizing overall critical path time. Allowing workers to operate the Stinger remotely ensures reduced radiation exposure, helping plants meet As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) goals.

Contact: website: www.ge-energy.com/nuclear.

ServicesPlant Maintenance

Nuclear power plant maintenance carries stringent requirements. The Merrick Group, Inc. offers the personnel and equipment to meet these requirements and create greater plant effi ciency throughout the maintenance cycle. Two decades of successful nuclear power plant maintenance and dedication to the commitment of upholding industry

standards has led to their record of success.

Merrick’s has comprehensive nuclear plant maintenance, cleaning and service program for all facets of the nuclear industry, including outages and on-line maintenance. These include cooling tower maintenance, underground piping, heat exchanger cleaning, inspections, coating applications, condenser cleaning and tube plugging.

Through years of experience, Merrick have become aware of and practice strict ALARA principles.

Contact: telephone: (570) 455-0600, fax: (570) 455-5787.

ContractsNuclear Fuel

AREVA has signed a contract with the Korean KAERI/DAEWOO consortium to supply fuel elements for the JRTR (Jordan Research and Training Reactor) currently being built in Jordan.

The agreement concerns the supply of nuclear fuel for the fi rst reactor core


http://www.ge-energy.com/nuclear

http://www.birns.com


and for a reload batch. Delivery of the fuel elements is scheduled for the beginning of 2015.

Construction of the JRTR research reactor by the KAERI/DAEWOO consortium is an essential step for Jordan in acquiring the capabilities required for nuclear R&D and producing nuclear power. AREVA is proud to be a part of this project together with the Korean consortium, who is one of the research reactor suppliers, and stands ready to offer its experience regarding construction of a power reactor in Jordan, for which the selection of a supplier is now in progress.

The thermal power of the JRTR will be 5 MW, which can be extended to 10 MW in the future. It will be used for neutron beam research, neutron irradiation services such as medical radioisotope production, and training of Jordanian engineers and scientists.

Contact: Julien Duperray, telephone: 33 1 34 96 12 15, email: [email protected].

Spent Fuel PoolAREVA has received a contract

award to provide Duke Energy 20 VEGA Through-Air Radar Spent Fuel Pool Level Instrumentation (SFPLI) systems for the company’s nuclear energy plants, as well as a system specifi cally for training.

AREVA and VEGA Americas, Inc. provide safe, reliable and economical SFPLI solutions to North America’s nuclear utilities by combining comprehensive engineering services and quality-augmented equipment.

In direct response to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Near-Term Task Force recommendations on post-Fukushima safety upgrades at U.S. nuclear energy plants, AREVA’s Through-Air Radar solution meets new requirements for spent fuel pool monitoring. The system features two redundant, independent channels and an independent power supply. This solution is reliable and rugged in adverse conditions,

and has been proven in more than 300,000 applications including nuclear, military and industrial installations.

Contact: Kelly Cousineau, telephone: (202) 680-2469, email: [email protected].

Radiological MonitoringInStep Software announced that the

Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA) has selected its eDNA software suite to perform real-time environmental and radiological monitoring of the state’s seven nuclear power plants. The selection of InStep Software was accomplished as part of a competitive bid process.

InStep’s advanced data management software will be used by IEMA to continually monitor, store and analyze data from Illinois’ 11 commercial and three closed nuclear reactors. eDNA seamlessly integrates with the IEMA’s existing monitoring devices and will immediately alert IEMA personnel of abnormal changes in radiation levels.

As part of the $1.4 million contract award with the state agency, InStep will replace the legacy monitoring system with a state-of-the-art, Microsoft Windows-based solution. The new monitoring system will be easier to support and maintain as well as provide more advanced and fl exible visual representation of the collected information to IEMA personnel.

InStep Software is a provider of real-time performance management and predictive analytics software products and solutions. InStep extends the investment in modern control, monitoring and smart devices by collecting, archiving, displaying, analyzing and reporting the information provided by these systems. Many of the world’s most successful companies use InStep’s software products to actively manage and analyze the rapidly growing amount of real-time operational, asset health and regulatory related information.

Contact: Colleen Kennedy, email: [email protected].

Severe Accident Simulation

L-3 MAPPS has won an upgrade contract from Daya Bay Nuclear Power Operations and Management Co., Ltd.

(DNMC) to equip the Ling Ao Phase II full scope simulator with a severe accident simulation model to enhance training scenarios that simulate degraded reactor core conditions. The project, which underscores L-3 MAPPS’ continued commitment to DNMC, will commence immediately and is slated to be in service at the beginning of 2014.

L-3 MAPPS will connect the Electric Power Research Institute’s (EPRI) Modular Accident Analysis Program (MAAP5) to the Ling Ao Phase II simulator. MAAP5 is a software program that performs severe accident analysis for nuclear power plants, including assessments of core damage and radiological transport. The simulator will also be equipped with new 2-D and 3-D animated, interactive visualizations of the reactor vessel, containment building and spent fuel pool to provide operators with additional insight into the behavior of the plant during severe accidents. The 2-D graphics will be enabled with L-3’s Orchid® Control System and 3-D visuals will be powered by Bridgeworks© from TriLink Systems.

In addition to the normal operations and abnormal, off-normal and emergency event training for which the simulator is currently extensively used, the upgraded Ling Ao Phase II simulator will be used for training scenarios relating to degraded reactor core conditions that result in fuel melting, including cladding oxidation and hydrogen generation, vessel failure, containment failure and fi ssion product release.

Contact: Sean Bradley, telephone: (514) 787-4953. �

Contracts...Continued from page 13




New Documents

EPRI1. Ion Exchange Filter Transition Plan for BWRs and PWRs. Product ID: 3002000371. Published March, 2013.

This report includes an interim review of plant experiences with various cation exchange membranes to determine if new fi lters are comparable and suitable for nuclear power plant chemistry applications. Gaps in performance and impacts to recommendations in EPRI reports BWRVIP-190: BWR Vessel and Internals Project, BWR Water Chemistry Guidelines - 2008 Revision (1016579), Pressurized Water Reactor Primary Water Chemistry Guidelines (1014986) and Pressurized Water Reactor Secondary Chemistry Guidelines – Revision 7 (1016555) are identifi ed.

2. Materials Reliability Program: Assessment of the Current Status and Completeness of Work on Inner and Outer Diameter Stress Corrosion Cracking of Austenitic Stainless Steels in PWR Plants (MRP-352). Product ID: 3002000135. Published March, 2013.

Field experience with austenitic stainless steel in operating pressurized water reactors (PWRs) has, in general, been good, with a relatively small number of failures due to stress corrosion cracking (SCC) observed worldwide. The objective of this report is to review the completeness and direction of the current research into SCC in austenitic stainless steels and to identify gaps in understanding that need to be addressed by future research activities.

3. Depletion Reactivity Benchmark for the International Handbook of Evaluated Reactor Physics Benchmark Experiments. Product ID: 3002000306. Published April, 2013.

The International Handbook of Eval-uated Reactor Physics Benchmark Exper-iments (IRPhE)-evaluated benchmark is for hot full-power reactor conditions and zero cooling time. The evaluated bench-marks benefi tted from a rigorous review

by the OECD/NEA experts’ group. Sever-al improvements resulted from the review, but no signifi cant changes to the EPRI-published cold benchmarks generated for criticality analyses were required. The full evaluation, reproduced as an appen-dix in this report, has been accepted as a draft for the 2013 release of the IRPhE. It is anticipated that the benchmarks will be fully accepted for the 2014 IRPhE release when the results of an ongoing project, the Benchmarks for the Evaluation and Validation of Reactor Simulations project conducted at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, are incorporated into the evaluation documented in this report.

4. BWRVIP-271NP: BWR Vessel and Internals Project, Testing and Evaluation of the Browns Ferry Unit 2 120° Capsule. Product ID: 3002000078. Published April, 2013.

In the late 1990s, a Boiling Water Reactor Vessel and Internals Project (BWRVIP) Integrated Surveillance Program (ISP) was developed to improve the surveillance of the U.S. BWR fl eet. This report describes testing and evaluation of the Browns Ferry Unit 2 120° capsule. These results will be used to monitor embrittlement as part of the BWRVIP ISP.

5. Steam Generator Management Program: Flaw Tolerance Evaluation of the Steam Generator Channel Head. Product ID: 3002000411. Published April, 2013.

There are two cracking scenarios of concern: cracks propagating from the divider plate assembly through the channel head cladding and into the low-alloy steel, and cracks initiating in the tubesheet and propagating through the tube-to-tubesheet weldments. Both scenarios represent a potential breach of the primary pressure boundary of the channel head assembly. This report addresses only the fi rst cracking scenario and its potential impact on the structural integrity of the steam generator channel head.

6. Pipe Rupture Frequencies for Internal Flooding Probabilistic Risk Assessments: Revision 3. Product ID: 3002000079. Published April. 2013.

This report updates a 2010 EPRI report (1021086) on piping system failure rates for use in probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) involving internal plant fl ooding and high-energy line breaks (HELBs) and represents the third revision to this pipe failure rate handbook. These failure rate estimates are intended to satisfy requirements of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) and American Nuclear Society (ANS) PRA Standard RA-Sa-2009. The estimates also support an EPRI PRA Scope and Quality project to provide guidelines on internal fl ooding analysis and are intended for use in conjunction with separate EPRI guidelines for performing an internal fl ooding PRA (1019194).

7. Plant Manager’s Guide for BWR Source Term Control and Reduction. Product ID: 3002000820. Published April, 2013.

This guide is the result of a collaborative effort between INPO and EPRI to provide boiling water reactor (BWR) plant managers a simplifi ed how-to on radiation fi eld source term reduction. The goal is to reduce radiation fi elds through source term reduction efforts and ultimately aid in improving collective radiation exposure. The content was collected from plant experience and technical studies to help plant managers understand, manage, and reduce source term at their plant.

8. Boiling Water Reactor Chemistry Summary: 2012 Update. Product ID: 3002000410. Published April, 2013.

This report documents the latest median values for key boiling water reactor (BWR) reactor water, feedwater, and condensate parameters. Median, rather than average, values were used for most parameters to minimize the bias due to transient conditions. It compares the results with action levels, needed values, and goals (or good practice values) from BWRVIP-190: BWR Vessels and Internals Project, BWR Water Chemistry Guidelines – 2008 Revision (EPRI report 1016579).

The above EPRI documents may be ordered by contacting the Order Center at (800) 313-3774 Option 2 or email at [email protected].


Meeting & Training Calendar 1. International Forum ATOMEXPO

2013, June 26-28, 2013, St. Petersburg, Russia. Contact: telephone: 7 495 66 33 821, fax: 7 495 66 33 820, email: [email protected].

2. UniTech’s R3 Nuclear Workshop, June 26-28, 2013, Intercontinental Hotel, Chicago, Illinois. Contact: Gregg Johnstone, telephone: (413) 543-6911, website: www.regonline.com/UniTechR3workshop

3. International Conference on Nuclear Power in the 21st Century, June 27-29, 2013, Saint Petersburg, Russian Federation. Contact: International Atomic Energy Agency, telephone: 43 1 2600 21314, fax: 43 1 2600 2007, email: offi [email protected].

4. U.S. Women in Nuclear 2013, July 21-24, 2013, Swissotel Chicago, Chicago, Illinois. Contact: Linda Wells, Nuclear Energy Institute, telephone: (202) 739-8039, email: [email protected].

5. Radiation Protection Forum, July 28-31, 2013, The Westin Riverwalk, San Antonio, Texas. Contact: Linda Wells, Nuclear Energy Institute, telephone: (202) 739-8039, email: [email protected].

6. International Conference on Nuclear Engineering (ICONE), July 29-August 2, 2013, Chendu, China. Contact: Erin Dolan, ASME International, telephone: (212) 591-7123, fax: (212) 591-7856, email: [email protected].

7. Nuclear Fuel Supply Forum, July 30, 2013, The Westin Georgetown Hotel, Washington, D. C. Contact: Linda Wells, Nuclear Energy Institute, telephone: (202) 739-8039, email: [email protected].

8. Utility Working Conference and Vendor Technology Expo, August 11-14, 2013, Westin Diplomat, Hollywood, Florida. Contact: American Nuclear Society, telephone: (708) 579-8316, email: [email protected].

9. 16th International Conference on Environmental Degradation of Materials in Nuclear Power Systems- Water Reactors, August 11-15, 2013, Asheville, North Carolina. Contact: NACE International, telephone: (281) 228-6200-8316, fax: (281) 228-6300, email:fi [email protected].

10. The International Symposium on Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Materials (PATRAM). August 18-23, 2013, Hilton San Francisco Union Square, San Francisco, California. Contact: Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, telephone: (847) 480-9573, email: [email protected].

11. 7th Annual RadWaste Summit, September 3-6, 2013, Las Vegas, Nevada. Contact: Exchange Monitor Publications & Forums, telephone: (877) 303-7367, fax: (202) 296-2805, email: [email protected].

12. World Nuclear Association Annual Symposium 2013, September 11-13, 2013, Central Hall Westminster, London. Contact: telephone: 44 20 7451 1520, fax: 44 20 7839 1501.

13. 2013 LWR Fuel Performance Meeting/Top Fuel, September 15-19, 2013, Westin Charlotte, Charlotte, North Carolina. Contact: American Nuclear Society, telephone: (708) 579-8316, email: [email protected].

14. International Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Analysis (PSA 2013), September 22-27, 2013, Marriott Columbia, Columbia, South Carolina. Contact: American Nuclear Society, telephone: (708) 579-8316, email: [email protected].

15. International Uranium Fuel Seminar, October 6-9, 2013, The Westin Riverwalk, San Antonio, Texas. Contact: Linda Wells, Nuclear Energy Institute, telephone: (202) 739-8039, email: [email protected].

16. International Conference on Topical Issues in Nuclear Installation Safety, October 21-24, 2013, Vienna, Austria. Contact: International Atomic Energy Agency, telephone: 43 1 2600 21314, fax: 43 1 2600 2007, email: offi [email protected].

