Planning Paris City-Region. The State’s role in mixed ...paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_55587.pdf · by a recentralization process which takes various forms. These observations

- 2016 IPSA World Congress, Poznan, Poland –

RC05 Central and Local Governments' Relations: Institutional Reforms and Political Competition

Planning Paris City-Region. The State’s role in mixed processes of decentralisation, recentralisation, and steering at a short distance

(2005-2016)

Jeanne CHAUVEL

Doctor in political science Sciences Po Rennes

[email protected]

* * *

DRAFT PAPER – Please do not quote

* * *

Résumé: This paper examines the evolution of the division of powers in planning policies between the State and the local authorities in Paris city-region since 2005. Major reforms have indeed impacted urban governance of planning policy in the 2000 decade with first a decentralisation process, followed by a recentralization process which takes various forms. What are the reasons, the nature and the impacts of this recentralisation process on regional planning and coordination? I argue that the Central State control on its region-capital planning reveals its lack of confidence in local and regional authority and does not happen for immediate financial reasons. Whereas its financial and expertise resources have yet to be reduced, the State paradigm towards its capital is always Jacobin. The distribution of powers between the State and the local governments still balances in favour of the State in planning policies in the Ile-de-France region through a mix of decentralisation, recentralisation (at once inside central government and towards deconcentrated administration) and steering at a short distance processes.

1


In France, as many other European countries since the beginning of this century, the government have implemented numerous reforms of its territorial system (Pasquier, 2015)1. Dealing with economical and public expenditure crisis, normative Europeanisation and globalism pressure, successive governments since the late 1990 have tried to adapt the so called “millefeuille territorial”2, leading to growing territorial divergences. For many years, the French Capital and its agglomeration -with a particular legal status- was kept aside territorial reform. But Paris, as many large metropolises, has been facing in the last twenty years many policy issues: a challenged economy, a housing crisis, growing territorial and social differentiation, an ageing and jammed transport network. But because of a growing fragmentation of the economic, social and institutional systems in the past decades, and increase of actors and dissemination of resources, public actors face high obstacles in finding solutions. These processes affect urban governments which often lack of coordination for the elaboration and implementation of public action. As scholars highlight, only cities “with well-managed urban growth, supported by effective infrastructure provision and integrated policy programmes for reducing the negative externalities of urban expansion, can achieve relatively high levels of productivity and competitiveness while minimising the costs” (Floater, Rode et al. 2014). In this context, the first issue is to allow coordination a minima, cooperation a maxima, between public and private actors in urban governance. The second issue is the ability to build a leadership in planning policies to implement this coordination. There are then two parts in the governance problem: a structural/institutional one addressing the division of powers between the State and local and regional authorities, and a relational one addressing a leadership construction. This paper examines therefore the answers to this governance problem through the analysis of the evolution of the division of powers in planning policies between the State and the local authorities in Paris city-region since 2005. Major reforms have indeed impacted urban governance of planning policy in the 2000 decade with first a decentralisation process, followed by a recentralization process which takes various forms. These observations reveal a paradox. On the one hand, the above-cited processes show a clear State return with the implementation of a very centralised and expensive public transport network, and a great difficulty of the regional actor to appear as a recognised leader in planning policies. On the other hand, the State faces a lack of long-term expertise on metropolitan strategy in its capital, and needs to reduce its expenses in an economical crisis context and a European pressure on budget deficits reductions. This article aims then at analysing the reasons, the nature and the outputs of this recentralisation process. I argue that the Central State control on its region-capital planning reveals its lack of confidence in local and regional authority and does not happen for immediate financial reasons. Whereas its financial and expertise resources have yet to be reduced, the State paradigm towards its capital is always Jacobin. While the local authorities are forced to financially support the urban project, and get more divided with territorial reform, the State uses its capital land planning as an essential economical window to attract international investors, keep Paris

1 We can list four laws in the past 6 years : from the law prepared by the government under conservative Nicolas Sarkozy’s presidency in 2010, to the Act 3 of decentralisation from the socialist government under socialist François Hollande’s presidency which led to for laws : 27th January 2014, 16th June 2015, 7th August 2015. 2 This expression refers to a pastry and means numerous local administrative levels. In France, the territorial organisation has three levels of territorial administration with the “collectivités territoriales”/local authorities: “communes”, “départements” and “régions”. We must add to the list the “intercommunalités”, which are groupements of communes, on an urban basis: they have gained powers and resources in the last reforms.

2


in the distance in a growing economical concurrence between world cities. As Brenner argues, it is because of the transformation of global capitalism than the State pays particular attention to metropolitan investment and development (Brenner 2004)3. This political rescaling is particularly vivid in Paris City-Region. On a theoretical ground, this paper aims at discussing the concept of territorial governance by an analysis of the evolution of the relations between the State and local, mainly regional, authorities in Ile-de-France region. The analysis is not on the State but on the State’s power as it is “an institutionally and discursively mediated condensation (a reflection and a refraction) of a changing balance of forces that seek to influence the forms, purposes, and content of polity, politics, and policy” (Jessop 2016, p.10). Despite a marginalisation of its deconcentrated services, the State has recentralised a political capacity in local territories throughout diverse policy tools inspired by New Public Management: agencification, calls for tender (financial resources), norms diffusion, indicators of performance, and label distribution (Epstein 2005, 2015)4. This steering at a distance government model goes beyond the analysis of partnership, cooperations, and contractualisation characterising the horizontal model of cooperation build by decentralisation. The State is back in the analysis of urban governance in France (Béal 2011, Aust et al. 2013, Dupuy and Pollard 2014). I want to emphasize in this paper the fact that those theoretical models are not sufficient to qualify and understand our case. Why Paris, why planning policies? Paris is a particularly accurate field to investigate the evolution of the urban government as the City of Paris is very special in many ways: it has indeed represented in many occasions a threat towards the central State emergence and building since the Middle Age5. Issues related to political centrality of Paris, to its capital status, to its demography, to its economic weight, explains a specific legal status for Paris until 1970 decade. After the creation of the Region Région Ile-de-France in 1976 and the reform of Paris legal status in 1975 with an election of its mayor by universal suffrage, local representatives become legitimate actors in front of the State. Analysing planning policies in this region is a way to investigate a highly political public policy. Planning policy, with objectives in transports, housing building, territorial inequalities reduction, sustainable development, economic development, shows strong political ambition on territory and in the effects of such a policy. Planning is certainly a political exercise as it builds a territory representations and leans on highly political choices (Lefebvre 1972; Deloye, in Gaxie (ed.) 1997). Methodology

3 Neil Brenner explains particularly clearly this process: “The long-entrenched primacy of the national scale of political-economic regulation has been destabilized as new scalar hierarchies of state institutional organization and state regulatory activity have been forged. Within these rescaled configurations of state power, major urban regions have become important geographical targets for a variety of far-reaching institutional changes and policy realignments designed to enhance local economic growth capacities. For this reason, processes of state downscaling – the devolution or decentralization of regulatory tasks to subnational administrative tiers, coupled with a restructuring of subnational institutional configurations – are as fundamental to the contemporary remaking of political space as the forms of state upscaling that have been examined at length by international political economists” (Brenner 2004, p. 3). 4 This is visible through the LOLF in 2001, the Acte II de la decentralisation in 2003-2004, and administration reform programs (RGGP and MAP). 5 I will refer in this paper to Paris city-region to qualify the Parisian metropolis, independently of its borders. When speaking of the institutions, I will refer to the Ile-de-France Regional Council, or Regional Council, the regional local authority, or the City of Paris, which is the inner city.

3


The methodology is qualitative. Documentation analysis and interviews come mainly from my doctoral research on the Greater Paris issue (2001-2012), and is complemented by new sources for the 2012-2016 period. I have used institutional documentation from organisations, institutions and actors involved in planning policies, informational and parliamentary reports, technical files from APUR, Regional Council and STIF, parliamentary debates on the 2010-597 law creating a public transport network, and finally national, local and specialized press. I also use in this paper information from several interviews involved in the institutions dealing with planning coordination (mostly the Ile-de-France Regional Council, municipalities, the City of Paris, the central and territorialised State). Governance systems are not rocked: they evolve through time. After describing planning policies and planning actors in Paris City-Region, I will then highlight three specific sequences that show huge paradoxes in the Paris city-region governance of planning policies since 2004: the relative emergence of the Regional Council in planning policies coordinator since 2004, followed by a recentralisation of planning choices definition inside central government in 2008 and a last sequence with a search of a coordination and a leading role of the State.

1. Planning Paris City-Region; planning what?

Planning Paris City-Region is planning a territory with diverse features. Before describing these features, it is important to give some information about semantic definitions. Paris City-Region, Région Ile-de-France, Ville de Paris, Greater Paris, Greater Paris Metropolis, and so on… Vague expressions contributing to numerous misunderstanding, here is given some short precisions to help the political and technical issues understanding. Two different classifications of the territory are presented: a politico-administrative one and a geographical one6. The politico-administrative classification distinguishes the City of Paris which is the Inner City with 2 million inhabitants, the new Métropole du Grand Paris in 2016 with 7 million inhabitants, also called Petite couronne (Paris and four central departments), and the Conseil régional d’Ile-de-France with 12 million inhabitants. The geographical definitions includes the Parisian agglomeration, the unité urbaine, which is a bit larger than the perimeter of the Métropole du Grand Paris, and the aire urbaine de Paris, which is a bit larger than the perimeter of the Conseil regional d’Ile-de-France (See carte 1). I choose to use the Paris City-Region expression and to keep its vague definition because the issue in this paper is not to explain the political battles around perimeters but to explain the division of powers in the region-capital territory planning. The Paris City-Region expression can either refer to the central agglomeration or to the regional territory: it is in the nutshell the Parisian agglomeration, as large as the perimeter might be.

6 Those classifications come from important political battle in Paris City-Region on the definition, perimeter, and functions of the Metropolis (Chauvel 2015). It is useful for further understanding of the political issues to keep in mind the political aspects of denomination.

4


Carte 1 : Politico-Administrative and geographical classification in the Paris City-Region 7

These semantic expressions clarified, the diverse features of the regional territory will now be presented. The map (Carte 1) shows two distinct spaces: an urbanised and dense space in the middle (in grey) and a rural or peri-urban space around (light grey). In 2012, the unité urbaine has 10, 5 million inhabitants on 2845 km2, being 89% of the regional population on 31% of its territory (Apur, 2012). Planning this territory is taking into account the changes affecting the metropolis structure: changes affecting the population, its income level, its preferences evolution; economic pressures due to globalisation leading to inner suburbs gentrification (Montreuil in Eastern Paris), The Défense area development (specialised in international finance), industrial and railway wastelands rehabilitation (Plaine Saint Denis in Northern Paris). At the beginning of the 2000 decade, who decides of the planning orientations in the capital-region? After many decades (particularly 1960 and 1970) where the State was involved in defining and implementing planning policies, the actors system in Parisian planning gets more complex. First of all, because of growing numbers of actors and institutions involved, and second of all because the political and technical issues in the Region-capital intensify power games between all of these actors. Second of all, the local political system meets obstacles in institutionalisation because of the successive territorial reform since the 1960 decade (Estèbe et Le Galès 2003, p. 347). The hegemonic State, able to impose its vision and its strategy, from Haussmann in 1860 to Delouvrier in 1960, is over at the beginning of the 21st Century (Giblin, Papin et Subra 2001, p. 44). The question emerging then is where and how choices about Paris City-Region planning will be negotiated, and who will lead the definition of the choices.

7 Source : IAU IDF, 2014.

5


Tableau 1 – Actors system in planning in Paris City-Region in 2000 8

Politico-institutional Actors Technical Actors Socio-economical and associative

actors National level

The State Big private firms SNCF RFF

Regional level

Conseil régional d’Ile-de-Francel

Préfecture de région DREIF IAU IDF

RATP ADP

AUT IDF IDF Environnement

Infra-national level

City of Paris 7 départements

Intercommunalités communes

Epadesa Offices HLM

EPA (Plaine de France, Saclay, etc.)

CCIP

Legend:

One major issue in urban governance in Paris City-Region is the number of actors and institutions involved in planning policies (see Tableau 1). On regional territory, different levels of administration are involved in planning policies : 1281 communes (including 364 in unité urbaine de Paris, 124 in Petite couronne, 29 close to Paris), the City of Paris (commune and department), 7 Conseils départementaux, the Conseil régional, deconcentrated administration of the State (Préfecture de région and Préfecture de police de Paris) and the Central State. There are also the intercommunalités (EPCI and syndicats intercommunaux9) and particularly the Métropole du Grand Paris since 2016. So the use of the « millefeuille territorial » expression to describe this politico-administrative system with superposition of government levels. In 2016, there are 5 levels of local administration: this observation highlights the failures in simplification and efficiency aims of territorial reforms in the last years. Some public or semi-public actors (several établissements publics industriels et commerciaux (EPIC) as RATP, SNCF, RFF or the Agence foncière et technique de la région parisienne) as well as private actors (firms working for the technical syndicats, social landlords or real estate actors, big firms in housing construction sector) also contributes to planning (Lorrain 2003). Finally, interest groups representing firms begin to build a strategy in Paris City-Capital during the 2000 decade. The private sector, very divided until then, structure a common vision and action with the CCI Paris Ile-de-France, regional patronal syndicats like the MEDEF or the CGPME. Other interest groups are created to support international visibility and strategies of the firms: i.e. Paris Ile-de-France Capitale Economique, an association created by the CCI de Paris, representing big French and international firms, and wishing to develop foreign investments in Paris City-Region. The debates on Greater Paris project and the adoption in 2010 of a law aiming at creating a 30 billion euro public transport network contribute to the structuration of collective interests and strategy for firms, eager to be part of the construction and economic development projects.

8 This table is inspired by one made by Philippe Subra (Subra 2012, p. 9). 9 Some intercommunalités are very powerful like Plaine Commune (EPCI) with 8 cities in Northern Paris or specialised syndicats intercommunaux like the SIPPEREC for electricity distribution, the SEDIF for drinking water distribution system, the SIAAP for sanitary sewers and the SITCOM for waste processing.