17. 2013 American Nuclear Society Winter Meeting and Nuclear Technology Expo, November 10-14, 2013, Omni Shoreham Hotel, Washington, D.C. Contact: telephone: (708) 579-8316, email: [email protected]. �

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Research & Development

Fuel Reliability ProgramAn industry-wide effort led by EPRI’s

Fuel Reliability Program to eliminate fuel failures is bearing fruit at nuclear power plants. As shown in the graphics below, U.S. boiling and pressurized water reactors have signifi cantly increased the number of consecutive cycles in which a fuel failure has not occurred over the past fi ve years. In both light water reactor designs, the number of units operating for fi ve or more cycles without a failure has doubled, while the number of units with two or fewer cycles has been reduced by a third.

Originally known as the Zero by Ten Initiative, but since renamed Driving to Zero, the initiative defi ned roles for nuclear plant operators and other stakeholders to increase fuel reliability. While the initiative targeted U.S. nuclear plants, the underlying framework and technical guidance is applicable to all light water reactors. Note that when the industry implemented the initiative in 2007, about 30% of U.S. commercial reactors were experiencing a fuel failure. By December 2010, this fi gure had been reduced to 6%, a fi gure that has remained relatively constant through 2012. While zero failures has not been achieved, the near-zero performance represents a signifi cant accomplishment.

Through the Fuel Reliability Program, EPRI has assisted nuclear plants in achieving failure-free fuel, primarily through a set of fi ve fuel reliability guidelines that provide recommendations for avoiding each failure mechanism. These guidelines are reviewed every four years to assess whether they require updating.

For PWRs, grid-to-rod fretting remains the dominant failure mechanism in U.S. reactors. Of the 41 units that planned to transition to robust fuel designs to avoid this mechanism, 34 have fully transitioned. All but two units will have transitioned by spring 2016. For BWRs, foreign material-induced failures have been the dominant failure mechanism since 2008. While the number of units affected by debris failures has not been large (typically one or two per year), it has been a persistent and troublesome mechanism. EPRI continues to work with industry to address this failure mechanism for both BWRs and PWRs.

Contact: Jeff Deshon, telephone: (650) 855-8744, email: [email protected].

Dose ReductionActivities related to refueling

operations continue to account for signifi cant radiation exposure at both plant and individual levels. Finding and validating improved dose reduction options for refueling activities will be important in meeting current standards and responding to future standards and goals. EPRI examined a range of refueling dose reduction techniques and has compiled a best practices document (EPRI Product 1025309) based on input from a working group consisting of BWR and PWR operators, refueling vendors, and the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations.

The working group spent two days each at Exelon’s Dresden boiling water reactor and at Luminant’s Comanche Peak pressurized water reactor to review detailed site data related to refueling activities, radiation fi elds, radiation sources, and reactor-specifi c challenges

to exposure reduction. The participants used their site- or task-specifi c knowledge and experience to identify opportunities for improvement, focusing particularly on refueling effi ciency, radiation fi eld reduction, and reductions in individual and cumulative personnel exposure.

Opportunities identifi ed during the assessments included:

Outage planning: Including a • dedicated ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable) specialist in the planning process results in a more effi cient and effective outcome. Use of 3D dose modeling based on EPRI-developed dose rate algorithms also shows promise for optimizing planning and performance.Reactor cavity activity: Increased • purifi cation fl ow rate and the addition of submicron submersible fi lters and submersible demineralizers can reduce the cavity radionuclide and crud inventory. In BWRs, reactor water cleanup systems should be optimized and augmented with portable systems if necessary.Reactor disassembly and reassembly: • Automated closure systems that simultaneously manipulate multiple reactor head studs can reduce personnel exposure and reduce outage critical path times.Radiation fi eld reduction: Custom • head-shielding packages, advanced remote shielding, temporary shielding on bridge cranes and work platforms, and molded fl exible shielding materials can reduce worker dose.Cavity decontamination: Underwater • robotic cleaning and inspection systems show great promise for reducing personnel exposure, eliminating industrial safety hazards, and improving the outage schedule and critical time path. Contact: Phung Tran, telephone:

(650) 855-2158, email: [email protected].

Source: Electric Power Research Institute’s (EPRI) Nuclear Executive Update, March, 2013. �


Staying Focused on Plant SafetyBy Bill Borchardt, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Bill BorchardtMr. Bill Borchardt is the Executive Director for Operations at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Prior to assuming this position, he was the Director of the Offi ce of New Reactors, a position he assumed when the new offi ce was created in August 2006. Since joining the NRC in 1983 he has served as the senior site inspector at both pressurized and boiling water reactors, and has held several leadership positions including Director of the Operating Reactor Inspection Program, Director of the Offi ce of Enforcement, Deputy Offi ce Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, and Deputy Director of Nuclear Security and Incident Response. Prior to joining the NRC in 1983, Bill was an offi cer in the U.S. Navy’s Nuclear Power Program.

An interview by Newal Agnihotri, Editor of Nuclear Plant Journal at the Regulatory Information Conference in Bethesda, Maryland on March 13, 2013.

1. What is the U.S. NRC’s contribution to research and development of technology to detect incipient failure in metals, pipes and concrete?

The NRC Offi ce of Research has a number of research programs in the non-destructive examination area (ultrasound, etc.). I would put them into two major categories. One that has to do with the examination of piping and materials that can be used to examine the structure of existing systems, and there’s a number of research programs in that area. Then there’s another program looking at what techniques can be used to help evaluate the plant’s readiness to go beyond the current 60-year time period of potential licensed activity. This is the “extended life” issue.

So, the fi rst pro-gram that I talked about is really look-ing at day-to-day operations under the current term, including the re-newed license - the 40 to 60-year time period - and what that is doing is, I think, maybe more like confi rmatory research. Because as you said, PNNL (Pacifi c Northwest National Laborato-ry, Richland, Wash-ington) is doing re-search on different programs. We have

our own research program just to validate those kinds of test results.

2. What are U.S. NRC’s Research efforts in looking at the possible license extension from 60 to 80 years?

The second program that I was referring to is if there is another wave of interest on the part of the industry to get a license extension from 60 to 80 years. Of course, we need to make sure there’s a technical justifi cation to make that decision, and so we’re looking at NDE methodologies to be able to evaluate things like concrete, some of the passive systems, components, building structures to make sure that they in fact could support additional 20 years of operation.

3. How does NRC adjust its oversight of plants which have decided to shut down?

You’re probably referring to Kewaunee and Crystal River. They shut down, really, I think, for two different reasons, although the economics is probably a common factor. Of course, Crystal River is shutting down because of the damage to their containment structure, and I think they have made the business decision that it was not worth putting the money into repairing that containment structure in order to enable the plant to meet the safety standards to be able to restart.

Kewaunee, of course, was operating and is operating, but the plant owner Dominion has decided to shut that plant down for economic reasons. The NRC doesn’t review the economic basis for that decision. What we’ll do is when the plant is shut down for the last time and its fuel is offl oaded from the reactor vessel for the last time, we’ll transition over time from the reactor oversight program to our decommissioning oversight program.

We adjust our activities depending on the radiological risk that exists at the site. You could expect that as a plant has no fuel left in the reactor vessel, it has no need to have all of the emergency core cooling systems that would be needed to operate that. Our inspection program and oversight would decrease commensurate with those changes. I’m told we’ll get to the point where there’s relatively little inspection on an ongoing basis. As the fuel gets offl oaded then from the spent fuel pool to dry cask storage, there’s very little inspection needed. There’s no intent for either of those plants, to my understanding, to ever restart them, so there would be no maintenance of safety systems or components at the plant, so you’ll see a signifi cant decrease in NRC oversight.

We review every plant that goes into decommissioning. It has to submit a decommissioning plan which we review and approve, and that shows whether the plant is going to go into deconstruction or safe storage, or how they’re going to handle that activity. We’ll review it and that’s a factor in how we move forward on our regulatory process as well.



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4. What is the U.S. NRC’s interaction with Chinese nuclear regulators to benefi t from their experience in construction of AP 1000?

We’ve been monitoring what’s going on with the AP1000 facilities in China very closely. We’ve had an agreement with the regulator in China for over 30 years for sharing information at various degrees of detail.

That was long before there was any thought of the AP1000, but just as a fellow regulator in nuclear safety. We’ve had an agreement, I think, since the early ‘80s that covered a number of different areas.

Regarding AP1000, though, specifi -cally, because it was an NRC-certifi ed design, we entered into a number of in-teractions with the Chinese regulator to help them understand the safety basis that we used to approve the design, why it’s certifi ed, and we actually went over and gave training to the regulatory personnel on the AP1000 design and our design ap-proval.

Since they’ve been constructing over there, we’ve sent a number of inspectors, both from headquarters and from Region II out of Atlanta, to go over to the reactor site in China in order to see the construction progress,, what kind of lessons we could learn from the methods they were using to construct it, so we could see if we needed to revise our inspection program. We continue to do that. In addition, we’ve had the Chinese regulatory staff come over to the NRC for extended periods of time for their own development, and so we could learn from them. There’s a lot of active exchange going on between the two countries.

We had done the design review for the Part 52 rulemaking. We helped them improve their understanding. Now they are ahead of us in the construction activities.

5. How does the U.S. NRC transfer the knowledge of its experienced inspectors to the new inspectors?

There are a lot of facets to our knowledge management activities at NRC. We have qualifi cation programs for many key technical programs. As you go through a qualifi cation program and you learn - if you are a new employee - as you study and learn about an area, you would seek out the more experienced people to get their information so that you could obtain the qualifi cations that you need to do your work. That happens as part of the technical design review staff and also especially in the inspectors area. That qualifi cation program really facilitates a lot of interaction between the more experienced employees and the new employees.

We also put a lot of effort into making sure that we keep our review guidance up to date, and we have the experienced staff provide those procedures and those guidelines so that they’re available to the new staff.

If there is an instrumentation that controls a section of the application for a design certifi cation that needs to be reviewed, the reviewer can go and get the guidance that he should follow in conducting that technical review. Then because experienced people have contributed to writing that guidance, they can see what kinds of questions, what kind of areas should be examined, where the reference material is. That’s, I would say, a second stage. We have communities of practice on our computer network, where people who share a common interest, a common responsibility, can enter into a virtual chat room, if you will, to be able to ask questions and get information from more experienced staff. That’s another way of helping to facilitate knowledge management and knowledge transfer.

It never stops. Every single day, there is an element of that going on somewhere. Much of it’s informal, but you work right next door to somebody who’s got more or less experience than you and you work on common projects, and that’s how you help them come up to speed.

6. Does the U.S. NRC rehire retired professionals?

We have, at the NRC, utilized a program for what we call “rehired annuitants.” When an individual retires, if we have some projects that they can work on - including working with younger staff - we can bring them back to work on a part-time basis. In effect, they’re like a contractor now, but they come back, and that’s a very effective way to help the younger staff continue to learn their job. A lot of times, we’ve brought rehired annuitants back in order to document, again, how they did their job, what lessons did they learned over the years, that kind of activity.

Then the Offi ce of Personnel Management has also developed some other programs, I think, at the national laboratories, where you can almost go into a partial retirement. You can go from working full-time to working part-time which is, I think, a slightly different approach than being a rehired annuitant, but it would accomplish the same kinds of things for knowledge management and knowledge transfer.

7. How does the U.S. NRC meet the challenge of ensuring the quality of products of foreign suppliers providing safety-related equipment to the new plants in the United States?

It’s equally important for parts and equipment to be of proper quality that is delivered from overseas and those delivered from within the United States.

There are a couple of things, I would say, in response to that. One is that it’s, of course, the U.S. licensee’s responsibility to do the quality controls that are necessary to make sure that the parts they get are adequate.

In addition to that, we’ve entered into a number of agreements with other regulatory bodies from around the world. Part of this is the Multinational Design Evaluation Program, where we’ve actually gone so far that we’re now doing joint inspections with other countries, for vendors in that other country. For example, if there was a vendor in Korea, we would work with the Korean

Staying Focused...Continued from page 18


regulatory body and go and do a joint inspection, and we might have a U.S. inspector, or a Korean inspector, or we might have somebody from Finland with us. We would go in and do an inspection of their quality program to make sure that it’s in conformance with international standards and for the U.S. parts that are being produced, in conformance with U.S. standards that they’re obligated to meet through whatever contract they have. No matter where they are in the world, they’re subject to regulatory oversight and inspection.

The Multinational Design Evaluation Program is a cooperative effort of a number of regulatory bodies. MDEP does not have any regulatory authority by itself, but the NRC does, and because we’re cooperating with these other countries - again, I’ll use the example of South Korea. If there was a vendor in South Korea, the South Korean regulator has authority to go in and do inspections. We accompany the South Korean inspector as part of our activities.

8. How is the U.S. NRC’s funding obtained? What part of it comes from the government and what part is shared by the licensee?

The Congress of the United States appropriates the total budget for the NRC, and they provide that funding either at the beginning of the year, or as we are now - we’re in a continuing resolution, so they do it in small pieces. The law requires that 90% of our budget be paid for by the entities that we regulate. We send out bills to the generating companies and to all of the entities that we regulate in order to recoup 90% of that fee. That money does not really come to the NRC. It goes to the general treasury of the United States. We can only spend what Congress has authorized, and then 90% of that is paid from the companies we regulate to the general treasury.

Our budget of roughly $1 billion - a little bit more than $1 billion now - somewhere around $100 million is paid for by the taxpayers.

9. How does the International Nuclear Regulators Association (INRA) facilitate cyber security of nuclear power plants worldwide?

The INRA is a collection of regulatory agencies from some of the major established countries. Again, they don’t have any regulatory authority. That’s more like a club. They have an interest in cyber security but not really an active role in it.

Every nuclear power plant is required to prepare and submit to the NRC a cyber protection plan that is based on a number of well-established standards that they need to compare their program to these standards which we’re reviewing. This is done in conjunction with the standards from NIST, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the U.S. government organization. On a broad level, that’s the cyber protection plan that each nuclear power plant has to have.

Even before that, even before any of us knew what “cyber” meant, the nuclear power plants’ safety-related systems were isolated from the outside world. We, even in the early days, wanted to make sure that there couldn’t be an external infl uence on safety-related equipment. That still is preserved.

10. Concluding remarks.These are very demanding times

that we’re facing because of all of the follow-up from Fukushima and a number of important issues that we’re working on. I think we need to every day remind ourselves that it’s the day-to-day safety of the plants that’s the most important thing. For the NRC, it’s the day-to-day oversight of all of the 100-plus reactors in the United States that we need to stay focused on.