6


2. Decentralisation of planning tools: the relative emergence of the regional actor as coordinator of planning policies since 2004

The Regional Council is a new territorial collectivity. It acquires new powers with decentralisation laws but still suffers from a weak political legitimacy contrary to the communes and the State. Sometimes called a « political dwarf »10, the regional authority would not have the means of its ambitions. But in the 2000 decade, the Region gains more regional power, defined as « la capacité politique dont disposent les régions pour orienter les principales séquences d’action publique en lien avec le développement économique, social ou culturel de leur territoire » (Pasquier 2012, p. 332). But this political capacity stays very framed and contrained by the State. This regional political capacity has two complementary dimensions: the ability to produce a common vision of the territory and an influence capacity of a coordination of political and economical interests at the regional level. I analyse the six variables in this regional power: the institutional resources, the economical resources, the identification logics, the territorial narrative, the relationship with the State and political leadership (Ibid.). POWERS TRANSFER IN TRANSPORT LEADERSHIP AND PLANNING CHOICES DEFINITION During the Trente glorieuses period, planning policy is indeed particularly central in national public action: the Welfare State aims at reducing territorial inequalities in the context of globalisation (Pasquier, 2012). But decentralisation affects regional power as the State transfers decisive powers to the Conseil régional d’Ile-de-France in the 1990’s. The regional authority takes profit in the decentralisation process to try to implement a function of “global animation of the metropolitan territorial regulation” (Béhar et Estèbe 1999). This animation function needs to get through the contruction of a project for the regional territory: it needs therfore to quit a counter logic to a project logic with an association and accompagnying of public and parapublics operators working with the Region. Regarding planning, a first initiative is in this logic: the creation of the Agence régionale de développement in 2001 in charge of the socio-economical development. Financed at 95% by the Regional Council, this agency establishes a partnership whith Commerce and Industry Chamberts (CCI) and départements. But it meets the reluctances of the CCI and few départements (particularly Hauts-de-Seine département) who fear a regional emergence in this field. Second of all, the ability to think and choose the objectives of its planning scheme, the SDRIF, after a 1995 law11, is for the first time implemented by the Regional Council who begins a revision process. The 1994 SDRIF revision begins in 2005, after 2004 regional elections when socialist majority wins its reelection. It ends with the adoption of a SDRIF project by the Regional Council in February 2007. This traditional planning tool, heritage of the jacobian and planificative era, gives political and technical orientations for two decades in housing, economic developments, environmental preoccupations, public and private transport infrastructures. The

10 This expression come from Philippe Dallier, a conservative Senator and Mayor in a town close to Paris: « Dallier : “La Région est un nain politique” », propos recueillis par Baptiste Etchegaray, Mégalopolismag, n°1, 15th February 2010. 11 See Pasqua law of the 4th February 1995.

7


SDRIF, prescriptive and prospective document, is then the major document for the regional planning, as all infra-documents have to respect its orientations. Third of all, the president of the Regional Council gets also in 2006 from the State the presidency of the Syndicat des transports d’Ile-de-France (STIF), and acquire a leading role in the coordination of public transport policies at the regional scale. The STIF has to coordonnate with the mayors all the public transports projects on all regional territory. Communes are indeed deeply involved in planning policies. This STIF management is a serious issue, as urban transports face liberalisation (Merley 2009). STIF regionalisation would facilitate a relative coherence in planning choices, as the Regional Council is in charge of its strategic planification choices (SDRIF). But this search of coherence is weakened by the State’s presence in choices definition (see part 3 and the SGP role). Finally, the Regional Council creates in 2007 a regional land institution (Etablissement Public Foncier régional) in relation with its housing policy. Its goal is a bigger action capacity on its territory in a very constrained land context12. These transfers of powers give formal leadership to the regional actor with tools in planning and public transport organisation. THE SDRIF REVISION: ACQUISITION OF EXPERTISE RESOURCES AND POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL LEGITIMACY The SDRIF revision procedure helps the Regional council winning a technical and political legitimacy in front of the other territorial collectivities of the region13. This legitimacy comes from the ability to build a common vision of the development of the region and an identity construction that is a regional power in its two dimensions. At the beginning of the 2000 decade, the Regional Council is politically weak because it lacks of powers, expertise and qualified staff, legitimacy, and sometimes can not decide because of an unstable political majority (Lefèvre 2003, p. 297). The SDRIF revision is an opportunity for the Council to become the leader of a regional vision construction, and to combine diverse positions from all the Parisian metropolis institutions (east/west, “petite couronne”/”grande couronne”). The SDRIF revision, firstly thought as a technical process, becomes a very political exercice (in the “politics” and not only “policy” meaning). It is indeed part of a triple interdependent process: the SDRIF revision in the context of a Region/State negociations over the Contrat de plan Etat/Région; a 2006 political iniative from the City of Paris of cooperation between mayors in the inner suburbs of Paris; the State’s role in planning policies from 2007. The SDRIF revision reveals the tensions in the majority at the Council between ecologists, communists and socialists. The socialist President Jean-Paul Huchon decides to give the vice-presidence in charge of the SDRIF revision to an ecologist representative, Mireille Ferri, to delegate a technical process in tune with ecologic themes. But the socialist group within the

12 At its creation, this political capacity is only in the eastern territory of the Region, as the Hauts-de-Seine, Yvelines and Val d’Oise conservative départements are not members. But décret 2015-525 du 12 mai 2015 suppress the land institutions of these departements, which are included in the regional land institution starting from the 1st January 2016. 13 The legitimacy gain is nevertheless fragile because the State is going to demolish regional ambition in 2007 and in 2008 with the creation of a new administration at the heart of the governement, in charge of the exact same mission as the regional Council with a project definition for the regional territory (See part 3).

8


Council fears the debates dynamic implemented by Mireille Ferri and her team, whereas political equilibrium within the majority is not solid. Tensions appear between ecologists and socialists about the ambition of the SDRIF revision, the procedure method, and finally about the planning choices. Some socialist representatives (including socialist mayors of big cities) fear choices they are not ready to assume. This might be paradoxical as the debated choices look like the technocratical vision of the Equipment Ministry and then are not new. But its discourse is not yet shared by local representative. Mireille Ferri’s team engages the revision procedure in this tense context with ambition and energy. She decides to unite actors through a consultative process to stand out from the last revision process led by the State in the beginning of the 1990 decade when the State imposes its choices to local elected representatives (Buchet de Neuilly 1997)14. The revision process creates a dynamic within the team in charge of the process with an ambition: make the Regional Council emerge as an essential interlocutor for the State. They choose to associate largely the public and private actors of planning and try to avoid strategical and politically biased issues. Civil associated is represented mostly by the Conseil économique et social régional, but also by associations, big firms, regional federations. The SDRIF revision process forces the Regional Council to gain expertise resources. With its new powers, the Regional Council experiences at first the lack of human resources. In 2004, it is not ready for the revision. Nothing has been prepared in the last socialist mandate (1998-2004) even if the Regional Planning and Urbanism Institute, the IAU IDF has been conducting some research. Local representatives are neither familiar with these new powers. The Regional Council is until then « a very small structure with significant financial resources supporting projects of the territorial collectivities in the region », as the head of cabinet of the regional president15. Second of all, there is no political framing for the revision process. Mireille Ferri has “carte blanche” and wants to end the revision process before the presidential election of 2007 to avoid political battle in a region where many regional representative are linked to central power. With the revision process, regional services grow and train for three years. Around 20 000 contributions by citizens, associations and federations are produced, hundred of meetings are organised throughout the Region. Hundred of documents are produced to help the local reprensentatives to participate. For three years, local representatives and administrative staff build an expertise capacity on planning issues and build also a stronger regional image through concertation with local representatives and civil society. This revision process helps the Regional Council to emancipate from the State’s supervision and emerge as the planning policies coordinator. Although not interested at first by the process, the President of the Regional Council realises that the SDRIF revision has a political potential as a symptom of decentralisation: the Regional Council is able to show how it can take charge of its future. A VERY RELATIVE AUTONOMY OF THE REGIONAL ACTOR The Regional Council as weak institutional and economic resources. Limited financial resources in comparison to other collectivities The regional Council resources are the highest in Europe (Pasquier 2004). But they are lower than City of Paris resources, and the difference is bigger in resources per inhabitant. Figures 2

14 The ambition of the 1994 SDRIF is to stop urban sprawling as public transport system face high issues and as environmental issue emerge (Lefèvre 2003). 15 Interview conducted on the 25th May 2011.

9


and 3 show investment and operating costs for City of Paris, Regional Council (CRIF) and the three departements of the Petite couronne. As total mounts (figure 2), Regional expenses are slightly lower that City of Paris’ one, in 2008 as in 2013, whereas its expenses amount grows more quickly.

Figure 1 – Paris, Departements of Hauts-de-Seine, Seine-Saint-Denis and Val-de-Marne, and Regional Council expenses / Investment (« investissement ») and operational (« fonctionnement ») costs in million euros in 2008 and 2013 16

The Regional Council gets nevertheless a higher investment capacity than the City of Paris which support high operating costs. When regarding the expenses amount per inhabitant, the difference is higher because there are 2 million inhabitants in Paris and 12 million inhabitants in the Regional Council (figure 3).

Figure 2 - Paris, Departements of Hauts-de-Seine, Seine-Saint-Denis and Val-de-Marne, and Regional Council expenses / Investment (« investissement ») and operational (« fonctionnement ») costs in euros per inhabitant in 2008 and 2013

16 Source : tableau effectué par l’auteure. Données : DGCL - Comptes individuels des collectivités territoriales.

10


A political weakness toward the State and toward the City of Paris: a fragile regional identity Paris City-Region is a very singular region in France because of the proximity of the local representatives to central power. This proximity situation, as mayors have high possibilities of having acquaintances in the government, is an obstacle against cooperation between local elected. The regional Council gain of legitimacy is weakened by numerous powerful and autonomous local and national institutions, the City of Paris, the départements especially in the Petite couronne, and the State (Zylberberg 1992). The Region has difficulties in creating a regional identity disctinct from the Parisian identity. This search for a distinctive identity is dne « against » Paris as much as it uses Paris. As Simon Ronai writes, « il est encore plus étrange que la Région « Ile de France », qui pour les visiteurs du monde entier est totalement assimilée à Paris, épouse ces querelles et cherche à se doter à son tour d'une identité propre pour exister à côté, voire contre Paris alors que toutes les études, notamment celle du comité régional du tourisme, montrent la vanité de cette perspective » (Ronai 2007). The relations between the two institutions, although inegal, contentious and ambiguous, are necessary. They need to cooperate on definition and implementation of their public policies. This cooperation is easier when the political majorities are the same (common left coalitions in Paris and in the Region from 2001 to 2015). The regional Council finances projects from the Parisian Municipality. And the regional leadership and legitimacy ambitions are stopped by the return of the State in the definition of planning choices.

3. Recentralisation of planning powers: the Jacobian State return

In the meantime, the withdrawal of the State, represented by its regional Prefet, is relative since it keeps a direct role in regional planning through national planning operations17. And after a very short process of decentralisation, the State comes back in planning definition18. The President Nicolas Sarkozy’s discourses in 2007 on the necessity for the State to guide the local and regional actors in the capital’s planning lead to the creation in 2008 of a very centralised administration: the Secrétariat d’Etat au Développement de la Région Capitale, a mission administration within the central administration, prepares a massive urban project for Paris city-

17 These National planning operations (Opérations d’Intérêt National) are planning tools decided and implemented by the State: on a chosen and territory, the State preemt local representatives’ planning powers. OIN en Ile-de-France qui sont des opérations d’urbanisme où l’Etat préempte les compétences des élus locaux : deux OIN sont décidées en 2006 lors d’un CIACT dans les secteurs de la Seine-Amont et de Saclay 18 The expression is an echo to a famous expression from: Evans Peter B., Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (éd.), 1985, Bringing the State Back in, Cambridge University Press.

11


Region, formally voted by the Parliament in 201019. This direct recentralisation at the heart of the State of planning choices definition for a region (and not in its deconcentrated bodies like before) is a unique experience in the 5th Republic. It leads to huge political tensions between the local elected representatives and the Minister in charge of the project on an institutional but not a partisan basis. THE ELABORATION OF AN ALTERNATIVE PLANNING PLAN IN THE GOVERNMENT: THE STATE AGAINST THE REGIONAL COUNCIL

An alternative project thought within the governement The State comes back in the regional planning choices definition in the Ile-de-France region from 2007, but not only within its Regional prefecture (deconcentrated administration). After voluntarist discourses from the President Nicolas Sarkozy in 2007, a Secrétariat d’Etat au développement de la Région capitale is created within the government in 2008. This mission administration is first under supervision of the Ministry of Ecology, Energy, Sustainable development and planning, and second under the supervision of the Prime Minister. This administration in place for two years (2008-2010) is unique in 5th Republic history. The President of the Republic criticises indeed the lack of ambition of the SDRIF project and affirms the necessity for the Region Ile-de-France, and moreover for the Nation’s interests, of the State’s implication. The ability of the Regional Council to take in charge its planning leading lines, and a fortiori decentralisation, is seriously questioned. The State through its Secrétariat d’Etat elaborates a meta-project with an idea20: give to Paris the infrastructures needed in a global competitive economy within world cities (London, New York, Tokyo). This main idea is divided into two framing principles: first, economic development must be encouraged through clusters development (and first airports and scientific research leading in State’s discourses to innovation and competitivity); and second, the clusters need to be linked by a public transport network which would then avoid Inner Paris. This meta-project is not thought only in Secrétariat d’Etat’s offices. It is the result of numerous interactions with planning actors in the region (led in a secret way). The balance of powers tips nevertheless in favour of the State until 2010, with a project which attracts more and more mayors wishing to get a train station in their town. The Secrétariat d’Etat’s works, implemented by about 40 people under direction of Christian Blanc, end by the adoption in 2010 of a law creating a tubular public transport network around Paris, whose drawing links several clusters in key economic sectors in a globalised economy (culture, finance, research and development, creation’s economy…). The law creates thus two new institutions. The Société du Grand Paris (SGP), an Etablissement public, is the public transport network project manager and the Etablissement public Paris-Saclay is the project manager of the planning of a Research, higher education and innovation cluster in the south-west of the region. This urban project of around 30 billion euros in 2010 confirms the State’s role in regional planning with a State’s representatives’ majority in their surveillance councils.

19 See on the definition of a mission administration : (Pisani 1956). In a government, there are Ministries, and within Ministries can be created Secrétariat d’Etat which are then second in the government hierarchy. 20 On Meta-project concept, see (Pinson 2009).

12


Figure 3 Map of the Greater Paris Express Public Transport Network in 2015 / Société du

Grand Paris

The result of this governemental work is a high concurrence between the Regional Council and its Arc Express project in the SDRIF and the State and its planning project called réseau de transport du Grand Paris. Tensions between the Regional Council and the State over their respective planning project The Regional Council looses in action capacity with a geographically close Central power and its new planning tools who can impose its views, negociate with the City of Paris without the Regional Council and stop the regional project. The SDRIF revision process is in point of fact stopped by the State from 2008 to 2010. Once voted by the Regional Council, the document must be transferred by the Prime Minister to the Conseil d’Etat for formal approval. But the Prime minister refuses to transfer the document as the Secrétariat d’Etat is working on an alternative project. The Secrétariat d’Etat’s mission is a global planning project for the region capital, that is to say the exact same SDRIF’S purpose. The two institutions fight over planning objectives, i.e. in housing or economic growth objectives (Subra 2009)21. The Regional Council is resentful toward the State’s project. Although regional staff has been gaining expertise on technical issues, it is judged as not enough ambitious nor capable. The relationship between Jean-Paul Huchon, President of the Regional Council and Christian Blanc,

21 See on that subject Chapter 16 of Philippe Subra’s book Le Grand Paris, named « pourquoi la région et l’Etat s’opposent-ils sur le projet de schéma directeur ? ».