Contact: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Offi ce of the Executive Director for Operations, telephone: (301) 415-1700 or the Offi ce of Public Affairs, email: [email protected]. �

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Fukushima, a Game ChangerBy David Skeen, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

David SkeenDuring the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in March 2011, Mr. Skeen served as an on-shift Director of the Reactor Safety Team in the NRC’s Emergency Operations Center for two months following the accident, and was involved in the NRC efforts to support the U.S. Embassy and the Government of Japan in responding to the accident.

In the Fall of 2011, he was named Director of the NRC’s Japan Lessons Learned Project Directorate, to lead the NRC’s lessons-learned effort resulting from the Near Term Task Force Report, “Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st Century,” that was issued in July 2011. He is responsible for managing NRC’s efforts to implement the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident at all U.S. nuclear power plants.

He is a graduate of the Federal Senior Executive Services (SES) Candidate Development Program, and served as the Deputy Director of the Division of Engineering from 2009 to 2011. Mr. Skeen holds a B.S. degree in Electrical Engineering from West Virginia University.


1. Does every US plant have an emergency response center similar to the one at Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant? Also, what is its function during the normal operation as well as during the emergencies?

We don’t have a seismically isolated building. Every plant has a technical support center (TSC).

Initially in an accident the control room handles the issues that are going on. But if things go beyond the control room’s resources for any reason, they go to the technical support center which is on site.

It is not a seismically qualifi ed building like the power plant itself, but it is built to building codes that are local standards.

We also have the emergency oper-ations facility which is 25 miles or farther off from the site.

Licensee man-agers fi rst go to the TSC on site but then if they have to have support from off site at the emergency operations facility, they bring in corpo-rate people, maybe people from other

plants that they own if it’s a multiple licensee. They have people from the corporate offi ce there that can provide technical support to the people at the site.

The whole idea of the emergency operations facility is that there are technical support groups to support the people in the TSC or the control room whatever their need is – more engineers, more experts, depending on what the issues that they are dealing with.

2. How does the convention on nuclear safety enable sharing of information among different countries worldwide?

The convention on nuclear safety is an international treaty. All of the countries with nuclear power plants are signatory to this.

As with other international treaties, it goes through our Senate and has to be ratifi ed. It’s actually a post-Chernobyl group that got together. This came about in the early 1990’s. We meet every three years on a continuing basis for two weeks, and every signatory to that convention has to write a national report on “Here’s how my program works. Here is what is going on.” It includes operating experience, if you’ve built new reactors, if you’ve shut down reactors; you talk about your program in your country. It’s a peer-review meeting. They go to the IAEA offi ces in Vienna. We have a meeting where each country presents the results of their reports and gets questions from the other contracting parties to the convention. We have this on-going discussion all the time. After Fukushima, it was decided that we would hold a special meeting; we called it an extraordinary meeting for the commission on nuclear safety in August 2012 to talk only about the lessons learned from Fukushima.

We spent a week just talking about what every country was doing to learn the lessons from Fukushima. I think the summary report of that is a public document.

Basically all the countries identifi ed very similar lessons learned from the Fukushima event. Each country may be addressing it in a slightly different ways that go along with their regulatory infrastructure or their cultural system or how they help their social structure. Everybody is addressing sort of the same type of issues whether it is prolonged station blackout event, or loss of the ultimate heat sink. Everyone identifi ed the same kind of issues that they need to go back and look at. All countries with nuclear power plants are doing the very similar things.

3. How many days must a U.S. nuclear power plant keep operating without off-site power?

Our near-term task force looked at prolonged station blackout and said we didn’t really address that very well in the past. After 9-11 and the terrorist attacks, we had required licensees to have a strategy that says if a large fi re or explosion at your



site takes out a large area of the plant, you have another water source or pump, or diesel power supply that can support core cooling. We had already implemented that after 2001, so we have that pump in place. What we had not thought of at the time, what if the event is not an airplane crash or something like that but is a severe natural event? Well, this particular pump that we had put in place really wasn’t protected from seismic or fl ooding events and we also never thought about what if the event affects more than one unit at a multiple unit site? That made us go back and think. We ended up issuing an order, a mitigating strategies order that says licensees now have to be able to cool the core, and preserve containment, without putting a timeframe on it.

We made it a performance-based order basically that says we want a plant to be able to handle three phases of an event, and the plant has to defi ne what those phases are and demonstrate to us that you can do this. The fi rst phase involves being able to survive with permanently installed equipment, what you already have available at the site. That period of

time must last long enough for the plant to hook up portable equipment at your site. On-site equipment that’s there but it’s portable and has to be put in place. Plant personnel have to make connections, mechanical connections, and electrical connections to put this equipment in place. As the licensee, you tell me how long you need to do that, and however long it takes to do that, your permanent equipment has to last that long.

The transition phase as we call it, is using on-site portable equipment to support the permanently installed things. Then the fi nal phase is using off-site support. The cavalry can come over the hill, bring over more equipment, bigger pumps, more diesels, more people, and so all of this is up to each individual licensee to explain to us how do you meet those three stages. One plant may say, “Well, my permanent equipment can last eight hours. I have eight hours to hook up my temporary equipment”. Another plant may say, “Well, I have six hours,” depending on the situation on my plant, what equipment I have. It’s up to the licensee to tell us what those timeframes

are and demonstrate how you’re going to meet those different phases. When you get to the fi nal phase, that’s indefi nite. You’re supposed to be able to last that way for as long as you don’t have power to your site. If it was a grid-related event that took down transmission towers, that you are going to be down for a while, we expect you to be able to survive until such time as you can get off-site power back, however long that might be? That’s the major difference on how far the US has gone, other countries may not have gone that far with what we’re calling mitigation strategies for a prolonged station blackout and loss of heat sink event.

After the terrorist attacks, we issued an order. Section B.5.b. (Station Blackout and Advanced Accident Mitigation) of that order says plants have to have equipment or strategies that cope with an event that causes a loss of large areas of the plant due to fi re or explosion. It became known as the B5b pump or the B5b strategy. It later got codifi ed in our regulations. It’s now called 50.54hh in the regulations.

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If you hear 50.54hh or B5b it’s a very similar thing. One was the order and then the regulation got put in place later.

We allowed this for the station blackout events. If one unit at a three-unit site lost power, we assumed if the other units had power, they would support - they could support with diesel power across ties between the units. Again, Fukushima made us rethink that strategy and say, “Wait a minute,” now we’re going to say – assume none of the units have power, which is a substantial change in a way we are regulating the plants. But the licensees are doing it. They are out there implementing that strategy now.

The JNRA, the Japan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (JNRA) is Japan’s new regulator. Our understanding is that they have draft standards out for public comments in Japan. Our understanding for what we have seen is that they are going to require seven days - that a plant has ability to survive for seven days with no off-site equipment or support to the site. That would mean you would have to have portable diesels and pumps and hose or fi re trucks. So that you would have enough power supply and water capability - water injection capability which should keep the core cool for seven days or keep the plant in stable condition for a seven-day period. That is Japan’s response.

4. What is US NRC’s approach to ensure effective communication with the plant, in case of an accident so that confusions similar to Fukushima are avoided?

We certainly have protocols, emergency procedures that the licensees go through whenever there is a substantial event at the plant. We go into our monitoring mode or activation mode in our emergency operation center. We monitor the event and what is going on. It is up to the licensee to make the call on what they need to do. We may give recommendations to the state because a lot of times, the governors have to be involved or some of the local authorities

– if you are going to evacuate, they have to make that call.

If the licensee is recommending to the governor that we need to evacuate, the governor may contact the NRC and say “What do you guys think? Do you agree? Should we evacuate people at this point?” We may give some thought on that but it’s up to the governor to decide and it’s up to licensee to make the recommendation to the states – we have various set of criteria when you get into a site area emergency or a general emergency that says core damage is eminent or containment failure is eminent. Then they know when to make those calls.

5. What is US NRC’s current involvement with TEPCO and with other Japanese organizations in benefi ting from the lessons learned and also in helping the decontamination and decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant?

For almost - nine months after the event, we had our presence in Tokyo at the U.S. Embassy. In fact, a day after the event, we had two experts on site at the embassy in Tokyo to support the ambassador because of the many U.S. citizens living in Japan as well as a military presence there with their families. Our experts there grew to a team of nine to 10 people over the next six months or so, and then we tapered that off to one to two people until December 2011.

We were in contact through our operations center for two months after the event, 24 hours a day. We had a group that supported our team over there for the rest of that time – for the next six months. Certainly we were there to provide support to the U.S. government as well as the government of Japan. We did have several interactions with the government of Japan during the event and the aftermath of the event to provide technical support, equipment support, whatever they needed and we were there to help provide that. As they have stood up the new regulatory authority, certainly we’re aware of what is going on. We have offered our help to

help them in any way that we can. We have that communication line open. We have a very good relationship with the government of Japan. Between the JNRA and the U.S. Department of Energy, we are helping look at decontamination and decommissioning of the Fukushima site.

DOE has a lot of expertise because of the Hanford site and the Savannah River site in this country in developing robotics and helping remove the highly radioactive materials. We have been in contact with the Japanese government about that. There will probably be some form of contract put in place or some kind of agreement that we can help support them as they work on that. At Fukushima, this is going to be a multiple-year thing.

They certainly talked to us as they were developing their plans for setting up their new regulatory structure.

6. Concluding remarks.Japan has to fi gure out what works

in their culture and their social structure and in their framework. We certainly had discussions with them as they were talking about setting up the new regulator. I don’t want to give the impression that they are becoming a Japanese version of the US NRC.

They have taken on their own way of doing business. That stays within Japan. Anything the NRC and the United States can do to support them, we stand right there to do that. Certainly, they are completely an independent organization. We wish them the best and we hope it does work out for them.

I think the Fukushima Daiichi event was a game-changer, similar to when Three Mile Island happened or Chernobyl. I think the world has stepped up. All the regulators around the world have looked at this event and will certainly learn what we can from it and our hope is that an event like this doesn’t happen again.

Contact: Japan Lessons-Learned Project Directorate, telephone: (301) 415-3091, email: [email protected]. �

Fukushima, a...Continued from page 23


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Dose Management ChallengesBy Pete Orphanos, Exelon Generation.

Pete OrphanosAs the Vice President of Fleet Support for Exelon Generation, Orphanos is responsible for Radiation Protection, Chemistry, Operations, Emergency Preparedness and Environmental at Exelon’s 10 nuclear sites. Prior to his current assignment, Orphanos served in various roles at the Limerick, Peach Bottom and Oyster Creek generating stations, including Director of Operations at both Limerick and Oyster Creek, and Plant Manager at Oyster Creek. He held a Senior Reactor Operator license at Limerick and a Fuel Handling Senior Reactor Operator license at both Limerick and Peach Bottom.

Mr. Orphanos earned a bachelor’s degree in Nuclear Engineering Technology from the University of the State of New York and a bachelor’s degree in education from Southern Illinois University.

Response to questions by Newal Agnihotri, Editor of Nuclear Plant Journal.

1. What is the structure of Exelon’s ALARA Radiation Advisory Committee? Does it include health physics professionals from outside the company. Also, what is the scope of Advisory Committee’s responsibilities?

The structure of Exelon’s ALARA Advisory committee includes both a site and corporate role. At each site, there is a site committee that is comprised of the senior leadership from all disciplines. The site ALARA committees are chaired by the site vice president or plant manager. The primary responsibility of the site ALARA committee is to ensure that the dose is maintained ALARA at a site level. These actions include development of

strategic, long range dose reduction plans and tactical actions to reduce personnel exposure on day-to-day evolutions.

At Exelon, there is also a corporate ALARA commit-tee, chaired by the vice president of fl eet support, which includes senior ex-ecutives of the cor-poration, all site vice presidents, and

site radiation protection managers. The corporate ALARA committee provides oversight of the site reduction efforts and develops fl eet initiatives for dose reduc-tion.

2. What software is used in ensuring that interferences are avoided during the planning phase of an outage management to ensure minimum radiation dose?

Exelon uses several functions to ensure that interferences are avoided during the planning phase of work to reduce outage dose. First is the Exelon scheduling tool. These programs are used to establish the correct sequence for work and apply the appropriate logic ties in the outage schedules. These schedules are challenged by multi-discipline work teams to review interferences, develop the optimum schedule for the work, and ensure that the appropriate prerequisites are included in the schedule. These

actions have ensured that appropriate ALARA fl ushes of systems are scheduled to reduce work area dose rates prior to work, such as fl ushing of vessel nozzles prior to performing in-service inspections on the nozzles during an outage.

3. What incentives or recognition programs are offered by Exelon to motivate groups of employees or contractors towards achieving dose reduction goals?

Each site has an ALARA incentive program to encourage employees to reduce dose. These programs reward employees for submitting ALARA suggestions and implementation of dose reduction ideas. The rewards include everything from big screen TVs to gift cards. These site programs have resulted in signifi cant savings, especially during refuel outages where sites have saved more than 10 person-rem each outage because of dose reduction ideas. An example of an action implemented as a result of these programs is the development of a new diving platform for use in the suppression pool. Using the platform resulted in signifi cant savings for outage dose and reduced the overall duration to perform the suppression pool diving during a recent outage at one of the Exelon stations.

Additionally, Exelon has developed an innovation reward program that recognizes these recent innovations at a meeting with the Chief Nuclear Offi cer. In all, there were more than 196 specifi c items developed within the fl eet. At this meeting, the top practices are recognized for fl eet wide innovation awards. During the recent award ceremony, six of the 15 practices recognized were submitted solely for dose reduction benefi ts that were achieved. These included items from improved use of robots for at power inspections in PWRs and cleaning radwaste vaults to improved methods for diving in the suppression pool, and practices to improve dressout for a torus recoat project.

Clearly, through this mechanism and the ALARA suggestion program, Exelon values employee input and innovation to reduce collective radiation exposure and improve worker performance.



4. What ALARA design features such as quick electrical disconnects, fl anged connections, remote readouts, video cameras, or remote operators have been installed to reduce periodic maintenance and to reduce time in radiation areas?

Exelon has implemented most if not all of the above design features to reduce dose at the stations. Several examples of these that have been used are as follows; remote telemetry and cameras to monitor system performance to minimize operator entries into high dose fi elds; changing the design of bolting to hydro-nuts to reduce mechanics dose during installing of valves in high dose rate areas such as the drywell. In addition, a design change to install permanent shielding has been completed at most stations to reduce the time and dose for installing temporary shielding during the refuel outages.