13


Secrétaire d’Etat, are very cold and quasi-inexistant from the beginning. Only a few month after Christian Blanc’s arrival, he and his team have to let know their remarks on the SDRIF projet priorly to the vote in the Regional Assembly. But the Secrétariat d’Etat does not give its remarks before the deadline on the 10th September 2008 and ask for a vote delay. But “that was totally impossible politically” explains Jean-Paul Huchon Chief of Staff22. The Regional Council adopts the SDRIF Project by a vote on the 25th September 2008 without the State’s formal opinion on the project. Then the préfet de région announces strong reserves wereas Prime Minister François Fillon reproches the Regional Council for a « vision d’une région urbaine en recul, en repli, qui n’est pas celle d’une métropole du plein emploi », and deplores « le manque d’ambition économique » du projet de schéma directeur » (Subra 2009, p. 103). The State and the Region have two diverse political logics: on one side competitivity with strong interest in assets of the Region (La Défense, research and innovation,airports) and on the other side a will to defend living environment (fight against territorial and social inequalities, fight against pollution, environment preservation). After this episode begins a total breakdown between the State and the Regional Council until May 2009 (wether it is representatives or administration). In a meeting at the Presidential House in June 2009, Jean-Paul Huchon asks for consideration of forgotten territories (Cergy-Pontoise, the Seine’s valley, the ville nouvelle de Sénart, and so on), wereas the State asks for lowering some objectives in the SDRIF (Ibid., p. 105). On the 13th July of 2009, an agreement is signed between the two institutions: it gives precisions over modalities of Sdrif transfer to the State after a revision of four points (like the growth objective and the number of housing constructions). But this negociation is not accepted by the Regional Council, because at the same time is presented the first version of the projet de loi from the Secrétariat d’Etat. Strong negociations follow during the summer (inside cabinet and inside the council) to work on the projet de loi. A lot of regional representatives still have illusion of equality with the State. But the Regional Council realizes soon enough that it is powerless in front of the Parliament: as « we had no chance to get through this » explains the chief of Staff of the socialist group in the Regional Council, a compromise process with the State is necessary to negociate each point of the law’s project23. The SDRIF ‘s project, adopted in September 2008, waits for several months before its transmission to the Conseil d’Etat, as the State waits for the law on the Greater Paris’ approval. The Regional Council decides in October 2009, with a large majority (socialistes, communists, Ecologists, leftist radicals, centrists), to demand to its President a request to the Conseil d’Etat for approval of its SDRIF’s project. It finally in June 2010, after the law on the Greater Paris’ vote than the document, now inadapted to the new legal dispositions, is transmitted to the Conseil d’Etat. The Conseil d’Etat asks therefore to the Regional Council to revise the document again to take into account the law’s demands. This situation leads to legal uncertainty. As the SDRIF’s project need revision, the 1994’s SDRIF is still legal. All new local planning documents (PLU, SCOT) in the region must respect the 1994’s SDRIF objectives. Furthermore, some planning projects are bloqued or meet compatibility problems (Roissy area for instance, elaboration of the PDU by the STIF in November 2010). Theses tensions between the Regional Council and the State over leadership in planning definition are favourable to the State. It keeps the agenda’s control and forces the Regional Council to adapt to its priorities even if it can not impose on a unilateral way its views. Those tensions show also a remaining attachement to this traditional planning tool, the planning scheme wchich keeps a symbolic role in leadership affirmation. It is paradoxical as a planning

22 Interview with Jean-Michel Thornary, 25th May 2011. 23 Interview with Sarah Proust, 25th May 2011.

14


document without operationnal resources does not arbitrate much: “the key decision makers are often market actors themselves” (Wiel 2011, p. 211). A recentralisation led by economical and political ambition: « Paris is France » It is paradoxical to analys this return to a classical, ascendant, hierarchical form of government, as the new referential of the 1980 and 1990 decades had led to the project logic with collective action instead of planification by an “elightened” State’s administration (Oblet, 2005). The State contributes anew to urban governance of planning policies in Paris City-Region. But why the State chooses to be back? I argue that it is a jacbin referential that guides the State’s action toward its capital: “Paris is France” and the State, for the Nation’s interests, must be ambitious for the region capital’s development. After decades of planning policies rebalancing developments in favour of regional metropolises, the aim is to focus on higly competitive area. As development goes to development, it is by the Parisian metropolis that the State seeks to secure its place in global economic competition. Ile-de-France Region is indeed the economic engine of the whole country with 1/3 of national GDP. The State does not trust the ability of local representative to build the sufficiant conditions for a dynamic economic development (high level infrastructures, clusters) leading to increasing international investments. It is not for financial nor fiscal reasons that the State recentralise planning powers because the State’s project is more expensive than the regional one. In an economic crisis context, the massive urban project’s financing is nevertheless difficult. Estimated to around 30 billion euros in 2010, the sources of funding are highly problematic24. But the State expects between 100 and 140 billion euros of investments until 2030 in transport, housing and planning sectors (Estimation of the CCI). A CONFLICTED RECENTRALISATION WITHIN THE STATE This recentralisation is not consensual and several tensions appear inside first within the government, and second with the prefecture de region. Tensions within the governement This recentralisation of Paris City-Region planning within the Government meets obstacles because the project is in its nature interministerial. Within the Central administration, several Ministries and General directions are working on issues related to the Greater Paris project (as the DGITM, direction générale des infrastructures, des transports et de la mer, the DGALN, direction générale de l’Aménagement du Logement et de la Nature within the Ministry of Ecology and Sustainable Developement). Christian Blanc chooses to ignore planning projects elaborated in some central administrations to keep an innovation capacity. 22 interministerial meetings are organised on the project, three presided by the Prime Minister and one by the

24 The local representatives fear State’s dismissal as it already lower its charges transfer in direction of territorial collectivities. The law on the Greater Paris plans a public transport’s network financing by the State (a 4 billion euros funding in total, a billion a year) and recourse to borrowing. In the meantime, the SGP receives resources from local taxes444F. Read VINCENDON Sybille, « La Société du Grand Paris aurait-elle trop d’argent ? », on her blog Grand Paris et petits détours, article du 31 août 2012.