5. What has been the Radiation Protection and ALARA-related corrective action program implementation from Exelon’s most recent outage?

There are multiple lessons learned during a refuel outage. At Exelon, at the end of every outage, a post-outage critique meeting is conducted to review and challenge the outage performance and develop corrective actions for a site’s next refuel outage. An example of a recent action developed at the site based on lessons learned was a method to shield the reactor refueling mast with new innovative shielding. This resulted in saving more than two person-rem for the fuel handlers at the station.

As appropriate, these actions are shared with Exelon Nuclear corporate for potential corporate level actions and lessons learned. These fl eet actions are presented at the fl eet outage lessons learned meeting. Recently completed fl eet actions include use of improved shielding on the refuel fl oor and in methods for source term reduction and control. Based on fl eet lessons learned, the fl eet is implementing improved resin and shutdown strategies for the PWRs in the fl eet.

6. How does Exelon effectively utilize the industry databases, such as Brooke Heaven National Laboratory’s ALARA Center Exchange (ACE), Nuclear Energy Agency’s Information System for Occupational Exposure (ISOE), and similar other databases by INPO, WANO or other institutions?

Exelon, through benchmarking, makes extensive use of these databases to reduce dose. These have included informal and formal site visits to top performing plants both in the United States and internationally to obtain dose reduction best practices. These have included identifi cation of several dose reduction best practices, which have been assembled in what Exelon calls, dose reduction best practices BINGO chart. This chart is used to drive site implementation of these actions. This BINGO chart was recently recognized within the industry as a reference for all utilities to use to assess their specifi c dose reduction practices.

The corporate radiation protection manager is the current chairman of the ISOE. Through attendance at the annual

ISOE ALARA meeting and the ISOE committee meeting, the fl eet takes advan-tage of the opportunity for benchmarking and networking with United States and International Radiation Protection peers to improve the ALARA programs. Re-cent improvements identifi ed in the meet-ing include methods to control source term at our reactors, such as resin use strategies, use of increased zinc injection, and improved methods for remote moni-toring. Recently, as a result of bench-marking at a similar industry seminar, the fl eet picked up on the use of a radiation simulation tool to improve RP techni-cian training. This resulted in receiving recognition from the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) for the use of this training tool.

7. What engineered controls (applied innovations and current practices) have been utilized by Exelon to maintain radiation dose ALARA?

Engineered controls used by Exelon have included installation of permanent shielding in high dose rate areas, the use


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of remote monitoring technologies, and fl ushing of radioactive systems to remove source term to name a few.

8. What innovations have been utilized by Exelon in computer and video aided plant image databases and robotics to plan reduced radiation exposure, before the workers enter the radiation area?

The use of remote telemetry systems are used extensively in Exelon. These systems give radiation protection technicians, who oversee jobs in high dose areas, the ability to see and hear feedback from workers in those areas, as well as monitor the dose the workers are receiving. The technician then uses this information to reduce the overall dose for a job. For example, by using these systems, a technician can identify high dose rate areas and reposition the worker to a lower dose rate fi eld. This reduces the overall dose of the worker. In addition, using the same system, dose rate detecting devices can be placed in the plant to monitor for radiological changes in the facility. If these are detected, then mitigating actions can be taken promptly, such as local shielding, fl ushing the hot spot, or controlling the area to reduce worker dose.

In addition, Exelon recently began a pilot program in electronic surveys. This system will use wireless technology and provide almost live-time radiological information to all site personnel. The system will use a tablet device, and as the RP technician obtains radiological information, it will be recorded on the tablet device, approved by an RP supervisor, then available for use by personnel in less than one hour. This task used to take up to a day to make the information available. The electronic survey system will allow all site personnel to access radiological information over the intranet and use it to reduce overall collective dose.

9. How is decontamination utilized in achieving of ALARA during a refueling outage in the plant?

During the planning phases of a job, the work planners and ALARA engineers identify tasks that can benefi t from use of decontamination to remove source term during work execution. In addition to the convectional decontamination methods, these efforts have been identifi ed and incorporated into the outage schedule actions to conduct system fl ushes to remove hot spots, and perform hydrolazing of the valve internals and system piping to reduce dose rates and contamination levels prior to maintenance. These efforts result in signifi cant dose savings during Exelon refuel outages.

10. What chemical and physical technologies are utilized for dose reduction in the plant?

There are a number of different chemical and physical technologies used by Exelon to minimize source term and reduce dose. The primary technology used to control dose is ion exchange; however other technologies, including zinc addition, peroxide additions, and chemistry optimization are also contributors to the overall dose control strategy.

Ion exchange and fi ltration are key aspects of our source term control strategy. Ion exchange media are optimized to maximize the removal effi ciency for key radio nuclides, such as cobalt 58 and cobalt 60. Exelon continues to work to improve the removal capability of the media. Examples include pilot testing of specialty resins developed to maximize cobalt removal. Exelon has also piloted cobalt sequestration resins, a new Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) developed technology. Although similar to ion exchange, sequestration resin uses a different removal technology that is more focused on cobalt removal. These removal resins are used primarily in the reactor cleanup and fuel pool cleanup systems; however, Exelon is proceeding with efforts to use underwater demineralizers to further supplement removal rates in the reactor cavity during shutdown periods.

Exelon is also using zinc addition to further reduce cobalt source term. Depleted zinc, which is isotopically enriched in Zn 65, is used as an additive in both BWRs and PWRs. Depleted Zinc 65 will not become activated in the core. This non radioactive zinc displaces the

cobalt on surfaces greatly reducing the plant dose rates during plant outages.

The Exelon fl eet of BWRs has also transitioned to performing On Line Noble Chemistry (OLNC) additions. OLNC has been shown to reduce shutdown dose rates in the vast majority of plants that perform these treatments as compared to the classic noble chemistry treatments previously utilized.

Exelon uses hydrogen peroxide in PWRs during plant shutdowns to oxidize the radioactive crud of the fuel and plant surfaces and uses the ion exchange media to remove this crud in a controlled manner prior to initiating refueling outage maintenance, thereby controlling plant dose rates.

Water chemistry control programs are also critical aspects of the dose control program. The tight control of iron levels in BWRs helps control the crud that develops in the reactor thereby minimizing outage dose. PWR’s tightly control primary chemistry boron and lithium concentration to minimize corrosion and optimize outage dose rate impacts.

11. Concluding comments.Exelon has set a goal to meet or

beat the industry top quartile values for accumulated collective radiation exposure (CRE) at its twelve BWR units and fi ve PWR units by the end of 2014. Our fl eet focuses on improvements in fi ve areas: source term reduction, shielding use, technology use, process improvements, and behavior enhancements.

Radiological safety performance is driven by outstanding ownership of each site department and site leadership teams. Effective ownership at the site level is complemented by strong governance, oversight, support and performance (GOSP) activities from the corporate organization. Strong leadership behaviors from the site Radiation Protection departments, as well as robust partnerships between the Chemistry and Radiation Protection departments at the site and corporate levels, will help solidify our CRE reduction efforts and drive us to top quartile CRE performance in 2014.

Contact: Kristen Otterness, Exelon Nuclear, telephone: (630) 657-4207, email: [email protected]. �

Dose Management...Continued from page 27


Current Issues in Radiological ProtectionBy Ted Lazo, OECD Nuclear Energy Agency.

Ted LazoTed Lazo holds a bachelors and Masters degrees in Nuclear Engineering, and a PhD in Radiation Protection. His experience has included work at Three Mile Island, contaminated DOE sites, Brookhaven National Laboratory, and French nuclear power stations with FRAMATOME and EDF. Mr. Lazo is presently with the NEA’s Division of Radiation Protection and Radioactive Waste Management, where he is the Scientifi c Secretariat of the NEA’s Committee on Radiation Protection and Public Health (CRPPH).

Much of what is currently being discussed in radiological protection is as a result of the Fukushima accident. There are many questions arising with regard to how the experience from the accident will affect the emergency and recovery plans that are in place, and in particular how such plans will be accepted, or not, by affected stakeholders. The Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), in coordination with other international organisations, in particular the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), is investigating these issues and will be developing relevant technical reports over the course of the next year or so. In addition, however, the Fukushima accident has brought home that occupational exposure management at nuclear power plants remains an important concern, in

“normal” operational circumstances as well as in accident situations. This paper will briefl y describe some of the work being performed by the NEA, more specifi cally by the Committee on Radiation Protection and Public Health (CRPPH), to learn from this terrible accident.

Occupational ExposureThe management of occupational

exposure has continued to improve, and worker doses have continued to fall. The Fukushima accident, beginning on the 11th of March 2011, has heightened the awareness of occupational exposures within utilities, and focused efforts on preparedness to prevent, and if necessary to address severe accidents. Overall, however, the management of occupational exposures at operating facilities has remained good. As the following graphs and table show, occupational exposures have roughly been cut in half over the

past 20 years. This decrease can be seen in the annual average dose per reactor (Figure 1), and in Figure 1, as well as in Figure 2, which shows the 3-year rolling average annual exposure to refl ect years in which reactors have no outage periods. This same information is also captured in Table 1.

These gains in occupational exposure have come as a result of deliberate work management activities on the part of reactor operators, and through the exchange of operational experience and dose reduction approaches. One area of key importance to dose reduction is source-term management. To contribute to the exchange of experience in this area, the NEA’s Information System on Occupational Exposure (ISOE) is developing a state-of-the-art report on primary circuit water chemistry and its effect on occupational exposure. Water chemistry approaches in different designs of NPPs vary in results and consequences in terms of radiation protection performance. The ISOE Expert Group on Water Chemistry and Source-Term Management (EGWC) was established and mandated to address the experience of various ISOE utilities with various water chemistry regimes to explore if experience exchange could help to improve radiation protection performances. It is also necessary to note that water chemistry should not be viewed only from the context of radiation protection issues, but also from the context of operational and safety issues. With these aspects in mind, the work has been grouped into a few of the most commonly used water chemistry approaches (e.g. zinc injection, pH control, iron injection, hydrogen water chemistry, etc.) to focus the exchange of experience. The expert group work, which is due to be completed in 2014, is focusing primarily on:

Description of strategies and • techniques aiming to limit the level of activity in the primary coolant (prevention of contamination);Description of strategies and • techniques for the decrease of activity in the primary coolant or circuit decontamination (remediation of contamination);




Performance indicators to assess re-• sults from the above strategies and techniques; measurement techniques and performance assessment (moni-toring), and

Management of iodine, xenon and • alpha risks.More directly related to the Fukushi-

ma accident, the ISOE programme agreed shortly after March 11, 2011 to develop a report summarising operational experi-ence in the management of worker doses in severe accident situations. The Expert Group on Occupational Radiation Pro-tection in Severe Accident Management and Post-Accident Recovery (EGSAM) is performing these studies and will pub-lish its fi ndings in late 2013. It is also

proposed that a workshop to present the report’s fi ndings, and to share operational experience should be organised in 2014. The types of topics that are being ad-dressed, in the report and perhaps in the workshop, include:

Radiation Protection Management • and Organisation,Radiation Protection Training and • Exercises related to Severe Accident Management,

Facility Confi guration and • Readiness,Overall Approach on the Protection • of Workers,Radioactive Materials, Contamina-• tion Controls and Logistics, andLessons Learned from the Fukushima • accident and past accidents.

RP Issues Arising from the Fukushima Accident

There are many issues that have emerged from post-Fukushima

discussions, in particular with respect to emergency and recovery management. While it is relatively clear that these issues are not completely new in nature, it is also clear that their signifi cance and nature is broadly a function of the severity of the consequences of the Fukushima accident. In terms of emergency management, three areas that quite clearly presented challenges to the Japanese government, and to all other countries around the world trying to address accident consequences, were emergency communications, technical assessment of the accident situation, and dealing with outgoing and incoming trade.

The magnitude of the accident resulted in signifi cant rupture of infrastructures for a signifi cant period, signifi cantly occupying emergency management responder organisations in Japan, and around the world. In these circumstances fi nding time in Japan to provide timely and accurate information to interested governments around the world proved to be challenging. This in turn affected the ability of responding organisations, in Japan and elsewhere, to appropriately access the status of the accident in order to inform protection decisions. While the Japanese decisions to evacuate and shelter seem to have prevented signifi cant exposures, the advice that other governments gave to their citizens and embassies in Japan were hampered by incomplete understanding of the accident situation. It should also be noted that many questions were raised with regard to advice and decisions for incoming and outgoing ships and airplanes, as well as for food and commodities coming from Japan. Although trade issues generally do not emerge until late in the emergency phase, the signifi cant length of the Fukushima accident lead to many trade questions being asked by the public and by governments.

In terms of recovery management issues, these are now, after 2 years, becoming more clear. Questions of returning to evacuated areas, of management of decontamination wastes, of clean-up criteria and approaches, of public dialogue and stakeholder engagement strategies, and in general of education, information and building effective radiological protection culture

Current Issues...Continued from page 29


are all emerging signifi cantly both in Japan and in other countries reviewing their recovery management preparedness. As was mentioned above, these are not new questions, but their signifi cance is clearly augmented for an accident the magnitude of Fukushima.

The CRPPH is working to clearly identify these issues, and to address those which fall within its expertise. Much of the Committee’s work will thus fall in the areas of stakeholder engagement, and emergency and recovery management. At the CRPPH annual meeting, 14 – 16

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May 2013, emergency and recovery management issues will be discussed during specifi c topical sessions, based on which the Committee will agree on which areas should be specifi cally addressed.

ConclusionsMany occupational exposure,

emergency and recovery management issues have arisen as a result of the Fukushima accident, diverting expertise and resources from normal operational focus and issues. The NEA is working, in close collaboration with the IAEA and other international organisations, to address these issues to assure that, should another accident occur, we will all have learned from this situation and will have improved preparedness.

Contact: Ted Lazo, OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, email: [email protected]. �


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Meeting Safety ChallengesBy Rita Bowser and Jim Brennan, Westinghouse Electric Company.

Rita BowserDr. Rita C. Bowser is a Vice President for Westinghouse Electric Company. She is supporting the Americas Region responding to nuclear utility needs in a post-Fukushima environment. She recently led the development of a post-Fukushima Westinghouse strategy for a key segment of the nuclear fuel cycle.

She comes to the Americas role after serving as the Regional Vice President - South Africa for Westinghouse Electric Company. Dr. Bowser served on the Boards of Westinghouse Electric South Africa (WE-SA), and the Board of American Chamber of Commerce. She was a founding member and served on the Board of the Nuclear Institute of South Africa (NIASA). Dr. Bowser is a founder and Executive Sponsor of Women in Nuclear-WE-SA.

Dr. Bowser received her Doctor of Business Administration (DBA) from the American University of London, a Master of Science in Mechanical Engineering (MSME) in Heath Physics from the Georgia Institute of Technology. She is a Registered Radiation Protection Technologist.


1. How has US NRC’s post Fukushima, licensing requirements affected Westing-house’s projects related to:

License renewal?• Plant maintenance?• Outage management?• Jim: Plans continue to support

safety-related plant maintenance and license renewal projects. Some projects not related to plant safety have been delayed so plants can focus on the U.S. NRC Tier 1 safety requirements.

Fukushima has also affected some of the Diverse and Flexible Coping Strate-gies (FLEX) work we’ve done. Some of that work needs to be implemented and

completed as early as fall 2014, so we’re on a tight schedule. We’re trying to sup-port not only the fi rst two phases of FLEX implementation, but also the third and fourth phases. We need to make sure all the equipment is procured, all the work packages are procured or com-pleted, procedures are in place, people are training and then plants are ready to implement and com-plete by as early as fall 2014.

Most of our focus thus far has been on the near-term task force, Tier 1 requirements and the FLEX work. We’ve provided extensive support for FLEX requirements and the Tier 1 requirements. As part of Tier 2 and 3, we’re investing in innovation programs to upgrade our products and services so that we can support our customers in responding to these requirements.

2. What projects, has Westinghouse completed for utilities to deal with US NRC’s tier one recommendations related to:

Beyond Design Basis External • events.Spent fuel, instrumentation.• Jim: Early on we dedicated a team

of people to interface with the industry groups, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI),

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Westinghouse participates in numerous working groups within the industry, so that we can work with the industry to understand the event, and develop a path for moving forward.

We’ve also been very active within the industry to develop generic programs, where applicable, with the Pressurized Water Reactor Owners Group (PWROG), such as to further understand extended loss of all AC power (ELAP) requirements. We have worked with 30 plants to implement the fi rst phases of FLEX. We have also developed a guided wave technology for application for Spent Fuel Pool level indication.

Rita: NSAIC is the Nuclear Strategic Advisory Committee (NEI). Right after Fukushima they took a leadership role in ensuring that there was alignment within industry, between INPO and NEI, and suppliers, ensuring that the industry was tasking its members to work in one direction and not push-pull in different directions.

Jim: The AP1000® is designed and built so that it doesn’t have to rely on operator interaction. As far as the coping time of the standard plant versus an AP1000® plant, the coping for the AP1000 with no operator interaction on the extended loss of offsite power event is 72 hours.

For operating plants, we looked at a lot of different technologies for measuring spent fuel pool level. We eventually settled on a highly reliable technology that is already being deployed in new nuclear plant design, which utilizes guided wave radar. We’ve also developed a wireless technology option to help our customers get the indication to a lot of different places without the need for extensive wiring. Our customers have been very receptive to this solution and we have received several orders so far.

3. What has been Westinghouse’s activity related to the containment vents?

Jim: We’ve been very active in Japan on boiling water reactors (BWRs) and pressurized water reactors (PWRs) because of our fi ltered vent technology. This technology applies one of two basic methods: a dry fi ltered vent or a



Jim BrennanAs vice president, Engineering Services, Mr. Brennan is responsible for all engineering activities related to the engineering and regulatory support of the Westinghouse designed operating

fl eet. This includes support of plant upratings, license renewal, component replacement and repair, safety analysis, PRA and system design for PWRs and BWRs. Engineering Services has 17 locations throughout the world and includes 1,600 personnel.

Mr. Brennan joined Westinghouse in 1984 as an engineer within the

former Nuclear Technology Division. He advanced through a series of engineering and strategic positions of increasing responsibility. Signifi cantly, he helped to lead Westinghouse’s acquisition of PaR Nuclear and served as Toshiba Transition director for Engineering Services. Applying his skills as a certifi ed Customer 1st leader, Mr. Brennan’s projects have addressed BWR and balance of plant Engineering Services growth and the integration of Westinghouse’s business plan with Toshiba.

Mr. Brennan has a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering from the Pennsylvania State University and a master’s degree in business administration from the University of Pittsburgh.

wet fi ltered vent. The amount of heat required to be removed from containment determines which method is appropriate to use. Both systems have been used in Europe, and we are now discussing application of these technologies with Toshiba in Japan. We are currently under contract to implement the dry fi lter method for two units in Japan and a unit in Europe.

4. Is Westinghouse helping any utility to perform seismic and fl ooding evaluations due to a Beyond Design Basis External event?

Jim: Yes, we are helping several plants with this evaluation. Plants have been asked to do external event hazard evaluation. They have been asked to come back and look at their hazards evaluations, both to make sure that what was in their original licensing basis is up to date with the latest information. That was all part of the hazards evaluation, to go back and look at what’s in a licensing basis for seismic hazards, fl ooding hazards, and make sure that represents the latest information that’s available.

5. How has Westinghouse faced the following challenges with their innovative approach?

Predicting incipient degradation of • equipment and structures before it becomes an issue.Utilization of IT and Automation in • Maintenance. Jim: We have a hot cell facility

located in Churchill, Pennsylvania (USA), where we’ve performed examinations and conducted research on materials and degradation mechanisms, including studies on cracking that is found in a nuclear environment. Currently, a lot of our work in these areas is focused on reactor vessel internals. The industry, under the Materials Reliability Program, developed an inspection and evaluation guideline for long-term aging management of pressurized water reactor (PWR) internals. The MRP-227-A guideline identifi ed key components that serve as leading indicators in predicting degradation. Westinghouse has been very active in helping the utilities apply the guidelines, and has developed a

comprehensive 4-step approach for inspection and implementation of reactor internals aging management.

All of our standard steam generator inspections are done by robotic tools. Pegasys™ is our main inspection tool, but sometimes we use other robots, such as the Remotely Operated Service Arm (ROSA) which is deployed for more complex steam generator projects typically involving heavy-duty repairs. The OMNI-200 all-in-one tester is used in conjunction with the Pegasys robot as a “Suitcase Eddy Current System” which greatly reduces setup time and minimizes personnel exposure. The Submersible Platform with the ROSA End Effector Motion (SUPREEM™) robot system is used in the reactor vessel to do all of the inspections remotely. Our SQUID™ scanner was designed specifi cally for examination of reactor vessel nozzle safe-end welds and provides an alternative when the balance of the reactor vessel does not require inspection. With Forsmark’s support, we developed the Nemo core shroud support leg inspection system. It was designed, qualifi ed, tested and applied successfully at Forsmark -- all in less than a year. We continue to develop robotic tools for either inspection or repairs.

We’re working with Toshiba to develop an underwater laser beam welding system to be deployed remotely. We have a remote welding center that links as many as 20 remote welding stations – up to a mile away from the work area – via fi ber optic cables. This reduces site congestion and means less equipment in containment.

Other recent IT-related innovations would include our Scanning 3D Laser Metrology, which is a digital means of capturing plant walkdown data, including components, piping and layout; viewable



Post-Fukushima InnovationsBy Thomas Franch, AREVA, Inc., North America.

Thomas FranchThomas Franch is Senior Vice President of Reactor and Services for AREVA, Inc., North America. Tom is responsible for the groups’ business operations overseeing fi nancial performance, innovative products and services, customer relationships and overall project delivery for the operating U.S. nuclear fl eet and the design and deployment of the next generation Nuclear Plant. While driving growth in the core business and accelerating the transition to a greater mix of services, Tom leads AREVA Reactors and Services in operational excellence for safety, quality, performance and delivery.

Tom has more than 30 years of power industry experience in various technical, engineering, and executive positions.

Tom holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Civil Engineering and Architecture from the University of Illinois.


1. What projects have currently been undertaken by AREVA in response to the US NRC’s post-Fukushima recommendations?

Since the NRC organized their post-Fukushima recommendations into three tiers, the U.S. industry fi rst addressed the NRC’s Tier 1 recommendations. Tier 1 included seismic and fl ooding walk downs and evaluations (among others), and we helped various utilities with these evaluations so they could respond back to the Commission with the results.

Subsequent efforts are now address-ing the follow-up work from Tier 1 along with planning for Tier 2 and 3 recommen-dations. Tiers 2 and 3 apply the lessons learned and insights gained from the Tier

1 evaluations and re-ports. These recom-mendations consider other natural events such as tornados, droughts or hurri-canes, which will be evaluated and their results will build upon the entirety of the Tier 1 response. AREVA is well po-sitioned to address Tier 2 and 3 activi-ties with our custom-ers as we have been helping to initiate in-dustry discussions on

the best path forward. We are also developing innovative and cost-effective products and services that will help the industry to meet the NRC’s recommendations while minimizing the impact on their operations and costs.

A good example of one of our post-Fukushima solutions is our Spent Fuel Pool instrumentation system that simply and safely identifi es fuel pool levels so that customers can measure, analyze, report and trend results for the enhanced safety of their plants. Through discussions with customers and industry leaders, we identifi ed potential improvement areas for spent fuel pool measurements and explored options to use technology to enhance safety at our U.S. plants. During the technical evaluation process, we found an off-the-shelf Through-Air Radar system that works very well to measure spent fuel pool levels. Through successful fi eld tests, we enhanced the

system to meet specifi c customer needs. We’ve been able to demonstrate that the spent fuel pool monitoring system will meet utilities’ needs should a beyond-design-basis event ever occur. At AREVA, we’re always looking for new technologies, services and products to help the industry economically address regulatory requirements, without the constraints of undue costs.

We believe that our expertise in the fi eld and our technology can help utilities meet the NRC’s post-Fukushima requirements. We know that any solution has to meet ever-increasing safety and security requirements over the next 25 years and it also needs to be cost effective.

2. What will be the application of the radar system?

If you’ve ever been traveling on the road and seen a state trooper checking for speeding cars, that’s an application of Through-Air Radar. We’ve been able to take this technology and utilize it for checking the water level in a spent fuel pool, even if there is debris, saturated steam or smoke in it, and demonstrate that the radar will still be able to return an indication of spent fuel pool level. The radar wave shoots across the pool, refl ects back and the calibrated signal shows the level of water in the spent fuel pool. We are working with various customers to implement this technology as part of their response to meet the Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Requirements.

The concept is to avoid exposing plant workers to radiation during or after a beyond-design-basis event. The system has remote application and can be used safely to measure spent fuel pool levels without exposing personnel to high radiation. While you have to install the necessary equipment before a beyond-design-basis event occurs, it will help to reduce dose exposure during an actual event. We’ve actually proven the functionality of this technology in our own facilities, where it has been thoroughly tested.

3. Is AREVA working on any other new technologies?

At AREVA we are always working on new and innovative technologies. We are very interested in robotics and the solutions that advanced technology can


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Post-Fukushima...Continued from page 34

Meeting Safety...Continued from page 33

provide to the industry. For example, we are looking at new technologies for our steam generators, our Non-Destructive Examination (NDE) applications, and automation to ensure the safety and reliability of the existing U.S. fl eet.

We have an ongoing innovation incubator program here at AREVA where we encourage all of our employees to come up with innovative ideas to help solve real problems for our customers. As a result, we have found solutions, like the spent fuel pool instrumentation example, and we have applied for new patents. In fact, this past year we rewarded several of our employees for earning patents and coming up with technology and solution ideas to help our customers. We held an executive-level ceremony recognizing our “Patent Elite” for their outstanding contributions to innovation. We are proud of our patent holders and the innovation they bring to move our industry forward to ensure a sustained supply of safe, clean, “round-the-clock” power to achieve America’s clean energy vision.

Contact: Kelly Cousineau, AREVA, Inc., telephone; (202) 680-2469, email: [email protected]. �

as high-defi nition, 3D, as-built images with spatial intelligence for dimensional analysis. It can be used for either dry or underwater scanning and reduces worker exposure. And our Real-time Automated Analysis product provides an alternative, independent data extraction method for steam generator primary inspections. It was recognized with a 2012 Nuclear Energy Institute Top Industry Practice award.

6. Concluding RemarksRita: I would like to leave the audience

with the assurance that the industry is safer now than it was before the Fukushima event, thanks to Westinghouse’s and the industry’s innovation. Such innovation will serve us well as we go forward, and the collaborative process, among industry groups, customers and suppliers will persist as an effective model for the future of nuclear power. Westinghouse benefi ted not only from the specifi cs of the challenges we solved, but also from this better way of working together to achieve objectives.

Jim: A lot of above questions have been focused on the U.S., but a lot of our efforts have been focused in Asia and Europe as well. One of the benefi ts

or lessons learned coming out of what’s happened following Fukushima is that global communication about safety is vital. Since the Fukushima event, Europe, the U.S. and Asia are communicating more frequently and more clearly about their nuclear safety efforts. As we’re all trying to understand what are the appropriate lessons learned from Fukushima, I think there’s a lot more sharing of information and certainly Westinghouse is reviewing the requirements in Asia and what’s being done there and comparing them to what they are in Europe and in the U.S. Our challenge now is to determine how to meet all those needs and how to help our customers.

Contact: Jackie McCoy, Westinghouse External Communications, telephone: (803) 647-3314, email: [email protected]. �

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Fukushima Daiichi StatusA Nuclear Plant Journal Report.

1. Fuel Removal from the Spent Fuel Pools

Work towards spent fuel removal is in progress while ensuring seismic safety. In particular, efforts are being made to achieve the early start and completion of Unit 4 spent fuel removal, which is planned to be completed by the end of 2014.

Spent fuel removal at Unit 4 The cover installation for fuel removal

is ongoing, which is to be completed by mid-2013. In addition to the foundation work, the steel frame construction for fuel removal was started on January 8, 2013.

Spent fuel removal at Unit 3 Platform installation and debris

removal from the upper part of the Reactor Building is ongoing. The steel truss debris which had remained in the upper part of the spent fuel pool has been removed.

After the area surrounding the pool is cleaned up, protection will be installed on the spent fuel pool and debris removal from the upper part of the operation fl oor

will be started. Though the fuel handling machine mast fell into the pool during the steel truss debris removal, it was confi rmed in an investigation on February 13, 2013 that the mast did not directly contact the spent fuel storage rack and the liner.