15


President. This interministerial characteristic of the project increases the difficulty of elaboration. Regarding relations between the Secrétariat d’Etat and its supervisor Ministry, the relationship is not good either. The fact that the Secrétariat d’Etat is first under supervision of the Ministry of Sustainable Development and not the Interior Ministry points out that a territorial reform is not a priority. Jean-Louis Borloo’s Ministry gives at first resources to the Secrétariat d’Etat for its installation and a good cooperation begins. But soon tensions occur. Christian Blanc wishes to work in autonomy, in direct relation to the President and the Elysée but Jean Louis Borloo and its cabinet demand to be associated to the works to balance the given financial resources. The economic and social context changes with the subprimes crisis in October 2008 and the financial question becomes an issue: expenses lower, and transport projects are not the priority anymore. In 2009, the Prime Minister becomes the supervisor of the Secrétariat d’Etat. But here again, the relationship between Christian Blanc and François Fillion is not good. The Prime Minister tries to take into account the anger of local reprentatives afraid of a questioning of their powers in planning. The Prime minister has great difficulty in finding its role between Christian Blanc and the Elysee, in a general context of tensions with Nicolas Sarkozy, the “hyper-président”. The Greater Paris project is indeed directly managed by the Elysee. Created by and for the President, the Secrétariat d’Etat is directly accountable to the President, through the Secrétaire général de l’Elysée Claude Guéant. Tensions between the Secrétariat d’Etat and the Préfecture de Région After the decentralisation, the Préfet de région is the main State’s representative in the region. The creation of the Secrétariat d’Etat leads to an original situation where the Central Stae disputes to the deconcentrated State the elaboration of leading principles of planification, in relation to the mayors and the Regional Council. Those two years (2008-2010) shows the hesitations of the State toward its organisation and powers repartition. The difficulty is in aggregating three issues: the necessity to come to a decision, the relevance of a vast consultation of all planning actors and the respect of local autonomy. In this context, the cooperation issue between the State, the Regional Council and the City of Paris becomes essential, issue underlined in the name of the Secrétariat d’Etat chargé de la “région capitale” (Chemetov 2009). The fact that Christian Blanc’s relations with most of public actors involved in the Greater Paris project were bad suggest that his position within the actors configuration was almost impossible as the Secrétariat d’Etat was adding itself to numerous actors. His mission is in parallel of the Préfet de region, Daniel Canepa’s powers. They also meet the same obstacles: the necessity to consult the Prime Minister and several minister’s office, to consult also “high” local representatives, that means local representatives with high political power. As Pauline Pra writes, « si le préfet de la région Île-de-France est un proche de l’exécutif et du gouvernement, pour certains préfets en revanche, ce poste prestigieux dépend aussi inexorablement des directives gouvernementales » (Prat, 2012, p.286-287).

16


4. Towards a planning policies coordination by the Regional Actor, with a steering at a short distance government by the State (2010-2016)

Once again, paradoxical sequence opens in 2010, with a mix of different trends. The major change with the last sequence is the partnership logics from 2011 between the State, through its Prefet, and the regional actor. The State still contributes to planning through two processes: the first one in a negociation process with the Regional Council, and the second through a Steering at a short distance government of planning policies in Paris City-Region. A PARTNERSHIP STATE/REGION OVER PLANNING DECISIONS Partnership between the Sate and the Region is not new. But after the 2010 law vote on the Greater Paris and the suppression of the Secrétariat d’Etat au Développement de la Région Capitale soon after, a third phase begins with a will to build a parternership on planning issues: negotiations and compromises between the Conseil régional and the State, represented by its regional Prefet and a new institution in charge of the implementation of the public transport network, the Société du Grand Paris. The SGP and STIF partnership over public transport network building: a State led implementation After three years of damaged partnership between the State and the Regional Council, coordination starts again with two agreements State-Region signed on the 26th January 2011 and on the 26th May 2011 which plan a common public transport network, the Greater Paris Express (contraction of the regional “Arc Express” and the state “Greater Paris”). The network’s drawing counts 68 train stations on four new lines around Paris, which planning is detailed in Contracts of territorial development (new planning tool from the 2010 law on the Greater Paris). But the project is criticed by researchers who underlines the narrow analysis of Greater Paris issues in the SGP’s project: it is accused of ignoring urban research analysis with a project limited to a unique transport network (Bocquet 2009, p.48, Orfeuil, 2014, Delpirou 2014). Criticisms deal with the ability of such an expensive and massive transport network to answer the urban issues. The necessity of a joint reflexion on the rehabilitation of existing network and extension with new lines lead to several redefinitions of the project (Orfeuil, 2014). The issue of SGP and STIF articulation remains. The coordination issue between the Société du Grand Paris (SGP), planning manager of the new network, and the Syndicat des Transports d’Ile-de-France (STIF), in charge of the general definition of public transport in the region (new lines, but also reparations of existing lines) is relevant. In 2010, the SGP is not under supervision of the STIF. But the STIF, which is the authority in charge of transports on regional territory, must coordonnate with the SGP, the SNCF and the RATP the totality of transports projects. This is an essential role to avoid badly coordonnated networks, stations in a not suitable territorial position, leading to increased costs. The coordination issue is more largely concerning planning documents (SDRIF/ law on the Greater Paris and new Contracts of territorial development). A legal disposition stops the ambiguity since in 2013, Duflot law imposes to Contrats of territorial development to respect

17


SDRIF’s orientations. After a first sequence where regional institutions and tools are put aside by the arrival of the SGP and the Contract of territorial development, a sequence with meetings with the two institutions on coordination issues are frequently organised. But the SGP with staff coming from the Secrétariat d’Etat, and high public office in central administration is defending a higher expertise and a strong ability for innovation and effiscience. It is reluctant to obey to STIF’s methods and visions. A decree in 2015 clarifies the modality of association between the SGP and the STIF. The words of the decree let no doubts about the fact that the STIF was left aside the SGP works25. The SGP wants to go fast because the realisation agenda is thight with an ending horizon on 2023 in 2011 (2030 in 2016). A State leadership in State/region relations The State keeps a central position in planning policies with partnership in contractualisation (plan contract State/Region26) and strategic tools (National Interest Operations/National Interest Contracts). Horizontal relations between regional elected representatives and Regional prefecture are build (Pasquier 2012). The contracts State-Region are negociated by the State, through its Préfet de region, and the Regional Council to clarify common planning projects (social and territorial cohesion, roads network, public transports, sustainable development, territorial competitvity) and their financing for 6 years (2000-2006, 2007-2013, 2014-2020). The partnership is as a matter of fact a permanent negociation on objectives in Ile-de-France (when the State wants 200 000 apprentices in Ile-de-France in 2011, the Region says they will be 250 000 by the end of its mandate). The Regional Council tries to show it can be as ambitious as the State, but with State’s support. As Regional’s President chieff of Staff explains :

« Le réseau du Grand Paris, l’État ne peut pas le réaliser sans nous. Et nous, on peut pas réaliser notre plan de mobilisation des transports sans l’Etat. Donc l’État et la région Île-de-France se tiennent par la barbichette. Aucun des deux ne peut faire seul ce qu’il veut sur un territoire de cette taille là et de cette importance on va dire dans, dans, dans le fonctionnement de la métropole entière. Quel que soit le sujet dont on parle. On parle recherche : 40 % des chercheurs français sont en Île-de-France. On parle transport aérien : le n°1 français, il est à Roissy. On parle agriculture : la première région agricole c’est l’Île-de-France, parce que les céréaliers de Seine-et-Marne sont ceux qui font le blé avec lequel on fait le pain des français »27.

While Ile-de-France region is first in France in many sectors, regional ambitions equal national ambitions: the State and the Region have to get along well. From a massive opposition over planning and public transport networks divergences, partnership becomes inevitable. A STEERING AT A SHORT DISTANCE STATE In planning policies, a tripartite system emerges in the beginning of the 2010 decade. The regional Council becomes the coordinator of planning policies in the territory among public and private actors of planning policies, and particularly mayors. Mayors, and particularly City

25 See the Décret n° 2015-308 du 18 mars 2015 relatif à l'association du Syndicat des transports d'Ile-de-France aux missions de la Société du Grand Paris de conception et de réalisation du réseau de transport public du Grand Paris : https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000030375713 26 These Plan contracts are called Project contracts from 2007 to 2013. 27 Interview on the 25th May 2011.