Inspection for the integrity of Unit 4 Reactor Building

The fourth regular inspection was performed in order to confi rm the integrity of the Reactor Building and the spent fuel pool (February 4-12, 2013). As a result, it was confi rmed that the integrity of the building is acceptable and the building is capable of safely storing spent fuels. An outside expert participated in the inspection to confi rm the results of evaluation performed so far including seismic analysis results.

Investigation of Unit 2 Reactor Building operation fl oor

The radiation released from the target surfaces has been measured utilizing a camera inserted from the blow-out panel opening on February 21, 2013. The results obtained will be provided as inputs for developing an effective and effi cient plan for decontamination and shielding which will be essential for the preparation for fuel removal.

2. Fuel Debris RemovalIn addition to decontamination

and shield installation being carried out for improved accessibility to the PCV, technology development and data acquisition necessary to prepare for fuel debris removal (such as investigating and repairing the leakage location of the PCV) are being accelerated.

Development of comprehensive radiation dose reduction plan

Comprehensive radiation dose reduction plan is being developed for improving the environment of the Reactor Building. Environment improvement technologies to be applied under high radiation were discussed with 6 overseas organizations (completed on February 28, 2013).

Development of remote control decontamination technology

The production of three types of remote control decontamination equipment (high-pressure water decontamination, dry ice blast and blast/suction) has been completed on January 31, 2013. Demonstration test of the equipment was performed at Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station for the purpose of identifying issues to be resolved before putting them in operation at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station from January 15 to February 28, 2013. Demonstration observation of dry blast was held on February 15, 2013. The results of evaluation (on-site simplifi ed analysis done by the plant manufacturers and detailed analysis performed by the JAEA) of the contaminated samples collected in Units 1-3 Reactor Buildings during site investigation in FY2012 have been completed.

Removal of foreign material (such as debris) from the fi rst fl oor of Units 1 and 3

Before performing decontamination in the Reactor Buildings, foreign material will be removed by unmanned machinery to secure the access route for decontamination equipment and investigation of the inside of the PCV. Foreign material removal is scheduled to be completed by September 2013 for Unit 1 and by June 2013 for Unit 3.

Investigation of Units 1-2 Torus The investigation of the Torus

Room in the Reactor Building basement and the condition of the accumulated water there, for providing inputs for the development of equipment to investigate the leakage locations, is ongoing in Unit 1, the Torus Room was investigated by drilling a hole on the fi rst fl oor of the Reactor Building in February 2013. As a result, the accumulated water level depth was approximately 4.9m (16.07 feet), the water temperature was approx. 23℃ and the maximum radiation dose was


View from the Top of Unit 4.


920mSv/h. No major damage was found on the structures. Unit 3 investigations will be performed after decontamination, since the radiation dose inside the building is too high.

3. Reactor CoolingCold shutdown condition will be

maintained and measures to complement status monitoring will be continued.

Maintaining and monitoring stable reactor condition

The RPV bottom temperature and the PCV gaseous phase temperature has been stable and is currently in the15 to 35℃ range.

The release rate of radioactive materials has also been stable at lower level.

Investigation of the inside of Unit 2 PCV and installation of permanent monitoring instruments

Investigation of the inside of the PCV and the measurement of PCV temperature and water level is performed for complementing status monitoring and providing inputs for the future technical operations. Permanent monitoring instruments will also be installed.

Investigation of the inside of the reactor and thermometer installation utilizing Unit 2 TIP guide pipes

The investigation of the inside of the reactor and installation of permanent thermometers will be performed by utilizing the TIP (Traversing in-core probe) guide pipes, in addition to the alternative thermometer installation through the SLC (Standby liquid control) differential pressure detection pipe on October 3, 2012. The integrity investigation of the inside of the TIP guide pipes (4 lines) was done by inserting a fi berscope.

On February 25-28, 2012, TEPCO was unable to insert the fi berscope all the way through the guide pipes for all 4 lines due to substances attached inside

and the limit switch roller of the indexing device not being pressed up. TEPCO will consider ways to remove the substances attached inside of the guide pipes and to press up the limit switch roller.

Nitrogen injection into the suppression chamber (S/C) for the purpose of mitigating hydrogen-related risk

The residual air with high hydrogen concentration in the upper part of the S/C (Suppression Chamber) which was generated in the early stage of the accident will be purged. Though the estimated hydrogen concentration was reduced to below the fl ammability limit at Unit 1, nitrogen injection is continuing to further reduce the hydrogen concentration. The fl ammability limit represents the limit allowing combustion, which is 4% or more hydrogen and 5% or more oxygen.

For Unit 2, the design and production of nitrogen injection equipment are ongoing. After the equipment is installed at the site, which was planned for mid March 2013, nitrogen injection will be started.

4. Dose Reduction Effective dose reduction at site

boundaries, aiming to achieve 1mSv/year by the end of FY 2012 and

purifi cation of the water in the port for mitigating radiation impact on the outside environment is described below.

Effective dose reduction at site boundaries

The annual radiation exposure dose at site boundaries due to the radioactive materials to be released and the temporarily stored solid waste, etc. as of the end of March 2012 is estimated to achieve 1mSv/year goal as a result of implementing dose reduction measures such as transporting debris to the soil-covered-type temporary storage facilities. The breakdown of radiation exposure amount is:

Gaseous waste: 0.03mSv/year, solid waste: 0.69mSv/year, Total: 0.72mSv/year.

Radioactivity density of the seawater in the port

Back in September 2012, the radioactivity densities (Cs-134, 137) of the samples obtained in some locations (such as the inside of the silt fence installed near Units 2-4 water intake channel) exceeded the density limit stipulated by Japan’s Reactor Regulations. Measures to prevent further contamination of the seawater in the open duct and to purify Cs and Sr are currently being considered. As for Cs, the purifi cation equipment is being designed prior to starting the purifi cation from the inside of the silt fence utilizing fi ber adsorbent. As for Sr, enhanced monitoring is performed. For effi cient Sr purifi cation, purifi cation techniques such as adsorption and sedimentation are being studied and verifi ed in collaboration with the Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry. Purifi cation implementation plan based on feasible purifi cation techniques is to be considered.

Decontamination performed within the power station site

Radiation dose reduction through decontamination has been ongoing for

Fukushima Daiichi...Continued from page 37

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reducing radiation exposure dose for workers. The paved ground at the main gate where security offi cers stay was cleaned by ultrahigh pressure water (December 10, 2012-February 4, 2013). For the parking lots inside and outside of the power station site, measures such as removing the surface soil are ongoing (From January to May, 2013).

5. Cesium ReleaseThe current release rates of cesium

(total of Cs-134 and 137) at Units 1-3 Reactor Buildings were evaluated to be approx. 0.0003 Billion Bq/h (Unit 1), 0.005 Billion Bq/h (Unit 2) and 0.0005 Billion Bq/h (Unit 3) based on the radioactivity density dust of the air in the upper part of the Reactor Buildings.

The maximum total release rate of cesium (Unit 1-3) has been approximately 0.01 billion Bq/h, which is the same as the previous month.

The radioactivity density (both Cs-134 and 137) of the air at site boundaries was approx. 1.4x10-9Bq/cm3. The radiation exposure dose at site boundaries is evaluated to be 0.03mSv/year.

The maximum limit of radioactivity density of the air outside the surrounding monitoring area for [Cs-134] is 2x10-5Bq/cm3, and for [Cs-137] it is 3x10-5Bq/cm3.

6. Staff Safety The objective is to secure long-term

staffi ng while thoroughly implementing workers’ exposure radiation control. Continuously improve working environment and work conditions based on workers needs at site.

Staff managementThe number of people who were

registered (for one day or more in a month) to work at the power station in the past 3 months (October-December, 2012)

was approx. 8,000 (TEPCO and contract company workers).

Implementation of dose reduction measures

Measures such as shielding have been implemented in the rest areas and the Emergency Response Center where workers spend a long time in order to reduce their radiation exposure doses. Radiation dose reduction work has been completed in the rest areas in the Administration Offi ce Building and the Emergency Response Center (locations which have a great impact on workers’ exposure doses) (October 22, 2012-February 22, 2013). The effectiveness of the measure implementation will be evaluated through performing dose measurements.

Contact: Dr. Hide Okada, The Institute of Applied Energy, email: [email protected], website: https://fdada.info. �

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Outage Performance ImprovementsBy Mark Hansen, NextEra Energy, Inc.

Mark HansenMark Hansen is the current outage manager at Point Beach Nuclear Plant where he has been employed for over 25 years. His current position is a culmination of experiences gained at Point Beach following a short tour of duty in the US Navy. Mr. Hansen started at Point Beach in 1988 and over the next 22 years was able to obtain his Reactor Operator’s License, Senior Reactor Operator’s License and a Bachelor’s of Science from the University of Maryland University College. During this time he discovered that he had a niche in outage management and in 2010 he was given an opportunity as the Operations Shift Manager – Outage. Mr. Hansen’s overall successes with operation’s outage performance lead to his promotion to Outage Manager in the spring of 2011 where he has provided oversight of the past three successful outages.

Nuclear Energy Institute’s Top Industry Practice (TIP) Awards highlight the nuclear industry’s most innovative techniques and ideas.

This was a 2012 NEI Process Award Winner.

The team members who participated included: Mark Hansen, Outage Manager; Robert Gilbertson, Outage Supervisor; John Ramski, Outage Supervisor; Steve Robitzski, SPU Site Manager; and Don Leclair, Senior Outage Scheduler.

Summary Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP)

implemented 17% Power Uprate Outages on both Unit 1 and Unit 2 in 2011. The outages included scope that was unprecedented in the Nuclear Industry resulting in an additional 90 MWs per unit. This article describes how the lessons learned from the Unit 2 spring outage were applied to the Unit 1 outage in the fall resulting in a shorter outage and improved industrial safety performance.

In the spring of 2011, Point Beach completed the third of three uprate outages on the Unit 2 plant. The scope included upgrades on all major secondary pumps, piping and heat exchangers to go along with an uprated electrical generator system resulting in essentially a new secondary plant to ensure safe operation of the plant for the foreseeable future. While the spring outage was successful on many fronts, the outage did have its challenges in safety, cost and duration. The station focused on improved execution of the 2011 fall outage on Unit 1 by understanding and implementing lessons learned. The fall outage work included new main feed water pumps & motors, new condensate pumps & motors, new low pressure feed water heaters, new main power transformers, new main feed isolation valves and a main generator output breaker. The HP Turbine was replaced and the main generator was rewound. Upgrades were performed on the main steam isolation valves, main feed regulating valves and the non-return check valves. The steam generators also needed to be modifi ed. Many balance-of-plant and nuclear steam supply system set point changes were required, and start-up testing was very extensive. Signifi cant routine outage activities were also completed: Integrated Leak Rate Testing, Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger inspections, check valve program work, water box coatings, pump overhauls, multiple valve repairs and breaker inspections. By implementing the improvements outlined in the following sections, the station was able to complete a broader outage scope in 35 less days without sacrifi cing safety or quality.

Safety ResponseSafety has always been Point Beach’s

number one priority. However, during the

2011 spring outage, the station was chal-lenged in the safety arena, particularly in the area of contractor safety. The large number of construction activities com-bined with a large new-to-nuclear work force created many of these challenges. The station took aggressive action to develop and communicate a safe outage strategy to the station and its contractor partners. Key was ensuring the station and contractor partner personnel understood and believed that the most important goal was safety. This was conveyed by a strong plan, management involvement and con-tinuous communication with the site per-sonnel. The senior management team’s involvement was evident and crucial from the start as the Plant Manager, Director of Maintenance and Safety Manager visited the local union halls to convey the mes-sage that at Point Beach, safety is always fi rst. The implementation of the 5 Rules to Live or Leave by was also key to en-suring that the message was received by our station and contractor personnel. The rules were:

Do not put any part of your body 1. under suspended loads.Wear fall protection when required.2. Do not violate circuit breaker arc 3. fl ash zones.Do not violate danger tags or danger 4. tape.Do not violate confi ned space 5. requirements.Ensuring the message was delivered

prior to contractor personnel arriving on site made the focus on safety during initial training more effective. Personnel had a safety focus before they started work. The station also used safety advocates (fl eet and industry safety personnel), who monitored the individual work locations for safety practices using a Behavior Based Safety (BBS) observation system. These observations and trends from the observations were the focus of the daily outage messages to the station. Another aspect that was addressed was courageous leadership. This program taught supervisors that safety was personal and how to best approach the workers and demonstrate that we are all looking out for their best interests. To truly ensure that the station and our contract partners were ready to conduct a safe fall outage, the station had a “30 Day Safety Blitz” immediately preceding the outage. Each



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day had a special activity focused on safety. These initiatives resulted in a dramatic improvement in industrial safety. PBNP’s OSHA rate improved from 0.47 to 0.12 while the TISAR rate was reduced from 0.14 to 0.06.

The station also demonstrated marked improvements in radiological safety and met all the goals in this large outage. The station implemented a new methodology from within our fl eet to control dose and contamination at the source, to reduce worker exposure. The resulting excellent crud burst and subsequent clean-up lead to lower-than-expected dose rates in containment and pipeways. We also used Radiation Protection technicians in our Dynamic Learning Activity (DLA) training to ensure the proper fundamentals were established and maintained by the station and contractor personnel. The success of these initiatives was clearly demonstrated by the very low number of personnel contaminations (27) and a total dose 2.4 REM less than our target.

The overall cost saving of the practices implemented in the Point Beach

Unit 1 Outage come in the form of outage duration. The spring Unit 2 outage was successfully completed in 110 days.

The challenge to the station was to take the lessons learned from the spring outage, as well as the successes, and create a Unit 1 schedule that was safe yet more effi cient. A challenge for the Unit 1 outage was additional electrical work scope, including the repair of the station transformer and the replacement of the main station transformers. This additional scope added additional risk in both nuclear and electrical safety. The Fleet challenged the station to complete this uprate outage within 85 days. The station planned an 80 day outage. By implementing many scheduling and work practice changes, the station was able to implement the outage safely in 74.9 days, clearly making this outage an industry-leading outage for duration and work scope. Being able to complete a broader scope in 35 less days for Unit 1 saved approximately $9 million.

Innovation ResponseThe innovation of the outage came

in many forms. The fi rst was the station focus to keep safety in the forefront. The station attacked the safety and production by work zones. This allowed station and contractor management to focus on the 5 major work areas in the plant. These locations had consistent supervision, assigned safety oversight and detailed work plans that could be worked in parallel, giving us fi ve major work sites with a focus on safety and providing us effi ciency in production. The work zones within the condenser were also highly scoped for pre-outage work and working environment. Additional air fl ow and larger access holes were added for both personnel safety and for reducing the buildup of gases and contaminants that would later have to be removed for chemistry reasons. This additional planning and oversight provided the station gains in the form of a much lower number of reported injuries and a noticeable gain in production rate.


http://ehwachs.com



Simulator Scenario Based TestingBy Gregg Ludlam, Exelon Nuclear.

Gregg LudlamGregg Ludlam is Director – Fleet Training for Exelon Generation. In this position, he has oversight of all accredited and non-accredited training programs for 11 nuclear plants in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Illinois and Nebraska with direct focus on operator training programs. Prior to his current assignment, Gregg was Site Training Director at Oyster Creek and Robinson and served in several operator training leadership roles at Robinson, Brunswick, Susquehanna and Vermont Yankee. Gregg is a U.S. Navy submarine service veteran, having served for 8 years.

Nuclear Energy Institute’s Top Industry Practice (TIP) Awards highlight the nuclear industry’s most innovative techniques and ideas.

This was a 2012 NEI Process Award Winner.

The team members who participated included: Gregg W. Ludlam, Director, Fleet Operator Training, Exelon Nuclear; Shawn Quick, Operations Training Program Manager, Exelon Nuclear; Robin Brown, Simulator Coordinator, Oyster Creek Generating Station; Mark Honzell, Simulator Coordinator, Clinton Power Station; Steve Lentz, Manager, Fleet Simulator Support, Exelon Nuclear.

Summary In October of 2001, the NRC endorsed

ANSI/ANS-3.5-1998, Nuclear Power Plant Simulators For Use In Operator Training and Examination. Scenario Based Testing (SBT), fi rst conceived in this version of the standard, was intended as the replacement for the 1985 standard’s requirement to perform malfunction testing as the primary method of periodic simulator performance testing. Paragraph 4.4.3.2 of the 1998 standard describes the concept of simulator scenario based testing as a means of conducting ongoing performance testing on plant referenced control room simulators but does not provide a methodology for the

actual conduct and documentation of such tests. By 2006, approximately half of the country’s simulators utilized the 1998 version of the standard, while the other half still utilized the 1985 and 1993 versions. Utilities that adopted the 1998 standard since its approval in 2001 have been challenged with regulatory uncertainty with

regard to what constitutes acceptable SBT during Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) IP-71111.11 (Licensed Operator Requalifi cation Program and Licensed Operator Performance )inspections. Other utilities delayed transition to the 1998 standard for the same reasons. It was quickly realized among industry Training professionals that written guidance was needed for SBT. This was especially important as a new version of ANSI/ANS-3.5 was being completed and the NRC expressed a desire for all utilities to move to this latest version as the single recognized standard for simulator fi delity and confi guration management.

Exelon Nuclear, working closely with the NRC through their chairmanship of NEI’s Licensed Operator Focus Group, wrote NEI 09-09 (Nuclear Power Plant-Referenced Simulator Scenario Based Testing Methodology) Rev. 0 and Rev. 1, Nuclear Power Plant-Referenced Simulator Scenario Based

Testing Methodology. For the fi rst time, a methodology was crafted for industry use based on the author’s extensive experience designing and implementing SBT at several plant sites. It describes a process in which simulator performance testing is conducted in parallel, not series, to training and evaluation preparation activities by training instructors. This process results in minimal personnel resource impact, reduction of testing that adds little or no value, and the identifi cation of more simulator performance discrepancies before the conduct of training or evaluation. With SBT, multiple simulator models are exercised concurrently as part of the process instructors use to prepare for simulator training and evaluation. An added benefi t of following NEI 09-09 is improved simulator training and evaluation quality through better instructor preparation and higher scrutiny of simulator performance and better instructor knowledge of scenario content and execution.

In several public meetings beginning in 2007, the NRC reviewed and eventually endorsed the methodology (NEI 09-09) as the accepted means of conducing SBT. In September of 2009, the latest version of ANSI/ANS-3.5 was released; correspondingly, the author revised NEI 09-09 through the release of Rev. 1 to match the new standard. As the NRC has worked to offi cially recognize ANSI/ANS-3.5-2009 as the single recognized simulator testing standard, NEI 09-09 Rev. 1 is fully endorsed as the acceptable means to conduct SBT through Regulatory Guide 1.149 Rev. 4 (Nuclear Power Plant Simulation Facilities for Use in Operator Training, License Examinations, and Applicant Experience Requirements). In doing so, the methodology authored by Exelon Nuclear has become the single regulator-acknowledged means for the industry to conduct SBT; regulatory uncertainty has been eliminated, and the idea of the industry moving to a single standard for the maintenance of control room simulators can be realized for the fi rst time since issuance of the 1985 version. Having all utilities using the same standard with the same simulator performance testing methodology will eliminate regulatory uncertainty, allow for benchmarking and operating experience exchanges, drive consistency in simulator performance testing, and drive

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Simulator Scenario...(Continued from page 42)

consistency in regulatory inspections as well as improve the quality of simulator training and evaluation.

When Regulatory Guide 1.149 Rev. 4 was approved in April of 2011, Exelon Nuclear took an industry leadership role to adopt the 2009 version of ANSI-3.5 fl eet-wide by December of 2011. Key to this initiative was the training on the new standard and SBT in particular, and supporting procedure development necessary to accomplish the stated goal. Exelon’s Fleet Director of Operator Training personally conducted all of the training for fl eet and corporate personnel and directly oversaw the development and implementation of a fl eet-common simulator testing procedure for the conduct of SBT. Team members listed on page 42 were critical in support and advocacy of the SBT initiative. For example, two members fi rst piloted the SBT process for the Exelon fl eet beginning in early 2008 at Oyster Creek and provided fl eet peers the key positive attributes of their experience. The Simulator Coordinator at Clinton Power Station also advocated the benefi ts of SBT to peers and was instrumental in the development of the fl eet procedure. Finally, the Manager of Fleet Simulator Support provided key resources and support to ensure that the fl eet’s simulators had the necessary capabilities to ensure SBT data capture was a simple process for Operations Training instructors to use. Without the help of these four individuals and their strong support of SBT, and the signifi cant efforts of the simulator coordinators and operations training staffs across the fl eet, the initiative would not have been successful.

By December 1, 2011 Exelon Nuclear became the fi rst fl eet in the country to entirely adopt the new SBT process and use of the 2009 version of ANSI/ANS-3.5. NRC executive management has recognized the Fleet Director of Operator Training’s leadership in developing the SBT process for the industry and for Exelon’s timely adoption of the latest standard.

Safety ResponseSBT enhances nuclear safety by

testing simulator fi delity and confi guration management in the method for which it will be used for training and evaluation, rather than through hundreds of simplifi ed malfunction tests that do not exercise all aspects of simulator modeling.

Cost Savings ResponseSBT tests the control room simulator

in parallel, not series, with validation of training and examination material that is already performed for use during operator training and evaluation. It fully eliminates the need to conduct approximately 100 malfunction tests per year over a four year period of time as previously required. Each malfunction test would typically take one simulator professional 4 hours to set-up, perform, and analyze for a total of 800 person-hours per year or approximately $40,000 in O&M labor alone.

Innovation ResponseAs stated above, written guidance for

the conduct of SBT did not exist before the development of NEI 09-09 Rev. 0 and Rev. 1. Providing such guidance for the industry based on individual experience in crafting successful SBT performance is an innovative solution to an issue that existed for several years.

Productivity/Effi ciency ResponseValuable simulator time is no

longer needed to conduct malfunction testing, allowing the simulator to be more available for operator training. The simulator professional who would have expended 800 person-hours annually to perform malfunction testing is now free to perform other tasks in support of station training.

Transferability Response

With the endorsement of NEI 09-09 in Regulatory Guide 1.149 Rev. 4, SBT methodology is fully transferable for use by the entire industry. According to data provided on January 7, 2012 by the ANSI-3.5 Working Committee chairman, 49 of 72 (68%) simulator facilities nationwide are utilizing NEI 09-09.

Contact: Gregg Ludlam, Exelon Nuclear, 200 Exelon Way, Kennett Square, Pennsylvania 19348; telephone; (610) 765-5648, email: [email protected]. �

The second major innovation came in the form of material movement within the site. Due to the large number of items that were moved in and out of the turbine hall, we formed a logistics crew that mapped the entire site for placement of new equipment. The schedule was updated with movement of material in and out to ensure there were no confl icts, and planning of the major moves did not get interfered with. This included the use of the turbine crane, movement through the turbine building door as well as in and out of the plant gates. The logistics team communicated with the Outage Control Center (OCC) through personnel staged in all these locations so the team was always informed of critical movement of material. Also within our logistics plan, we used an outside search area for all incoming trucks and additional security personnel to bring the trucks in so the movement within the site could be maximized.

A key innovation used to more effi ciently install large runs of pipe was prefab of key pipe runs. During the previous outage, there was time spent on minor adjustments to the fabricated piping due to fi eld measurements being slightly off. To offset this, the site used laser measuring systems to give accurate measurements that needed very little adjustment during installation. It also gave us a secondary benefi t of positively identifying interferences that were required to be removed during installation and removal of equipment.

The last innovation was the station’s view of being complete with the work. Closeout of the work packages became an issue during the fi nal phases of the spring Unit 2 outage. The major lesson we learned was the need to be “Done-Done” with your work. This “Done-Done” motto was used in each phase of the process from package preparation and walkdown up to completion for the fall outage. A phase of work was not complete until the handoff to the next group was complete. The fi nal step in the completion was the records retention and mod acceptance group giving fi nal

Outage Performance...(Continued from page 41)



approval of the work package, agreeing that all paperwork was complete. This allowed for very effi cient modifi cation turnovers and avoided lost time at the end of the outage waiting for paperwork to be completed and assembled.

Productivity/Effi ciencyThe increase in productivity is

evident by the site’s ability to complete the fall outage (which had a larger scope than the spring outage) in 35 fewer days. This is essentially a 30% increase in productivity.

This overall increase in productivity was driven by increased schedule and cost performance. Schedule performance as measured by the schedule performance index improved from .8 to 1.12 while the cost performance index improved from .98 to 1.08; a 40% improvement in schedule performance and 10% on cost.

To ensure that improvements in productivity and schedule adherence did not occur at the expense of safe behaviors or quality, over 13,400 in-fi eld observations were performed by supervision and safety professionals. In

addition to providing immediate feedback and coaching, a rapid trending process was used to look for low-level trends and to communicate trends and insights on a shiftly basis.

TransferabilityThe process used by Point Beach

to improve performance during power uprate can serve as a template for other nuclear sites interested in pursuing power uprate. A signifi cant number of plants are undergoing power uprates. This structured approach to improvement can be used by other stations to reduce outage length. The lessons learned are being applied at other NextEra sites, including the Turkey Point and St Lucie plants.

Contact: Mark Hansen, NextEra Energy, 6110 Nuclear Road, Two Rivers, Wisconsin 54241; telephone: (920) 755-6238, email: [email protected]. �

January-FebruaryInternational Trade & Waste & Fuel Management

March-AprilPlant Maintenance & Plant Life Extension

May-JuneOutage Mgmt. & Health Physics

July-AugustNew Plants & Vendor Advertorial

September-OctoberPlant Maintenance & Advanced Reactors

November-December Annual Product & Service Directory

Contact: [email protected]: (630) 364-4780

AnnualEditorial

Schedule




Fuel Reliability: Achieving Zero Failures By Rob Schneider, Global Nuclear Fuel.

Rob SchneiderRob Schneider is an engineer in the GNF Fuel Technology and Design group, with over 25 years nuclear experience. His background includes 18 years at GNF in Wilmington, N.C. in BWR fuel reliability, specializing in helping utilities prevent fuel failures, and minimizing the consequences of failures when they do occur. Prior experience includes 5 years in the GE Hitachi nuclear services business, where he was SRO certifi ed and worked on outage projects and startup testing, and the U.S. Navy Nuclear Propulsion Program. Rob has a Chemical Engineering degree from Manhattan College in New York.

In March 2013, Global Nuclear Fuel (GNF) met the INPO challenge for zero-leaker fuel reliability, with all of GNF’s North American BWR customers operating over 1.4 million rods with no leakers. More than a story of success for GNF and its customers, achieving this milestone opens the door on a new era of fuel reliability expectations. It is also an occasion to look back at the road to, and lessons learned in, achieving zero-leaker fuel reliability; to refl ect on the cost of leakers on plant performance and what operating leaker-free means; and to consider what we must do to maintain leaker-free performance.

In March 2013, Global Nuclear Fuel (GNF) met the INPO challenge for zero-leaker fuel reliability, with GNF’s North American BWR customers operating over 1.4 million rods with no leakers. More than a story of success for GNF and its customers, achieving this milestone opens the door on a new era of fuel reliability expectations. It is also an occasion to look back at the road to, and lessons learned in, achieving zero-leaker fuel reliability; to refl ect on the cost of leakers on plant performance and what operating leaker-free means; and to consider what we must do to maintain leaker-free performance.

How is zero-leaker fuel reliability achieved?

Implementation of lessons learned from failure events has played the most important role in the systematic identifi cation and elimination of failure mechanisms. Because GNF has the largest BWR installed base, and GNF fuel is exposed to the widest variety of BWR operating conditions, fuel reliability challenges have often been encountered fi rst by GNF, and solved fi rst by GNF. For example, today’s improved debris fi lters are a result of higher debris inventories faced in a small number of plants, but the challenge of solving the debris problems for those plants now yields benefi ts for the entire BWR fl eet. Similarly, when missing-pellet surface induced “duty-related” failures were fi rst identifi ed, corrective actions were taken for GNF fuel to fl eet-wide benefi t.

GNF has collaborated closely over the years with utility fuel engineering teams and operational staff to solve these problems and reduce fuel failures.