18

https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000030375713


of Paris’s mayor, are keen on negotiating directly with the State. The State hesitates over the way to get into decisions, balanced between a call for more decentralisation and a call for more State’s financial and strategic engagement. After a direct recentralisation at the heart of Central Government, it is steering at a distance, at a very short distance. Neo-liberalisation does not mean the end of State and with New Public Management Tools, the State spreads competitive regulation principle. It is steering at a distance (“gouvernement à distance”); tax reforms (especially tax reforms), quasi normative monopolis, orientation of local policies via calls for tender, and increase of specialized agencies (Epstein, 2005, 2015). The State, through the Etablissements publics in which he has a majority representation, fixes strategic development orientations. It does so thus with several planning tools he controls. In 2015, 15 Operations of National Interest and six Contracts of National Interests are planned on Paris City-Region territory. Those Contracts of National Interest are signed by the Prime Minister and local reprentatives (the first one signed in June 2016). The State gives also 100 million euros in a calls for tender through its Programme des Investissements d’avenir for a promotion of Greater Paris Express train station neighbourhoods that the Préfet de région calls ‘true international hubs”. The Creation of a Métropole du Grand Paris (MGP) by the State: divide and better rule? In Ile-de-France region, planning technical issues and governance issues are tightly linked (Gilli et Offner 2008). Since the 1960 decade, the institutional issue becomes an « un enjeu majeur de la politique d’aménagement du territoire » as institutions reform is thought as a political leveredge in planning policy (Déloye 1997, p. 47). Institutional reform aiming at building metropolitan government are usually Central State’s matter (Lefèvre 2009). A territorial reform agenda is build from 2008 in a context of financial crisis to rethink territorial organisation in France particularly with stronger metropolies and regions, and more efficience of the territorial hierarchy (Pasquier, 2016). The idea of creating a Greater Paris institution, on a metropolitan territorial basis, met few support until 2007, even if it is part of debates over the Greater Paris issue. The obstacles are indeed numerous: politically risky, institutionaly constrained. But the territorial reform engaged by socialist government from 2013 leads to the creation of the Métropole du Grand Paris, on 1st January 2016 (after MAPTAM law of 2014 and NOTRe Law in 2015). This metropolitan intercommunalité, on the Petite couronne territory, sets up a metropolitan government of mayors (123 towns in the Petite couronne and 7 towns around) with four main powers: It is certain that the Regional actor, which could be the metropolis on a geographical basis, is thus challenged on the top by the planning project led by the State, and by the bottom by the emergence of a metropolitan institution leaded by mayors willing to intervene in planning. This reluctance of the Regional Council against the emergence of another massive territorial collectivity eager to intervene in planning lays down on one observation: the metropolitan dynamic is usually more favourable to metropolises than regions in balance of powers between metropolises and their region (Béhar in (Pasquier et Lemouzy (eds.) 2013). Metropolises and regions relations are often complex and conflicting: the legal and political metropolization opposes the affirmation process of regions28. But the hypothesis of Daniel Béhar is that on

28 See on that subject the n°96 of the review Pouvoirs locaux who explores regions and metropolises articulations (Pasquier et Lemouzy (eds.) 2013).

19


public action coordination matters, the regional actor is relevant: it becomes the accurate level for a « mise en système » of all levels of public action (Béhar, dans Ibid., p. 46‑47)29. As a matter of fact, Valérie Pécresse, the new conservative President of the Regional Council, follows its predecessor mantra about the fact that the Region is the Metropolis. The regional perimeter is thus the “good scale” to coordinate action from all the territorial collectivities in Ile-de-France as it is similar to Tokyo, London, Chinese Cities with more than 10 million inhabitants. She also explains that the role of the Regional Council is double: a strategic role for the whole territory, and a role in lowering the inequalities gap. She asks then for a suppression of the MGP, which is nonsense without airports areas, research clusters, and economic areas (Saclay, Marne-la-Vallée, Cergy-Pontoise and Roissy are aside MGP’s territory)30.

Tableau 2 – Actors system in planning in Paris City-Region in 201631

Politico-institutional Actors Technical Actors Socio-economical and

associative actors National level

The State Big private firms SNCF

SNCF Réseaux Regional level

Conseil régional d’Ile-de-Francel

Préfecture de région DRIEA SGP STIF

GRAND PARIS AMENAGEMENT IAU IDF

RATP Paris Aéroport

AUT IDF IDF Environnement

Infra-national level

City of Paris 7 départements

MGP Intercommunalités

communes

Epadesa Offices HLM

EPA (Plaine de France, Paris Saclay etc.)

CCIP

PARIS ILE-DE-FRANCE CAPITALE ECONOMIQUE

Legend:

The loose of centrality of the State in local interests’ management is thus an « intermède historique » (Epstein 2013). But the Steering at a distance model of government emerging in the 1990 and 2000 decades in several public policies (as urban renewal for instance) does not qualify the State’s role in Ile-de-France. Paris City-Region remains an exceptional territory for the State, with a particular status (even if territorial reforms of 2014 and 2015 constitutes an exception with an inclusion of Paris in territorial reform). It is therefore a vast issue: what place and role for the State in a decentralized system, in a region capital. The State is, and more and more, an “Etat aménageur” (Marcou, 2010) which defends its ability to suitably treat

29 Il conclut l’article par un vœu : « Entre espace métropolitain et processus de métropolisation, entre pertinences absolue et relative, entre logique de complémentarité et logique de mise en système, ce sont des formes d’interpellation réciproque entre régions et métropoles qui seront nécessaires et qui pourraient davantage politiser la scène territoriale. En espérant qu’en regard de ce défi, les métropoles ne céderont rien à la tentation hégémonique ! » (p.47). 30 Sentiments revealed in La Tribune, 30th June 2016. 31 This table is inspired by one made by Philippe Subra (Subra 2012, p. 9).

20


complexity (in mobility issues for instance). If the State is not the principal planning actor anymore with decentralisation and the growing power of private actors32, it has access to several tools allowing it to play the role of « ensemblier de référence ». This role lays down on general interest defence, certainly shared with local representatives, but with a broad outlook that the State judges decisive against political and financial interests from the territorial collectivities.

Conclusion

The analysis of decentralisation/recentralisation processes in planning policies in Paris City-Region from 2004 to 2016 show the game of dupes in decentralisation processes. The State acts as if he was aside planning policies, local representatives act as if they were able to decide and implement alone. The article highlights then three specific sequences that show the emergence of interdependences between the State and local representatives in planning policies, especially the Regional Council and the mayors. The State emerge as a strategic and planning State with an impetus power and resources distribution ability in planning policies. After a very unique period of Parisian planification recentralisation within the government from 2008 to 2010, the following model is more close to a steering at a distance model, but a very close distance, since central administration, and not only deconcentrated administration, is regularly part of planning decisions in Ile-de-France. The local representatives are also limited in their political capacity even if the State cannot impose any institutional support without a minimal support. After a short decentralisation process with the transfer of the power of revision of its plan, the Regional Council experiences soon the limits of its growing legitimacy and expertise in front of the will of the State to remain a leading actor. Is the case analysed in this monography unique because of the strategic status of capital and World City in France? Or is it a more massive trend with a State identifying some key sectors to support directly from the government even if the relevant powers are already decentralised?