Recently, this collaboration was reinforced by fuel reliability initiatives such as “Zero by 2010” and “Driving to Zero” supported by INPO and the EPRI Fuel Reliability Program, which increased the visibility and importance of fuel reliability among utility senior management. These programs enable more widespread implementation of innovative fuel designs and facilitate exchange of operational experience. The success of these efforts is indicated by the decreased fuel failure rate in recent years, as outlined in Figure 1.

With respect to the specifi c challenges overcome on the way to reaching zero failures, there are four broad failure mechanisms that have affected BWR fuel over the past twenty or so years: debris fretting; duty-related or PCI (pellet-clad interaction) type; manufacturing defects; and crud or corrosion. Three of these challenges have been largely resolved in recent years, as crud/corrosion has not affected a US plant in approximately 10 years, manufacturing related failures have been eliminated for the most part, and PCI-type failures are rare now, largely due to widespread implementation of operating practices to reduce the duty applied to the fuel.

Recently, debris fretting has been the failure mechanism that has affected the most plants, caused the most fuel failures, and has been the most diffi cult to eliminate. Three factors are most important in the U.S. BWR fl eet debris failure rate improvement seen from 2006 through today:

Reloads with “non-line of sight” • DefenderTM lower-tie plate debris fi lters began operating in 2006 and are now near 100% of most GNF supplied cores.

Figure 1: 40+ year path to zero fuel failures.

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Fuel Reliability...(Continued from page 46)

GNF communicated to plants the • increased susceptibility to debris failures in BWRs with pumped forward feedwater heater drains. Most plants with this confi guration, including a BWR/5, a BWR/6 and two BWR/4 units in the U.S., installed strainers in the heater drain lines to help protect this otherwise unfi ltered stream that is approximately 35% of feedwater fl ow. All have seen their debris fretting failure rate decline dramatically. A BWR in Sweden opted to switch to cascade drains during a 2011 mid-cycle outage and has operated since that time without a failure (after experiencing 19 debris failures in 5 annual cycles just before this change).Many plants where repeat debris • failures had occurred signifi cantly strengthened their Foreign Material Exclusion (FME) programs and practices.

Cost of fuel failuresThe drive to zero leakers is rooted

in the substantial costs associated with fuel failures. Traditional wisdom in U.S. BWRs is that avoidance of a mid-cycle outage (especially during a peak electricity demand period) is of paramount importance. A mid-cycle outage is typically about seven days in duration, and includes the dose impact of an extra reactor disassembly evolution. For most plants, this will result in failing to meet long-term effi ciency and dose goals, and these costs (direct and indirect) are far larger than those associated with continued operation with a failure. Nonetheless, some plants have decided that proactively shutting down to remove a fuel failure, to remove the associated uncertainty and operational complications, as well as mitigate the next-cycle core design impacts is a better course of action.

In any event, operating with a leaker for an extended period of time is still a costly option. The largest costs are the direct impacts on plant capacity factor.

The actual cost is dependent on the size of the plant, time of year, and other factors, but main impacts include:

Up to two days at ~65% power to • locate the failure (Power Suppression Test (PST))Early coastdown near end of cycle• Maneuvering restrictions (deeper • load drops, slower ramp rates)Figure 2 illustrates graphically

the capacity factor impacts directly attributable to operation with a failure.

Other potential impacts include:Plant and engineering staff diverted • to focus on leaker related issues during operationIncreased chemistry sampling during • operationAdditional costs due to fuel sipping • and inspection during outagesAdditionally, a fuel failure usually

adversely impacts the next cycle’s core design:

Suppressed bundles may require • channel exchange for distortion managementSuppressed bundles are loaded near • the periphery (in low duty locations) or softer power ascension rates are proscribed for the BOC startupControl blades used for suppression • may require earlier replacementAnother important consideration is

that leakers may result in indirect dose costs, depending on the size of the leaker. For small “offgas-only” failures, when there is little or no secondary damage, the dose effect is limited mainly to increased chemistry sampling during operation. A U.S. BWR/6 plant completed a cycle in 2013 with such a leaker, where application of failed fuel management practices resulted in dose impacts attributable to the failure being only those for inspection of the failure. For larger failures, dose effects have been seen during outages

from carryover of iodine activity to secondary plant areas such as the low-pressure turbines, and occasionally as a fi ssion-product isotope contribution to piping dose rates (normally controlled by Co-60). Several U.S. plants have experienced these types of impacts within the past decade.

Finally, the presence of a fuel failure has a signifi cant adverse impact on a plant’s INPO scores. Not only is there an indirect impact, as shown in Figure 2 for capacity factor , but there is also a direct impact, as 10 of a plant’s 100 points are tied to fuel reliability. Of these 10 points, four points are lost if a fuel failure is present, and six points are tied to long-term reliability (weighted according to the number of months operating with a leaker in the last 48 months.

Maintaining zero-leaker performance

The BWR industry has seen dramatic improvements in fuel designs. Exposure and energy capabilities have increased by approximately a factor of three, while reliability has improved by several orders of magnitude. It is now “expected” that fuel will operate without failures. However, this success cannot be taken for granted and maintaining today’s zero-leaker level of performance requires sustained focus. It is critical to pay attention to individual plant details: A single reactor maneuver or maintenance activity can result in unexpected failures. It will remain important to keep in place effective defensive measures, such as the Defender™ lower tie plate debris fi lter, the latest generation of debris mitigation technology in GNF fuel, which has been critical in reducing failures from the leading failure mechanism in the BWR industry. Underpinning all such efforts, we must of course maintain a safety and quality culture, as employed by GNF and BWR operators in helping GNF meet the challenge for leaker-free operations in North America.

Contact: Robert J. Schneider, Global Nuclear Fuel (GNF), 3901 Castle Hayne Road, Wilmington, North Carolina 28402-2819; telephone: (910) 819-6204, fax: (910)819-6204, email:[email protected]. �

Figure 2: Costs of fuel failure.



A Long History of Safe and Reliable OperationsBy Suzanne D’Ambrosio, Oyster Creek Generating Station.

Garey StathesOyster Creek Generating Station Site Vice President Garey L. Stathes is responsible for the safe and effi cient operation of the facility, including coordination and management of personnel, overall station performance and fi nancial plan oversight.

Stathes has 33 years of nuclear industry experience. He has held a wide range of positions at Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station and the Mid-Atlantic corporate offi ce at Kennett Square, Pennsylvania. He has served as plant manager and in managerial positions within engineering, maintenance, maintenance/work control, and operations.

Stathes earned a Bachelor of Science degree in mechanical engineering from Drexel University in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, as well as an associate degree in mechanical engineering technology from The Williamson Free School of Mechanical Trades in Media, Pennsylvania.

It was December 23, 1969…the Sears Christmas Catalog featured an 11-inch portable color television set for $188.88; holiday greeting cards were mailed with six-cent stamps, and teens were listening to the fi rst record album that featured the Jackson 5.

Meanwhile, at the Jersey Shore, history was being made, as the Oyster Creek Generating Station -- began producing electricity. The facility, commissioned by Jersey Central Power & Light Company, took about 150 workers over four years to build. Built at a cost of $96 million, Oyster Creek was the largest investor-owned nuclear plant in the country at the time of construction.

Those who were there for construction, which began in 1965, remember the bleachers that were actually set up on nearby Route 9, the area’s main thoroughfare, so that curious residents and passersby could sit and watch as the

facility was built. The dawn of

the nuclear era came on quickly. Accord-ing to a 1966 News-week report, “the growing acceptance of atomic power has gone beyond even the most optimistic estimates. The im-pressive new orders (of nuclear plants) indicate that later in the 1970s, nuclear power will make sharp inroads into

the use of the so-called “fossil“ fuels – oil, gas and coal. By the year 2000, experts estimate more than half the power used in the U.S. will come from the atom.”

That sentiment was – and still is --overwhelmingly apparent in Oyster Creek’s host municipality of Lacey Township, New Jersey, where one portion of the town’s coat of arms contains an atomic symbol.

Times have changed, but Oyster Creek continues to generate clean safe and reliable power for more than 600,000 homes and businesses.

Oyster Creek in BriefOyster Creek is located on a 700-acre

tract in Lacey Township, NJ, about 60 miles east of Philadelphia and about two

miles from the Atlantic Coastal beaches of the Jersey Shore. Owned and operated by Exelon Generation, it is a single-unit General Electric Mark 1 Boiling Water Reactor, constructed by Burns & Roe, Inc. A horseshoe-shaped canal surrounds Oyster Creek and connects it to the Barnegat Bay, providing a continuous source of cooling water for the facility.

Exelon Corporation (NYSE: EXC) is the nation’s leading competitive energy provider, with 2012 revenues of approximately $23.5 billion. Headquartered in Chicago, Exelon has operations and business activities in 47 states, the District of Columbia and Canada. Exelon is one of the largest competitive U.S. power generators, with approximately 35,000 megawatts of owned capacity comprising one of the nation’s cleanest and lowest-cost power generation fl eets. The company’s Constellation business unit provides energy products and services to approximately 100,000 business and public sector customers and approximately 1 million residential customers. Exelon’s utilities deliver electricity and natural gas to more than 6.6 million customers in central Maryland (BGE), northern Illinois (ComEd) and southeastern Pennsylvania (PECO).

Approximately 700 men and women are employed at Oyster Creek with an annual payroll of approximately $69 million. Most employees make their homes in the 10-mile radius surrounding the station and, as a result, pump millions back into the local economy.

Oyster Creek received a 20-year license extension from the NRC in 2009 but has since reached an agreement with the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection to retire Oyster Creek in 2019.

The retirement decision is based on the cumulative effect of negative economic factors, which has caused Oyster Creek’s value to decline. These factors include low market prices and demand, and the plant’s need for continuing large capital expenditures. Also, potential additional environmental compliance costs based on evolving water cooling regulatory requirements – at both the federal and state government levels – created signifi cant regulatory and economic uncertainty. Due to Exelon’s decision to retire the plant early, the New Jersey Department of



Environmental Protection (NJDEP) will not require the company to install cooling towers at Oyster Creek.

Protecting the Environment

Oyster Creek has had a tremendous, positive environmental impact on Ocean County and the State of New Jersey by generating electricity with virtually no air emissions. Each year it operates, Oyster Creek essentially avoids some 7.5 million metric tons of carbon dioxide that would be produced in coastal New Jersey by a replacement fossil fueled power plant.

Oyster Creek’s high standards of environmental excellence are refl ected in a number of signifi cant accomplishments:

Implemented an Environmental • Management System that has been certifi ed in accordance with the ISO 14001 International Standard for Environmental Management.Executed a zero liquid radioactive • waste discharge policy since 1989, making Oyster Creek a top performer in the industry.Made signifi cant reductions in gaseous • effl uents as a result of improvements in waste treatment systems.Implemented rigorous spill prevention • programs.Established a comprehensive Ground-• water Protection Program.Certifi ed as a Wildlife at Work and • Corporate Lands for Learning facility.Successfully completed regulatory • audits and inspections of environmental permits, our hazardous waste program, and our radiological effl uent and environmental monitoring program revealed no programmatic defi ciencies.

Powering the CommunityThe values of professionalism,

dedication and safety are apparent in Oyster Creek’s commitment to the community. Talk to any Oyster Creek employee and they will tell you how proud they are to help their community.

Each year, Oyster Creek and its employees give back nearly $400,000 to the community. In 2012, alone, Oyster Creek employees pledged nearly $295,000 to the United Way of Ocean County, making Oyster Creek the largest regional contributor.

Oyster Creek employees volunteer thousands of community service hours each year to youth athletic organizations, PTAs, scouting groups, environmental and animal advocacy organizations and other nonprofi ts. They spearhead teams and individually participate in fundraising walks, bike-a-thons, runs and other events. Recently, a team of bicyclists trekked along the Jersey Coast to raise over $3,400 for the M.S. Society.

Each year, dozens of employees take the day off of their traditional jobs to volunteer in the community. Last year, during Volunteer Days, employees installed terrapin fencing along a marshy roadside to assure these tiny creatures do not become victim to motor vehicles. They also teamed up to makeover a number of facilities operated by nonprofi t organizations.

Responding to Superstorm Sandy: Learning from Fukushima

On October 29, 2012, Superstorm Sandy, a hurricane of unprecedented intensity, made a direct hit to the Jersey Shore. The second largest Atlantic tropical cyclone on record, with storm surges unmatched by any other in the region ripped apart central and northern New Jersey coastlines and destroyed numerous shore communities.

Oyster Creek, already shut down for a refueling outage, began preparing for the storm days ahead of it making landfall. A severe weather preparation plan was put into place and key employees stationed at site were ready to remain there throughout the storm.

The plant was able to withstand the torments of one of the worst hurricanes in modern history, without impact whatsoever to the station. Oyster Creek’s emergency plan, too, was successfully implemented, proving station personnel’s readiness and professionalism.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission performed a post-storm, on-site integrated inspection and determined that the station and its employees performed appropriately throughout this historic storm.

Two years after the events in Japan, Exelon’s nuclear facilities in Illinois, Pennsylvania and New Jersey are even better prepared for the unimaginable. New safety equipment, enhanced training and updated procedures are in place at all ten of our facilities, based on lessons learned from Japan.

Exelon intends to squeeze every lesson learned from Fukushima to improve our safe and reliable nuclear operations.

Since the Fukushima event, Exelon Nuclear has:

Added 17 additional high-volume • diesel-driven pumps at its nuclear facilities.Verifi ed the readiness of more than • 1,700 pieces of equipmentInspected more than 1,900 fl ood • barriers and seals.Invested more than 43,000 worker • hours checking equipment and procedures that might be needed in an emergency.Completed reviews of existing • hardened vents at the Mark I sites, including Oyster Creek. Development of a conceptual design for the Mark I units are in progress.Completed a study to evaluate • available spent fuel pool level-sensing technologies. Each Exelon station has been • receiving emergency equipment needed for FLEX response, including the additional pumps, response trucks, hoses and hose trailers, portable generators, lights, extension cords, cots, bottled water and other equipment and supplies for use in responding to a severe disaster.Additionally, every facility in the • Exelon Nuclear fl eet has a team in place to develop any plant modifi cations needed to meet make its facilities even safer and more robust based on the lessons learned from the Fukushima event.Oyster Creek Generating Station, with

its rich history and committed employees, will continue to provide clean, safe, and reliable energy for years to come.

Contact: Suzanne D’Ambrosio, Oyster Creek Generating Station, telephone: (609)971-2185, email: [email protected]. �

A Long...(Continued from page 49)


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