Références

AUST Jérôme, CRESPY Cécile, EPSTEIN Renaud and REIGNER Hélène, 2013, « Réinvestir l’analyse des relations entre l’État et les territoires », Sciences de la société, 90, 3-21. AUST Jérôme, CRET Benoît, 2012, « L'État entre retrait et réinvestissement des territoires. Les Délégués régionaux à la recherche et à la technologie face aux recompositions de l'action publique», Revue française de sociologie, vol. 53/1, p. 3-33 BEAL Vincent, 2014, « “Trendsetting cities” : les modèles à l’heure des politiques urbaines néolibérales », Métropolitiques, 30 juin. BEHAR Daniel et ESTEBE Philippe, 1999, « L’Ile-de-France, exception ou laboratoire ? », Pouvoirs Locaux, mars 1999, no 40. BEVIR Mark, 2010, «Interpreting Governance», in BEVIR Mark (ed.), Handbook of Governance, Sage. BEZES Philippe, LE LIDEC Patrick, 2010, « L’hybridation du modèle territorial français. RGPP et réorganisations de l’État territorial », Revue française d’administration publique, 4, 136, pp. 919-942.

32 Several planning operations are build without State’s approval.

21


BORRAZ Olivier, 2003, « 5. Le leadership institutionel » dans Andy Smith et Claude Sorbets (eds.), Le leadership politique et le territoire : Les cadres d’analyse en débat, Presses universitaires de Rennes, p. 125‑143. BRENNER Neil, 2004, New State Spaces: Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood, Oxford University Press. BUCHET DE NEUILLY Yves, 1997, « Chapitre 6. Mobilisations autour de l’aménagement urbain. Luttes territoriales et prégnance de logiques sectorielles » dans Daniel Gaxie (ed.), Luttes d’institutions. Enjeux et contradictions de l’administration territoriale, Paris, L’Harmattan, p. 295. DAHLSTRÖM C., PETERS B. G., PIERRE J. (eds), 2011, Steering from the Centre: Strengthening Political Control in Western Democracies, University of Toronto Press. DELOYE Yves, 1997, « Chapitre 1. L’aménagement du territoire en débats. L’imaginaire d’une politique publique » dans Luttes d’institutions. Enjeux et contradictions de l’administration territoriale, Paris, L’Harmattan, p. 23‑48. DUPUY Claire, POLLARD Julie, 2014, « A Dethroned King? The Limits of State Infrastructural Power in France », Public Administration, 92/2, pp. 359-374. DURAN Patrice, THOENIG Jean-Claude, 1996, « L’État et la gestion publique territoriale », Revue française de science politique, 46/4, pp. 580-623. ESTEBE Philippe et LE GALES Patrick, 2003, « La métropole parisienne : à la recherche du pilote ? », Revue française d’administration publique, 2003, vol. 3, no 107, p. 345‑356. EPSTEIN Renaud, 2005, « Gouverner à distance. Quand l’État se retire des territoires », Esprit, 319, pp. 96-111. EPSTEIN Renaud, 2015, « La gouvernance territoriale : une affaire d’Etat. La dimension verticale de la construction de l’action collective dans les territoires », L'Année sociologique, vol.65/2. GAXIE Daniel (ed.), 1997, Luttes d’institutions : enjeux et contradictions de l’administration territoriale, Paris, L’Harmattan (coll. « Logiques juridiques »), 295 p. GIBLIN Béatrice, PAPIN Delphine et SUBRA Philippe, 2001, « Paris/Londres : enjeux géopolitiques de villes capitales », Hérodote, 2001, vol. 101, no 2, p. 26‑56. GILLI Frédéric et OFFNER Jean-Marc, 2008, Paris, métropole hors les murs. Aménager et gouverner un Grand Paris, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 186 p. HEINELT Hubert, KÜBLER Daniel (ed.), 2005, Metropolitan governance, Routledge. JESSOP Bob, 2016, The State: Past, Present, Future, Polity Press. JOUVE Bernard, 2005, «From Government to Urban Governance in Western Europe: A Critical Perspective», Public Administration and Development, vol. 25, n° 2. JOUVE Bernard et LEFEVRE Christian, 1999, « De la gouvernance urbaine au gouvernement des villes. Permanence ou recomposition des cadres de l’action publique en Europe ? », Revue française de science politique, 1999, vol. 49, no 6, p. 835‑853. LE GALES Patrick, 2011, Le Retour des villes europeennes : societes urbaines, mondialisation, gouvernement et gouvernance, Presses de Sciences Po, seconde édition. LE GALES Patrick, LASCOUMES Pierre (eds), 2004, Gouverner par les instruments, Presses de Sciences Po. LE GALES Patrick, 1995, « Du gouvernement des villes à la gouvernance urbaine », Revue française de science politique, 45/1, pp. 57-95. LE LIDEC Patrick, 2007, « Le jeu du compromis : l’État et les collectivités territoriales dans la décentralisation en France », Revue française d’administration publique, 121-122, 1-2, pp. 111-130. LEFEBVRE Henri, 1972, Le droit à la ville 2. Espace et politique, Éditions Anthropos (coll. « Société et urbanisme »). LEFEVRE Christian, 2003, « Chapitre 17. Paris - Ile-de-France region » dans Metropolitan governance and spatial planning, Spon Press, p. 287‑300.

22


LORRAIN Dominique, 2003, « Gouverner «dur-mou» : neuf très grandes métropoles », Revue française d’administration publique, 2003, no 3, p. 447–454. MARCOU Gérard, 2010, « La loi sur le Grand Paris, le retour de l’Etat aménageur », AJDA, 11 octobre 2010, no 33, p. 1868. NEGRIER Emmanuel, 2005, La question métropolitaine: les politiques à l’épreuve du changement d’échelle territoriale, Presses universitaires de Grenoble. PASQUIER Romain, 2012, Le pouvoir régional : mobilisations, décentralisation et gouvernance en France, Presses de Sciences Po. PASQUIER Romain, 2004, La capacité politique des régions: une comparaison France-Espagne, Presses universitaires de Rennes. PASQUIER Romain et LEMOUZY Laurence (eds.), 2013, « Métropoles et régions : quelles règles du jeu ? », Pouvoirs Locaux, 2013, vol. 1, no 96. PASQUIER Romain, SIMOULIN Vincent, WEISBEIN Julien (eds), 2013, La Gouvernance territoriale. Pratiques, discours et theories, L.G.D.J., seconde édition. PISANI Edgar, 1956, « Administration de gestion, administration de mission », Revue française de science politique, 1956, vol. 6, no 2, p. 315‑330. PINSON Gilles, 2009, Gouverner la ville par projet. Urbanisme et gouvernance des villes européennes, Presses de Sciences Po. PINSON Gilles, 2010, « La gouvernance des villes françaises », Métropoles, mis en ligne le 14 juin 2010. RONAI Simon, 2007, « SDRIF : conflits géopolitiques en Ile de France », Urbanisme, janvier 2007, no 352, p. 22‑26. SUBRA Philippe, 2012, Le Grand Paris : géopolitique d’une ville mondiale, A. Colin. SUBRA Philippe, 2009, Le Grand Paris, Paris, A. Colin. WIEL Marc, 2011, Le Grand Paris. Premier conflit né de la décentralisation, L’Harmattan, 236 p. ZYLBERBERG Laurent, 1992, De la région de Paris à l’Ile-de-France, construction d’un espace politique, Thèse pour le doctorat de science politique, Institut d’études politiques de Paris, Paris.

23

Documents

Planning Paris City-Region. The State’s role in mixed ...paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_55587.pdf · by a recentralization process which takes various forms. These observations